CITIES OF WELCOME, INDIFFERENCE AND REFUSE – COMPARING CITIES' RESPONSE TO THE MIGRATION INFLUXES OF 2015 AND 2022

By

Mónica Silva

Submitted to

Central European University

Department of International Relations

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

Supervisor: Professor Christopher LaRoche

Vienna, Austria

2023

ABSTRACT

Cities are emerging in the international arena as actors capable of bringing innovative solutions to transnational challenges, namely in the field of migration. The general response of the European Union (EU) and its member states to the 2015 migration influx was based on the securitization of asylums seekers, militarization of borders, and externalization of the asylum-seeking process; on the contrary, the response to the migration influx of 2022, resulted in European cooperation, a loose borders approach, and a commitment to welcome. Given the discrepancy and discriminatory responses at national and European levels, the following question arises: did cities exhibit the same behavior? This thesis aims to compare and analyze cities' responses to both migration influxes by identifying the main local policies and discourses of local authorities of the cities of Barcelona, Milan, Warsaw, and Budapest. Even though previous research most often characterizes big European cities as *cities of welcome*, this thesis concluded that not all cities exhibited a clear non-discriminatory response during both periods, fitting better under the classification of *cities of indifferenc*e and *cities of refuse.*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CEU eTD Collection

INTRODUCTION

There has been an academic effort in the last decades to better accommodate cities as influential actors in international relations (Ashamin and Thrift 2005; Curtis 2011; Acuto 2013), namely in the field of migration, in which cities often become the doers, from reception to the long-term integration of migrants[1]. The migration influxes of 2015 and 2022 generated extensive comparative research at the national and EU levels (e.g., Çiçek 2022; Rosstalnyj 2022; Sales 2023), however, research conducted at the city level is comparatively scarce. Why compare the local strategies and discourses of the same city during different periods of massive migration flows? The European Union and its member states faced strong criticism for their failure to deal with the 2015 influx, which resulted in several violations of refugee and human rights (Taran, Lima and Kadysheva 2016, 18). Scholars often emphasized the inherent racism towards non-European asylum seekers as one of the underlying causes for such failure (e.g., Carrera et al. 2022; Gallant 2022; Bayoumi 2022). Therefore, it is crucial to seek alternative solutions to migration management that embrace a more human rights-based approach. Academic research and policy reports have been highlighting cities' tendency to be more open, receptive, and tolerant towards migrants. In many instances, cities often engage in processes of decoupling from the national legal framework, to comply with international law (Oomen 2020). In this context, it becomes relevant to explore whether cities live up to their non-discriminatory reputation, in times of massive migration flows.

This thesis is structured in the following manner: it starts with an exposition of the growing agency of cities in the realm of international relations, emphasizing their ascension and influence in addressing transnational issues, such as migration; then, it continues with an EU and national-level comparison of the main policies and discourses during the migration

---

[1] There is no universally accepted definition for the term "migrant". This thesis uses IOM's inclusivist definition: "an umbrella term covering all forms of movements." (IOM – "International Migration Law", nº 34, 2019)

influxes of 2015 and 2022, highlighting the disparity and discrimination of the responses; the same comparative analysis is also made at the city level for the cities of Barcelona, Milan, Warsaw, and Budapest. The last section of the thesis analyzes and discusses the main findings, wrapping up with a conclusion with suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER 1: THE GROWING AGENCY OF CITIES

The state-city dynamic is shifting. In the past, with the Westphalian edification of the nation-state, cities have been relegated to the background in the realm of international relations. These once powerful and autonomous actors were subsumed within the national territory and seen as entities that mainly worked for the engines of national economies (Curtis 2014). Nevertheless, in the last few decades, cities have been regaining prominence in the world economy. The globalization of economic activity (opening of national economies, deregulation, and privatization) re-scaled its engine and management to sub-national actors, such as regions and cities. Sassen (2005) introduced the term "global cities" to describe those cities that act as centers of "command and control" in the post-Cold War neoliberal global economy. The underlying reasoning is that the bigger the "geographic dispersal of economic activities", the more centralized its management needs to be (Sassen 2005, 28). The author argues that such centralization of control operations is concentrated in the cities. Then, global cities become accumulators of financial services, specialized firms, and control operations, turning into regional nodal points that coordinate the activities of the global economy (Sassen 2005).

Yet, some cities are stretching beyond their dominance in international finance. Their renaissance is not purely economic but also political due to their greater role in global governance. Thus, cities are becoming *de facto* international political agents with policy-making influence, especially in transnational fields, such as climate change, migration, security, and human rights, in which the international response appears to be failing or underperforming (Curtis and Acuto 2018).

Cities have been able to display their actorness on the global stage in numerous ways. For instance, the rising prominence of city mayors, who have moved "from ceremonial and advocacy roles to facilitating and policymaking functions" (Acuto 2013, 485). Mayors have had a bigger media presence, catalyzed global attention on certain agendas, engaged in mayor-

to-mayor diplomacy, and increasingly attracted the attention of international and supranational organizations (Acuto 2013, 485-486; Curtis 2016, 464). Another example of cities' agency is development of and participation in transnational city networks. These networks function non-hierarchically, often comprising a multiplicity of actors, such as local and international associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and the third sector. They are capable of exchanging practices and knowledge, engaging in multiscalar governing, enforcing norms and producing new ones, and bringing new alternatives to international cooperation (Acuto 2013, 487-494; Hachigian 2019). City networks are thus able to offer alternative governance solutions based on cooperation, as opposed to sovereign and more coercive forms of command, typical of nation-states. These abilities to cooperate horizontally and interact in a multiscalar way did not go unnoticed by supranational entities which have been more frequently inviting these networks to take a seat at the table to generate better responses to global issues (Normandin 2023).

1.1 Cities and Migration

Migration has been traditionally a matter of national responsibility, although it has undergone a "local turn" (Zapata-Barrero, Caponio and Scholten 2017). Since 80% of all migrants settle in urban areas (OECD 2022), cities are inevitably at the "front line" when it comes to welcoming, receiving, integrating, and relocating migrants. Therefore, they must find *ad hoc* solutions about the local realities that often do not reach national governments (Thouez 2020, 651). Consequently, many migrants settling in cities might feel a bigger attachment to their urban surroundings than to the nation, creating a different type, but much less *imagined community* – an urban citizenship (Kaufmann 2019, 2). Additionally, there is the public perception that states are not able to effectively deal with migration challenges, along with the fact that the will of the *demos* is more vigorously performed in cities, given the general decline of national democracy (Thouez 2020, 654).

This "local turn" on migration is not necessarily undesired by national governments. Although migrants recognized legal status are assigned exclusively by national authorities, the set of rights, obligations, and restrictions that come with each status are controlled by local authorities. This means that subsidies, access to welfare, education, employment, and other services are administered by cities, which must constantly verify the identity and status of migrants. As a result, the monitoring and verification of migrants' legal status is re-scaled from the national/border level to the local level, turning into a more recurrent process. Not surprisingly, nation-states are hopeful to see their cities as national law enforcers (Lebuhn 2013, 42-45).

How are cities reacting to this urbanization of migration? Most scholarly works state that cities apply a variety of local policies and strategies to welcome, support, care for, and protect migrants (e.g., Poppelaarsa and Scholten 2008; Blocher 2017; Muggah and Abdenur 2018; Saliba and Wolff 2018; Oomen 2020, Thouez 2020) since they are "most directly called on to meet human rights" (Taran, Lima and Kadysheva 2016, 1). Besides that, Sassen (1993) has argued that global cities, as centers of financial services with high-income workers, could not operate and flourish economically without the parallel offer of services provided by small firms with low-income workers, who are often immigrants (32). So, cities need migrants "to spur innovation and economic growth" (OECD 2014, 3).

The human rights and economic imperatives appear to be a strong combo that incites cities to become champions of the migrant cause. These cities have been given a panoply of labels: *Cities of Welcome, Cities of Refuge, Sanctuary Cities, Integrating Cities,* or *Intercultural Cities*. For simplification, we will use the term *city of welcome* to refer to any city that displays a general "culture of welcome" and shows commitment to migrants' rights and well-being through its policies and discourse.

5

The examples of policies are countless. For instance, New York introduced a municipal identity card in 2014 (*IDNYC*), recognized by the New York Police Department which provides access to several health, social, and cultural services, regardless of immigration status. The city of Paris was the first European city to run a similar program in 2015 (*Carte Citoyenne*), which has been particularly popular among the youth (Urban citizenship 2019). Montreal created an integration program (*BINAM*) to provide on-the-job training to newcomers (Ladouceur-Girard n.d.), while São Paulo established a municipal immigration council (Global Compact on Refugees 2020). Finally, Chicago conducted more than 700 "*Know Your Rights*" workshops ("Urban refuge 2018).

Some migration policies are aimed at irregular migrants, who are often excluded by national governments. Kaufmann (2019) groups these policies into *sanctuary policies*, meaning that local authorities cannot demand any information about a citizen's immigration status or pass it on to national authorities; *local bureaucratic membership*, meant to provide equal access to services irrespective of immigration status; and *regularization*, through which cities get actively involved in regularization programs.

Cities of welcome also engage in multiple alliances to address migration, whether through networks (e.g., *Cities of Migration, URBACT Network: Arrival Cities, Integrating Cities, International Cities of Refuge Network*) or through national and inter-city exchanges (e.g., Athens co-founded a network with other 10 Greek cities to share municipal responses and solutions towards migration). Oomen (2020) who analyzed dozens of European transnational municipal networks in the field of migration, described how these alliances operate. Firstly, cities exchange information, knowledge, and practices to "sustain more open policies in times of increasingly restrictive national rhetoric and practices pertaining to migration" (926-931), for example, network webinars on how to better assist and include irregular migrants. Secondly, urban networks can codify their own norms, as well as reiterate, refine, and merge international

law through their own texts "to strengthen migration law and bring it more in line with local needs". This is done by adopting their own joint declarations, creating their own handbooks as well as their own controlling and monitoring mechanisms (926-931). Finally, cities also engage in symbolic actions and discourses of "showcasing, storytelling and shaming national governments" to decouple from national policies, i.e., to "strengthen local authorities independence vis-à-vis national governments" while legitimizing their own progressive policies toward migrants (926-931). As such, decoupling occurs when local authorities purposely apply local policies that diverge from those imposed nationally, which might or might not violate national law (Scholten and Penninx 2016, 92). Examples of that are the provision of more services to migrants than those required by national law, the implementation of *sanctuary policies*, or the creation of human corridors to facilitate direct access to cities. However, not all decoupling practices result in state confrontation, since some cities approach the lack of national state policy on migration as a "silent permission of the state to incorporate migrants" (Slezak and Bielewska 2021).

