
MOBILISING THE FAR RIGHT:
DETERMINANTS OF FAR-RIGHT PROTEST MOBILISATION
IN POST-COMMUNIST HUNGARY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DÉNES ALPÁR

SUPERVISOR: PROF. ERIN K. JENNE, PhD

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

VIENNA, MAY 2024

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates far-right resurgence in Europe by examining determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary between 1990 and 2016. Drawing on the literature on the far right and on social movements, I assess whether grievances, opportunities, and resources can provide a systematic explanation for the successful mobilisation of the far right. I utilise a multi-method approach. I collect and quantify far-right protest data from *Népszabadság*, a single newspaper source. Then, I conduct multiple regression analyses to test for systematic explanations of far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary. The results show that my objective independent variables cannot account for the protest activity of the far right either at the national or at the subnational levels. My subsequent protest event analysis sheds light on the wide range of subjective grievances and arising political opportunities at the subnational level, which fuelled far-right protest mobilisation.

Keywords: far-right, mobilisation, protest event, Hungary, protest event analysis

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to Professor Erin K. Jenne, my supervisor, whose support, guidance, and feedback shaped and informed my research.

I would also like to thank my family and friends, who supported me throughout the thesis writing and listened to my ideas. This thesis would not have been possible without you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. EXISTING THEORIES	4
2.1 <i>Far-right as a social movement</i>	4
2.2 <i>Far-right mobilisation</i>	5
2.2.1 Grievance-based explanations	5
2.2.2 Opportunity-based explanations	7
2.2.3 Resource-based explanations	8
3. CASE SELECTION: HUNGARY	10
3.1 <i>Explaining the resurgence of the far-right in Hungary</i>	11
3.1.1 Party-based explanations	11
3.1.2 Explanations emphasising the importance of grassroots activity	14
4. HYPOTHESES	19
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	22
5.1 <i>Protest events</i>	22
5.2 <i>Independent variables</i>	24
6. ANALYSIS	27
6.1 <i>Results</i>	27
6.2 <i>Discussion</i>	30

6.2.1 Temporal and spatial distribution of far-right protest events in Hungary	30
6.2.2 Forms of far-right protest mobilisation	34
6.2.3 Themes and issues of far-right protest mobilisation	36
6.2.4 Far-right organizations mobilising	40
6.1.5 Number of participants on far-right protest events	42
7. CONCLUSION	44
APPENDIX A. SEARCH QUERY	46
APPENDIX B. CODEBOOK	47
APPENDIX C. FAR-RIGHT PROTEST DATASET, 1990-2016	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY	66

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, far-right parties have gained support across Europe. While the Front National has been formidable in France for decades, far-right parties, such as the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, the Golden Dawn in Greece, or the Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom in Hungary, have risen and achieved considerable electoral successes since the late 2000s. Others, such as the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria and the Lega Nord in Italy, were able to form governments by allying with mainstream formations. Thus, the rise of far-right seem to be neither limited to a specific region in Europe nor a momentary political phenomenon.

To explain the resurgence of far-right in Europe, the scholarship has mainly focused on party politics and analysed election results, party manifestos, and party organization (Koopmans 1996; Giugni et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 2006; Kriesi 2015). While studies focusing on party organisation found that far-right parties, such as Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom in Hungary and CasaPound in Italy, can be described as movement parties located at the junction of party politics and social movements, there are only a few studies addressing the resurgence of far-right parties with a focus on their grassroots activities (Pirro and Gattinara 2018; Pirro 2019). Mudde draws attention to “the recent rise of populist radical street politics” and emphasises the significance of bottom-up protest activity in the twenty-first century dynamics of the far-right parties (2016, 612). Nevertheless, far-right protest mobilisation does not always correlate with the street politics of far-right parties but include the activities of non-party organizations as well. Although there can be significant overlap between membership in far-right parties and far-right non-party organizations, it is not clear whether the participation of these far-right formations enhances, or weakens, the mobilisation and political impact of the far-right (Varga 2014; Mudde 2016).

This thesis investigates far-right resurgence by asking the question *What are the drivers of far-right resurgence in modern-day Europe?* by focusing on the case of Hungary. Empirically, I utilise a dataset of 331 far-right protest events between 1990 and 2016 to systematically analyse far-right protest activity in Hungary over the 27-year period. My hypothesis is that economic grievances and political opportunities on the national and subnational levels play a significant role in far-right protest mobilisation in post-communist Hungary and in far-right mobilisation generally.

I use a multi-method research design and utilise my protest event dataset to test my hypotheses on the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation. First, I conduct multiple linear regression analyses to test my hypotheses. Second, I utilise protest event analysis to explore the spatial and temporal distributions, forms, themes and issues, and associated organizations of these protest events. My results find no statistically significant relation between the number of protest events and objective economic grievances in Hungary between 1990 and 2016. However, the analysis of my protest event dataset reveals the far-right's ability to exploit subjective grievances and arising political opportunities, such as economic crises and perceived threat of refugees.

This thesis contributes to several strands of literature in the field of international relations and political science. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine whether the national and subnational economic situation directly affects the protest activity of the far-right in Hungary. Being a smaller economy in the European Union, Hungary's economic performance is heavily dependent on external factors which makes the country vulnerable to international shocks. By assessing the correlation between economic performance and far-right protest activity, I suggest that external factors are important determinants of far-right protest mobilisation. Second, my research design provides a new angle on the determinants of far-right resurgence in modern-day Europe. Most of the literature is party-based and focused on voting

patterns that ignore the importance of protest-based mobilisation in the success of the far-right. Third, the comprehensive protest event analysis provides important insights into the evolution of far-right protest activity in modern-day Hungary by going beyond the timeframe and focus of Pirro et al. (2021) and covering a 27-year period. The dataset also provides information on the targets, number of participants, participating organizations, and politicians of the protests. Fourth, the paper adds to the recently recontinued strand of protest event analyses in the Central European region by Greskovits (2020) and Pirro et al. (2021), following Szabó (1996), Ekiert and Kubik (1998), and Císař and Navrátil (2015).

The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide the theoretical framework for the paper by outlining the three main strands of literature on explaining the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation. Then, Chapter 3 zooms in the case of modern-day Hungary, highlights its importance, and provides a review of existing explanations for the far-right's success in the country. In Chapter 4, I construct my main hypotheses and introduce control hypotheses to control for alternative explanations. Chapter 5 provides an overview of my research methodology and variables. In Chapter 6, I conduct the multiple linear regression analyses to test my hypotheses and analyse my protest dataset to demonstrate the importance of subjective grievances and political opportunities in the protest activity of the far right. Chapter 7 concludes the paper.

2. EXISTING THEORIES

2.1 Far-right as a social movement

In recent years, the contentious politics of the far-right have gained new momentum across Europe. While social movements and political parties are commonly studied as separate entities in distinct streams of literature, there is an emerging scholarship aiming to bridge the gap between them. Already in the early 2000s, Minkenberg's work highlighted the importance of both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary dimensions of the far-right (2002; 2003). Comparing the far-right in Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe, Minkenberg claimed that an analysis of the far-right needs to consider "both its party-type and its movement-type characteristics" to understand the electoral and organizational strength of far-right formations (2002, 362). Building on this, Minkenberg identified national variables, including the institutional and cultural setups, and the structure of party competition, as key determinants of the far-right's organizational structure in each country (2003). His findings reveal an inverse relationship between far-right parties and the far-right social movement sector in European countries (2003, 165). Thus, while countries with strong far-right parties generally feature weaker movements, those with weaker far-right parties correlate with stronger movements. New and/or weaker far-right parties often engage in extra-parliamentary, contentious activities to pursue their agenda and can be described as movement parties.

While the term "movement party" was first used to describe the fuzzy, transitional organization of Green/left-libertarian parties in the second half of the twentieth century, it was later linked to the contemporary far-right. Kitschelt defines movement parties as "coalitions of political activists who emanate from social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition" (2006, 280). For Kitschelt, movement parties are transitional phenomena because as most parties develop, they

become stable organizational structures that aim to change the system from the inside, as a party, rather than from the outside, as a movement. However, Mikenberg argues that while this might apply to most movement parties, far-right parties are different as “their opposition to the entire party system, along with their internal hierarchical structures and a strong leadership principle, keep them from ‘normalizing’” (2019, 481). His argument is confirmed by studies on far-right movement parties. Through the case studies of Jobbik in Hungary and CasaPound in Italy, Pirro and Gattinara show the intersectional nature of these parties despite their more than a decade-long existence (2018). Specifically, their analysis of Jobbik and CasaPound highlight that while the organization of both parties have formalised, they continue to utilise “repertoires of social movements” such as demonstrations, rallies, and occupation of buildings in their external mobilisation (2018, 278–79). Pirro’s analysis further underscores the intersectional nature of contemporary far-right through linkage mechanisms between Jobbik’s movement and its electoral performance (2019).

2.2 Far-right mobilisation

Despite many of the contemporary far-right parties originating in the social movement sector, the scholarship on the far-right rarely examined protest events systematically. Below, drawing on the classification of Gattinara et al. in a landmark paper which synthesised social movement theory and factors influencing the success of far-right parties (2022), I summarise the three main rival determinants of far-right protest mobilisation, namely (1) grievances, (2) political-institutional and discursive opportunities, and (3) resources.

2.2.1 Grievance-based explanations

The conventional literature on the far-right has identified grievance-based and opportunity-based explanations of far-right mobilisation. Grievance-based explanations emphasise “objective conditions which are assumed to lead to subjective grievances or discontent, which in turn lead people to participate in social movements” (Koopmans 1996, 195). Economic

grievances arising from welfare retrenchment, privatization efforts, globalization, and economic crises can provide fertile ground for far-right mobilisation. Indeed, the social movement literature highlights economic hardship as a significant determinant of protest activity in general. Analysing the protest activity in twenty-five European countries between 2000 and 2014, Quaranta argues that “the state of the economy, whether objective or subjective, is associated with anti-government protests” (2016, 745). Thus, citizens seem to mobilise against the perceived threat of economic hardship in an attempt to protect themselves from the negative consequences of declining economic conditions. Similarly, focusing on economic contention in the Visegrád 4 countries, Císař and Navrátil find that austerity measures produce collective mobilisation through subjectively perceived economic hardship even in the absence of economic problems (2015). In contrast, the literature on the far-right points to the limits economic grievance-based mobilisation within the electoral arena. Ivaldi (2015) stresses the importance of economic issues over a culture grievances in the political program of the Front National in France to attract a wider voting base from the 2000s. However, Ivarsflaten’s cross-country study shows that the far-right mobilisation of economic grievances varies significantly across countries and that successful far-right parties “were not particularly good at mobilizing dissatisfaction with the national economy” (2008, 12). Instead, her analysis draws attention to far-right mobilisation concerning grievances over immigration.

Indeed, grievances over marginalised groups such as immigrants, ethnic minorities, and asylum seekers are identified as a second important determinant of far-right mobilisation. Ivarsflaten draws attention to the integration problem of Muslim immigrants in Western European countries as a source of grievances that created opportunities for far-right mobilisation (2008, 8). Her findings show that all successful far-right parties mobilised upon grievances stemming from the immigration crises of the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, Koopmans highlights that the presence of ethnic minorities or an increased influx of immigrants and

asylum seekers may create actual or perceived problems for the population, specifically for low-skilled workers who are already threatened by unemployment and social marginalization (1996, 196). The study of Lucassen and Lubbers contributes to a more refined understanding of far-right mobilisation over such grievances (2012). Their findings show that grievances over immigrants are a stronger determinant of far-right preference in European countries with a lower proportion of Muslims. Hence, far-right parties mobilising over immigration-based grievances are likely to be successful in more homogenous countries.

2.2.2 Opportunity-based explanations

In contrast, rather than focusing on the quantity of real and perceived grievances, opportunity-based explanations of far-right mobilisation highlight the political-institutional and discursive opportunities and constraints around issues, which in turn encourage people to participate in social movements (Giugni et al. 2005). Firstly, system-level institutional variables, namely the position of the mainstream right-wing party and the configuration of government, are identified as important determinants of far-right opportunity structures (Giugni et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Through the absorption of far-right policy elements, not only the extreme political agenda but far-right parties themselves may be mainstreamed. Thus, the position of mainstream right-wing parties matter because their radicalization can result in the legitimisation of the far-right and its agenda.

Similarly, the literature highlights the role of government configuration. A grand coalition government increases the number of far-right votes in a country as well because such a government configuration might cause right-wing voters to feel unrepresented and turn to extreme alternatives if “they do not see their preferred policies being enacted and do not enjoy the consolation of seeing their party play the role of a principled opposition” (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, 424). Furthermore, Kriesi argues that right-wing governments might function as

political allies and provide far-right formations with an institutional access point (2015). In turn, far-right parties may be able to impact and shape their political allies and politics as a whole.

