

CORRUPTION IN ALBANIA. EXPLORATION OF CORRUPTION PERCEPTION DRIVERS, AND INTERNATIONALLY FUNDED REFORMS WITH THE FOCUS ON THE JUDICIARY

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AUTHOR`S DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, Kristian Petro, candidate for the MA/PhD degree in Economic Policy in Global Markets, declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to explore opportunities created through the implementation of the judicial reform and how this reform can stand as a substantial precondition for implementation of actual and future anti-corruption reforms. By studying first, the background of corruption in Albania, international interference to reduce the phenomenon and role of media in the process of anticorruption reform, this paper seeks to propose approaches for corruption reduction by using the judicial reform as a baseline and a point of reference to analyze mistakes as well as positive outcomes. The work includes a survey implemented to question perceived corruption levels which, together with the literature review, led to the proposal of the next anti- corruption reform.

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INTRODUCTION

Veblen, the famous American institutionalist, saw human social classes evolving in cycles that resemble each other (Veblen, 1899). As for him, corruption is a natural consequence of the capitalist system, the pursuit of profit, and accumulation of wealth. Since capitalistic society gives much value to wealth, it makes it highly important to be able to differentiate yourself from the others, then, corruption will be present. Outside of the heterodox world, corruption can easily be labeled as a tool to bypass the common system. If there is corruption, there is mutual benefit. Both the giver and receiver get goods or services that they would or could not get under normal circumstances. This makes the process extremely difficult to trace and analyze since the mutual benefits make sure to keep all involved parties quiet, resulting in no witnesses.

The region of south-east Europe, in particular the Western Balkans, has consistently faced challenges of significant nature with corruption. Therefore, this region has been subject to international support and funding from the western democracies to control and combat corruption. The destabilization and the historical context of a complex nature during the 1990s, have gotten corruption- related issues further exacerbated, making anti-corruption measures more challenging to implement.

This master`s thesis seeks to explore the positive impacts of the judicial reform in Albania as well as to identify aspects that can serve as a basis for significant and continuous anti - corruption reforms, in particular related to the administrative reform. Through the examination of the challenges and successes of the judicial reform, this research seeks to contribute to the existing literature on reform efforts on fighting corruption, as well as to provide insights that can feed policy recommendations. Understanding the key elements of the judicial reform that

led to its success, can facilitate replication of alike corruption related reforms in Albania and inspire other countries of the region to adopt similar judiciary and anti-corruption reforms.

To achieve the objective, this work has completed a comprehensive literature review, examined relevant works with regards to corruption and the reforms from which it has extracted foundational knowledge. Additionally, this work will identify problems and benefits resulting from the judicial reform in Albania. This reform proved to reduce corruption perception levels and opened new paths for the country towards other reforms (EU Report on Albania, 2023).

By recommending findings related to the problems faced during the judicial reform and highlighting the aspects that influence public perception with high significance, this research seeks to provide policy recommendations for future reforms of anti-corruption nature in Albania. Insights gathered from the judicial reform may serve as a valuable guide for this goal because they are created from implementing a successful strategy. This can contribute to a more transparent and efficient society.

To understand the relevance, prior to starting the work, I checked the data related to the corruption statistics in Albania regarding the placement of the country in the region and the evolution of corruption statistics. These data allowed me to believe that there is a need for anticorruption measures in the country as well as let me interpret some of the factors that may have contributed to corruption reduction in the country.

An important indicator used throughout the work is the Corruption perception index which is a tool used to measure and rank countries by the perceived levels of corruption in the public sector. It is based on surveys and assessments from international institutions as well as from experts and businesses. It aims measuring of bribery, nepotism, and other forms of abuse for personal gain (Transparency International , 2023). It ranks 180 countries and territories around the world by their perceived corruption. The scale of the index goes from zero to 100 where

zero means highly corrupt and 100 means no level of corruption. The global average stands at 43 out of 100. Albania appears to score lower than the global average as well as lower than the countries of the region with 36 out of 100.

Figure 1 Regional Corruption Score (Transparency International, 2023)





Figure 2 Corruption Perception Index Albania, the higher the better (Transparency International, 2023)




Before 2012, Transparency International evaluated on scale from 1 to 10. After 2012 they changed to a scale from one to 100. I have adjusted the newer perception index from 1-100 to 1-10 to illustrate both periods in this graph. Major rises in corruption perception evaluation in

2006 and 2016 correspond respectively with the introduction of a new government focused on anti-corruption and with judicial reform. In 2016, people perceived the least corruption since the measures have been taken. This pushes to use the year 2016 as a point of reference indicating changes in corruption.

From my survey, answering the question “is there a connection between Judicial Reform and Lower Corruption”; 118 agreed and 34 were against the statement. Most of the population believes that there is a relationship between the reform and reduced corruption, proving some of my expectations and opening possibilities for further study.


Figure 3 Connection between the Reform and Lower Corruption



ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING LOW CORRUPTION LEVELS

It is important to understand the risks that come with corruption through economical regards before we can start to study possible lessons. One paper by (Morabido, 2016) studies the impact of corruption regarding economic growth in Albania for the period 2005-2014. It acknowledges that corruption is very complex and difficult to express in data. Generally, crimes are negative to the economy, especially economic growth, and there are many past studies to prove this. However, in the case of corruption, as of (Morabito, 2016) recent empirical studies have found that its effect on growth is insignificant statistically, but it leads to the misuse of power and other problems related to unfair solutions. This is typical for emerging, developing countries.

Figure 4 Perception of the Economic Situation (IDRA, 2016)



It is agreed among authors, including (Aysan 2007), and (Freeman 2009), as of (Morabito, 2016), that corruption facilitates public investment, but lowers to almost nonexistence aggregate investments for the simple reason that a business has more expenses in a corrupt country. However, it is seen that in the developed world, corruption has more negative effects to the companies than in other countries where it does not affect them since the cost of corruption is already taken for granted or is beneficial to the companies (Morabito, 2016).

Academic literature dictates that foreign direct investments have a direct positive impact in economic growth. Since corruption lowers their level, its effect should be negative. According to (Mauro, 1997) and (Paldam, 2002), this relation is significantly low, and the reasoning logic does not comply with the reality. Corruption, specifically in Albania, seems to be tightly engaged to the organized crime. In 2013, Albanians declared that they agree that corruption in the past ten years had increased a lot in the sectors of judiciary, health, and police forces (Morabito, 2016).

Corruption has an impact on economic growth because it is a major changer when it comes to the factors that push economic growth. Investments are heavily affected by corruption and in cases of small countries foreign investment, which is highly important, faces many problems in terms of the security of the payback, as well as the environment to open and run the business in the midst of all the bribes and illegal competition (Morabito, 2016).

Bad infrastructure appears to be highly problematic when it comes to economic growth and development since it does not allow the needed connectivity and circulation of goods and services. The way corruption influences bad infrastructure is not complicated. Public procurement corruption does not allow proper development of the infrastructure, when the funds or the public money are transferred on corrupted pockets, thus resulting in favorizing certain companies that provide less works quality and do not meet the standards. However, this form of corruption is not the only one. The corruption in the police forces, licenses to transport or customs all have bad impact on their fields of action, leading on the reduction of the possibilities of economic growth.

Corruption pushes for different government policies, which are influenced by laundered illegal money, approve policies that are more in favor of those who want to maintain corruption instead of the major benefit of the people and country. Corruption also influences and creates

more problems in terms of encouraging only certain investors, who are not the best option. These policies all together bring business failure, low general income, lower living standards and negative net migration rates with the population leaving for other countries. In the case of countries of south- eastern Europe, the fact that neighboring countries offer much better solutions than those in the home country make it very convenient to migrate in a country that is highly close geographically and culturally but further ahead in terms of economy. This has happened with Albania and Greece and Italy where the poor economic conditions of Albania pushed a migration towards the neighboring countries. With less labor force, as of classical economics, there is also less economic growth.

BACKGROUND OF CORRUPTION IN ALBANIA

PETTY CORRUPTION

Historical background can imply multiple changes in corruption perception of a country and can cause significant difficulties when trying to implement a foreign policy model. The historical similarities among western Balkan countries allow for more possibilities of sharing similar reforms.

Corruption has been associated with societies since their beginning. However, there are times, under certain influences, when this phenomenon seems to be spread more than other times. Albania entered the 1990s after almost half a century in a Stalinist regime. High stake corruption was punishable by death while smaller forms with harsh prison sentences. After the fall of the dictatorship, money started to make sense, and with weaker and less controlling governments, corruption started to spread in every sector. Referring to Veblen here would be understandable to illustrate how capitalistic systems drive more corruption.

Causes of petty corruption “flourished in the environment created” including weak rule of law, the economic stage of the country, low wages, as well as organized crime. A big problem for the country during the 1990s was human trafficking, as Albania was in the middle of the road that transported mainly women for prostitutes from post-soviet countries through the bordering countries to Italy and Germany using Albanian shores (Cela, 2016) and (Abrahams, 2015).

From the Institute of Statistics of Albania reports, and interviews with people who lived during this period, the economy faced major difficulties (INSTAT Institute of Statistics Albania, 2023) in 1991 and until 2000 it was in a severe condition hardly hit by the civil unrest of 1997. The country was not perceived safe for foreign investors and therefore international investment was extremely low. Public salaries were extremely low (INSTAT Institute of Statistics Albania,

2023), and this pushed public administrative workers, as well as law enforcement mechanisms, to accept money in exchange for giving their services.