The argument that cities have been more open to migration than nation-states has been challenged mainly by trans-Atlantic research. Researchers have identified North American cities that apply stricter local policies on migration than those established by the federal powers. Varsányi (2008) argues that "an increasing number of cities and states are utilizing the tools at their disposal (…) to (severely) constrain the opportunities and/or behaviors of the cities' undocumented residents, and essentially to 'get these people out of town'" (30). She analyzed how some American city governments have prohibited the establishment of "Formal Day Labor Hiring Sites" – a gathering place to assist with job allocation and the hiring process, for laborers who work on a day-to-day informal basis and do not have to be subjected to verification of their legal status (34).

On the European side, research on anti-migration local policies is scarcer. Marchetti (2020), who analyzed local policies towards migrants in Italian cities, affirms nonetheless, that cities' strictness has been growing since 2016 (246). The "local practices of exclusion" by some of these cities were defined by Ambrosini (2020) as "those measures adopted by local authorities, that aim to exclude migrants and separate them from the native component of the population by establishing specific, albeit implicit, prohibitions against them and which may be indirect or hidden, and which set up special screening procedures or limit their access to benefits and local social policy resources" (198-199). At the local level, policies of exclusion often materialize through administrative acts. A concrete example is the decision of the City Council of Fontevivo, Italy, to "deny the possibility to host migrants in public facilities" as well as "in private facilities located in the Municipal territory", given that "reception of migrants in the municipal territory brings sanitary and social problems" (Marchetti 2020, 249).

Policies of exclusion might be accompanied by discourses of exclusion through public declarations in open letters, protests, and campaigns by local authorities. For example, the Mayor of Capizzone, Italy, wrote an open letter to his citizens saying "No to refugees on the territory of Capizzone" (Marchetti 2020, 248). In turn, Ambrosini (2020) concluded that these Italian cities' scarcity of resources, and the belief that urban security, Italian identity, and European values were at stake, led to the activation of local policies of exclusions, particularly aimed at asylum seekers during the influx of 2015. As a result, such cities were labelled as *cities of refuse* as opposed to *cities of refuge*.

CHAPTER 2: DETERRENCE AND WELCOMING DURING MIGRATION INFLUXES

In the last eight years, the EU was confronted with two humanitarian challenges. The first one, in 2015, originated from the intensification of the Syrian civil war, as well as the conflict and persecution in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to a mass influx of refugees towards Europe. At the end of the same year, more than 900,000 refugees had entered Europe (UNHCR 2015), coupled with several tragedies on the Mediterranean shores (IOM 2016) and inside the EU's territory (Reuters 2015). Moreover, Greece and Italy received the highest number of arrivals across the Mediterranean (UNHCR 2015a), while Hungary received the highest number of first-time applications for asylum per 100,000 people in the country's population (Pew Research Center 2016). The second one, emerged in the first months of 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, and triggered another influx with more than four million refugees entering Poland, one million entering Romania, and another million entering Hungary (UNCHR 2023).

2.1. Securitization, Militarization, Externalization – The EU and National Responses in 2015

During the migration influx of 2015, the EU and its member states took a "fortress" approach via militarized and externalized policies that violated "legal obligations in terms of international refugee protection and the protection of migrants' rights" (Taran, Lima and Kadysheva 2016, 18). The EU's initial response to the influx attempted to live up to the asylum, border, and immigration policies of Art. 80 TFEU – a governance "by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility" (EUR-Lex). Perhaps sensing what the future would bring, the European Commission presented in early 2015 the "European Agenda on Migration" based on "Europe's duty to protect" through a common asylum policy and "saving lives" at the borders (European Commission 2015). The agenda proposed an emergency relocation system for

migrants in case of influx, as well as a temporary distribution mechanism for those requiring international protection (European Commission 2015).

However, as the crisis deepened, enthusiasm waned. For instance, the then Polish Prime Minister, Ewa Kopcacz, referred to the "duty to help" but also to the need of sorting economic migrants from asylum seekers, of "responsible solidarity," and of unrealistic expectations from migrants (Reuters 2015a). Also, the EU emergency relocation plan aimed at relocating around 10,000 migrants to Poland, yet the Polish government was not willing to accept more than 2,000 (Reuters 2015a). Later, with the election of a right-wing government in October and the Paris terrorist attacks in November, Poland refused to accept any migrant (Potyrala 2016, 82). Similarly, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia also opposed any relocation scheme (Court of Justice 2020). Moreover, the European Council President Donald Tusk, noticing the reluctance of Italy and Greece to detain people, reminded nation-states that international law does allow detention of protection-seekers up to 18 months, incentivizing arbitrary detention since "we can and should hold migrants for as long as needed until the verification is complete" and the EU "should not underestimate the security threat" that refugees represented (Reuters 2015).

As a result of EU and states reactions, it did not take long for the influx to be seen as a danger to European values and homogeneity, and refugees compared to invaders and even linked to terrorism (Schimd 2016, 7). For instance, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, described refugees as "illegal migrants", "looking like an army", linking them in several speeches "with the spread of terrorism" (Clibbon 2015), and a danger to "Europe's Christian culture" (Karnitschnig, 2015). Furthermore, the Czech President Milos Zeman, referred to refugees as an "organized invasion", carriers of diseases and terrorism (DW 2016).

Framing the influx as a threat to national security gave room for maneuver for member states to apply exceptional measures, such as unilaterally dismiss the Schengen area by

10

reinstating the control of their own borders, performing pushbacks, refusing to accept refugees, temporarily closing the borders, or even constructing wire border fences (Abderrahim 2021, 8), clearly in breach of international law and human rights. For this motive, several humanitarian organizations condemned the fact that "European governments (…) invent new and arbitrary criteria" to control borders (Medecins sans Frontieres 2016), as seen in Hungary through the construction of a new border fence, and in Czech Republic's unlawful and lengthy detention conditions that were described as "worse than prisons" (DW 205).

At the same time, there was a shift towards a more militarized response to reduce and control the flows of asylum seekers who crossed the borders irregularly (Asderaki and Markozani 2021, 190-194). The EU proposed and launched military operations in 2015, in the Mediterranean, by reinforcing and expanding the role of FRONTEX in a "systematic effort to capture and destroy vessels used by the smugglers" (European Commission 2015a), and by 2016, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maritime force joined FRONTEX in what some scholars consider "the beginning of a collaboration in security and defense" (Asderaki and Markozani 2021, 190-194).

Following the growing division between the member states and their inability to adopt a common and consensual path, the relocation scheme was never fully ignited leaving Italy and Greece especially isolated. Consequently, the EU advanced with the EU-Turkey deal: an externalization plan, that sought to transfer the "refugee burden" to a third country in order to stop the migration influx. As such, Turkey would hamper asylum seekers from reaching EU territory in return for money, visas, advancement in Turkey's assessment to the EU, recognition as a safe third country, among others (Çiçek 2022, 2). This deal provided further leverage to refuse irregular migrants and perform collective expulsions of those who had crossed from Turkey resulting in a 98% decrease in irregular crossings via Turkey to the EU by 2020 (European Council 2023).

2.2. Cooperation, Solidarity, "Humanizing" – The EU and National Responses in 2022

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine in 2014 entered a new phase on February 2022, igniting a sudden large-scale displacement of people residing in Ukraine. By March, close to one million people were estimated to have left Ukraine ("The Ukraine crisis" 2022). The reaction to the invasion was followed by an outpouring of welcoming and solidarity speeches by all EU institutions, namely the speech of the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, who stated that the Ukrainians are an "inspiration to us all", and "we welcome with open arms" in "full solidarity" (European Commission 2022).

Within one week, the European Commission proposed the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), which was promptly and unanimously adopted by the Council of Ministers on March 4. The TPD is an "exceptional measure to provide immediate and temporary protection in the event of mass influx" for one year with automatic extension (European Commission n.d.). This means that asylum seekers are immediately recognized as in need of protection and do not have to go through an application for international protection. Moreover, access to employment, housing, social welfare, and education are granted (EUR-lex 2022).

The TPD was followed by a "Council Implementing Decision" stating that given the fact that Ukrainians were previously visa-free travelers in Europe, they are "able to choose the Member State in which they want to enjoy the rights attached to the temporary protection", since it will "in practice facilitate a balance of efforts between Member States, thereby reducing the pressure on national reception systems" (EUR-lex 2022). This led to loose border policies that allowed Ukrainian nationals to enter the EU without passports or valid documentation.

The EU also launched the "Solidarity Platform", a mechanism set up by the Commission to better tackle the needs on the ground of the member states, through operational support and

cooperation between the EU agencies, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR; European Commission 2022a). The TPD and the "Council Implementing Decision" were further accompanied by the "Communication from the Commission on Operational Guidelines" which provided a wider room for accepting expired documents, simplifying border controls, establishing emergency support, and facilitating the entry of pet animals traveling with their owners (EUR-Lex 2022a).

The immediate discursive and policy responses of the member states were unanimously welcoming. For the Eastern countries in particular, securitization seemed something of the past, as the Bulgarian Prime Minister reflected, "There is not a single European country now which is afraid of the current wave of refugees", given the fact that these "are intelligent" and "educated people" (Berlinger 2022). In addition, the Hungarian prime minister also stated that Ukrainians "can be assured they will be welcomed by friends in Hungary," labelling such action as an "elementary human, Christian instinct" (PM Orbán 2022). Even Poland, during an overwhelmed moment at the end of March, when it had already taken more than two million refugees, stated through deputy prime minister Piotr Glinsky that it was "still ready to accept more refugees", later justifying the effort by adding that Ukrainians had changed and "they are trying to be more European" (Karnitschnig 2022). Some member states have taken additional measures, like Slovakia and Poland, which prepared ahead of the Russian invasion to "facilitate a large-scale exit of Ukrainians in the event of another Russian attack" (Euronews 2022). UNHCR (2022) briefing notes indicates how there was "tremendous solidarity and hospitality" from the national authorities of the countries receiving Ukrainian refugees.

