Coalition Formation and Portfolio Allocation in Brazil:
An Analysis on Portfolios and Roll Call Votes
in the Brazilian Congress

By

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Declaration of Authorship

I, the undersigned *Koichi Osamura*, hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the allocation of positions in the federal bureaucracy to affiliates of parties composing legislative coalitions and whether this distribution impacts how legislators behave when voting on bills. To understand this issue, I investigate the case of Brazil and the degrees of obedience of deputies in coalitions toward presidents, from 2001 to 2018, by examining how deputies behaved when voting for bills ($n = 987$) in roll call votes ($n = 497,065$). The dependent variable is obedience to a president, which is defined by whether the vote for a given bill followed the president's instruction. The independent variables are the share of positions given to the parties composing legislative coalitions and party ideology. This thesis aims to contribute to scholarship on the field of coalitions in multiparty presidential systems by expanding the traditional focus on portfolio positions and including positions that are in charge of operational tasks. The regression models show that the allocation of positions result in a general positive impact in obedience to presidents, following the findings from the literature in the field, but also advance scholarship by showing that party ideology is not relevant toward obedience.

Keywords: Coalitions, presidential systems, portfolio design, legislative behavior.

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1 Introduction

One of the main challenges in multiparty democracies is designing coalition agreements. In scenarios where heads of government do not count with majority in the legislative, they find themselves in possible situations of legislative stalemate. To solve this issue, they form coalitions with other parties by offering perks in exchange for support in the legislative (Bäck, Meier, and Persson 2009). These perks can be appointments to the bureaucracy, budget allocation to the constituencies of those willing to endorse the government, among others (Ames 1995; Pereira and Mueller 2004).

For decades, scholarship on the topic has discussed the structure of coalitions and how portfolios are allocated, as well as the weight of legislative support in different government, although with a predominant focus on parliamentary systems (Baron and Ferejohn 1987; Browne and Franklin 1973; Warwick and Druckman 2001). There are also distinct and well accepted theories on coalition bargaining and payoffs, debating qualitatively the portfolios that each party in a coalition will earn based on their relative power (Gamson 1961; Laver and Shepsle 1996). Nevertheless, in multiparty presidential systems, it is not clear whether appointments are effective on influencing negotiations not only toward legislative support or endorsement for those policies, but also on sustaining obedience toward presidents.

In fact, parties that compose a coalition also have their interests; it could be improving presence as a party to grasp votes in upcoming elections, participation in the policy-making process by defending partisan ideology, among others. Nevertheless, this relationship between what is being offered and the support that is exchanged for can lose its balance depending on the political situation that a country faces.

The concept of portfolio relates to upper-rank positions within an administration, such as ministers and others of similar policy-making attributions depending on the country (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Therefore, it is reasonable to find research focused only on portfolio design, considering the importance it has on policy formulation and execution. Due to the fact that non-policy-making positions do not hold significant importance to governments, they might not be considered relevant to scholarship in the field of coalition formation.

Still, in situations in which appointments quota for parties exist, these could be used as

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a bargaining chip that would involve a larger number of people and therefore satisfy requests from coalition allies. Thus, it is necessary to understand the impact of appointments to middle-ranking positions that are not in charge of policy-making nor have significant attributions to the executive power.

My goal is to empirically answer the following question: **How effective is the allocation of positions in the federal bureaucracy to coalition parties in ensuring coalition members to obey presidents?** To answer this question, I will investigate the relationship between appointments to the federal administration and the approval rates for bills of interest to the president, considering also the role of partisan and ideological fidelity.

I will examine the case of Brazil, ruled under a multiparty presidential system in which the governing party has never held legislative majority. Brazilian parties can appoint their affiliates to commissioned positions not only in leadership functions in executive bodies such as ministries, regulatory agencies, and other institutions in the federal bureaucracy, but also operative positions in charge of executing these policies. The country also has another distinct feature which relates to the large number of parties with representation in congress, making the formation and maintenance of coalitions with members from the same political spectrum rare to be achieved. As of 2022, the country counted with 22 parties in the Chamber of Deputies (equivalent to a Lower House). In other words, presidents need to count with the support of other parties, including those which at first glance would not be willing to do so.

The thesis is structured as follow: Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on coalition formation and portfolio design in presidential systems. Chapter 3 introduces the case study of this thesis, Brazil, with a thorough explanation on the structures that compose the National Congress. With a focus on the Chamber of Deputies, this chapter introduces not only its composition but also how the legislative procedure works – in other words, how laws are created. Chapter 4 discusses the theory and hypotheses, and the Chapter 5 explains the research design and methods used to test those hypotheses. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the analysis of the results and discussion, followed by a conclusion chapter that summarizes all implications of this study.

2 Literature Review

In this chapter, I will introduce the theories on coalition formation, portfolio design and appointments. There are, however, several concepts that are often exclusive to the Brazilian reality, therefore some context is necessary, which will be further developed in the next chapter.

2.1 Understanding coalitions in presidential systems

Parties and their members have distinct interests and goals. Strøm and Müller (1999) summarize three types of *seekers* in politics, which are vote-seekers, office-seekers, and policy-seekers, based on the rational choice theory established by Downs (1957). From a partisan perspective, they aim to maximize their goals, whether these are to aggregate more votes, secure the elections of more affiliates, or ensure the policies they defend are approved and implemented.

Nevertheless, Strøm and Müller (1999) theorize that parties fitting only one of these three categories might not exist, and instead present a unified behavior model. In fact, it can be said that these three categories are unified by interacting with one another; if a party's objective is to expand its reach and perpetuate in power, this party needs to show voters it is relevant to continue being elected, closing a cycle in which one category supports the other in continuance.

A similar pattern occurs with coalitions. Regardless of the type of government, in democratic countries, heads of government seek to maximize their chances of approving their policies by holding majority in the legislative power – whether parliament, congress, or assembly. This is done because these heads of government and their parties seek to remain in power, and therefore look for expanding the votes for the upcoming elections while aggregating more seats in the current legislature. Therefore, coalitions may also have their unified behavior, as proposed by Strøm and Müller (1999).

Scholarship on the formation and composition of coalitions often focuses on the hardships of ensuring accountability and protecting democratic institutions (Fortunato et al. 2021). Although research on this field is commonly concentrated on parliamentary regimes (Adams 2012; Angelova, König, and Proksch 2016; Fernandez-Vazquez and Somer-Topcu 2019; König et al. 2022; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik 2014; Warwick 2001), presidential regimes count with characteristics that may provide new perspectives on the studies of formation of coalition.

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One of the main features of parliamentary regimes, as pointed by Linz (1990), is the executive's dependency on the parliament. In other words, a very unpopular head of government can be cast out by a vote of confidence. Presidential regimes, as Linz (1990) continues, are based on fixed terms in which do not have the "confidence vote" feature as in parliamentary regimes. Nevertheless, Latin America shows many cases of informal non-confidence behavior, where presidents find themselves in long-lasting situations of legislative stalemate and cannot call for snap elections due to the fixed term of the legislature (e.g., Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008; Marsteintredet, Llanos, and Nolte 2013; Pérez-Liñán 2018).

