

WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY DEVELOPMENT AID?

**IDENTIFYING WESTERN AND CHINESE
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN GHANA**

By

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Declaration of Authorship


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A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of stylized, overlapping loops and strokes, representing the name Tijana Zherajikj.

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Abstract

This thesis aims to investigate the differences between the Chinese and OECD definition and how development cooperation discourse is expressed in Ghana. The results indicate that there is a clear divergence between the aid architecture and the discourse surrounding the support in Ghana. China frames its aid in Ghana as a partnership within the framework of South-South cooperation, emphasising keywords such as “partnership”, “friendship”, and “shared future”. In contrast, the DAC donors describe their aid to Ghana using different rationales and keywords. The US emphasises the humanitarian aspects of development aid, utilising keywords such as “women”, “fisheries”, and “health”, whilst Germany focuses on development sustainability with keywords such as “energy”, “environment”, and “training”. This analysis ultimately contributes to the literature on donor preferences and aid conditionality.

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1 Introduction

Development aid has always played an essential part in China's foreign policy and economic statesmanship. It is becoming even more vital today as the nation gets increasingly involved in global development funding. China's growing diplomatic activism, from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to "the building of a community of shared future for mankind" (Chinese President Xi Jinping 2017, Geneva), is both expanding its presence, as well as influencing norms and practices in critical areas of the traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA).

The Official Development assistance (ODA) is conceptualised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries." (OECD 2021, 01). Historically, development aid has been assigned a variety of functions, including the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe, and aiding post-decolonization development initiatives in developing countries. OECD development assistance covers many fields; poverty and promoting welfare and security alleviating poverty, and solving migration crises (Ibid.). In contrast, Chinese development assistance is difficult to define. China considers itself a provider of South-South cooperation, diverging itself from a donor-to-recipient relationship. Chinese aid is characterised as a strategy of merging aid, investment, and trade. China's foreign aid offers an alternative source of funding with no conditions attached to the aid agreement. While economic interests are perhaps the primary driver, China emphasises the importance of a top-down approach to its foreign aid.

This thesis aims to explore and analyse key differences in what is defined as aid or development assistance by the People's Republic of China (PRC) compared to the definitions by the members of the OECD Development Cooperation Directorate (DAC). Specifically, this study aims to explore the language and terminology used by Chinese officials in Ghana, with a

focus on identifying recurring concepts and ideas. Chinese development aid to Ghana has focused on infrastructure investments and has been characterised by rhetoric emphasizing "win-win cooperation," "South-South cooperation," and "non-interference." This research uses the following question to better understand development aid in Ghana and the persuasion and appeal of Chinese development aid:

- Which keywords does China use to describe its aid to Ghana?
- How do these compare to Western “development assistance”?

The analysis contributes to several areas of the development aid literature. It adds to the research on the delimitation of development aid, sheds light on donor preferences and aid conditionality, and most importantly, contributes to a better understanding of different developmental aid approaches between the Global North and South.

This thesis finds that China describes development assistance in Ghana as a partnership, which is consistent with the framework of South-South cooperation. The donor emphasises its position as a partner, rather than a donor, in promoting cooperation by utilising keywords such as “partnership”, “friendship” and “shared future”. The results suggest that China’s language is associated with the commitment towards the well-being of the Ghanaian people, targeting areas such as infrastructure development, economic partnership, people-to-people exchanges, and cultural diplomacy. On the other hand, the US describes its aid to Ghana on the basis of humanitarian rationales by targeting economic growth and quality of life. The US utilises keywords such as “women”, “fisheries”, and “health”, which also aligns with the DAC definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Germany describes its aid to Ghana on the basis of development sustainability, particularly targets climate and energy, food insecurity, and sustainable economy. Germany utilises keywords such as “energy”, “environment”, and “training”, which aligns with the European Union, the United Nations, and the OECD global development agendas.

The results suggest that the area of difference lies within the development philosophy and approach, as well as the modalities of aid. Chinese development strategies appeal more to emotions and a sense of victim solidarity. On the other hand, Western aid tends to emphasise practical and measurable outcomes. The area of agreement between China and the DAC donors is the stated goals and objectives of poverty eradication, improvement of well-being and livelihoods, education, and economic development.

2 Literature Review

This thesis requires consultation with a body of literature from a range of perspectives, particularly in the areas of foreign policy approach and its development aid architecture. This section explores Western approaches to aid, conditionality in particular, China's non-interference, and a brief discussion on China's soft power model.

2.1 Dialogue on Western Approaches to Aid: Conditionality

In the early 1990s, donor countries began to increasingly condition their aid on democratic government, as it was viewed to be essential to economic development. At the request of major shareholders, the IMF implemented conditionality in the 1950s. Selbervik (1999) explains that aid conditionality can be drawn between two generations. The first generation refers to economic conditionality, which was established in the early 1980s by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whilst the second generation emerged in the 1990s, which extended from economic to political conditionality (Selbervik 1999, 12). Koeberle et al. (2005) explains that conditionality in aid is crucial due to the ignorance of critical policy areas and perspective on development models that are mostly inappropriate to the recipient countries (12). The key ingredients for successful development programs lie within country-specific agenda and involvement in policy dialogues with the recipient countries.

In the following section, two contrasting views will be discussed regarding aid conditionality: pro-conditionality discourse and anti-conditionality discourse.

2.1.1 *Pro-Conditionality Discourse*

Pro-conditionality discourse states that attaching conditionality to aid indicates (1) the morality and duty of aiding and guiding, (2) properly influencing recipient reform, and (3) establishing the economic basis underpinning reform that obliges neoliberal/democratic solutions. Johannesen and Leraand (1997) define aid conditionality as an "expression of the donor's strategic and/or economic interest in addition to claims/conditions to ensure that the aid

would be channelled to achieve stated goals” (cited in Selbervik 1999, 12). The strategies differ from country to country; however, the consensus is that aid conditionality is an instrument for compliance.

In the 1940s, President Truman used the word “underdevelopment, an illness without a cause”, which began arguably a new power of discourse that had a huge political significance (cited in Watson 2013, 06). President Truman also made it clear that it was the duty of the West to assist these “underdeveloped” countries. Such principle is also present in the League of Nations article 22,

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance [...] (1924, Article 22).

The discourse on duty legitimised the right to dominate other cultures through the disguise of helping civilisation of the colonized territories to prosper within the modern world (Settles 1996, 03). Voituriez et al. (2017) take the defensive position, suggesting that Germany was once a former beneficiary of aid, and surely under the effects of the Marshall Plan, the country was able to prosper (10).

The rationale behind imposing conditionality relates to the safeguarding repayment of donors’ loans, but most importantly, influencing recipient priorities over development and reform. Hatemi and Irandoust (2005) defends OECD ODA, as foreign aid promotes growth since it supplements local resources and savings, which are crucial components of economic growth (71). However, in the context of Africa, the apparent lack of growth and development has been attributed to the shortage of capital. Therefore, foreign aid plays an essential role in accumulating both human capital stock and economic growth.

