EMOTIONAL *TANZÎMÂT*: CIVILIZATION, COMMUNITY, AND EMOTIONAL REGIMES

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ABSTRACT

The Ottoman reform period of *Tanzîmât* (1839-1876) is often implicitly characterized as a process of increasing control over emotions due to the introduction of Enlightenment ideals and the establishment of modern state institutions. However, a closer look suggests that not only new emotions came to the forefront during the period, but also unbounded nature of certain emotions came to be appreciated for their capacity to lead the Ottoman men and women to embark on a self-civilization towards the end of it. This thesis explores this process through different interpretations and conceptualization of *civilization* found in the texts produced by three major figures of the era: Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Sadık Rıfat Pasha representing the early *Tanzîmât* political culture, and Namık Kemal representing that which was spearheaded by the Young Ottoman opposition. It argues that not only they did not accept the Enlightenment understandings of emotions at face value, but also infused it with indigenous moral and emotional knowledge. Consequently, two distinct emotional regimes emerged during the period: the emotional regime imposed by the *Tanzîmât* bureaucracy, emphasizing the importance of moderation for political order and material prosperity, and the regime championed by the Young Ottomans, emphasizing the power of love and zeal in the pursuit of freedom and political progress.

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INTRODUCTION

In his article entitled *Terakkî* (Progress) published in 1873 in the İstanbul-based newspaper *İbret* (Lesson), Namık Kemal, the most influential member of the liberal constitutional movement called the Young Ottomans, eulogized the works of civilization and progress to his avid readership. The embodiment of civilization at the time, for Kemal, was London, where he had to spend some time just a few years ago as a political *émigré*. Before listing the political, economic, social, and moral manifestations London's civilization, he described the city with prose reminiscent of a *ghazal*:

> This country, like the happiness of humanity, which is written within the clouds of doubt, is usually covered in a dark smoke, and even the houses seem to be buried in blackness as if the customs of civilization have permeated to its very stones and trees. But if one looks under the dark veil, the enchanting beauty of civilization starts to show its face with such splendor and majesty that would bewilder the minds, making it impossible for the hearts that can appreciate beauty to be captivated by its physical beauty.[1]

The exaltation of the many facets of the civilization of Europe throughout the article culminates at the end of it in a poignant critique of the Ottoman Empire which, Namık Kemal asserted, had been lagging in the march of civilization due to the laziness and heedlessness of its population, effectively shaming them into action. Although typical of its time and author, the emotionally charged prose of the article evoking a deep sense of affection towards a figure of a European city and a visceral feeling of shame comparing the Ottomans

[1] Namık Kemal, "Terakkî," in *Makalat-ı Siyasiye ve Edebiye*, ed. Erdoğan Kul (Birleşik Dağıtım Kitabevi, 2015), 206–7. "Bu memleket reyb ü gümân bulutları içinde mestûr olan ikbâl-i beşer gibi ekseriyet üzere bir kara duman ile muhât ve hatta güya ki âdât-ı medeniyet ahcâr ve eşcârına varıncaya kadar sirâyet etmiş gibi haneleri bile siyahlara müstağrak görünür. Fakat bir de o nikab-ı zulmanînin mâverâsına ta'lîk-i nazar olunursa nâzenîn-i dil-rübâ-yı temeddün nazar-firîb-i efkâr olacak bir zînet ve saltanat ile arz-ı dîdâr etmeye başlar ki bedâyi'-pesend olan gönüller için hüsn-i endâmına meftûn olmamak ihtimalin haricindedir."

unfavorably in what amounted to a civilizing mission would have raised some eyebrows just a few decades earlier.

Before the 1860s, such knowledge was produced by diplomats and statesmen such as Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha, the two towering figures of the reform period between 1839 and 1876 named the *Tanzîmât* (Reordering) era during which the empire experienced wide-ranging social, political, and cultural transformations. They held long diplomatic posts in major European capitals, observing the importance of *civilization*¸ be it as an important marker of legitimacy in the international arena, or as a culmination of material advancements and political order. They would refrain from causing such an emotional reaction in the populace, not least because they thought "civilizing" was the prerogative of the bureaucratic elite. They believed that a fervent public opinion would bring more trouble than benefits. While they envisaged the subjects of an Ottoman Empire reached civilization as "disciplined and deferential servants,"[2] Namık Kemal and his generation, despite being big admirers of the aforementioned Pashas, strived to engender a proactive and passionate, self-civilizing Ottoman citizenry necessary for the survival and well-being of the polity in a rapid age of progress.

The above comparison complicates the dominant narratives on civilization in general and the *Tanzîmât* era in particular. Grand narratives on modernity and processes of civilization have largely been assumed to entail rationalization, disciplining, and emotional self-restraint. Theories of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Norbert Elias, and Michel Foucault on modernity have permeated the historical scholarship, identifying the typical social spaces of modernity as "the factory, the army, and the bureaucracy, and once the attention shifted to surveillance and

[2] M. Alper Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots: Debating Science, State, and Society in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire* (Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 392.

governmentality, the prison, the clinic, and the lunatic asylum."[3] While periods of emotional outbursts are captured here and there, they are often regarded as inimical to the progressive disciplining of the modern subject through institutions of the modern state and the efforts of the rational political elite. Despite being an appealing narrative, it hinders our ability to see and make sense of processes that resemble emotionalization as much as disciplining. Margrit Pernau suggests that historians bring in new spaces that passionate emotions were ennobled and encouraged, let alone restrained, and to revisit those spaces that are typically associated with control and discipline to reinterpret the relationship between modernity and emotions.[4]

This thesis is an attempt to answer that call by focusing on changing conceptualizations of *civilization* and their implications for the discourse on the emotions of the community. Taking the contrast presented between the discourses implicated in the stances and beliefs of the early *Tanzîmât* Pashas and the Young Ottomans, in the figure of its leading *hommes de lettres*, Namık Kemal, as my point of departure, I try to answer the question of how changing interpretations of civilization correlated with different aspirations concerning the emotionality of the community throughout the *Tanzîmât* period. I also attempt to unpack the roots of these varied discourses and practices, suspending the historiographical assumptions of the above figures as rational and modernizing political elite. Along the way, I attempt to re-read the *Tanzîmât* as a period of reform that involved negotiations and renegotiations of the imperatives of the European civilizing project, leading to distinct, yet not unparalleled, emotional regimes. This was done through homegrown as well as borrowed concepts, traditions, and concerns by generations of perceptive political elites that interpreted, and tried to reorient, the global hierarchies which rested on Eurocentric understanding of *the*

[3] Margrit Pernau, *Emotions and Modernity in Colonial India: From Balance to Fervor* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 7; For a comprehensive survey and critique of the discipline-focused theories and approaches, see Pernau, 255–64.
[4] Pernau, *Emotions and Modernity in Colonial India*, 263.

civilization in the model of Europe. In these processes, I argue that we can observe a *Tanzîmât,* although permeated by a preoccupation with civilization through and through, did not lead to a progressive restraint and self-restraint of emotions, but rather, ennoblement of visceral, passionate feelings. Specifically, I argue, the period witnessed a transition from the preoccupation with *i'tidâl* (moderation), the Aristotelian golden mean, to overwhelming emotions such as *muhabbet* (love) and *hamiyet* (patriotic honor)

In the historiography of the Ottoman Empire, the last one hundred and fifty years of the empire has been read as a process of modernization, secularization, and westernization. In the seminal books such as Bernard Lewis's *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*[5], Niyazi Berkes's *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*[6], and Şerif Mardin's *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*[7], we are presented by political and intellectual developments that rests upon the efforts of "the modernizing elites as an organized group of enlightened and sincere political actors."[8] The political elite that *have* impacted the course of the Ottoman reform, are anachronistically placed in a linear process of modernization and rationalization that culminated in the establishment of modern Turkey, disregarding to a great extent the contested and contingent aspects of the Ottoman reform experience in the nineteenth century.

In the last fifteen years or so, a new surge of scholarly activity has emerged that started to divert our gaze towards exactly such contested and contingent processes with all their complexity. While the immediate pre-history of *Tanzîmât,* especially the cultural milieu that produced statesmen like Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha remain a sort of a black hole in the historiography, new works focusing on the emergent public sphere, moral debates

[5] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
[6] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1998).
[7] Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton University Press, 1962).
[8] Olivier Bouquet, "Is It Time to Stop Speaking about Ottoman Modernisation?," in *Order and Compromise: Government Practices in Turkey from the Late Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century* (Brill, 2015), 61.

on science, domestic contestation of foreign policy, translation and transformation of political concepts within the broader context of global processes. These works have populated the *Tanzîmât* processes with new actors along with the challenges and complexities they brought as integral components of the era.[9] The Young Ottomans, the liberal constitutional political group critical of several aspects of the *Tanzîmât* reforms, have also received renewed attention. Works of scholars such as Nazan Çiçek and Madeleine Elfenbein reassessed the Young Ottoman opposition as integral to the reform debates we well as part of a global discourse, rather than naïve and largely inconsequential efforts.[10]

This thesis builds upon this new literature yet goes beyond it by focusing on emotions. After all, civilization and civility were not only a way to negotiate difference for the European and Ottoman actors alike, but also moral and emotional categories. Being civilized "meant feeling the right emotions, and feeling them with the required degree of control and passion,"[11] obliging the historical actors to adjust and reconfigure their emotional norms and displays in a highly moralizing discourse. Making sense of such processes requires us to go beyond conventional tools of intellectual history. First, since we usually access past emotions through language and concepts, I employ the insights of conceptual history to regard concepts as dynamic entities shaping and being shaped by broader social, political, and intellectual developments, contestations and negotiations of social actors, as well as material practices.[12]

[9] For a selection of this new wave of scholarship, see Murat R. Şiviloğlu, *The Emergence of Public Opinion: State and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018),; Yalçınkaya, *Learned Patriots*; Aylin Koçunyan, *Negotiating the Ottoman Constitution: 1839-1876* (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2018); Einar Wigen, *State of Translation: Turkey in Interlingual Relations* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2018).
[10] Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: Tauris, 2010); Madeleine Elfenbein, "No Empire for Old Men: The Young Ottomans and the World, 1856–1878" (Unpublished PhD diss., The University of Chicago, 2017), https://doi.org/10.6082/uchicago.1566.
[11] Pernau, *Emotions and Modernity in Colonial India*, 4.
[12] Margrit Pernau and Imke Rajamani, "Emotional Translations: Conceptual History Beyond Language," *History and Theory* 55, no. 1 (February 2016): 46–65.

Drawing upon the insights from the field of History of Emotions[13], which conceptualizes emotions as biocultural phenomenon imbued with materiality hence subject to change, this thesis also employs the conceptual tools within this field to incorporate emotions and moral values as historical-analytical categories.

Two such concepts were of particular use as a heuristic tool to this research. One is "emotional regimes" which refers to "the set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices and emotives that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime."[14] I use the term in the plural, applying it beyond the political regime, yet preserving its emphasis on power structures and normativity. The second is "emotional practices," here defined as "things people do *in order to* have emotions, or 'doing emotions' in a performative sense" in a social context.[15] The most important implication of this concept for the purposes of this research is that thinking emotions as practices can bridge the gap between the expression and the supposedly inaccessible inner feelings. Expressing love of the motherland can be viewed as an *act* of patriotic love, while this act itself can convey to others a template about the emotion, or an imperative to perform the same emotion, or even a completely different emotion such as compassion for the community, depending on the act's social context.

Tracing the changes in the Ottoman political elites' conceptualization of *civilization* and its implications for the emotional reconfiguring of the civilizing mission, the sources of the thesis revolves around two important moments of conceptualization and reconceptualization where *civilization* had profound implications for the emotional regime of *Tanzîmât*. The first

[13] For comprehensive and accessible surveys of the field, see Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, First edition, Emotions in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Rob Boddice, *The History of Emotions*, Historical Approaches (Manchester (GB): Manchester University Press, 2018).
[14] William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 129.
[15] Monique Scheer, "Are Emotions a Kind of Practive (And Is That What Makes Them Have a History)?: A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotions," *History and Theory* 51, no. 2 (May 2012): 194.

moment, which is covered in the first chapter, is the entrance of the concept into Ottoman parlance through translation by several Ottoman diplomats almost simultaneously during mid-to-late 1830s. I chose to focus on two of them, Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha, not only due to their impact on the *Tanzîmât* reforms, but also due to the breadth of sources available to us on their engagement with the discourse of civilization. The sources for this chapter consist of the diplomatic correspondences of Mustafa Reşid Pasha between 1835-1845, Sadık Rıfat Pasha's significant treatise on his observations of the civilization of Europe and two moral treatises he wrote for the curriculums of the new educational institutions they helped create. Taken together, these sources allow to capture that significant moment of conceptual translation, and its repercussions for the education of the Ottoman citizens. The second chapter switches to what we can call "the Young Ottoman era" within the *Tanzîmât*, where a new class of educated intelligentsia with roots in bureaucracy started challenging the *Tanzîmât* regime on media ranging from political journals to poetry, accusing the earlier reforms of being over-Westernized and without a philosophical basis and authentic moral underpinnings, while striving the wrest the role of educators of the society. The focus will be primarily on a selection of oeuvre of Namık Kemal, the most prolific writer and the most popular member of the group.