Sieberer (2006) proposes to identify the foundations of party cohesion and obedience to heads of government in parliamentary systems. A governing coalition is subject to lower cohesion and obedience in comparison to opposition parties, despite the supply of goods that a head of government might be willing to provide in exchange for support (Sieberer 2006). Cohesion refers to whether the party members behave in unity, while obedience refers to whether these party members follow the voting instructions of the heads of government. Again, similar studies in presidential systems are not common. Meanwhile, Linz (1985) suggests that such lack of studies on presidential systems might be a result of the large number of violations against democratic institutions that those countries faced in throughout their history; thus, these countries were put aside whenever researchers carried comparative studies among democracies.

Several elements related to a country can influence how the regime is conducted and how powers are divided and interact among each other (Elgie 2005). Among these factors, composition of governmental cabinets is also a substantial matter of research (e.g., Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011; Laver 1998). Cabinets in multiparty systems are usually composed not only by the head of government's party but also by others who are forming a coalition, to seek governability and endorsement within the legislative and the approval of policies and bills (Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers 2011; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011).

Cabinets are structured on appointments to portfolio positions in charge of policy-making within the national bureaucracy to ensure that the government agenda is endorsed in the legislative (Sieberer et al. 2021; Verzichelli 2008). There are, however, instances in which the legislative power used this access to policy-making institutions as leverage to push more costly

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demands (Elgie 2016).

2.2   On portfolio design and appointments

Literature on portfolio design and cabinet formation is traditionally set on the concept that coalition members are interested in the number of upper rank positions, such as ministries, that they will earn in exchange for supporting the government (Carroll and Cox 2007). One of the most consolidated theories on portfolio formation refers to (Gamson 1961), who suggests a relationship of fairness according to each coalition party's seat share in the government (Carroll and Cox 2007; Ecker and Meyer 2019; Warwick and Druckman 2001). The "Gamson's Law" states that "Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition" (Gamson 1961, 376).

Among the critics that are already listed by the literature, there are studies that focus on the seat share rather than the voting weight (Browne and Franklin 1973), or how many votes it can gather to support the government (Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere 2005). The importance of portfolio positions impact the relationship between the government and the coalition members is also debated (Warwick and Druckman 2006). Nevertheless, it is still not clear the interest that parties have on other positions besides those from higher ranks, as well as other types of compensation (which may involve corruption) – which can be better observed in less stable democracies.

In general, presidents offer portfolio positions in the bureaucracy – whether in ministries, state-owned enterprises (e.g., natural resources management enterprises), or regulatory agencies (e.g., telecommunications or health agencies) – to earn support and form a coalition. Their goal is to sustain the policies that are crucial to their administration – or to halt, in case these are not in their interest (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Elgie 2016; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011). These positions, especially to upper-ranks such as ministries and heads of other branches within the bureaucracy such as state-owned enterprises, give the employed people the opportunity to be under the spotlight, take the lead in strategic policies and open doors for a future campaigns, whether in the local or national level (Pereira and Melo 2012; Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers 2011).

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There are several reasons that could explain the interests of center-positioned parties on accepting the offers that a president can make. The most common are appointments to positions within the federal bureaucracy that are not necessarily portfolio positions nor given to the upper ranks in the parties (Batista 2017). Scholarship on coalitions frequently discusses the impact of portfolio design and the qualitative importance that certain jurisdictions have in the negotiation process behind coalition formation, from the government's side or even based on how voters perceive this process (Bäck, Debus, and Dumont 2011; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Lin et al. 2017; Warwick and Druckman 2001). Even though there are also studies on salience of portfolios (e.g., Krauss and Kluever 2022; Warwick and Druckman 2006), little is known about the relevance of non-portfolio positions when negotiating and consolidating legislative support from coalition members.

A second reason that explains center-positioned parties' openness to compose coalitions with the president's party refers to the allocation of federal budget to the electoral districts those congresspeople belong to, which literature refers as *pork barrel politics* (Bernhardt, Dubey, and Hughson 2004; Lancaster 1986; Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers 2011; Samuels 2002). By doing so, they can promote local investments such as construction and renewal of infrastructure (e.g., sanitation and illumination facilities), parks, schools, or hospitals, to use these as leverage toward future election campaigns (Freitas 2011).

In Brazil, this allocation is done through amendments to the annual budget law, which is proposed by the president but discussed and adjusted by members of a extraordinary committee composed by members of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate (Batista 2017; Pereira and Mueller 2004). During this process, members of that extraordinary committee can propose – by themselves or representing congresspeople that do not belong to that committee – amendments to the budget bill. This can be used by governing congresspeople as leverage to secure policy support from other congresspeople whose stance is independent, or even in the opposition.

Nevertheless, perks in the format of portfolio appointments or budget allocation work differently than bribery (or other corruption format) since counterparts are necessary for the president to gain the necessary support to pass – or halt – bills that are crucial for the president. Such

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support is usually given as a bloc, and whereas congresspeople who prefer independence might exist, those who disobey voting instructions might be expelled from their party under infidelity claims (Marchetti 2012).

3 *Coalitional Presidentialism* and the case of Brazil

This chapter provides a background on the case to be study in this thesis, which is Brazil. It start by reviewing one of the best established political theories on the country, called *coalitional presidentialism*, and expands the politics behind appointments to the bureaucracy. Finally, the chapter explains the structure of the Brazilian Congress, which is the object of analysis, as well how policies are created, to provide a better understanding on the case.

3.1 *Coalitional presidentialism*

Brazil, although being a presidential system, experiences an unusual relationship between the executive and legislative powers with one often influencing and intervening in each other constitutional roles (Power 2010). It is a condition that could be called as *de facto* semi-presidential regime – not a actual semi-presidential regime as Duverger (1980) would define or Elgie (1999) would contest.

Although the head of government is still the president, the speakers of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate are able to grasp enough power to threat a presidential mandate through a combination of crony congresspeople and pork-barrel politics (Ames 1995; Lyne 2008; Samuels 2002). This can be observed from the power that the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies has in starting an impeachment procedure based on their discretion. While in theory impeachment procedures should be based on crimes committed by a president, in practice it can be started and voted upon securing the minimum votes needed to overthrow a president (Chalhoub et al. 2017).

This alternative and informal system, experienced in Brazil, is called *coalitional presidentialism*, and was firstly conceptualized by Abranches (1988), who observed the relationship between the executive and legislative powers in search for sustaining governability. Abranches (1988) theorizes that such system is a combination of a powerful president, a very fragmented multiparty system and undisciplined parties. Indeed, in Brazil, due to the large number of parties, it is improbable for the president's party to have majority in Congress, a situation in which policy approval could be undermined by the lack of support, thus making it necessary to establish coalitions in the legislative power (Freitas 2011).

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Coalitional presidentialism, therefore, is a regime characterized by the convergence of parties toward the president, which is usually done upon a series of presidential goods in exchange for support in the Congress (Limongi and Figueiredo 1998). This support can be either the approval of bills in which the president is interested in, or blockage of bills proposed by the opposition that would impact the administration in a way that is not desired by the president (Elgie 2016). These goods are the presidents' counterpart to the demands of parties willing to give their support, regardless of ideological or agenda-based position (Power 2010).