2.3. Spotting the Differences and the Predominance of the Racism Argument

It is reasonable, by now, to suggest that Europe adopted two distinct responses to the influxes. Although the migration flow in 2022 was noticeably greater and more abrupt, it is the

mass influx of 2015 that is famously known as the "refugee crisis". Hence, the crisis dimension is not only related to the number of crossings into Europe, but also to the inertia, lack of consensus, and solidarity among the member states, as well as the narratives and framings adopted by the media (Çiçek 2022, 2; UNHCR 2023a; Alcalde, n.d.).

In 2015, the EU outsourced asylum seekers back to Turkey and the member states refused to comply with several EU policies, like the relocation mechanism. On the contrary, in 2022, the EU and member states assumed a firm commitment with the TPD and a unanimous cooperation. As a result, the Dublin regulation was imposed during the first influx to avoid secondary movements, but the Ukrainian nationals could freely choose their country of destination.

The securitization of the 2015 influx led to numerous unilateral measures which often breached human rights, such as pushbacks and closing of borders. Besides that, there was a clear call from Brussels to detain asylum seekers, contrasting to the 2022 visible effort of the member states to walk the extra mile in order to fully comply with the EU decision of ensuring a "rapid process by reducing formalities to a minimum" (EUR-Lex 2022).

The 2015 measures were supported through narratives that framed asylum seekers, who were mostly Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi nationals, as a threat at all counts. Even though the number of land and sea crossings had considerably diminished after 2015, some scholars mention a "permanent crisis management" and a "securitization approach that does not seem to wane" all over Europe (Abderrahim 2021). Surprisingly, as for the "innocent" ("Ukrainian refugees" 2022) "intelligent and educated" Ukrainian refugees, (Berlinger 2022) member states adopted a culture of welcoming.

Scholars and the media have suggested a multitude of explanatory factors for what has been labelled a "double-standard" (Dahinden 2022; Monti 2022; Carrera et al. 2022), namely the influence of islamophobia, racism, and origin. Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis non-European

origin, dark skin, and Islamic faith contrasted with the European origin, white skin, and Christian faith of Ukrainians (Carrera et al. 2022; Gallant 2022; Bayoumi 2022; Esposito 2022). Also, the media coverage played a significant role in the amount of attention given to each conflict, being that the Syrian crisis did not elicit as much attention as the Russian invasion (Carrera 2022, 3). In addition, in 2015, the media framed refugees similarly to the national and European portrayal of "the dangerous others", in opposition to them being "like us", in 2022 (Sales 2023). Moreover, geopolitics comes into play, justifying the discrepancy of reactions with the fact that Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan are countries way too distant, while the proximity of the Ukrainian territory instigated a duty to help, otherwise "we are next" (Obordo and Caroline Bannock 2022). Finally, some scholars also mention how the Europeans' subjective perception of distance was "shrunk" in 2022, due to the undoubted and immediate assimilation that Russia is an aggressor and Ukrainians are unthreatening victims, triggering feelings of empathy and solidarity (LaRoche and Pratt 2022).

Even though the multiplicity of factors to justify such discrepancy of responses may be highly entangled and overlapping, two points must be taken into consideration. Firstly, there were accounts of numerous incidents at the Ukrainian and EU borders, where non-white nationals from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East were subjected to discriminatory practices and racial profiling, such as being hampered from crossing the borders, subjected to longer waiting periods, or thrown into separate queues (Tondo and Akinwotu 2022; Carrera et al. 2022, 7-8). Secondly, the TPD "gives Member States wider room for maneuver when deciding whether to apply or not the TPD model to non-Ukrainian third-country nationals" (Carrera et al. 2022, 13). In other words, there is no obligation for member states to apply the TPD to non-Ukrainians fleeing Ukraine. A case in point is Hungary, which did not adopt the TPD for non-Ukrainian third-country nationals, neither did it provide an alternative form of protection (Dobiás, Homem 2022. 14). Another case is Denmark, which is not bounded by the TPD and had established a

15

similar but narrower protection mechanism that did not cover stateless persons fleeing from Ukraine (European Commission 2022b). If the double standard was predominantly based on the media, geopolitics, or psychological distance, it would be harder to justify the salient discrimination against non-Ukrainians at the borders, who found themselves in the exact same situation and conditions as Ukrainians. Why subjecting non-Ukrainians to worst procedures at the borders and leave their protection at the discretion of each member state? One may assume that the discrimination at the borders, the mistreatment of non-Ukrainians, and the EU's decision to leave non-Ukrainian third-country nationals out of the scope of the TPD reinforce that "the only good thing about the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that it has exposed the real, instinctively racist face of the West" (el-Fetouh 2022) and brings the racist argument to the forefront.

Considering the increasing agency of cities in dealing with migration challenges and their propensity to be more tolerant, it becomes relevant to analyze their responses to each influx, in order to find out if there were discrepancies and discriminatory mishandling. If their general performance surpasses the one of the EU and member states, perhaps cities may be considered an alternative solution for times of massive migration flows.

A summary of the discrepancies displayed by the European and national responses to the migration influxes may be visualized in table 1. The nature of the cities' responses will be uncovered in the following chapter.

		POLICIES	DISCOURSE
EU	2015	Externalization: EU-Turkey Deal	Securitized: incentivizing detention
	2022	Taking charge: Temporary Protection Directive	Welcoming: "with open arms" in "full solidarity"
MEMBER STATES	2015	Noncompliance with EU policies: stricter measures (control/closing of bordures, arbitrary detention)	Securitization of Refugees: *Muslim invaders; terrorists*
	2022	Compliance and cooperation with EU: (TPD; Solidarity Fund) & more generous measures (e.g., looser system of reception)	*Humanizing* of refugees: *educated; intelligent*
CITIES	2015	**?**	**?**
	2022	**?**	**?**

Table 1 European and national discrepancies of the responses to the migration influxes.

CHAPTER 3: POLICY AND DISCOURSE AT THE CITY LEVEL

The assessment of the cities' responses comprised essentially the careful analysis of policies and discourses. These elements are relatively abundant in the literature and facilitate the acquisition of a general perception of the cities' stance towards migration. Additionally, the cities' selection was based on the respective countries' overall exposure to both influxes. To ensure a diverse sample, the following rationale was employed:

a) A country slightly or moderately exposed to both influxes: Spain received less than 1% (3,845 arrivals) of all irregular refugee arrivals in 2015 (IOM 2015) and ranks as the 6th country with more registrations of Ukrainian refugees (UNHCR 2023).

b) A country mainly exposed to the influx of 2015: Italy received the second highest number of irregular arrivals at the end of the year (IOM 2015).

c) A country mainly exposed to the influx of 2022: Poland received the highest number of border crossings (UNHCR 2023).

d) A country heavily exposed to both influxes: Hungary received the highest number of first-time asylum applications per 100,000 people (Pew Research 2016) and the second highest number of the EU in 2015 (Eurostat 2023), while at the end of 2022, it registered the second highest number of border crossings from Ukraine (UNHCR 2023).

As a result, the selected cities were Barcelona, Milan, Warsaw, and Budapest. Moreover, two of the chosen cities are capitals, and the other two are not. For these comparisons, policy reports, public statements from the mayors and local authorities, the websites of the municipalities, local and national newspapers, and academic articles were used. The time frame of analysis for the first influx is from April 2015 to December 2016, whereas

for the second influx, it starts with the Russia invasion in February 2022 and extends to December of the same year.

3.1. Migration Influx of 2015

If someone were to look at media footage during the migration flow of 2015, one would often see "rows of white tents in an otherwise sparse landscape" (Miliban 2015). However, only a minority of refugees chose to reside in refugee camps. The majority sought refuge in urban areas, and thus, the "crisis" had been "largely played out at the local level" (Doomernik and Ardon 2018, 91). Moreover, even though most of asylum seekers chose neighboring countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, the EU was still unable to successfully deal with the influx of arrivals, and nation-states often evaded their responsibilities. Consequently, it fell upon the cities "to carry on providing services that residents have come to expect, while also extending these to refugees, with little or no increase in resources" (Miliband 2015).

3.1.1 Barcelona

In 2015, the Spanish asylum system was mainly a matter of national competence, without effective coordination with local authorities (Mazza 2022, 3). Even though Spain was not a transit country and had a relatively low number of asylum seekers, by the end of August, given the increasing number of shipwrecks and deaths at the Mediterranean Sea, the mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, proposed creating a network of refuge cities: "from Barcelona we will do as much as we can to participate in a network of refuge cities," she said "we want cities built on human rights and life – cities we can be proud of," further justifying it with the need to address "a human tragedy from the ability to love that make us human or we will all end up dehumanized" (Camarasa 2015). In early September, Colau reiterated the city's stance on the migration influx, stating "We, the cities of Europe, are ready to become places of refuge. We

want to welcome these refugees. States grant asylum status but cities provide shelter. (…) We want to share the responsibility, we want to do more and we can do more" (Irgil 2016, 12-13).

Expecting more asylum seekers through the EU relocation mechanism, Barcelona attempted to proactively work within state bounds and requested a more entangled cooperation with the Spanish government, including more funds to address the migration challenges in the city (Triviño-Salazar 2021). Yet, the then prime minister Mariano Rajoy, refused to cooperate or provide funds, arguing that asylum is a national responsibility and city-led initiatives could even be a "threat to territorial cohesion" (Garcés-Mascareñas and Gebhardt 2020,18). Meanwhile, asylum seekers would complete the whole integration process without knowing if they were granted refugee status by the national authorities, meaning that an asylum seeker could be denied recognition long after being fully integrated. Moreover, asylum seekers who would not immediately fill out an asylum application, would have no access to any state services (Mazza 2022, 11-12).

Witnessing such governmental inaction and a dysfunctional and centralized national asylum system, Barcelona established, with its own resources, the "Barcelona City of Refuge" (*Ciutat Refugi Plan*): a program to "establish a city-to-city network for securing the safe arrival of refugees and offering well-designed reception policies" (Irgil 2016, 2). The program created a reception and integration system that would operate independently of the national government, relying instead on arrangements with other municipalities, NGOs, and volunteers (Irgil 2016, 2). One component of "Barcelona City of Refuge" was the setup of the "Nausica" program, aimed specifically at asylum seekers that were not covered by the state's response and, consequently, were left in particularly vulnerable situations. Hence, "Nausica" offered psychological support, temporary accommodation services, and assistance with employment (Garcés-Mascareñas and Gebhardt 2020, 6).

