

Loyal Victims:
The Memory of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Former
Cisleithanian German Language Press, 1920-1929

By
Cole Ashkenazy

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of History

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Constantin Iordachi
Second Reader: Professor Balázs Trencsényi

Vienna, Austria
2024

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Abstract

Following the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918, German speakers across Central Europe found themselves suddenly thrust into centralizing and nationalizing states as a minority population. This thesis investigates what these German speakers recalled about their Habsburg past during the often neglected, but formative decade of the 1920s. Three regional case studies, Bukovina in Romania, Moravia in Czechoslovakia, and Slovenia in Yugoslavia are combined with a focus on two periods of mnemonic concentration: the 1921 coup attempts of former emperor Karl, and the tenth anniversary of the 1918 transition. The German speaking Jewish population of the areas is also included. This approach finds a wide variety of views, including the established nostalgic narratives and well-known descriptions of the Habsburg Monarchy as a backward prison of nations. Ultimately, the predominant perspective of the Habsburg legacy across Central Europe was a mixture of positive and negative associations.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the assistance, guidance, and valuable feedback of my advisors Constantin Iordachi and Balázs Trencsényi. I am incredibly thankful to both of them for improving this thesis beyond what I could have accomplished alone. I am also indebted to many of the other amazing faculty at CEU. In particular, parts of this thesis, even if in very altered or minimal form, first appeared in course papers for classes taught by Liliya Berezhnaya, Karl Hall, Michael L. Miller, Jan Rybak, and Mate Nikola Tokić. Robyn Dora Radway's paleography course also prepared me to read many sources I would not have otherwise. Judit Minczinger and the late Robin Bellers each helped with the clarity of my writing and overall quality of the thesis. A sheynem dank to the CEU Jewish Studies Program for not only welcoming me as an honorary member, but also allowing me to visit one of the towns, Nikolsburg (Mikulov), I was writing about.

Various seminars and workshops headed by Tolga Esmer, Jan Hennings, Marcell Sebők, Charles Shaw, and Carsten Wilke helped to shape and finetune the thesis. In these my MA cohort all provided useful feedback—even if I did not always follow it.

Beyond CEU my gratitude goes out to Karin Almasy, Codi James Inglis, and Christopher Wendt, each of whom furnished me with ideas, suggestions, and literature over correspondence. I would also like to thank James Krapfl, under whom my interest in Central Europe, the interwar period, and memory of the 1918 transition began.

Institutionally, I would like to thank the Ústav dějin Univerzity Karlovy a archiv Univerzity Karlovy, especially Andrea Veverková, the Národní archiv, the Národní knihovna, all in Prague, and the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich. My third chapter also benefited from a visit to the Sudetendeutsches Museum. Without the digitized newspaper collections Austrian Newspapers Online (ANNO), Compact Memory, Digitale Forum Mittel- und Osteuropa (DiFMOE); and Digitalna knjižnica Slovenije (sLib) this thesis would have been

impossible. Additionally, the CEU library, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, and the numerous libraries at the Universität Wien were all helpful and necessary.

Funding-wise, I would like to thank the Fonds de recherche du Québec—Société et culture (FRQSC) for their generous backing, I would not have been able to write the thesis without it. The CEU MA research travel grant was also necessary to access some sources, even if they were mostly cut from the final product.

I must also give a massive thank you to my friends for helping me to take breaks and not lose my mind too much in the process of writing this thesis, as well as providing a general sense of solidarity of the shaken. The sleep deprived version of myself also merits an acknowledgement because the final notes I left myself before passing out were often surprisingly insightful. My parents, sister, and the rest of my family also were nothing but loving and supporting this entire time and I could not have done it without them.

Despite this varied help and support, I am certain that flaws, mistakes, and oversights remain in the thesis. The fault for any of these lies only with me.

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Introduction

*Today, the fate of Humpty-Dumpty has become that of one dynasty after another. They are like the egg in the nursery rhyme and break under circumstances that exclude the possibility that they will ever be put together again*¹

Karl Kautsky November 1918

After the Habsburg Monarchy ended in 1918, millions of German speakers found themselves as minority populations in a diverse series of successor states. These new or expanded states included Czechoslovakia; the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia); and the Kingdom of Romania, among others. Throughout the 1920s the German speaking minorities, along with other minority groups, attempted to negotiate—often less than enthusiastically—with their new states for greater rights and protections. While the move to minority status was jarring for many, this transition should not be examined solely in light of changes because continuities and connections remained. One path for accessing both altered and durable elements across the transition is through the historical references to the Dual Monarchy crafted in German during the formative first decade of the interwar period. The potential for a “Habsburg legacy” of some sort across the former Austrian half of the monarchy is a convenient lens for comparison among several local contexts. This thesis uses areas in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia as cases for just such a comparison. More specifically, the focus is on the ways in which the German language press recalled the Habsburg Monarchy throughout the 1920s. On this note, a few initial examples will provide a taste.

An Amuse-bouche: Three Quotes

“But anyone who had believed that 1918 meant the transition from the desert to the promised land for the Germans was soon to be bitterly disappointed. From the beginning, the

¹ “Heute ist das Schicksal Humpty-Dumpty das einer Dynastie nach der andern geworden. Es geht ihnen wie den rohen Eiern im Kinderlied und sie zerbrechen unter Umständen, die jede Möglichkeit ausschließen, daß sie je wieder zusammengeflickt werden,” *Habsburgs Glück und Ende* (Berlin: Cassirer, 1918), 6-7. All translations from German are my own unless otherwise noted.

Germans in Slovenia had nothing to laugh about.”² In 1928, as German minority groups across the former Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy remembered the transitions of 1918, “disappointment” captured a common feeling. While German speakers were certainly not in any promised land, they were also not in the desert, and more often than not this was conveyed in the press’ diverse memory narratives. With the promised land on our mind, let us turn to the “Austrian Jerusalem,” Czernowitz (Chernivtsi), to remember that German as a language was not confined to a single faith.³

“But the Jew can also love his King as he had loved his Emperor. But one must earn love.”⁴ This line from a 1922 issue of the *Ostjüdische Zeitung*, a German language Zionist newspaper from Romania, makes no attempt to shy away from the feelings the Jewish community expressed towards the Habsburg Monarchy, as embodied in the Emperor. Furthermore, the quote uses this “love” as proof that the Jews of Czernowitz and Bukovina could also be good, loyal Romanian citizens. The additional key is recognizing that this would not be a relationship without reciprocity and that the Romanian monarch would have to prove their worth to the community, just as the Habsburgs had done. The disappointment in the new states expressed in the prior example is absent here, replaced with a clear willingness to work with the new governments. While the acknowledgement of change after 1918 remains the same, there is a desire to reestablish an old status quo, in as much as that was possible. Other German speakers, such as some in Moravia (Mähren), saw the old status quo as inherently problematic.

² “Aber wer da geglaubt hatte, das Jahr 1918 bedeute für die Deutschen den Uebergang aus der Wüste ins gelobte Land, erfuhr nur zu bald bittere Enttäuschung. Nichts zu lachen hatten von vornhinein die Deutschen in Slowenien,” *Cillier Zeitung*, 29.11.1928, 1.

³ See Appendix B for a list of names and conventions. Quoted in David Rechter, “A Jewish El Dorado? Myths and Politics in Habsburg Czernowitz,” in *Insiders and Outsiders: Dilemmas of East European Jewry*, edited by Cohen Richard, Jonathan Frankel, and Stefani Hoffman (Portland: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010), 209.

⁴ “Aber der Jude kann auch seinen König lieben, wie er seinen Kaiser geliebt hat. Aber Liebe muss man sich erwerben,” *Ostjüdische Zeitung*, 3.10.1922, 1.

Invoking the Habsburg Monarchy could also act as a warning or a veiled threat, such as in one Brunn (Brno) daily on the anniversary of Czechoslovakia's founding. "History has shown that the old Austria perished above all because it did not understand in time to unite the divergent nationalities in pursuit of their common goals. Even today, 10 years after the creation of the Republic, we are further away than ever from a national balance."⁵ As with the Slovenian example, no sympathy is shown for the defunct Dual-Monarchy, but there is also greater emphasis here on a continuity in a more abstract sense: that of the struggle of groups for national rights. A fuller breakdown of these quotes will appear in subsequent chapters along with comparisons between cases, but at this stage, the potential differences and commonalities between diverse mentions of the Habsburg past are hopefully becoming visible.