CHAPTER 1: JUST GOVERNANCE AND ORDERLY SUBJECTS FOR A PEACEFUL ORDER

This chapter explores the involvement of Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha in the discourse of civilization during their diplomatic missions in Europe in 1830s and 1840s, against the backdrop of a growing European hostility towards the Ottomans which was expressed by the language of civilization. It explores how they interpreted and engaged with the concept of civilization, considering both the empire's international struggles and local priorities as well as European and local cultures. Although their understanding of civilization differed in certain aspects, they both reflected a distinct, indigenous understanding of legitimacy rooted in the notions of order and *âdâb* (etiquette), thereby conceptualizing civilization as a homegrown concept as a moral category. Furthermore, it explores the repercussions of their interpretation of civilization on their understanding and evaluation of the emotionality of general population and public opinion.

The Ottomans, Eastern Question, and the "Standards of Civilization"

By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the Ottomans found themselves grappling with a series of challenges that not only exposed their military weaknesses, but also tested the very foundations their state's power and authority over its domains. The Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 had exposed the empire's weakness on the battlefield. Just as the military limitations of the Ottoman Empire had been put on the limelight, the Balkans became a hotbed of nationalist sentiments during the early nineteenth century, reflecting, and influenced by, the nationalistic fervor sweeping across Europe during the period. The most significant was

the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832) which led to establishment of the First Hellenic Republic which meant significant territorial losses for the Ottoman Empire. The military campaigns of Muhammad Ali further complicated the matters, as the ambitious governor of Egypt sought to establish his power within the Ottoman territories of Egypt, Levant, and parts of Anatolia. His son Ibrahim Pasha's advance deep into Anatolia, all the way to Kütahya in 1833, caused a profound sense of crisis in İstanbul. The French invasion of Algeria, then nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, in 1830 was only of secondary importance to the Ottomans under these pressing circumstances.

The Ottoman military weaknesses was only one part of the ubiquitous Eastern Question, which was characterized by an anxiety to deal with the impending demise of the Ottoman Empire and the diplomatic complexities surrounding the issue. At this time, the Ottomans were also subjected to an unfavorable discourse of the "standards of civilization"—although it was predominantly an implicit discourse rather than an explicitly defined legal category before the latter parts of the nineteenth century—which held certain standards of the European experience of modernity as a major measuring stick for political legitimacy throughout the century. The legal usage was a mid-to-late nineteenth century invention of the European international lawyers, and as Andrew Linklater states, its purpose was to "defend the Europeans' right to colonize and in other ways control non-European societies."[16] In its political meaning in the early nineteenth century, the "standards" emerged out of the European feeling of superiority with respect to social, political, and economic transformations in the continent following the Enlightenment and industrialization. As the European commercial and political influence expanded, these developments were used as a comparative benchmark to measure the worth of non-Western polities and societies, bringing about

[16] Andrew Linklater, "The 'Standard of Civilisation' in World Politics," *Human Figurations* 5, no. 2 (2016).

perceived global hierarchies, Europe sitting firmly at the top. What emerged out of these perceived asymmetries, facilitated by the material dominance of European states, was a "civilizing project" as a "moral vocation" with an "aim of saving humanity."[17] civilizing project was centered on the ideals and the scientific understanding of the social world of the Enlightenment, and European statesmen maintained that government institutions emulated from those of European states would provide the framework to Western and non-Western civilizing elite to order, rationalize, hence "civilize" non-Western societies and facilitate social, political, and economic progress.[18]

Although the meanings of both the concept *civilization* and the standards underpinning it was fluid and varied across political traditions, by the first half of the century it indicated in the works of romantics a singular concept signifying "a linear process of sophistication of humanity that gave sense to history."[19] One of the most prominent of these thinkers, François Guizot, elaborated in 1832 a "common sense" definition of civilization through its two necessary conditions: "the progress of society", and "the progress of individuals", bringing together different strands of thoughts on civilization at the time.[20] This meant, for Guizot, "the melioration of the social system, and the expansion of the mind and faculties of man," entailing a progressive improvement of both the external and internal, intellectual, condition of an individual.[21]

The standard of civilization, filled with value judgement, expected certain civilized behavior that Europe imposed on itself as well as others. Civilization meant honing of a particular type

[17] Andrew Delatolla, *Civilization and the Making of the State in Lebanon and Syria* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 50.
[18] Delatolla, 50–52.
[19] Margrit Pernau et al., *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 63–64.
[20] Lucien Febvre, *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*, ed. Peter Burke, trans. K. Folca (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
[21] Guizot François, *General History of Civilization in Europe, from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution* (D. Appleton & Company, 1862), 25.

of sociability and demeanor that restrained unbounded beastly emotions while cultivating lofty emotions. According to Guizot, in barbarism the man remained rude and uncultivated, but the progressive expansion of the social relations through the state—the political organization of society—that man is "softened, ameliorated, cultivated."[22] Despotism and tyranny, along with fanaticism were considered calamities that had the potential to disrupt this progress of civilization by breeding individuals with beastly passions. Members of the European international society, defining itself culturally and morally superior, took it upon itself to embark upon a civilizing mission to rule and "soften" the "uncivilized" or "barbarous" rest of the world.[23] Those polities and societies who failed to meet these standards risked being subject to colonial expansion, or imperial dominance.[24]

The Ottoman Empire, largely seen as falling short, were not accepted into the 'civilized' circle, hence into the European international system. The Ottomans, or the Turks, had long been the Europe's Other as a Muslim entity. By the early nineteenth century this otherness started to be represented as the Ottomans' *uncivilized* or *barbarian* status in contrast to the *civilized* status of the Europeans.[25] During much of the nineteenth century the Ottoman prospects of joining the march of civilization has been viewed with some considerable suspicion and even disdain. For Guizot, for example, the expulsion of the Turks from Europe would be a cause of celebration for humanity.[26]

The Greeks and Muhammad Ali of Egypt, on the other hand, were widely held to be more favorable and even up and comers of civilization from the Orient, compared to the relative barbarity of the Ottoman governance and society during this period. The breaking out of the

[22] François, 18.
[23] Alexis Heraclides and Ada Dialla, "Eurocentrism, 'Civilization' and the 'Barbarians,'" in *Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century*: *Setting the Precedent* (Manchester University Press, 2015), 31.
[24] Andrew Linklater, *The Idea of Civilization and the Making of the Global Order* (Bristol University Press, 2020), 2.
[25] Wigen, *State of Translation*, 74.
[26] Heraclides and Dialla, "Eurocentrism, 'Civilization' and the 'Barbarians,'" 45.

Greek Uprising in March 1820 led to a transnational humanitarian and solidarity movement called the Philhellenic Movement, inspiring support committees in the European capitals and even hundreds of European citizens to volunteer to fight the Ottoman army for the Greek cause.[27] Already in 1821, in his preface to his poem Hellas, which he wrote out of his intense sympathy for the Greek cause, Percy B. Shelley would exclaim:

> The apathy of the rulers of the civilized world to the astonishing circumstances of the descendants of that nation to which they owe their civilization—rising as it were from the ashes of their ruin, is something perfectly inexplicable to a mere spectator of the shews of this moral scene. We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts, have their root in Greece.[28]

Without Greece, Shelley maintained, the Europeans "might still have been savages and idolaters" as: (Shelley, ix)

> The human form and the human mind attained to a perfection in Greece which has impressed its image on those faultless productions, whose very fragments are the despair of modern art, and has propagated impulses which cannot cease, through a thousand channels of manifest or imperceptible operation, to ennoble and delight mankind until the extinction of the race.[29]

Philhellenism of the early to mid-nineteenth century, with its emphasis on centrality of Ancient Greece as a reference point for European civilization along with liberty, as Caroline Moine points out, combined the "romantic mood with the rise of political liberalism."[30] Shelley reflected this prominent view during the period under consideration when he deems the Ottoman Empire in the figure of Mahmud II, "the Turkish tyrant", the enemy of "domestic happiness, of Christianity and civilization", and the Greeks as, despite being subject to

[27] Ute Frevert et al., *Feeling Political: Emotions and Institutions since 1789* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022), 310.
[28] Percy B. Shelley, *Hellas* (London, 1821), pp. viii-ix.
[29] Shelley, ix.
[30] Frevert et al., *Feeling Political*, 311.

oppression, hopefuls of the "social perfection" in Europe, of which their ancestors were the originators.[31] Emotions of pity, sympathy, compassion, gratitude, fear, anger were evoked in the public opinion in printed materials and works of art throughout Europe, towards an essentially European nation in its struggle against a tyrannical Muslim polity. Heavy references to the Crusades and the tropes of barbarity versus civilization further alienated discursively the Ottoman Empire from the circle of civilization.[32]

In the European public opinion, Muslim polities and dynasties were rarely viewed positively, but Muhammad Ali of Egypt seemed to have break through some of the prejudices. While his image in European public sphere was still that of an oriental despot, the continuation of the Ottoman sultan Mahmud II in its despotism during the Greek War of Independence, this perception quickly changed from the 1830s onwards, especially in French and British circles. In both French and British public sphere, he was more and more associated with modernization and reform, boasting his image as an enlightened despot educating his subjects. A French diplomat, Boislecomte, impressed by the policies of the governor, praised Muhammad Ali's ability to introduce civilization accurately and without rush, contrasting with the inability of the Ottoman sultan Mahmud II who could not convince his subjects to carry out reforms.[33] In Britain, as well, his image became that of a carrier of progress and civilization, and an enemy of fanaticism.[34]

The Ottomans can be said to have their own standard of civilization, if we reduce it to principles governing diplomatic conduct, international relations, and governance. As Gong points out, non-European countries also "defined, distributed, and regulated political power

[31] Shelley, *Hellas*, ix–x.
[32] Frevert et al., *Feeling Political*, 311–15.
[33] Jean-François Figeac, "Pour en finir avec le despotisme. L'image de Méhémet-Ali dans l'opinion publique franco-britannique," *Revue historique* 694, no. 2 (2020): par. 3, https://doi.org/10.3917/rhis.202.0105.
[34] Figeac, par. 15–17.

according to their own standard of 'civilization'" within the context of their own political cultures.[35] The Ottomans, however, came to the pungent conclusion from the late eighteenth century onwards with respect to the empire's incapacity to claim legitimacy in the international arena without catering to the essentially European discourses of legitimacy, based on highly passionate discourses of civilization. It was now the Europeans who had the capacity to impose their own standard of civilization. European extraterritoriality in the form of capitulations and protectorate systems worked as reminders of inferiority of the Ottomans and many non-Europeans in the ladder of international political and cultural hierarchy.[36] The Ottomans had to speak the language of civilization, prove their legitimacy and capacity to be fully civilized if the survival of their state was to be guaranteed. This communication took place in a highly hierarchical "language games" where the Ottomans had to claim legitimacy through engaging with French (and sometimes English) rhetorical traditions.[37]

The Ottomans were more than mere onlookers to the Eastern Question, or to the discourse of civilization that colored the public opinion on their legitimacy. They were aware of the relatively weak voices that favored them. However, they were also aware of the discursive consequences of Philhellenism, and the favorable publicity Muhammad Ali was getting on the pages of the French and British newspapers. Moreover, they were convinced that both Greeks and Muhammad Ali were actively involved in these developments.

Therefore, it should not surprise us that it was in this very moment the Ottomans decided to re-establish permanent embassies in Europe with great urgency. In quite a short time, several promising young bureaucrats such as Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Namık Pasha, and Sadık Rıfat Pasha were sent to the capitals of the major European powers of the time, Paris, London, and

[35] Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 8.
[36] Gong, 8.
[37] Wigen, *State of Translation*, 72.