The first president elected by popular vote in Brazil after re-democratization in 1985 was Fernando Collor (1990-1992), and since then no other president's party alone was able to even reach 20% of seats in each House occupied by congresspeople from the same party as the president. When a president's party alone does not hold majority in the Congress, a coalition with other parties becomes inevitable to ensure minimum stability in the legislature and to avoid legislative stalemates (Cheibub 2007). Figure 1 shows the proportion of seats held by the president's party in the Chamber of Deputies, at the beginning (in red) and at the end (in blue) of their term[1].

Figure 1: Proportion of seats held by the president's party in the Chamber of Deputies

For this research, a new coalition will be considered to be formed upon admission or de-

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[1]Itamar Franco (1992-1994), who became president after his predecessor Fernando Collor was impeached, was not affiliated to any party during his administration. He left his party PRN (the same as Collor) when the investigations started, and remained unaffiliated. This is why Franco's coalitions in Figure 1 show zero deputies from the same party.

parture of one or more parties in the group that supports the president in the Congress within a presidential term or legislature, regardless of the period. This movement of admission and departure of parties can be explained by observing internal negotiations in each party, where formation of electoral alliances aiming for earning more votes in elections in other levels. This is why Figure 1 shows the variance in parties for both the start and the end of a presidential term, therefore also impacting in the legislative majority throughout a legislature.

In Brazil, a legislative coalition does not necessarily mean a pre-electoral alliance. A legislative coalition relates to the formation of alliances once the election results are announced and both the governing group and opposition parties start negotiating their composition for the upcoming legislature. Meanwhile, a pre-electoral alliance refers to agreements prior to the elections, in which parties organize themselves in groups aiming for a broader exposure in public advertisements[2] and consequent voter support and participation. Despite the existence of evidence on electoral alliances representing stronger coalitions in multiparty presidential systems (Borges, Turgeon, and Albala 2021), Figure 1 shows significant instances of decrease on the number of parties composing a coalition with the president after a coalition is formed.

Elections in Brazil are held every two years: elections for mayors and city councils are held every leap year; two years later, elections for president, senators and deputies, governors, and state councils. Therefore, there are cases in which parties decide to leave or join a nation-wide coalition (a coalition that is structured in the federal level involving the president's administration and members in the Congress) depending on the agreements toward elections in the municipalities[3]. Such agreements relate to the distribution of campaign budget as well as exposure time in the public advertisements that are part of the official campaign period (Power and Roberts 1995). There are also cases in which parties merge or split, depending on internal circumstances. Finally, there are cases in which parties are rivals in the national level but informal allies in the municipal or state levels, and vice-versa (Nicolau 1997; Pereira and Renno 2003).

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[2]The Brazilian electoral law establishes a specific time of public advertisements to be announced in all television and radio broadcasts, based on the number of seats a party holds in the House of Deputies in the current legislature. The total time is then shared among all candidates, therefore the larger an electoral alliance is, the more exposure time the candidates of the parties composing that alliance will have.

[3]The electoral legislation was changed in 2022 by instituting the *electoral federation*, in which parties also form alliances aiming for a larger result in the polls. The difference to the previous structure refers to the fact that now the alliance must last for four years and must be valid in the entire country. Therefore, a federation of parties cannot have two candidates running for the same seat in the executive power – e.g., a governor or a mayor.

Between 1990, when Fernando Collor was elected, and 2018, Brazil had six presidents, who governed with 30 different formal coalitions, having parties entering and leaving the governing bloc due to diverse reasons (CEBRAP 2022). Those who were elected for a second mandate (Cardoso, Lula, and Rousseff) have two insertions each. The different colors represent the parties they belonged by the time of inauguration. Fernando Collor was impeached after two years in power, being substituted by Itamar Franco (1992 to 1994); and that Dilma Rousseff (2011 to 2016) was impeached during her second mandate, being substituted by Michel Temer (2016 to 2018), who remained in power for two years.

To better visualize how coalitions worked alongside the presidents and their parties, Figure 2 shows the composition of the Chamber of Deputies between 1990 and 2018. The red line represents the total seats that a coalition had at the beginning of a coalition while the blue line represents the total seats that the president's party had at the same period, and both numbers are represented by the left-side Y-axis. The gray line shows the number of parties that composed a coalition, with values shown in the right-side Y-axis. In this plot, each entry means a change in the coalition – i.e., a new party arrives or another leaves.


Figure 2: Distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, by coalition

As theorized by Abranches (1988), the composition of such coalitions seldom relies on ideology and instead is more frequently based on the benefits that coalition members would earn by joining the president's support group (Ames 2002). Thus, this would contradict what

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literature on formation of coalitions traditionally states regarding the struggle in sustaining party ideological positions (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013). It can also be seen as an over-saturated version of the *office-seeking party* theory (Budge and Laver 1986; Strom 1990), in which many parties change their ideological stances to adapt to the president's party and therefore earn more goods and few remain more consistent with their position (Zucco and Power 2021).

Borges and Ribeiro (2021) show that countries with strong presidents have their congress or parliament composed by parties with lower cohesion on ideological grounds, making it possible for presidents to obtain legislative support. Thus, the alignment between executive and legislative powers through formation of coalitions is crucial from the point of view of the congresspeople, who want to secure a place under the governmental sun (i.e., portfolio appointments or budget allocation to their electoral districts) and to stand out before voters and secure a new vote in future elections (Simonovits 2017; Fortunato, Silva, and Williams 2018; Fortunato et al. 2021). This can also explain the frequency in which politicians in Brazil change parties, reinforcing the perception of low cohesiveness among parties.

Although commonly blamed by voters, media, and the politicians themselves, *coalitional presidentialism* has been present in the Brazilian political affairs since re-democratization (Power 2010), and often ensured governance toward the president and incumbent party. This system can also work against the government, and it is clearly witnessed when the cost charged (i.e., the types of benefits that those who enter the coalition seek in exchange for support) by those parties that compose the coalition increase and the president cannot manage it anymore. For instance, during the second term of President Dilma Rousseff (2015 – 2016), the combination of very disobedient coalition members and pressure from the markets led to her impeachment and later removal from office under accusations of creative accounting and violations of fiscal law (Chalhoub et al. 2017). As observed in Figure 2, Rousseff had four different compositions in the governing coalition in one month, due to the fact that parties were leaving one after another.

Even though these were not considered crimes (in the realm of the criminal law), since impeachment procedures are decided in Congress rather than the Supreme Court, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha (who belonged to the same party as the Vice Pres-

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ident), was able to gather enough support to approve the impeachment process, resulting in a political trial (Pereira and Coêlho 2016). One of the considered reasons for Cunha to allow the impeachment process to begin refers to unsuccessful negotiations toward his own trial regarding accusations of corruption; since Rousseff and her party did not agree with his support, he retaliated by accepting the impeachment request (Chalhoub et al. 2017).