According to Selbervik (1999), aid has always been conditional, in fact, essentially a coercive nature of relations (12). One key factor is that donors attempt to persuade the recipient

country to prioritise specific goals and adopt certain policies. Although coercive, most Western donors target the issue of democratisation, human rights, and conflict resolution. Knack (2004) suggests that foreign aid can contribute to the democratisation of the recipient country through conditionality (251). For instance, promoting democratic institutions as well as strengthening channels that contribute to liberal values. Moreover, Dreher (2009) states that conditionality might serve as a commitment device, for instance, if recipient countries implement the reforms suggested by the donors, then more aid might be imposed based on past performance (236).

2.1.2 Criticisms of Conditionality

Criticism of conditionality can be classified as (1) Marxist criticism of capitalistic self-interest, (2) creating a dependency trap, (3) being entirely self-serving to the donors, and (4) being rooted in neo-colonialism by imposing Western values and principles in the recipient countries.

Generally, aid is criticised as a means of capitalist exploitation of the resources and cheap labour of recipient nations. Other critics argue that aid hinders the development of market dynamics, which slows economic progress (Gülseven 2020, 233). Wilhite, Lou, and Geo-JaJa (2012) highlight how traditional capitalist donors, who formed the foundation of the OECD, have been accused of acting in self-interest in reaction to recipients' rising social welfare opportunities and economic hardships (57). Others have observed the dependency trap associated with Western foreign aid. Arcand and Chauvet (2001) point out the role of attaching conditionality in aid introduces uncertainties, such as the effectiveness of the aid, for the recipient countries, especially if the circumstances of the countries are unable to maintain control over the target goal (24).

Sternehäll (2018) suggests that conditionality might be strategically motivated by the donor's political agenda, such as obtaining support for the recipient countries' interests, which most of the time is linked to trading deals (09). In this case, the donor might utilise tied aid to

dictate the recipient country to use the funding to purchase goods and services from the donor's country instead of prioritising greater issues. Park and Kwak (2017) suggest that aid is also not effectively enforced, and there is the possibility that recipient countries lack reforms in order to draw more aid to alleviate the conditions (127). As recipients have more options now to fund their development programs, DAC donors may be forced to offer loans with fewer conditions to "stay in the business" and attract recipients (Hernandez 2016, 04).

Colonialism engenders growth patterns that frequently leave nations heavily dependent on exports from mono-crop agriculture or resource-extractive industries (Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004, 229). Kothari (2006) also explains that the link between colonialism and international development involves a direct engagement with institutions that are easier to imbed ideas that originated in the West (12). These ideas and practices, as a production of Western knowledge, demonstrate similarities between development and colonialism. Aid could merely serve as a tool for neo-colonialism and dependency, in order to keep the receiving nation under the control of the donor.

The concept of ODA reproduced asymmetries within the system, therefore, the legitimacy of such hierarchy is questioned by the Global South. The authors further explain that the donor-recipient relationship was a way of converting economic inequalities into political hierarchies (Esteves and Assunção 2014, 1779). Beyond DAC, many international organisations are embedded in a hierarchy, such as the World Bank, with a superior decision-making body that divides the lines between North and South. Kim and Garland (2019) explain that the traditional development aid paradigm follows a top-down approach, situating developing nations in the position of passive receivers, being controlled and supervised under an external agenda (1253).

2.1.3 *Synthesis*

While current research has established rationale behind conditionality and its criticism, the dialogue on the Western approach to development generally does delve into the specific discourse and keywords constituting these rationales, especially in specific contexts. The donor-recipient relations are quite complex considering the historical connection to the region of Africa as well as the diversity of the African region, more research is required to better understand how exactly the West is shaping its dialogue and what keywords underpin their strategies.

Qualitative analysis is more present in the field of media and surveys. However, it does not delve into the exact issue of Western behaviour towards recipient countries. Frequently, authors dive into the historical ties and colonialism and blame the overall inconsistencies of the ODA and its unilateral disposition on domestic affairs without examining the linguistic mechanisms that cause these discrepancies.

2.2 Dialogue on the Chinese Approach to Aid: Non-Interference, Soft Power, and Non-Conditionality

China's role in Africa goes against the conventional and familiar approach to development. China's foreign aid includes what the OECD DAC describes as ODA but in a broader ambiguous term of both the objectives and avenues for financing development, such as foreign direct investment (FDI). It is important to note that the Chinese government does include similar policy actions that are included in the OECD ODA, but China puts more emphasis on economic cooperation rather than military or security-related assistance. Furthermore, China does not publish country-specific aid figures like the OECD, however, it prioritises the guiding principles of peaceful coexistence, especially mutual respect, and non-interference.

Funding is almost exclusively focused on infrastructure; however, it can be extended to small- and medium-sized social welfare projects, agricultural planting and breeding, poverty reduction, culture and education, clean energy, and in some cases, medical services (The State Council; The People's Republic of China 2014). In practice, investments in infrastructure projects have deeply rooted China as the highest investor in Africa.

In this section, two contrasting arguments will be discussed on the topic of China's soft power, guiding principles for economic and technical cooperation, and the overall perspective on its alternative approach to development assistance in Africa.

2.2.1 *Pro-Chinese Development Discourse*

The dense literature on pro-Chinese Development discourse introduces (1) the emphasis on mutual help, (2) China's soft power in Africa, (3) the Western narrative, and (4) non-conditionality.

Beijing's primary foreign policy priority aims to preserve an autonomous, powerful, and united China that can pursue economic development based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence (The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China 2019). Rudyak (2021) states that the Chinese discourse surrounding development assistance started with a simple generous *gift* that is reciprocated in the future (587). The rhetoric follows a story that can be traced back to 1945 when China was a post-colonial and war-torn country. Communist leader Mao Zedong asked the US for economic assistance and in return, China would offer resources and agricultural products (Ibid.). The US ultimately declined, and China turned towards the Soviet Union for help, and from then on (Ibid.). Subsequently, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1949 stated China only "welcome help from friends and on the basis of equality and mutual assistance" (Rudyak 2022, 587). The *gift* that shifted China from a recipient to a donor has established a long-term responsibility to lend a hand to a country in need. Pan (2015) explains that China helps recipient countries build up their image, expend diplomatic relations,

and enable self-development (286). China's coherent foreign aid policy has invoked a network of trade cooperations with over 50 African countries. By prioritising agricultural, medical, and health services, and educational facilities, it executes almost perfect humanitarian assistance. China's cooperative relations can be formed via bi- and multi-lateral cooperation or broader cooperation agreements, thus the behaviour is not restrictive.

Soft power is the starting point for understanding China's approach to foreign aid. Nye (2008) explains that,

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. At the personal level, we all know the power of attraction and seduction [...] soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to entice and attract. In behavioural terms, soft power is attractive power. (95).

Nye (2008) emphasised that the perceived legitimacy of a country, and the appeal of ideology and culture, all play crucial roles in shaping international politics (as cited in Albert 2018, Council on Foreign Relations). China's diplomatic ties and development agenda are only a fraction of the larger scope of enhancing soft power. Harper (2019) explains that one of the major facets of Chinese soft power in Africa is education. The establishment of the Confucius Institutes (CIs) around the African region became the centre of China's economic diplomacy. Li and Ronning (2013) explain that cultural diplomacy and education have been fostering institutions by helping spread Chinese initiatives and advocacy on the importance of human development and growth (04).