These three quotes are not representative of all the views from their respective regions. They do, however, touch on key concepts which will return throughout the thesis. The desert exodus example highlights how the Habsburg past was often referred to indirectly and implicitly, in this case as the desert. In some cases, absences and Austria-Hungary shaped voids will call attention to themselves. The offer of Jewish loyalty is broadly emblematic of how publications used memory of the Habsburgs to attempt to work with the new states. Slightly more narrowly, the example demonstrates a certain degree of having come to terms with the past, of accepting that the old Monarchy was gone for good, and that new paths needed to be treaded. The quote, with its "love" of the emperor, also conjures up an image of nostalgia for a Habsburg past. The final example from Brunn offers a counter to this nostalgia, as it clearly points to the old monarchy as dysfunctional and unable to successfully handle the trials and tribulations of ruling over diverse nationalities.

⁵ "Die Geschichte hat erwiesen daß das alte Österreich vor allem daran zugrunde gegangen ist, das es nicht rechtzeitig verstanden hat, die auseinanderstrebenden Nationalitäten zur Verfolgung ihrer gemeinsamen Ziele zusammenzuschließen. Von einem nationalen Ausgleich sind wir auch heute, 10 Jahre nach Schaffung der Republik, weiter als je entfernt," *Tagesbote*, 28.10.1928, 1.

Argument, Questions, and Scope

Through engaging with sources like the prior quoted newspapers, this thesis pursues answers to a few core questions. The overarching question is what German language historical/mnemonic narratives about the Habsburg Monarchy were produced in the 1920s post-Cisleithania space.⁶ In searching for the “why” to this question, the instrumentalization of the past for current ends features prominently. The major sub-questions to this are how similar, and different cases in separate locations were and if there were any dominant narratives. A goal is to find, dispute, or at least hint at, a common Habsburg legacy in these places in the 1920s.

While it would have been striking, and made my own work easier, there are no straightforward answers to these questions. No case study showed signs of embracing a singular narrative akin to general Habsburg nostalgia or Habsburg hatred. Instead, the German language narratives about the Habsburg Monarchy produced in the 1920s post-Cisleithania space, are inconsistent, nuanced, and combine both these extremes, often at the same time. This is where the titular “loyal victims” enters the scene, as when referring to the Habsburg past, German speakers often would portray themselves as not only simultaneously loyal, but also victimized by their new states, while also as victims of the Habsburgs, or at least the Habsburgs’ ultimate failure, yet still show guarded hints of continued nostalgic loyalty to the defunct Danubian Monarchy. Notable exceptions to this are often found in the Jewish press, where feelings of victimhood at the hands of Austria-Hungary were not normally expressed, and in Southern Moravia where sympathy for the Habsburgs was rarely found and some groups did not even try to court the new state.

With this, the instrumentalization of the past as a tool in the struggle for greater minority rights was a crucial pattern among all the cases. The Habsburg past could act as a model or a

⁶ The Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, or Cisleithania, became legally distinct in several ways from the Hungarian half of the monarchy in 1867 (not to mention prior differences). Each half was essentially independent except for a common foreign policy, military, and renegotiable customs union, in addition to the common monarch.

warning, though it would normally be accompanied with declarations of loyalty to the current state because there was no sense of a public desire to restore the Habsburg past in total—German speakers accepted that the Monarchy was not coming back. One common element across the cases was that of not challenging the dominant state narratives of the Habsburg Monarchy as essentially a prison of nations. German speakers recognized how the majority populations in their new states felt and did not challenge them, instead they tried to offer supplemental narratives to demonstrate that their German or Jewish cases were more complicated and nuanced but still compatible with the state. In particular, the 1928 decennial of the transition was a charged moment, when elections coincided almost exactly with the anniversaries of the transition in Czechoslovakia and Romania, and in Yugoslavia with the culmination of a multiple months long political crisis, which led to a royal dictatorship.⁷ While the various German speaking groups were not often happy with their new states, in the 1920s there does not appear to be the start of some inevitable march towards fascism. There were alternatives, such as working with the state, even though later fascist groups drew on similar grievances to those issues expressed in the 1920s.

This thesis is not about the eventual turn to the radical right many German communities experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. In fact, the thesis halts around 1929 to avoid diving into the world of the economic crisis, the actual National Socialist accession to power in Germany, and the growth of various more extremist German groups across East Central Europe. The rationale here is that the mnemonic narratives of the German minorities offer a window into various alternative moments: the shift to fascism was not inevitable, but the result of various choices, and historical narratives of the Habsburg Monarchy often occurred when different choices could have been made. Studies on interwar German minorities tend to center on the later forms of national conflict and relegate the bulk of the 1920s as merely a setup for later

⁷ For Romania these were national, and for Southern Moravia they were local elections.

heightened conflict.⁸ While fascism casts a shadow over all studies of the German minorities, including this thesis, I hope to decenter it. Scholarly work has moved away from the simplistic myth that German minorities were universally some powerful fifth column of National Socialism,⁹ but casual public views still require that nuance be promoted.

The specific local case studies—smaller areas of Bukovina, southern Moravia, and Slovenia¹⁰—form the compromise between breadth and depth at the heart of this thesis. All too often the German speaking minority populations are treated in isolation from one another because of the predominance of state-based studies. There is nothing inherently wrong with this focus, in fact it offers details and inner-country context beyond what this thesis will, but it does not allow for the direct comparison or the consideration of the potential endurance of any wider Cisleithanian phenomena. Another key compromise in this thesis is the focus only on the former Austrian half of the monarchy to make the comparisons slightly more similar.¹¹ Each region had different experiences under the Habsburgs, during the transition in 1918/1919, and in the interwar years, all of which helped inform what narratives about the Habsburg past

⁸ The literature on the Slovenian case is a good example of less weight placed on the 1920s and the build up to conflict receiving the main attention. This is true among more popular oriented works, such as Mitja Ferenc, and Joachim Höslér, eds., *Spurensuche in der Gottschee: Deutschsprachige Siedler in Slowenien*. (Potsdam: Deutsches Kulturforum östliches Europa, 2011); as well as academic works such as the extensive Helmut Rumpler, and Arnold Suppan, eds. *Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien, 1848-1941*. (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1988). The excellent Caroline Mezger, *Forging Germans: Youth, Nation, and the National Socialist Mobilization of Ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia, 1918-1944*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), is also worth consulting though largely ignores the Slovenian case (in favor of the more nationally active Banat Germans). For an example focused on the 1920s in Romania, see Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

⁹ For more on the myth and an investigation of it see Anthony Komjathy and Rebecca Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich: Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the Wars* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), especially the Introduction and Conclusion.

¹⁰ More specifically the press based in the following places will be the focus: in Bukovina, the capital city of Czernowitz; in southern Moravia the cities/towns of Brünn, Nikolsburg, and Znaim; and in Slovenia, the cities/towns of Cilli and Marburg in Untersteiermark (Lower Styria); and the large isolated German community of Gottschee in Krain (Carniola). The term Slovenia should not be thought of as equivalent to Bukovina and Moravia because the latter were established historical territories and fairly clear subdivisions of the Habsburg Monarchy. Slovenia on the other hand came together in the 1920s from entire, or portions of several, subdivisions of the Habsburg Monarchy.

¹¹ Of the former Cisleithania, two important areas—South Tyrol and Galicia—were excluded from the case studies in favor of the three selected ones. Galicia was excluded because of the added complexity of Poland receiving an additional German minority population from the German Reich and South Tyrol was excluded because I am less familiar with the Italian context.

were remembered, thus limiting as many variables as possible is helpful. In general, each region showed signs of being deeply influenced by its own distinct local context, but this did not necessarily limit the similarities between the cases. This thesis does not have dedicated sections of comparison, but instead throughout Chapters II and III, comparisons will arise when they are relevant and build towards the Conclusion.