The city of Barcelona also engaged in numerous alliances. By mid-September, the "Cities of Refuge" network had 55 Spanish city councils of varied political ideologies, at the national level (Garcés-Mascareñas and Gebhardt 2020, 7-9). The network was very vocal in its commitment to welcome refugees, in making the national government accountable for the poor implementation of the EU relocation scheme, and in claiming that EU funds (AMIF) had not reached the cities (Garcés-Mascareñas and Gebhardt 2020, 7). Barcelona also co-founded transnational city networks such as the "Solidarity Cities", established in 2016 within the "Eurocities" framework, consisting of an initiative "which supports city-to-city solidarity through exchange of know-how, financial assistance, and facilitates relocation of refugees between the cities" (Eurocities 2022). A case in point is when Colau and the mayor of Athens, Giorgos Kaminis, attempted to conduct a city-led relocation agreement, by relocating 100 refugees from the Greek to the Spanish capital, in order to contribute to Spain's relocation goals. Even though Barcelona would assume all the expenses with its own resources, the Spanish national authorities did not allow it (Nielsen 2016). This reluctance of the Spanish national government to comply with the EU relocation scheme was often vocalized by Colau as the "main obstacle in the path of turning Barcelona into a city for refugees," characterizing the actions of the national government as "immoral and illegal" (La Vanguardia 2016).

3.1.2 Milan

Milan, unlike Barcelona, was a major city of transit, given its closeness to the borders of other European countries. From 2013 until June 2015, 64,000 migrants made their journey through Milan, but only 250 have requested asylum (Pogliano and Ponzo 2017, 15). The NGOs in Milan had been active in providing assistance to migrants in transit since 2013, however, due to the influx in 2015, the city stepped in by establishing an area of support near its railway station. In 2016, the Milan municipality opened a new area of support nicknamed "the Hub", to

provide humanitarian assistance and better accommodate migrants after a long journey (Sinatti 2019). "The Hub" was created through the city's three public calls for cooperation with the third sector. More than 100 entities answered the call, resulting in an innovative network of cooperation and sharing of ideas towards pragmatic solutions "that would not have been conceived otherwise" (Costa 2020, 13). According to Costa (2020), who analyzed Milanese policies towards migrants between 2014 and 2016, "the Hub" was "the fulcrum of the city's hosting system and a reference for arriving migrants" (12). It included "a canteen, showers, a children's area, a medical unit, and 70 beds for emergencies" (Pogliano and Ponzo 2017, 16). Given its efficiency in assisting migrants in transit, it became regarded as a model in Europe (Bazurli 2019, 13; Petrillo 2016).

In 2015, Milan also established and managed accommodation centers to assist migrants in transit, yet its financing came from the Ministry of the Interior. Italian national law foresaw the establishment of emergency accommodation for migrants who had not yet applied for international protection. Although they should apply within eight days, Milan purposedly interpreted the national law the other way around, meaning "they could stay in the accommodation centers for eight days without declaring their identity", giving migrants room of maneuver to choose whether they want to remain and apply for asylum in Italy, or keep moving to another European country (Pogliano and Ponzo 2017, 12). As such, the city became a *de facto* humanitarian corridor which circumvented the Dublin Regulation.

However, with the EU pressure to enforce the Dublin Regulation in early 2016, and the closing of borders of Switzerland, France, the Balkans, and Nordic countries, Milan went from being a humanitarian corridor to a city of asylum, since the asylum seekers that were hampered from continuing their journey towards other countries, would now remain and apply for protection in Italy (Costa 2020, 4; Pogliano and Ponzo 2017, 13). The posture of the city, however, did not change since "the municipal administration continues to give a dignified

22

welcome to new arrivals" (Caracciolo 2016). Nevertheless, Milan quickly became a migrant "bottleneck" at the end of the year, and "all the beds around the city that had once been reserved for the every-changing crowd of those passing are now occupied by (…) asylum seekers stuck in Milan pending examination of their claims" (Petrillo 2016).

Understanding that his city is near breaking point, the new mayor of Milan, Giuseppe Sala, in an open letter to the Italian government entitled "Change immigration policy", criticized the unilateral responses of several countries, namely the "tightening of border controls" and deteriorating reception conditions, as well as the "double failure of Europe" that is "unable to control the flow" and "proving to be more of an obstacle than a support on this front" (Sala). The mayor also urged the Italian government to abandon the idea of being solely an emergency first reception country, stating that immigration "is not a burning match to pass from hand to hand", and therefore there is a need to implement a serious integration policy (Sala 2016). In December of the same year, in the Casina Pio IV Summit, Sala reinforced that the reception and integration of refugees are almost all "on the shoulders of the municipality" (2016a). As such, he urged the national government as well as Europe to adopt long-term policies of integration and stop portraying the situation as an emergency, given that the situation is now part of the reality and reminding that "to welcome, it is a duty" (Sala 2016a).

3.1.3 Warsaw

The city of Warsaw entered the migration influx of 2015 without any concrete integration strategy, since there was "no legal framework or funding coming from the state budget for integration services which could be provided by local government" (Pilat and Potkanska 2017 9). Pilat and Potkanska (2017), who analyzed the local responses in Poland during the influx, labelled the role of local governments as "unspecified" (8). At the beginning of September 2015, Warsaw's City Council spokeswoman, Agnieszka Kłąb, when asked

whether Warsaw was going come up with its own policies to assist asylum seekers, replied that it was still too early to talk about details, since the city could only figure out what kind of help was needed when asylum seekers arrived (Jakubowski 2015). Even when it was known that several thousand would come to Poland through the EU emergency relocation mechanism, the Varsovian City Council stated that it would wait for governmental guidance in case "assistance may be required from the capital" (Jakubowski, 2015a). A couple days later, the Mayor of Warsaw, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, stated that the city was capable of accepting several hundreds of refugees and that religion should not be an admission criterion (Marcin 2015). Kłąb then reiterates once again that it is difficult to talk about details, due to the fact that the main decisions are made at the government level, and therefore, most assistance will not be financial but in-kind, such as food and clothes (Marcin 2015). By the end of October, Gronkiewicz-Waltz affirms that her city is making preparations to accept at least 500 Syrian and Eritrean refugees, by planning to set up a special team of volunteers to assist them, an information desk, and a few flats for single mothers and people with disabilities (Karpiszuk 2015). Nevertheless, the national elections in October installed a new government, and the preparations and the narrative of the city regressed to a point of standby and governmental dependence (Sawicki 2015a).

Even though Warsaw waited for governmental action, some areas like access to education, legal assistance, or access to language courses were also grossly overlooked by the Polish national government, being almost exclusively managed by NGOs with external funds (Pilat and Potkanska 2017, 14). In spite of that, the Varsovian City Council applied for EU funds, which provided five sheltered flats for refugees (Pilat and Potkanska 2017, 19). The city had also previously established the "Social Dialogue Committee for Foreigners" in 2012, which functioned as an advisory body to the mayor and was active during the crisis of 2015, especially in providing grants to NGOs to develop solutions that support foreigners living in Warsaw (NGO.PL 2017). Additionally, by November 2015, Warsaw had established a permanent

committee with other local institutions, in order to elaborate a comprehensive program to assist people granted refugee status, which would provide basic assistance, accommodation, employment, and language classes. The Committee also reinforced the obligation to provide education to refugee children and instigated social inclusion by fighting against racism and discrimination within local Varsovians (Pilat and Potkanska 2017, 28).

3.1.4 Budapest

Budapest's only concrete response to the 2015 influx, occurred in August, when it set up "transit zones" in the three railway stations of the city. However, the conditions were extremely precarious, with "one single open water pipe with eight taps and seven mobile toilets" for thousands of refugees (Bruszt László 2015). Given that no shelter was provided, the area surrounding the two most central train stations in Budapest became *de facto* spontaneous refugee camps (Hartocollis 2015). Nevertheless, by the end of the same month, the mayor of Budapest, István Tárlos, stated that he was already considering abolishing the transit zones: "If things continue like this, it's not likely that the illegal immigrants will continue to have access to the transit zones at the train stations in the heart of the capital city" (Novak 2015). He added that transit zones were created because of Hungarian laws that state that "they should board the trains and move on," and that transit zones have not only been established for humanitarian aid but also to stop migrants from swarming into Budapest (Novak 2015).

By September, the General Assembly of Budapest requested Tárlos to submit a proposal on "the extra tasks of municipal institutions and public services providers" that would arise out of the migration flow (Municipality of Budapest 2015). The mayor emphasized that even though the EU has been useless and inconsistent, the city of Budapest had no obligations under the law to act on the current crisis, further adding that "as being a matter of conscience, we are trying to deal with migration, primarily to protect the residents of Budapest and ease the

pressure on our city" (Municipality of Budapest 2015). In addition, Tárlos ruled out the establishment of a permanent refugee camp, suggesting instead replacing the three transit zones with a central social facility of temporary character "to persuade migrants to stay in these blocks" and because "innocent children and women cannot be left without care, either" (Municipality of Budapest 2015). Basically, it would contain shower facilities permanent medical assistance, information, and protection if needed, but emphasized that "we do not wish to accommodate these people, we have no intention to provide them with comprehensive care. No refugee camp will be set up here, we will ensure that they do not get soaked or freeze, but we will not establish district heating there" (Municipality of Budapest 2015a). During earlier debates, the then councilor for municipal affairs, Máté Kocsis, also added that the center facility would satisfy basic needs but it would be set up near a railway station to encourage the migrants to move on (Municipality of Budapest 2015). The mayor justified this decision by saying that "they are coming by hundreds of thousands and millions, and we do not know their country of origin and their motivations. It is a naive mistake to take in those who are not refugees or arrive with speculative intention" (Municipality of Budapest 2015a). In the end, the central social facility was never set up.

3.2. Migration Influx of 2022

The massive flow of people fleeing Ukraine presented an immediate challenge, especially after COVID-19 had strained so many public services (WHO 2022). Yet, if in 2015 it was the European and state's inaction that compelled cities to take the lead during the influx, in 2022 "the solidarity that is at the heart of the European response has also put the local and regional infrastructure of the frontline cities and regions to the test" (Dobiás and Homem 2022, 1).