Another major part of Beijing's influence strategy is the dramatic expansion of its media presence overseas. Shambaugh (2015) explains that the Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television have expanded abroad in an effort to become a modern multimedia conglomerate and report "authentic" international news (103). Similarly, Nantulya (2018) argues that Chinese broadcasting seeks to influence narratives and improve the communication of China's messages to the world.

In March 2018, China decided to reconstruct its foreign aid management system by creating the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) to reform its development aid model (Zhang and Ji 2020). Cheng (2019) claims that CIDCA distinguishes China's foreign aid from the standard OECD conceptions of development assistance (03). Mardell (2018) argues that Beijing's foreign aid program may become more professional due to the newly established development agency, however, the agency also institutionalised a mercantilist model of development.

China's engagement with Africa is often seen as a positive example of "South-South" cooperation and development, which is believed to result in mutually beneficial outcomes as opposed to the zero-sum outcomes that Africa has experienced in its postcolonial relations with the West in the past five decades, as noted by Edoho (2011, 106). Xue (2014) explains that the emphasis on non-interference and non-conditionality principle is consistent regardless of the policy shifts over the years (42). China's aid is largely independent of the recipients' governmental institutions, which seems to confirm the non-interference principle (Dreher and Fuchs 2015, 1019). Li (2015) explains Chinese model of development applies to other countries since China's experience provides useful lessons on development (135). Especially since most Western donors do not relate to the current issues and challenges that African countries go through; China offers a unique and relatable partnership that is praised for its impressive development background.

One of the most important essences of the Chinese development model is no conditionality attached to development assistance. Author Watkins (2022) explains that Chinese aid is not fully politically free, considering that China provides development aid to countries in support of the One-China Policy (671). Moreover, the principle of non-interference fundamentally attracts recipient states to deviate towards China, resulting in competitive pressure within the international development scene.

2.2.2 *Criticism of the Chinese Approach*

Criticism of the Chinese alternative development approach is generally related to (1) transparency, (2) the West's concern, and (3) the debt trap.

Gülseven (2021) argues that China is often accused of utilising aid in an effort to secure raw commodities, expand markets, and saturate emerging nations with unmanageable debt (902). Beijing, unlike most donors represented in the OECD DAC, does not release comprehensive data on the countries and projects it supports abroad. Similarly, Watkins (2022) suggests that Chinese development assistance undermines DAC conditionality by introducing competitive loans and development assistance with no conditions attached to set pressure on the international development system (668).

Matthews, Ping, and Ling (2016) argue that the West's concern regarding China's overseas aid is that it operates as a form of neo-colonialism imperialism. However, Gülseven (2021) claims that China does not have the potential to promote self-sufficiency and an independent model for recipient countries (919). In this retrospective, China is engaging in a two-front conflict with the traditional donor countries, whilst attempting to cooperate and compete at the same time.

The debt-trap diplomacy is often attached to headlines regarding China-Africa relations. Debt-trap diplomacy is described as the “creditor nation or establishment extending loans to a borrowing nation in order to expand the lender's political leverage” (Ajnoti 2022, The Geopolitics). The founding father of the term, Bahma Chellaney (2017), explained that China often exercises foreign policy as leverage by reserving the right to recall loans or demand repayments. Parker and Chefitz (2018) explained that China utilises accumulated debt to further its existing strategic goals (03). One of the most infamous cases was Sri Lanka, where China placed 361 million dollars in debt-intensive projects (Ibid.). As Sri Lanka failed to generate enough revenue, a debt of more than 8 billion dollars is owed to Chinese-controlled firms (Ibid.,

10). This resulted in Sri Lankan government handing over the Hambantota Harbour to China on a 99-year lease (Ibid.). Bräutigam (2019) notes that the Chinese banks' funding of infrastructure is overblown and exaggerated by the West (06). However, Carmody et al. (2022) highlighted that the narrative is due to the opacity of Chinese lending, thus, manifesting a mixed picture of broken politics and mismanagement (64).

2.2.3 *Synthesis*

The positive discourse of Chinese aid in Africa suggested that China's coherent foreign policies, no strings attached to aid, and the principle of non-interference have established a symmetrical partnership. However, the positive discourse is not supported by any collection of data that can demonstrate the dialogue that China is directing toward Africa.

The bulk of the literature stated that the Western narrative on debt-trap diplomacy is rather exaggerated and not empirically supported. However, a concrete, rigorous examination of the exact language being used to establish such discourse is lacking, which can help support these claims with concrete data.

Qualitative content analysis on China's engagement in Africa is limited to the media, focusing on how China employs dialogues of partnership and investment that implies economic and human development without looking at nuanced language. The problem is particularly compounded by the fact that most dialogues take place in the political sphere of China's engagement in Africa. And the majority of the dialogues surround the Chinese defensive position as a response to the negative Western perceptions. Even if dialogues are interpreted and analysed, usually the data collection is derived from media outlets, which can have a biased and concealed outcome.

3 Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative research method to capture the complexity of the study's aim. The study's unit of analysis is Ghana, with a focus on identifying recurring concepts and ideas regarding development cooperation. A general overview is provided of the methodology and data collection strategy below.

3.1 Qualitative content analysis

This thesis employs a qualitative content analysis from a naturalistic paradigm that concerns the exploration of meanings, which is inherently compatible with a case study. The selection of the case study is Ghana since the country depends extensively on donor support for agriculture, education, and health systems financing. Ghana's heavy dependence on foreign aid also demonstrates the different approaches that China and DAC donors utilise.

Hartley (1994) explains that case studies are tailored to freely explore new processes and behaviours that have limited knowledge (as cited in Meyer 2001, 330). The advantage that is provided by case study research is the opportunity to explore many different aspects of the issue presented. Yin (2018) highlights that a case study “investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (45). The contextual nature of the case study allows for a deeper investigation of the overall patterns and themes that reflect the factors discussed in the study.

Content analysis is a method that analyses and interprets the content from various types of communication, such as texts, audio, symbols, and images, to describe a specific phenomenon (Bengtsson 2016, 09). Krippendorff (2004) explains the method as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.” (18). By exploring the language and narratives of the selected donors, I seek to identify the recurring theme and patterns which may reflect China's unique approach

to development cooperation. To gain more insights into the discourse that attracts countries towards Chinese development assistance, the paper will interact with the selected text and attempt to interpret it to describe the phenomenon. This research assumes a rather more relaxed division that allows for the exploration of patterns and trends that are not often observable in the context of development aid in Africa.

Drawing on the literature from the field of development aid approach and public diplomacy, a content analysis will be conducted based on selected samples of public speeches, news coverage, and publication from the People's Republic of China embassy in Ghana. For the OECD member states, the volume of content was selected based on speeches, press releases, policy documents, development agencies' publications, and reports.

The first stage of the analysis will be an inductive approach, which involves open coding and creating categories that belong to a particular characteristic of the donors. The process of the inductive approach is as follows. The collection of the text from China was rigorously reviewed and compared gradually, and two categories of coding emerged: modalities of aid and principles and values. The subordinated code of the category is based on the current development assistance approach that China employs in Ghana. The subordinated codes, which can be found in Appendix B., identify the common aid form provided to Ghana. The collection of the DAC donors' text was consistent with the OECD aid framework, which was categorised as democratic governance and human rights, economic development and partnerships, sustainable development, and education and capacity building. The text can fall into the sub-coding that defines various factors related to the OECD principles and values. The coding system can be found in Appendix C.