Some further similarities and differences between case studies are worth briefly mentioning. Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia made up the Little Entente during the interwar period which united them in opposition to any Habsburg restoration. All three states were nationally and religiously diverse countries, though the exact breakdown and mixtures varied, and all three inherited multiple clusters of Germans, including from the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy. Attempted state centralization was also a common theme, as were varying degrees of pressure on the Germans to assimilate. Another significant difference was that Czechoslovakia was a republic and Romania and Yugoslavia were monarchies. Czechoslovakia also stands out as it bordered both Austria and Germany, while Yugoslavia only touched Austria, and Bukovina was off on its own. Furthermore, Czechoslovakia was an entirely new state, while Romania and Yugoslavia were essentially expansions of existing ones. These differences are not necessarily negative factors when doing a comparison, in fact if similarities are found it would point to an explanation which transcended the local differences and perhaps suggest a common Habsburg legacy. The listing of similarities and differences could continue on in both directions, but the subject will return in the Conclusion.

A major limit to this comparison is that the newspapers I found do not represent all of the political positions in each of the regions. For example, I was unable to access Social Democratic periodicals in Slovenia or Bukovina, and in Bukovina, Zionist views in the Jewish press are predominate in my sample. These papers would also have been read by different class/socio-economic backgrounds, which means that large parts of the population are not

represented in this study.¹² This does limit the wider applicability of the results, but I think that comparing the dozen or so newspapers I look at across the cases together helps to mitigate the imbalances. Furthermore, to respect these limits, my conclusions and arguments are fairly modest and place an emphasis on variety and inconsistency. The Cisleithanian focus also means that any (post)Hungarian spaces might have experienced the phenomena differently. Overall, I am unable to speak to everything each of these newspapers wrote about the Habsburgs, or every detail of the specific local contexts they were published in, or how much the narratives were reflected in the actions and beliefs of readers.

The major way I plan to deal with the first two limits is through focusing on two periods of mnemonic concentration so that I can compare as similar events as possible in all three cases. The first of these is from spring 1921 until spring 1922, which covers the attempted restoration of former Habsburg Kaiser Karl in Hungary. The second is the 1928 anniversary celebration of each state either forming or growing in size. While these occurred at slightly different times (from later October until early December), it is still a small enough time window for a fair comparison. Both of these events were widely reported on in all three case studies and the respective years allow me to view the situation from near the start and end of the decade. Essentially, these two events are meant to represent the wider decade while limiting as many variables as possible. While more on sources will come up later, I am simply not engaging directly with people at the ground level; I am looking at narratives, not their reception. That being said, these moments of mnemonic concentration should highlight a time when readers were more likely to be considering the options that the narratives presented to them.

“Germans” are not the object of study here, instead German speakers or German language narratives are. There are multiple interrelated reasons for this distinction. In the 1920s there was no single definition of who or what was “German.” Focusing on the language avoids

¹² For example, I am missing workers, and I did not find many articles written explicitly by or for women.

arbitrarily siding with a single limited conception of Germanness, assuming actors' own identities, and sets a clear boundary for what sources to use.¹³ An exception is found in the framing of the topic of fascism; however, German has been used here in a vague sense to emphasize that the turn to the radical right was not simply a result of linguistic choices. Furthermore, it is important to consider the entire field of narratives available to those who read German because many who might not have fit a definition of "German" wrote in the language. The challenge of multilingualism arises here because I will not be able to consider the full body of narratives available to the multilingual German speakers who also consumed texts in languages, such as Czech, which I do not read.

In the case of Bukovina, Jewish periodicals in German are included because language, not ethno-cultural-religious group affiliation, is the defining trait this study centers on. Any issues of what qualifies as a Jewish source, will be addressed as they come up. The inclusion of German speaking Jews offers many important elements to this thesis, including distinctly Jewish approaches to mnemonic narratives about the Habsburg Monarchy. The similarities and differences between Jewish and non-Jewish texts—as well as the texts which are both or neither—helps to fill out the picture of the alternate views of the past available in German in the 1920s. Common elements of the minority experience can be found, but this did not automatically equate to common causes or cooperation between Jews and non-Jews. Jewish voices are also practically mandatory when addressing the memory of Czernowitz, the capital of Bukovina, because of the city's mythology as a sort of near utopian case of diversity, tolerance, and inclusiveness.¹⁴ It must also be emphasized that the Jewish communities in these

¹³ There can also be debates over the limits of the German language. In this context, a possible issue is those who incorrectly accuse Yiddish of being simply a German dialect, however, Yiddish is a separate language, and Yiddish sources will not be used aside from potential brief comparisons. In the case of Gottschee, there is the actual issue of "kitchen German" which uses a lot of Slovenian words and constructions, however I have yet to encounter it in my sources.

¹⁴ For an overview of the myth(s) see Rechter, "A Jewish El Dorado?," 207-220.

regions were diverse: there was no single Jewish voice, and this plurality of voices includes not just German, but also Czech and Yiddish.

Literature and Sources

Generally, the memory of the Habsburg Monarchy among the German speaking minorities of the successor states remains understudied, especially during the 1920s where studies are few and far between. The 1920s is a significant gap worth filling for three key reasons. The first is that this period, as already stated, allows for memory of the Danubian Monarchy to be studied prior to the rise of National Socialism in Germany and other fascisms, as well as the start of the Great Depression. This is significant because, especially for many Jews, these events promoted more nostalgic views of the Habsburg past.¹⁵ The second is that the 1920s offers a period when Habsburg memory narratives, such as the rose-colored nostalgic view, were developing and not yet solidified, as well as often blurring with then current events. Thus, there is the chance for unexpected finds. The third is that the Bukovina/Czernowitz myth, that this place under the Habsburgs was some unique harmonious quasi-utopia (especially for Germans and Jews) does not appear to be studied as a phenomenon taking place in the 1920s. There is a great deal of work and sources for this myth during the Habsburg period itself, as well as for following the Holocaust and the Second World War. Given this, I hope to find if the dominant positive view of the myth from these two periods existed in the interwar years, or if the 1920s is a useful moment to complicate these narratives. More on this last point can be found in Chapter II.

Two enduring narratives about the Habsburg Monarchy are that it was a backwards dysfunctional empire ready to be destroyed by nationalism à la Humpty-Dumpty, and the nostalgic view that despite any flaws, it was a state which was a diverse and secure (or at least

¹⁵ Heidi Schlipphacke, "The Temporalities of Habsburg Nostalgia," *Journal of Austrian Studies* 47, no. 2 (2014), 7. The Legion of the Archangel Michael was founded in 1927, though its paramilitary wing, the Iron Guard, only emerged in 1930.

more so than what followed) place to live. While versions of these narratives began prior to the empire's end, they only fully developed in the interwar period. This thesis seeks to examine these narratives in depth, among others, during their formative years. Prior work has tended to focus on Austrian or other national narratives, not the German speaking minorities in the successor states. This means there is the risk that views of the Habsburg legacy are distorted to only show an incomplete picture of the nationally dominant groups' relations to the defunct Monarchy. My research can help to mitigate this risk and because the localized cases I focus on are in quite distinct contexts, any similarities I find could signal or confirm a more widespread form of the Habsburg legacy.

Recent work, most notably that of Pieter Judson, has promoted reevaluating the Habsburg Monarchy and not treating it as though it were a backwards anachronism. This approach is a direct challenge to more nation centered ones, which have often reduced Austria-Hungary to villainy, incompetence, or both. Judson specifically calls for research to “foreground the common experience of empire,” including its legacy.¹⁶ This last point is where I hope to make a contribution though the comparative looks at cases from across the former empire. The 1920s deserve further research to see what the legacy was like at that time, beyond simple nostalgic or backwards narratives. The press in the early post-war years provides an opportunity to consider if the recent reassessments of the monarchy have perhaps strayed too close to, not nostalgia or neglecting the empire's negative traits, but to having these less positive or functioning aspects taking up a secondary, as opposed to more equal position with the reevaluations. The 1920s press allows for this because it combines real experiences, with some hindsight; these newspapers were not engaged in a disconnected academic debate, but attempting to process things which did and were happening around them. Reassessing the

¹⁶ Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2016). I do not use the term Habsburg Empire in this thesis. My reasoning is that while I have read sources in the 1920s which use both terms, neither is dominant and both compete with a variety of other terms. Given this, and that no one would dispute that it was a monarchy, I have gone with that term.

monarchy is something I support, but we cannot downplay the backwardness argument as simply incorrect or biased, when the experiences closer to the ground were much messier.