Secondly, discursive opportunity structures are identified as important determinants of far-right mobilisation. Giugni et al. highlight that the contemporary far-right heavily depends on “the politicization of new cleavages or the repoliticization of existing ones”, such as immigration or the presence of ethnic minorities (2005, 159). If mainstream parties already have “ownership” of a given policy domain, the far-right is less likely to be able to capitalise on the issue area. Koopmans further stresses the crucial role of political elites in influencing the range of discursive opportunities available to the far-right (1996). While a moderate stance of mainstream political parties may counter the efforts of the far-right, the problematization of specific issues in mainstream politics provides fertile ground and heightened media attention for the far-right to formulate and press claims. Consequently, beside the (re)politicization of issues, the lack of general consensus over policy areas between mainstream parties can provide an entry point for the far-right.

2.2.3 Resource-based explanations

Neither grievance-based nor opportunity-based explanations consider the agency of collective actors and thus, may only provide a partial understanding of far-right protest mobilisation. Resource-based explanations complement these models “by highlighting the role of agency and addressing how collective actors use resources available to craft their own fortunes” (Castelli Gattinara, Froio, and Pirro 2022, 1024). Resource-based models differentiate between symbolic and material resources of far-right mobilisation. Symbolic resources identified include the ideology and visibility of far-right parties. Parties with extreme-right ideologies which oppose democracy enjoy significantly less public legitimacy than parties with radical-right ideologies that are willing to pursue their objectives within a parliamentary democracy (Mudde 2019). Similarly, far-right parties capitalise on the publicity of far-right and mainstream media outlets,

which can support protest mobilisation and normalise a far-right agenda in everyday life. (Rone 2022; Castelli Gattinara and Froio 2024). Material resources include the degree of institutionalisation and occupation of public office. While social movements depend on their grassroots base, political parties exhibit a certain degree of stability through their organizational structure and membership (Kitschelt 2006). Alongside stability, political parties are able to compete in elections, their members can hold public offices, which in turn provides additional media visibility and enhances the material resources available (e.g. money, infrastructure) for the far-right (Castelli Gattinara, Froio, and Pirro 2022, 1025).

The next chapter introduces the case of Hungary, highlights its importance for this scholarship, and summarises the existing explanations on the successful mobilisation of the far-right in this case.

3. CASE SELECTION: HUNGARY

Since the regime change of 1989-1990, Hungary has faced the continuous presence of far-right formations. In the 1990s, Albert Szabó founded and led three consecutive Hungarian, far-right parties that were openly antisemitic and encouraged hatred against Jews in organised protests. While these parties were condemned by the mainstream political elite and were short-lived, others have been more successful and have shaped the politics of Hungary in Parliament. Between 1990 and 2018, two prominent far-right parties, namely Magyar Élet és Igazság Pártja (MIÉP; Hungarian Life and Justice Party) and Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik; Movement for a Better Hungary), emerged and achieved electoral success. MIÉP, a radical, national conservative party founded in 1993, was able to gain a foothold, winning 5.5% of the vote in the 1998 parliamentary elections and acquiring 14 seats. However, by the mid-2000s, MIÉP's vote share was declining. In the run-up to the 2006 parliamentary elections, the party entered an alliance with Jobbik, another radical nationalist party founded in 2003. Nevertheless, the alliance of the two far-right parties had limited success because by winning only 2.2% of the votes, they gained no seats in the Parliament. In 2010, Jobbik participated in the general election alone and successfully obtained 12,18% and 11,56% of the parliamentary mandates in the general elections of 2010 and 2014, respectively. While Jobbik underwent a phase of conscious moderation in the mid-2010s, the party's most extreme members quit and established a new far-right party, Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) which has enjoyed stable electoral support in the 2022 general elections, obtaining 3,02% of parliamentary seats. Hence, the far-right in Hungary has successfully mobilized following the collapse of communism.

This case requires a closer look, as Hungary is identified by Bustikova (2020) as an outlier in explaining the driver of far-right support and mobilisation in Eastern Europe. Specifically, Bustikova argues that “radical right support is fuelled not by prejudice and xenophobia but by dissatisfaction with and resentment against ascending minority groups” (2020, 7). As Hungary

is an ethnically homogenous country, Bustikova's theory of far-right mobilisation indicates a moderate level of far-right party success which stands in stark contrast with the reality of high success. Thus, Hungary is a deviant case with respect to her theory. While Bustikova acknowledges this anomalous nature of the Hungarian case, the explanation of the phenomenon remains outside of the scope of her book (2020, 65). Therefore, identifying the drivers of far-right mobilisation in Hungary remains an interesting puzzle.

Besides the continuous prominence of far-right formations and the lack of general theories to explain the persistence of far-right mobilisation in post-communist Hungary, I selected the case because the political science literature on the far-right in Hungary is divided on the drivers of far-right resurgence. Moreover, being a native Hungarian speaker, I possess the necessary language expertise to conduct research utilising Hungarian language sources.

The rest of this chapter outlines the existing explanations for the resurgence of the far-right in Hungary from the late 2000s to present.

3.1 Explaining the resurgence of the far-right in Hungary

The literature on the resurgence of the Hungarian far-right can be divided into two strands. First, party-based explanations highlight the post-2006 shock in the Hungarian party system and Jobbik's political program as determinants of the far-right party's success (Becker 2010; Karácsony and Róna 2010; Varga 2014; Murer 2015). Second, other studies focus on Jobbik's grassroots activity in explaining the successful mobilisation of the party (Varga 2014; Murer 2015; Feischmidt and Szombati 2017; Kovarek et al. 2017; Pirro et al. 2021).

3.1.1 Party-based explanations

In the 1990s and 2000s, Hungary attained a high degree of party system consolidation. Hungarian party politics developed a bipolar configuration with the two principal poles being social liberalism and right-wing conservatism. As Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party swiftly

consolidated itself as the driving force of the right-wing conservative formation, far-right parties, specifically MIÉP, were marginalised from the beginning and could only achieve limited electoral success. The status quo in Hungarian politics changed after the infamous Őszöd speech of the social-liberal PM Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked in 2006, which contained detailed information about the desperate situation of the government. The situation further escalated following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which had a devastating effect on the lives of many Hungarians and forced the government to take emergency credit from international financial institutions. The subsequent mass protests and riots, many of which were organised by the right-wing conservative opposition, successfully challenged the social-liberal pole, and gave a powerful boost to right-wing conservatism, led by Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in the 2010 general elections.

Becker (2010) argues that the collapse of status quo between the social-liberal and right-wing conservative political poles not only gave rise to the latter, but also provided the far-right with an entry to parliamentary politics. Jobbik was able to seize this opportunity in both the 2009 European Parliamentary elections and in the subsequent 2010 general elections as well. Becker's emphasis on the role of the leaked Őszöd speech, the devastating effects of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on the lives of many Hungarians, and the reliance of Hungary on emergency credit provided by the IMF and the World Bank supports a mixture of political opportunity- and economic grievances-based explanations for the surge of Jobbik.

In contrast, Karácsony and Róna (2010), Kovács (2013), and Murer (2015) offers opportunity-based explanations that highlight the politicization of societal problems, particularly the issues around the Roma population, as the key determinant of Jobbik's success in Hungary. Karácsony and Róna (2010) argue that the civil war-like situation between the Roma minority and the majority society was the main reason for Jobbik's electoral success in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections. They hold that Jobbik politicised and successfully

appropriated the issues concerning the Roma as mainstream parties refused to acknowledge their failure to tackle these problems and address societal frustrations. Kovács argues that “the Roma problem” remained outside Hungarian politics after the regime change because the mainstream political elite neglected the growing economic and social tensions between the Roma and non-Roma populations. The negligence of successive governments provided Jobbik with an opportunity to exploit local incidents and tensions between the two groups and politicise the issue. In this way, the far-right successfully established ‘issue-ownership’ and obtained “a unique chance to appear as a substantial player in Hungarian political life” (2013, 225). Like Karácsony and Róna (2010) and Kovács (2013), Murer (2015) argues that Jobbik built its rhetoric on a fear-based fantasy that “small-scale crimes by Roma” was “allied with conspiracy theories concerning large-scale financial crimes perpetrated by [Jewish] bankers and European capital” (2015, 90). These claims appealed to the extreme-right, and by the late 2000s, to the politically mainstream as well due to the failure of the social liberal governments to mix neo-liberal ideas with social democracy and state welfare.

Thirdly, Varga (2014) analyses Jobbik’s party programs from 2006, 2010 and press releases between 2008 and 2010 to show that, besides anti-Roma sentiments, Jobbik constructs economic grievances, specifically issues of poverty and inequality caused by capitalism and globalization, as central to its message. He argues that “Jobbik developed its programmatic ideas and attempted to gain attention after 2009 not so much as an anti-Roma formation, but as one taking interest in alleviating the country’s economic problems” (2014, 792). Thus, contrary to MIÉP which identified the Hungarian state’s inability to enforce its laws as the root of all problems, Jobbik considered poverty, unemployment, and the declining welfare state as the greatest threat to the Hungarian nation. Varga argues that this focus on the economy is what allowed Jobbik to problematise and politicise the relationship between Roma and non-Roma population. Jobbik utilised fears connected to the growing economic hardship across Hungary

and argued that the situation fuels ‘gypsy crime’ and propagated ethnic tensions between the two groups.

3.1.2 Explanations emphasising the importance of grassroots activity

Besides the party-based explanations outlined above, the literature highlights the role of grassroots mobilisation contributing to the success of the far-right in Hungary (Varga 2014; Murer 2015; Feischmidt and Szombati 2017; Kovarek et al. 2017; Pirro et al. 2021). Direct action organizations running parallel to Jobbik since the late 2000s have played a crucial role in the mobilisation of the public. The most well-known direct action organization was Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard), which was founded in 2007 by Gábor Vona, the party president of Jobbik, to strengthen national self-defence, self-help, and contribute to the maintenance of public order. The organization adopted black uniforms and waved the red-white Árpád flag associated with the Arrow Cross Party, the Hungarian fascist organization in the Second World War. As a paramilitary organization that was seen as a threat to Hungarian democracy, Magyar Gárda was banned in 2009.

However, the group reorganized into several smaller organizations such as Új Magyar Gárda (New Hungarian Guard), Magyar Nemzeti Gárda (Hungarian National Guard), and Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület (Civil Guard Association for a Better Hungarian Future). While these successor organizations were no longer linked directly to Jobbik, the cooperation between these groups and the party continued in the 2010s. Simultaneous, active membership in both Jobbik and a direct action organization was commonplace, which was evident at any Jobbik event “where participants sport the uniforms and other sartorial attire that denotes membership of Betyársereg, Szebb Jövőért, or Magyar Gárda” (Murer 2015, 91). Besides Magyar Gárda and its successor organizations, other far-right direct action organizations were founded starting in the 2000s, most notably Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom (HVIM;

Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement), Betyársereg, (Army of Bandits), Véderő, (Defence), and Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (Hungarian National Front).

Varga (2014) and Murer (2015) emphasise the importance of these direct action organizations for mobilising on the local level outside of party politics. Varga (2014) holds that Magyar Gárda signalled strength and Jobbik's determination to solve the country's problems, which appealed to the radical nationalist voting base. Furthermore, through Magyar Gárda, Jobbik was able to pursue its agenda on the local level without having any parliamentary representation. Magyar Gárda became notorious for holding protests against 'gypsy crime' outside of Budapest. While these protests victimised and threatened the local Roma population, they also provided a platform for local Jobbik leaders to articulate the party's agenda. Murer (2015) argues that the lack of formal ties between Jobbik and the successor organizations of Magyar Gárda allowed "the party itself to suggest that it is more moderate, without actually alienating the participants in the direct action groups" (2015, 91). In this way, Jobbik was able to appeal to both the extreme right and a wider, politically mainstream voter base, while utilising the direct action groups as an extended arm of Jobbik to pursue their political ambitions without an electoral backlash and decline of public opinion.

Pirro and Róna (2019) argue that Jobbik's movement party characteristics contributed to the party's breakthrough and electoral success. Their analysis shows that Jobbik was able to satisfy the demand for youth participation at the grassroots level. While on the supply side, Jobbik organised nationalistic music festivals and established an active internet presence, on the demand side, Jobbik's diversified presence was able to "respond to the needs of instrumentality, identity, and ideology", which resonate well with the youth who are primarily driven by a sense of belonging to join Jobbik's youth organization (2019, 620). The major investment in grassroots mobilisation is a unique trait of Jobbik. While MIÉP regularly organised

protests on national holidays in the 1990s, the party did not realise the full potential of grassroots activities as modes of political socialization and participation.

Nevertheless, grassroots level activism as a strategy of mobilisation is not exclusive to the far-right. Greskovits (2020) holds that the Civic Circles Movement significantly contributed to the enduring rule of Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party after 2010. His analysis of 4792 events between 2002 and 2006 shed light on the ability of right-wing circles to mobilise educated middle-class supporters beside less educated groups consistently, even in periods when no election was in sight. While "the spatial distribution of the events shows a centre-periphery pattern" with most events taking place in Budapest and its greater metropolitan area, the dataset highlights that these civic circle events reached beyond the capital with over a 1300 being organised in county capitals, smaller towns, and villages (2020, 252). Thus, significant far-right mobilisation on the grassroots level in the late 2000s may have been inspired by the practices of the mainstream right in the early 2000s.