Vienna respectively. Their mission was not only to negotiate, but also to reverse the prejudices against the Ottomans, hence reinstituting the empire within global moral and political hierarchies.

Mustafa Reşid Pasha: Interpreting "Civilization" across the European Standards and the Sublime Porte

The first instance where the French concept of civilization was translated into the Ottoman parlance was in a letter dated 1834, written by the famous Mustafa Reşid Pasha then minister plenipotentiary to Paris. In the letter, he refers to civilization as "disciplining/education of people and execution of regulations."[38] As vague as it is succinct, this is an initial attempt at describing a concept that colored any debate on the Eastern Question and the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire. The literature often takes this definition to be the essence of the westernizing and modernizing proclivities of the *Tanzîmât* elite, and an early indicator of the Pasha's intention to rationalize the Ottoman Empire.[39] By extension, it is largely assumed, reflective of the spirit of the *Tanzîmât* reforms that envisaged order and discipline in the Enlightenment sense, despite the appreciation of the polysemy of the concept in its cultural variations, and the contingency of the *Tanzîmât* reforms and civilizational discourse itself.

On the surface, such a credit given to Mustafa Reşit Pasha is to an extent warranted. It was, after all, he who masterminded the famous Edict of *Gülhâne* in which achieving internal order and discipline was emphasized as of utmost necessity for the well-being of the community

[38] Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, 4th ed. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010), 69. "…civilisation usûlüne, ya'ni terbiyye-i nâs ve icrây-ı nizâmât hususlarına…"
[39] Ahmet Karaçavuş, "Temeddünden Medeniyete (Civilisation): Osmanlı'nın İnsan Toplum ve Devlet Anlayışının Değişimi Üzerine bir Deneme," *OTAM*, no. 37 (2015): 126–27, https://doi.org/10.1501/OTAM_0000000659.

and the state's power. Subsequent reforms indicate efforts to secure order through internal regulations of institutions and new educational institutions that imparted "useful knowledge" to the subjects. Throughout the nineteenth century, Ottoman intellectuals and political elites of different stripes strove to associate themselves with Mustafa Reşid Pasha to claim moral standing and give credence to their ideals. These facts helped establish the story of *Tanzîmât* since the *Tanzîmât* era itself as that of a process of streamlining of bureaucracy and an implicit controlling and retraining of emotions in order to achieve the European model of civilization.

When Mustafa Reşid was sent to Paris as a high-level diplomat in the June of 1834, at the age of 34, he was well aware of the precarity of his situation. Not knowing any French, he had to negotiate with the French ministers about the most pressing issues of the time: the French occupation Algiers and the Muhammad Ali crisis in Egypt and Levant. In all these, he had to mediate between the Ottoman concern with securing the Russian support and the French reservations on this relationship. Accommodating different considerations and priorities of different states, particularly France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had the potential to be crippling.

The Pasha was also aware of the negative stereotypes about the Ottoman Empire and its importance in France, both within the government circles and on the pages of the newspapers. If compassion and trust was evoked in anything related to the Eastern Question, the French usually directed them those who stood against the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Greeks and the government of Muhammad Ali. As "civilization" was the major way of negotiating difference, he would have to dirty his hands by engaging in this highly moralizing, passionate discourse.

His conduct as a diplomat was of crucial importance. More than anything, he had to be taken seriously. He had to align his emotional displays with the ways of the French and British, as

it pertains to either their "national character," or the message the Ottoman state wanted to convey. He was speaking on behalf of the state, and showing any sign of deficit in character, or a deviation from proper comportment and appropriate emotional displays carried the danger of hindering the Ottoman effort to be considered a legitimate equal to be trusted, as much as his future as a bureaucrat. He had to interpret and perform civilizational norms in different spaces with different audiences, from the court of the French Emperor to short discussions with high level bureaucrats on corridors. Having a double audience of his European interlocutors and the Sublime Porte, he had to consider different formulations of such norms. He knew that he did not address only the European officers, but also addressed, and felt the overwhelming gaze of the Sublime Porte and international public.

Despite some hiccups and minor blunders, he seemed to have articulated a civilizational template palatable to the Sublime Porte, and apparently the European statesmen, during this short mission. Therefore, I argue that starting from this very context helps us understand the *Tanzîmât* as an emotional regime. This rested on a translation work undertaken by Mustafa Reşid Pasha in a watershed moment in the nineteenth century, in his encounter and first-hand engagement with the vicissitudes of the international politics.

The first instance that Mustafa Reşid Pasha had to directly engage with the concept of *civilization* came within the issue of Muhammad Ali Pasha. He was discussing about the response of the Ottomans, France, and Britain in the face of a possible declaration of independence by the governor of Egypt. In his letter to the imperial center, he relays the stance of the French officials on the Egyptian question as he infers from his intermittent discussions with them:

> Muhammad Ali, being ignoble (*fürû-mâye*) and old, is understood to be a demented person, especially due to his inappropriate behavior. As even his son İbrahim [Pasha] is known to be senseless and possess faulty character (*ahlâk-*

> *ı zemîme*), it became evident to them [the French officials] that the general condition of Egypt would be in a state of chaos (*muhtel*) and left helpless, as he would not be able to accomplish anything after his father's death. And although Muhammad Ali initially brought some order to Egypt with the assistance and support of the Europeans, the fake wisdom (*dirâyet-i kâzibe*) he claims to possess and declares is understood to be not capable of governing the vast territories, as evidenced by the upheavals (*ihtilâl*) in the Levant.[40]

After mentioning how the French bureaucrats maintained that Muhammad Ali should be dealt with for good and the governor's illusions of independent rule is unlikely, the letter presents a significant contrast the Egyptian governor and his son in Mahmud II from the mouths of the same French bureaucrats. Especially, Mustafa Reşid Pasha writes:

> As [the Ottoman sultan] is young and his equanimity and orderliness (*rezânet-i 'akl*) and flawless acuity (*fetânet-i kâmile*) worthy of the sultans is conspicuous for all, and because at the same time he is putting effort towards the ways of civilization, that is, disciplining of people (*terbiye-yi nâs*) and execution of regulations (*icrâ-yı nizâmât*), and since the entire Muslim community is devoted to the sultan by way of religion and law (*dînen ve şer'an*), it is evident that he will swiftly and effortlessly enforce the laws throughout the entirety of Arabia.[41]

It is not clear whether these reflected the true sentiments of the French officials—we can even question the truthfulness of the report based on the fact that Mustafa Reşid Pasha took great care to signal its inferential nature. What is clear, however, is that Mustafa Reşid Pasha encountered an important notion in *civilisation* that was significant enough to include

[40] Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, 69. "Mehmed Ali fürû-mâye ve ihtiyar bir âdem olarak ale'l husus bu esnada tuttuğu nâbecâ tavırlarından bayağı matuh hükmünde olduğu anlaşılmakda ve oğlu denilen İbrahim (Paşa) dahî bîşuûr ve ahlâk-ı zemîme ile muttasıf olduğundan babası geberdikten sonra hiç bir şey yapamıyarak Mısırın hey'et-i hâliyyesi bütün bütün muhtel ve perişan olacağı zevi'l-ukûl indlerinde tebeyyün etmekde ve Mehmed Ali Avrupalının iâne ve irâesiyle mukaddemlerde Mısır'a biraz nizâm vermiş ise de kendisinin iddia ve i'lan etmekde olduğu dirâyet-kâzibe memâlik-i vesîada icrây-i hükûmete mütehammil olmadığı Beriyyetü'ş-Şam ihtilâlinden anlaşılıp…"

[41] Kaynar, 69. "Ale'l husus ki zat-ı şevket simat-ı hazret-i şehinşâhînin sinn-ı hümayunları genc ve rezânet-ı 'akl ü fetanet-i kâmile-ı mülûkâneleri cümleye müsellem olarak bir tarafdan dahî civilization usûlüne, ya'ni terbiyye-i nâs ve icrây-ı nizâmât husûslarına sa'y ü ikdam buyrulmakta olduklarından ve bütün millet-i islâmiyye dahî dînen ve şer'an taraf-ı eşref-ı cihanbâniye merbut bulunduklarından az vakitte ve kemâl-ı sühûlet ile bütün Arabistan'da tenfîz-i ahkâm buyuracakları bedîhiyâttandır."

centrally in a narrative of Ottoman legitimacy and authority, not least in a document that would be taken as a policy advice. What is also clear, as indicated by his reply to the officials, according to the course and needs of every meeting (*her bir meclisin revişi ve iktizâsına göre*), is that the Ottoman ambassador took notice of, and proclaimed to those sentiments as he has also witnessed the low character (*ahlâk-ı red'ia*) and numerous injustices and cruelties (*mezâlim-i 'adîde*) of Muhammad Ali and İbrahim Pasha. He goes on to mention how he praised the Ottoman sultan excessively (*ıtrâ-yı kelâm*) about the administrative regimens (*tedâbîr-i mülkiye*) and auspicious regulations (*nizâmât-ı hasene*) undertaken by the sultan.[42] From the beginning, civilization signified for Mustafa Reşid Pasha a moral and emotional category that he could instrumentalize, instead of taking it for granted and interiorizing it at face value.

What words and semantics Mustafa Reşid Pasha mobilized to engage with the concept of civilization? The way he chose to present the concept to his Ottoman bureaucratic audience is quite striking, as he did not utilize the word *medeniyet*, which became popular later in the nineteenth century as a translation equivalent to civilization, instead opted to preserve the French word *civilisation,* although later in his correspondences he used the neologism *sivilizasyon*. He chooses the word *usûl*, a common and ambivalent word that can signify "theory," "ways," "style," or "practice" to categorize the concept, which suggests a tool for achieving power and authority, much different from the concept's ties to progress and a stage of development in a hierarchical temporal order prevalent in Europe at that time, or the aforementioned *medeniyet,* which implied a stage in the Khaldunian life cycle of states.[43]

The twin elements of his neologism, 'disciplining of people' (*terbiye-yi nâs*) and 'execution of regulations' (*icrâ-yı nizâmât*) is also significant, as it seems to the Ottoman political culture

[42] Kaynar, 70.
[43] Wigen, *State of Translation*, 85.

as much as it did to the European. Notions of individual liberties, social relations, and character of the institutions is not invoked, yet the civilizing project of the elite and the preoccupation with order and security seems to be captured. In the first element, *nâs* stands simply for people, while *terbiye* can refer both to education as acquisition of knowledge, as well as polishing of morality or disciplining (*te'dîb* or *tehzîb*). It is not exactly clear what Mustafa Reşit meant with *terbiye* in this context, but it is more probable that he had in mind 'discipline' (in a sense also borders on nurturing good morals through knowledge) more than professional education. *Nizâmât*, plural of *nizâm* (order) was a popular concept to talk about reform in the post-Selim III era. While the term could stand generically for a general order of things, it usually referred to new regulations and laws within Ottoman institutions during the period yet tied to the notions such as *'adâlet* (justice/balance), *âsâyiş* (security/order), and *refâh* (well-being) of the society.[44]

Just as the letter invokes more local political culture than European to engage with *civilisation*, it nevertheless ties it to more international notions of legitimacy that the Ottomans had long been speaking through and more familiar with. Social and political order is paramount, and political legitimacy rests with those who could establish and maintain such an order. The loyalty of the population based on religion is only one requirement of such legitimacy. The ruler must display certain traits, equanimity and orderliness (*rezânet-i 'akl*), acuity (*fetânet*), and in the case of Mahmud II (contrasting at every chance with Muhammad Ali) youthful vigor. Civilization as a method, which buttressed political legitimacy by ensuring discipline and order with apt regulations and institutions, is to be executed by young, virile, and orderly civilizing agents.

[44] Maurus Reinkowski, "The State's Security and the Subjects' Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century)," in *Legitimizing the Order* (Brill, 2005), 200–201, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047407645_012.

Mustafa Reşid Pasha's correspondences from his diplomatic dealings indicate that he was instrumentalizing the concept of civilization more than taking it as a universal normative concept that *must* guide the Ottoman reforms beyond its obvious currency in diplomacy and public opinion, as much as the latter's impact on government policies go, and often to showcase his diplomatic skills. It is true that he was taking its normative aspects seriously and putting effort to bring together the Ottoman political culture he and his colleagues and superiors back in İstanbul had been socialized in and the European political cultures as much as he was aware of at least partly through his discussions with his European interlocutors. What was at stake, however, was his ability to deal with the practical diplomatic solutions to the many problems the Empire has been facing at that time, rather than coming up with basic principles for over-arching reforms. His endeavors reveal a distinct emotional regime of Ottoman bureaucracy and diplomacy.