There is not a great deal of work on the mnemonic production of the German language minorities in the former Cisleithania during the interwar period.¹⁷ This thesis will of course not fill such a massive gap on its own, but it will hopefully demonstrate the merits of the focus. Additionally, this thesis is a small response to the lack of comparative studies on interwar Czechoslovak minorities with other national minorities.¹⁸ There are a variety of works on the German minority populations and they will be cited as they are relevant to this thesis. For instance, there is a great deal of work done on the press in Czernowitz, though the mnemonic aspect is quite absent.¹⁹ To repeat an earlier point, there do not appear to be many dedicated comparative studies of the interwar German speaking minorities, which I again hope to take a step towards.

More broadly, the memory of the Habsburg Monarchy in the 1920s is also quite neglected in scholarship. Two recent works which address the early history writing and memory about the end of the monarchy, but not from the view of minority German speakers, are Adam Kożuchowski's *The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary: The Image of the Habsburg Monarchy in Interwar Europe* and Ulrike Harmat's "*Untergang, Auflösung, Zerstörung der Habsburgermonarchie? Zeitgenössische Bedingungen der Erinnerung und Historiographie.*"²⁰

¹⁷ For an example in Czechoslovakia, see Nancy Wingfield, "Statues of Emperor Joseph II as Sites of German Identity," in *Staging the Past*, 193-197. See also note 20.

¹⁸ Ines Koeltzsch, and Konrád Ota, "From „Islands of Democracy“ to „Transitional Border Spaces,“ *Bohemia* 56, no. 2 (2016), 318-319.

¹⁹ For good examples on newspapers see Andrei Corbea-Hoişie, ed., *Zeitungsstadt Czernowitz: Studien zur Geschichte der deutschsprachigen Presse der Bukovina (1848 - 1940)*. (Kaiserslautern: Parthenon-Verl., 2014); and Marten-Finnis, Susanne. "... zwischen dem Osten und dem Westen Europas": *deutschsprachige Presse in Czernowitz bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*. (Dresden: Thelem, 2005); and for a through overview see Mariana Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung der Bukovina 1918–1944. Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Großrumäniens*. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001).

²⁰ Adam Kożuchowski, *The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary: The Image of the Habsburg Monarchy in Interwar Europe* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2013); and Ulrike Harmat, "Untergang, Auflösung, Zerstörung der Habsburgermonarchie? Zeitgenössische Bedingungen der Erinnerung und Historiographie." In *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 Band XII*, Helmut Rumpler and Ulrike Harmat eds (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2018), 49-95. The Habsburg myth in literature is not a part of this thesis, though in this field it goes back to Claudio Magris's thesis from the 1960s, *Der habsburgische Mythos in der modernen*

These works will be referenced throughout, however it should be pointed out now that they both focus on more academic or literary sources, and not on newspapers as I do. Additionally, Harmat's work was quite inspiring because of her emphasis on the narratives about the 1918/1919 transition and including works from the continually neglected 1920s. There are also many books from the 1920s, mostly from rump-Austria on the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, though those will need to wait for a separate study.²¹

Newspapers are the major source this thesis is based on. In many of the localities analyzed there were a variety of competing newspapers and where possible these have been accessed. A single newspaper will not represent an entire community, though through reading against the grain and using other forms of sources, I hope to offer a more fleshed out picture. Broadly speaking, these periodicals all present a consistent point of interaction between people and the world around them. Furthermore, while newspapers are crafted by small groups of actors, they still require reader approval and buy-in, especially when many readers will have experienced the 1918 events themselves. Thus, the press influences the people, but the people also influence the press. In the context of studying memory, newspapers provide the opportunity to see how remembering is linked to day-to-day news and how newspaper editors, as actors, wanted their readers to remember events. Generally, newspapers may have acted as a regular space for groups of mnemonic actors to repeat and reinforce their collective memory

österreichischen Literatur (Vienna: P. Zsolnay, 2000). For a recent commentary on the work and field see Norbert Christian Wolf, "Claudio Magris's 'Habsburg Myth': A Response to Hermann Broch's Reading of Hofmannsthal and Kraus," *Austrian Studies* 28 (2020): 148-165. A few edited volumes are worth mentioning as they are related but not directly on 1920s German minorities memory of the Habsburgs: Maria Bucur, and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe 1848 to the Present* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001), see especially Bucur's chapter with a section on interwar Romanian state commemorations, and Wingfield's chapter on statues of Joseph II in the Czech lands; Mark Cornwall, and John Paul Newman, eds., *Sacrifice and Rebirth: The Legacy of the Last Habsburg War* (New York: Berghahn, 2016), see especially Laurence Cole's chapter on Tyrol; Paul Miller and Claire Morelon .eds., *Embers of Empire: Continuity and Rupture in the Habsburg Successor States after 1918* (New York: Berghahn, 2019); and Tomasz Pudłocki, and Kamil Ruszała, eds., *Postwar Continuity and New Challenges in Central Europe, 1918-1923*, (New York: Routledge, 2022), see especially Christopher Brennan's work of Kaiser Karl in the latter two.

²¹ For two examples, see Erich von Kahler, *Das Geschlecht Habsburg* (Munich: Verlag Der Neue Merkur, 1919); and Josef Redlich, *Österreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky A.-G., 1925).

of the past. It is also worth keeping in mind that a newspaper might not have a consistent or singular view of the past. Finally, newspapers, and the narratives contained within, were also mobile and able to cross borders.

To step back and schematize, newspapers occupy a middle position between more elite, top-down oriented approaches and more “everyday,” bottom-up approaches. In the specific context of this thesis, the newspapers do not project the voice or views of the government directly, nor do they directly offer what a variety of “average” citizens believed. Drawing on this third position has its advantage, for while it does not adequately explore either top or bottom extreme, it addresses both and offers hints at interactions and views between the two. As with the broader geographic spread, a certain depth is sacrificed on the altar of breadth. While the press as a mediator between top and bottom might be too strong a term, and outside the main point of the thesis, it is worth acknowledging newspapers are sites of knowledge production and distribution.

Memory?

No single overarching theory or approach to memory studies will guide this thesis. Beyond the historian’s natural (and sometimes justified) fear of theory, the diversity of how actors at the time wrote their narratives merits more specific applications of methods or theory. Not all bodily ailments are treated with the same approach, and neither should the variety of mnemonic productions. Thus, various works on memory will be woven into the thesis and explained when they become relevant. An exacerbating factor which adds difficulty to selecting an overarching theory is that because I am looking at the immediate aftermath of the monarchy, I might not be studying traditional memory, but instead the blurry transition zone between a fading but not vanished past and the present. For example, the death of the former Habsburg emperor Karl in 1922 was at once a moment for remembering the Habsburg past and a major contemporary event in the saga of an attempted Habsburg restoration. An advantage to this

1920s focus is that it can help illuminate the process of how and when things become (or do not become) memory. For all these reasons, I have a certain hesitancy in attempting to define and distinguish between memory/mnemonic and history in the narratives I encounter. Many scholars have pushed for some variation of a distinction between memory and history, including Pierre Nora.²² Instead, much as past and present can blend together in this case, so do memory and history, with the key commonality that they both produce, and are, stories about the past, trumping any differences. Michel Foucault also distinguished between memory and history in various ways, though for this thesis he captures a key idea to consider when grappling with the German mnemonic tales. Counter-memory is a concept which appears repeatedly in Foucault's work, and in a most basic sense is a mode of history "directed against truth, and opposes history as knowledge."²³ In this case truth is the official version of the past, such as the narratives of the interwar Central European governments, and a counter-memory would be an act of resistance, through revealing the incompleteness and flaws in said official version. In Chapter III, we will weigh whether the German speakers created counter-memories, or if their resistance did not actually challenge power. Ultimately, however, the distinction between memory and history does not appear to have mattered to the writers of the periodicals in the 1920s.