Organized crime would bribe or threaten law enforcement structures to not intervene with their sectors of the city where they collected taxes instead of the state. Another cause is related to the lack of judiciary experts. A reduced number of judiciary experts was inherited from the Communist regime, since the need was much lower, as the trials during communism were mainly orchestrated by one party member. As a result, the government took a controversial measure and launched a 6-month course to random people, mostly connected to the new anti-Communist government who became new judges and prosecutors (shqiptarja.com, 2018). These professionals were proven highly corrupt by the reform that was only taken after 2014 to expel them from the system. Petty corruption that they received contributed to higher crime, worse economic conditions and serious problems with the rule of law.

Other effects of petty corruption contributed to the erosion of trust that people had in institutions and a general feeling of apathy towards the government and other people. One of the major effects that hit society were irregularities regarding the privatization process.

TRANSITION ERA

After 1992, when the first party, different from the communist since World War two, was elected, transition into a market economy was one of the main goals. The path that privatization followed was heavily criticized by the opposition party which was the descendant of the old communist party (Albanian National Library, 2023).

During the same time, Ponzi Schemes emerged, and they were heavily influencing society. With Pyramid Scheme money, it was now easier to corrupt, and the general population started to see corruption as part of capitalism and democracy. It is important to point out that during this time there were almost zero public infrastructure, health, and education investments.

International aid was the only source of certain educative materials mainly the OSFA Open Society Foundation of Albania and UN related agencies were helping the medical sector, while state was deepening the national debt for investments that were never seen (Albanian National Library, 2023).

The governments that ruled the country until 2005 were mainly focused on restoring order and international relations of the country rather than tackling with corruption and petty corruption, which became widespread at the point where to become employed by the government you had to pay to get the job, since with that job it was sure that corruption benefits would be good. Although during these times the first cases of people caught with corruption were unveiled, (Albanian National Library, 2023), there was not much done to modernize the laws. The first National Strategy Against Corruption was created in 2004, (EBRD, 2006) ringing a bell that the government was starting to recognize the problems that corruption brought as well as to prepare to sign the association and stabilization agreement as the first step towards joining the European Union. The strategy addressed corruption and organized crime as well as introduced steps to be taken to overcome the issues. Modernizing anti-corruption laws, enhancing law enforcement, boosting public awareness of the detrimental impacts of corruption, and promoting openness and accountability in governmental institutions were some of the goals of the strategy.

In 2005, a new government was elected for their main goal of combating corruption in the public sector. The fact that they won the elections explains that the population is now more aware of the problems caused by corruption. During the rule of this new government, Albania's corruption index scored a better position and petty corruption was slowly being reduced (Transparency International, 2023). What started to appear during these times was the factorization of certain companies and corruption in higher levels, and there is a period of shift from petty corruption being the main one to the large scale one that involved enterprises.

One example can be the controversial privatization of the electrical energy transmission company to a Czech firm. The offer given by the Czech firm was the most expensive and did not benefit the state as much as the competing Japanese firm, but the Czech was chosen anyways. The result of this privatization was a massive loss for the Albanian state after they had to nationalize the firm again for not fulfilling the expected results (Report TV, 2022). There is still undergoing investigation to find corruptive relations of representatives of the government with the Czech company (Top Channel Albania, 2022).

After 2014, with the introduction of a new government certain measures were taken to eradicate petty corruption. Steps were taken to fully formalize the housing sector. During this time, vetting was conducted with the goal of removing all corrupt judges and prosecutors from office, since the judiciary system is the core of implementing any new reform. The reform was aided by the EU and the US and included an international body that would monitor. The result was the dismissal of more than 60% of the judges and prosecutors that went through screening as of the Albanian free media. The investigation was taken care of by a special prosecutor institution built under international monitoring. The results of this reform are reflected in the corruption perception index which appeared better after the reform started.

Digitalization of all government services that did not require a physical person may have also helped in reducing corruption. Since Albania is a small country, digitalization was not difficult and since 2022 all public services are digitalized (shqiptarja.com, 2022). Wages of policemen and doctors were raised to discourage petty corruption and the territory is now controlled via satellites drones and cameras to minimize corruptive attempts towards policemen and border police. These measures have significantly reduced petty corruption up to a point, but there are still issues relating to integrity and corruption proof standards in local and central administration.

However, petty corruption was replaced by other phenomena, high-end corruption and increased political corruption. The historical overview makes more sense when analyzed as a whole. All previous developments have pushed people towards worse corruption perception.

PRIORITIZING SECURITY

There is plenty of debate regarding the importance of anti-corruption reforms and the corruption perception when there are other issues in the country which seem to outshine corruption. A study by Ryan J Barry in the mid-2000s puts emphasis on the importance of security in the country and the developments of reforms as of EU's importance of them.

As the population seems to be concerned about everyday security, it is important to understand where all the EU money goes, what it covers and what is left for the government to finish. Another important concern of the EU had been to help national governments invest more into security, especially regarding such events that concern everyday lives. A public security reform is seen as a competition between values and interests. From another point of view, (Brzoska 2006), in most conditions, there is no space for a state that is dealing with war and terrorism to work with cases, as in her example a reformed police force.

It is impossible to even think about democratization and anticorruption when there are larger problems. This is among the top reasons why there is less work done in the states of southeastern Europe which faced difficult years through the 1990s and 2000s. In Albania the 1990 disability followed by the governments of 1991-92 as well as the civil unrest of 1997-98 did not allow much space to focus on problems regarded as “not of high importance” to the general public and politicians. Barry also gives an historical brief of the developments in the Western Balkans during the pre-2005 period. Regarding Albania, he explains the origin of many problems including organized crime and corruption, paying attention to the economic problems appearing after all the state companies went bankrupt in the beginning of the 1990s

(Barry J, 2009). Since 2002, Albania has been notified about the problems of their judiciary system and the need for reform. This paper also points out the problems with the police force in the early 2000s when many police officers were hired without any education or experience since the old police officers were all leaving the force because of their political views.

“The same political reasons have pushed people to be distanced from the police forces, especially in the south” (Barry J, 2009). Half of the people surveyed at that time have declared that they were dissatisfied with the police response and that they would not want the police to get involved in cases of corruption or other crimes that they consider minor. Eight out of ten of these people saw burglary, drugs, and prostitution as the main problems of their security. Over 37% declared that it is not safe to travel during the night. Up until 2009, polarization of the police force remained a big problem” (Barry J, 2009).

After many of the security and institutional problems were solved, there was more push towards reforms on corruption and organized crime. In Albania, the main reason why the reform had to be “dictated” by foreigners is that it was not in the benefit of any ruling party to conduct it, as it could expose that party`s affairs. The historical overview shows that there are external factors related to corruption and that the main form of corruption has evolved. For the next reforms it is needed to adapt to the changes and tackle the current problems.

JUDICIARY PROBLEMS PRIOR TO THE REFORM

Many authors see low wages as one of the drivers of corruption among judges. As of them, before the reform, in Albania a normal judge or prosecutor would get an annual salary of 14700 Euro/year, compared to the Council of Europe median being 57909 Euro a year (Bojana Hajdini, 2022). The High Council of Justice (HCJ), the institution that was responsible for hiring, promoting, and controlling judges, was governed in complete lack of transparency where the minister of Justice was the deputy head of the council. This, along with the complete

lack of transparency that they had while hiring or promoting judges and prosecutors, made the institution not trustable, and thus, the whole system problematic (Bojana Hajdini, 2022).


The old HCJ was also accused of lacking clear criteria for the evaluation of judges and has had problems investigating the assets of judges, although they have been declaring them since 2003. Together with all the problems created by the HCJ, the judicial system in general failed in the years prior to the reform to complete all the cases and people have been left to wait a long time before their cases could be taken into consideration (Bojana Hajdini, 2022). Judges used to have immunity and therefore their conviction rate for corruption related crimes is very low. This is among the top reasons why trust in them is extremely low. The reform was conducted in order to address all the issues above and create a modern, non-corrupt judicial system that is completely independent of other institutions. There are similar issues related to nepotism and dependence of institutions in other sectors.

After years of specialized work with funding and help from internationals, the reform passed the parliament vote in 2016. There was agreed to have a vetting process, which would evaluate if the judges were compliant with the position professionally, personally and monetary wise. The monetary part would be the evaluation of all that a judge owned and then decided if their income could afford their assets. Other institutions were created such as the Qualification Commission and the Appeal Chamber that would take care of the vetting process. At the same time, the High Prosecutorial Council was created separated from the High Judicial Council. The High Inspector of Justice monitors both structures. The structures of these institutions do not allow politicization. Another change was the creation of a special structure against corruption and organized crime, which is supposed to tackle all cases of corruption among high officials and the judiciary system. During 2019 and 2020, the budget towards the judiciary system was raised by 0.35% (Bojana Hajdini, 2022).

Although the justice reform had positive effect on corruption perception of the citizens, the situation is still far from optimal. Access to information using modern Information and Communication technologies would help to raise transparency and bring the results of the reform closer to the citizens. Monitoring courtrooms as well as publishing the decisions will make it easier for researchers to get real-time information on how the system works and will allow other experts to detect problems with certain decisions that can later be appealed. Experiences from developed small countries push for better implementation of these ICT systems since they are proven to give positive results (Bojana Hajdini, 2022). The main aspects of the reform were the vetting process, the independent institutions from the government as well as lowering the chances of the judicial system being led influenced by political parties or parliament members. These are important for further studies, especially with regards to new reforms.