Thirdly, Feischmidt and Szombati (2017) wrote about the extent to which Jobbik was able to reconfigure local social relations by exploiting local grievances through grassroots mobilisation. Using the case study of the 2011 anti-Roma events in Gyöngyöspata, their analysis shows that Jobbik established itself as an ethno-racial political agent in the village alongside the existing 'pragmatic' and 'ethno-traditionalist' local political groups through social performance (2017, 325). Exploiting the suicide of a local, Jobbik's local leader "declared that the man had committed suicide because he could not stomach the 'relocation of Gypsies into the village.'" He then promoted a new discourse by organising a mass rally against 'gypsy terror' in the village (2017, 324). Direct action groups invited by Jobbik, namely Szébb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület and Véderő, patrolled the village and observed the movement of Roma residents. Open racial discrimination and intimidation was left to the extended arm of Jobbik to avoid electoral backlash.

While Feischmidt and Szombati (2017) studied Jobbik's extra-parliamentary performance, Kovarek, et al. focuses on Jobbik-led localities, namely Ásotthalom, Devecser, Ózd, Tapolca, and Tiszavasvári, to evaluate the performance of Jobbik mayors in office. Their findings point to the role of discursive opportunities in shaping the actions of Jobbik mayors who continued to use radical discourse and enemy images to determine their political goals and implement policies despite the moderation of the party on the national level since 2013. In particular, the Roma minority still served as the main scapegoat and enemy image for local Jobbik politicians in the second half of the 2010s. Nevertheless, their analysis shows that Jobbik mayors adapted to national and international realities during the 2015 migration crisis and anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments complemented the dominant anti-Roma discourse.

Lastly, Pirro et al. (2021) evaluate the development of Jobbik's protest activity from 2009 to 2017 and find that the framing of protests corresponds to Jobbik's moderation efforts after 2013. The analysis of overall 201 coded events (147 in the 'radical' 2009-2013 period and 54 events in the 'non-radical' 2014-2017 period) shows significant variation of issues along which Jobbik mobilised. While protests are mainly framed in terms of gypsy criminality; security, order and law enforcement; and anti-Semitism in the radical period, the non-radical period is dominated by immigration as a security issue and irredentism. The type of protest events shifted over time as well. While Jobbik utilised "a variety of protest techniques ... ranging from non-violent ones ... to more disruptive acts of symbolic violence" in the first phase, protest activities were predominantly peaceful and "carried out through public assemblies and legal, non-violent demonstrations" in the second phase (2021, 26).

The above outlined literature highlights both grievances and opportunities as determinants of far-right mobilisation in Hungary. However, as the studies are either based on party politics on the national level or isolated case studies on the local level, there is no research systematically evaluating determinants of far-right mobilisation on the subnational level.

Furthermore, the existing literature mainly focuses on political and social factors, such as party performance, policymaking, and the politicization of the Roma, while ignoring the role of economic factors in influencing the far-right's ability to mobilise and attract voters. Consequently, the next chapter puts forward hypotheses that can be tested systematically on the subnational level. I set up a competitive test between theories of political, social, and economic factors as determinants of far-right resurgence.

4. HYPOTHESES

My main argument is in line with the scholarship on grievance-based explanations of far-right protest mobilisation, which holds that economic hardship is a major determinant of protest activity (Císař and Navrátil 2015; Ivaldi 2015). Quaranta (2016) associates the dissatisfaction with the state of the economy with anti-government protests. In the case of Hungary, the economy was notably underperforming in the mid-1990s during the early transition period and in the late 2000s as the global financial crisis devastated the economy. Specifically, Varga (2014) highlights the prominence of economic issues in Jobbik's political message in the latter case and suggests the far-right's heightened attention on the economy during that period. Besides, cross-temporal tendencies, spatial economic realities can influence the rate of protest mobilisation. Local economic hardship may provide fertile ground for far-right protest mobilisation. Consequently, I expect that:

- H1: There is inverse proportionality between far-right protest mobilisation and economic growth at the national level in Hungary.
- H2: There is inverse proportionality between far-right protest mobilisation and economic performance at the subnational level in Hungary.

To test for other explanations, I put forward alternative hypotheses. First, grievance-based explanations highlight immigration as a determinant of far-right protest mobilisation (Koopmans 1996; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). Kovarek et al. (2017) argue that Jobbik mayors utilised the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim public sentiments fostered by the Fidesz government during the 2015 migration crisis in Hungary. However, as suggested by the far-right mobilisation literature, the tendency to mobilise due to the increased inflow of immigrants may be generalised on the national level. Thus, I expect that:

- H3: There is direct proportionality between far-right protest mobilisation and the inflow of immigrants and asylum-seekers at the national level.

The presence of Roma minority is highlighted by both grievance-based and opportunity-based explanations in the literature as an important driver of far-right mobilisation in Hungary. Feischmidt and Szombati (2017) and Kovarek et al. (2017) identify local grievances, namely a local suicide and economic hardship, respectively, as determinants of far-right activities. Secondly, Karácsony and Róna (2010), Kovács (2013), and Murer (2015) identify the politicization of issues concerning the Roma minority as a key determinant of Jobbik's success in the late 2010s, which fits the opportunity-based explanation of Giugni et al. (2005). While it is unclear whether the presence of Roma minority is a grievance- or opportunity-based determinant of far-right mobilisation in Hungary, I expect that:

- H4: There is direct proportionality between far-right protest mobilisation and the presence of the Roma minority at the subnational level.

Opportunity-based explanations point to government configuration as a determinant of far-right mobilisation. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) argue that a grand coalition government may foster far-right protest mobilisation. Nevertheless, as there was no grand coalition government in Hungary between 1990 and 2016, this argument cannot be directly tested. Instead, drawing on Kriesi (2015), who argues that right-wing governments may act as political allies and provide institutional access for far-right parties, I expect that:

- H5: Far-right protest mobilisation is higher at the national level when the incumbent government is right-wing.

Lastly, resource-based explanations point to the importance of visibility and the occupation of public office as important determinants of successful far-right protest mobilisation. While Rone (2022) emphasises the role of publicity in far-right and mainstream media outlets in

supporting far-right protest mobilisation, measuring the level of far-right media presence is beyond the scope of this thesis. Beside visibility, the occupation of public offices is identified by Castelli Gattinara, Froio, and Pirro (2022). Indeed, public office provides additional publicity in the media and enhances the material resources (including money and infrastructure) available for the far-right to pursue its agenda and mobilise at the grassroots level. Based on these resource-based explanations, I expect that:

- H6: Far-right protest mobilisation is higher in constituencies with higher support for far-right parties at the subnational level.
- H7: There is direct proportionality between far-right protest mobilisation and the number of parliamentary seats occupied by the far-right at the national level.

This chapter has put forward four grievance-, one opportunity-, and two resource-based hypotheses to test for the main determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary outlined in the literature. While the hypotheses were separated to provide clarity, they may be blurred and tightly intertwined in reality as Varga (2014) highlights in the case of economic hardship and the presence of Roma minorities. Testing the seven hypotheses should provide a better understanding on the relative relevance of these factors.

5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To test these hypotheses, this paper utilises protest event analysis (PEA), a type of quantitative content analysis that allows for the systematic tracking of occurrences and associated features of protest events over time and space. Utilizing my compiled dataset, I conduct multiple linear regression analyses to assess cross-temporal national tendencies.

My research design aims to address the research question directly. Most of the literature is party-based and focused on voting patterns which misses the protest-based mobilisation that is vital to the success of the far right. Similar to Pirro et al. (2021), I focus on protest events to show patterns of far-right mobilisation outside of institutionalised party politics and test for determinants of mobilisation outside of the electoral arena. However, my research is different from that of Pirro et al. (2021): 1. the timeframe of my thesis is wider with accounting for 27 years from 1990 and 2016, 2. instead of exclusively focusing on Jobbik or other far-right party organizations, I incorporate non-party organizations in my thesis, and 3. in addition to the form and issue areas of recorded protest events, my thesis analyses the temporal-spatial distribution, associated organizations, and number of participants as well.

5.1 *Protest events*

My unit of analysis is the protest event. Protest events are the repertoires of contentious politics, which are defined by Tilly as the “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (2008, 5). Thus, contentious politics combine three features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics. Drawing on Tilly’s framework, this thesis defines protest events as occasions in which people gather in public and make an identifiable political claim which, if realized, would affect the interests of others.

I recorded and coded 331 far-right protest events between 1990 and 2016 in Hungary. The data were collected from articles published between January 1990 and October 2016 in *Népszabadság*, a major national newspaper in Hungary.¹ To retrieve relevant articles, a keyword search was conducted on the digitalised database of the newspaper (Arcanum Digitális Tudománytár 2024).² The query in Hungarian language consisted of several keywords covering far-right and protest vocabulary including “far-right,” “MIÉP,” “Jobbik” and “protest,” “demonstration,” “rally,” respectively.³ Results of the search were individually checked, redundant articles were removed, and located relevant articles were saved for quantitative coding and qualitative referencing.

For the codification of recorded protest events, a codebook was created to provide guidelines.⁴ Each unit (protest event) contains the following variables: (1) date of the event, (2) the location of the event, (3) the form of action, (4) the theme of the action, (5) associated organizations (6) number of participants. Thus, I code the protest for its temporal and spatial dimensions indicating the date of and settlement in which the event took place. Furthermore, my dataset differentiates between forms of action (assembly, blockade, commemoration, demonstration, and festivity) as well as themes (including social and economic issues, political issues, law and order, etc.). If available, the number of participants were coded. In addition, associated political party and non-party organizations were also registered.⁵

The coding of a total of 437 news article on 331 protest events was done using NVivo. Each protest event was assigned a case that contains all the relevant articles written on the event. To quantify the variables of the collected events, I utilised case classification in NVivo that

¹ *Népszabadság* was discontinued on 8 October 2016.

² All issues of *Népszabadság* are digitalised and available online through the database of Arcanum Digitális Tudománytár.

³ The full query is available in Hungarian and English in Appendix 1.

⁴ The codebook is available in Appendix 2.

⁵ The full dataset is available in Appendix 3.

enabled the creation of attributes. Attributes under each protest event were assigned specific values based on the information provided by the relevant news articles. This way, my quantitative dataset remained directly linked to the underlying qualitative data. This linkage enables me to analyse trends not as simple data entries but with considering their respective contexts.

While utilising a single newspaper resource is advantageous, as the archives are accessible, reliable, and consistent over the timeframe of the research, newspaper-based data has limitations due to selection bias (Ortiz et al. 2005; Hutter 2014). Hutter (2014, 350–51) highlights three sets of factors contributing to selection bias. Firstly, event characteristics affect the likelihood of an event being covered. Larger and violent events tend to be reported more frequently than small and peaceful ones. Secondly, news agency characteristics play a major role in determining whether an event is reported. The presence of a correspondent in a locality increases the chance that an event is covered. Lastly, issue characteristics influence the coverage of an event as well. A protest that reflects a more general concern or an issue within the media's attention cycle is more likely to be reported. Consequently, I do not claim that the recorded events a representative sample of all far-right protest events that took place between 1990 and 2016. Nevertheless, the newspaper-based data allows me to present general trends and associations among the coded variables of the recorded 331 protest events. Exclusively relying on my pre-defined search query ensured that only events fitting the set of criteria were found and coded between 1990 and 2016. Furthermore, using *Népszabadság*, as my single newspaper source, ensured that the bias in my dataset remains consistent over time.

5.2 Independent variables

The introduction of independent variables enables the assessment of determinants of protest mobilisation of the far-right in Hungary between 1990 and 2016. First, economic performance is captured with two lagged independent variables (t-1) from 1992 to 2015, GDP per capita

growth and unemployment. On the national level, I utilise the GDP per capita growth (annual %) variable of the World Bank (2024). GDP per capita growth is a significant indicator of economic growth. While higher numbers are associated with greater growth, more modest rates may indicate crises in the national economy which in turn generally result in increased levels of hardship. On the subnational level, I use the annual unemployment rate of the active population in regions provided by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH 2021).⁶ Regional unemployment rates provide important insight into the varying levels of hardship across Hungary. Indeed, economic inequalities are not homogenous across the country as some regions may be more vulnerable to economic crises than others. In general, Central Hungary, including Budapest, and Western Transdanubia are more prosperous and have lower rates of unemployment than the regions of Northern Hungary and Northern Great Plain.

Second, to measure the annual inflow of immigrants and asylum-seekers on the national level, I deploy two lagged independent variables ($t-1$). The annual inflow of immigrants from abroad captures all incoming voluntary or involuntary immigrants arriving to Hungary in a year. Here, I utilise the data provided by KSH (2023b) online for the period between 2000 and 2015 complemented by the overlapping data presented by Gödri (2012) to cover the decade between 1990 and 1999. Furthermore, the annual number of asylum-seekers shows the number of involuntary immigrants requesting refugee in Hungary regardless of whether their request was approved or denied. Here, data is only provided from the year 2000 by KSH (2023a).