Despite several efforts on maintaining support through allocation of appointments, Rousseff was not able to secure majority within the coalition, and eventually the impeachment procedure was opened. This goes against to what Linz (1990) stated about executive power not being sharable in a presidential regime, and beyond the understanding of Cheibub, Przewoski and Saiegh (2004) on political stalemates in presidential regimes; a president without majority in congress can be impeached due to this lack of support.

3.2 Appointments and Political Patronage in Brazil

A study by the Brazilian National School of Public Administration on appointments to upper- and middle-ranking positions in the federal bureaucracy between 2000 and 2018 shows the distribution of positions in the federal bureaucracy for both coalition and opposition parties, as shown in Figure 3 below (Equipe CGDADOS 2019)[4]. A significant shift on positions offered to governing coalition and opposition parties could be observed between 2015 and 2016: as Figure 3 shows, while December 2015 observed 44.2% of upper ranks in ministries occupied by members of the coalition parties and only 1.4% by members of opposition parties, in March 2016 the proportions changed to 31.4% for coalition and 12.8% for opposition.

This shift coincides with the period when then President Dilma Rousseff was facing an impeachment trial during her second term. Aiming for controlling the turmoil among her once allies, Rousseff started demoting staff from her own coalition and offering positions to people affiliated to opposition parties. For higher-ranking positions (those in charge of policy-making), the impact is clear: DAS 6 and SN positions, including in state-owned companies and other

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[4]DAS refers to "High-Level Direction and Advisory" (acronym in Portuguese) positions, which are commissioned positions for civil servants, regardless of being originally from the bureaucracy or not. Those appointed to DAS positions are of free appointment and dismissal, therefore without the need of taking an entrance examination or other criteria. As a rule, ministerial portfolio positions are provided as DAS positions. They are divided into 7 categories, from lower ranks related to operational tasks (DAS 1 or 2) up to higher ranks that include ministers (DAS Special Nature, or SN) and are in charge of policy-making.

Figure 3: Distribution of Portfolio positions among Coalition and Opposition parties members between 2000 and 2018 (Equipe CGDADOS 2019)

federal bureaucracy offices such as regulatory agencies, changed from 22.29% and 0.92% in December 2015 to 18.92% and 4.73% in March 2016, respectively for coalition and opposition parties.

In fact, the impeachment request was submitted in December 2015, and she was suspended from office in May 2016, which shows that the movement toward opposition parties was not enough to secure her mandate. Finally, her vice, Michel Temer, who belonged to a different party, took office temporarily during her suspension from May to August 2016 and was formally appointed president after the impeachment procedure was concluded, in August 2016. Therefore, the sudden shift in portfolio allocation for members of both governing coalition and opposition parties can be easily noticed.

Rousseff's case shows that appointments in the federal bureaucracy might also be distributed among parties regardless of their position in the Congress – as in coalition, opposition or independent – based on the president's strategic interests. Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain how coalitions are sustained in Brazil. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, coalitions are formed to ensure the president will have at least simple majority in the Congress to be able to pass or block bills of interest. Nevertheless, parties composing such coalitions also have their interests, and depending on the political situation, the costs of maintaining a coalition may increase, making its continuation not sustainable.

In Brazil, however, several of those appointments are not limited to the upper ranks, and extend down to middle-ranking positions that do not limit to the ministries and include to state-owned companies and regulatory agencies, as shown in Figure 4 below (Equipe CGDADOS 2019). The plot shows the occupancy rate for both coalition and opposition parties' affiliates – not necessarily politicians – in middle-ranking positions, which refer to department directors or managers and similar positions in the federal bureaucracy and who are not in charge of policy-making (Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers 2011).

Figure 4: Distribution of Portfolio positions among Coalition and Opposition parties members between 2000 and 2018 (Equipe CGDADOS 2019)

Evidence on the number of appointments in the federal bureaucracy in 2010 alone shows that while 86.3% (or 18,649 people) were civil servants with no partisan affiliation, whereas 13.6% (2,946 people) of the employees were appointed by parties (Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers 2011). These appointments are done through recommendations from politicians that compose the governing coalition and, whereas upper-ranking positions get the largest focus from scholars, lower- and middle-ranking positions represent the majority of appointments. Figures 3 and 4, show a similar shift pattern in the occupancy ratio for both portfolio and middle-ranking positions among coalition and opposition parties during President Rousseff's impeachment trial.

3.3 The structure of the Brazilian Congress

The current Federal Constitution, promulgated in 1988 after the end of the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1964 and 1985, establishes that the country would follow a presidential system and would have proportional representation based on open list for electing members of the Congress.

Mauerberg and Pereira (2020) point that such structure enables the existence of countless parties, and that it encourages the formation of coalitions that provide the presidents a backbone to propose and execute policies based on the support of those coalitions. In fact, congresspeople from 13 parties worked together to write the new constitution and, in the following elections in 1990, deputies from 19 parties were elected (Câmara dos Deputados 2022).

In 2022, the Brazilian Congress was composed by 23 parties in the Chamber of Deputies and 14 parties in the Federal Senate. Table 1 below shows the affiliation distribution for the current composition of the Chamber of Deputies for 2022. While opposition parties usually announce their position once the election results are announced, those considering to compose a legislative coalition opt to better evaluate what is at stake. Independent parties assume a neutral position, without committing themselves to neither government nor opposition, and vote on bills according to their partisan leaning and interest on the topic.

Table 1: Chamber of Deputies in 2022

	Number of Parties	Number of Deputies
Coalition	11	343
Opposition	8	127
Independent	4	43
Total	23	513

Such fragmentation results not only in difficulties regarding differentiating how these parties see themselves in the political spectrum, but also on whether voters can identify themselves with those parties, or if their preference is more associated to the individual candidates based on their policy proposals. Figure 5 shows the ideological positioning of all the 23 parties with

representation in the Chamber of Deputies as of 2022[5].

Figure 5: Distribution of Seats in Chamber of Deputies in 2022

Zucco and Power (2019) have been conducting the Brazilian Legislative Survey (BLS), a series of survey waves conducted with Brazilian congresspeople in every legislature since 1990 (i.e., four-year waves), being the most recent one related to results collected in 2017 (Zucco and Power 2021). These surveys, however, cover only a sample of the congresspeople, and by design do not survey some parties due to lack of relevance. For instance, Figure 6 shows the ideological distribution for the 2017 wave of the BLS (Zucco and Power 2019). Although the Chamber of Deputies was composed by 28 parties in that time, the survey covers only 20 parties.

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[5]This information was obtained from each party's official website, and placed by myself in a 5-level scale that goes from Left (-2) to Right (2) referring to the self-declared positioning in the political spectrum. Although previous literature has already measured ideology of parties in Brazil, the most recent study refers to a survey conducted in 2017 (Zucco and Power 2021). Therefore, Figure 5 aims to illustrate the current composition of the Chamber of Deputies in a simple manner, without the need of providing a precise positioning for each party. Nevertheless, when analyzing the ideology of these parties, the way each party defines themselves ideologically would show different results, as they would include different variables from Christian-based conservatism and nationalism, to social democracy or communism, that would place parties in different positions in a more complex scale.