A survey by IDRA conducted in 2016, was financed by the US Embassy in Albania and took place between January and February 2016. The methodology of this study includes interviews conducted within the period of the study and the participants are randomly chosen by a formula. Their margin of error is 3.1 with a 95% confidence interval. The analysis is based on age, gender, education, location, income, and experience with corruption. The number of interviews is proportional to the number of inhabitants (IDRA, 2016).

Figure 5 % Of citizens who believe that the institutions are corrupt (IDRA, 2016)



Transparency seems to be very low as for this survey. The state police are trusted by 54% of the interviewed, The National Bank of Albania by 47%, while parliament, unions and political parties score the lowest at 27%, 26% and 24% respectively. Government transparency scores below average at 41%. Political orientation is mainly left oriented as 43% of the interviewed declared to be more left while 32% declared to be more right (IDRA, 2016). Unions are closer to political parties and parliament than the state institutions, meaning that people trust more the state than the unions. This can also be relatable to corruption perception heritage of unions and their problems with helping the union members.


Figure 6 Political Orientation (IDRA, 2016)



The majority- left population is a sign that people give a lot of attention and responsibility to the state and public officials. Three out of five of the interviewed citizens believe that government institutions are corrupt.

Customs officers seem to be perceived as the most corrupt, scoring 77% while judges and prosecutors score 76% and party leaders 74%. Less corrupt are seen the Institution of the President of the Republic with 43 points out of 100 and the religious leaders with 41 out of 100 (IDRA, 2016). Corruption in the judicial system is constantly shown by all surveys of the era. It is fair to mention that the corruption perception is high enough to see religious leaders as corrupt by 40% of the population.

Figure 7 Figure Perception of Corruption by Sector (IDRA, 2016)



International organizations are trusted much more than domestic institutions, scoring 60 out of 100 for effectiveness against corruption. Regarding experiences, fewer Albanians seem to have been exposed to corruption personally in 2015 compared to 2010 with 57% and 44% respectively (IDRA, 2016). There is more trust in media for exposing corruptive cases than the government while the police forces have started to be trusted more than in 2010. Health care seems to have made improvements from 2010 when 1 in 3 people declared to have paid a bribe, while in 2015, only 1 in 5 declares the same (IDRA, 2016). Although most citizens are uninformed about the anticorruption strategies their government has, most of them understand that bribes are corruption and also know the negative effects.

INTERNATIONAL EVALUATIONS ON CORRUPTION

International evaluation has contributed on what Albania appears in the eyes of foreigners, but also on the corruption perception of the population. These evaluations have been the first steps towards major reforms and have had their contribution towards corruption perception. International evaluations have constantly tackled problems that may need reform and this chapter goes through the most important ones. There is a comparison between international evaluations before and after the judicial reform to understand where the reform succeeded and where it failed to deliver results.

The European Union has tried to push reforms in Albania and the region of the Western Balkans since the early 2000s. When the stabilization- accession agreements were reached, they could implement more of the EU rules and infrastructure to the country due to its determination to join the union. The corruption perception has lowered within the past two decades (Transparency International, 2023) and, among the reasons, stand the reforms and development in every area that the country has managed to achieve.

Public security and the lack of organized crime is what determines a safe and non-corrupt society. When there are problems with security, there is also more corruption and organized crime since it is easy for these people to connect and use some of their profit from their illegal activities to finance the people in power who let them operate. The difficulty of implementing all the reforms presented by the EU stands as well in the context of the country. The models that might have worked for the western Europe would not fit the context of the Western Balkans and Albania, therefore a reform that took all aspects of the country into consideration was needed. From the survey I conducted, most of the respondents who replied regarding the origin of the funding for the judicial were correct pointing at the EU and the US.

INTERNATIONAL EVALUATION OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE (GRECO)

Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) are leading evaluations of compliance with Council of Europe (CoE) anti-corruption standards. Member states that comply with the rules of CoE give assistance in evaluating countries that need more help in terms of combating corruption. These reports evaluate with a developing score, putting certain measures in the beginning and then advancing the requests and findings.

Here a comparison between two recent GRECO evaluations for Albania, taken into consideration. The first one is from 2013 and the second from 2020. Through the differences in reports, there are differences in the score that CoE gave Albania. Corruption perception changes progressively as citizens see more development in terms of the reform.

In 2013, GRECO evaluates that Albania did not implement the recommended legislations for 4 out of five recommendations. The authorities managed to criminalize active and passive corruption of foreign officials as well as those who work in international organizations (Council of Europe, 2013). However, they have not managed to apply laws related to corruption in the private sector yet as of this report. The fact that until 2013 a foreigner could corrupt and not be punished in Albania is one of many problems.

The second part of the third GRECO report includes transparency of party funding where six out of seven recommendations were implemented. They included better progress in laws that make it obligatory for heads of parties to declare the origin of their funds (Council of Europe, 2013).

The results of the later GRECO reports are described as satisfactory and the willingness of the later government to fulfill all the requirements is understandable. The call that was made to the government in 2020 to increase transparency, which still remained a problem after the 2013

evaluation, was mainly solved with all the political advisors and their funding being published on the webpages of each ministry (Council of Europe, 2020).

Their second recommendation was regarding integrity plans that each ministry and sector of the administration should have. In the end, the integrity plans were created in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice leading the process (Council of Europe, 2020). However, the lifespan of these plans is different from one sector of the administration to another. Therefore, they consider this recommendation as partly implemented (Council of Europe, 2020). This is important towards the corruption perception because it introduces citizens to some rules that they are aware of and know that are obligatory to be respected by the officials as well.

The fourth recommendation by GRECO was about implementing in the Code of Ethics and matters of integrity such as third-party contracts, gifts or lobbying. Together with this, the creation of an “Ethics Commission” as a credible supervisory mechanism was highly advised. This recommendation, as of GRECO, is partially dealt with because there is still presence of government officials in the so-called “Ethics Commission”, thus paving the way for suspicious activity.

Inside another recommendation, GRECO requests that the laws of special interest be more open to the public so that the citizens can be part of their draft, in order for the law to express the interests of as many people as possible. The authorities point out their statistics as of which around 300 laws passed, around 200 were sent for public consultation. In general terms, for the central government, the terms were fulfilled (Council of Europe, 2020). For other sectors of the government, especially in local units, it was difficult to take the consideration of citizens or groups of interest, therefore they have evaluated this recommendation as partly implemented.

Recommendation 7 stated that there is more need for transparency in terms of relations between high officials and other entities, especially concerning lobbying. This recommendation can be achieved by having sufficient transparency on these contacts and their purpose (Council of Europe, 2020). As of GRECO, the authorities have responded that they have implemented an article that makes it compulsory for any high government official who has meetings with important people of business or other fields to have in office two representatives of the institution as well as get the minutes hold.

If we compare the two reports, it is clear that the last report is much more detailed and much more serious in what it tackles. The first report touched just the surface of the many problems that existed regarding corruption in Albania while the second one tries to end many of these problems. The first is directed to a more corrupt country, and it seems to be less direct, while the other one seems to be more understandable. The amount of not implemented recommendations is higher in the first report, meaning that before 2013 and the judicial reform governments had it easier to reject the recommendations because of less public pressure.

EUROPEAN UNION PROGRESS REPORTS

EU progress reports serve as a manual for the integration of Albania into the Union. From the reports, the work that the judicial system has done is positive and there can be suggestions in the report as well as acknowledgements regarding the finished work. I have chosen to comment on some parts of the 2016 progress report since this is the year when judicial reform law passed, and it is when the population perception against corruption reached the peak of the 2010s.

The progress report shows clearly to the citizens and the governments where the problems are and what can be done in order to fix sectors that need more work. Through the IPA fundings the EU has more to check for since they count for most of the financiers (Hasmuça, 2017). The importance of this progress report is remarkable because it creates a turning momentum for the

point of view that the union had towards the country. Without a free, functional, and independent judicial system, it is impossible to go on with other reforms. The union saw similar problems in Bulgaria and Romania which did a lot of judicial reforms after their accession to the union. It took longer and more money to work with countries that were ratified to be part of the union because of the lack of leverage from EU's side (Hasmuça, 2017). With the countries in the western Balkans, especially Albania, it is easier to control and suggest reforms because of the need these countries have to join the union.

However, the EU is not the sole contributor. The US Department of State gave technical assistance, helped with capacity building, helped with writing laws as well as the public outreach. The assistance that the American government gave was crucial to the implementation of the reform and training of some of the new staff of the new institutions. They have a better public trust than the government and their outreach programs are not seen as propaganda for elections but rather accepted and believed by the majority of the citizens (Hasmuça, 2017). They were among the major promoters of the reform, and it is also due to them that the public perception changed.

The evaluations, alongside the progress reports show a view of what reforms need to be conducted and their baseline implies where there is more corruption perceived. I do believe that these reports are important as a first step towards the report.

MEDIA

COVERAGE

Media helps to direct the population towards ideas as well as expresses the problems of the day. The changes in media reports related to corruption, as well as the chronicles covering developments of it as successful or not, are important to understand the outcome of the reform.

The previous system allowed for easier control of the judiciary by the politicians. The president elected in 2012, Mr. Nishani, started to dismiss participants of the system who were against the Prime Minister Berisha and hired people close to Berisha and his Democratic Party (Gjipali, 2013). These years were characterized by weak economic growth and a shrinking GDP (The World Bank, 2015). World Bank also estimates problems, reporting worse business climate in Albania in 2012 than the previous years. The return of migrants from Greece, following the Greek crisis, contributed negatively to the economy (Gjipali, 2013).