Throughout his diplomatic missions Mustafa Reşid Pasha deliberately catered to the expectations of his interlocutors in the imperial center of how an Ottoman diplomat in his position ought to behave and deal with the diplomatic issues. His detailed letters betray an anxiety to represent himself as a skillful diplomat who considers both the political language of the Ottoman state and the ways and language of his European interlocutors. His correspondences from Paris maintain the subtleties of his discussions with French officials, even extending to minor disturbances and misunderstandings that occurred during their conversations. Even during the most contentious debates, Mustafa Reşid Pasha seems to have consistently managed to find peaceful resolutions saving the day, often earning the respect of the European statesmen in the process. He emphasized the polite and courteous (*nâzikâne*) nature of his responses when negotiating the positions of the Ottomans and Europeans amidst

intricate power struggles.[45] European statesmen frequently end up congratulating the Ottoman diplomat for his civilized and stately demeanor.

One particular interaction between Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Henri de Rigny is revealing. After months of hesitance partly due to the Austrian and Russian advise to postpone the talk of the affair to after the resolution of the Egyptian affair, the Ottoman diplomat finally addressed the issue of Algeria to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, the French minister outright refused to entertain Pasha's motion, citing the Algiers being an independent region under rebels' control (*'âsî elinde bir memleket-i müstakille*) at the time of the invasion as a reason. Additionally, the French minister asserted that their positions were unequal, as he was a minister representing his home country, while Mustafa Reşid Pasha was merely an envoy away from home. Unable to contain himself, the Ottoman diplomat criticized the minister's behavior as inappropriate (*münâsib değil*) and explained that ambassadors, even when far from home, speak on behalf of their states and are aware of their respective stances, asserting that the minister should listen to the motion of the Ottoman ambassador. He emphasized the religious imperative that compelled the Ottoman state to resolve the issue, while expressing its desire for a friendly resolution. After a lengthy discussion, the French minister agreed to consider Mustafa Reşid Pasha's motion, acknowledging his gratitude for presenting his mission in a manner consistent with civilized etiquette and international diplomatic norms: "Although this matter will greatly affect us,", said the French minister to the Ottoman diplomat, "I am grateful for the well-mannered language and diplomatic approach you have taken in conveying your official duties".[46] It was clear to the reader of the letter that Mustafa Reşid also demonstrated *rezânet-i 'akl* (equanimity or orderliness) and

[45] M. Cavit Baysun, "Mustafa Reşit Paşa'nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasî Yazıları," *Tarih Vesikaları* 1, no. 4 (Birincikânun 1941): 287.
[46] Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, 75. "Bu maslahat bize ziyâdesiyle dokunacak şey ise de sizin lisân-ı edeb ve usûl-ı düvel üzere beyân-ı me'mûriyet eylemenizden pek müteşekkirim."

fetânet (acuity) in this challenging interaction, while protecting his and by extension the Ottoman state's dignity that he was representing.

In Mustafa Reşid Pasha's correspondences, civilization emerges as a distinct moral category, similar to what we observe in the whole discourse of the "standards of civilization." This time, however, it is populated with, and deeply rooted in concepts of morality indigenous to Ottoman political culture and its emphasis on the justice of the ruler for the order. Order (*nizâm*) and disciplining (*terbiye*) works in tandem with notions of *'adâlet* (justice), and their opposites in the Ottoman political language, particularly *fesâd* (disorder/mischief) and *bî-edeb/bî-terbiye* (lacking moral character) and *zulm* (injustice/cruelty).

Thus, he appropriates the notion of civilization to use it as a tool for moral accusations against Muhammad Ali, Greeks, and even the European diplomats themselves. In a way that marked whole of his diplomatic career, the essential Other of this understanding of civilization was Muhammad Ali of Egypt. He never seems to run out of words to describe the faulty character of the governor and his son, but the most emphasis is given to his vices that endangered domestic and international order. "Can the state of the world remain stable as long as this person continues in such a state?" he exclaims to the French officials, referring to the cruelty and injustices (*mezâlim*) of Muhammad Ali.[47] Therefore, he says to the French general Guilleminot, that France and England first and foremost should protect the Islamic lands from turmoil and upheavals by chastening (*edebini takındırup*) Muhammad Ali as his undesirable dispositions (*evzâ-yı gayr-ı marziyesi*) has continually been disrupting the tranquility (*şîrâze-i râhat*) and order/security (*âsâyiş*).[48] He writes about the Greek uprisings as *Rum fesâdı* (Greek disorder/mischief) instead of *ihtilâl* (uprisings). This is significant because while *fesâd*

[47] Baysun, "Mustafa Reşit Paşa'nın Paris ve Londra Sefaretleri Esnasındaki Siyasî Yazıları," 288. "Bu herif bu halde durdukça ahval-i âlem berkarar olur mu?"
[48] Baysun, 289.

implied an immoral act on the part of the agents of disorder who deliberately engages in acts of sedition and mischief.[49] He juxtaposes the legitimacy of the Ottoman response to the Greek *fesâd* and the European response to the "unjust" suffering caused to the people of Algeria by the French invasion when he notes to then the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Palmerston, during his ambassadorship in Britain: "The [European] states formed alliances with each other during the emergence of the Greek *fesâd* to prevent bloodshed. Now, they say nothing about the unjustly shed blood in Algeria. Could it be that the European indifference towards the suffering of certain innocents in Algeria stems from their lack of viewing them as humans?" [50] He connected the local political tradition with broader geopolitical concerns through the language of civilization as he attempted to renegotiate international moral hierarchies.

In Mustafa Reşid Pasha's letters, there is a notable indifference towards discussing the emotional dispositions of people in comparison to the political elites, who were often associated with qualities such as *i'tidâl* (moderation, equanimity) and *sebât* (steadiness) or the lack thereof. While this indifference can be attributed to the diplomatic nature of the texts, it nevertheless reflects the recurring belief within Ottoman political culture that views people as essentially good and capable of loyalty, although "they were occasionally led astray by certain malicious and perfidious elements."[51] Although the letters do not explicitly engage with the implications of civilization *cum* order for the emotions and values of the community, they provide insights into what he perceives as dangerous for both internal and international order.

[49] Reinkowski, "The State's Security and the Subjects' Prosperity," 203.
[50] Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, 729.
[51] Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, 1st ed. (London: Tauris, 2011), 40.

A key aspect that emerges from Mustafa Reşid's writings is the significance of the emotionality of the public opinion (*efkâr-ı nâs* or *efkâr-ı umûmiye* used interchangeably) and its potential impact on the political landscape. Public opinion, ever susceptible to the passionate language found in newspapers, were the scene where disorder and mischief (*fesâd*) can manifest for Mustafa Reşid Pasha. The newspapers played a crucial role as catalysts for the development of disorder, as seen in the case of Greek *fesâd* and its international context, such as Philhellenism.[52] The public moods and sentiments, characterized by the term *cûş u hurûş* (effervescence and fulmination), a reference to the behavior of water and fire, often part of the hyperboles of *dîvân* poetry, were exerted a powerful force that cannot be ignored. When this force manifests itself in public opinion, it not only affects the domestic order but also influences the actions of the political elite on an international scale.

Mustafa Reşid Pasha frequently contrasts the moderation displayed by European statesmen with the *cûş u hurûş* exhibited by the public and the journalists. This sharp contrast highlights his anxiety about public opinion, and the potential disruptions that can arise from uncontrolled emotional outbursts. His diplomatic interactions surrounding contentious issues in Greece, Algiers, and Lebanon were colored by a collective concern among diplomats to prevent the escalation of *cûş u hurûş* and the potential repercussions it may bring.[53]

[52] Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, 507.
[53] See, for example Kaynar, 432; Kaynar, 480.

Sadık Rıfat Pasha: Polishing the Individual Morality

Three years after Mustafa Reşid translated the concept of civilization with reference to notions of disciplining and order, a close associate of his, Sadık Rıfat Pasha, then the ambassador to Vienna penned his own definition in a significant ambassadorial report, *A Treatise on the Conditions of Europe (Avrupa Ahvâline Dâ'ir Bir Risâle)* written in 1838:

> [Europeans] attain the progress of the essential benefit of their governance only through growth of the population of the nation and development of the realms and state and attainment of security and welfare, as required by Europe's present civilization, that is, the ways of its habituation (me'nûsiyet) and *medeniyet*. They progress and gain over each other in present conditions and reputations through such common good.[54]

Like Mustafa Reşid Pasha's definition, Sadık Rıfat Pasha's definition renders *civilization* a practice to achieve prosperity, rather than a state of affairs, or a stage. As far as we are aware, Sadık Rıfat Pasha is the first one to refer to the Khaldunian concept of *medeniyet* to translate civilization.[55] The other part of his two-part description, *me'nûsiyet,* was a word derived from the Arabic root *u-n-s* (acquaintance, intimacy, and friendship) and meant having been acquainted, accustomed, habituated. In this meaning, it could signify leaving savagery, wildness, and nature behind and developing prosocial emotions.[56] But in the treatise it takes a more restricted meaning related to the peaceful relations between the European states or a particular type of diplomatic sociability that brought political harmony at the international scale, bordering on the value of *ülfet* (familiarity, friendship). Europeans, as he marks in the treatise, have for a while been giving preference to peace over war, hence ensuring the development of their realms (*imârât-ı mülkiye*) through preserving internal security/order

[54] Sadık Rıfat Paşa, *Müntehebât-ı Âsâr*, vol. 2 (Tatyos Dividciyan Matbaası, 1873), 4.
[55] Karaçavuş, "Temeddünden Medeniyete," 131.
[56] Karaçavuş, 131.

(*âsâyiş*) and the welfare (*istirâhat)* of their peoples and the countries enabled by the general peace brought about by the agreements of the rulers.[57] Security and order was paramount for *sivilizasyon* which entails the progress of "the essential benefit of their realms" *(menâfi'-i mülkiye-i lâzımelerinin ilerlemesi*) not through war but only though demographic policies, public works, ensuring security and welfare while keeping the general international benefit in mind.

Similar to Mustafa Reşid Pasha's conceptualization, this order at home and international relations rested on the proper emotions and virtues of the political elites. Sadık Rıfat Pasha explains how the rulers of Europe were very perceptive of the sensitive situations (*dekâ'ik-i ahvâl*) in the international arena and they maintained wise and prudent actions (*tedâbîr-i hekîmâne*) even in the everyday affairs.[58] In case of breakout of internal or external conflicts (*münâza'ât*), marks Sadık Rıfat Pasha, they refrain from engaging in warfare by all means, and strive to use the diplomatic channels and the force of the pen (*tev'em-i seyf*) to sooth (*teskîn*) the conflict.[59] As Einar Wigen notes, this could be an interesting instance of an entangling of Metternich's discourse on the Congress of Europe with the discourse of the Hâlidî brotherhood's, which both Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha were members of, emphasis on the morality of ruler and "the importance of a ruler in imposing an equitable and moral order to ensure the welfare of the subjects and the prosperity and security of the state."[60] However, we should also bear in mind that Sadık Rıfat Pasha was also involved in

[57] Sadık Rıfat Paşa, *Müntehebât,* 2:2. "… mukaddemlerde niçe niçe ceng ü pîkâr vukû'a gelmiş ise de bir müddetden beri inkılâbât-ı sâbıke-i harbiye ve ictima'-ı hükümdârân ile bi'l-ittifâk karârgîr olan musâlaha-i 'umûmiye üzerine hıfz-ı âsâyiş-i mülk ü millet kaziyye-i nâfi'ası her devlette mültezim tutulmakta yâ'nî cemi' zamanda sulh harb üzerine mürecceh olub husûsiyle imârât-ı mülkiye ise musâlaha-i mütemâdiye ve istirâhat-ı kâmile-i teb'a ile hâsıl olduğu…"
[58] Sadık Rıfat Paşa, 2:3. "Bu dekâ'ik-ı ahvâl ekseriyâ şimdiki hâlde Avrupa düvel hükümdâranı indinde ma'lûm ve mücerreb ve mu'teber olarak herbâr-ı hâdîsât-ı güniyyede tedâbîr-i hekîmâne ile hareket itmekde…"
[59] Sadık Rıfat Paşa, 2:3.
[60] Pernau et al., *Civilizing Emotions,* 111.