The second stage of the analysis will be the interpretation of the data collected and attempting to make sense of the patterns and themes that have emerged from the findings. Then,

the analysis will involve comparing the keywords and definitions that were identified in the coding scheme.

3.2 Data Collection

For this research, the most desirable approach for sampling text and collecting data is the convenience sampling, which Benoit (2010) explained that the technique is used for texts available to the researcher (272). Considering the lack of transparency regarding Chinese development aid and data, convenience sampling will target available texts available in different platforms.

The thesis will utilise policy statements, speeches, press releases, and most importantly, white papers that outline China's principles, priorities, and approach to development cooperation in Ghana. The primary texts are derived from the People's Republic of China embassy in Ghana and the State Council Information website. Furthermore, in order to see how China communicates its aid efforts to Ghana, texts will be also taken from diverse media landscapes such as China Global Television Network (CGNT), ChinaXinjiang, Xinhua, People's Daily, and Ghana News Agency.

In the case of traditional ODA, speeches, press releases, and policy documents are taken from individual Western donors in Ghana, specifically the United States, and Germany. It is worth noting that keywords and phrases used by the selected countries are communicated through the official development agencies that are not part of the OECD. Research on aid practices and policy priorities is made available by these agencies rather than general publications and reports from the OECD. These agencies play a crucial role in coordinating and harmonizing development assistance on behalf of the countries that are part of the OECD DAC. Although the donor agencies operate completely independently, they align the same practices and principles set by the OECD DAC.

The reason behind selecting individual donors rather than examining the collective aid efforts is the access to the data on development assistance. Western donors use different keywords and definitions to describe their development assistance in Ghana. Especially when it comes to foreign aid and development policies, donor countries differ in volume and composition. The rules and standards of the international aid architecture remain the same under the OECD DAC. The members of the OECD DAC use standardised categories, principles, and definitions. By examining the language and terminology used by individual Western donors, the data collection allows for a more focused and in-depth analysis of the aid approach. Furthermore, analysing three major donors separately allows for more nuances and elaborateness of the aid approach to Ghana.

Key documents for the United States, I will utilize strategic documents released by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the country-specific strategies reports and projects, as well as the US embassy in Ghana press releases and speeches that relate to foreign assistance. For Germany, the thesis will refer to key documents and policies issued by the German government and its development agency, specifically the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung - BMZ) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Specifically, documents that refer to policy guidelines, country strategy papers, and development cooperation programs and projects in Ghana. As well as press releases from the German embassy in Ghana. The main source of information regarding aid flows, commitments, practices, and bilateral aid agencies during the thesis utilises the OECD Statistics, OECD peer review publications, and country-specific reports.

4 Case Overview

4.1 Economic Context

Ghana is a former British colony and gained independence under President Kwame Nkrumah in 1957. The party system of the 1950s demonstrated that Ghana is a country with two political traditions, one radical and populist while the other pragmatic and conservative (Ayee, Lofchie, and Wieland 1999, 03). In 1966, the National Liberation Council (NLC), with Western support, overthrew the Nkrumah regime as he was out of the country in China (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1994, 04). Jerry Rawlings led an uprising in 1979 and after years of military rule, Ghana transitioned to a democratic state (Ibid.). By the 1980s, inappropriate macroeconomic and institutional development policies were implemented which caused unintended consequences that declined economic growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other multilateral and bilateral donors helped to implement the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), which was a comprehensive set of measures that reformed the trade, monetary, and fiscal sectors (Aryeetey and Harrigan 2000, 07). Although it took a major economic reform, Ghana managed to regularly hold up as an exemplary state of successful implementation of adjustment policies.

Following Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana is the second-largest producer and exporter of cocoa worldwide. Ghana furthermore was recently discovered to have oil, seen as a promising path for economic development (Quartey and Abbey 2020, 331). However, Ghana's history with the extractive industry has a troubled past, with the Jubilee oilfield owned by the British Tullow Oil Corporation as well as Chinese oil firm Sinopec.

As a result of external ownership, in 2022, Ghana only accumulated 0.4 percent of revenue from oil and in the last 8 years, the oil and gas sector has only contributed an average of 4.5 percent to Ghana's GDP (Sasu 2023a).

Today, Ghana is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, however, its long-term economic growth is constrained by high levels of government debt, and a competitive business climate that constrains private sector growth (USAID, n.d.a.). In 2021, Ghana's poverty rate was 11.3 percent based on the poverty line set at 1.90 US dollars (Sasu 2022). Figure 1 demonstrates the gradual increase in aid flow volume from 1960 to 2021. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Ghana has received approximately 2.2 billion dollars from existing




Figure 1: Net official development assistance received (current US\$) in Ghana

Source: stats.oecd.org and

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?end=2021&locations=GH&start=1960&view=chart>

development programs, however, the majority of the flow was directed to external income, such as trade and foreign direct investment declined and humanitarian aid, health systems, and food security (Ahmad and Carey 2022, 03). Today, approximately 3 million people in Ghana live in extreme poverty in rural areas, while 200,000 people live in extreme poverty in urban areas (Sasu 2023b).

Ghana also struggles with the pervasive nature of political corruption. Based on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (2022), Ghana scores 43 out of

100 and ranks 72 out of 180. For the last two decades, Ghana's CPI has been consistent and remained below average level.

4.2 OECD-DAC and Ghana

During the 1980s, Ghana was among the nations that underwent extensive economic reforms. Yet, compared to other African nations, Ghana received a relatively small amount of aid. Tsikata (2001) explains that during the 1980s, the volume of aid largely tracked the policy level, meaning aid would only increase if policies improved (47). In the 1970s, a decade which was characterised by persistent domestic economic mismanagement, aid flows remained at a low level regardless of the major macroeconomic challenges. It was not until 1981 when President J.J. Rawlings adopted economic reforms with financing support from the World Bank and IMF (Whitfield and Jones 2007, 06). Consequently, Ghana's commitment to economic reforms has attracted many donors to increase aid flow.

4.2.1 *The United States*

Currently, the United States is the largest bilateral donor to Ghana, in which the US government assists in improving food security, health, and education, as well as sustainable natural resources management (USAID, n.d.b). In 2021, the US ODA volume exceeded over 40 billion dollars, ranking the donor country 23rd among the DAC member states (OECD, 2022a).

The overall US aid flow to Ghana, including all agencies that deliver the funds, was approximately 200 million dollars in 2022, which was distributed among 32 sectors (Foreign Assistance 2022). Figure 2 demonstrates which sectors in Ghana have received the most




Figure 2: US Foreign Assistance in Ghana provided by the State Department, 2022.