Media has played the role of raising awareness about corruption even in the most corrupt years of Albania and it has managed to expose cases that the judicial system would not treat because of corruption. Media channels have promoted the fact of the reform happening and have pushed people to believe that since this reform was pushed by the foreigners, it is not like the others, and it has helped to reduce corruption perception. However, what the media did not deliver completely were the law packages and the entire reform. They mainly explained what people wanted to hear, the vetting process, but were much less generous into explaining the other components of the reform, focusing at the differences and independence the institutions and the judicial will have, in comparison with the problematic previous system.

There are more than 250 articles from trusted media sources related to the judicial reform, but there are certainly more from others closer to some political parties. Through free media, the citizens have had the possibility to see the difference between the old and new judicial systems

as well as the importance of the reform. The coverage of the media on some highly corrupt high officials before and after the reform is remarkable. They allow citizens to build their own understanding on corruption and, at the same time, let it serve as an example for other officials that might consider being corrupt (Gjipali, 2013). Media is sometimes feared more than any police investigation since the people who want to share or film a corruptive scene have more faith in media than in the police who they see as close to the officials as of the general perception.

Over the Western Balkans, there have been multiple cases of high officials being arrested on corruption accusations. One of the most famous ones is the verdict to arrest the former Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Gruevski. An arrest warrant was issued by a court in North Macedonia sentencing him for around two years in prison (Top Channel Albania, 2022). However, in 2018 he fled to Hungary where he was given political asylum heavily influenced as of the sources, by his friendship with the prime minister of Hungary, Orban. Although Gruevski is not in prison and not serving his sentence, his arrest warrant speaks for the change that is coming in the region. There are also multiple other cases of high officials brought to justice all over the region. In Albania, some of the new judicial institutions are specialized to work only with cases of high-level corruption and therefore more is to be seen. However, the result, the lesson from these changes is the same for the whole Balkan region, the times are changing and there is now more rule of law than ever, and the societies are starting to be better developed.

CASES OF HIGH CORRUPT OFFICIALS IN ALBANIA

These cases are proven to involve corruptive means and the reason why they are included here is not to pose any accusations on any Albanian politician but to explain the perception of the population regarding them. None of the politicians involved who were found not guilty by the

courts are seen as guilty. The aim is to explain the population perception that may find them guilty or believe the system is corrupt. However, for the public perception, these cases introduce the fact that some high officials are being arrested and therefore this means that people are being punished by the new judicial system. Thus, the system gets more appreciation and the trust in judicial institutions rises.

In Gërdec, Albania, a small village close to Tirana on March 15, 2008, there was an enormous explosion from a weapon demounting facility with 26 casualties, including children. This facility existed as a place where old ammunition, heritage of communism, could be demounted part of country`s NATO joining criteria (Top Channel Albania , 2012).

The business was owned and managed by people with family ties to the children of the former prime minster Berisha. However, the government of Albania distanced itself from the case and declared no knowledge of the case. The Minister of Defense, Mediu resigned (Top Channel Albania , 2012).

The case was taken into consideration by the legal system and there were multiple accusations against the former minister Mediu alongside more than twenty-five others accused. The accusations back in 2008 declared that it was highly possible that Mr. Mediu had knowledge about the facility since his ministry was directly connected to the demounting process. After the investigation, the court found guilty 21 people mainly related to the business world with connections to the facility owners (Top Channel Albania , 2012). No politician was ever found guilty.

After the judicial reform, the Special Court against Corruption and Organized Crime took the case of Mediu back for investigation. It is to be waited for the verdict of this court to have a more accurate and free judicial system (Top Channel Albania, 2022).

In the news and among people it is highly believed that the facility existed with the knowledge of the politicians of the time and that the courts of the time were all corrupted or threatened to give the verdicts that they did. The opposition party of that time still declares that the new justice institutions should reconsider the involved politicians.

Another case that appears to have happened before the reform is the videotape of the former Vice Prime Minister and President, Ilir Meta. Mr. Meta appeared in a video discussing with a minister from his party a corruptive affair related to energy. From the video, it could be understood that they were talking about the claim of around seven hundred thousand euro for themselves through corruptive manners. The video was published by the minister and sent to court. Meta resigned from his position as Vice Prime Minister but was soon found not guilty as the video was considered not suitable proof by the court (Top Channel Albania , 2012).

This verdict brought massive protests and, just two years later, the Socialist Party won the elections (Top Channel Albania, 2022). Many people believe that Meta is involved in multiple corruptive scandals that have made the news also in the past and they relate his party to nepotism and corruption, but no legal action has ever proven this. When the court found Meta not guilty, corruption perception remained high for the judicial system as in people`s eyes they supported the politicians.

These decisions, being highly questionable, have raised attention, especially from groups of interest and public opinion. To contrast, after the judicial reform, there was an open case initiated by the court of Catania in Italy and then sent to the Albanian authorities about some possible connections of that time`s Albanian Internal Affairs Minister Mr. Tahiri. He was accused of being part of a group that facilitated drug cultivation and allowed criminal organizations to have connections to the police. Initially, the prosecutors asked for corruption, organized crime and misuse of duty charges but the judge only agreed on misuse of duty

charges, and he was sentenced to five years in prison out of which he is only conducting three and a half as per the law for shorter investigation (Top Channel Albania, 2022). The minister had facilitated the connections between the police forces and the criminal organizations related to his relatives and had allowed illegal activity in cannabis cultivation during 2014-2016 in Albania when the country became the first producer of the drug in Europe. During his investigation, he was freed of his duties and MP mandate (Top Channel Albania, 2022).

The contrast between the last case and the two previous ones remains on the fact that Mr. Tahiri's arrest is the first one of a high official since Albania entered a consolidated area. More arrests followed as one vice-minister and former minister were arrested for similar cases. In 2021 another former minister was arrested under corruption charges. He resigned his post as a minister shortly before the arrest. He was accused of corruptive affairs related to the funding of one waste incinerator. There were also multiple former mayors arrested after 2016 with the accusation of corruption, the last one being in March 2023. The presence of more politicians in the court and getting some in prison has improved the public corruption perception.

MONEY LAUNDERING AND CRIME IN MEDIA

Media shares an important role when it comes to speaking about crime and money laundering. They whistle blow to citizens the dangers and developments when it comes to corruption and crime. It is thanks to the media that the citizens may have a slightly worse corruption perception than the one they experience in their lives. The main problem coming from this is the pessimistic climate that damages business and many more other economic components of the country.

Together with media, another important factor in determining the corruption perception of the citizens is the crime money they see and experience in their everyday life. Prices in the housing market are enormously high and there are plenty of studies to prove that there is a connection

between higher demand or higher bids and the rise in prices. Although money laundering is special and not related to the general pattern of corruption, the citizens perceive activities that include illegal money as some form of corruption and therefore money laundering as well as illegally earned money is put under the big shade of corruption. A proposed fiscal amnesty by the Albanian government has recently been in the center of attention and has had negative effects towards corruption perception since people believe it will allow more money to be used in corruptive affairs (Open Data Albania, 2022).

THE JUDICIAL REFORM IN ALBANIA

GENERAL INFORMATION RELATED TO THE REFORM

The whole reform amended 21 out of 26 articles of the Albanian constitution that are related to the judicial system. At least 12 new institutions, as well as modifications for the existing ones were created by these changes. A new special prosecutor office against high-level organized crime and corruption initiated under the name SPAK, as well as a new court specialized in anti-corruption. These changes alongside the adaptation of organic laws, contributed to the start of the vetting process (Albanian National Publishing Center, 2018). An international monitoring operation was left in charge of monitoring the whole process as the sole guarantor that the monitoring would be above the political parties. The European Commission deployed the monitoring (Balliu, 2020).

A paper by (Bakiasi, 2011) emphasizes how Albania is evaluated to be better than the region concerning the judicial reform as well as following the Copenhagen criteria. The amount that EU has invested into Albanian reform is 81 million EURO. Among the purposes of the new reform being introduced in Albania were raising integrity of the judges and prosecutors, higher levels of trust among people and making the whole system independent (Bakiasi, 2021).

Current legal structure after the reform based on the national law publication center:

- The constitutional Court is the highest in Albania. They take into consideration cases related to constitutional law, giving the final verdict.
- The high court gives verdicts related to every area of the law except the constitutional ones. They serve as a cassation court and have appellate jurisdiction.
- Lower than that is the appellate court, based in Tirana followed by the first level courts, which are based in the 12 regions.

- High judicial and prosecutorial councils are responsible for appointing judges and prosecutors. They make an independent organ that is not dependent on the parliamentary majority.
- Related to anti-corruption, there is a special prosecution office and the anti-corruption and organized crime court. Both have special status and the judges and prosecutors working there are chosen differently.
- The prosecutor general represents the government in criminal cases with others.
- An organization called the Justice Appointments Council was established to depoliticize and limit the amount of discretion in the appointment process. It helps the appointing bodies do this by pre-screening applicants and producing ranking lists in accordance with the legal requirements for appointments.
- Magistrate school is the institute that prepares new judges and prosecutors to join the system.

The reform has allowed Albania to open negotiations to join the European Union. However, some of the results of the reform, although predicted, created problems in terms of staffing for the judicial sector (reporter.al, 2018). One of the outcomes of the vetting sector was numerous vacancies at every level of the system. Since more than 50% of the judges and prosecutors did not pass the vetting, vacancies are considerable, and it is difficult to fill all the positions with trained personnel (reporter.al, 2018).