an indigenous debate of expansion through external jihad versus prosperity through domestic reform which had its roots in the New Order debates from the late eighteenth century.[61]

The temperament of the people and their emotional attachment to the state gains a renewed importance through Sadık Rıfat Pasha's emphasis on the administrative and material advancements associated with civilization as a peaceful domestic and international order. "The melioration (*ıslâh*) of the incompatible temperaments of human beings (*tabâ'i-yi mütehâlife-yi beşeriye*) such as obedience (*inkıyâd*), defiance (*muhâlefet*), and loyalty (*sadâkat*) and betrayal (*ihânet*) and favour (*rağbet*) and contempt (*nefret*)" says Sadık Rıfat, does not only emerge from coercive and power of states but from "kind measures (*tedâbîr-i rıfkiye*) that attract the hearts of the people (*celb-i kulûb-ı teba'a*) such as heartfelt security (*emniyet-i kalbiye*) and sustained personal dignity (*i'tibârât-ı zâtiye-yi mütemâdiye*) and peacefulness (*istırâhat-ı tabî'ye*)." Enabled by the adherence to establish laws by the rulers and official alike, this gives spiritual power to the European states.[62] The importance of personal dignity of the subject through good governance as a source legitimacy is a novelty within the Ottoman context, but not an entirely unexpected one, as this coincided with the heightened sensitivity regarding human dignity and breaches of it through degradation and debasement during this time. As Ute Frevert shows, this was a result of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution that promoted the language of equal citizenship where citizens expected respect from the government, which apparently did not escape Sadık Rıfat Pasha.[63]

Another important way Sadık Rıfat Pasha brings the vocabulary of justice to the discussion on civilization is through an emphasis on the hardworking and ardor (*sa'y u gayret*) the

[61] Alp Eren Topal, "From Decline to Progress: Ottoman Concepts of Reform 1600-1876" (Unpublished PhD diss., Bilkent University, 2017), 115–18.
[62] Sadık Rıfat Paşa, *Müntehebât*, 2:5.
[63] Ute Frevert, "Humiliation and Modernity: Ongoing Practices, Changing Sensibilities," *Cultural History* 10, no. 2 (2021): 282–89.

peasants demonstrate in production as they can keep their earnings thanks to lack of injustices and oppression (*mezâlim and te'addiyât*) due to proper regulations. This still reads like a classical account of Circle of Justice,[64] yet Sadık Rıfat Pasha ties it to *ilerleme* (progress) of crafts and industry.[65] *Gayret*, an essential virtue within the Ottoman *ahlâk* tradition, here holds particular significance within an international order where the Circle of Justice is not predicated on territorial expansion, but rather on the productivity and industriousness of the populace.[66]

Progress, however, was for Sadık Rıfat Pasha of administrative and material kind, not of social and political. Education was important, but he firmly believed that knowledge should be in the service of the maintenance of the public order. While he emphasized the importance of publications that informed the general population about the workings of governance, his emphasis was on fostering empathy and understanding in the people towards the government. In a similar vein, he advocated for restricting professional education to those who pursue a career in officialdom, fearing that such an instruction could foster liberal outlook and potentially incite disobedience and rebellion.[67] Sadık Rıfat Pasha shared Mustafa Reşid Pasha's conviction that the popular opinion is associated with unbounded emotions. In another treatise, for example, he likened the public opinion (*efkâr-ı 'âmme*) of their time and the propensity of the people to a rushing river (*cûş u hurûş*) that cannot be suppressed. The ebullition (*galeyân*) and excitement (*heyecân*) of the public opinion should be dealt with in accordance with the course of nature (*cereyân-ı tabîat*) and not through injustice and

[64]Although an ancient Middle Eastern concept, the term "Circle of Justice" is an invention of the sixteenth-century Ottoman writer Kınalızade. This saying can serve as a summary description: "No power without troops... No troops without money… No money without prosperity… No prosperity without justice and good administration." Linda T. Darling, *A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2013), 2.
[65] Sadık Rıfat Paşa, *Müntehebât*, 2:9.
[66] Darling, *A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East*, 161.
[67] Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline* (Brill, 2001), 62.

oppression (*zulm ü te'addî*) which hurts order (*nizâmât*) and feeds disorder and mischief (*fesâd*).[68]

Sadık Rıfat Pasha later wrote two treatises on individual morality*, Risâle-i Ahlâk (Treatise of Morality)* published in 1847 for children, and *Zeyl-i Risâle-i Ahlâk (Addendum to the Treatise on Morality)* in 1857 for adults in the civil service.[69] Written to be included in the curriculum of the newly established schools, both books were republished many times throughout the century, and *Risâle-i Ahlâk* were thought in both Qur'an schools and secular grade school at least until the Hamidian period.[70]

Both books belonged to the lineage of Islamic-Ottoman *ahlâk* (ethics) tradition, influenced primarily by Kınalızade Ali Çelebi's *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î*, which had been immensely popular since its publication in the sixteenth century, and through it to the Aristotelian virtue ethics.[71] Similar to the classical *ahlâk* texts Sadık Rıfat Pasha's treatises do not concern with emotions as a distinct category, but often as virtues, the golden mean, or vices, deficiency or excess of a virtue. States that we would call emotions such as compassion (*şefkat*) and grudge (*garaz, kin*) belonged to the same category with cleanliness (*nezâfet*) and lying (*kizb*).[72] Hence, the pupils were not expected to control or suppress an emotion that stood somewhere inside the body, but to develop a virtuous soul by learning about the vices and virtues and through habitual practice. Defined as they are, the recommended virtues and need to find balance (*i'tidâl*) were often emphasized in the treatises on their role in the preserving of social order,

[68] Bekir Günay, "Mehmet Sadık Rıfat Paşa'nın Hayatı, Eserleri, ve Görüşleri" (MA Thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1992), 287.
[69] For the full transliteration of the texts, see respectively: Mükerrem Bedizel Aydın and Ender Büyüközkara, eds., "Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa ve Risâle-i Ahlâk," *Ahlâk Çalışmaları ve Ahlâk Felsefesi Dergisi* 1, no. 1 (2020): 90–101; Mükerrem Bedizel Aydın and Ender Büyüközkara, eds., "Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa ve Zeyl-i Risâle-i Ahlâk," *Ahlâk Çalışmaları ve Ahlâk Felsefesi Dergisi* 1, no. 2 (2021): 87–106.
[70] Aydın and Büyüközkara, "Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa ve Risâle-i Ahlâk," 90.
[71] Fabian Steininger, "Morality, Emotions, and Political Community in the Late Ottoman Empire (1878-1908)" (Unpublished PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2017), 37.
[72] Aydın and Büyüközkara, "Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa ve Risâle-i Ahlâk," 94–98.

while the imperative and struggle to develop virtues were expressed in the language of *i'tibâr* (reputation, dignity) and *gayret* respectively.

The way Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha conceptualized emotions differed from the common the post-Enlightenment European conceptualization. The prominent European perspective on emotions was impacted by the Enlightenment ideals, resting on rationality and self-control, as emotions were often regarded as irrational hence disruptive forces for the civilizational order. Emotions were evaluated in terms of their alignment with social norms, as certain emotions such as compassion and empathy were considered beneficial, while anger and vengeance were seen problematic. For our Pashas, if civility was about emotional restraint and display of proper emotions, they thought of them as inseparable from moral categories. What was at stake is not to instill or repress specific political or social emotions and overcoming the nature, but to nurture a virtuous habitus through finding the golden mean (*i'tidâl*) which kept the order both within the individual and in the world intact. *Cûş u hurûş, galeyân, heyecân*, references to nature and the moral subjects' internal dynamics separated from the will in the *ahlâk* tradition, stood outside of the paradigm of emotion-vices and emotion-virtues and cultivation of the soul, hence their anxiety about its repercussions for the order for the decision makers.

CHAPTER 2: FERVENT LOVERS AND ZEALOTS OF PROGRESS

In an article dated 1873,[73] Namık Kemal wrote at length about what is now confidently called *medeniyet* (civilization) and debates surrounding it within the budding public sphere of the 1870s İstanbul. In response to those who associate civilization with immorality, he engaged in a detailed discussion on the necessity of civilization for humans, in his usual polemical style. He uses the opportunity to consider its two definitions in circulation at the time. One, as he explained, is to live a communal life (*insanın ictimâ' üzre yaşaması*), which is necessary beyond doubt as a child would die of hunger if released to the nature immediately after breastfeeding. Moreover, he argued that humans need civilization (*temeddün*) because the capacity to progress/promotion (*istidâd-ı terakkî*) which God has granted them cannot be realized through living in isolation. Then he considered a second, and less trivial, definition of civilization from science of politics (*fenn-i siyâset nazarında*): perfection at security (*âsâyişte kemâl*).[74] He espoused civilization in this very definition and mustered lengthy arguments against those who would question the need for perfect security through material development brought about by civilization. For Kemal, civilization was "the guardian of human life" (*hayat-ı beşerin kâfili*): "Humans surpassed the population of the animals several thousands of times, although they have less power at procreation. This abundance is seen not in the wilderness of the desert (*sahrâ-yı vahşet*), but in the felicitous palace of civilization (*sa'âdet-sarây-ı medeniyet*)."[75] He cites cloth, money, strong buildings, gaslight, ships, and

[73] Namık Kemal, "Medeniyet," in *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri: Bütün Makaleleri 1*, ed. İsmail Kara and Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu (Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 358–61.
[74] Kemal, 358.
[75] Kemal, 359. "Görüyoruz ki insan tevlîd kuvvetinde hemen kâffe-i hayvanâtın mâdûnunda iken dünyada meşhur ve ma'rûf olan hayvanâtın kâffesinden birkaç bin kat ziyade bulunuyor. Ve bu kesret sahra-yı vahşette değil saadet-saray-ı medeniyette görülüyor."

telegraph as products of civilization that enables perfection of human security, themselves are results of effort and though (*sa'y ü fikr*) of humans.[76]

For Namık Kemal, however, civilization served a higher imperative than simply to live: "The right and purpose of a human is not merely to live but to live with freedom (*hürriyet*). Is it possible for non-civilized nations to preserve their freedoms in the face of this many civilized nations."[77] It was not simply a matter of survival but to live with dignity, and it is only an inevitable consequence of modernity that the civilized dominates the uncivilized. Thus, it is only natural for Namık Kemal that people like Indians and Algerians came under European domination:

> "It does not befit the human dignity to lose freedom under the oppression and domination of the foreigners like the Indians and Algerians by insisting on saying 'We need such and such and we need to be contended with that. We have seen such and such from our fathers and anything else is innovation. What is the use of lessons, trainings, books, machines, progresses (*terakkîler*), inventions?'"[78]

Hürriyet was the essential value that brought about true security (*âsâyiş-i hakîkî*), abundance of which relied on arduous effort (*meşâkk-ı sa'y*): Every hardship of civilization brings a comfort, while every comfort of savagery (*vahşet*) leads to a thousand torment...In summary, to live without civilization is akin to dying before appointed time of death."[79]

[76] Kemal, 359.
[77] Kemal, 360. Bir de insanın hak ve maksadı yalnız yaşamak değil hürriyetle yaşamaktır. Bu kadar milel-i mütemeddineye karşı kâbil midir ki akvâm-ı gayr-ı mütemeddine hürriyetlerini muhafaza edebilsinler."
[78] Kemal, 360. "Bize şu lâzım onunla kanaat etmeliyiz. Ve pederlerimizden bunu gördük onun haricinde ne var ise bidattir.Dersler, talimler, kitaplar, makineler, terakkiler, icadlar ne işe yarar?" diye diye Hindliler, Cezayirliler gibi ecânibin kahr u galebesi altında izâ'a-ı hürriyet şan-ı insaniyete hiçbir suretle yakışır şeylerden değildir."
[79] Kemal, 360. "Asayiş-i hakikinin kesreti daima meşâkk-ı sa'yın kesretiyle mütenâsib olagelmiştir. Medeniyetin her sıkıntısı bir rahat tevlîd eder, vahşetin her rahatı bin eziyeti mûcib olur…. Onu olsa olsa medeniyetin hazâin-i iddihârı isti'âb edebilir. Hülasa medeniyetsiz yaşamak ecelsiz ölmek kabîlindendir."