3.2.1 Barcelona

Barcelona reacted to the migration influx of 2022 by adapting its previous program, "Barcelona Refuge City", to Ukrainian nationals. The city updated its website to display comprehensive information on municipal services in Ukrainian language. Additionally, the main provision of social services was ensured by numerous entities: the "Barcelona Social Emergency and Urgent Care Center" (CUESB), which operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year within the Municipality of Barcelona; the "Care Service for Immigrants, Emigrants, and Refugees" (SAIER), which provides legal advice to obtain asylum and refuge (Barcelona 2022); and the "Ucrane", a municipal care center launched in April (La Vanguardia 2022). Barcelona also financed activities directed at the youngest. By the end of the same month, the City Council had launched a program of cultural activities for children who were staying in hotels, offering 1200 tickets to the Zoo, and doubling the number of places available in the program "In the Summer, Barcelona welcomes you" – a municipal initiative of activities for young people (Mercader 2022).

Discourse wise, the mayor of Barcelona insisted on the necessity to not discriminate refugees, affirming that "we will do our best to respond to their needs no matter what war they are fleeing from" (Eurocities 2022).

Similarly to 2015, Barcelona also pledged for increased funding in 2022, to implement effective reception and integration measures. Mark Serra, the Councilor for Citizenship, Participation and Global Justice of Barcelona, affirms that the city has been spending half a million euros each month towards helping refugees, but it should be the national government's responsibility to assume such costs (Mercader 2022).

3.2.2 Milan

The city of Milan "took immediate steps to organize the emergency reception of Ukrainian refugees who arrived in the city after the Russian occupation" (Municipality of Milan. 2022) by providing 200 places in municipal dormitories that were complemented with social and educational services (Lombardia 2022). In another statement given in the City Council just days after the Russian invasion, the mayor affirms that "the generous heart of Milan tightens around these people, and the city will never back down", further adding that health support structures will be available "in the centers of the municipality and in the central station" and guaranteeing that "every effort will be made (…) to accelerate the inclusion in our community of the hundreds of people who fled the war" ("Refugees" 2022).

Several policies were put in place to facilitate the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees. The municipality, in partnership with the third sector, started a fundraiser that had over 350 donors. The fundraiser culminated in several projects, like a hotline with Ukrainian-speaking operators, to aid newcomers in terms of school enrollment of children, regularization of their situation, or application for a residence permit (Municipality of Milan 2022). There was also a hub point, for those who arrived spontaneously, that provided basic information and reported housing needs to the municipality of Milan. Besides that, the city was available to be contacted prior to arrival, in order to inform about the number of people coming and their needs. All this information is available in an online portal, "Milan helps" (Milano Aiuta) created by the city, along with information for local Milanese citizens who wish to voluntarily help Ukrainian refugees.

3.2.3 Warsaw

Warsaw also reacted promptly from the very beginning of the 2022 influx. Along with other cities' officials and NGOs, the city gathered in Lublin just a few hours after the Russian

invasion, to debate how to cooperate and assist those who were about to flee from Ukraine. The meeting led to the establishment of the "Lublin Social Committee to Aid Ukraine" which aim at providing comprehensive assistance to Ukrainians (Hargrave 2022). Warsaw had earlier established contact points for refugees arriving at its train stations with travel and hygiene packs, even though it acknowledged that a big part of the packs were donations from civil society and non-governmental associations (Municipality of Warsaw 2022). Given the lack of funding, Warsaw also opened four bank accounts, so Varsovian locals could contribute with donations to support Varsovian refugees. By March 4, Warsaw's Mayor, Rafał Traskowski, stated that the municipality had provided shelter to almost 2000 refugees in 22 facilities (municipal properties along with office buildings, recreation centers, and hotels), and more than 100 students were already enrolled in educational municipal institutions (Municipality of Warsaw 2022a).

Besides that, the Municipality of Warsaw opened several centers where refugees could get assistance regarding legalization, career, job placement, psychological support, and language classes. A helpline and webpage were also made available with all the information in Ukrainian language (Municipality of Warsaw 2022). Warsaw also engaged in domestic relocation with other cities. For example, it relocated 180 refugees to the cities of Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot (Municipality of Warsaw 2022). Furthermore, the city focused on assisting citizens with Ukrainian citizenship with employment services, allowing them to register and search for job offers, in the municipal database, with the help of a Ukrainian interpreter. The partnerships with NGOs, like UNICEF, that donated nearly PLN 100, led to the implementation of projects in "nursery and pre-school care, education, health care, psychological support, or nutrition" (Municipality of Warsaw 2022).

The general discourse of the Municipality reflects its policies: "Ukrainians are among us but they're with us they're not as if relegated to the margins of the society they're in our

homes they are participating in our life and that's the beauty of it" (Pereira 2022). Even though by the end of March, Warsaw was already overburden with the task of registering more than 300,000 refugees for social services, the mayor insisted on putting "more people at a task of doing it as quickly as possible" (Pereira 2022). In spite of that, the predominant theme on the mayor's discourse was the need for funding, in order to comply with all the necessities of the refugees, especially when the state is "taking funds from the local governments." He recognized that "the central government did its job on the border" but "it was really late in coming to assistance" (Traskowski 2022). By May, Traskowski stated in an EU conference that Warsaw "haven't seen a dime of EU money yet" (Traskowski 2022).

3.2.4 Budapest

Budapest took immediate action since the war broke out in Ukraine. Two days after the Russian invasion, the city was prepared to offer meals and accommodation in council buildings to 2000 refugees (Hungary Today 2022). By the beginning of March, the city had already provided shelter to 1500 refugees and had been in charge of distributing over 10,000 meals (Német 2022). At the same time, Budapest opened a 24-hour information center at the main train station, and by April, public transportation in the city was free for those who could prove Ukrainian citizenship (Német 2022). Moreover, in partnership with IOM and UNHCR, it established the "Budapest Helps" program, which opened an "Information and Community Center for People Fleeing Ukraine" that provided essential services and encouraged connections between refugees and the local community. The center also included language classes and childhood development support (IOM 2022). Moreover, "Budapest Helps" created a new webpage with practical information, a hotline, info desks at train stations, and the possibility for those fleeing Ukraine to apply in advance for temporary accommodation in Budapest (Budapest Helps 2022).

Discourse wise, the city was quite clear regarding its willingness to receive Ukrainian refugees. Its mayor stated that the mission of the municipality was "to help and support refugees who are fleeing Ukraine" and that the "main goal is to reach as many vulnerable people as possible" (IOM 2022). Furthermore, the mayor also emphasized his concerns regarding the slow reaction of the Hungarian national government: "we hope that by the time the city's tickets run out, the government will have changed the rules to ensure that travel by train is in fact for free for refugees" (Hungary Today 2022a).

DISCUSSION

The significance of the response's discrepancy

The findings of this research confirm the prevailing idea in the literature, that cities tend to be more tolerant than states. More specifically, the responses of the four cities, although disparate, revealed an overall less discriminatory nature when compared to the responses of the states to the same events.

The city of Barcelona acted in a coherent and integrated manner in both crises. Its responses were marked by its ability to react autonomously, as well as to establish and participate in city networks. As a result, Barcelona came up with alternative forms of cooperation with actors that, like the city itself, were committed to prioritizing the defense of human rights. Contrary to Warsaw, which directed its commitment in 2015 specifically towards those recognized as refugees, Barcelona attempted to guarantee that not only refugees but also asylum seekers and those in irregular situations could benefit from a set of services that was not provided by the Spanish state. The fact that the city established national and transnational city alliances, engaged in decoupling, applied *sanctuary policies,* and facilitated *local bureaucratic membership* to better support those seeking protection, indicates the absence of a discriminatory attitude towards the 2015 migrants. Hence, the non-discrepant responses in each period make Barcelona an archetypal example of a *city of welcome*.

In a similar manner, the city of Milan displayed a proactive and supportive stance. Its continuous attempt to receive and assist protection-seekers, culminated in the creation of an innovative model coupled with engagement in partnerships and fundraising. Nevertheless, Milan's shared management of migration matters with national authorities gave the city leverage to take advantage of national legal loopholes and develop progressive policies, such as the humanitarian corridor. Moreover, even though the city became overburdened with the reception and integration of asylum seekers, it still maintained a discourse based on a duty to

32

help. As Barcelona, Milan also engaged in decoupling and *sanctuary policies* to better accommodate the needs of all seeking protection in 2015, exhibiting similar responses in both periods, which is evidence of the absence of discriminatory attitudes. Therefore, Milan may also be awarded the title of *city of welcome*.

The city of Warsaw, contrary to Barcelona and Milan, showed relatively discrepant forms of action in each period. In 2015, a sense of non-emergency predominated, leading the city to maintain a standby posture and wait for state guidance, which resulted in a lack of timely preparation to respond. In 2022, however, there was an immediate response and a more pronounced commitment and positioning to providing holistic assistance and creating and engaging in partnerships. Furthermore, Warsaw's main responses in 2015 were mainly aimed at those who had been recognized with the status of refugee, leaving asylum seekers and others with less assistance. Likewise, the city's discourse in the same period carried a cautious, restrained, and impersonal tone, in opposition to the 2022 discourse that portrayed Ukrainians as people "in our homes (…) participating in our lives" (Pereira 2022).

Although Warsaw's response to both influxes was discrepant, it is debatable if they were based on a discriminatory attitude. The positive evolution of the responses from one period to the other, may be due to the accumulation of experience and the procedures put in place during the first influx (as mentioned above, Warsaw lacked a structured legal framework in 2015). In 2022, the palpable sense of emergency may have surfaced due to Poland's geographical location relatively to the asylum seekers' country of origin, rather than their color, religion, ethnicity, or other cultural aspects. Besides that, it should be noted that in 2015, amidst the anti-migrant rhetoric taken by the Polish state, media, and part of the population, Warsaw did not give in to such discourses (even after a change of the national government).

It is true that Warsaw's responses were marked by passivity and did not mirror the same commitment as Milan or Barcelona in 2015. However, the Polish city did not engage in clear

attempts to exclude or separate asylum seekers from local Varsovians, a behavior associated with *cities of refuse*. As such, Warsaw does not meet the requirements to be considered a *city of welcome* nor a *city of refuse,* scoring somewhere in-between. Given the need for a third denomination, Warsaw may be labelled as a *city of indifference*. The suggestion for this term was inspired by Kelsey Norman's book 'Reluctant Reception', in which the author introduces the concept of *strategic indifference* to characterize the intentional inaction of Morocco, Turkey and Egypt towards migrants in the 1990s and 2000s (Norman 2020).