The Constitutional Court has nine judges and out of them, only one passed the vetting process. Albania had no constitutional court for more than two years, making it difficult to treat certain cases that may violate the constitutional rights of the citizens. Speaking of the High Court, only four out of 17 judges managed to pass the vetting. For almost two years, they could not work,

therefore more than 23 thousand cases were backlogged and could start to be examined until the necessary quorum to adjudicate on cases was created (Bakiasi, 2021).

Among the population, one of the concepts of judicial reform, the right of the judicial official to resign before vetting is seen with negativity and does not improve the already skeptical view that they have towards the system. It was proven by the reform that corruption was the main problem among the judiciary officials. For most of the cases that did not pass the vetting process, the reason was unjustified assets. The EU agreed to open the negotiations of *acquis* with Albania in March 2020. Among other achievements, the judicial reform was mentioned as being crucial for this step.

Many scholars as well as (Bakiasi, 2021) criticize the fact that the deadlines were not met for the integral laws to pass and the right to resignation as well. The last one is considered highly problematic because it caused many corrupt judges and prosecutors not to be evaluated and it made people perceive more corruption and irresponsibility. (Bakiasi, 2021) Regarding the financial aspect, financial autonomy for the newly created institutions is needed.

In coordination with help from the United States, institutions monitored by the internationals resulted in dismissing 60% of the vetted magistrates until 2020. The reform did receive critics in terms of speed (Bakiasi, 2021). The time it is still taking is considered unnecessary by opposition parties. They seem to attribute the slow speed to the reduced popularity of the reform as well as public support of the new justice institutions.

The main international contributor to this reform is the European Union through the EURALIUS and US through their capacities. EU institutions have valued Albanian reforms as being genuine and an example for what is needed to be done in the other western Balkans countries. EU funded through IPA II this reform with the amount of 649.4 mln EURO for the period 2014- 2020. The next target of EU funding can be a reform in the public administration

and public financial management. As of Bakiasi 2021, progress reports of Albania and the EU on the reform are similar but the domestic one is more detailed. On their progress report is highlighted the importance of the new institutions (High Judicial Council, High Prosecutorial Council and Justice Appointment Council). The European Commission also highlighted the vetting process as credible, taking into consideration reports of the international monitoring operation. EU commission progress report points out the need to make more effort against money laundering and confiscating the assets of organized crime (Bakiasi, 2021).

Later reports show an even clearer view of what is considered to be finished with the judicial reform in Albania. In one article, Mr. Dobrushy (Head of Open Society Foundations Albania) briefs the problems associated with the pre-reform of judicial system. He stresses that OSFA was among the first local actors to identify the need for reform. The pressure from the EU and the US to make the reform happen has grown and achieved its peak in 2014 when the first step was made by the Albanian parliament to appoint a special committee whose duty would be to prepare proposals for the changes (Dobrushy, 2016). The changes proposed by this committee were sent for advice to the Venice Commission as well as the Council of Europe, which sent back a draft that was later turned into a law that was voted in the parliament in July 2016 unanimously. EU has funded the reform through their EURALIUS project, which offered technical assistance as well as U.S. Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training Program (Dobrushy, 2016).


The main changes include changes in the Supreme Court, which will now only decide on matters of law instead of law and fact. Prosecutors will become more independent, their governance will shift to a parallel independent structure, and a process called “Vetting” will screen all judges and prosecutors regarding their integrity and dismiss those who have problems.

In 2022, as for the EU report, the vetting process advanced steadily, dismissing 64% of the subjects. It is encouraged that these authorities refer the dismissed cases to the prosecution service when there are indications of criminal records. They encourage the work of the Special Structure for Anti- Corruption and Organized crime, as well as the National Bureau of Investigation. After budget increases, these institutions have more capacities (EU Report on Albania, 2023).

Related to the fight against corruption, there is some level of preparation as of the EU Report. Although there were certain cases that included important final decisions of SPAK over high officials including a previous minister, there is still work to be done in order to deliver to the people better results to change corruption perception (Dobrushki, 2016).

CHANGES IN THE COURT DECISIONS THROUGH YEARS


Figure 8 Found Guilty of Corruption (Ministry of Justice of Albania, 2023)



From court verdicts, there can be seen a rise in public officials charged with corruption. Around 2016, the first year of the reform, there are more people convicted. The presence of more decisions like this around the reform speaks for the importance of the reform on the work that the judiciary did and that there were more fair decisions than before. People`s perception is highly related to what they hear or experience, meaning that if they hear more about the reform

and see that people are being punished for corruption, it makes more sense for them to acknowledge less corruption. The explanation I give to the decline in the years to follow the reform of the guilty decisions are mainly related to the reform, which left less judges on the system and therefore the workload was much higher thus, corruption cases could not be judged with the same regard as before. Another comment I want to add is that 2016 is the top moment when many officials were arrested and found guilty. As the time passed, from the example that was set in 2016 and the fear of being arrested, there are less cases of corruption. This is in fact, an example of perception changes.

Figure 9 Court Convictions 2004-2021 per each Category (Ministry of Justice of Albania, 2023)



From this chart, it can be witnessed how until the mid-2010s. cases of corruption remained uninvestigated. For corruption in the private sector, the law had to be changed so that this form of corruption could be recognized. For corruption in the judicial system there is a jump in 2016 with more people found guilty than in the previous years.

This is also related to the vetting process and the “acceptable performance” uncorrupt judges wanted when they were entering the vetting process. Conflict of interest, investigations, and then, decisions reached maximum around 2016 as well. These cases are mainly related to public procurement, which is still regarded as a problematic sector among people, especially the youth. High official corruption, being among the most common ways of corruption in the Balkans and Albania, has had similar levels, but around 2016 there are more decisions. All these speak for more corruption decisions taken during these years than any time before.


SPECIALIZED ANTI-CORRUPTION COURTS

Specialized anti-corruption courts seem to be a new phenomenon that emerged especially among developing countries after the 1980s. In Albania, international stakeholders influenced the creation of the Special Court against Corruption and Organized Crime. The success of the reform is mainly given to the push of the internationals, who are trusted more than the government. Because of this reform, Albania was granted the EU candidate status in 2014.

Another reasoning behind a specialized anti-corruption court is to ensure that nonpolitical-independent authorities treat corruption cases, a reform that will also ensure judicial integrity will be needed. In Albania, the structure is independent from other parts of the judicial system, and it is mainly focused to send its subjects to the specialized court. The sizing of the court should also be an important aspect when talking about these courts, as different countries require different numbers (Matthew C. Stephenson, 2022). Similar specialized courts have been present in other countries as well. Romania is an example that was proven successful until slowly the scope of its court started to fade. From the news sources in Romania during the era of this court, which operated mainly in the late 2010, politicians criticized it multiple times for lack of transparency and usage. This court had jurisdiction over cases related to abuse of office, money laundering and other forms of corruption such as bribery. The Romanian parliament

voted in 2022 to abolish the court, a decision that was awaited with protests (EURACTIV, 2021). The cases that this court investigated were related to very high officials and they managed to put to justice and institutionalize multiple well-known high officials. After the voting passed, the competencies of this court went to the normal courts. This court had a special structure, and it was not dependent on the general judicial system. Lessons from this court can also be taken for other countries, as it is the case of Albania. The “SPAK” there serves a similar purpose as the Romanian special court (SIIJ), but its structure is built in a different way since it was also included on the main judicial reform and the reform was taking care of the major players in corruption in the judicial reform.

Figure 10 Albanian SPAK Structure (Gunjic, 2022)



THE STUDY

METHODOLOGY

The research design includes a mixed- methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. There is document analysis, expert interviews as well as a survey.

This thesis analyzes the situation in which Albania found itself in, before the judicial reform in 2014-16, and compares it with the situation after the reform. I collected insights regarding the reform from people working close to or inside the judicial system through phone interviews with a former persecutor, a judge, and two public officials. Through the exploration of historical context, international reports, the role of media in judicial reform, this work aims to provide suggestions related to outcomes of the reform, as well as other future reforms in the public administration to lower the perceived corruption level.

To contribute to existing data and literature I conducted a survey on corruption perception in Albania. The goal of the survey was to understand the perception of the population/target group chosen, related to corruption before and after the judiciary reform. The answers contributed to the goal of the paper to explain which components of the judicial reform were proven successful and which remain problematic. First, people were asked about their corruption perception in general, then about their corruption perception in the judiciary before and after the reform. Secondly, they were asked about hypothetical situations involving their willingness to engage in active corruption. For example, they were asked if they would bribe to get their charges canceled even if they are innocent. I aimed to see if the surveyed trust the legal institutions and their work. If someone was innocent and chose to pay the bribe, it would signal that they have a lack of trust in the legal institutions and choose the shortcut. Finally, they were asked to assess which sector has the highest level of corruption according to their perception

as well as regarding the public safety before and after the reform, to see the trends. Citizens had the opportunity to fill in their data regarding age and education, which allowed me to understand how different age and education groups engage in or perceive corruption.

The questions of the survey were designed to be short and understandable for the interest of those interviewed. The survey brought some results such as the perception of corruption before the reform and indicated expected government, corruption-based reforms. The study took place in Albania and the data collection lasted for one month. Results were collected in person and online. Most of the data collected in person was done for technical reasons and it resulted in the interviewer completing the form on an electronic tablet while asking the questions to the respondents. Online surveys were shared through email or instant message. The target sample was chosen based on their occupation. Other data series used and cited in this work were collected online through official webpages of the data holders.