For Namık Kemal and the Young Ottomans, civilization is associated with not only material but also political progress. In Namık Kemal's depiction of London as the ultimate representation of civilization and progress, all the material aspects of civilization were in the last instance tied to the progresses in good governance and strong public opinion.[80] Scholarly emphasis is on the focus of these intellectuals on the material aspects of civilization and progress.[81] But as Alp Eren Topal shows, the Young Ottomans associated progress with "grand political change" and strove to align the Ottoman history with the history of material and political progress of Europe.[82] Both Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi narrated the modern history of the empire as a progress toward freedom and constitutionalism through administrative reforms. Both intellectuals also maintained that the Ottoman people desired to take the lead in progress through their own collective effort (*hey'et-i mecmû'a*), instead of the "wise" and "virtuous" individuals of *Tanzîmât*.[83]

In contrast to what we observed in Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha, Namık Kemal presents civilization as not a practice or ways, but as an ideal state. While internal order and security is emphasized, it is not a means to achieve something else, but an end in itself. What's at stake is not only to buttress the legitimacy of the polity or social and political order within a transient world order, but survival and freedom, and living with dignity. In Namık Kemal we see a reproduction of the tripartite division of savagery/barbarity/civilization, as he was convinced that civilization implied a progressive temporal regime, and those who were left behind risked losing their freedom. In his opinion, what the Ottomans were experiencing was a crisis of sovereignty in a march of progress that the Ottomans were clearly lagged. Hence, what the Ottomans needed the most was not a population inculcated with virtues of

[80] Kemal, "Terakkî," 212.
[81] Wigen, *State of Translation*, 89–90; Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, 319–23.
[82] Topal, "From Decline to Progress: Ottoman Concepts of Reform 1600-1876," 163.
[83] Topal, 165–67.

orderliness or obedience, but a new individual subjectivity with political agency, sacrificing their present for the future of the polity.

Ottoman Vices

The conviction that political and material progress rests on the people went hand in hand with a wider criticism of the society. While Namık Kemal emoted an optimism for reaching the level of civilization, he nevertheless had some reservations about the tendency of the Ottoman people in its current state towards demonstrating effort towards progress: as indicated in his article entitled *Bizde Efkâr-ı Terakkî* (Our Idea of Progress):

> "Before the lazy house was consumed by fire, there used to live a notorious lazy person. Every day, they would lie down under the mulberry tree in the courtyard. One day, a strong wind caused a large mulberry to fall from the tree. The mulberry ends up falling directly onto the lazy person's mustache. Upon seeing this, (without any laziness) the lazy person expresses his gratitude to God and says, 'O Lord, send another man so that he pushes this mulberry into my mouth.'"[84]

The vices of indolence and heedlessness and served as one of the bases of Namık Kemal's criticism of the society. According to Namık Kemal, the Ottomans were not only lacking in effort, but also paying no heed to the country struggling for survival. There was, however, another related vice that distinguished the Ottomans from the nations on the way to progress. It was the lack of courage and moral integrity to follow one's principles. Namık Kemal complained that the political morality (*ahlâk-ı siyâsiye*) of the Ottomans deteriorated to the

[84] Namidar Günay, "Namık Kemal'in Tasvir-i Efkar ve Diyojen Makaleleri" (Unpublished MA Thesis, Selçuk Üniversitesi, 1990), 344. "Tenbel-hâne muhterik olmaden mukaddem orada belli başlı bir tenbel var imiş. Her gün havludaki dut ağacının altına uzanıp yatar imiş. Bir gün rüzgâr ağaçdan irice bir dut düşürür. Dut gele gele tenbelin tamam bıyığı üzerine konar. Tenbel bunu görünce (üşenmeden) Cenâb-ı Hakk'a levâzım-ı şükrâniyyetini bi'l-ifâ "Yâ-Rabb bâri bir de adem gönder de şu dutu ağzımın içine itsin'"der."

extent that self-interest held sway, as even those who claimed to possess *hamiyet* (zeal/honor/patriotism) were failing to stand up for their principles (*meslek*). Even Napoleon III had followers, he wrote, and even though the general population did not like the king, they held a certain level of respect for their supporters for they had the courage to adhere to a principle.[85] Kemal viewed the hierarchical order of peoples as contingent upon their selflessness and dedication to their principles and collective well-being of their groups and communities, and their ability to feel strong enough to sacrifice their lives for loftier causes than merely to pursue self-interest.

He also evaluated global civilizational hierarchies based on societies' capacity to assert their freedom and exhibit a proactive stance against despotic rule. This rested on, more than anything, the political culture of the society and habitus of the citizens, embodied in the capacity of the public opinion (*efkâr-ı 'umûmiye*) to check on the power of the government. This section from an article where he discusses the public opinion's importance for political legitimacy and stability can serve as a summary of his and his comrades in the Young Ottoman movement's views on the importance of habitus of the citizens necessary for political freedom:

> The political discipline (*terbiye-i siyâsiye*) is termed … as the totality of the sentiments and instigations of the conscience (*hissiyât ve ilka'ât-ı vicdâniye)*[86] necessary for the existence and progress of the political ethics (*ahlâk-ı siyâsiye*) among the people, which consists of the love (*muhabbet*) of the motherland, nation, freedom, and justice, that is necessary for the ability of

[85] Namık Kemal, "Meslek Fikri," in *Makalat-ı Siyasiye ve Edebiye*, ed. Erdoğan Kul (Birleşik Dağıtım Kitabevi, 2015), 299–300.

[86] *Vicdân* was a concept with a good deal of polysemy in the nineteenth century. In the classical *ahlâk* tradition, the term stood for moral authority within a person which conferred them the ability to pass judgement regarding moral values and actions. In Sufism it carried the same meaning as heart as the seat and source of moral virtues. During the nineteenth century, it entangled with the French concept *conscience morale*. The French concept was translated as *vicdan*, as inner feeling (*hiss-i bâtın*), and the capacity to distinguish right from wrong, contrasting it with *hiss-i zâhir*, the bodily senses. Osman Demir, "Vicdan," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2013), https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/vicdan.

> the public opinion (*efkâr-ı ʻumûmiye*) to oversee, and if needed, to intimidate the government.[87]

As much as Namık Kemal tried to align the history of the Ottoman Empire with the universal narrative of political progress, the idea of a political collective subjectivity as a factor of legitimacy of a government was a novelty in Ottoman political thought. Namık Kemal had no doubt that the empire had once been home to individuals possessing splendid political ethics, discipline, and education, and he was anxious to prove to the doubters that such an ethics and discipline has been flourishing among their compatriots through their effort. Such values have led the Ottomans of the past to sacrifice their self-interest for the community. The strength of the public opinion in a country did not depend on *maʻârif-i siyâsiye* (political education) thought at the schools, but on cultivation of a complex constellation of values and emotions in what he calls *terbiye-i siyâsiye* (political discipline/manners/education).

Feeling for the Community

The concepts of emotions were in flux in the Ottoman Empire as well as in Europe during the nineteenth century. In the works of such intellectuals like the Young Ottomans whose habitus was created in many languages and cultures, we encounter all the ambiguities of the period. The Arabic words of *hiss* and *hissiyât,* which Namık Kemal used frequently to categorize emotional states and values ranging from love to honor, belonged to the semantic field of (bodily or spiritual) perception, and often associated with the resulting mental states,

[87] Namık Kemal, "Efkâr-ı Umumiye," in *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri: Bütün Makaleleri 1*, ed. İsmail Kara and Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu (Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 201. "Terbiye-i siyâsiye halk içinde bâlâda beyan ettiğimiz efkâr-ı siyasetin husulünü ve hükümeti onun ilcaâtından ayırmamak üzre efkâr-ı umumiyenin icrâ-yı nezaret ve lüzumu halinde ikâʻ-ı tehdit edebilmesi için iktizâ eden ve -vatan ve millet ve hürriyet ve adalet mahabbetlerinden ibaret olan ahlâk-ı siyasiyenin vücud ve terakkisini temin için lâzım olan hissiyat ve ilkaât-ı vicdaniyenin mecmûʻuna derler."

sentiments, and passions. Şemseddin Sami, another prominent Young Ottoman, and a fellow Romantic, chose three main sets of definitions for *hiss* in his dictionary of Ottoman Turkish. The first is the perception through five bodily senses (*havâss-ı hamse*), while the Turkish equivalent *duygu* used as a synonym. The second is related to intuition, (*zımnî idrâk*) and presentiment (*hiss-i mukaddem*), while the third is feelings emerging in the heart or soul (*hiss-i kalbî/hiss-i derûnî*).[88] *Hissiyât* (literally 'sensibilities'; sg. *hissiyet,* an abstraction derived from the word *hissî,* 'pertaining to *hiss*') on the other hand, is defined as states pertaining to feeling (*duyguya mute'allik hâsseler*) and impressions of feelings (*duygu te'sîrâtı*).[89]There was, we can assume, a distinction between *hiss,* which resonates with bodily and spiritual affect, and *hissiyât* as the mental state resulting from the recognition (*idrâk*) of *hiss.*

Şemseddin Sami utilized both words to translate the two popular terms in French for emotions in this period, *sentiment* and *passion*, in his French-Turkish dictionary. He puts "lofty" feelings such as inner sentiment (*vicdân, yürek*), love (*'aşk, muhabbet*), and esteem (*ri'âyet*) under the category of *sentiment*, while "to possess sentiments" means to possess honor (*nâmus*), mercy (*insâf*), and conscience (*vicdân*).[90] Under the entry of *passion* we see specific emotions such as fear (*havf*), hope (*umut*), love (*'aşk*), and envy (*hased*); affection (*ibtilâ', meftûniyet*); strong desires (*pek şiddetli ârzû ve heves*); and desires of the carnal soul (*hevâ-yi nefsâniye, şehvet*).[91] Ambivalence regarding the evaluation of certain emotions such as love and affection may reflect the French conceptions at the time, and we see the tendency to distinguish between good and bad emotions and associating the letter with the beastly and carnal desires.

[88] Şemseddin Sami, *Kamus-i Türkî* (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1899), 535.
[89] Sami, 549.
[90] Şemseddin Sami, *Fransızca'dan Türkçe'ye Lügat Kitabı*, 4th ed. (Mihran Matbaası, 1882), 1988.
[91] Sami, 1641.

The Young Ottomans have not produced elaborate moral treatises on how and what to feel or texts engaging directly with the dynamics of emotions. We have, however, one precious article[92] written by Namık Kemal that deals with love (*muhabbet*) in considerable depth. In order to explore this phenomenon that he referred to as a strange sensibility (*hâssiyet-i 'acîbe*), Kemal drew upon his entire intellectual repertoire making reference to works from Islamic philosophy and Sufi poetry to *Romeo and Juliet* of William Shakespeare and *The Confessions* of Jean-Jacques Rousseau along with his personal experiences.

Namık Kemal's Sufi leanings are unmistakable throughout the discussion. Love, Namık Kemal was convinced, belonged to the spiritual and worked its way through the soul, manifesting in the human heart or conscience (*kalp, gönül, vicdân*). It originates in somewhere external to the material world and limits of comprehension, whereas the body and mind is only secondary in its manifestation. While it may emerge as a result of imagination, it must not, he thought, originate from diaphragm (*hicâb-ı hâciz*) as some physicians claim, although it may cause its advancement.[93] In the same vein, he took great care to distinguish the essence of love from sexual desire (*şehvet*), citing the fact that both Rousseau and himself experienced love at a very young age.[94] Existence of love independent of bodily desires pointed to a pure, otherworldly sentiment for Kemal: "Is it possible to imagine a connection to sexual affection (*'alâka-yı şehvet*) in the love of a child? If not, why wouldn't such a pure sentiment (*hiss-i hâlisâne*) arise in adults?"[95]

For Namık Kemal, love had an elemental power. It emerged in the heart unexpected and out of nowhere, out of a glance at a beautiful eye of the beloved, or of a perceptive gaze (*hiss-*

[92] Namık Kemal, "Muhabbet," in *Makalat-ı Siyasiye ve Edebiye*, ed. Erdoğan Kul (Birleşik Dağıtım Kitabevi, 2015), 80–89.
[93] Kemal, 80.
[94] Kemal, 81.
[95] Kemal, 82. "Bir sabinin muhabbetinde alaka-ı şehvet tasavvuruna imkân var mıdır? Yok ise, sabilerde hâsıl olan bir hiss-i halisâne, baliğ ve reşid olan ebnâ-yı beşerde niçin zuhûr etmesin?"