Source: <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/ghana/2022/obligations/0>

funding from the US. Keep in mind that OECD data is categorised by distinct sectors that describe the program related to foreign assistance. For example, the health and population category oversee basic health, health care, HIV/AIDS programs, and maternal and child health (OECD, 2018). The majority of the foreign assistance, approximately 99 million dollars, is directed towards the health and population, specifically on Malaria control, basic nutrition, health care, and Covid-19 control (Foreign Assistance 2022). The second largest sector where the aid is distributed is the agricultural sector. Around 50 million dollars is dedicated to the area of agricultural policy and administrative management, food crop production, and agricultural development (Ibid.). In March 2023, the US announced 5 million dollars were added to the current aid flow to improve the performance of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana (US embassy in Ghana, 2023).

4.2.2 Germany

In 2021, Germany provided approximately 32 billion dollars of ODA, making the nation the second-largest development co-provider of the DAC. The BMZ's thematic priorities are sustainable economy, food security, climate and energy, health, and food security (OECD, 2022b). In the area of sustainable development, Germany is strongly committed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and actively supports recipient countries by expanding renewable energies and combating climate change. Since Ghana is battling with rapidly increasing inflation and unemployment, Germany focuses on creating employment opportunities, especially for women and young adults (Federal Mistry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2023a). Accordingly, Germany's support for vocational education and training has improved the employment situation to 50,000 people (Ibid.).

Figure 3 demonstrates that German aid flow to Ghana increased during early 1990, however, aid quickly decreased due to the administration's objections to the donors' (mainly the World Bank and IMF) conditionality and policy participation (Anderson et al. 2017, 03). During




Figure 3: Net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors, Germany in Ghana
Source: data.worldbank.org and stats.oecd.org

the Covid-19 pandemic, German aid flow hit a new high of 262 million dollars. Although it is

unclear how the aid is distributed between sectors, there is an estimate provided by Aid Atlas on funding committed or disbursed by Germany in Ghana. Between 2002-2018, Germany provided Ghana overall 1.39 billion dollars in total development finance (Atteridge et al. 2019). The top sectors that received funding were actions relating to debt, such as debt relief of multilateral institutions, rescheduling and refinancing, and debt forgiveness, which were estimated in total around 317 million dollars (Ibid.). Following action relating to debt funding, the Ghanaian government and civil society received 228 million dollars in total (Ibid.). Finally, education received 168 million dollars overall and the agricultural sector, alongside forestry, food crop production, and fishing received 153 million dollars (Ibid.).

4.3 China-Ghana Bilateral Relations

Current Chinese aid flow in Ghana is unknown, however, the foreign direct investments (FDI) in 2021 was 127 million dollars (Textor 2022). The Chinese FDI mainly focuses on construction and manufacturing, such as building and construction, agriculture, export trade, and liaison (Atobrah et al. 2021, 08).

Ever since Ghana gained independence, China and Ghana have enjoyed diplomatic and trade relations. Relations mostly consisted of industry, general trade, manufacturing, and agriculture. In 2000, China was one of the smallest foreign investors, only accounting for 3.61 percent of imports in Ghana (Carrozza and Sandnes 2022, 02). China is now Ghana's largest trading partner and foreign investor. However, China's presence in Ghana can be traced back to the 1960s, when Premier Zhou Enlai visited Ghana and engaged in highly effective public diplomacy that established a strong image of China (Strauss 2009, 781). Thus, the fundamental morality of China's actions in Africa, especially the clear delineation of China from the West, has promoted a fraternity image that granted a long-lasting relationship (Ibid., 780). Between 1963 and 1964, Zhou Enlai pledged over 22 million dollars in interest-free loans that would be repayable in Ghanaian exports (Wang 2018, 05).

Since 1960, China has been assisting Ghana mainly in the form of loans, grants, and technical assistance (Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010, 866). Mohan (2010) explains that early development aid was relatively small, and things only started to pick up in the mid-1980s when Ghana signed the first major cooperation agreement valued at \$390 million which included infrastructure and water supply projects. However, Ghana already has a debt of 1.7 billion dollars to China, which accounts for 5 percent of the West African region's total debt (Orr 2023).

5 Findings

This section describes the findings of the content analysis based on the collection of policy documents, press releases, news outlets, and foreign policy approaches.

5.1 Overview of results

This analysis of the research confirms the clear divergence between the aid architecture and the discourse surrounding the support of the recipient's development. China often repeats the word “partnership” and reassures unconditional support as long as Ghana reciprocates the same behaviour, the keystones of its discourse of people-to-people exchanges and cultural diplomacy. However, the most frequent pattern in describing development aid involved the principles of “mutual respect” and “friendship”. Chinese discourses, therefore, tend to offer somewhat emotionally entangling angle that emphasises commonality and bonds.

The DAC donors communicate its development assistance through the OECD initiative of shaping policies that foster democracy, equality, opportunity, and well-being. The US mostly provided aid in the health sector in Ghana, thus linking a lot of discourse on health and well-being. Therefore, the US tended to direct its goals towards tangible, measurable outcomes, and emphasised human development. Moreover, the US addressed poverty reduction through the funding and support of the fisheries sector in Ghana.

Germany was the least engaged donor in Ghana. Germany's development assistance primarily targets development sustainability, economic growth, and poverty eradication. The frequent keywords that emerged were business, energy, environment, and training, which reflects which sector Germany is targeting. The program's initiatives reflected the ambitious goal of transforming Ghana into a green economy. When it came to communicating these ambitious goals, Germany lacked a two-way dialogue. Statements and press releases were limited to the explanation of the planned programs set for the future, as well as the predicted outcomes. Thus, assuming a stance of a distant and passive donor.

5.2 China

China's aid motive cannot be understood through the long history of aid programs and relations; however, its more emotional discourse demonstrates the effort to depict long-lasting



Figure 4: China Word Cloud. Frequent words used to describe development assistance in Ghana.

relations with Africa as genuine friendship, sometimes even in the face of a common foe (colonialism).

When Chinese officials address Ghana, they usually invoke an image of a shared past and future. China portrays itself as a friend who expresses constant gratitude and reassurance for unconditional support, frequently using words such as friendship, mutual benefit, peace, support, trade, shared future, and most importantly people. Figure 4 demonstrates that China emphasises the people in Ghana, which is quite frequently addressed by Ambassador Lu Kun in the Ghanaian media. One example could be seen in an interview regarding the inauguration of a new journey for China-Ghana relations. Lu Kun states,

Over the past two years, the China-aided University of Health and Allied Sciences in Ho, fishing ports, 1000 boreholes bring benefits to the Ghanaian people. They are all tangible development projects for the well-being of Ghanaian people. Just as H.E. President Akufo-Addo once said, Ghana-China cooperation is a model of Africa-China cooperation. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana, 2021).

China emphasises providing aid in order to help developing countries improve the people's livelihoods. Moreover, China reflects its commitment to not only economic growth but also human-centred development.

Based on the coding system, which is included in the Appendix B., Chinese distinctive discourse on aid was categorised into two parts: *Modalities of Aid* and *Principles and Values*. The coded keywords of modalities of aid relate to infrastructure development, trade, economic partnership, capacity building, people-to-people exchanges, cultural diplomacy, and technology transfer. The principles and values coded the keywords describing South-South development, win-win cooperation, sustainability and ownership, and non-interference and respect for sovereignty. In the following section, the inductive analysis of the keywords will be described and interpreted.

5.2.1 *Modalities of Aid*

In this category, the analysis found that Chinese discourse on development assistance is dominated by infrastructure development, economic partnership, people-to-people exchanges, and cultural diplomacy. The aspects of trade, capacity building, and technology transfer were absent in the partnership discourse between China and Ghana.