Regarding my survey, most of the data is averaged to show the average corruption perception or public safety perception. Sample size is 152 and the gender balances are respected. The interviews were taken in institutions and universities. Most of the young people asked are students of the faculty of Economy of the University of Tirana and Korca, and Students of the Faculty of Justice in Tirana. They were contacted by student body representatives to fill in the survey. Students from Tirana were chosen because it is the largest university with the most diverse community in Albania. For other subjects, I managed to visit two state institutions in person to gather data from some of the employees who were contacted by the executive management of the institution.

To meet the credibility requirements required for this work, I collected the ID numbers of the respondents. However, they will not be published due to recent cyber-attacks on the Albanian data systems by the Iranian government because of the risk of data exposure for the people I

have involved with the survey. I have adhered to ethical standards and have considered the privacy of all the respondents of the survey as well as the interview.

DESCRIPTIVE STUDY

There were 70 respondents who were part of the young age group (18-29), 31 were (29-50) and 51 were above the age of 50. There is a disbalance in age, especially for middle age compared to younger age. Although the target was to include balanced numbers in terms of age, the application showed that older people refused the most to take the survey.

Figure 11 Age Groups






Figure 12 Educational Level



Most of the interviewed have a university degree. 117 hold a university degree, 31 a high school diploma and only 4 had completed only the obligatory education of nine years.

Figure 13 Sector of Employment



Out of the total number of 152, 138 of the interviewed answered regarding their employment and most of them (91 participants) were in the private sector, whereas 47 worked in the public sector. There were 14 missing answers.

In summary, most of the respondents were exposed to corruption or have related information/education. I managed to get answers from the same number of men and women leaving less room for gender dominated answers. Most of the interviewed are between the age of 18-28 (46%). The level of education is mainly high, also related to the aim of the survey where 77% of the interviewed hold a university degree, 20% hold a high school diploma and the rest have completed the complementary education of nine years.


When I asked about the presence of corruption before 2016, 52% of the respondents who evaluated corruption with high values (7-10) did the same with the question regarding corruption in the judicial system. At the same time 52% of the people who voted that there is

high corruption before 2016 evaluated less public security before 2016 in the upcoming question.

78% of the people who answered positive for a connection between the judicial reform and corruption reduction answered that corruption levels in the judicial system after 2016 are lower than before.


The “Bribery Acceptance” question is asked with the intention to understand the willingness of respondents to occasionally engage in corruptive activities. The willingness of the respondents to engage in small forms of corruption remains high. This relates to what I mentioned in the beginning that corruption is difficult to understand because it is beneficial for both parties.

Figure 14 Bribery acceptance



The survey also included two questions related to the level of public safety as illustrated below:

Figure 15 Public Safety



FINDINGS


TRUST IN THE SYSTEM TO PROVE INNOCENCE

This question of the survey I conducted intends to get information on the trust that responders have regarding the judicial system. They are asked to answer if in case they are under investigation and innocent they would pay a bribe to cancel their charges. If they trust the system will prove the truth, they are not willing to pay. More than half of the surveyed population (61%) declared that they would not pay to cancel charges if they are innocent. This question exposes the credibility that people do have in the judicial system. More than half of the people believe that the judicial system will not fabricate or give wrong decisions. Among young people, the belief is higher with 80%.

62% of the people under 50 and over 30 declared that they would pay even if they were innocent because they do not trust the system, while for ages more than fifty, eighty percent of the questioned declared that they would pay. The lower trust in the institutions comes also because

of bad corruption perception related to the courts. Older people have lived most of their life in a country with higher corruption and before the judicial reform.


Figure 16 Trust in the Judicial System



RELATION BETWEEN THE JUDICIAL REFORM AND LESS CORRUPTION

This question is part of the study I conducted. Most of the interviewed answered that there is a relation between a lower level of corruption and the judicial reform, however young and older people believe in this more than the middle age. My explanations can be found in the media, which older and younger people tend to follow much more than others.


Figure 17 Is the judicial reform related to less corruption?



AVERAGE DEGREE OF CORRUPTION PERCEPTION

For the question related to the overall presence of corruption in 2016 the maximum value the responders could give as 10 and the minimum was one. The mean in 8.24, standard error is 1.29, both the median and the mode catch the value of 9. The standard deviation is 1.59 while the skewness is -1.077, meaning that the tail of distribution is larger to the left. Minimum value is 2 and the maximum value is 10. There is a 95% probability that the true value of the parameter estimated values lies within the interval of 0.254 units. For the overall presence of corruption after 2016 the questions were of the same nature as the previous question while the result was as following: the mean 4.57, standard error 0.2 median and mode, again the same, at 4 standard deviation of the data is 2.5 while the skewness is 0.76, meaning that the distribution is positively skewed. The tail on the right side is longer compared to the left side. There is a 95% probability that the true value of the parameter estimated values lies within the interval of 0.254 units.

Figure 18 Average grade of corruption perception overall and only for judicial before and after 2016 1 to 10



Through this question of my study, I understood that older people tend to perceive a bigger difference between the two periods. This can be related to what they base the comparison on. It is common that people remember moments of personal experience related to corruption even if they are far back in time. The appeal of these experiences comes much faster than the appearance of constant change. Older people remember more corruption experiences and believe that there is more corruption. All the three groups perceive less corruption after the reform but the change in the perception for the judiciary is larger.

INSIGHTS FROM JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALS

These interviews were taken in confidence prior to the implementation of the survey. Publishing the results of them is consented by the people interviewed. We respect their choice to remain discreet. Among the people interviewed there are two former prosecutors, one lawyer, one current judge as well as two officials working in the respective ministry.

When questioned about the three main problems of the reform, most experts responded differently. However, most of the participants agreed on the problem that exists with the methodology of evaluation. Sometimes the evaluation pays attention to aspects that are not completely responsible for a person's illegal wealth such as old receipts or plane tickets. It was also stated that the uncertain faith of those who did not pass the vetting is a driver of worsening corruption perception.

Most of the interviewed responded positively to the question if they believed that more arrested people for corruption express a better work of the judiciary. However, it is stated that this relation can easily be manipulated, and there are better ways to measure the work of the Judiciary. When more people are arrested for corruption means a better system when under the same people or conditions, the old system did not arrest people and the new does. When the judicial system remains constant and the officials change, a rise in arrest rates could be related to the corruption of the officials instead of the success rate of the judicial system. However, for the situation in Albania, the change of the judicial and the correlation between the higher arrest rates right after the reform is possibly related to less connections between the judicial system and the executive as well as a better, more reformed system.

The other question posed to the experts was related to the timing, if the trust would have risen more if the judicial reform was held in the early 2000s. They responded that Albania was not completely ready for a reform of this scale in the early 2000s. If this would have been conducted, the trust of the people would, of course be in much better conditions than it is now but nevertheless the condition in which the country was in the early 2000s did not allow much space for the judiciary problem to be a main one. There were many worse structural and infrastructural problems of the country including an energy crisis, armed civilians, organized crime, gangs, and international human trafficking. Many of the policies could have been better in Albania during that time, but the fact remains that they were not.

When asked which aspect of the reform they consider to be more positive they answered that most of the general population will start to feel the developments of the new reform in the next three years. They will understand from the news and other sources that there are positive developments in terms of the judicial system with the convictions of certain crime subjects that were hidden in shadows during the old judicial system. Many, including the focus group, see the vetting process as the baseline of this reform. It will tag all the members of the judicial system whose wealth is questionable. In the eyes of people, the next step after not passing vetting is to go to jail but investigations need to be conducted in order to open criminal charges against these previous judicial system workers. People also see the rise of the special prosecutor's office, which will deal with crime and corruption as a supreme court and believe that it is the only one to have the power to arrest famous politicians. The general population mainly is not concerned about other highly important aspects of the reform including the new independent institution created to hire new judges and prosecutors but is a core element of the reform to make the judiciary independent from the executive.

For the experts, there were some negative choices related to the implementation of the reform. What could be understood was that members of the judicial system did not accept quite well the international monitoring of the reform, seeing it as a violence of the national sovereignty. Others, mainly working in the executive or NGOs, declared that the right of prosecutors and judges to resign and not be vetted was not genuine, since the ones who were the most corrupt found a window to escape while those who were less corrupt than them and got into the vetting were fired and have a higher chance of being investigated than the ones who just resigned.

This is among the only EU funded reforms that went as promised and gave the expected results. Our experts declared that the funding reached its goal. The timing remained a problem, but it was justified since the number of dismissed judiciary workers was more than 60% and thus, of

the reform and especially the vetting process had full speed there would be moments without a functioning judicial system at all in the country.

COMPARING THE RESULTS TO SIMILAR STUDIES

A study from CR from 2022 found out that 27.8% of all public officials are corrupt while 63.1% think that most of them are corrupt. This perception is created after citizens have talked to their relatives (QQ Albania, 2022).

The fact that most of them created this perception after talking to their relatives explains the difficulty of getting correct data on corruption. People can be easily manipulated. However, this does not mean that the data is wrong (QQ Albania, 2022). The perception is not a complete reflection of the real cases but is built upon multiple cases the people are aware about. The same study found out that half of the population would only pay a bribe is extremely necessary while 20% would never pay under any circumstance. Corruption as mentioned in the beginning of this paper is well related to the service the people get. They want to pay only if necessary but there are also people who refuse to do so.