Another challenge that will be grappled with in this thesis is related to absences and voids. How much can I read into silences on the monarchy? It is difficult to tell if silences or very guarded references to the past are due to German speakers' self-restraint or censorship in the face of the state—assuming the state actually cared—or simply genuine not remembering or caring on the part of the minorities. Given these obstacles, the focus will end up being placed on the instrumentalization of memory as that is clearer to identify. However, at the same time

²² Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations*, 26 (1989), 7-24.

²³ Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, Donald Bouchard ed. and trans. (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1977), 160. Especially the essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 139-164.

that this fairly outward interpretation of memory is addressed, a more inward facing one will also come up. While it was still public facing, inward here refers to reading the narratives of the Habsburg past as instances of the German speaking minorities processing or even coming to terms with said past. Given that “lavishing national slogans and dissociating oneself from the imperial past were usually meant to cover up or even completely erase one’s past and connections to old structures and creating completely new narrations,”²⁴ a silence or a gap could be a sign that a periodical was coming to terms with its past or avoiding doing so. This will all become clearer in the actual case studies with concrete examples.

This thesis has one chapter for each of its three case studies. Each of these chapters has a section to provide background on the situation of the German speakers in the 1920s. The other two or three sections vary, but between them, the two periods of mnemonic concentration are addressed to fuel comparison. The first of these is the ten-year anniversary of the transitions of 1918 and the second is the 1921 “adventures” of the former Habsburg Emperor Karl when he twice attempted to restore himself to the throne in Hungary.

To a certain degree, the various arguments put forward in the three chapters might be dissatisfying, but that is because I want to preserve the local variety up until the final comparisons are made. Chapter I on Slovenia shows the instrumentalization of Habsburg memory used to walk along the tightrope between loyalty and disloyalty. Chapter II on Bukovina addresses the Czernowitz myth and city’s Jewish population, in addition to centering on apparent silences and gaps. Chapter III on Moravia provides a split between the most pro-

²⁴ Tomasz Pudłocki, and Kamil Ruszała, “The War That Never Ended: East-Central Europe After 1918,” in *Postwar Continuity and New Challenges in Central Europe, 1918-1923*, Tomasz Pudłocki, and Kamil Ruszała, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2022), 3.

and anti-state newspapers and points to the significance of coming to terms with the past. The Conclusion synthesizes the comparison and unpacks what it means for the Habsburg legacy.

Chapter I No Laughing Matter: Slovenia, Yugoslavia

“We want to be good citizens,
may one not hate us.
Gottschee, the small homeland,
must be left German for us.”²⁵

This poem comes from a local priest on the occasion of the celebration in Gottschee (Kočevje) of the Germans living there for 600 years. Gottschee is a small area about 60km southeast of Ljubljana (Laibach). While the four lines are from 1930, they capture how expressions of loyalty to the Yugoslav state were relatively common in the German press of the Slovenian regions of Krain (Carniola) and Untersteiermark (Lower Styria) during commemorations.²⁶ The short verse also hints at how the 1920s were not an easy time for the Slovenian Germans as they faced outside hate and very real state efforts to de-Germanize their home. Interwar Yugoslavia was marked by the challenge of incorporating various linguistic, national, and religious groups, and a constant battle between centralization and decentralization. It is in this wider context which the German minority struggled for rights.

This chapter seeks to accomplish two goals. The first is to roughly sketch out the struggles the Germans of Krain and Untersteiermark faced and the second is to demonstrate the instrumentalization of the Habsburg past to assert loyalty or potential disloyalty. The first section is dedicated to the former objective and the subsequent pair of sections focus on the latter. The second section examines the ten-year anniversary of Yugoslavia in 1928 and the shorter third section engages with various news stories about the former emperor Karl prior to his death in 1922. To keep a tighter focus in the chapter, within Krain and Untersteiermark, the

²⁵ *Wir Wollen gute Bürger sein, Man möge uns nicht hassen. Gottscheer Land, die Heimat klein, Muß man uns deutsch belassen.* In Hugo Grothe, *Die deutsche Sprachinsel Gottschee in Slowenien: ein Beitrag zur Deutschkunde des europäischen Südostens* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1931), 187.

²⁶ A brief note on the term Yugoslavia, the state was only officially named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, prior to this it was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SCS), but Yugoslavia is used to refer to the state in the 1920s throughout this thesis for the sake of convenience and recognizability.

region of Gottschee, and the cities of Cilli (Celje) and Marburg (Maribor) will stand in the spotlight.

1.1 For Krain Out Loud: Background

Prior to 1918 almost all the Slovenian parts of Yugoslavia were in the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy. Cilli, Marburg, and the rest of Untersteiermark were part of the larger Duchy/Crownland of Steiermark since the thirteenth century. Between 1918 and 1920, centuries of unity would be severed, with the ultimate border between Austria and Yugoslavia cutting the historical entity in two. The Gottschee Germans were in a *Sprachinsel* (language island) even under the Habsburgs, as their isolated territory in the mountains of the Krain saw them surrounded by Slovenians who made up the vast majority of the population of the Duchy/Crownland of Krain. In 1918, all of Krain, except for a western section which became Italian, joined Yugoslavia. This transition was a massive shock to the Germans in both Krain and Untersteiermark, who while no strangers to national political clashes with their Slovenian neighbors, were more used to dominating public life, as well as not being a national minority even if they were regionally not a majority.²⁷ In 1918, practically all Germans in Slovenia wanted to remain part of Austria.²⁸ This joining with Austria was more likely to occur in Marburg than Gottschee based on physical proximity and the number of Slovenians ‘in the way.’

²⁷ For prewar conflicts see Karin Almasy, *Wie aus Marburgern, Slowenen‘ und, Deutsche‘ wurden: Ein Beispiel zur beginnenden nationalen Differenzierung in Zentraleuropa zwischen 1848 und 1861* (Bad Radkersburg: Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe des Pavelhauses, 2014); Karin Almasy, *Kanon und nationale Konsolidierung: Übersetzungen und ideologische Steuerung in slowenischen Schullesebüchern (1848–1918)* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2018); Janez Cvirn, *Das „Festungsdreieck“: Zur politischen Orientierung der Deutschen in der Untersteiermark, 1861-1914* (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2016). *Festungsdreieck* (fortress triangle) refers to Cilli, Marburg, and Pettau as the core of Germanness in Untersteiermark. (Pettau not have an interwar newspaper).

²⁸ Rok Stergar, “‘Yugoslavia Is Worthless . . . You Can Get Neither Sugar nor Kerosene.’ Food Supply and Political Legitimacy in the Slovene Part of Yugoslavia, 1918–1924,” *Austrian History Yearbook*, (2024), 11 for an example of the Germans around Klagenfurt voting to join Austria even as Austria had food shortages and Yugoslavia was getting those under control.

In the fall of 1918 Krain and Untersteiermark were occupied by Yugoslav forces and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was officially declared on December 1st, 1918. The borders between Austria and Yugoslavia were only finally settled in October 1920 when a plebiscite in Kärnten (Carinthia) determined that the Kärnten would remain Austrian. This followed months of sporadic fighting from the fall of 1918 and well into 1919. This plebiscite was an example of how the principle of national self-determination was only exercised sporadically and inconsistently.

A violent incident also occurred in Marburg on January 27th, 1919, which became known as Marburg's Bloody Sunday. Thousands of German civilians protested the absorption of the area into Yugoslavia, and the termination of German civil servants in the city. Slovenian soldiers opened fire on them, and many were killed or wounded. The initial spark of the shooting and the number of casualties remains disputed, though low estimates include around 30 wounded and 8 deaths.²⁹

Cilli, Gottschee, and Marburg are the focus in this chapter because they each had a relatively high percentage of the German population compared to other areas in Slovenia, while also having an accessible regular newspaper. In Slovenia in 1910 there were 106,377 Germans, while in 1921 that number had fallen to 39,631, and by 1931 it would only be 28,998.³⁰ This is a fall from 11.5% of the population to mere 2.5%. Over this same period the German population in Gottschee went from 32.6% to 23.2%, in Cilli from 66.8% to 5.9%, and in Marburg from 80.9% to 8.3%. The area around Marburg also saw a decline from 19.3% to 1.8%.³¹ Overall in Slovenia around 25% of Germans were in trades, 20% in commerce, a bit

²⁹ For more see Arnold Suppan, *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Zwischen Adria und Karawanken* (Berlin: Siedler, 1998), 357-359; and Arnold Suppan, *Jugoslawien und Österreich 1918–1938: Bilaterale Außenpolitik im europäischen Umfeld* (Köln: Böhlau, 2015), 514-516. Chapter V also contains a detailed look at the transition across Yugoslavia.