Budapest revealed the greatest discrepancy of responses in each period. In 2015, the city provided a single response. Such lack of action had a clear intention of discouraging asylum seekers from remaining in Budapest and wandering around the city. Additionally, the prospective policies that were on the table (which were never put into practice) were meant to offer the bare minimum, instead of providing a comprehensive assistance. Moreover, the discourse of local authorities showed concern with the migrants' origin, labelling them as "illegal immigrants" and conceiving them as a potential danger to the city locals. On the contrary, in 2022, Budapest took immediate action to accommodate refugees and it also engaged in collaborations with international organizations, in order to facilitate their adaptation to the city.

The almost complete lack of response in 2015 would make Budapest a *city of indifference*. Nevertheless, contrary to Warsaw, a logic of securitization based on the asylum seekers' origin and *the getting these people out of town* rationale are revealing of a discriminatory stance. Even though Budapest's response did not blatantly impose severe restrictions on refugees, the city discourse and policies aimed to "exclude migrants to separate them from the native component of the population", clearly fitting under Ambrosinis' (2020) definition of local practices of exclusion (198-199). Thus, Budapest may be categorized as a *city of refuse*.

34

In 2022, Budapest acted as a *city of welcome*, although not at the same level as Barcelona and Milan. The city exhibited some selectivity by putting forward policies which excluded refugees without Ukrainian citizenship (e.g., free public transportation). Considering the discriminatory responses toward refugees in 2015, it is debatable if such discriminatory basis is also present in 2022. However, it should be also noted that the city has undergone a major political change – the election of a new leftist-green mayor in 2019, who ousted the previous right-wing mayor – which may also explain the city's discrepant behavior. Hence, the selective responses of Budapest represent a challenge when it comes to the attribution of the category *city of welcome*.

Regardless of the reasons behind these attitudes, it can be argued that all four cities, in 2015, were still more accommodating towards asylum seekers and refugees than the EU and respective member states, thereby reinforcing the predominant scholarly perspective that portrays cities as more tolerant than states.

"Passive exclusion" of cities of refuse

The comparison of the cities' responses in 2015 also revealed a clear alignment between discourse and implemented policies, in three of the studied examples. Barcelona and Milan's explicit pro-migrant discourse was echoed in the cities' accommodating and welcoming policies. Likewise, Warsaw's discourse and policies were in agreement, both displaying some reservations towards refugees. Budapest proved to be the exception as its straightforward anti-refugee discourse did not translate into concrete anti-refugee policies. Consequently, the sample of cities indicates that pro-migrant cities have taken the most actions. Surprisingly, Budapest maintained an overt anti-migrant discourse, however, the few implemented actions, although insidious, were less exclusionary than expected. This finding might indicate that *cities of refuse* may tend to rely on "passive exclusion" rather than engaging in concrete exclusionary policies,

suggesting that in times of influx, these cities are still more benevolent towards migrants than their national governments.

Inclusivist networking

The sample in this thesis was comprised of large urban areas only. Large cities are aspiring *global cities,* which, as mentioned earlier, have a very strong economic motivation to accommodate migrants. In spite of that, small cities do not envisage becoming the next financial centers, and, therefore, they might not share the same interests and solutions towards migration. This fact is particularly important, given that small cities are increasingly becoming destinations for migrants (Zhuang and Lok 2023). Bigger cities have advocacy power to demand for more funds and the capacity to create networks to manage migration challenges autonomously. An example is Barcelona, which run a reception and integration program parallel to that of the state, through networks. Nevertheless, smaller cities do not have the same resources to adopt their own policy strategies or quickly adapt to sudden changes that migration influxes might bring. It is then important for large cities to include smaller ones in their networks. Otherwise, the likelihood of these cities becoming *cities of indifference* or *cities of refuse* increases significantly. Although the results of this research show that all three types of cities have a more tolerant stance towards migrants than states, the ideal would be to exclusively promote the proliferation of *cities of welcome*, in order to better respect and comply with human rights.

CONCLUSION

In a world where the international society is experiencing increasing difficulty in the resolution of transnational issues, cities re-emerge as important powerful actors. Besides becoming regional nodes in the global economy, cities are also rich in humanity. The cities of this research showed to be more tolerant than the states, during massive migration flows. Tolerance did not necessarily mean a 'culture of welcome' towards migrants: some cities did not show discriminatory responses in both influxes, while others revealed discrepant policies and discourses, sometimes with a discriminatory basis. This conclusion shifts the focus to the not so rosy picture of cities that often prevails in the academic field, arising the interest to further develop the research about European *cities of refuse* and perhaps the nascent topic of *cities of indifference:* how do *cities of indifference* and *refuse* manage migration influxes? What kind of exclusionary policies and discourses do they adopt and in what way do they engage in decoupling policies? Do they establish and engage in city-to-city alliances and transnational networks? In what way do such *networks of refuse* differ from those of *cities of welcome?*

As far as terminology is concerned, there is also a need to create more labels that allow for more precise categorization of cities and better reflect their position in the welcome-refuse continuum.

Even though cities appear to be more flexible, more knowledgeable of the local realities and more tolerant towards migration, they are still sub-national entities at the end of day. Therefore, it is in their best interest to stimulate harmonious cooperative relations with nation-states as opposed to maintaining a confrontational stance. If cities prove to be tolerant powerful actors, we may allow ourselves to hope that, in the future, the management of migration challenges will be carried out in a more humanized manner.

REFERENCES

Abderrahim, Tasnim. 2021. "The Securitization of the EU's Migration Policies: What Consequences for Southern Mediterranean Countries and Their relations with the EU?" *Euromed Survey*

Acuto, Michele. 2013. " City Leadership in Global Governance." *Brill.* no. 19(3): 481-498.

Alcalde, Xavier. n.d. "Why the refugee crisis is not a refugee crisis." *Peace in Progress. https://www.icip.cat/perlapau/en/article/why-the-refugee-crisis-is-not-a-refugee-crisis/*

Ambrosini, Maurizio. 2016. "The Local Governance of Immigration and Asylum: Policies of Exlcusion as a Battleground." In *Migration, Borders and Citizenship. Between Policy and Public Spheres,* edited by Maurizio Ambrosini, Manlio Cinalli and David Jacobson, 195-216. Palgrave Macmillan.

Ashamin and Thrift. 2005. "Citizens of the World. Seeing the City as a Site of International Influence." *Harvard International Review.* Fall.

Barcelona. 2022. "Help and support for refugees from Ukraine." March 7, 2022. https://www.barcelona.cat/en/noticia/how-to-help-refugees-from-ukraine-2_1151973

Bayoumi, Moustafa. 2022. "They are 'civilised' and 'look like us': the racist coverage of Ukraine." *The Guardian,* March 3, 2022. http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/news/2000s/2022/march/guardian3mar2022.pdf

Bazurli, Raffaele. 2019. "Local Governments and Social Movements in the 'Refugee Crisis': Milan and Barcelona as 'Cities of Welcome'." *South European Society and Politics.*

Berlinger, Joshua. "Critics say Europe should be treating all refugees equally, regardless of where they come from." *Euronews,* March 1, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/01/does-the-ukraine-exodus-reveal-a-shocking-distinction-on-refugees-in-some-parts-of-the-eu

Blocher, Julia. 2017. "Lessons from the UNU Panel Series on Academic Thinking on Migration." *United Nations University Summary Report.*

Bruszt, László. 2015. "The strange emergence of Viktor Orbán as the 'guardian' of the EU's borders. *Hungarian Free Press*, September 14, 2015. https://hungarianfreepress.com/2015/09/14/the-strange-emergence-of-viktor-orban-as-the-guardian-of-the-eus-borders/

Budapest Helps. 2022. https://help.budapest.hu/en/

Camarasa, Violeta. 2015. " An 'Appeal to Affection and Empathy': Barcelona's Mayor Wants Spain's Cities to Welcome Refugees. *Global Voices.* https://globalvoices.org/2015/09/05/an-appeal-to-affection-and-empathy-barcelonas-mayor-wants-spains-cities-to-welcome-refugees/#

Caracciolo, Franceso. " Profughi a Milano: saranno ospitati in una caserma ma non è "stato di emergenza", *Milano Today*, August 10, 2016. https://www.milanotoday.it/cronaca/profughi-caserma-montello-immigrati.html

Carrera, Sergio et al. 2022. "The EU grants temporary protection for people fleeing war in Ukraine." *CEPS.*

Christoph, Wnke, Stephanie Kron. 2019. "Solidarity Cities in Europe." *Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiffung.*

Çiçek, Deniz. 2022. "Bordering Preferences in the EU nad the Extrnalization of the Refugee Crisis. Master Thesis, Sabanci University.

Clibon, Jennifer. 2015. " Hungary's Viktor Orban, the cunning leader who would keep refugees out of Europe". *CBC News,* Septemberm 17, 2015.

Costa, Giuliana. 2020. " Hosting Asylum-Seekers and People Transiting through Milan as an Opportunity for Social Innovation." *Refugee Survey Quarterly,* no.0: 1-18.

Court of Justice of the European Union. 2020. "Commission v Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.*" Press Release,* no40/20. *https*://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-04/cp200040en.pdf

Curtis, Simon. 2011. " Introduction: Empowering Cities." In *The Power of Cities in International Relations,* edited by Simon Curtis, 16-31. Routledge.

Curtis, Simon. 2016. "Cities and Global Governance: State Failure or New Global Order?" *Millennium Journal of International Studies,* no.44(3): 455-477.

Curtis, Simon, Michele Acuto. 2018. "The Foreign Policy of Cities." *RUSI Journal,* no. 163(3): 8-17

Dahinden, Janine. 2022. "A Call for Solidarity with All Refugees, Beyond Double Standards!" *NCCR,* March 24, 2022. https://nccr-onthemove.ch/blog/a-call-for-solidarity-with-all-refugees-beyond-double-standards/

Doomernik, Jeroen, Djoeke Ardon. 2018. "The City asn an Agent of Refugee Integration." *Urban Planing,* vol.3, no.4: 91-100.

DW. 2015. "Czech watchdog slams conditions in refugeecamp", October 13, 2015. https://www.dw.com/en/watchdog-czech-refugee-camp-offers-worse-conditions-than-prisons/a-18779731

DW. 2016. "Europe face's organized invasion." December 26, 2015. https://www.dw.com/en/czech-president-zeman-says-refugee-wave-is-organized-invasion/a-18943660.