Figure 6: Distribution of Seats in Chamber of Deputies in 2017

Nevertheless, Zucco and Power (2021) identify a shift toward the center of the political spectrum for several parties that composed coalitions throughout the eight waves of surveys conducted with Brazilian congresspeople. This could explain the reason former President Jair Bolsonaro, despite his far-right position, had more center- and center-right parties in the coalition in comparison to right and even far-right ones, as shown in Figure 5. While such a pulverized political environment as the Brazilian Congress still has ideological parties and they tend to create alliances aiming for larger number of seats obtained in elections, they are not enough to ensure majority once elected, and this is where the center-positioned parties enter the negotiation arena (Downs 1957). In addition, such phenomenon is not exclusive to the current administration; in fact, it has been present in Brazilian politics since the re-democratization and the first legislature after the end of the military dictatorship (Zucco and Power 2021).

3.4   Legislative Process: How Policies are Formulated

Finally, I will provide an explanation on the Legislative Process, which refers to how laws and policies are created. It is defined and ruled by the Federal Constitution, from articles 59 to 69, having the details explained by the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. There are several different types of bills that can be presented in the Congress,

such as the ordinary bills (PLs)[6] and the constitution amendment proposals (PECs), each of them with distinct procedures.

Brazil has a bicameral legislative structure – the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) and the Federal Senate (Upper House) – and both of them have the power to start the discussion of a PL. For instance, regarding the procedure for PLs, the entire process is composed by three stages: Firstly, either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate introduces a PL, which will run through several committees to discuss its validity and relevance. The analysis procedure has also a marking feature: to avoid long discussions about one single bill, by the time of introduction each bill is assigned to thematic committees which will evaluate the above mentioned significance and merit. Only if approved by all assigned committees they will be analyzed by two final committees, one to examine the existence of impacts on the federal budget and another to verify whether it violates the constitutional framework. In case a bill is rejected in any thematic committee, it needs to be voted by the plenary, which is constituted by all members of the Chamber of Deputies or the Federal Senate. Otherwise, if it is approved by all thematic committees and the other two final committees, the PL moves to the reviewing house and go through the same procedure once again.

On the one hand, if the introduced PL is rejected in the first (Introductory) House[7], then the PL is entirely rejected and cannot proceed. On the other hand, if the reviewing House makes any change to the original PL, then it must return to the Introductory House for a second review. Finally, after approval in both Houses, the PL follows to the third stage, which is the presidential sanction, who also has the power to veto the PL entirely or some parts; in this case, the PL returns to the introductory House for a second round of procedures, and the members of that House can decide whether they will follow the presidential veto[8] or if the PL will be entirely rejected (Oliveira, Albuquerque, and Delbem 2018). A brief flowchart on the PL system can be found in Figure 7 to understand better the procedure.

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[6]This thesis will use the Portuguese acronyms for the bills analyzed, following the standard in the literature.

[7]A PL bill can be introduced in either the Chamber of Deputies or the Federal Senate, and if approved in this first house it will then be analyzed by the reviewing house – i.e., if a bill is introduced at the Chamber of Deputies, it will be reviewed by the Federal Senate, and vice-versa.

[8]Presidential vetoes can be overruled by the Congress under specific conditions, which require absolute majority in both Houses.

Figure 7: Procedure to approve PLs

The PLs can be presented by deputies, senators, the president, Supreme Court justices, and the attorney general. In addition, the current Federal Constitution also allows the submission of PLs by citizens. In this case, such proposal needs to obtain a significant number of signatures in order to be accepted by either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. Other types of bills count with different procedures. For instance, the PEC can only be introduced by deputies, senators, the president, or at least half of the state assemblies.

There is also a special type of bill called provisional presidential decree (MPVs)[9]. Although they were originally present since the 1988 Constitution, their purpose and procedure was changed in 2001 by the then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Pereira, Power, and Renno 2005). It is special because it can only be presented by the president as long as they are of relevance and urgent matter, and become effective immediately for the duration of 60 days. Meanwhile, special committees within both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate debate whether this MPV should become an ordinary law, and in case both Houses cannot finish this analysis within the original period, it is extended for another 60 days. In case it is rejected, then that once-a-time law becomes nullified. Therefore, it is a special provision that can skip the formal steps for a bill to become a law.

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[9]There is inconsistency in the literature regarding the correct translation for the "Medida Provisória," which refers to the MPV bill. While *temporary order*, *provisional measure*, and others can be found in the literature, I decided to follow the denomination available in the glossary of the National Congress official website, which is *provisional presidential decree*.

It also has a second special feature which is the power to *lock* the Congress agenda: if the MPV committee of a House does not start its work within 45 days, then it locks the agenda of the House that is currently analyzing the MPV and forces the voting on that provisional presidential decree before any other measure. This is a tool often used by presidents to pressure the legislative power to take action and follow the executive agenda, while having the president overriding the legislative power's attributions by skipping the entire legislative procedure and enforcing adoption of policies, even though for a short period of time (Renno 2010). Again, a flowchart on the MPV system can be found in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8: Procedure to approve MPVs

4 Theory and Hypotheses

4.1 Theory

The elements that are responsible for sustaining coalitions, including distribution of positions in the bureaucracy to coalition members, have been widely studied by scholarship in the field (e.g., Neto 2018; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011). The literature widely debates the role of portfolio allocation in coalition negotiations (e.g., Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011; Krauss and Kluever 2022), as explained earlier in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, in the case of Brazil, the actual efficiency of allocation of positions on obtaining policy support, obedience to the president, and party cohesion are still not clear.

Among the several topics involving the relationship between portfolio allocation and obedience to the president, this thesis will focus on the actual effects that can be observed based on the interaction of the executive and legislative powers and the extent to which portfolio allocation is effective in shifting voting patterns within the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, one can suppose that concession of positions to allies – and potential allies as well – is effective. This mechanism can be visualized in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9: Relationship between governing party and coalition parties

Brazil also shows a distinct bond between the executive and the legislative powers, which is based on appointments to positions that not necessarily represent policy formulation but rather operational labor. As explained in Chapter 3, middle- and lower-rank positions in regulatory agencies and other instances in the federal or local bureaucracy are offered in exchange for support for specific bills, as an exchange currency in the legislative *market* (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Freitas 2016). In other words, support would be maintained as positions are

given throughout the legislature.

The Brazilian case counts with the joining and departure of parties from a coalition within a legislature, which represents a distinct variable for this composition. Does a party leave a coalition when the requested portfolios are not given by the president? Does a party join a coalition upon the offering to one or another portfolio that a party considers relevant?

The Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP, acronym in Portuguese) collects and codes information on how each deputy voted for all bills that had roll call vote during any procedure. From this data set, Figures 10 and 11 show the degrees of obedience of deputies in parties composing a coalition during President Rousseff's first and last coalitions, in 2011 and 2016 respectively. Each circle represents the average obedience rate of a given deputy, by party, and placed according to their ideological position following the findings from the BLS (Zucco and Power 2019). As explained in Chapter 2, the BLS is based on 4-year waves, therefore I am considering the results from one given wave for all subsequent years until the next wave. In both figures, each circle represents a deputy's average obedience toward President Rousseff, clustered by party. The average obedience is calculated based on the number of times each deputy followed President Rousseff's instructions when voting for all bills that had roll call vote. The plots show that many deputies were not obedient, including those affiliated to the president's own party (the Workers' Party – PT).