³⁰ *Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien* (Dusseldorf: Oskar Leiner, 1961), 13; 11-14. The vast majority of non-Germans in Slovenia were naturally Slovenians. The 1931 number also includes 167 Jews, who were generally not a significant minority in Slovenia.

³¹ Suppan, *Jugoslawien und Österreich*, 667.

under 20% were self-employed, 13% were workers, and 5% were public servants.³² In Gottschee there were many more farmers as it was a more rural area,³³ which provides variety to complement the much more urban population of Untersteiermark.

There are four main explanations for the declining population of Germans in Slovenia. The first is that prior to the First World War, in Gottschee there was already a trend of population decline because of limited land driving emigration.³⁴ The second and most significant is that many Germans left willingly or were driven out prior to 1921 as Yugoslavia was asserting its control of the area. In particular, old Habsburg civil servants and associated professions were forced out.³⁵ Austria and North America were the major destinations. A third factor by 1931, though it is unclear how strong it was, could be the Slovenization of Germans, based on lack of German education and economic opportunities. The fourth and most significant is simple: many Germans in 1910 were actually bilingual Slovenes or some less clear/national identity.

In the 1920s, the Germans of Slovenia faced various acts of discriminatory legislation. The most important was the destruction of the well-developed German education system, which between November 1918 until the summer of 1922 saw the effective end of both public and private German education.³⁶ This also pushed out many German teachers.³⁷ One major concern regarding the lack of education was that it closed off the prior path to state jobs, as German youth who went to school in Slovenian or Serbo-Croatian would not be able to compete with native speakers.³⁸ German was also banned from public signs and the civil

³² Mitja Ferenc, "Das Schicksal Der Deutschen Sprachminderheit in Slowenien," *Linguistica (Ljubljana)* 60, no. 2 (2020): 227.

³³ For more of the Gottschee economy see the very detailed Grothe, *Die deutsche Sprachinsel*, Chapter V,

³⁴ Ferenc, "Das Schicksal Der Deutschen," 228.

³⁵ *Das Schicksal der Deutschen*, 14.

³⁶ Petra Kramberger, "Das Jahre 1929 in der deutschsprachigen Presse der Untersteiermark aus Maribor, Celje un Ptuj," in *Grenzdiskurse: Zeitungen deutschsprachiger Minderheiten und ihr Feuilleton in Mitteleuropa bis 1939*, Sibylle Schönborn, ed., (Essen: Klartext, 2009), 119-120.

³⁷ *Das Schicksal der Deutschen*, 22-23.

³⁸ Anthony Komjathy and Rebecca Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich: Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the Wars* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), 165.

service, for example the German motto on the sign to the cemetery in Cilli had to be removed, and most German national organizations were also shuttered.³⁹ In 1929 the *Marburger Zeitung* even had to change its name to the *Mariborer Zeitung* to reflect the Slovene name of the city. There was also concern that because of the strength of the local dialect, German youth unable to attend German school would severely lack the standard German (*Hochdeutsch*) necessary to be part of a wider German community.⁴⁰ The German communities elsewhere in Yugoslavia, particularly the Banat, suffered similar fates.

In addition to this state pressure to assimilate, there were also violent attacks against remaining German events and spaces in Untersteiermark, including Cilli and Marburg in the early 1920s. These even involved bombings by militants associated with the Yugoslav nationalist *ORJUNA* group. This would have contributed to the political intimidation of the local Germans.⁴¹ It should also be recognized that these intimidation and assimilation factors would likely have felt worse as the population further shrunk and had less strength. The largest German political party, the *Partei der Deutschen (PdD)* which ran across Yugoslavia and got around 2% of the national vote in each of the 1923, 1925, and 1927 elections, was not very influential in Slovenia.⁴² However, the *PdD* highlights an important pattern the Germans in Slovenia also exhibited, which was choosing to work within the confines of the state system, though fluctuating between loyalty to the regime and courting the opposition.⁴³ Overall, the situation of the Germans in Cilli, Gottschee, and Marburg during the 1920s leaves little surprise

³⁹ Kramberger, "Das Jahre 1929," 119-120; for the Cilli example along with similar ones see Hans Karsten, "Die Deutschen in Sudslawien," in *Das Deutschtum des Sudostens im Jahre 1928*, Deutschen Schulvereines Sudmark, ed., (Graz: Alpenland-Buchhandlung Sudmark, 1929), 54.

⁴⁰ See for example Grothe, *Die deutsche Sprachinsel*, 181; and Karsten, "Die Deutschen," 52.

⁴¹ Suppan, *Jugoslawien und Österreich*, 696-697.

⁴² Zoran Janjetovic, "Die Partei der Deutschen im Konigreich der Serbien, Kroaten und Slowenen," in *Politische Strategien nationaler Minderheiten in der Zwischenkriegszeit*, Mathias Beer, and Stefan Dyroff, eds., (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013.), 181. For election statistics see Suppan, *Jugoslawien und Österreich*, 1298.

⁴³ Janjetovic, "Die Partei der Deutschen," 177-178.

as to why they may have felt little love for the Yugoslav state. The next section will also highlight how the Germans may or may not have maintained public loyalties to the Habsburgs.

1.2 A Reversal of Fortune: Commemorating the Decennial of Defeat

Memory undergoes constant and competing renegotiation efforts, and an anniversary can offer a snapshot to study those struggles. In 1928 opposition parties pushed for a boycott of the tenth anniversary celebration of the unification of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on December 1st. The anniversary represented different feelings and events to different groups, and for the German minority in Slovenia it was a reminder of how they were involuntarily made part of Yugoslavia in 1918. Prior to the boycott the government had already been in a crisis following the assassination of the major Croat leader Stjepan Radić that summer. December 1st did not prove to be a day where its symbolic unifying potential triumphed, instead it was one of the final dominoes to fall and lead to the start of the royal dictatorship in January 1929.⁴⁴ The decennial was a moment when the German minority in Slovenia, which generally otherwise ignored the unification holiday, expressed a mixture of loyalty and criticism towards the state and adopted a narrative of Germans' own victimhood to show that their desire for greater minority rights was legitimate. The press also expressed both positive and negative views of the Habsburg Monarchy in their decennial accounts. Using the three newspapers, the *Cillier Zeitung*, the *Marburger Zeitung*, and the *Gottscheer Zeitung*, this section focuses on how the German minority marked the 10-year anniversary of the unification of the Kingdom of SCS.

The purpose here is not to fact check the narratives the German press produced, nor is it to carefully track the evolution of a specific idea in the collective memory of the German

⁴⁴ Zagreb police killed a dozen protesters on 1.12.1928. The protesters flew three banners with: (i) the date 1.12.1918, (ii) Radić's assassination date 20.6.1928, (iii) a Croatian crest without a crown, *Marburger Zeitung*, 3.12.1928, 1. For a brief look at the period from the assassination to the dictatorship see John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 161-162. For broader Yugoslav context see Chapters 4 and 5 in the same.

minority as expressed through the press. Regarding the second point, the inconsistency of digitized newspaper runs would make it a challenge. The decision has been made to examine a moment of mnemonic concertation which emerged during a period of crisis. Prior to 1928, the three newspapers largely did not address the December 1st unification holiday, but they all chose to do so that year. To invoke Nora's classic idea, the state anniversary was a *lieu de mémoire*, and in 1928 it seemed that for the first time among the Germans, there was a "will to remember."⁴⁵ This is not to say the Germans otherwise neglected the past, just that this marks a moment of heightened engagement with this specific commemoration. While there was no single grand German narrative the press connected to the anniversary, the idea of victimhood came up repeatedly.⁴⁶ The lack of a unified story can make sense when one considers the Germans had been a minority population for only a decade, after a comfortable position in the Habsburg Monarchy. The historian Arnold Suppan identifies three functions of anniversaries for the Germans in Yugoslavia (beyond just Slovenia): (i) to recall the period of initial German settlement and continuity until now, (ii) to offer a current assessment of social struggles, and (iii) to position themselves in relation to the state and offer declarations of loyalty.⁴⁷ Suppan applies this to the 1930s, and not the December 1st celebration in the 1920s, but his pattern holds true based on my research.