China manifests its interests and goals mostly through infrastructure projects, which are often mentioned in the statements and press releases, along with the importance of poverty alleviation and economic development. In addressing poverty reduction in Ghana, China first tells a story about its victory in eradicating absolute poverty, thus providing wisdom to other countries. Ambassador Lu, once more, claims that the Chinese shared experience on poverty alleviation will provide their African “friends” with help and support to overcome the challenge (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana 2021). Furthermore, there is a hint of reassurance tactics, such as in this following interview,

As Ghana's good friend and partner, China has never been absent from Ghana's development. China's aid, financing, investment and contracting of projects are too many

to count...China supports Ghana's "Year of Road" policy actively by building numerous trunk roads, interchanges and traffic signal systems. In addition, China also constructed gas processing factory and national fibre backbone nets for Ghana. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana 2021).

The reassurance China has never been absent from Ghana's development indicates a rhetorical commitment to equality between the two nations.

In recent years, Chinese foreign policy has emphasised people-to-people exchanges. Although that aspect of cultural diplomacy involves broad elements in the discourse of development assistance, the Confucius Institute at the University of Ghana demonstrated the close relations between the two countries. Facilitating educational and cultural exchanges between Ghanaian and Chinese institutions enhances China's national image, thus, creating more opportunities to build trust and promote appreciation. Ambassador Sun Baohong addressed the students in Ghana directly in a speech dedicated to China-Ghana Friendship in the New Era. Ambassador Baohong stated,

Dear Students,

All of you shoulder the great expectation of the nation and the future of Ghana. I sincerely wish you would have a happy life in China [...] I also believe that you will inject new impetus into China-Ghana friendly relations and become Ambassador of China-Ghana friendship in the new era. The future belongs to you and Ghana's tomorrow relies on you! (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana, 2017a).

The Ambassador directs her speech toward the students, establishing a sense of trustworthiness and closeness to the audience. Such encouragement also demonstrates the attitude towards goodwill and friendship.

In relation to trade and economic development, China is assisting in developing Ghana's manufacturing sector to ensure quality export products (Odonkor 2021). Moreover, last year it was reported that trade between China and Ghana hit 9.57 billion dollars, making it one of China's largest trading partners in Africa (Arkoh 2022). Ambassador Lu Kun stated that "These are not just numbers, but a symbol of China-Ghana friendship we value and cherish" (Ibid.).

Furthermore, the statement can also be interpreted as a positive outcome of the bilateral relations. The situation inherently complimented the pursuit of win-win cooperation.

5.2.2 Principles and Values

China's principles and values are often communicated through the visions set for deepening the relations with Ghana. China adheres to the principles of non-interference, win-win cooperation, South-South cooperation, and sustainability and ownership. The essence of these principles contains keywords such as, "mutual benefit", "respectful" "good of all mankind", "sincerity", "good faith", and "shared future", especially when it comes to strengthening solidarity and cooperation dialogue. For instance, the previous Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, Sun Baohong made remarks regarding connecting for common development in Africa. She stated,

China-Africa cooperation emphasizes treating each other with equality[...]In conducting cooperation with Africa, China always abides by the guideline on its relations with Africa featuring sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith, as well as the policy of upholding justice and pursuing shared interests. We combine the sustainable self-development of Africa and other developing countries with China's own development closely together to achieve win-win cooperation, common development and promote a more balanced and inclusive development. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana 2017b).

Based on these remarks, the Ambassador explicitly explained that development assistance is attached to China's principles and values that can shape successful cooperation in the region. Rather than the top-down relationship, China suggests that relevant actors should foster these principles and values in order to ensure a more balanced and inclusive development. However, adhering to these principles suggests that Ghana is conditioned to reciprocate in order not to depart from China's developmental assistance.

The cornerstone of Chinese characteristics in development assistance is the rhetoric on non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Ambassador Lun Kun emphasised the differences between Western and Chinese development assistance, "China stands firmly against all forms of hegemonism and power politics, the cold war mentality, interference in other countries'

internal affairs and double standards,” (Kanyi 2022). The “cold war mentality” implies that China will never depart or abandon Ghana, even if the country is going through hardship or conflict. This also frames their “friendship” as one that must stand strong in the face of “common enemies”, though the principle remains that China will continue to provide development assistance and not meddle in the domestic affairs of Ghana. Similar remarks were made by Ambassador Sun,

CPC is willing to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation with African parties on the basis of independent, completely equal, mutual respect and mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, actively deepen the exchange of experiences in managing state affairs and governance, enhance mutual understanding and recognition of each other's governing system and philosophy, so that we can learn from each other, work together to improve the governing ability and promote the economic and social development. (Embassy of People's Republic of China in the Republic Ghana 2017c).

While these principles relate to China's efforts to deepen its relationship with Ghana, it also reflects on the shared experience of colonial exploitation and foreign interference. The policy was set to safeguard from foreign meddling, thus protecting China's interests and goals in Africa. This also suggests that if Ghana does not meet the conditions set by the DAC donors, which can result in aid discontinuation, Ghana still has China to support its development.

5.3 The Western Donors

Overarchingly, the US and Germany take a less emotional, less people-centric approach to their development discourse and focus on measurable outcomes with four obvious characteristics defining development aid to Ghana. These are (1) democratic promotion and human rights, (2) economic cooperation and trade flows, including technical assistance in industry-specific fields such as agriculture, oil, and gas, (3) sustainable development connected to SDG indicators, and (4) education and capacity building. In the following section, frequent keywords used by the DAC donors that describe development aid in Ghana are discussed.

5.3.1 *The United States*

The United States, first and foremost, emphasises the importance of democracy and human rights. Ambassador Palmer stated, “U.S.-Ghana ties are strong, rooted in history and our common democratic values...Our commitments tonight for Ghana affirm African agency, strengthen partnerships, and catalyse economic growth and opportunities.” (The US Embassy in Ghana 2022). The democracy and human rights characteristics reflect the US beliefs and values as a nation. In Figure 5, it demonstrates the keywords used by the US that describe development aid in Ghana. The emphasis on democracy, communities, agriculture, business, education, employment, and health aligns with the development aid strategy provided by USAID. However, the US also does somewhat employ more emotional vocabulary at times, such as “strength”, “together”, and “partnership”.



Figure 5: The United States Word Cloud. Frequent words used to describe development assistance in Ghana.

This goes back to the notion of responsibility and duty that the US, alongside other Western donors, has committed to support and expand democratic governance in the developing world. The premise of democracy and human rights promotion as a foreign policy strategy can be also seen in a statement by the US Department of State and the USAID,

On Friday, President Biden announced 10-year plans for implementing the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability in partnership with Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, and Coastal West Africa, including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo. These plans represent a commitment to global peace and security, with the United States working alongside an array of local partners toward shared, long-term goals of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. (USAID 2023).

Although not as pronounced as in Chinese discourse, the US does emphasise support and partnership to deepen collaborative efforts in the future.