Figure 10: Average obedience to President Rousseff (1st term, 1st coalition – 01/2011 to 03/2012)

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Figure 11: Average obedience to President Rousseff (2nd term, 5th coalition – 04/2016)

4.2 Hypotheses

As observed from Figures 10 and 11, disloyal deputies are actually more common than loyal ones. While it would be understandable to see larger degrees of infidelity among those parties that did not compose the electoral alliance, this is not the case. In fact, even among Rousseff's own party the average obedience dropped from 87.58% in her first coalition to 75.11% in her last coalition before being impeached. Therefore, what would explain such variance in fidelity among deputies that belong to the same party as the president, and what would explain deputies from coalition parties with opposite ideological positions sustaining their support?

Distribution of appointments to the federal bureaucracy and budget allocation to constituencies are relevant to aggregate parties prior to and soon after the inauguration of a president. Still, obedience rates drop over time and distribution of non-portfolio positions are responsible for recovering and maintaining those obedience rates due to patronage. I make this claim because non-portfolio (operational or bureaucratic) positions exist in larger number and have less attention from the media in comparison to portfolio ones, such as ministries and other upper rankings. Nevertheless, it is still not clear to which this relationship between governing party and coalition members changes, nor the existence of a specific period for this shift in inclinations to occur. For instance, when there is a sensitive bill about to be introduced in the Congress and therefore

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the governing party needs to ensure majority from coalition members.

I propose that obedience to the president vary according to the subject of the bills, and I expect that presidents earn more support and obedience toward voting bills upon allocation of positions to coalition parties **(H1)**. There is an increasing *relative price* to be paid by the president in order to ensure the support for bills, whether by redesigning portfolio through changes in the parties holding one or another ministry or by appointing more people affiliated to those parties. However, even this *relative price* may also have its limits – this would even explain several and recent instances of corruption scandals in Brazil, such as the *mensalão*[10] (big allowance, in English), or more recently involving federal budget allocation for the electoral districts of the supporting deputies.

I also expect to observe a lower impact of allocation of positions over obedience to the presidents during roll call votes for MPVs in comparison to PLs **(H2)**. While the literature points toward a general increase of obedience to the president as more appointments are given, I propose that when comparing MPVs and PLs, roll call votes for the former is less impacted than the latter. I suggest this outcome due to the former's immediate implementation feature prior to voting in Congress, in comparison to the latter needing to be approved by the deputies. Since MPVs are based on urgency, eventual losses in the Congress could represent major political defeat, thus the president could see the need to place higher bids to ensure the approval these bills (Pereira, Power, and Renno 2005). Finally, MPVs procedure requires a larger number of votes that might not be attained only by restructuring the federal or local administrations.

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[10]The *mensalão* scandal occurred during Lula's first administration (2003 to 2006), in which members of center parties, regardless of being members of the coalition or not, were bribed through *monthly allowances* (thus the name) to secure votes in Congress (Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011).

5 Research Design

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the extent to which appointments to the federal bureaucracy impact deputies' obedience toward presidents. To test the effect of appointments, I structure my analysis on roll call votes of both PLs and MPVs. However, instead of quantifying whether a deputy voted for or against a bill, I focus on whether these deputies followed or not the presidential instruction on how to vote for each bill. I also analyze the impact of the percentage of members of each party employed in the federal bureaucracy impacted on obedience to the president and support.

I take this approach due to the fact that the way deputies vote for a given bill does not clarifies whether that vote is in agreement to the president's goals. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 3, bills of sensitive matter can be seen as a *support barometer* for presidents, who then might ask the leaders of parties composing a coalition to *punish* rebel deputies – this can be done by not providing opportunities to become a *rapporteur* of important bills (who indicates the committee the type of vote), access to special committees, or even blockade to sending budget to their electoral constituencies, among others.

In the Brazilian Congress, not all bills are voted under roll call; in general, only specific types of bills, such as amendments to the constitution have roll call voting as a rule. Ordinary bills only have roll call voting when it is requested, through a motion, by party leaders. As pointed by Figueiredo and Limongi (2000), this is usually done as a political tool to expose congresspeople voting behavior toward sensitive matters, therefore roll call votes are, in most cases, related to crucial and delicate topics. For the majority of bills, therefore, voting is called *symbolic* (i.e., a formality) in which the president of the committee asks those against the matter to speak up. In general, congresspeople do not vote individually for each bill, since party leaders indicate their party's position in advance (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). Thus, this thesis will consider only roll call votes for bills, with a particular emphasis on PLs and MPVs when examining **H2**.

This thesis is an observational study based on different models to test the three hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. I conduct linear regression analyses to test the hypotheses, structuring them based on three components: 1) Relationship between obedience when voting for general

bills and distribution of positions in the bureaucracy; 2) Party ideology; and 3) Obedience toward voting for PLs and MPVs. Therefore, the dependent variable is average obedience to the president when voting bills for each party i (O_i) while belonging to a coalition, measured by how many times a deputy from that party followed a president's instruction over the total of votes of that deputy. The independent variables are: 1) the percentage of party i affiliates employed in the federal bureaucracy (βE_i), out of the total of party members employed, within a given coalition span; and 2) the ideology of each party i (βI_i). Finally, ϵ is the model error. As explained earlier with Figure 2, it is more appropriate to use coalition spans as units of time instead of years, since each change in the coalition composition – whether a party joined or left – counts as a separate coalition.

There were instances in which there were several different compositions in one single year, which would cause a different understanding from the intended by this thesis. Therefore, instead of a year-based timeline, I will consider coalition spans regardless of their duration. I am also considering only the percentage of party affiliates that are employed since the more than 70% of civil servants are not appointed by parties but are employed through public examinations instead (Bersch, Praça, and Taylor 2017).

Finally, appointments will consider not only cabinet seats (i.e., ministries and other policy-making positions), but appointments in general. I take this approach due to the fact that while a given party might receive minimum ministries, this can be balanced by the provision of a larger number of operational positions in the bureaucracy.

I propose a standard model that verifies the first component, which is the impact of the number of party affiliates employed over general obedience, regardless of the type of bill. Hence, Model 1 is:

$$O_i = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

From Model 1, I derive to a subsequent model in which I control for party ideology. Thus, Model 2 is:

$$O_i = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \beta_2 I_i + \epsilon \tag{2}$$

The next models are variants of Models 1 and 2, which will examine the same relationships by

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focusing on the impact of appointments over obedience when voting for PLs (Models 3 and 4) and MPVs (Models 5 and 6):

$$O_{PL_i} = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \epsilon \tag{3}$$

$$O_{PL_i} = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \beta_2 I_i + \epsilon \tag{4}$$

Where O_{PL_i} refers to the obedience rates for each party when voting PLs, and

$$O_{MPV_i} = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \epsilon \tag{5}$$

$$O_{MPV_i} = \alpha + \beta_1 E_i + \beta_2 I_i + \epsilon \tag{6}$$

Where O_{MPV_i} refers to the obedience rates for each party when voting MPVs.