In 1928, the *Cillier Zeitung*, which ran three times a week, had articles addressing the 1918 transition on both 29 November and 2 December. On the 29th, there was a sympathetic report on opposition parties calling for a boycott of the 1 December celebration, though it did not mention any German groups or explicitly call on Germans to join the boycott. The boycotters were divided over whether it was a protest against only the regime or against the

⁴⁵ Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations*, 26 (1989): 12; 22.

⁴⁶ These victimhood narratives generally fit into George Schöpflin's "myth of unjust treatment," "The Functions and of Myths and a Taxonomy of Myths," in *Myths and Nationhood* Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds (London: Hurst, 1997), 24-25. The newspapers were vague as to what/who oppressed the Germans, often implicitly the Yugoslav state.

⁴⁷ Suppan, *Jugoslawien und Österreich*, 964.

very basis of the state itself.⁴⁸ The main article of that issue argues that in 1918 there was a reversal between the Germans and South Slavs and levels a charge of hypocrisy at those who only supported certain minority struggles. Where under the Habsburgs, the Slavs had their rights threatened, now it was the Germans who were under threat. The threat is aimed at language and schooling, which stand in for culture more broadly. The article expresses understanding with Slovenian resentments and that for many the end of the Habsburg Monarchy was welcomed, “but anyone who had believed that 1918 meant the transition from the desert to the promised land for the Germans was soon to be bitterly disappointed. From the beginning, the Germans in Slovenia had nothing to laugh about.”⁴⁹ As mentioned in the Introduction, these feelings of disappointment were not unique to the Germans of Slovenia, but spread across the former Cisleithania. Overall, the article makes it clear that Germans became victims in 1918 and remained so in 1928, but it also allows for the Slovenians and others to have been victims prior to 1918.

This final point, that others could be victims, was rejected in a direct response article on 6 December.⁵⁰ The article’s title summarizes its attitude when it places “suppression” (*Unterdrückung*) in quotation marks when referring to Slovenians. The article believes the 29 November piece was biased towards Slovenians, but that it thus could perhaps convince Slovenians to support the German cause. The bulk of the article is dedicated to showing that the Germans were, and are much bigger victims than the Slovenians, and arguing that the Slovenians were not even victims.⁵¹ The final line captures this idea where it states that the Germans would be happy to be treated as the Slovenians were under the Habsburg Monarchy. The general theme is to blame Slovenians for not having solved their own problems. The article

⁴⁸ *Cillier Zeitung (CZ)*, 29.11.1928, 2. The report positions the Croatian peasants as opposed to December 1 on principle, but the democrats as only opposing the current regime but still supporting the unification.

⁴⁹ *CZ.*, 29.11.1928, 1. See Introduction for original German.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.12.1928, 1-2.

⁵¹ For the education struggle in the Habsburg Slovenia see Almasy, *Kanon und nationale Konsolidierung*; for the relationship between Germans and Slovenians in the Habsburg period, see Cvirn, *Das „Festungsdreieck“*.

also does not care about consistency as it attacks the Slovenians. A frankly absurd argument is made that if the Slovenians had wanted to, they could have solved the schooling issue because they had representatives in the ruling coalition for a time. Even if this claim was true, it runs counter to an earlier argument which was that Slovenian was less developed as a literary and education language, and that the Habsburgs and Germans were not to blame because the expansion of Slovenian language schooling simply had to take time. This response fits with the idea that some Germans believed they had an exclusive claim to victimhood. The article actively denies that “members of the ‘perpetrator’ group may have also suffered at the hands of the ‘victim’ group” and maintains that the Slovenians were “deserving of their fates.”⁵² Beyond this article, I have not found other strong cases of exclusiveness in Slovenia, however the story of German victimhood was popular.

The *Cillier Zeitung* begins its article titled “1918-1928” not with German victimhood, but with a Slav centered narrative.⁵³ On the one hand 1918 was a time of “freedom” (*Freiheit*) and the welding (*schweißte*) of the three South Slav brother tribes with the same blood and language. On the other hand, in the following decade Yugoslavia had not reached its potential “peak” (*Gipfel*) and it turns out that in addition to economic trouble, certain national groups, especially the Croats, had major grievances. The *CZ* repeats the official memory of 1918, freedom and unification, but then uses the ideals of its foundation to criticize the state’s later flaws. In the face of the boycott, the article then moves on to critique the Slovenian shift of emphasis to, or rather the distortion of, the “conquest” (*Eroberung*) of Marburg. The case is made that the Slovenian press had exaggerated how Marburg became part of the Kingdom in 1918 to make it seem like a great military victory, when in an “objective view”

⁵² Pamela Ballinger, “Exhumed Histories: Trieste and the Politics of (Exclusive) Victimhood.” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 6, no. 2 (2004), 145-147. This comes from a different, graver, context. But if the sites of remembering for Trieste decreased unity, this anniversary also seems to have come as another crack for parliamentarism in Yugoslavia. For another example of downplaying Germanization *CZ*, 5.12.1925, 1.

⁵³ *CZ*, 2.12.1928, 1-2

(*objektiverweise*) it was not. The Germans are positioned as helpless victims with “the all-encompassing higher power of a mighty fate” against them. Marburg was a city “precariously located and exposed” and thus not an impressive conquest.⁵⁴ The *CZ* was not denying defeat, just explaining it was nothing glorious or worthy of celebration, because of how powerless the Germans were. The degree of weakness is also important because it removes responsibility—the Germans could not have changed things.

The degree to which the *Cillier Zeitung* is willing to harbor different views of what happened in 1918 and how they should or should not be commemorated, points to the variety of narratives in the 1920s. The best summary of their basic position is found in a November 1928 issue, but it applies equally to the articles around 1 December. After 1918, the Germans became loyal citizens of Yugoslavia, but one could not expect the Germans to wholeheartedly celebrate becoming a national minority. The same article believes that the victorious peoples should be able to celebrate, but wishes that they saw things “objectively” to understand the German position.⁵⁵ This is quite similar to the later article that was upset over the exaggeration of the conquest of Marburg. It appears regarding 1918, the *CZ* expressed a limited mnemonic pluralist view through what it chose to publish—limited because all narratives of the past still supported the German cause.⁵⁶ On the note of different views and Marburg, let us turn to the *Marburger Zeitung*.

The daily *Marburger Zeitung*'s articles around 1 December 1928 are the least explicitly German of the three newspapers surveyed here. In articles on 30 November and 1 December about the anniversary, German as a people or language is absent. Instead, the discourse centers

⁵⁴ “*die alles umfassende höhere Macht eines gewaltigen Schicksals,*” and “*prekär gelegenen und exponierten,*” *CZ*, 2.12.1928, 2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.11.1928, 1.