Third, general census data from 1990, 2001, and 2011 on the ethnic composition of subnational administrative units (counties, in Hungarian: *megyék*) is used to quantify the presence of the local Roma minority (KSH 2011). Specifically, using the number of people

⁶ Here, I identify the population aged 15-64 as active population as this group covers the actively working population.

identifying as Roma and the total local population, I calculate the percentage of the local Roma population to enable the comparison of all counties regardless of their total population.

Lastly, political variables are constructed based on general election results in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Government position is a dummy variable with 0 = left-wing government and 1 = right-wing government. for each year. In addition, parliamentary seats occupied by far-right parties are expressed as a percentage of the total number of parliamentary seats for each year to enable comparison during the studied period as the new 2012 constitution reduced the total number of parliamentary seats from 386 to 199. On the subnational level, support for far-right parties is determined by looking at the percentage of votes MIÉP and/or Jobbik received on the party list in the latest general election. For example, for far-right support in a county in 2008, I take the percentage of MIÉP and Jobbik votes in the respective county from the 2006 general election. As county-level results are not available for the 2014 election, I calculated far-right support for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016 based on the results in the 106 constituencies. The general election results and statistics used for these variables are published by the National Election Office (Nemzeti Választási Iroda 2024).

The next chapter presents the analysis of the data. First, I deploy multiple linear regression analyses to test my hypotheses and provide a better understanding of the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary between 1990 and 2016. Second, utilising the 331 gathered and coded protest events, I shed light on subnational tendencies including the spatial distribution as well as the form, objective, and target of the collected far-right protest events in post-communist Hungary.

6. ANALYSIS

Utilising the dataset of 331 far-right protest events, this chapter explores patterns of far-right protest activity in Hungary between 1990 and 2016 and shed light on the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation by testing the hypotheses outlined in Section 4. The chapter is divided into two parts. First, I conduct and present the results of the multiple linear regression analyses that test my economic grievances-based argument about far-right protest mobilisation. Then, I discuss the results and alternative explanations of far-right mobilisation based on my dataset.

6.1 Results

To assess my argument on the economic grievances-based mobilisation of the far-right and to shed light on the effects of other variables, I conducted multiple linear regression analyses on my dataset. I tested for the determinants of far-right mobilisation in Hungary in three models: (1) a cross-temporal national model, (2) a subnational model including protests in Budapest, and (3) a subnational model excluding protests in Budapest. Deploying the two subnational models allows me to evaluate the effects of my independent variables further because Budapest skews the dataset as 213 out of 322 recorded events were in the capital.

Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 show the correlation and direction of trends between the number of protest events, my dependent variable, and my two lagged economic variables, namely the annual GDP growth rate and unemployment, which are my two main independent variables for the national and subnational analyses, respectively. The figures depict contradictory trends. First, looking at Figure 1, there is no linear relationship between annual GDP growth and the number of protest events. Rather than a linear trend, protest events form a cluster between 0% and 5% annual growth with outliers on both end of the axis. Similarly, the direction of the trend is unclear with both negative and positive growth rates recorded having a




Figure 1. No. of protest / GDP growth (%)




Figure 2. No. of protests / unemployment (including Budapest)




Figure 3. No. of protests / unemployment (excluding Budapest)

high numbers of protests events. Consequently, Figure 1 refutes H1 because there seems to be no linear relation between the number of protest events and annual GDP growth.

Second, there seems to be a correlation between the number of protest events and unemployment both with and without including the events in Budapest. However, the direction of the trend is ambiguous. While Figure 2 suggests that there is inverse proportionality between the number of protest events and unemployment, Figure 3 shows that there is direct proportionality between the two. With its comparatively low levels of unemployment between 1990-2016 and high rate of far-right protest mobilisation, the inclusion of Budapest in the model creates a significant bias. However, if we exclude events recorded in Budapest from the model, the trend in Figure 3 shows inverse proportionality between far-right protest mobilisation and unemployment outside Budapest, which confirms H2.

As Figure 1 suggests no linear relationship between the number of protest events and economic grievances, I conduct the multiple linear regression analysis of the two subnational models only. Table 1 contains the results of the two multiple regressions ran on the determinants of far-right protest mobilisation on the subnational level with the inclusion and exclusion of Budapest, respectively. First, Model 1 including Budapest explains 11,52 per cent of the variations in far-right protest mobilisation across Hungary, $R^2 = 0.1152$. However, the model is statistically insignificant with significance $F > .05$. Based on the results, the effect of my main

	Model 1					Model 2			
	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)		Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	6.8375	1.1366	6.016	3.69e-08 ***		1.4409	0.2787	5.171	2.29e-06 ***
Unemployment	-44.9466	15.1358	-2.970	0.00381 **		-4.7535	3.4264	-1.387	0.16994
% of Roma minority	-0.7175	28.9072	-0.025	0.98025		17.7143	6.1988	2.858	0.00568 **
% of far-right support	6.0099	5.9680	1.007	0.31659		0.4794	1.2733	0.377	0.70772

All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation.

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 1. Results of the multiple linear regression analyses
(including and excluding Budapest, respectively)

independent variable, unemployment, is statistically significant, at $p < .05$, and has a negative effect on protest mobilisation, $\beta = -44.9466$. Thus, as the discussion of Figure 2 highlighted, H2 is falsified when considering all far-right protest events across Hungary as the effect of unemployment is inverse rather than direct. In contrast to my main independent variable, neither of the control variables, namely the percentage of Roma minority and that of far-right votes on the latest general election, were statistically significant at the $p > .05$ level. Consequently, H4 and H6 are falsified as well, when considering all recorded protest events because there is no significant relationship between protest mobilisation and the percentage of Roma minority nor is there a relation between protest mobilisation and regional far-right support.

Model 2 excluding Budapest explains 9,98 per cent of variations in far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary, $R^2 = 0.09975$. However, like Model 1, this model is statistically insignificant as well. Based on the results, the effect of unemployment is statistically insignificant, and even shows a slight negative effect on protest mobilisation ($\beta = -4.7535$). Thus, Model 2 does not support H2 because the effect of unemployment is not statistically significant and shows an inverse rather than direct relationship. Focusing on the control variables, the percentage of Roma minority is statistically significant in the model, at the $p < .05$, and has a positive effect on mobilising the far-right outside Budapest. Hence, Model 2 confirms H4 outside Budapest. In contrast, the level of regional far-right support remained statistically insignificant, at the $p > .05$, and thus, does not support H6.

6.2 Discussion

As the results show, there is no statistically significant linear relation between the number of far-right protest events and objective economic grievances between 1990 and 2016 in Hungary. Moreover, as both Model 1 and Model 2 were statistically insignificant, there seems to be no relationship between the number of far-right protests and either grievances over local Roma minorities or political opportunities provided by the volume of local far-right party support. Consequently, my results suggest that objective variables accounting for grievance-based, opportunity-based, and resource-based explanations cannot provide an adequate explanation for the protest activity of the far-right in Hungary since 1990. The lack of systematic objective determinants points to an explanation of far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary based on subjective grievances and political opportunities. To uncover these underlying subjective grievances and political opportunities on which the far-right mobilised, I analyse my protest dataset below. First, I provide an overview of the temporal and spatial distributions of the far-right's protest activity. Then, I analyse the forms, themes and issues of the recorded events. Last, I consider the role of far-right organisations in protest mobilisation and shed light on the motives of the participants of these events.

6.2.1 Temporal and spatial distribution of far-right protest events in Hungary

First, the distribution of recorded far-right protest events across time and space reflects significant mobilisation on political opportunities. Figure 4 shows the cross-temporal distribution of the 331 recorded far-right protest events between January 1990 and October 2016. While the annual number of far-right protest mobilisation between 1990 and 2001 was relatively low with 2 to 10 reported events, the rate of mobilisation grew significantly in the 2000s and reached an all-time high in 2008 with 36 recorded far-right protest events. Although the rate of far-right mobilisation declined in the 2010s compared to that of the 2000s, the annual number of protests remained consistently above that of the 1990s with 10 to 21 recorded events




Figure 4. Number of far-right protest per year, 1990-2016

between 2010 and 2015. The year 2016 saw a stark decrease in the number of recorded protest events, which may indicate the beginning of a new period with negligible rate of far-right protest mobilisation. Furthermore, 2016 is also the year in which my data source, *Népszabadság*, was discontinued. Consequently, I consider the year 2016 an outlier rather than an indicator of the rate of far-right protest mobilisation in the post-2016 period.

In general, Figure 4 reflects trends outlined by the literature. First, Bohle and Greskovits (2019) hold that following the collapse of communism, the countries of Central Eastern Europe experienced ‘extraordinary politics’ whereby societies endured turbulent political developments and tolerated temporary hardship in the interest of a common good. Observing Figure 4, far-right protest activity in the 1990s seem to reflect a state of ‘extraordinary politics’ with a low number of recorded protests. Second, Figure 4 shows a heightened rate of far-right protest activity in times of economic crises, between 1994-1996 and 2006-2008/9. Thus, the far-right seems to utilise the subjective economic grievances created by periods of economic crises to mobilise. Likewise, the number of recorded protests rose from 8 in 2014 to 14 in 2015 at the time of the migration crisis, which provided an opportunity for far-right mobilisation on the fears and dangers associated with immigrants and refugees as suggested by Giugni et al. (2005).

Similarly, the spatial distribution of far-right protests corresponds with opportunities for mobilisation. Looking at the geographical location of recorded events, 322 took place in Hungary and on nine occasions, Hungarian far-right party and non-party organizations mobilised abroad. Six were recorded in neighbouring countries, specifically Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia, which have large Hungarian minorities as an outcome of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. Indeed, the far-right have actively mobilised the irredentist sentiments of the public since the 1990s, and these six protests in the neighbourhood are a direct extension of these irredentist aspirations going as far as screening a movie commemorating Trianon in Subotica, Serbia in 2005 or protesting in Bratislava, Slovakia for the protection of Hungarian minority rights in 2006. The other three occasions of far-right mobilisation abroad were recorded in France and the United Kingdom. In France, far-right groups organised trips from Hungary to Versailles in 2006 and 2010 to commemorate the Treaty of Trianon signed there in the Trianon Palace. Like the protests in the three neighbouring countries, these organised trips show how irredentism played an important role in the mobilisation efforts of the Hungarian far-right abroad.

Figure 5 shows the subnational distribution of the 322 recorded events recorded in Hungary. Budapest was the uncontested hub for far-right protest mobilisation between 1990 and 2016 with 213 out of 322 recorded events being organised there. In contrast, only 107 out of 322 events were recorded in the nineteen counties, with Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén leading with 15, the highest number of far-right protest events after Budapest. Figure 6 highlights the distribution of far-right protests across the counties. Besides Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Pest, Hajdú-Bihar, and Baranya counties were significant hubs of far-right protest mobilisation with 10 or more recorded events. On the other hand, Bács-Kiskun, Tolna, Vas, and Somogy counties had close to no reported far-right protest events.



Figure 5. Distribution of far-right protest events (including Budapest), 1990-2016




Figure 6. Distribution of far-right protest events (excluding Budapest), 1990-2016

The subnational distribution of recorded far-right protests is highly uneven with a centre-periphery pattern like that of Civic Circles Movement events studied by Greskovits (2020). With almost 2 million inhabitants, Budapest was an ideal location for not only major protests events but celebrations and commemorations of the far-right as well. Beyond Budapest, eastern Hungary shows a heightened level of far-right protest activity. Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Hajdú-Bihar, Heves, and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg experienced a large number of far-right protest events. As these counties are economically less prosperous regions with sizable local Roma minorities, theories of far-right mobilisation suggest an explanation based on economic grievances and the scapegoating the disadvantaged Roma minority. Thus, while my regression analysis evaluating the relationship between the number of protest events and grievance-based factors was statistically insignificant when considering Hungary as a whole, a large number of protest events were in counties with considerable grievances over the real economy and over local Roma minorities. Furthermore, the far-right was remarkably active in Baranya. Unlike in the eastern counties, far-right protest activity may be connected to the proximity of the non-Schengen border with Serbia and perceived threats about immigration. Indeed, 3 out of 10 protest events were recorded in the county in 2015, a considerable spike compared to previous years. This highlights the far-right's ability to mobilise along emerging political developments.

Nevertheless, the temporal and geographical distribution of protests cannot shed light on all political opportunity structures. The intensity of recorded far-right protest activities in Győr-Moson-Sopron, Pest, and Nógrád is contrary to expectations. Despite the former two counties economic prosperity and the lack of non-Schengen borders, the rate of far-right mobilisation was significant. In contrast, Nógrád, which is often grouped with the economically least prosperous Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Heves, had only three recorded far-right protests. Below, I analyse the forms and themes of the recorded events to show patterns of far-right mobilisation in Hungary to zoom in on the effects of subjective grievances and political opportunities across Hungary which determined protest activity.