5.1 Data

To explore the hypotheses, I analyze a data set obtained from the CEBRAP containing information on roll call votes in the Chamber of Deputies regarding 987 bills from 2001 to 2018, and compare with the data set obtained from the National School of Public Administration on appointments to the federal administration in the same period.

Table 2 provides the description and summary for all relevant variables. Since this analysis refers to how deputies voted when belonging to a coalition, I am using a subset from the CEBRAP data set that considers only that group. *Party ideology* is based on the BLS (Zucco and Power 2019) waves, and I am using the same values for the years corresponding to the same legislature, to match the survey waves. Coalitions refer to the number of coalitions in the observed period, as shown in 2 in Chapter 3. *Average obedience to the party* and *Average obedience to the president* represent the average of votes of deputies following the instructions of their party and the president, respectively. Finally, *Employment rate* refers to the percentage of party affiliates employed at the federal bureaucracy over the total of civil servants.

Finally, Figure 12 shows the total of bills by type[11] in the period examined by this thesis. As explained in both Chapter 3 and in the hypotheses section in Chapter 4, PLs and MPVs are more

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[11]Some bills face distinct procedures while in Congress and might appear in different instances along Figure 12. The total of unique bills analyzed in this thesis is displayed in Table 2.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	18			2001	2018
Bills	987				
PLs	170				
MPVs	363				
Deputies	1362				
Parties	18				
Party ideology		0.061	0.476	−0.881	0.817
Coalitions	21				
Roll call votes for all bills	497,065				
Roll call votes for PLs only	76,820				
Roll call votes for MPVs only	191,583				
Average obedience to the party		0.918	0.037	0.784	0.992
Average obedience to the president		0.881	0.079	0.504	0.995
Employment rate of party affiliates		13.38		0.24	37

relevant to this study considering their purpose and voting procedure, thus Figure 12 highlights these two types of bills. The expressive difference on the number of MPV bills to the others refer to the fact that MPVs are more prone to face roll call votes due to their urgency and relevance characters. PECs are also important, however due to their complex voting procedure this thesis will not examine the impacts of employment rates in the federal bureaucracy. Although REQs (requests, acronym in Portuguese) show a large number of occurrences, they refer to tools used by deputies to make any requirement to the speaker (e.g., information on a given bill to be provided by specialists, summoning of authorities such as ministers), and therefore will not be considered in this analysis.

Figure 12: Total of bills, by type

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6 Results and Discussion

This chapter will test the hypotheses based on the data used for this thesis and analyze the impacts that appointments to the federal bureaucracy has on securing obedience (or avoiding rebel behavior) of deputies toward a president.

6.1 Results

Table 3 presents the results for Models 1 and 2, which first analyze the impact of appointments toward the obedience on voting bills in general. Difference in the number of observations when controlling party ideology results from information on ideology for some parties not being available, as they might not have been surveyed by the BLS (Zucco and Power 2019). A similar issue occurs with the remaining models to be presented further in this chapter.

Table 3: Regression table for Models 1 and 2 (all bills)

	Obedience to the president	
	Model 1	Model 2
Party affiliates employed	0.003***	0.003***
	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$
Party ideology		-0.003***
		$p < 0.001$
(Intercept)	0.843***	0.844***
	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.0001$
Observations	497,065	495,563
R^2	0.157	0.156
Adjusted R^2	0.157	0.156
Residual Std. Error	0.075 (df = 497063)	0.075 (df = 495560)
F Statistic	92,410.490***	45,721.070***
	(df = 1; 497063)	(df = 2; 495560)
Note:		*$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

When examining the relationship between appointments and obedience when voting for general bills, both Models 1 and 2 show a positive relationship that is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$ for both models), which indicates the possibility of rejecting the null hypothesis of **H1**. While extremely low p-values points toward the rejection of a null hypothesis, this might result from the size of the data set. The models show low results for both R^2 and Adjusted

R^2, with 15.7% and 15.6% of the variance of the average obedience respectively, which could be explained by the fact that there are several parties clustering in specific regions of the plot. When comparing the correlation between obedience to the president and the two independent variables, employment results in a weak positive correlation of $r = 0.39$, whereas party ideology results in a weak negative correlation of $r = -0.24$. Figure 13 shows the representation of this relationship by displaying plots for Models 1 and 2, in which each circle represents a party in a given year while being a member of a coalition.

Figure 13: Regression plots for Models 1 and 2

Table 4 shows the results for the remaining models, in which I test the impact of appointments to the federal bureaucracy over obedience when voting for PLs only (Models 3 and 4) or MPVs only (Models 5 and 6). Following the findings from the original models (1 and 2), there is a positive relationship that is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$ for all models), suggesting once more that the more positions a party receives, the higher will be the obedience of its members. Thus, these results also point toward the rejection of the null hypothesis for **H2**, which claimed that obedience when voting for MPVs should be less impacted by appointments than when voting for PLs. This assumption is further emphasized when comparing the correlation coefficients between the variables. Again, there is a positive moderate correlation between obedience to the president and employment ($r = 0.47$ for PLs and $r = 0.40$ for MPVs), and a weak negative correlation between obedience to the president and party ideology ($r = -0.30$ for

PLs and r = -0.28 for MPVs). Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between appointments and obedience by displaying plots for Models 3 and 5 by comparing PLs and MPVs, and Figure 15 shows the relationship for Models 4 and 6, which the same comparison but controlling for party ideology.

Table 4: Regression table for Models 3 and 4 (PLs only) and Models 5 and 6 (MPVs only)

	Obedience to the president			
	PLs only		MPVs only	
	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Party affiliates employed	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.002***
	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$
Party ideology		-0.007***		-0.011***
		$p < 0.001$		$p < 0.001$
(Intercept)	0.835***	0.838***	0.853***	0.857***
	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$	$p < 0.001$
Observations	77,037	76,820	192,125	191,583
R^2	0.227	0.228	0.167	0.168
Adjusted R^2	0.227	0.228	0.167	0.168
Residual Std. Error	0.067 (df = 77035)	0.066 (df = 76817)	0.070 (df = 192123)	0.070 (df = 191580)
F Statistic	22,685.110***	11,313.580***	38,423.510***	19,366.310***
	(df = 1; 77035)	(df = 2; 76817)	(df = 1; 192123)	(df = 2; 191580)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


Figure 14: Regression plots for Models 3 and 5

Figure 15: Regression plots for Models 4 and 6, controlling for party ideology

Repeating the findings from Model 2, whenever controlling party ideology (as in Models 4 and 6), there is a negative relationship between appointments and obedience, regardless of the type of bill. From this, I can suggest that party ideology is not relevant for deputies when voting for bills, and I suggest an additional dimension to understand specific scenarios. I proposed in Chapter 4 the possible existence of a *relative price*, which refers to the *value* of positions and perks in general offered by presidents. Several scholars have been researching on salience of portfolios and jurisdictions, which refer to the priority ranking that parties joining a coalition give to ministries and other positions within the administration (e.g., Bäck, Debus, and Dumont 2011; Browne and Feste 1975; Ecker and Meyer 2019; Sieberer et al. 2021; Warwick and Druckman 2006).