The questioned seem to be not sure when it comes to the effect of digitalization in lowering corruption since it is new, and we do believe that there is related to them not benefiting and realizing the benefits of digitalization but can also be that the target of corruption has shifted elsewhere. This survey supports the data and the arguments mentioned above.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, this study highlights several key findings and recommendations based on the analysis of the judicial reform in Albania and on its impacts. The main conclusions:


The Albanian judicial reform can be presented as a model for future reforms as it provides valuable insights while emphasizing the importance of an independent system, reduction of unnecessary institutions as well as dismissal of corrupt officials.

The study recognizes the importance of reforms as an effective measure to reduce corruption while emphasizing the need for high standards of the reformed institutions.

Media should be allowed to work unbothered and independently. All cases raised by it must be taken into consideration. It helps to spread information, denounce corruption and reduce perceived corruption. There are variations on corruption perception among different age groups and understanding these variations is essential for designing tailored approaches addressing corruption.

Another address this study gives is related to the need for more research and a possible reform on the public administration of Albania. The main goal of this would be to tackle all institutions that interact with public procurement and are perceived as the most corrupt.

Figure 19 The Most Corrupt Sector and group age differences (From my survey)



These questions were an important part of the study I conducted. With reference to the judicial reform, after exploring the literature as well as older and current data, it will be suggested that the judicial reform is needed to be quickly implemented in other similar countries, but they must be prepared for the problems it may bring.

When asked for the most corrupt sector, most of the population answers in favor of the judicial system, however, there are differences among ages. Young people believe that the most corrupt sector is the public infrastructure, meaning public infrastructure procurements. I would connect this to the judicial reform and because of perception change. Public infrastructure investments have been the target of many investigations and there are more cases exposed in the media daily. The distance that young people have from the judicial system is another factor that pushes them to be more interested in other problems. The probability of having dealt with the system when you have a younger age is simply lower. We do believe that along with judicial reform and the decline in judicial corruption, the next major problem also known as the public administration starts to be exposed more, and therefore can end in another reform.

Corruption perception is mainly driven by the developments of the present time, but also experience. Through Albanian lessons, it was easy to understand that corruption tends to stick in the memory of the people. This is justified by the results of the survey, but also through the review of different papers.

The judicial system is an important driver of corruption perception. All the previous literature as well as the study included in this paper prove that there is a relation between corruption in the judicial system and the general corruption perception. If the judicial institutions do not do, their job to sanction law violations corruption has more opportunities to thrive. In the case of Albania, the condition before the judicial reform was worse than recently. The system allowed corruption and nepotism because of the way it was organized. By cutting ties of the government

in the judiciary, the reform intended to create an independent system that solves the problems uninfluenced.

The change in the judicial system became possible following three main strategies:

- *Independence of the system from possible political or government connections.*

Under this, the institutions have managed to be uninfluenced by other parties that might be close to a side in a judicial case. These institutions manage to serve the population regardless of the political beliefs, choices, or majority powers. The system works the same for the entire population, following the same rules.

- *Inclusion of foreign experts to work with the screening process.*

These experts are an independent voice for the screening of the officials. The fact that they are foreigners reduces the chances of them being compromised.

- *Reduction of the number of not necessary institutions*

After the reform, many appellate courts in the other cities of Albania were closed. They are now part of the main appellate court in Tirana, which has better capacities.

What could be done better with the reform is related to the timing of the process as well as to address some key elements such as the actual possibility for a subject to the reform to get out of the system without consequences.

There is enough proof to believe that the judicial reform had a positive impact in terms of reducing corruption, which is illustrated through reduction in perceived corruption. The analyzation of reports and papers on the judiciary of Albania have been important to show that not only the survey that we conducted, but also past studies agree on the conditions that the judicial was before and is now.

Through the judicial reform, the general trust in institutions has grown. However, there are still remaining problems. Judicial institutions have grown in popularity and are seen as less corrupt, especially among younger people, but other public institutions, especially those related to public procurement, now have the lead in institutions perceived as corrupt. This indicates the need for further reforms, especially in the public administration and the management of public money. A reform would be accepted also in the other sectors, such as police forces and public health. As a model to follow, the judicial reform in Albania is an example of reducing corruption and can be used in countries with similar problems if there are adjustments as per their needs.

There is adequate proof from the study to indicate the need for change in the public administration. This change can be based on some of the strategies with which the judicial went. The study provides sufficient evidence to support the positive impact that the judicial reform of Albania had with regards to reducing perceived corruption levels of the country. The findings emphasize a need for ongoing changes and efforts to combat corruption and advance reforms in the public administration.

LIMITATIONS

The limitations of this work are mainly related to the small sample of population that is taken into consideration, but also the difficulty that exists in gathering data concerning corruption. The phenomenon is particularly difficult to register because it is illegal and both parties agree to engage with it. It offers discretion that does not benefit data collection. Although corruption perception is the safest choice when it comes to data, it can also be not fully relatable depending on the person, history, education, or moment of questioning.

Different generations experience different major problems as the time passes. Corruption is highly related to these problems or developments. As corruption perception is built upon stories

and living situations, premises of it to change are low. Generations can sometimes be attached to their perception, and this is present in Albania. Therefore, it is best that all factors are considered before studying the perception of corruption.

The internationally funded anti-corruption reforms in Albania exist as a proof of methods that may be used to lower the corruption perception and of course the actual level of corruption and its consequences. However, it must be admitted in conclusion that corruption is not only dependent on the previous factors as well as they are not the only ones that affect it. It is highly complex and multiple studies are needed to achieve conclusions that are more precise. There will be need for more comparison, especially in terms of data regarding Albania and another country from the region to understand more about the phenomenon. There is more research needed to apply further specifics to the studies. The data I collected might have been biased and the representation although was enough, it was still based on certain institutions and may not reflect completely the society.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The policy implications highlight the significance of the judicial reform in corruption reduction as well as provide recommendations for the new reform in the public administration sector.

Through the study and past works it is relevant to say that the judicial reform had an impact in lowering corruption. The perceptions and other related figures went lower from 2016 and on for a reason and it cannot be more than the judicial reform.

Regarding the judicial reform, it is important to maintain the progress and ensure that the quality of appointment committees remains high even after vetting process is finished. The institutions must remain powerful and independent.

Media needs to tackle more structural changes of the new institutions and explore more about the possibilities that exist for future reforms. Through analyzation, it was implied that the judicial reform or reforms in general bring more towards corruption reduction than other channels of perception. Media can help, but an important baseline is needed. The relationship works as follows: The reform is pushed by domestic or foreign evaluations and perceptions and then media publishes the evolution of the reform as well as sends the message to the citizens. The success of the judicial reform came to some costs which need to be eliminated in the future.

The public administration is the next problematic sector that needs to be reformed. The study as well as the past papers, include trustable reasoning that this sector is now the new nest of corruption in the country. We propose that following the successes of the judicial reform some crucial steps can be passed to this other reform.

Although public administration and the judiciary are highly different sectors, the fact is that they both need independence, uncorrupt officials and a functional system.

It is important for the public administration to align policies with the ruling party but this alignment shall not stop the administration from establishing a system that operates independently in terms of the general work and objectives that this administration has. The public administration should be able to handle itself even in times of government deficiency or unclear directives. All the institutions that are dependent on ministries, therefore, government, can be handled by the institutions policy wise but they must be left to professionals to implement their activity as independent.

A vetting process can be applied also to the public administration reform. This can also include an institution that appoints all the heads of the public administration institutions as well as an institution that could be able to evaluate their wealth. Public administration officials can be

checked and then those who do not pass requirements must be put under further investigation from the judicial system.

Establishing a trustworthy public administration is important for easing the path of the country towards further democratization. The reform in the administration will be eased by the judicial reform as the cases can now be treated in a more trustable manner than before.

The problems with public administration, especially cases related to public procurements, are mentioned multiple times in the papers studied, as well as in the statistics studied and gathered. The public administration is more corrupt than the judiciary in the eyes of the young people. With this, it is important to understand that what is driven by young people can lead to further changes.

A structure of control like the ones of the judicial reform can be created to evaluate the public administration constantly. The structure should be parallel structure and not dependent on the government. This way, it will allow for constant independent evaluation.

There are high costs associated with these changes and there would be more need for investment in the field. Feasibility studies are needed prior to conducting the administrative reform and those indicate for further exploration of the field by experts as well as consultations with relevant groups. This policy of reform is more suggestable than the status quo. To summarize, the impacts derived from this study, put emphasis on the importance of finalizing and consolidating the judicial reform in Albania with complete success and extending the reform efforts to the public administration.

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SURVEY SAMPLE

Respondent

x

Anonymous

05:07

Time to complete

1. Mosha/Age *

☒ 18-28☐ 29-50☐ 50+

2. Gjinia/Gender *

☒ Femër/Female☐ Mashkull/Male

3. Niveli i edukimit/Education level *

☐ Arsimit mesëm i ulët/ 9th Grade☒ Gjinnaz/High School☐ Universitet/University

4. Punësimi/Occupation

☐ Publik/Public☒ Privat/Private

5. Nga 1 në 10, si e vlerësoni praninë e korrupsionit në Shqipëri para 2016? *

How would you rate corruption before 2016?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

I pa pranishëm /Not
presentTepër i lartë /Extremel
y high

6. **Nga 1 në 10, si e vlerësoni praninë e korrupsionit në Shqipëri pas 2016? ***

How would you rate corruption after 2016?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

I pa pranishëm /Not
present

Tepër i lartë /Extremel
y high

7. **Nga 1 në 10, si e vlerësoni praninë e korrupsionit në sistemin e drejtësisë para 2016? ***

From one to 10 how do you rate corruption in the judicial system before 2016?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

I pa pranishëm / Not
present

Tepër i lartë /Extremel
y high

8. **Nga 1 në 10, si e vlerësoni praninë e korrupsionit në sistemin e drejtësisë pas 2016? ***

From one to 10 how do you rate corruption in the judicial system after 2016?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

I pa pranishëm /Not
present

Tepër i lartë /Extremel
y high

9. **Nga 1 në 10, si e vlerësoni sigurinë publike para 2016? ***

How would you rate public safety before 2016?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Tepër i problematike/
Highly problematic

Siguri e lartë /Highly
safe

10. **Nga 1 në 10, si e vlerësoni sigurinë publike pas 2016? ***

How would you rate public safety after 2016?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Tepër i problematike/
Highly problematic

Siguri e lartë /Highly
safe

11. **Nga 1 në 10, si i e vlerësoni praninë e krimeve të vogla pas 2016? ***

How would you rate the presence small crimes after 2016?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Prani e ulët/ Low pres
ence

Prani e lartë /High pr
esence

12. **Mendoni se ka një lidhje mes reformës në drejtësi dhe uljes së nivelit të korrupsionit ne vend? ***

Is there a connection between the judicial reform and corruption reduction?