6.2.2 Forms of far-right protest mobilisation

Far-right protest activity took on different forms between 1990 and 2016. Figure 7 classifies the recorded events according to five broad categories. Demonstration and assembly were the dominant forms of action with 183 and 74 recorded occasions, respectively. Demonstrations not only included events tied to a specific location, such as a square or street, but also included marches that primarily took place in Budapest and often included multiple stops around city. For example, the demonstration organised by HVIM in June 2002 against the Treaty of Trianon started at Hősök tere (Heroes' Square) and passed the embassies of France, Serbia (then Yugoslavia), Romania, and Slovakia, which are scattered around Budapest. While demonstrations were organised by both far-right party and non-party organisation, assemblies were mainly utilised by the former, with MIÉP and Jobbik associated 20 and 33 out of the 74 assemblies, respectively.

With a total of 65 recorded commemorations and festivities, far-right groups regularly organised celebrations and commemorations. Besides national days, two other occasions provided the far-right with the opportunity to mobilise regularly. First, there is the infamous Becsület napja (Day of Honour) in February, which commemorates the breakout attempt of




Figure 7. Forms of far-right protest events, 1990-2016

surrounded Nazi troops from Buda Castle in 1945. This annual event was almost exclusively organised by far-right non-party groups and attracted neo-Nazis not only from Hungary but abroad as well, mainly from Germany. Despite facing anti-Fascist counter-protests regularly since the 2000s, *Becsület napja* continued to take place between 1990 and 2016. Second, *Magyar Sziget* (Hungarian Island) is an annual political and cultural festival organised by HVIM in Kismaros, which invites Hungarian youth with nationalistic sentiments from both from Hungary and across the world. The festival fosters irredentist sentiments through various channels ranging from the display of historic maps of the Kingdom of Hungary to chanting “*Vesszen Trianon!*” (“Down with Trianon!”). However, despite the festival being organised annually, my query only showed records of the event from 2002, 2005, and 2007. This may be due to the lack of articles on the festival in other years, but it is more likely that *Népszabadság* did not use the far-right vocabulary in my query to describe the event in other instance, which points to the fluctuating level of radicalism on *Magyar Sziget*.

Finally, there were nine road blockades recorded, which were outcomes of far-right mobilisation. Notably, five out of nine blockades were organised simultaneously in November 2008 by Jobbik and Magyar Gárda, targeting border crossings between Slovakia and Hungary in retaliation for police brutality against Hungarian fans at a football match in Slovakia, and in

general, for the Slovakian government's anti-Hungarian policies. These five blockades shed light on the far-right's ability to mobilise and exploit outside events even in counties with no significant previous far-right protest activity, like Győr-Moson-Sopron, Komárom-Esztergom, and Nógrád. Having identified the forms of far-right protest activity, the following section looks at the dominant themes and issues along which the far-right mobilised in Hungary.

6.2.3 Themes and issues of far-right protest mobilisation

The far-right in Hungary mobilised upon an extensive number of issues between 1990-2016, from joining the agrarian protests and advocating for national ownership of land in 1997 to organising anti-government protests following the Ószöd speech in 2006. While Figure 8 shows the recorded events grouped into six dominant themes, Figure 9 provides insight into the distribution of issues areas across the protests.

The rate of far-right protest mobilisation was the highest along domestic political themes with 96 recorded events. Specifically, anti-government protests dominate the theme with 36 recorded occasions followed by protests against Left-Liberal parties and the entire political system with 17 and 12 recorded events, respectively. Mobilising anti-government sentiments was heavily utilised by the far-right after the 2006 Ószöd speech by PM Gyurcsány with 23 out of the 36 recorded protests taking place between 2006 and 2009. Similarly, while there were some protests against the Left-Liberal parties before 2006, their frequency increased along with that of anti-government protests. Looking at the associate organizations, anti-government sentiments after 2006 were primarily exploited by non-party groups such as HVIM, Magyarok Világszövetsége (World Association of Hungarians), or Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom (Hungarian Self-defence Movement) and party organizations, particularly Jobbik, mobilised with a focus on the governing Left-Liberal parties with the objective of discrediting the party alliance as a whole.




Figure 8. Themes of far-right protest events, 1990-2016




Figure 9. Issue areas of far-right protest events within themes, 1990-2016

Besides domestic political themes, there were other main themes upon which the far-right mobilised: 1. celebrations and commemorations, 2. minorities, and 3. far-right themes with a total of 58, 51, and 50 recorded protests, respectively. First, among the minorities, the far-right mobilised most along the politicization of the Roma with 32 events. Already in the 1990s, there were two reported demonstrations in Heves which mobilised local skinheads against the Roma. However, the issue was politicised and exploited only starting in 2007 by Jobbik and Magyar Gárda, which scapegoated and mobilised against the Roma minority for years with the last

recorded instance in 2013. These Jobbik protests were almost exclusively held outside Budapest in settlements with significant Roma minorities, such as Devecser in Veszprém or Olaszliszka in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, with the participation of direct action groups linked to the party. Moreover, there were a number of far-right protest which were fuelled by anti-Semitism and anti-LGBTQ sentiments. While the former shows no clear pattern as non-party and party organisations mobilised on antisemitism throughout the period, the latter was almost exclusively utilised by Jobbik from 2006 with annual protests in June-July during the Budapest Pride.

Focusing on the cross-temporal distribution of protest themes, Figure 10 shows that domestic political themes and celebrations/commemorations provided plenty of opportunities for far-right mobilisation across the 27-year period. The rate of mobilisation on minority themes, particularly the Roma, increased significantly between 2006 and 2013 when Jobbik politicised the issue and utilised subjective grievances against the Roma minority. However, the number of recorded events against the Roma sharply decreased after 2013, which coincides with Jobbik's moderation. Instead of minority issues, the far-right mainly mobilised on policy themes in 2014 before the outbreak of the migration crisis in 2015 created a better opportunity for mobilisation.

Lastly, a careful examination of the 50 protests with far-right themes reveals drifts between the two major far-right parties in post-communist Hungary. In the 1990s and early 2000s, nationalism and irredentism were defining characteristics of the far-right, and MIÉP mobilised on them. While Jobbik rallied along these issues as well, their focus shifted to events related to Magyar Gárda, the direct action group of the party. From 2007, Jobbik was active in organising recruitment events, initiation ceremonies, and assemblies for Magyar Gárda. After the ban of the organisation in 2009, the party organised protests against the court decision and later




Figure 10. Cross-temporal distribution of far-right protest themes, 1990-2016 commemorated the group which harassed and intimidated the Roma minority across the country with an annual event.

The far-right mobilised along international themes and policy spheres to a lesser extent with only 33 and 27 recorded protests, respectively. The former theme was dominated by the issues of Hungarians abroad and immigration. Atrocities against Hungarian minorities and their rights in the neighbouring countries were politicised and used for mobilisation from the early 2000s by Jobbik and HVIM exclusively. Besides the road blockades discussed above, both groups organised protests in front of the Slovakian and Romanian embassies in Budapest and HVIM was even associated with two protests in Bratislava and Komárno, Slovakia. In contrast, the issue of immigration was almost exclusively utilised by Jobbik during the 2015 migration crisis.

Then, looking at policy spheres, protests against foreign ownership and for welfare stand out, with 10 and 9 events, respectively. The issue of foreign ownership was in the focus of the far-right, particularly MIÉP, in the 1990s. With the privatisation efforts of the Hungarian

governments, MIÉP swiftly mobilised and advocated for national ownership of land and production sites over that of foreign investors entering the country. However, the focus of the far-right shifted from ownership to welfare in the policy sphere during the 2000s with Jobbik protesting against the legalisation of marijuana and for child protection under the umbrella of welfare. The shift from ownership to welfare suggests that the former lost salience in the 2000s. As Hungary joined the European Union and cross-border economic ties solidified, the far-right likely lost the ability to mobilise along the issue and shifted to mobilising along traditional values in welfare.

6.2.4 Far-right organizations mobilising

This subsection looks at the far-right groups which organised and mobilised on these protests. 313 out of 331 events were associated with various far-right organisations. Overall, my dataset recorded 39 far-right party and non-party groups that mobilised with protest activity between 1990 and 2016. Most of these organizations mobilised alone, with only 107 protests associated with multiple groups. Figure 11 highlights the most prominent of these far-right organisations and the number of protests associated with them.

Comparing party and non-party organizations, the former group stands out with Jobbik and MIÉP being involved in protest activity on 207 events together. Jobbik was associated with 145 protest events from its foundation in the early 2000s to 2016, more than two times as many as MIÉP. Thus, my data shows that the rate of Jobbik's protest activity corresponds with its movement party nature outlined by Pirro and Róna (2019), even compared with other far-right organisations in Hungary. Indeed, Jobbik heavily mobilised on a range of issues over time across Hungary, including the politicisation of Roma, the governing Left-Liberal parties in the 2000s, and immigration in 2015. In contrast, MIÉP utilised protest activity to mobilise only to a limited extent and almost exclusively in Budapest. Particularly in the 1990s, the party mainly mobilised and organised events on the two national days, March 15 and October 23, each year




Figure 11. Organizations on far-right protest events, 1990-2016

with a focus on conventional far-right issues, such as antisemitism, anti-government sentiments, and irredentism. Thus, rather than mobilising across Hungary to attract various social groups, MIÉP concentrated its efforts in Budapest and addressed the nationalistic, educated urban middle class.

While the far-right has been centred around Jobbik and MIÉP in party politics, my analysis sheds light on the numerous non-party organisations of the far-right. Unlike the political parties, far-right non-party organisations were associated with only a few events each, except for HVIM, Magyar Gárda and its two successor organizations, Új Magyar Gárda and Magyar Nemzeti Gárda. The lack of events connected to other organisations may be explained in two ways. First, because of their relatively small size, their lack of ability to attract an audience or short-lived nature, these groups may be rendered insignificant in the 27-year period covered by this paper. Second, events may not be recorded due to the limits of protest event analysis highlighted in Section 4. Specifically, due to the lack of media attention or limits of my source, *Népszabadság*, some events were possibly not reported in the first place.

6.1.5 Number of participants on far-right protest events

This subsection analyses the number of participants on far-right protests. The number of participants is the least reliable variable in my dataset because they are based on estimates of the journalist writing the article without being cross-referenced with other sources and were not specified in 129 out of 331 protest events. Figure 12 shows the number of participants categorised into five groups. Based on the available data, far-right protests were mainly small-scale events with the bulk of them (138 out of 202) having under 500 participants. Nevertheless, data show that the far-right was able to mobilise thousands of peoples on occasion.

While the location of the protest does matter as events with over a thousand participants almost exclusively took place in Budapest, Figure 13 shows that the number of participants varied based on the theme of protests as well. Protests against minorities generally mobilised only a few hundred people. Indeed, the actions of Jobbik and Magyar Gárda against the Roma were generally organised in smaller settlements and involved far-right protestors from across Hungary rather than the locality itself. Similarly, far-right themes only attracted a couple hundred committed far-right participants. Furthermore, while protests organised along international themes only attracted a limited amount of people, the far-right was able to mobilise most successfully along domestic political themes throughout the period. 18 out of 47 with over thousand participants were organised along domestic political themes. Notably, Jobbik and Magyar Gárda were able to attract over thousand participants on occasions with mobilising against the Roma minority. Furthermore, far-right protests over policy, specifically the ownership of land, were able to mobilise thousands of people in the late 1990s as well. Hence, the number of participants show that the far-right was able to mobilise most successfully on occasions when it exploited occurring political opportunities.




Figure 12. Number of participants on far-right protests, 1990-2016




Figure 13. Number of participants and themes of far-right protest events, 1990-2016

7. CONCLUSION

To understand the resurgence of far-right across contemporary Europe, the scholarship has primarily focused on party politics to differentiate between grievance-, opportunity-, and resource-based explanations for the rise of the far-right (Koopmans 1996; Giugni et al. 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Kitschelt 2006; Kriesi 2015). While party politics play an important role in far-right mobilisation, the far-right mobilised significantly on the grassroots level as well. Beside non-party organizations, far-right movement parties, such as CasaPound and Jobbik, have actively mobilised on the grassroots level (Pirro and Gattinara 2018). This thesis focused on far-right protest events in Hungary due to the significance of this case.

The case of Hungary was selected because of the continuous activity of the far-right within the country throughout the period and because Hungary is identified as an outlier in explaining the driver of far-right support and mobilisation in Eastern Europe by Bustikova (2020). To compile a dataset of far-right protest events in Hungary between 1990 and 2016, I used the method of protest event analysis and I utilised *Népszabadság* as my newspaper source and coded all captured events according to their respective date, location, form, issue area, and associate organisation(s) and number of participants when applicable. Being aware of the selection bias associated with the use of a single newspaper source, the dataset enabled me to present general trends and associations among the coded variables of the recorded 331 protest events.

My argument on economic grievances being systematic determinants of far-right protest mobilisation was partially rejected at both the national and subnational levels because the non-linear relationship between the number of protests and objective economic factors, namely GDP growth and unemployment. Furthermore, neither objective grievances over the Roma minority nor opportunities and resources associated with higher rates of far-right support were found to

be reliable, systematic determinants of far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary. Instead, my analysis suggests that the far-right mobilised contingently on subjective grievances and political opportunities throughout the period which is reflected in the date, location, and issues of the recorded events.