Nevertheless, the concept of *relative price* is yet to be investigated in detail. I emphasize the word *relative* due to the fact that it cannot – or perhaps shall not – be evaluated based only on fixed values, since circumstances vary according to the situation being investigated. Therefore, a pragmatic paradigm – instead of a sole positivist approach – should be adopted when examining this price.

In a situation where a president's approval rates are falling abruptly and their support in the congress is collapsing, the concession of appointments work as a sole temporary remedy to the situation, without ensuring its effectiveness. Once again, such a scenario could be observed

during President Rousseff's second term, when she was facing an impeachment trial and tried to offer a series of positions to coalition members and even to parties in the opposition (as shown in Figures 3 and 4 in Chapter 2).

6.2 Discussion

From the results obtained in all models I can affirm that appointments to the federal bureaucracy impact on how deputies vote in Congress (**H1**), although this should not be considered the sole cause for sustaining or losing such support. This assumption is reinforced by the negative relationship observed when controlling party ideology in Models 2, 4 and 6, showing that party ideology is not a relevant factor for presidents when forming coalitions. In fact, coalition parties more ideologically distant from the president's party are less impacted by appointments. Therefore, from the data analyzed in this thesis it is possible to affirm that appointments alone cannot guarantee that parties will be following the president's instructions when voting bills.

This thesis also covered the impact of appointments on obedience when voting for PLs and MPVs separately (**H2**). Going against to what was initially hypothesized, appointments are more effective toward MPVs in comparison to PLs, showing that coalition members may respond to presidents positively upon distribution of perks. Deputies perceive the MPVs urgency and relevance features, as well as the political risks for presidents in the occasion of a lost in the legislative. Therefore, this could be the reason why MPVs are more impacted by appointments in comparison to PLs.

Personal ideology (or ideological leaning) of each deputy can be interpreted as a confounding variable, as it also interferes the way they vote for bills. In fact, personal ideology might be more important than the party's, which shows that deputies may be affiliated just for the sake of being elected, emphasizing the concept of policy-seekers (Strøm and Müller 1999). While bills that do not represent sensitive matter tend to be approved by majority regardless of party affiliation, other topics require a larger support that cannot be ensured only by the parties composing the governing coalition due to conflicts related to private matters (e.g., religion affiliation or other background) as well as lobbying platforms that support specific deputies (Oliveira, Albuquerque, and Delbem 2018; Nery and Mueller 2022; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011).

Furthermore, the Brazilian Congress counts with several congressional caucuses that surpass ideological boundaries and members from most parties often vote together on the same subject based on group affiliation (e.g., Evangelicals, farmers, security forces, etc.), regardless of which party they belong to – and often ignore government or opposition orientation (Johnson 1998; Nery and Mueller 2022; Souza 2011). This composition not only impacts the functioning of the Congress or governability, but also increase the stakes and prices demanded by some congresspeople.

One example could be the voting for a bill related to moral issues such as the legalization of specific types of drugs, traditionally supported by more progressive parties. A left-wing deputy with strong ties with Christian churches – which is the case of many congresspeople in Brazil regardless of their party affiliation – might vote against the bill even though one may belong to the coalition. Thus, the allocation of appointments when voting for bills may not bring relevant impact because the personal ideology of each deputy might plays a more significant role in their decision.

This issue is much more explicit depending on the procedure; besides the several types of bills explained in Chapter 3, there are also internal procedures that can be used as tools to haste or halt voting of bills, such as requests for adjournment, division of bills by article, amendments of bills, among others, which also require voting processes and, therefore, extra-party negotiations (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000).

A second confounding variable could be whether a party composed a pre-electoral coalition. Carroll and Cox (2007) and Albala, Borges and Couto (2023) show that parties that combined forces with presidents prior to electoral campaigns tend to bring stability into coalitions. Nevertheless, this thesis brings an innovative perspective toward the same topic, and further develops the scholarship on coalition studies in Brazil.

Finally, cabinet design is not the sole negotiation token when forming coalitions, and in a scenario in which several parties compose an alliance with the president, the distribution of positions may not fit each party's demands. As explained earlier, presidents may offer different types of perks, such as federal budget allocation to constituencies, which might be preferred by some deputies over appointments. Thus, it is also necessary to advance the investigation on

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the other perks that presidents are willing to provide to coalition members to secure legislative support.

This study leaves three opportunities for future research. Firstly, the debate on *relative price* of positions offered is a field that should be further investigated. What would be the cases in which the allocation of positions matter more for deputies? An analysis on the topic of each bill would be appropriate to answer this question, which could include methods on sentiment analysis to verify the impact of the issues being tackled in each bill. Secondly, due to research limitations I could not deepen the focus on the difference between portfolio positions and operational positions (i.e., those that are not in charge of policy-making). As noted in Chapter 3, there is also a trend of appointments for operational positions that follow the political situation, and also involves issues such as patronage and corruption scandals that are covered by other fields within political science. Finally, a comparative study among other countries with a multiparty presidential system to discuss the variables examined in this thesis would also bring a major contribution to the fields of coalitions in presidential regimes.

7 Conclusion

I decided to cover voting behavior of deputies in Brazil over the influence of appointments to the federal bureaucracy considering the complexity of the relationship between the Executive and Legislative powers in that country. Besides the number of parties existing in Congress and frequent corruption scandals surrounding the country's politics, the way and under which *currency* parties negotiate the formation and maintenance of coalitions are relevant objects of study.

I brought an approach focused on obedience toward presidents instead of the pure analysis of votes that is usually observed in most literature on the field, resulting in a new perspective on the actual efficacy of appointments of party affiliated personnel toward voting behavior. The outcomes not only confirmed the general theory on portfolio allocation and expanded it to appointments for operational positions, but also showed that appointments alone are not the sole independent variable explaining what motivates deputies to follow a president's instruction. Further research should unravel the confounding variables suggested in the previous chapter and examine the extent to which personal ideology or identification impacts voting behavior, comparing to other perks such as budget allocation.

The data used in this thesis also contains information on party obedience, although I decided to focus only obedience toward presidents. There are two main reasons for this choice: firstly, because presidents are the ones who directly or indirectly (through their ministers and other higher-ranking staff) appoint personnel to the federal administration. Secondly, because there might be instances in which a party leadership decides to disobey a president but a deputy opts to obey them, which would require a cross-analysis to investigate in detail these cases and attempt to find a connection between obedience toward presidents and party leadership.

There is still a vast ground for research in the field of coalitions in Brazil, as well as in presidential systems in general, regarding the relevance of appointments. Brazilian legislation establishes open access to information on all public expenditures and other details, from which all data used in this thesis became available. This feature is crucial for the development of a detailed research, whereas other countries may not offer such access. Nevertheless, specific analysis on parties and deputies' voting behavior based on different conditions – such as parti-

san ideological leaning or deputies' affiliation to congressional caucuses – may also bring new contributions to the literature. I expect to continue advancing research in this field by analyzing structures in different countries and investigate whether there is a pattern regarding appointments, perks in general, and obedience toward presidents.

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