âşinâ nazar).[96] While love through habituation (*ülfet*) was not out of question, he doubted that such a love would bring spiritual pleasure (*zevk-i rûhânî*) that love through seeing brought.[97] Love dominated Namık Kemal's will as he enjoyed its spiritual pleasure. In the absence of his beloved, he would experience hell, and a profound sense of longing. He would find solace in his imaginations as his world would transform into a realm of dreams. His beloved would have a vivid presence in his mind, symbolized by the sun and the moon, representing the face of the beloved. The sun would bring tears to his eyes, while the moon bring joy to his heart. Whenever he manages to get a sleep, his beloved would be there with him. In her presence, what he felt the most immensely was jealousy, evoking in him feelings of envy (*hased*) and compelled him to devastating any potential rival.[98] When he was with his beloved, if he had not fainted already, he would not be able to do anything but to think if the beloved was in need of his service, or in fear of a danger. In the first case, the sentiments in his heart (*vicdân*) would call for sacrificing his life for the interest of the beloved, and in the second, he would feel like destroying anything or anyone to hurt the beloved.[99]

Self-sacrifice and a sense of protectiveness. Two virtues Namık Kemal would yearn for his compatriots, Ottoman men and women, to have for the good of the community and the motherland. While we would be mistaken to read this text as an instrumentalization of an emotion for the sake of social reform (as if he did not authentically feel it), it is significant that what evoked such lofty feelings in Namık Kemal was not a moral precept, but an unbounded emotion that transcended his will. As an emotional practice, such a public discussion of a private matter would do a significant political work. He would still call for moderation (*i'tidâl*) in the public opinion in certain circumstances as a responsible public

[96] Kemal, 85.
[97] Kemal, 86.
[98] Kemal, 87.
[99] Kemal, 87.

leader,[100] and rely on reason while putting aside intense spiritual fervor (*vicdânî halecân*) stirred by the promises of modernity to give realistic policy advice.[101] However, what the times called for most urgently for the Ottomans was not controlling of passions or honing of a sociability based on restraint of emotions, but those sentiments that stirred the heart and the soul, the lack of which, Namık Kemal would argue, was the cause of calamities struck at the heart of the empire.

Ennoblement of passionate sentiments, and appreciation of the mobilizing potential of emotions point to a distinct emotional regime of the late *Tanzîmât* public sphere. If the virtues such as self-sacrifice and passionate guardianship stood as one node of this emotional regime, a novel and peculiar sense of honor, *hamiyet* was the other.

The origin of the Young Ottoman movement is widely attributed to a secret society formed in 1865.[102] In Şerif Mardin's *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, we see "*İttifâk-ı Hamiyet"* (Alliance of *Hamiyet*) as its name. Although the name later shown to be doubtful and possibly a false attribution without evidence,[103] there would not have been any name more befitting the discourse of the group. A term marginal to the political discourse before at least the 1850s, it became a catchword from the 1860s onwards thanks to the Young Ottoman publications. For the Young Ottomans, it possessed a distinct emotive value to criticize the government and to mobilize the sentiments of the population. Ebuzziya Tevfik, one of the core members of the secret society, would remember how his compatriots were deliberately trying to evoke the passions of the population in 1866 against the backdrop of the upheavals

[100] Kemal, "Efkâr-ı Umumiye," 205.
[101] Namık Kemal, "İdarece Muhtac Olduğumuz Tadilat," in *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri: Bütün Makaleleri 1*, ed. İsmail Kara and Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu (Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 173.
[102] Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, ed. Yakup Öztürk (Kapı Yayınları, 2019).
[103] Christiane Czygan, "Reflections on Justice: A Young Ottoman View of the Tanẓīmāt," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46, no. 6 (2010): 433; For the many names of the group, see Burak Onaran, *Padişahı Devirmek: Osmanlı Islahat Çağında Düzen ve Muhalefet: Kuleli (1859), Meslek (1867)* (İletişim Yayınları, 2018), 255–62.

and Greece and Serbia, stirring up their *hamiyet*.[104] While we may attribute this language to the revolutionary fervor surrounding the Young Turk Revolution within which Tevfik was writing at the time, the Young Ottomans were feeling a similar fervor four decades earlier.

Hamiyet was a concept that retained a significant degree of polysemy throughout the nineteenth century. It is a central virtue in the classical Islamic philosophy of ethics (*akhlâq*). For Raghib al-Isfahani and Sufi philosopher al-Ghazali, it is associated with practices of anger, arising from the proper activation of the spirited faculty of the soul against outside dangers. As anger's excess or deficiency were considered a vice, al-Ghazali maintained that *hamiyet* was the activation of the power of anger within the boundaries of reason and religious principles. Within such boundaries, the power of anger was activated in situations that require *hamiyet and* subsides in situations where calmness is required. Associating it with jealousy, Al Ghazali thought that *hamiyet* was necessary for defending high values such as family, honor, chastity, and religion. For him, it was a quality that makes a person truly human: "A person whose anger and *hamiyet* has been completely lost is in reality an incomplete person."[105]

In *Ahlâk-i Alâ'î* of Kınalızade Ali Çelebi, *hamiyet* is one of eleven virtues belonging to the taxonomy of the cardinal virtue of courage (*şecâ'at*), itself associated with the spirited faculty (*kuvvet-i gazabiyye*).[106] *Hamiyet,* as Kınalızade explained, was "not to be lazy and show indifference in protecting the religious community and one's self and dignity, but to exert effort and show competence to the fullest extent of one's ability."[107]

[104] Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, 40–43.
[105] Mustafa Çağrıcı, "Hamiyet," in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1997), https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/hamiyet.
[106] Enfel Doğan, "Ahlâk- Alâî (Metin-Sözlük-Sentaks İncelemesi)" (Unpublished PhD diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2006), 239–42.
[107] Doğan, "Ahlâk- Alâî (Metin-Sözlük-Sentaks İncelemesi)," 242. "Ammâ hamiyyet oldur ki himâyet-i himâyı millet ve hirâset-i harîm-i nefs ü hurmet itmekde tekâsül ü tehâvün itmeyüp aksa'l-vüs' sa'y ü kifâyet göstere."

In *Risâle-i Ahlâk (Treatise of Morality)*, Sadık Rıfat Pasha put *hamiyet* and chastity (*'iffet*) under a single category as a quality of character (*sıfat*). It meant, according to him, to protect one's self, chastity, and honor from things that would bring shame in the eyes of people. Even a man of status, the Pasha cautioned the reader, would lose face in its lack, hence it is a command necessary for everyone.[108] In *Zeyl-i Risâle-i Ahlâk (Addendum to Treatise of Morality)*, he categorized the quality together with *gayret* (zeal, emulation). "A person without *hamiyet* (*hamiyetsiz olan şahıs*) is not a human", he says, while a person who is indifferent and languid (*bî-gayret olan*) was equal to an animal. Possessors of these qualities would strive to surpass their peers and protect their honor. Without these qualities, a person cannot even attain true esteem (*i'tibâr-ı sahîha*), hence cannot have the ability to bring order and execution to important matters as desired.[109]

In the nineteenth century dictionaries, *hamiyet* retained its polysemy, as well as its place as a *sine qua non* of a moral subject. A Turkish-French dictionary written by French Orientalists published in 1835 defined it as "zeal, ardour, courage", while *hamiyet-i islâmiye* (Islamic zeal) was given as an example.[110] In his 1852 Turkish dictionary, English linguist James William Redhouse defines it as to abstain from, and to feel ashamed and blush about something due to a sense of honor (*gayret ve nâmustan nâşî*).[111] By the 1880s, the concept took a new meaning. Ebuzziya Tevfik borrows Redhouse's definition but adds that it consists of high virtues (*fezâ'il-i 'âliye*) related to national zeal (*'asabiyet ve milliyet*).[112] Şemseddin Sami defines it as the *gayret* of a person to "protect their motherland, family, and relatives from violation and insult,"[113] while defining *gayret* as "jealousy", and "a praiseworthy

[108] Aydın and Büyüközkara, "Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa ve Risâle-i Ahlâk," 101.
[109] Aydın and Büyüközkara, "Mehmed Sadık Rıfat Paşa ve Zeyl-i Risâle-i Ahlâk," 102.
[110] Elfenbein, "No Empire for Old Men," 88.
[111] James William Redhouse, *Müntahabât-ı Lugat-ı Osmâniye* (Cerîdehâne Matbaası, 1852), 279. "Gayret ü nâmusdan nâşî bir nesneden 'ar ve istinkâf etmek, utanmak ve kızarmak."
[112] Ebuzziya Tevfik, *Lugat-ı Ebûzziyâ* (Matbaa-i Ebûzziyâ, 1891), 439.
[113] Sami, *Kamus-i Türkî*, 529.

sentiment and state of intolerance resulting from witnessing outside violation and assault to something valuable and sacred."[114] In his French-Turkish dictionary, Sami renders the French word *patriotisme* as love of the motherland (*muhabbet-i vataniye*) and *hamiyet.*[115]While we cannot pinpoint the instance in which the lexical shift from the protection of personal and religious honor to the inclusion of the motherland took place, we can safely assume that it is reflective of the rhetoric of the Young Ottomans as the term gained its popularity and novel political meaning through the wide-ranging political and social criticism of the Young Ottomans. What the polity was needed the most was citizens with strong, visceral feeling of honor and affection towards freedom, nation, and the motherland.

Disciplining the Conscience

Namık Kemal was not tired of emphasizing the role formal educational institutions in attaining progress and civilization. Formal education (*ma'ârif*) and instruction (*ta'lîm*), however was not enough to attain the requisite discipline (*terbiye*), which required far more encompassing process that involves the soul and conscience as much as the body and mind. He believed that *terbiye* took place first and foremost in the conscience (*vicdân*), the moral sense as well as the seat of emotions. The human conscience and soul had the ability to feel love and honor (although some more than the others), what it needed was the image of the object of the emotion, the body would follow along with it. A true *terbiye* had to take place through the language of conscience (*lisân-ı vicdân*), to transfer this knowledge.

[114] Sami, 973. "Muazzez ve mukaddes bir şeye ağyâren tecavüz ve ta'arruzunu görmekden hasıl olan 'adem-i tahammül his ü hal-i memdûhî."
[115] Sami, *Fransızca'dan Türkçe'ye Lügat Kitabı*, 1646; For the similar semantic journey of the term in European definitions see Onaran, *Padişahı devirmek,* 259.

Namık Kemal was convinced that this language belonged to *belles-lettres* (*edebiyât*) which, in its very nature, was the interpreter of the senses and feelings of wisdom and conscience (*'irfân ve vicdânın tercümân-ı müdrikât ü hissiyâtı*).[116] He was a believer in the power of well-written, emotionally stirring work of literature to reveal the truths of the spiritual world, so much so that he could find the proof for the existence of love at first sight in Shakespeare *Romeo and Juliet.*[117]

In this regard, theatre had an important place for Namık Kemal. For Kemal theatre plays were where spaces where literature and music, "two heart-captivating nurses created to be the ruler of emotions (*hâkim-i hissiyât*) and companion of joy (*nedîm-i neşât*) of the conscience of the human (*vicdân-ı beşer*)", physically manifest.[118] Imitating the human condition before the eyes of the spectator, Kemal reasoned, it spoke directly to conscience, bringing about an excitement of affection (*meftûniyet*) and hatred (*nefret*) which are the educators and guides of the conscience, and the effect was magnified as the heart already finds itself attentive and joyful in the house of the theatre.[119] Kemal found theatre far more efficient than moral treatises to polish a society's morality also due to its accessibility. It was overwhelming even for the most earnest to study Kınalızade's *Ahlâk-ı Alâ'î,* he suggests, while even the most frivolous would benefit from watching the miserable of Paris.[120] He argued that theatre has served the civilized nations more than anything else in bringing about the profound changes in morality and emerging of nobility in sentiments.[121] Works of theatre, he argued, motivated the works of civilization in Europe, motivating and facilitating the French revolution by

[116] Namık Kemal, "Muâhezât-ı Edebiyeyi Hâvî Bir Mektup," in *Makalat-ı Siyasiye ve Edebiye*, ed. Erdoğan Kul (Birleşik Dağıtım Kitabevi, 2015), 251.
[117] Kemal, "Muhabbet," 85.
[118] Namık Kemal, "Tiyatro," in *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri: Bütün Makaleleri 1*, ed. İsmail Kara and Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu (Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 497.
[119] Namık Kemal, "Tiyatrodan Bahseden Arkadaşlara," in *Osmanlı Modernleşmesinin Meseleleri: Bütün Makaleleri 1*, ed. İsmail Kara and Nergiz Yılmaz Aydoğdu (Dergâh Yayınları, 2005), 574.
[120] Kemal, "Tiyatro," 497.
[121] Kemal, 498.

inducing selfless devotion for the motherland and freedom (*vatan ve hürriyet meftûniyet-i fedakârânesi*) in the hearts.[122]

Therefore, Namık Kemal believed that disciplining of conscience was best achieved through the immersive emotional experience in theatre and literature. The lofty sentiments of love and honor needed the knowledge of their object, and the conscience learned through experience. Theatre and literature would be central in this process as they invoked vivid mental imageries. A good written prose or poetry or a theatre performance with authenticity would give the necessary emotional template to the audience who would try those emotions out on the spot, actualizing them in real life when necessary.