Both far-right party and non-party organisations mobilised on the opportunities provided by national days and significant anniversaries of the far-right, such as *Becsület napja* (Day of Honour) in February or the foundation of Magyar Gárda in August. Far-right actors consistently exploited domestic political developments as well, most notably the 2006 Ószöd speech. With the politicization of the Roma in the late 2000s, the far-right created an opportunity for itself to rally outside Budapest in areas with significant Roma minority. However, as my analysis highlights, the far-right showed great flexibility and was quick to mobilise on a wide range of issues across Hungary, including immigration in the southwestern county of Barany or Hungarians abroad in Győr-Moson-Sopron along the border with Slovakia. Thus, rather than concentrating on a specific area or set of issues, the far-right in Hungary seemingly mobilised on subjective grievances and arising political opportunities.

What is revealed by the analysis of far-right protest mobilisation in Hungary is that the far-right exploits a wide range of subjective grievances and political opportunities to mobilise. While the scholarship focusing on party politics highlights the collapse of status quo in domestic politics (Becker 2010), the politicization of Roma (Karácsony and Róna 2010; Kovács 2013; Murer 2015), and Jobbik's economic policy (Varga 2014) as determinants of successful far-right mobilisation, protest event data suggest that the far-right mobilised on region-specific issues. My findings shows that systematic, objective variables are unable to account for the rate of far-right mobilisation. Instead, to understand the determinants and success of far-right mobilisation, it is necessary to open the black box of the state and account for the various subnational variables along which the far-right mobilises.

APPENDIX A. SEARCH QUERY

In Hungarian:

TEXT_EXACT=(szélsőjobb OR "Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom" OR jobbik OR "magyar gárda" OR miép OR skinhead OR skinheadok OR bőrfejű OR kopasz OR neo-náci OR neonáci OR hungarista OR hungaristák OR "világnemzeti és népuralmista párt" OR "magyar érdek párt" OR "magyarok nemzeti szövetsége" OR "magyar nemzeti front" OR "keresztény nemzeti unió" or "magyar út körök mozgalom") TEXT=(tüntetés OR felvonulás OR menet OR gyűlés OR találkozó OR demonstráció) DATE=(1990-01-01--2016-12-31)

In English:

The query consists of two parts and was restricted to results between 1.01.1990 and 31.12.2016.

First, the query includes both general and Hungary-specific far-right vocabulary, namely “far-right”, two spellings of “neo-Nazi”, the singular and plural of “Hungarist”, varieties of “skinhead”, and the most prominent far-right organisations in the period.

Second, the query looked for phrases indicating a protest event, namely “protest”, “march”, “rally”, “assembly”, “meeting”, and “demonstration”.

APPENDIX B. CODEBOOK

Date = date of the protest event.

Location = name of the municipality in which the protest event took place.

Form of action = type of the protest event.

- 1: Assembly
- 2: Blockade
- 3: Commemoration
- 4: Demonstration
- 5: Festivity

Issue area = issue area along which the protest event was organized/laid demands

Celebration and Commemoration

- 1: Celebration
- 2: Commemoration

Domestic themes:

- 1: Corruption
- 2: Election (Indicating dissatisfaction with the conduct or results of general elections.)
- 3: Government (Indicating the desire to replace the government.)
- 4: Local issues
- 5: Media
- 6: Left-Liberal parties (Referring to MSZP and SZDSZ, respectively.)
- 7: Political system (Indicating the desire to radically change the political system.)

Far-right themes:

- 1: Irredentism
- 2: Magyar Gárda
- 3: Nationalism

International themes:

- 1: EU
- 2: Foreign policy
- 3: Hungarians abroad
- 4: Immigration

Minorities:

- 1: Anti-LGBTQ
- 2: Anti-Semitism
- 3: Roma

Policy spheres:

- 1: Education
- 2: Law and order
- 3: Foreign ownership (Indicating dissatisfaction with land ownership, privatization.)

- 4: Security
- 5: Welfare

Associated organizations = name of far-right political and civil organizations associated with the protest event. (Maximum 2 organizations per protest event was recorded.)

No. of participants = number of participants if information was available.

- 1: 1-100 participants
- 2: 101-500 participants
- 3: 501-1000 participants
- 4: 1001-5000 participants
- 5: 5000+ participants

APPENDIX C. FAR-RIGHT PROTEST DATASET, 1990-2016

No.	Date	Location	Form of action	Issue area	Associate Organization 1	Associate Organization 2	No. of participants
1.	1990.02.16	Budapest	Demonstration	Election	Keresztény Nemzeti Unió		Not Applicable
2.	1990.06.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Irredentism	Keresztény Nemzeti Unió	Trianon Fórum	Not Applicable
3.	1990.07.02	Mátészalka	Assembly	Commemoration	Keresztény Nemzeti Unió		1-100
4.	1990.09.19	Eger	Demonstration	Security	Not Applicable		101-500
5.	1990.10.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Keresztény Nemzeti Unió		101-500
6.	1990.10.31	Budapest	Demonstration	Media	Keresztény Nemzeti Unió	Magyarok Nemzeti Szövetsége	1-100
7.	1991.05.01	Budapest	Assembly	Not Applicable	Keresztény Nemzeti Unió		1-100
8.	1991.10.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyarok Nemzeti Szövetsége		101-500
9.	1992.09.19	Budapest	Demonstration	Media	Magyar Út Mozgalom		5000+
10.	1992.10.03	Eger	Demonstration	Roma	Not Applicable		1-100
11.	1992.10.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Not Applicable	Not Applicable		101-500
12.	1992.11.28	Tatabánya	Assembly	Not Applicable	Not Applicable		101-500
13.	1992.08.01	Budapest	Demonstration	Immigration	Not Applicable		Not Applicable

14.	1993.07.11	Eger	Demonstration	Roma	Not Applicable		1-100
15.	1993.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	MIÉP	Magyar Út Körök Mozgalom	1001-5000
16.	1994.03.05	Pécs	Assembly	Media	MIÉP		101-500
17.	1994.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Political regime	Magyar Érdék Pártja		101-500
18.	1994.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	Media	MIÉP		1001-5000
19.	1994.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Celebration	VNP		1-100
20.	1994.05.01	Budapest	Festivity	Political regime	MIÉP		Not Applicable
21.	1994.05.01	Eger	Assembly	Immigration	Not Applicable		101-500
22.	1995.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Nationalism	Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség		Not Applicable
23.	1995.03.15	Budapest	Commemoration	Media	MIÉP	Magyar Út Körök Mozgalom	5000+
24.	1995.04.01	Debrecen	Demonstration	Nationalism	Not Applicable		1-100
25.	1995.10.22	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	MIÉP		5000+
26.	1995.10.22	Szombathely	Commemoration	Commemoration	MIÉP		Not Applicable
27.	1995.10.23	Pécs	Demonstration	Government change	MIÉP		Not Applicable
28.	1995.11.12	Székesfehérvár	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	Not Applicable		1-100
29.	1996.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	MIÉP		5000+
30.	1996.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség		101-500
31.	1996.05.18	Budapest	Demonstration	Welfare	MIÉP		Not Applicable
32.	1996.06.28	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	MIÉP		101-500
33.	1996.08.24	Hajdúdorog	Assembly	Media	MIÉP		Not Applicable

34.	1996.09.16	Pécs	Demonstration	Foreign Policy	MIÉP		101-500
35.	1996.10.01	Budapest	Demonstration	Education	MIÉP		1001-5000
36.	1996.10.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség		101-500
37.	1996.10.27	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	MIÉP		5000+
38.	1997.02.24	Not Applicable	Demonstration	National ownership of land	MIÉP		1001-5000
39.	1997.02.27	Budapest	Assembly	National ownership of land	MIÉP		1001-5000
40.	1997.03.10	Not Applicable	Demonstration	National ownership of land	MIÉP		1001-5000
41.	1997.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Welfare	MIÉP		5000+
42.	1997.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Not Applicable	Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség		101-500
43.	1997.04.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	MIÉP	Magyar Út Körök Mozgalom	1001-5000
44.	1997.04.06	Hajdúszoboszló	Assembly	Nationalism	MIÉP		Not Applicable
45.	1997.06.27	Budapest	Demonstration	National ownership of land	MIÉP		1001-5000
46.	1998.02.14	Budapest	Demonstration	Commemoration	Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal		501-1000
47.	1998.10.20	Esztergom	Assembly	Election campaign	MIÉP		Not Applicable
48.	1999.02.13	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal		101-500
49.	1999.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Nationalism	MIÉP		5000+

50.	1999.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Anti-Semitism	Magyar Népjóléti Szövetség	1-100
51.	1999.06.04	Budapest	Commemoration	Irredentism	MIÉP	Not Applicable
52.	1999.08.20	Budapest	Assembly	Irredentism	MIÉP	Not Applicable
53.	1999.09.29	Budapest	Demonstration	Irredentism	MIÉP	1-100
54.	1999.10.23	Budapest	Assembly	National ownership of land	MIÉP	Not Applicable
55.	1999.10.26	Mosonmagyaróvár	Assembly	Not Applicable	MIÉP	Not Applicable
56.	1999.10.23	Mosonmagyaróvár	Commemoration	Commemoration	Magyar Nemzeti Szabadság	Not Applicable
57.	1999.11.25	Budapest	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	MIÉP	Not Applicable
58.	2000.01.30	Budapest	Assembly	Local	Not Applicable	1-100
59.	2000.02.12	Budapest	Demonstration	Celebration	MIÉP	Not Applicable
60.	2000.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Celebration	MIÉP	Not Applicable
61.	2000.04.28	Budapest	Demonstration	Immigration	MIÉP	Trianon Társaság 101-500
62.	2000.08.20	Budapest	Festivity	Celebration	MIÉP	Not Applicable
63.	2000.10.23	Budapest	Festivity	Commemoration	MIÉP	Not Applicable
64.	2001.02.13	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Magyar Nemzeti Szabadság	1-100
65.	2001.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	National ownership of land	MIÉP	Not Applicable
66.	2001.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Law and order	MIÉP	Not Applicable
67.	2001.11.09	Páty	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	MIÉP	1-100
68.	2001.11.10	Budapest	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	HVIM	Not Applicable
69.	2001.12.13	Törökbálint	Demonstration	Local	MIÉP	Not Applicable
70.	2002.02.21	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik	KÉSZ 1001-5000

71.	2002.02.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	HVIM		Not Applicable
72.	2002.02.24	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	MIÉP		1001-5000
73.	2002.03.06	Budapest	Assembly	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik	KÉSZ	Not Applicable
74.	2002.03.14	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik	KÉSZ	Not Applicable
75.	2002.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Celebration	MIÉP		Not Applicable
76.	2002.05.05	Budapest	Demonstration	Election	MIÉP		Not Applicable
77.	2002.06.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Irredentism	HVIM		501-1000
78.	2002.06.04	Budapest	Commemoration	Irredentism	MIÉP		Not Applicable
79.	2002.07.04	Budapest	Blockade	Election	MIÉP		101-500
80.	2002.07.18	Budapest	Assembly	Election	MIÉP	Magyar Út Körök Mozgalom	Not Applicable
81.	2002.08.12	Budapest	Demonstration	Media	Jobbik		Not Applicable
82.	2002.08.14	Kismaros	Festivity	Celebration	HVIM		1001-5000
83.	2002.12.01	Budapest	Demonstration	Foreign Policy	HVIM		1-100
84.	2002.12.21	Budapest	Assembly	Not Applicable	Blood and Honour		101-500
85.	2003.02.14	Budapest	Demonstration	Not Applicable	MIÉP		Not Applicable
86.	2003.02.16	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Blood and Honour		101-500
87.	2003.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	EU	MIÉP		Not Applicable
88.	2003.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	EU	Jobbik		1001-5000
89.	2003.04.05	Budapest	Assembly	EU	Magyar Út Körök Mozgalom		Not Applicable
90.	2003.05.10	Komárno, SK	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	HVIM	Magyar Föderalista Párt	101-500
91.	2003.06.04	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	HVIM		Not Applicable

						Magyar Út Körök	
92.	2003.06.04	Budapest	Assembly	Commemoration	MIÉP	Mozgalom	Not Applicable
93.	2003.07.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	HVIM	Lelkiismeret '88	101-500
94.	2003.07.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Political regime	Jobbik	Trianon Társaság	1001-5000
95.	2003.10.11	Budapest	Demonstration	Media	Jobbik	Honfoglalás 2000	101-500
96.	2003.10.18	Söjtör	Demonstration	Government change	MIÉP		Not Applicable
97.	2003.10.23	Budapest	Assembly	Commemoration	MIÉP		Not Applicable
98.	2003.11.08	Budapest	Demonstration	Media	Jobbik	Honfoglalás 2000	1001-5000
99.	2003.11.22	Piliscsaba	Demonstration	Nationalism	Magyar Nemzeti Front		1-100
100.	2003.12.27	Budapest	Demonstration	Not Applicable	Blood and Honour	Lelkiismeret '88	101-500
101.	2004.01.06	Budapest	Demonstration	Media	Honfoglalás 2000	Magyarok Világszövetsége	Not Applicable
102.	2004.03.14	Budapest	Demonstration	Political regime	Pajzs Szövetség		Not Applicable
103.	2004.03.15	Budapest	Commemoration	Nationalism	MIÉP		Not Applicable
104.	2004.04.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Jobbik	HVIM	101-500
105.	2004.04.28	Szolnok	Demonstration	Local	Jobbik		1-100
106.	2004.07.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	HVIM	Lelkiismeret '88	101-500
107.	2004.09.08	Sopron	Assembly	Celebration	Magyar Jövő Csoport		1-100
108.	2004.09.18	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Not Applicable		101-500
109.	2004.10.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	MIÉP		5000+
110.	2004.10.29	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Jobbik		101-500
111.	2004.12.10	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Lelkiismeret '88		1-100