US development discourse in Ghana heavily focuses on agriculture and farmers. Although in the collected text material there is a lack of the words on poverty or food insecurity, the US still approaches the issue by working closely with Ghana's marine fisheries in order to increase the fish stock in the coastal areas. For instance, the USAID Economic Growth Office Director Paul Pleva express that "the US is committed to working with all of you to ensure food security and a healthy, nutritious diet for Ghanaians." (The US Embassy in Ghana 2023). Since 2014, the US has been committed to supporting fish stocks in small fishing villages, thus implementing the Feed the Future initiative to increase food security (USAID 2022). By addressing food insecurity, the US portrayed itself as a donor who engages in the local communities and not only the democratic and economic aspects of development.

As part of the development agenda, the US often puts emphasis on gender equality in education. The advocacy for women's economic development can be also seen in various programs that promise women entrepreneurs supplemental sessions on subjects in finance and marketing (The US Embassy in Ghana 2020). In a speech made by Ambassador Stephanie Sullivan, she addresses Ghanaian women as the cornerstone of families and communities, thereby boosting economic growth (Ibid.). The Ambassador further states,

At times most of us, including me, have had to "fake it 'til you make it" as we gained experience and grew professionally. You stepped up to a challenge, and that is exactly what AWE [Academy for Women Entrepreneurs (AWE)] is designed to do – to help women all over the world overcome challenges and fulfill their economic potential. To become "women without limits! (Ibid.)

Since the OECD advocates for a more resilient, productive, and inclusive economy in developing countries, the US communicates the fundamental components of achieving gender equality through such programs.

The analysis based on the collected documents demonstrated that the US portrays its development aid in Ghana in a more outcomes-based, less emotional framework. Political communication does not step outside of the development agenda and principles set by the OECD. Furthermore, the US does not portray itself as a friend but rather as a donor, fitting a top-down policy approach. However, while first glance may imply that the US solely focuses on measurable outcomes such as business, trade, and overall economic cooperation, further analysis demonstrated that the US also addresses social, cultural, and human development challenges, but still with a less emotional slant.

5.3.2 Germany

Similar to the US, Germany does not maintain an emotional discourse. Germany's aid discourse focuses on the lower middle-income class and emphasises development



Figure 6: Germany Word Cloud. Frequent words used to describe development assistance in Ghana.

sustainability, economic growth, and poverty eradication. Germany's development aid priorities

for Ghana are primarily sustainable development, good governance, and environmental sustainability. Germany often ties in development aid to climate change and renewable energy. As demonstrated in Figure 6, Germany has frequently used the words “energy” and “environment” when referring to German development cooperation with Ghana. The energy transition has become one of Germany’s trademarks in the international scenery, thus projecting its ambitions toward climate protection in Ghana. According to a publication by BMZ, under the Paris Agreement, Ghana plans to achieve 10 percent of the renewable energy mix by 2030 (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Accra, n.d.). In order to share Ghana’s economic development, alongside its climate goals, Germany has partnered with Ghana to facilitate and provide instruments for renewable energy infrastructure (Ibid.).

Germany’s discourse surrounding renewable energy and climate change in Ghana is present in small-scale projects in Ghana in rural areas. Direct quotes from the Ambassador or relevant actors were absent, however, BMZ published a news coverage on the critical area of development in Ghana:

Germany is supporting the establishment of proper recycling and waste disposal systems and the development of economically viable business models for the sustainable processing of electronic waste. This also helps to improve the working conditions and livelihoods of people in the informal sector who work at the dumps.” (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2023b).

Although Germany recognizes the importance of addressing environmental challenges, the initiative also contributes to the well-being of the people in Ghana. However, when it came to Germany communicating its ambitious goals, it lacked words that demonstrate reassurance or encouragement. Instead, the discourse often reflects the existing biases and the oversimplified vocabulary of the current situation in Ghana. Even though Germany is the second-largest donor in Ghana, there is a detachment to the real challenges and barriers that are in Ghana.

The second frequent pattern of discourse relating to development aid was vocational training and support for the financial sector development. In order to address the issue of

poverty in Ghana, German has implemented programs that help with the increase of jobs in small and medium-sized businesses. Federal Minister Hubertus Heil spoke about the implementation of new supply chain regulations that could establish a better working environment in Ghana. During a meeting with President Akufo-Addo in Accra, the Minister remarked:

Germany benefits more than almost any other country in the world from a globalised economy that is based on the division of labour. Our prosperity and the jobs in our country are secured by this system. However, this also means that we have a special responsibility: for human rights, for decent working conditions around the world, and for globalisation, which we want to ensure is fair and in line with human rights standards.” (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2023c).

The keyword “responsibility” can be linked back to the discussion of neo-colonialism and how Western donors impose values and principles in the recipient countries. Development assistance should be based on mutual respect and partnership, yet the priorities set by the donor reflect their own agenda on globalisation. There is also a hint of one-way dialogue, Germany attempts to persuade Ghana that the relations are merely a “partnership” and not a donor-and-receiver relationship. Therefore, the discourse suggests Germany’s interests dominate the overall relationship with Ghana.

The analysis concluded that Germany does not directly communicate with the people of Ghana but does reflect its ambitions to sustainable development aid through the reports and statements provided by BMZ and GIZ. The DAC donor does utilise the word “partnership”, but the message conveys a very passive and inactive tone, which suggests the typical Western standpoint on a top-down approach.

5.4 Comparison

The differentiation between the DAC donors and China is the degree of emotionality and type of mannerisms connected to the development assistance. China’s language towards Ghana portrays long-term support of the recipient’s development, not only in the area of economic growth but also in the area of the well-being of the Ghanaian people. The active and

reassuring tone of the language entangles Ghana not only in partnership and cooperation with China but in a “friendship” sometimes based on shared historical victimhood of colonialism. Although it may be misleading, considering that most of the data was collected from the Chinese enterprise networks, the solidarity approach remains effective and appealing in Ghana.

Indeed - the wording “partnership” and “partners” were exclusively used by all the donors; however, China also utilised the word “friends” and “friendship” in order to create an image of a more equal relationship. In the case of the DAC donors, “partnership” represented a rather empty rhetoric and a tactic for continuing to impose goals that are not necessarily a priority for Ghana. The partnership discourse represents the existential question of DAC donors, which is the question of equality. Based on the top-down approach of the OECD development strategy, the DAC donors try to remain relevant in the field of development aid, considering that China’s model has spread its sphere of influence in the African region.

Germany differs from the US in how the relevant actors communicate their priorities in Ghana. Whilst the US emphasises gender inclusivity, agriculture, and education, Germany primarily focuses on transforming the Ghanaian economy to climate neutral environment, which will lead to long-term sustainability in the future. Especially in the area of human development and sustainability, Germany promoted its policies through vocational training programs. The US similarly often focused on the coastal sector and the protection of the marine environment. China, on the other hand, does not prioritise the marine environment and climate change in Ghana rather than people-to-people exchanges and cultural diplomacy.

In contrast to the US and China, Germany does not direct its development discourse towards the people of Ghana at all, but rather towards the private sectors and stakeholders. The US and China demonstrated similarities in the area of human development. The US, however, utilizes words such as “education” and “gender equality”, which are directly linked to the standards and norms of a liberal democratic system and fundamental human rights. On the other

hand, China emphasises the value of education as it increases the employment rate. Moreover, the emphasis on education is closely connected to the idea of Ghanaian cultural exchange and traineeship in China, which it suggested to promote deeper relations between the two nations.