☒ Po/Yes

☐ Jo/No

13. Cili sektor është më i korruptuari sipas jush? *

Which sector is the most corrupt in your opinion?

- ☒ Policia/Police forces
- ☐ Gjykatat/Judicial system
- ☐ Sistemi shëndetësor publik/Public Health
- care ☐ Infrastruktura publike /Public
- Infrastructure

14. Nëse jeni i akuzuar për një krim që nuk e keni bërë, a do ti jepnit prokurorit 5000 euro që të anulojë akuzat? *

If you go to court today for a crime you did not commit, would you agree to give 5000 EURO to the prosecutor to cancel your charges?

- ☒ Po/Yes
- ☐ Jo/No

15. Në rast se keni harruar një dokument që nevojitet vetëm në doganë për të kaluar kufirin në një shtet fqinj, do të pranonit t'i jepni ryshfet policit të doganës 20 euro që të kaloni kufirin apo do të ktheheshit mbrapsht në shtëpi 1 orë për të marrë dokumentin? Kosto e kthimit mbrapsht është më e lartë se 20 euro.

You have forgotten a permit you need to pass the border with your car. The official asks for 20 euro to skip the check of that document. Do you give him the money or drive one hour back to your house to pick it up?

- ☐ Kthehu mbrapsht/Drive back
- ☒ Paguaj 20 euro/Give 20 euro

16. A keni informacion se kush e financoi reformën në drejtësi?

Do you know who financed the judicial reform?

eu

17. ID

SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS

Who financed the judicial reform?	EU	evropa	eu	amerika	usa and eu
Would you bribe a customs official to allow you pass without a document related to your car or you drive back?	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR
Will you pay 5000 EUR to drop your accusations for a crime you have not committed?	No	No	Yes	No	No
The most corrupt sector	Judicial system	Judicial system	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Judicial system
Connection between judicial reform and lower corruption	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Small crime rate after 2016	6	4	2	4	6
Public security after 2016	7	4	4	8	8
Public security before 2016	3	2	8	3	5
Presence of corruption in the judicial system after 2016	1	6	4	1	3
Presence of corruption in the judicial system before 2016	10	10	8	10	9
Presence of overall corruption after 2016	4	5	3	4	4
Presence of overall corruption before 2016	7	10	7	10	8
Occupation	Public	Private	Private	Public	Public
Education level	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years
Gender	F	M	F	F	F
Age	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28
No	1	2	3	4	5

BE dhe SHBA	eu	be shba	evropa	shba dhe be	eu			eu usa		USA	
Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Drive back
Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Judicial system	Police forces	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Police forces
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	5	6	5	7	4	5	4	4	5	10	10
7	7	7	6	9	5	6	8	4	5	8	0
4	4	5	6	8	4	4	4	8	4	8	0
3	4	7	7	1	3	5	2	3	5	10	10
10	7	10	10	9	8	7	7	8	7	10	10
6	4	5	5	7	4	4	1	3	5	5	10
9	7	9	9	8	9	7	7	8	7	5	10
Private	Public	Private	Private	Private	Private	Public	Private	Private	Public	Private	Public
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	Middle School 9 Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	High School 12 Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years
M	M	F	M	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28
9	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17

SHBA dhe BE	No	Dapartamenti Amerikan i Shkencave	BE	BE dhe SHBA	Jo, nuk kam informacio	Jo		Jo	usa		
Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Drive back	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR
No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Public Infrastructure	Judicial system	Public Infrastructure	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Police forces	Judicial system	Public Infrastructure
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	8	9	6	7	10	10	10	10	4	10	5
8	3	10	5	9	5	6	10	0	7	3	6
6	4	9	4	9	7	5	10	0	3	7	3
1	10	10	5	8	10	10	10	10	4	10	1
6	8	10	8	9	10	10	10	10	5	10	9
2	10	10	7	8	10	10	10	10	2	10	3
7	4	10	7	9	10	10	10	10	6	9	6
Public	Private	Private	Private	Private	Private	Private	Private	Private		Private	
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years
M	M	M	F	F	F	F	F	F	M	F	M
18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28
30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41

					Be dhe usa	eu usa	Usa	Eu dhe us	Rama	BE dhe SHBA	foreigners
Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR
No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Judicial system	Public Infrastructure
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
8	7	7	6	6	4	4	7	10	5	4	4
7	8	7	7	8	6	6	8	7	5	7	5
4	3	3	4	5	6	4	7	2	3	3	3
2	2	4	2	2	2	5	2	2	1	1	5
10	9	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	10	10	10
2	2	2	2	2	5	4	3	4	6	4	5
9	10	9	9	10	9	10	8	7	9	9	9
Private		Public	Public	Private	Private	Public	Public	Private	Private	Public	Private
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years
F	F	F	M	M	F	F	F	F	M	F	M
18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	18-28	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50
66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77

Eu	EU USA	geveria	evropa	eu us	eu	evr	be	shba	eu	evropa	Eu
Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR
No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Health Care	Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Health Care	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system
Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
4	5	3	6	4	8	5	5	5	6	6	4
7	5	7	7	7	4	4	7	9	10	5	6
2	3	1	4	6	3	7	4	7	8	7	5
4	4	3	5	3	4	4	5	4	6	0	6
9	7	10	7	8	8	7	8	7	8	9	8
5	5	2	5	4	4	5	5	4	5	3	6
10	8	10	7	7	8	8	9	6	7	6	8
Private	Private	Private	Public	Private	Private	Private	Public	Public	Private	Public	Private
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	Middle School 9 Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	High School 12 Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years
M	M	M	F	F	F	M	M	M	F	M	F
29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50
78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89

	shba eu	eu	eu		eu shba qeveria		eu		eu qeveria	eu
Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR
No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Police forces	Judicial system	Police forces	Judicial system	Health Care	Judicial system	Judicial system	Police forces	Police forces	Judicial system	Health Care
Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
6	7	6	5	4	5	6	4	5	7	7
6	5	5	5	6	7	4	4	7	8	3
2	8	3	4	5	5	6	7	3	7	6
4	5	4	6	6	4	4	2	2	2	3
7	6	6	2	4	7	7	8	7	10	6
5	5	4	7	7	5	4	3	2	3	3
9	8	6	3	5	8	8	7	8	7	7
Private	Private	Private	Private	Private	Private	Public	Private	Private	Public	Public
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	Middle School 9 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	Hgh School 12 Years	Hgh School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years
F	M	F	M	M	M	M	F	M	F	M
29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50	29-50
90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
										101

Jo	Bashkimi evropian	Evropa	Be dhe amerika	Eu	Evropa	Be	EU	shba	shba dhe be	eu	be, shba qeveria
Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back
Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
Public Infrastructure	Judicial system	Police forces	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Public Infrastructure	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Judicial system	Public Infrastructure	Judicial system	Public Infrastructure
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
8	5	4	5	4	7	8	7	6	4	5	3
8	7	7	7	6	7	5	8	8	9	3	10
7	3	5	5	5	3	2	7	4	5	1	7
10	5	6	3	5	4	5	3	4	1	2	1
10	10	10	10	10	8	10	10	8	9	7	8
7	6	3	4	5	4	7	4	5	3	7	3
7	10	9	9	8	7	10	9	7	8	8	7
Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Private	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	High School 12 Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years
F	M	F	F	M	F	M	M	F	M	F	F
29-50	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+
102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113

evropa	eu							jo			
Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Drive back	
Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
Police forces	Police forces	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Police forces	Public Infrastructure	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system	
Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
6	6	5	9	6	4	3	5	7	4	7	4
10	7	7	3	7	6	5	4	2	8	8	8
8	3	4	9	6	4	2	2	9	4	2	3
2	3	4	8	2	0	1	2	3	2	2	3
8	7	8	3	7	10	9	9	9	9	9	7
2	4	4	9	5	2	3	2	4	3	2	3
7	7	8	2	7	10	10	9	9	8	8	9
Private	Private	Public	Private	Private		Private	Public	Private	Public	Private	Private
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	High School 12 Years	High School 12 Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years
M	M	M	M	M	M	F	M	M	F	M	F
50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+	50+
114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125

Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR	Bribe 20 EUR
Yes	Yes	Yes
Judicial system	Judicial system	Judicial system
No	No	Yes
6	4	6
3	5	4
1	3	2
5	6	9
9	10	10
9	8	8
10	9	9
Private	Public	Private
University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years	University 12+ Years
F	F	F
50+	50+	50+
150	151	152