112.	2005.01.14	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	MIÉP		1-100
113.	2005.02.08	Subotica, RS	Assembly	Irredentism	HVIM		Not Applicable
114.	2005.04.16	Budapest	Demonstration	Foreign Policy	Blood and Honour	Lelkiismeret '88	1-100
115.	2005.05.01	Budapest	Festivity	Celebration	Jobbik	Magyar Nemzeti Front	Not Applicable
116.	2005.05.25	Budapest	Blockade	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		Not Applicable
117.	2005.05.29	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik	HVIM	101-500
118.	2005.08.05	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyar Nemzeti Front		Not Applicable
119.	2005.08.05	Kismaros	Festivity	Celebration	HVIM		Not Applicable
120.	2005.08.20	Budapest	Festivity	Celebration	MIÉP		Not Applicable
121.	2005.10.15	Harka	Festivity	Not Applicable	Not Applicable		101-500
122.	2005.10.15	Subotica, RS	Demonstration	Law and order	HVIM		101-500
123.	2005.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	MIÉP	Jobbik	1001-5000
124.	2005.10.28	Budapest	Demonstration	Welfare	Jobbik		Not Applicable
125.	2006.01.27	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		Not Applicable
126.	2006.03.08	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		Not Applicable
127.	2006.03.11	Mohács	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	MIÉP		Not Applicable
128.	2006.04.06	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Jobbik		101-500
129.	2006.05.01	Budapest	Festivity	Celebration	Jobbik		Not Applicable
130.	2006.05.01	Budapest	Festivity	Not Applicable	MIÉP		Not Applicable
131.	2006.06.04	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik	Magyarok Világszövetsége	Not Applicable
132.	2006.06.04	Budapest	Assembly	Not Applicable	MIÉP		Not Applicable
133.	2006.06.04	Paris, FR	Commemoration	Commemoration	HVIM		101-500
134.	2006.06.24	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-LGBTQ	Jobbik		1-100
135.	2006.06.24	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-LGBTQ	Not Applicable		1-100

136.	2006.07.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Jobbik		101-500
137.	2006.08.30	Budapest	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	Jobbik		101-500
138.	2006.09.02	Budapest	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	HVIM		101-500
139.	2006.09.16	Bratislava, SK	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	HVIM		1-100
140.	2006.09.20	Budapest	Demonstration	Political regime	Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság 2006		Not Applicable
141.	2006.09.22	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	HVIM		Not Applicable
142.	2006.09.22	Budapest	Assembly	Political regime	MIÉP		101-500
143.	2006.09.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	HVIM		5000+
144.	2006.09.25	Szeged	Demonstration	Government change	HVIM		Not Applicable
145.	2006.10.16	Budapest	Demonstration	Not Applicable	Jobbik		Not Applicable
146.	2006.10.28	Budapest	Assembly	Political regime	HVIM	Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság 2006	501-1000
147.	2006.10.28	Olaszliszka	Demonstration	Law and order	Jobbik		101-500
148.	2006.11.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyarok Világszövetsége	Ifjú Magyarok Egyesülete	101-500
149.	2006.12.03	Budapest	Assembly	Not Applicable	Jobbik		Not Applicable
150.	2006.12.05	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	HVIM	Magyarok Világszövetsége	101-500
151.	2007.02.02	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Jobbik		101-500
152.	2007.02.09	Szőreg	Demonstration	Government change	Jobbik	HVIM	1-100
153.	2007.02.10	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Not Applicable		501-1000
154.	2007.02.11	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik		1001-5000
155.	2007.02.01	2/A főútvonal	Blockade	Government change	Magyar Nemzeti Front		Not Applicable
156.	2007.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Not Applicable		101-500
157.	2007.03.15	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik		Not Applicable

158.	2007.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	MIÉP		Not Applicable
159.	2007.04.21	Budapest	Demonstration	Political regime	HVIM		101-500
160.	2007.05.09	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Jobbik		1-100
161.	2007.05.12	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		1-100
162.	2007.05.12	Debrecen	Demonstration	Welfare	Jobbik		1-100
163.	2007.05.12	Szeged	Demonstration	Welfare	Jobbik		Not Applicable
164.	2007.07.07	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-LGBTQ	Jobbik		101-500
165.	2007.07.14	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		Not Applicable
166.	2007.07.25	Tuzsér	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		Not Applicable
167.	2007.08.25	Budapest	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	101-500
168.	2007.08.01	Kismaros	Festivity	Celebration	HVIM		1001-5000
169.	2007.09.15	Salgótarján	Assembly	Government change	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	1-100
170.	2007.09.15	Tiszafüred	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	1-100
171.	2007.09.16	Miskolc	Assembly	Not Applicable	Magyar Gárda		1-100
172.	2007.09.17	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság 2006	Rendszerváltó Fórum	101-500
173.	2007.09.17	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyar Nemzeti Mozgalom		101-500
174.	2007.09.17	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Not Applicable		1001-5000
175.	2007.10.21	Budapest	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	1001-5000
176.	2007.10.27	Szarvas	Demonstration	Local	Jobbik		Not Applicable
177.	2007.12.09	Tatárszentgyörgy	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	101-500
178.	2007.12.15	Érpatás	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	1-100
179.	2007.12.15	Kerepeš	Demonstration	Security	Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
180.	2008.01.18	Budapest	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda		1-100
181.	2008.02.22	Varsány	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Jobbik	Not Applicable
182.	2008.03.12	Budapest	Demonstration	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Gárda		1-100

183.	2008.03.15	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
184.	2008.04.11	Budapest	Demonstration	Local	Magyar Gárda		501-1000
185.	2008.04.12	Nyírkáta	Demonstration	Government change	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
186.	2008.04.24	Budapest	Demonstration	Local	Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
187.	2008.04.27	Vásárosnamény	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	1001-5000
188.	2008.06.04	Esztergom	Commemoration	Commemoration	HVIM	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
189.	2008.06.06	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	HVIM		1001-5000
190.	2008.06.08	Nyíregyháza	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
191.	2008.06.13	Pátka	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda		101-500
192.	2008.06.21	Fadd	Festivity	Roma	Magyar Gárda		101-500
193.	2008.07.20	Szikszo	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
194.	2008.07.24	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Magyar Gárda	HVIM	1001-5000
195.	2008.08.02	Jászapáti	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
196.	2008.08.10	Barcs	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
197.	2008.08.20	Budapest	Festivity	Celebration	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	101-500
198.	2008.09.06	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom		Not Applicable
199.	2008.09.17	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság 2006	Rendszerváltó Fórum	101-500
200.	2008.09.20	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Jobbik	HVIM	1001-5000
201.	2008.10.17	Kiskunhalas	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda		1-100
202.	2008.10.18	Olaszliszka	Commemoration	Commemoration	Magyar Gárda	Nemzeti Őrsereg	101-500
203.	2008.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	HVIM		101-500
204.	2008.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik		Not Applicable
205.	2008.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	MIÉP		Not Applicable

206.	2008.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Rendszerváltó Fórum		1-100
207.	2008.10.23	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom		101-500
208.	2008.11.08	Komárom	Blockade	Hungarians abroad	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
209.	2008.11.08	Letskés	Blockade	Hungarians abroad	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
210.	2008.11.08	Rajka	Blockade	Hungarians abroad	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	1-100
211.	2008.11.08	Salgótarján	Blockade	Hungarians abroad	Jobbik	HVIM	Not Applicable
212.	2008.11.08	Vámosszabadi	Blockade	Hungarians abroad	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	1-100
213.	2008.11.20	Békéscsaba	Demonstration	Government change	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
214.	2008.11.28	Kiskunlacháza	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda		1001-5000
215.	2008.12.21	Budapest	Assembly	Political regime	Magyar Gárda	HVIM	Not Applicable
216.	2009.01.17	Budapest	Demonstration	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	501-1000
217.	2009.01.31	Iván	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	101-500
218.	2009.02.01	Miskolc	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik	Nemzeti Őrsereg	1001-5000
219.	2009.02.08	Veszprém	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda		1001-5000
220.	2009.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Election campaign	Jobbik		Not Applicable
221.	2009.03.15	Budapest	Festivity	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
222.	2009.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Celebration	MIÉP		Not Applicable
223.	2009.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom	HVIM	101-500
224.	2009.03.30	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		101-500
225.	2009.04.05	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság 2006	Jobbik	1001-5000
226.	2009.04.14	Budapest	Demonstration	Government change	Magyar Gárda		501-1000

227.	2009.04.18	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	Magyar Gárda		101-500
228.	2009.05.09	Hajdúhadház	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Not Applicable
229.	2009.07.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	101-500
230.	2009.07.10	Miskolc	Demonstration	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
231.	2009.07.11	Budapest	Demonstration	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	HVIM	1001-5000
232.	2009.07.30	Miercurea Ciuc, RO	Demonstration	Roma	HVIM		1-100
233.	2009.08.19	Eger	Festivity	Celebration	Új Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
234.	2009.08.20	Budapest	Festivity	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik		Not Applicable
235.	2009.08.22	Szentendre	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Új Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	501-1000
236.	2009.09.26	Kiskunlacháza	Demonstration	Roma	Magyar Gárda		1-100
237.	2009.10.16	Olaszliszka	Commemoration	Commemoration	Új Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	501-1000
238.	2009.10.23	Budapest	Assembly	Government change	Jobbik	Új Magyar Gárda	1001-5000
239.	2009.10.23	Debrecen	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik	Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
240.	2009.10.23	Keszthely	Commemoration	Commemoration	Új Magyar Gárda		1-100
241.	2009.11.17	Sajóbábony	Assembly	Roma	Jobbik		1-100
242.	2009.12.05	Budapest	Assembly	Irredentism	Jobbik	Magyarok Világszövetsége	Not Applicable
243.	2010.01.31	Újfehértó	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Új Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Not Applicable
244.	2010.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Election campaign	Jobbik		1001-5000
245.	2010.03.20	Veszprém	Assembly	Election campaign	Jobbik		Not Applicable
246.	2010.03.21	Hajdúhadház	Assembly	Election campaign	Jobbik	Új Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable

247.	2010.03.21	Hajdúhadház	Assembly	Election campaign	Jobbik	Új Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
248.	2010.04.08	Békéscsaba	Assembly	Election campaign	Jobbik		Not Applicable
249.	2010.04.08	Budapest	Assembly	Election campaign	Jobbik		Not Applicable
250.	2010.06.04	Paris, FR	Commemoration	Irredentism	Jobbik	Magyarok Világszövetsége	Not Applicable
251.	2010.07.24	Békéscsaba	Demonstration	Not Applicable	Jobbik	Magyar Nemzeti Gárda	1-100
252.	2010.08.20	Budapest	Festivity	Celebration	Jobbik	Magyar Nemzeti Gárda	Not Applicable
253.	2010.11.16	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Jobbik		101-500
254.	2010.12.10	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-LGBTQ	Jobbik		101-500
255.	2011.02.03	Lak	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		101-500
256.	2011.02.11	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Magyar Nemzeti Gárda		1-100
257.	2011.03.06	Gyöngyöspata	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik	Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület	1001-5000
258.	2011.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Commemoration	Jobbik		Not Applicable
259.	2011.03.15	Budapest	Commemoration	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Nemzeti Gárda		Not Applicable
260.	2011.03.23	Pécs	Demonstration	Local	Jobbik		501-1000
261.	2011.04.02	Hejőszabolcs	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		101-500
262.	2011.04.17	Hajdúhadház	Assembly	Roma	Jobbik	Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület	1001-5000

						Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület	
263.	2011.04.20	Tiszavasvári	Assembly	Roma	Jobbik		1-100
264.	2011.08.12	Budapest	Demonstration	Welfare	HVIM		Not Applicable
						Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület	
265.	2011.08.28	Budapest	Commemoration	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik		101-500
266.	2011.10.14	Olaszliszka	Commemoration	Commemoration	Jobbik		Not Applicable
267.	2011.10.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Jobbik		Not Applicable
						Új Magyar Gárda	
268.	2012.02.01	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	HVIM		1-100
269.	2012.02.11	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Betyársereg	HVIM	Not Applicable
				National ownership of land			
270.	2012.03.15	Budapest	Assembly		Jobbik		1001-5000
271.	2012.03.15	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	HVIM		101-500
					Magyar Nemzeti Gárda		
272.	2012.03.17	Budapest	Assembly	Magyar Gárda			Not Applicable
273.	2012.05.05	Berzék	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		Not Applicable
274.	2012.05.12	Budapest	Demonstration	Political regime	Jobbik		501-1000
					Magyar Nemzeti Gárda		
275.	2012.06.16	Csókakő	Festivity	Anti-Semitism		HVIM	Not Applicable
						Új Magyar Gárda	
276.	2012.07.08	Budapest	Festivity	Anti-LGBTQ	Jobbik		101-500
277.	2012.07.19	Kazincbarcika	Demonstration	Local	Jobbik		Not Applicable
					Pax Hungarica Mozgalom		
278.	2012.07.23	Pécs	Demonstration	Roma		HVIM	101-500
279.	2012.08.05	Devecser	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		1001-5000
						Magyar Nemzeti Gárda	
280.	2012.08.14	Cegléd	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		Not Applicable