Esposito, Addie. 2022. " The Limitations of Humanity: Differential Refugee Treatment in the EU." *Harvard International Review,* September 4, 2022. https://hir.harvard.edu/the-limitations-of-humanity-differential-refugee-treatment-in-the-eu/

EUR-Lex. 2016. *"Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union." https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E080*

EUR-Lex. 2022. "Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022." https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.071.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A071%3ATOC

EUR-Lex. 2022a. "Communication from the Commission (2022/C 126 I/01). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022XC0321%2803%29&qid=1647940863274

Eurocities. 2022. " Cities need more support for Ukrainian refugees.", May 11, 2022. https://eurocities.eu/latest/cities-need-more-support-for-ukrainian-refugees/

Euronews. 2022. " Poland prepares for possible influx of Ukrainian refugees, says interior minister." February 14, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/2022/02/14/poland-prepares-for-possible-influx-of-ukrainian-refugees-says-interior-minister

European Commission. 2015. "Managing migration better in all aspects: A European Agenda on Migration." May 13, 2015. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_4956

European Commission. 2015a. " Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten point action plan on migration." April 20, 2015.

European Commission. 2022. " Statement by President von der Leyen on further measures to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine." https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1441.

European Commission. 2022a. "EU launches Ukraine solidarity platform." https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/eu-launches-ukraine-solidarity-platform_en

European Commission 2022b. "New Danish law for those fleeing Ukraine mirrors EU Temporary Protection Directive", March 16, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/new-danish-law-those-fleeing-ukraine-mirrors-eu-temporary-protection-directive_en

European Commission. n.d. "Migration and Home Affairs." https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system/temporary-protection_en

European Council. 2023. "Migration flows on the Eastern Mediterranean route." https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/eastern-mediterranean-route/

Eurostat. 2023. "Asylum and first time asylum applicants – annual aggregated data." https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/TPS00191/default/table?lang=en

Garcés-Mascareñas, Blanca, Dirk Gebhardt. "Barcelona: municipalist policy entreneurship in a centralist refugee reception system." *Comparative Migration Studies*, no.8:15

Gallant, Katharina. 2022. "The 'good' refugee is welcome: On the role of racism, sexism, and victimhood when fleeing from war." *Collaborative Working Paper Series.* no.8:3.

Global Compact on Refugees. 2020. "How the city of São Paulo is placing refugee perspectives at the heart of its policy." *News & Stories.* https://globalcompactrefugees.org/news-stories/how-city-sao-paulo-placing-refugee-perspectives-heart-its-policy.

Hachigian, Nina. 2019. " Cities Will Determine the Future of Diplomacy." Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/16/cities-will-determine-the-future-of-diplomacy/

Hargrave, Karen. 2022 "Refugees and other migrants in Poland: a spotlight on city leadership." *ODI,* February 24, 2022. https://odi.org/en/insights/refugees-and-other-migrants-in-poland-a-spotlight-on-city-leadership/.

Hartocollis, Anemona. 2015. "Traveling in Europe's River of Migrants." *New York Times,* September 2, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/migrants/budapest-s-keleti-train-station-has-become-a-de-facto-refugee-camp.

Hungary Today. 2022. "Budapest Prepares to Assist Refugees from Ukraine." February 26, 2022. https://hungarytoday.hu/budapest-prepares-assist-refugees-ukraine/

Hungary Today, 2022a. "War in Ukraine: Budapest Offers Free Train Seats to Refugees." March 18, 2022. https://hungarytoday.hu/war-ukraine-crisis-budapest-free-train-seats-refugees-karacsony/

IOM. 2015. " Irregular Migrant, Refugee Arrivals in Europe Top One Million in 2015: IOM." December 22, 2015. https://www.iom.int/news/irregular-migrant-refugee-arrivals-europe-top-one-million-2015-iom.

IOM. 2016. "IOM Counts 3,771 Migrants Fatalities in Mediterranean in 2015." January 6, 2016. https://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-mediterranean-2015.

IOM. 2022. " Municipality of Budapest, IOM, UNHCR Open Information and Community Centre for People Fleeing Ukraine." September 5, 2022. https://hungary.iom.int/news/municipality-budapest-iom-unhcr-open-information-and-community-centre-people-fleeing-ukraine

Irgil Ezgi. 2016. "Muti-level governance as an alternative: the municipality of Barcelona and the Ciutat Refugi Plan. " *Glocalism: Jornal of culture, politics and innovation,* no.3.

Jakubowski, Tomasz. 2015 " Uchodźcy w stolicy. 'Zbyt wcześnie, żeby mówić o konkretach.'" *Wiadomsci,* September 8, 2015. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/warszawa/uchodzcy-w-stolicy-zbyt-wczesnie-zeby-mowic-o-konkretach-6178503567734401a .

Jakubowski, Tomasz. 2015a. " Miasto nie wydało zgody na manifestację antyimigrancką! Narodowcy i tak przyjadą. Będą zamieszki?" *Wiadomosci,* September 9, 2015. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/warszawa/miasto-nie-wydalo-zgody-na-manifestacje-antyimigrancka-narodowcy-i-tak-przyjada-beda-zamieszki-6178503647111297a.

Karácsony, Gergely. *Facebook,* March 17, 2022. https://www.facebook.com/karacsonygergely/posts/535446504610692

Karnitschnig, Matthew. 2015. "Orbán says migrants threaten 'Christian' Europe." *Politico,* September 3, 2015. https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-migrants-threaten-christian-europe-identity-refugees-asylum-crisis/.

Karnitschnig, Matthey. 2022. "Poland read to take more Ukrainians, deputy PM says." *Politico,* March 28, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-ready-to-take-more-ukrainians-deputy-pm-says/.

Karpiszuk, Wojciech. 2015. " Uchodźcy. Warszawa przyjmie co najmniej 500 osób. Przygotowania." *Wyborcza,* October 22, 2015. https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,34862,19062168,uchodzcy-warszawa-przyjmie-co-najmniej-500-osob-przygotowania.html

Dobiás, Katalin, Filipa Homem. 2022. "EU cities and regions welcoming Ukrainian refugees – mapping multilevel coordination." *Commission for Citizenship, Governance , Institutional and External Affairs.*

Kaufmann, David. 2019. "Comparing Urban Citizenship, Sanctuary Cities, Local Bureaucratic Membership, and Regularizations. *Public Administration Review*

Ladouceur-Girard, Marie-Christine. n.d. " Bureau d'intégration des nouveaux arrivants à Montréal (BINAM)." *Montreal.* https://montreal.ca/en/departments/bureau-dintegration-des-nouveaux-arrivants-montreal-binam

LaRoche, Christopher, Simon Pratt. "Ukraine's Refugees Are Close Enough for European Solidarity." *Revista de Prensa,* March 30.2022. https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/ukraines-refugees-are-close-enough-for-european-solidarity/.

La Vanguardia. 2016. "Ada Colau acusa al Gobierno de impeder que Barcelona sea ciudad refugio." https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20160503/401527441912/ada-colau-acusa-al-gobierno-de-impedir-que-barcelona-sea-ciudad-refugio.html.

La Vanguardia. 2022. "Barcelona ha atendido ya a 12.000 refugiados ucranianos." June 22, 2022. https://www.lavanguardia.com/local/barcelona/20220622/8358719/refugiados-ucranianos-atendidos-ayuntamiento-alcanzan-12-000.html.

Lebuhn, Henrik. 2013. "Local border practices and urban citizenship in Europe – Exploring urban borderlands." *City* 17, no.1: 37-51.

Lombardia. 2022. " Ucraina: dal Comune di Milano 200 posti per I profughi." March 16, 2022. https://www.ansa.it/lombardia/notizie/2022/03/15/ucraina-dal-comune-di-milano-200-posti-per-i-profughi_49ddf36a-539f-42e8-bec2-a4910bc427e4.html.

Marchetti, Chiara. 2016. "Crises of Exclusion: Are Local Authorities Refusing Asylum Seekers?" In *Migration, Borders and Citizenship. Between Policy and Public Spheres,* edited by Maurizio Ambrosini, Manlio Cinalli and David Jacobson, 237-264. Palgrave Macmillan.

Mazza, Jenna. 2022 "Urban asylum policy in openly conflicting, decoupled migration governance: the case of Barcelona." *GRITIM-UPF Working Paper Series,* no.51.

Medecins sans Frontieres. 2016. "Thousand stranded as new arbitrary border restrictions expose refugees to violence", February 23, 2016. https://www.msf.org/greecebalkans-thousands-stranded-new-arbitrary-border-restrictions-expose-refugees-violence

Mercader, Carla. 2022." Barcelona ha atendido a 12.000 refugiados ucranianos y ha empadronado a a 1.740. *20 minutos,* June 22, 2022. https://www.20minutos.es/noticia/5019669/0/barcelona-ha-atendido-a-12-000-refugiados-ucranianos-y-ha-empadronado-a-1-740/

Miliband, David. 2015. "Cities are at the center of the Syrian refugee crisis – so why are they being ignored?" *The Guardian,* October 30, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/oct/30/cities-are-at-the-centre-of-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-so-why-are-they-being-ignored

Monti, Martina. 2022. " Did Ukraine refugee crisis expose EU to double standards?" *Ecepaa,* October 31, 2022. https://www.ecepaa.eu/did-ukraine-refugee-crisis-expose-eu-double-standards/

Muggah, Robert and Adriana Erthal Abdenur. 2018. "Refugees and the City. The Twenty-first-century Front Line." *World Refugee Council Research Paper,* no.2.

Municipality of Budapest. 2015. "General Assembly of Budapest: temporary social care facilities will probably cost HUF 400 million.", *September 2, 2015. https://budapest.hu/sites/english/Lapok/General-Assembly-of-Budapest-temporary-social-care-facilities-will-probably-cost-HUF-400-million.aspx*

Municipality of Budapest. 2015a. "Tarlós: we are constantly monitoring the number of refugees changing in the capital." September 9, 2015. https://budapest.hu/sites/english/Lapok/Tarl%C3%B3s-we-are-constantly-monitoring-the-number-of-refugees-changing-in-the-capital.aspx.

Municipality of Milan. 2022. " Insieme per l'Ucraina. Un servizio telefonico per orientare famiglie e minori in fuga dalla guerra, Shevchenko e il Sindaco Sala presentano il progetto." April 14, 2022. https://www.comune.milano.it/-/insieme-per-l-ucraina.-un-servizio-telefonico-per-orientare-famiglie-e-minori-in-fuga-dalla-guerra-shevchenko-e-il-sindaco-sala-presenta no-il-progetto.

Municipality of Warsaw. 2022. "Realna pomoc uchodźcom." March 4, 2022. https://um.warszawa.pl/-/realna-pomoc-uchodzcom.