China emphasises social progress and self-development capacity more often than the DAC donors. Although the DAC donors also promote the improvement of living standards in developing countries, it is not well communicated in Ghana. Overall, China's dialogue in Ghana is more active, emotional, and perhaps even populist as it addresses citizens directly. In contrast, the DAC donors use a passive voice, which is generally used to highlight the presented actions and aid interventions in Ghana.

6 Conclusion

This thesis has demonstrated the divergence of development assistance in Ghana. China's language towards Ghana portrays a long-term commitment to development cooperation, not only encompassing economic growth and trade but also the welfare of the Ghanaian people. The choice of words utilised by China emphasises mutual benefit and common economic interests, which is consistently highlighted by Chinese officials. While the word "partnership" emerges often in the discourse of cooperation, China goes further by utilising words such as "friendship", "friends", and "equals" in order to create an image of a symmetrical relationship.

In contrast, the discourse utilised by the DAC donors often appears as empty rhetoric as both the US and Germany restate their goals in Ghana without persistent action in achieving equal partnership, thus aligning with the top-down approach of development assistance. While the US communicates its development goals through humanitarian rationales, Germany focuses on promoting policies in the areas of human development and sustainability. The communication regarding development was inconsistent between the DAC donors, solely because the US and Germany target different sectors, however, both of the donors were consistent with the OECD ODA framework.

The thesis has contributed to the knowledge of development aid strategies and the divergence between China and the West. Moreover, the thesis has also contributed to the field of political communication that reflects the donors' objectives and principles through development practices.

The overall limitation of the research was the access to information regarding donors' target sectors and development priorities in Ghana. The details regarding aid flow from China to Ghana were hard to access and the analysis had to depend on secondary sources in order to gather information. The DAC donor's aid flow was available through the OECD reports and

statistics, as well as through the agencies. However, Germany's aid architecture made it difficult to trace prioritised policies in Ghana, thus the information depended on the agencies providing country-specific reports and overall relations with Ghana.

Appendices

Appendix A. List of Content

Donors	Document Title	Type	Delivery Date
China	<i>Inaugurating a New Journey for China-Ghana Relations. Ambassador Lu Kun Took an Interview with the Ghanaian Medias</i>	Interview	3 rd March 2021
China	<i>To become Ambassador of China-Ghana Friendship in the New Era</i>	Speech	19 th April 2017
China	<i>Trade between Ghana and China hits US\$9.57 billion</i>	Statement	28 th September 2022
China	<i>Connecting for Common Development. Remarks by Chinese Ambassador to Ghana H.E. Sun Baohong</i>	Speech	7 th July 2017
China	<i>China working for modernised socialised state; pledges support for others to achieve sustainable development, peace</i>	Interview	7 th December 2022
China	<i>Remarks by Chinese Ambassador to Ghana H.E. Mdm. Sun Baohong at the Policy Dialogue Held by the New Patriotic Party of Ghana</i>	Speech	27 th November 2017
China	<i>China, Africa strive for more results in win-win cooperation</i>	Statement	22 nd February 2023
China	<i>China, Ghana to further enrich relations</i>	Press release	2 nd September 2018
China	<i>Chinese envoy calls for closer cooperation with Africa</i>	Press release	27 th August 2022

China	<i>Struggle for a Century, Set Sail on a New Journey</i>	Press release	7 th July 2021
China	<i>Wang Yi: China, Ghana should work together for international justice</i>	Press release	20 th April 2022
China	<i>Wang Yi Speaks on the Phone with Ghanaian Foreign Minister Bochwe</i>	Press release	19 th April 2022
China	<i>The Chinese Embassy in Ghana Holds the 2021 Consular Assistance Volunteer Online Commendation Ceremony</i>	Press release	12 th November 2021
China	<i>Highlights of foreign congratulatory messages on CPC's 100th founding anniversary</i>	Press release	10 th July 2021
China	<i>Building a China-Africa Community with a Shared Future steadily on course</i>	Statement	28 th August 2022
China	<i>China, Ghana issue commemorative stamps to mark 60 years of friendship</i>	Press release	21 st October 2020
The US	<i>Ambassador Palmer's Remarks at the Global Citizen Festival, Accra, Ghana.</i>	Speech	26 th September 2022
The US	<i>Taking the Next Step Towards Ending HIV: Op-ed by US Ambassador to Ghana Virginia Palmer</i>	Op-ed	27 th May 2023
The US	<i>Joint 10-Year Plans for the US Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability</i>	Press release	27 th March 2023
The US	<i>US and Ghana Partner to Improve Fish Standards</i>	Press release	31 st January 2023

The US	<i>United States Supports Ghanaian Women Entrepreneurs through the Academy for Women Entrepreneurs Program</i>	Speech	17 th November 2020
The US	<i>Agriculture and Food Security</i>	Op-ed	27 th May 2023
The US	<i>US and Ghana Working Together to Provide New Agricultural Financing</i>	Press release	11 th October 2022
The US	<i>USAID Education Activity Making a Meaningful Impact on Learning Outcomes in Ghana</i>	Press release	24 th April 2019
The US	<i>The US Strengthens Business Advocacy Efforts in Ghana through Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund</i>	Speech	18 th February 2021
Germany	<i>Securing a sustainable energy supply</i>	Statement	19 th January 2023
Germany	<i>China must join Ghana debt restructuring effort soon, Germany's Lindner says</i>	Statement	4 th February 2023
Germany	<i>From tracking the supply chain</i>	Interview	23 rd February 2023
Germany	<i>Speech by Federal Development Minister Dr. Gerd Muller at the opening of the German African Business Summit (GABS)</i>	Speech	12 th February 2019
Germany	<i>Speech by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Christoph Retzlaff on the occasion of the Day of German Unity</i>	Speech	8 th October 2019
Germany	<i>Vocational training, private sector and financial sector development</i>	Initiative	19 th January 2023

Germany	<i>Ghana and Germany: Strong Partnership for the Future</i>	Publication	2022
Germany	<i>Decentralisation and improved public financial management</i>	Report	19 th January 2023

Appendix B. Coding System [The People's Republic of China]

Code Category	Sub-Code
Modalities of Aid	Infrastructure development [ID]
	Trade and economic partnership [PAR]
	Capacity building [CB.PRC]
	People-to-people exchanges [PPE]
	Cultural diplomacy [CD]
	Technology transfer [TT]
Principles and Values	South-South Cooperation [SSC]
	Win-win cooperation [WWC]
	Sustainability and ownership [SO]
	Non-interference and respect for sovereignty [NIRS]

Appendix C. [OECD DAC]

Code Category	Sub-code
	Democratic promotion [DP]
Democratic Governance and Human Rights	Human rights [HR]
	Economic development [ED]
Economic Development and Partnerships	Economic cooperation and trade [ECD]
	Gender Equality [GE]
	Environmental sustainability [ES]
	Climate change [CC]
Sustainable Development	Poverty Reduction [PR]
	Education and skills development [ESD]
Education and Capacity Building	Education and vocational training [EVT]
	Capacity building [CB.OECD]

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