He wrote his play "Motherland, or Silistra" (*Vatan yahud Silistre*) precisely for this reason. He announced to the residents of Istanbul that since the play amounts to a description only of the emotions of love of the motherland and love of the family, he intentionally kept the plot of the play simple to keep the focus. Still regarded as one of the classics of the Ottoman and Turkish literature, the play quickly attained a cult status. According to Ebuzziya Tevfik, it was played forty-seven times within two months from its opening night in 1873, and perhaps five hundred times from İzmir to Selanik until the dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876.[123]

At the opening night, the theatre was packed to the brim. Yet, there was an orderliness and silence in the room, as if the people were waiting for a divine revelation, before everyone started crying as the plot started to unfold.[124] The play centers around two young lovers Zekiye, the heroine, and Islam, the hero. They have a strong, unbounded love for each other, but there comes a moment when Islam had to declare to Zekiye that he has to leave. Islam, as

[122] Kemal, "Tiyatrodan Bahseden Arkadaşlara," 574–75.
[123] Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal: Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında* (Alfa Yayınları, 2019), 608.
[124] Kuntay, 609.

it turns out, harbored a different love that eclipsed his love for Zekiye—a love for the *motherland*, which faced imminent threat. No one would be able to stop him, even Zekiye's desperate pleas. This love for the motherland surpassed everything he cherished: "How could it be that I engage only with your love when the love for the motherland is considered sacred above all else today?" he exclaims, "How could it be that while I know that everything in the world progresses, I should fall short of my father and ancestors?"[125] He was obliged to defend the motherland because he was who he is because of the motherland. The attack on his motherland stroke at the heart of his *hamiyet*: "Am I not a man? Do I not have a duty? Shall I not love my motherland? ... "How could you expect love from a man who fails to love his motherland?"[126] Zekiye, along with the rest of the audience, is reminded of the power of the love of the motherland. She encourages Islam to go, only to follow him to the battlefield. United by their unwavering love, both characters embark on a noble journey, risking their lives to follow their love.

The first staging of *Vatan yahud Silistre* is famous for the excitement it created afterwards among the audience. The audience cried "Long live Kemal" and "Long live the Nation!" in something resembling a riot brought about by the "the excitement of feeling of heroism and the effervescence of *hamiyet*".[127] Unsurprising to many observers, the spectacle raised some eyebrows. Levant Herald, an İstanbul based English and French bilingual newspaper found by the British subjects, blamed Kemal's "over-zealous style." The editors argued that the public opinion should be "strengthened by sound and wholesome instruction, not to be stimulated to precocious action by theories which intoxicate and enfeeble the immature

[125] Namık Kemal, *Vatan Yahut Silistre* (Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2019), 9. "Hiç nasıl olur ki, vatan muhabbeti bugün her şeyden mukaddes olsun da ben yalnız senin muhabbetinle uğraşayım? Hiç nasıl olur ki, dünyada her şeyin ilerlediğini bilip dururken, ben babamdan, ecdadımdan aşağı kalayım?"
[126] Kemal, 10.
[127] Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar Tarihi*, 354.

judgement."[128] The government was even more alerted, as this event led to his exile to Cyprus. "They are asking me", he would sarcastically write from Cyprus, "why I did not prevent the enormities of clapping and crying."[129]

His exile to Cyprus did not deter Namık Kemal from engaging in literary activity and getting his writings published in the journals in İstanbul. He continued to write provocative works, including *Rüya (Dream),*[130] where he combines elements of *divan* poetry and journalistic prose, employing mystical allegories and Romantic political ideals in a single text to invite the readers to his "dream." Through the voice of a beautiful fairy, Kemal delivers a fervent critique of society in order to evoke a visceral feeling of shame.

In *Rüya*, we encounter Namık Kemal with a longing heart, looking around İstanbul from a mansion on the Bosphorus. As his heart gets entranced by the view and he loses vision, the world starts to transform into a hellish landscape: "It was as if ever-raging dark and fresh blood of the martyrs of freedom (*şühedâ'-yı hürriyetin her dem cûşân olan taze hûn-ı siyahı*) surged against the atmosphere of injustice (*havâ-yı zulm*) surrounding the mountains and rocks with its roaring waves of storm."[131] Thereafter he slowly fades into a dream, finding himself in a desert where the entire landscape filled with delight and light, and color emanating from every element of nature. As he looks around, his eyes catch an immense gathering of perhaps more than half of the sons of the motherland, themselves captivated by the radiant nature. Then a fiery-colored cloud appears on the horizon, revealing a delicately beautiful girl (*nâzenîn*) as it unfolds.[132] Her divine beauty seemed to embody the sun, her

[128] Şiviloğlu, *The Emergence of Public Opinion*, 219–20.
[129] Kuntay, *Namık Kemal: Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında*, 613.
[130] Namık Kemal, "Rüya," in *Yeni Türk Edebiyatı Antolojisi II: 1865-1876*, ed. Mehmet Kaplan, Enginün, and Birol Emil (Marmara Üniversitesi, 1993), 109–28.
[131] Kemal, 252. "Güya ki pençeleriyle seyf-i ta'addiye sarılan şühedâ'-yı hürriyetin her dem cûşân olan taze hûn ı siyahı bir deryâ-yı bi-keran şeklini almış ve emvâc-ı tufân-hurûşuyla dağları, taşları ihâta ederek havâ-yı zulme karşı kabarmış kabarmış da bağladığı şekl-i hâilde dona kalmıştı."
[132] Kemal, 254.

fiery eyes penetrated hearts, revealing deepest secrets. This ethereal being triggers a sense of familiarity and affinity in Kemal. He ultimately realizes that she is Freedom (*Hürriyet*), recognizing her from her chains.

Looking at them with anger and contempt, Freedom lets out a loud cry, terrifying the Ottoman men and women. She chastises them for their heedlessness, indolence, accepting of bondage and humiliation, and cowardice in the face of injustice.[133] She questions their willingness and courage to save themselves from such a humiliating state, and to sacrifice their present for the future. In turn she humiliates them herself. In one of several instances where she invokes the beastliness of being oppressed, Freedom likens the Ottoman citizens to beasts of prey who are trying to confine their tranquil places in their present state as if they are guarding their prey from outsiders, while the world is progressing towards perfection.[134]

It is obvious that Namık Kemal conferred shame a profound mobilizing potential. Appealing to the conscience of the Ottomans, where a longing for freedom should be in place due to human nature, Kemal uses shame as a catalyst for encouraging the audience for introspection and reassessment of their choices and beliefs. Stark contrast between their stagnancy and the progressive world serves as a call to action for self-civilization. This needed recognizing and mobilizing one's inner feelings calling for fervent striving to break free from the chains of indolence and cowardice.

[133] Kemal, 256–57.
[134] Kemal, 257.

CONCLUSION

If one were to characterize the prevailing sentiment among the Ottoman public in the mid-to-late 1870s, it could very well be *cûş u hurûş*. When the Great Eastern Crisis hit in 1875, the Ottomans resorted to a language of unbounded love and zeal to help defend the motherland. The call for voluntary military service and contributions to the army was done using this same passionate language. Journals and printing houses competed with each other to heighten enthusiasm among the populace, while the names of donators to the military fighting in the Balkans were publicly honored in lists under the title "*erbâb-ı hamiyet*" (possessors of *hamiyet*). The same language defined the moral landscape in the conspiracy to overthrow Abdülaziz in 1876. Deputies from diverse regions and religious communities of the empire negotiated their differences in the same language in the first Ottoman parliament, congratulating each other for the zeal they demonstrated in pursuing common goals. The passionate moment of the 1870s Ottoman political discourse compared to the orderly and calculated imaginations of the high bureaucracy of *Tanzîmât* suggests a different reading of the Ottoman experience of modernity than a process of increasing control over emotions.

In order to understand the changing emotional regimes of the *Tanzîmât*, this thesis focused on their entanglement with changing interpretations and conceptualizations of *civilization*, the essential concept through which the Ottoman political elites including the bureaucrats and intellectuals made sense of modernity and negotiated the global hierarchies. The first chapter explored the conceptualization of Mustafa Reşid Pasha and Sadık Rıfat Pasha who would become initiators and ideologues of the *Tanzîmât* reforms. In their diplomatic missions to major European capitals, they came up with different interpretations of what civilization and being civilized meant. The Pashas' conceptualizations did not, or needed to, correspond to

the European conceptualizations, as they drew upon local notions of morality, political legitimacy and culture, as well as domestic and international order.

Mustafa Reşid Pasha's correspondence with the Sublime Porte suggests an understanding of civilization not as an ideal but as a tool, both in the sense of a set of regulating principles of governance and as a moral category to negotiate legitimacy on the international scene. Tasked with resolving complex issues such as France's occupation of Algiers and the military campaigns led by Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt, the young and anxious diplomat quickly recognized the necessity of speaking the language of civilization, which did not favor the Ottomans, to garner the support and empathy of European statesmen. The language of civilization he used, however, betrayed a heavy influence of the local notions of *âdâb* (etiquette), Circle of Justice, as well as the *ahlâk* (ethics) tradition. Interpreting the concept succinctly around notions of discipline and order, such as moderation and equity, he used it as a tool for asserting moral legitimacy not only against Greeks, Muhammad Ali Pasha, but also in his interactions his counterparts. Furthermore, his letters conveyed a sense of unease regarding the fervent and passionate nature of public opinion, suggesting a distinct understanding of civilization based on the orderliness among the general population.

Sadık Rıfat Pasha shared this anxiety while he interpreted civilization as a practice, or a method, that Europeans used to achieve domestic prosperity through attaining peaceful relations on the continent. His interpretation betrays the influence of the same political and moral repertoire we see in Mustafa Reşid Pasha's letter. Maintaining friendly and peaceful relations, according to Sadık Rıfat Pasha, rested on the virtues of the political elite. Domestically, civilization signified just governance and the social order and material advancements it entailed. To him, an important component of this peaceful order and material prosperity was the comportment of the citizens. Along with loyalty and obedience, for Sadık

Rıfat Pasha, civilization demanded from the citizens hard work, while the citizens demanded maintaining their personal dignity. He put into practice such an understanding in his moral treatises, which became part of the curriculum of Ottoman grade schools for decades, within the framework of Aristotelian *ahlâk* tradition that emphasized moderation.

The second chapter switches to the conceptualization of Namık Kemal, the leading intellectual of the Young Ottomans, who were critical of the *Tanzîmât* reforms and the "tyrannical" government it helped bring and challenged the *Tanzîmât* elite as moral authorities in the 1860s and 1870s. Associating civilization with freedom and material and political progress to be achieved by proactive citizens themselves, Kemal engaged in a wide-ranging criticism of the society, blaming their indolence, indifference, and cowardice for the Ottoman's lagging on the march of civilization towards progressive attainment of perfect security. He was convinced that the correction of such vices could rely only on formal education. Departing from the *ahlâk* tradition, he maintained that emotions and dispositions of humans are located in their conscience, and conscience can only be tamed and educated by authentic human experience. Consequently, he engaged in a "civilizing mission" through not only journal articles, but also *belles-lettres* and theatre, due to their ability to convey the knowledge of the heart. The tropes and symbolism he used in his politically charged artistic work implied an ennoblement of almost unbounded passions, something Namık Kemal saw as essential for the self-civilization of the indolent and oppressed Ottoman population.

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