Municipality of Warsaw. 2022a. " Ukraińscy uchodźcy w Warszawie – podsumowanie działań miasta. March 4, 2022. https://um.warszawa.pl/-/ukrainscy-uchodzcy-w-warszawie-podsumowanie-dzialan-miasta.

Municipality of Warsaw. 2022b. " Praca dla uchodźców – warszawski punkt pośrednictwa." March 16, 2022. https://um.warszawa.pl/-/praca-dla-uchodzcow-warszawski-punkt-posrednictwa;

Német, Tamás. 2022. "Karácsony: A fővárosi önkormányzat eddig 1500 menekültnek nyújtott szállást", March 8, 2022. https://telex.hu/belfold/2022/03/08/karacsony-a-fovarosi-onkormanyzat-eddig-1500-menekultnek-nyujtott-szallast.

NGO.PL. 2017. "W Światowym Dniu Uchodźcy prezydent Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz dziękuje organizacjom wspierającym imigrantów." June 16, 2017. https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/w-

swiatowym-dniu-uchodzcy-prezydent-hanna-gronkiewicz-waltz-dziekuje-organizacjom-wspierajacym-imigrantowy

Nielsen, Nikolaj. 2016. "Cities demand access to EU migration funds." *Solidarity Cities,* October 21, 2016. *https://solidaritycities.eu/press/coverage/59-cities-demand-access-to-eu-migration-funds.*

Normandin, Henri-Paul. 2023. " New Multilateralism: The United Nations and Governance in the Era of Nonstate Actors." In *Does the UN Model Still Work? Challenges and Prospects for the Future of Multilateralism,* edited by Kim Fontaine-Skronski, Valeriane Thool, and Norbert Eschborn, 78-84. Brill.

Novak, Benjamin. 2015. "István Tarlós refugees are loitering in transit zones." *The Budapest Beacon,* August 25, 2015. https://budapestbeacon.com/istvan-tarlos-thinks-the-refugees-are-loitering-in-the-transit-zones/

NYC. 2023. "About IDNYC." https://www.nyc.gov/site/idnyc/about/about.page

Obordo, Rachel, Caroline Bannock. " 'I'm afraid Russia will invade us next': alarm among Ukraine's neighbours." *The Guardian,* March 1, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/01/ukraine-neighbours-nato-lithuania-poland-slovakia-latvia-estonia-romania

OECD. 2014. "Is migration good for the economy?" Migration. https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202 02.pdf.

OECD. 2022. " The Contribution of Migration to Regional Development." Home. https://www.oecd.org/publications/the-contribution-of-migration-to-regional-development-57046df4-en.htm.

Oomen, Barbara. 2020. "Decoupling and Teaming up: The Rise and Proliferation of Transnational Municipal Networks in the Field of Migration." *International Migration Review,* no.54(3): 913-939.

Pereira, Ivan, 2022. "Warsaw mayor calls on international community to increase aid to Ukrainian refugees." *ABC News,* March 30, 2022. https://abcnews.go.com/International/warsaw-mayor-calls-international-community-increase-aid-ukrainian/story?id=83763723

Petrillo, Marina. 2016. "A border within the city: a journey into the Milan hub". *Open Migration,* 16 November, 2016. https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/a-border-within-the-city-a-journey-into-the-milan-hub/

"PM Orbán: 2022. Every refugee arriving in Hungary from Ukraine must be helped." *About Hungary,* February 28, 2022. https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/pm-orban-every-refugee-arriving-in-hungary-from-ukraine-must-be-helped

Pew Research Center. 2016. "Europe's asylum seekers did not equally disperse across countries." August 1, 2016. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/pgm_2016-08-02_europe-asylum-02/.

Pilat, Anna and Dominika Potkanska. 2017. "Local responses to the refugee crisis in Poland". *Niem.*

Pogliano, Andrea and Irene Ponzo. 2017. "Urban narrative-making on refugee crises." *Fieri working papers.* Urban communication foundation.

Poppelaars, Caelesta, Peter Scholten. 2008. "Two worlds-apart: The divergence of national and local immigration integration policies in the Netherlands." *Administration & Society,* Vol.40

Potyrala, Anna. 2016. "Polan towards the migration crisis of 2015-2016. *Migration Crisis in the European Union: idealism vs realism.*

"Refugees from Ukraine, up to 40 thousand arrivals are expected in Milan and its province. Room: "Fundraising and first reception space in the Central." *Breaking Latest News,* March 7, 2022. https://www.breakinglatest.news/news/refugees-from-ukraine-up-to-40-thousand-arrivals-are-expected-in-milan-and-its-province-room-fundraising-and-first-reception-space-in-the-central/.

"Refugees welcome." 2015. Barcelona en Comú, September 5, 2015. Ada Colau "Refugiados sed bienvenidos" / "Refugees welcome" #CiudadesRefugio. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iVLXQOV1bo&ab_channel=BarcelonaenCom%C3%B A

Reuters. 2015. "Austria releases 71 bodies found in truck for burial." September 11, 2015.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-austria-bodies-idUKKCN0RB1Q420150911

Reuters. 2015a. "Polish prime minister says accepting refuges is Poland's duty." September 10, 2015.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-poland-idUSKCN0RA0SR20150910.

Rosstalnyj, Nina. 2022. "Deserving and undeserving refugees?" Master thesis, Central European University.

Saatçioğlu, Beken. 2020 "The EU's response to the Syrian refugee crisis: a battleground among many Europes." *European Politics and Society.*

Sala, Giuseppe. 2016 " Milano, dal sindaco Sala messaggio al governo: 'Cambiare politica sull'immigrazione'." *La Repubblica.* September 19, 2016. https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2016/09/19/news/titolo_non_esportato_da_hermes_-_id_articolo_4575097-148053885/.

Sala, Guiseppe. 2016a. "Refugees Are our Brothers and Sisters." *Casina Pio IV,* December 20, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tp2h1yZ3wOY&ab_channel=CasinaPioIV

Sales, Matías. 2023. "The Refugee crisis' double standards; Media framing and the proliferation of positive and negative narratives during the Ukrainian and Syrian crises." *Euromesco.* no.129.

Saliba, Samer and Jessica Wolff. 2018. "Urban Refuge. How Cities Are Building Inclusive Communities." *International Rescue Committee*

Sassen, Saskia. 1993. "Rebuilding the Global City: Economy, Ethnicity, and Space." *Social Justice,* no.20(3/4): 32-50

Sassen, Saskia. 2005. "The Global City: Introducing a Concept." *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, no.11(2): 27-43.

Sawicki, Marcin. 2015. "Warszawa gotowa na przyjęcie kilkuset uchodźców." *Wiadomosci,* September 16, 2015. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/warszawa/warszawa-gotowa-na-przyjecie-kilkuset-uchodzcow-6178504028772481a

Sawicki, Marcin. 2015a. "Ratusz: "Nie wiadomo czy przyjmiemy uchodźców". *Wiadomosci,* November 17, 2015. https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/warszawa/ratusz-nie-wiadomo-czy-przyjmiemy-uchodzcow-6178507938408065a.

Schmid, Alex.2016. "Links between terrorism and migration: An exploration." *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.*

Sholten, Peter and Rinus Penninx. 2016. "The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration." In. *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe,* edited by Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Rinus Penninx, 91-108. Springer Open.

Sinatti, Giulia. 2019. " Humanitarianism as Politics: Civil Support Initiatives for Migrants in Milan's Hub." *Social Inclusion*, Vol 7, no.2.

Slezak, Eva, Agnieszka Bielewska. 2021. "Cities' migration policies in a country with a deficit of migration policy. The case of Polan." *International Migration.*

"The Ukraine crisis. 2022. Double Standards: Has Europe's Response to Refugees Changed?" *Global detention Project.*

Thouez, Colleen. 2020. "Cities as Emergent International Actors in the Field of Migration." *Global Governance* 26.

Tondo, Lorenzo, Emmanuel Akinwotu. 2022. *The Guardian,* March 2, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/02/people-of-colour-fleeing-ukraine-attacked-by-polish-nationalists

Traskowski,Rafal. 2022. *"Cities and Regions standing with Ukraine." https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=376133087892657.*

Triviño-Salazar, Juan. 2022. "Barcelona against the state: Defending the rights of people to seek refuge." *Swedish International Center for Local Democracy. https://icld.se/wp-content/uploads/media/Teaching-case-Barcelona.pdf*

UNHCR. 2105. "The year of Europe's refugee crisis.", September 8, 2015. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis

UNHCR. 2015a. "Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015." *UNHCR,* December 30, 2015. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/over-one-million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015

UNHCR. 2022. " UNHCR mobilizing to aid forcibly displaced in Ukraine and neighbouring countries."
https://www.unhcr.org/cy/2022/03/01/unhcr-mobilizing-to-aid-forcibly-displaced-in-ukraine-
and-neighbouring-countries/

UNHCR .2023. "Operational data Portal. Ukraine Refugee situation." Last updated 16 May 2023.
https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.

UNHCR. 2023a. "Refugees are not the crisis. It's the narratives we tell about them." *UNHCR.*
https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/refugees-are-not-the-crisis-its-the-narratives-we-tell-about-
them/

"Ukrainian refugees begin arriving in neighboring Poland." *PBSO News Hour,* February 24, 2022.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukrainian-refugees-begin-arriving-in-neighboring-
poland

"Urban citizenship and undocumented migration." 2019. *Urban Citizenship.* Policy brief.
https://rm.coe.int/urban-citizenship-and-undocumented-migration-policy-brief/1680933628

"Urban refuge. 2018. How Cities Are Building Inclusive Communities." *International Rescue*
Committee.

Varsanyi, Monika. 2008. "Immigration Policing Through the Backdoor: City Ordinances, the 'right to
the City,' and the Exclusion of Undocumented Day Laborers." *Urban Geogrpahy* 29, no.1: 29-
52.

WHO. 2022. " Essential health services face continued disruption during COVID-19 pandemic."
February 7, 2022. https://www.who.int/news/item/07-02-2022-essential-health-services-face-
continued-disruption-during-covid-19-pandemic

Zapata-Barrero, Ricard, Tiziana Caponio and Peter Scholten. 2017. "Theorizing the 'local turn' in a
multi-level governance framework of analysis: a case study in immigrant policies."
International Review of Administrative Sciences 83, no.2.

Zhuang, Zhixi, Ryan Lok. 2023. "Exploring the wellbeing of migrants in third palces: An empirical

study of smaller Canadian cities." Vol.4