281.	2012.08.25	Budapest	Assembly	National ownership of land	Jobbik	HVIM	101-500
282.	2012.09.08	Veszprém	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		1-100
283.	2012.09.13	Budapest	Demonstration	MSZP-SZDSZ	Jobbik		Not Applicable
284.	2012.10.10	Miskolc	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		Not Applicable
285.	2012.10.17	Miskolc	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		1001-5000
286.	2012.10.23	Budapest	Assembly	Commemoration	Jobbik		Not Applicable
287.	2012.11.12	Kaposvár	Demonstration	Law and order	Jobbik		Not Applicable
288.	2012.11.22	Budapest	Demonstration	Welfare	Jobbik		Not Applicable
289.	2013.01.12	Szigethalom	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		101-500
290.	2013.02.10	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Pax Hungarica Mozgalom	Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal	101-500
291.	2013.02.15	Veszprém	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	Jobbik		101-500
292.	2013.02.23	Debrecen	Demonstration	Anti-Semitism	Jobbik		101-500
293.	2013.03.02	Konyár	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik	Nemzeti Őrsereg	101-500
294.	2013.03.09	Budapest	Demonstration	Irredentism	Jobbik		101-500
295.	2013.03.15	Budapest	Festivity	Celebration	Jobbik		Not Applicable
296.	2013.05.02	Budapest	Assembly	Anti-Semitism	Jobbik		501-1000
297.	2013.07.06	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-LGBTQ	Jobbik		Not Applicable
298.	2013.08.19	Budapest	Assembly	Magyar Gárda	Jobbik	Új Magyar Gárda	1-100
299.	2013.08.25	Budapest	Commemoration	Magyar Gárda	Magyar Nemzeti Gárda	Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület	101-500
300.	2013.08.30	Budapest	Demonstration	Anti-LGBTQ	Magyar Nemzeti Gárda	Kárpát Haza Őrei	1-100
301.	2013.10.06	Budapest	Demonstration	Roma	Jobbik		501-1000

302.	2013.10.23	Budapest	Demonstration	Political regime	Jobbik		1001-5000
303.	2013.11.02	Budapest	Assembly	Nationalism	Jobbik		101-500
304.	2013.11.16	Budapest	Commemoration	Irredentism	Jobbik	Nemzeti Őrsereg	101-500
305.	2014.01.23	London, UK	Assembly	Not Applicable	Jobbik		1-100
306.	2014.02.08	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	HVIM	Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal	501-1000
307.	2014.03.10	Târgu Mureș, RO	Festivity	Celebration	HVIM	Jobbik	1-100
308.	2014.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Political regime	Jobbik	Új Magyar Gárda	1001-5000
309.	2014.04.24	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	HVIM		1-100
310.	2014.05.01	Budapest	Demonstration	Nationalism	Jobbik		101-500
311.	2014.05.01	Budapest	Assembly	National ownership of land	Új Magyar Gárda		Not Applicable
312.	2014.05.06	Budapest	Demonstration	National ownership of land	Not Applicable		Not Applicable
313.	2014.10.24	Budapest	Demonstration	Welfare	Not Applicable		1001-5000
314.	2014.11.28	Budapest	Demonstration	Welfare	Jobbik		101-500
315.	2015.02.14	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Betyársereg	Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal	101-500
316.	2015.05.01	Budapest	Festivity	Law and order	Jobbik		Not Applicable
317.	2015.06.25	Debrecen	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik	Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom	101-500
318.	2015.07.04	Budapest	Assembly	Anti-LGBTQ	Jobbik	Új Magyar Gárda	Not Applicable
319.	2015.07.05	Debrecen	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik		101-500
320.	2015.07.10	Budapest	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik	HVIM	501-1000

321.	2015.08.07	Pécs	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik	Új Nemzeti Gárda	101-500
322.	2015.08.10	Nagykanizsa	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik		501-1000
323.	2015.08.13	Martonfa	Blockade	Immigration	Jobbik		Not Applicable
324.	2015.08.14	Pécs	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik		101-500
325.	2015.09.02	Röszke	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik		101-500
326.	2015.09.05	Budapest	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik		501-1000
327.	2015.11.17	Budapest	Demonstration	Immigration	Jobbik		101-500
328.	2015.12.06	Budapest	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	HVIM		Not Applicable
329.	2016.02.13	Budapest	Commemoration	Commemoration	Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal	Pax Hungarica Mozgalom	101-500
330.	2016.03.15	Budapest	Assembly	Anti-corruption	Jobbik		Not Applicable
331.	2016.06.04	Budapest	Demonstration	Hungarians abroad	HVIM		101-500

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arcanum Digitális Tudománytár. 2024. "Népszabadság." 2024.
<https://adt.arcanum.com/hu/collection/Nepszabadsag/>.
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Elisabeth Carter. 2006. "Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (3): 419–43.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x>.
- Becker, Jens. 2010. "The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary." *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe* 13 (1): 29–40. <https://about.jstor.org/terms>.
- Bohle, Dorothee, and Béla Greskovits. 2019. "Polanyian Perspectives on Capitalisms after Socialism." In *Capitalism in Transformation*, 92–104. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Bustikova, Lenka. 2020. *Extreme Reactions: Radical Right Mobilisation in Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Castelli Gattinara, Pietro, and Caterina Froio. 2024. "When the Far Right Makes the News: Protest Characteristics and Media Coverage of Far-Right Mobilization in Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 57 (3): 419–52.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231169029>.
- Castelli Gattinara, Pietro, Caterina Froio, and Andrea L.P. Pirro. 2022. "Far-Right Protest Mobilisation in Europe: Grievances, Opportunities and Resources." *European Journal of Political Research* 61 (4): 1019–41. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12484>.
- Císař, Ondřej, and Jiří Navrátil. 2015. "At the Ballot Boxes or in the Streets and Factories: Economic Contention in the Visegrad Group." In *Austerity and Protest*, 35–54.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. 1998. "Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93." *World Politics* 50 (4): 547–81.
<https://about.jstor.org/terms>.
- Feischmidt, Margit, and Kristóf Szombati. 2017. "Understanding the Rise of the Far Right from a Local Perspective: Structural and Cultural Conditions of Ethno-Traditionalist Inclusion and Racial Exclusion in Rural Hungary." *Identities* 24 (3): 313–31.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2016.1142445>.
- Giugni, Marco, Ruud Koopmans, Florence Passy, and Paul Statham. 2005. "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities for Extreme-Right Mobilization in Five Countries*." *Mobilization*. <https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.10.1.n40611874k2311v7>.
- Gödri, Irén. 2012. "11. Nemzetközi Vándorlás." In *Demográfiai Portré 2012*, edited by Péter Őri and Zsolt Spéder, 137–54.
- Greskovits, Béla. 2020. "Rebuilding the Hungarian Right through Conquering Civil Society: The Civic Circles Movement." *East European Politics* 36 (2): 247–66.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1718657>.

- Hutter, Swen. 2014. "14. Protest Event Analysis and Its Offspring." In *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*, edited by Donatella della Porta, 335–67. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719571.001.0001>.
- Ivaldi, Gilles. 2015. "Towards the Median Economic Crisis Voter? The New Leftist Economic Agenda of the Front National in France." *French Politics* 13 (4): 346–69. <https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2015.17>.
- Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth. 2008. "What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (1): 3–23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006294168>.
- Karácsony, Gergely, and Dániel Róna. 2010. "A Jobbik Titka: A Szélsőjobb Magyarországi Megerősödésének Lehetséges Okairól." *Politikatudományi Szemle* 19 (1): 31–63.
- Kitschelt, H. 2006. "Movement Parties." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, edited by R Katz and W Crotty, 278–90.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 1996. "Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe: Grievances or Opportunities?" *European Journal of Political Research* 30 (2): 185–216. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00674.x>.
- Kovács, András. 2013. "The Post-Communist Extreme Right: The Jobbik Party in Hungary." In *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*, 223–34.
- Kovarek, Dániel, Dániel Róna, Bulcsú Hunyadi, and Péter Krekó. 2017. "Scapegoat-Based Policy Making in Hungary: Qualitative Evidence for How Jobbik and Its Mayors Govern Municipalities." *Intersections East European Journal of Society and Politics* 3 (3): 63–87. <https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v3i3.382>.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2015. "Party Systems, Electoral Systems, and Social Movements." In *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, 667–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- KSH. 2011. "4.1.6.1 A Néesség Nemzetiség Szerint, 2011." *Területi Adatok*. 2011. https://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/reszletes_tablak.
- . 2021. "5.1.12. Munkanélküliségi Ráta Korcsoportok Szerint, Nemenként (1992–)." 2021. https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_hosszu/h_qlf012a.html.
- . 2023a. "22.1.1.26. Magyarországra Érkezett Menedékkérők És a Nemzetközi Védelemben Részesülők Száma." 2023. https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/hu/nep0026.html.
- . 2023b. "22.1.1.28. A Bevándorló Külföldi Állampolgárok Az Állampolgárság Országa Szerint." 2023. https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/hu/nep0028.html.
- Lucassen, Geertje, and Marcel Lubbers. 2012. "Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats." *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (5): 547–74. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011427851>.

- Minkenberg, Michael. 2002. "The Radical Right in Postsocialist Central and Eastern Europe: Comparative Observations and Interpretations." *East European Politics and Societies* 2:335–62. <https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=911579>.
- . 2003. "The West European Radical Right as a Collective Actor: Modeling the Impact of Cultural and Structural Variables on Party Formation and Movement Mobilization." *Comparative European Politics* 1 (2): 149–70. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110017>.
- . 2019. "Between Party and Movement: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations of the Radical Right's Organizational Boundaries and Mobilization Processes." *European Societies* 21 (4): 463–86. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494296>.
- Mudde, Cas. 2016. "Conclusion: Studying Populist Radical Right Parties and Politics in the Twenty-First Century." In *The Populist Radical Right: A Reader*, edited by Cas Mudde, 609–20. London: Routledge.
- . 2019. *The Far Right Today*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Murer, Jeffrey Stevenson. 2015. "The Rise of Jobbik, Populism, and the Symbolic Politics of Illiberalism in Contemporary Hungary." *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, no. 2. <http://visegradinsight.eu>.
- Nemzeti Választási Iroda. 2024. "Országgyűlési Választások." 2024. <https://www.valasztas.hu/orszaggyulesi-valasztasok>.
- Ortiz, David G, Daniel J Myers, N Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena D Diaz. 2005. "Where Do We Stand with Newspaper Data?" *Mobilization: An International Journal* 10 (3): 397–419.
- Pirro, Andrea L.P. 2019. "Ballots and Barricades Enhanced: Far-Right 'Movement Parties' and Movement-Electoral Interactions." *Nations and Nationalism* 25 (3): 782–802. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12483>.
- Pirro, Andrea L.P., and Pietro Castelli Gattinara. 2018. "Movement Parties of the Far Right: The Organization and Strategies of Nativist Collective Actors." *Mobilization*. San Diego State University. <https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-23-3-367>.
- Pirro, Andrea L.P., Elena Pavan, Adam Fagan, and David Gazsi. 2021. "Close Ever, Distant Never? Integrating Protest Event and Social Network Approaches into the Transformation of the Hungarian Far Right." *Party Politics* 27 (1): 22–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068819863624>.
- Pirro, Andrea L.P., and Dániel Róna. 2019. "Far-Right Activism in Hungary: Youth Participation in Jobbik and Its Network." *European Societies* 21 (4): 603–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494292>.
- Quaranta, Mario. 2016. "Protesting in 'Hard Times': Evidence from a Comparative Analysis of Europe, 2000–2014." *Current Sociology* 64 (5): 736–56. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392115602937>.
- Rone, Julia. 2022. "Far Right Alternative News Media as 'Indignation Mobilization Mechanisms': How the Far Right Opposed the Global Compact for Migration."

Information, Communication & Society 25 (9): 1333–50.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1864001>.

Szabó, Máté. 1996. “Repertoires of Contention in Post-Communist Protest Cultures: An East Central European Comparative Survey.” *Social Research* 63 (4): 1155–82.

Tilly, Charles. 2008. *Contentious performances*. Cambridge University Press.

Varga, Mihai. 2014. “Hungary’s ‘Anti-Capitalist’ Far-Right: Jobbik and the Hungarian Guard.” *Nationalities Papers* 42 (5): 791–807.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.926316>.

World Bank. 2024. “GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %) - Hungary.” 2024.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=HU>.