⁵⁶ A mnemonic pluralist believes there can be multiple interpretations of the past and is willing to negotiate between them, Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard, “A Theory of the Politics of Memory,” in *Twenty Years After Communism*, Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, eds (New York: Oxford Academic, 2014), 15.

around minority rights and democratization, of which the paper is hopeful.⁵⁷ Pushing for broader and non-nationally exclusive rights could have been a strategy to attract wider support. The account of 1918 excludes the Germans and instead focuses on criticizing the Habsburg Monarchy as backwards because of a “centripetal” (*zentripetalen*) approach to nationalities and how it was very understandable for populations to “yearn” (*sehnsucht*) for freedom. This is not to say that the *MZ* was more loyal or followed an official line (though it did report on the boycott the least), in fact this allusion to the Habsburgs is also a disguised critique of the Yugoslav government because it also suffered from centralizing forces leading especially to tensions between Serbs and Croats. When reading the coverage of the clash between protestors and the government in Zagreb on 1 December, there is a sense of sitting on the sidelines of a sporting event where one does not like either team.⁵⁸

The less assertive tone of the Marburg article could also be connected to fear, because in the days leading up to the celebration there may have been rumors that homes without a Yugoslav flag would be attacked and that “spiteful” (*gehässiger*) anti-German brochures were distributed at the celebration. Additionally, on the site of the former monument to Emperor Franz-Joseph, a plaque commemorating the liberation of Marburg and the general who ordered (or at least oversaw) Bloody Sunday was erected.⁵⁹ Another miscellaneous aspect of note is that Marburg is referred to as a “border city” (*Grenzstadt*)⁶⁰ in the *MZ* which would be a new designation as of 1918, and serves as a reminder of how close geographically the city is to German majority Austria. More so than Cilli and Gottschee, the sheer proximity to Austria could have inspired the *MZ* to take a more mellow approach to not appear as a threat to the

⁵⁷ *Marburger Zeitung (MZ)*, 30.11.1928, 4; and 1.12.1928, 2.

⁵⁸ *MZ*, 3.12.1928.1. It is worth noting that the *MZ* does not seem to criticize the local Slovenians as much as the Croats or Serbs. This merits a wider survey.

⁵⁹ Karsten, “Die Deutschen,” 54. School children were also supposedly told the celebration was about “Nieder Schwabs.” This source, published by an Austrian group which promoted connections between Austria and German minorities had an interest in making things look bad, but in general this article does not appear over the top, it acknowledged that they were just rumors and does not fabricate violent situations.

⁶⁰ *MZ*, 30.11.1928, 4.

Yugoslav state. This is also an example of accepting the status quo and could be seen as an example of coming to terms with the past: that Untersteiermark was not Austrian.

The *Marburger Zeitung* also stands out from the other two newspapers in this regard: during the 1920s the *MZ* wrote more extensively on 1 December celebrations. Generally, these were more neutral descriptions which did not mention Germans and described the unification of the triad of South Slavs. These were often short and did not engage with broader politics, but when they did, they were vague and hopeful, such as in 1921 when there was a metaphor of a young state being like a young child.⁶¹ None of the papers acknowledged December 1st in their 1928 articles as much as the *MZ*. The other two newspapers, the *Cillier Zeitung* and the *Gottscheer Zeitung* both essentially ignored the anniversary every year of the 1920s other than 1928. The times it was not ignored was to acknowledge towards the end of an issue that an official holiday was occurring and where a celebration might be held. It is interesting that on and around December 1st reporting in the 1920s, the school/language issue was often brought up, but without invoking the past, which means that 1928 stands out.⁶² Thus, for the German minority it does not appear that December 1st was a *lieu de mémoire* of their own throughout the 1920s. There are two questions here: why not and what was different about 1928? But first, the *Gottscheer Zeitung* will be addressed.

The *Gottscheer Zeitung* released papers three times a month and in 1928 one of those conveniently fell on December 1st.⁶³ The article was in the vein of the *Cillier Zeitung*, but with heightened rhetoric to paint Germans as the victims of a “destruction process” (*Vernichtungsprozess*) and that protecting culture through German language schools was a matter of “life and death” (*Leben und Tod*). The phrase “our nation” (*unseres Volkes*) was also repeated ad nauseam. December 1 was portrayed as the beginning of a period of struggle, with

⁶¹ *MZ*, 1.12.1924. Even 1929 is only a minimal mention.

⁶² For example, see *Gottscheer Zeitung (GZ)*, 1.12.1921.

⁶³ *GZ*, 1.12.1928, 1-3.

actual moments not mattering in the face of a broader decade of “disenfranchisement” (*Entrechtung*). 1918 was simply the beginning, but not a distinct event from what came after it, and following Maurice Halbwachs, the expression of collective memory often does not subscribe to a strict periodization.⁶⁴ This might also explain why the *GZ* also utilized a much wider timescale when explaining their claim to victimhood. It referenced 200 years of German “industrious works” (*Fleißes*), and how the Germans, who were not “foreigners” (*Fremden*), had been in the “native soil” (*Heimaterde*) for “generations” (*Generationen*) and “centuries” (*Jahrhunderte*). There were also multiple references to how the Germans had bled for this land, with one noting it was explicitly against the Ottomans. These claims assert that depriving the Germans of their rights is even more tragic because of how long they had inhabited the area. The article notes that while the Germans are loyal to the Yugoslav state, they were “deeply worried and agitated” (*in tiefer Besorgnis und Erregung*) and wanted greater minority protections. While the *GZ* was not opposed to the state, it did not believe that the national holiday was worth remembering in isolation. If anything, as a *lieu de mémoire*, December 1st could be seen as a state attempt to freeze the pre-1918 past as something bad, something to be freed from. Let us turn back to the question of why 1928 was different from earlier years.

Reasons why the German press would not celebrate December 1st have already been brought up, the major one being that they simply did not want to celebrate their own defeat.⁶⁵ Another potential factor is simply that other days were more significant, and while I have not found any consistent commemorations, there are plenty of events in 1918-1920 that could also merit remembering. Possibly, the Germans had no need of a specific anniversary because their daily lives reminded them that they were now a minority and victims—the school issue could

⁶⁴ Maurice Halbwachs, “The Collective Memory,” in *The Collective Memory Reader* Jeffrey Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, eds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 145.

⁶⁵ The actual participation in the December 1st events has not been addressed as descriptions are rather sparse, but a key point is that the newspapers’ general disinterest might not have matched the reality of people actively participating. However, based on what cases in subsequent chapters reveal, I do not think it is unreasonable to view a lack of participation or unenthusiastic participation as the more likely situation.

easily have served this purpose. This idea of defeat could also be reframed to suggest that the Germans prior to 1928 did not see any political incentive to fight over memory because they remained defeated. Why bother entering a debate when “for the Germans, the gigantic game had already been decided and lost” in 1918.⁶⁶ In 1928, with the political crisis ongoing since the summer and calls for boycotts, the tenth anniversary was suddenly an important political event and change could be possible. The German press took a balanced approach where it did not seek to totally readjust the anniversary—it was not a full reinterpretation of the *lieu de mémoire*—instead it continued to recognize the dominant (at least to the state) story of the struggle for freedom from the Habsburgs and unification of the South Slavs. In addition to this, another narrative was added: German victimhood. These were not necessarily mutually exclusive and allowed the Germans to push for minority rights within the state. Opposition to a possible Habsburg restoration was an important element in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and at least in the early 1920s there is evidence that Yugoslav authorities in Slovenia did see pro-Habsburg sentiments as a threat. Though there is equal evidence that these authorities considered such cases contextually to see if they were a genuine threat or not.⁶⁷ The German language press also played with the unlikelihood of a restoration to express ideas about the (seemingly) defunct Monarchy.

1.3 Much Ado About Nothing? Reporting on Kaiser Karl’s Adventures

Twice in 1921, once in spring and once in fall, the former emperor Karl attempted to restore himself to the throne in Hungary. These events were international scandals and caused genuine worry of war breaking out and, in the fall, both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia mobilized their forces along the Hungarian border to force Karl to back down. This is of little surprise given the Little Entente’s “unshakable hostility” towards any possible Habsburg

⁶⁶ “Für die Deutschen war das gigantische Spiel bereits entschieden und verloren,” CZ, 2.12.1928, 2.

⁶⁷ For Yugoslav foreign policy see Suppan, *Jugoslawien und Österreich*, 1230 and chapter VIII. For Habsburg sentiments and authorities see Stergar, “Yugoslavia Is Worthless,” 10.

restoration.⁶⁸ The German press in Slovenia used these adventures as opportunities to demonstrate their loyalty to the Yugoslav state, or to be more accurate, their opposition to a Habsburg restoration. Interestingly, the instrumentalization of memory in this case was often also used to promote an *Anschluss* between Austria and Germany.

In both the Cilli and Marburg, the coups were consistently reported on. One method to demonstrate loyalty to Yugoslavia was to downplay the danger Karl posed. For example, a cover article had the title “Much Ado About Nothing” (*Viel Lärm um nichts*) and another wrote that the threat was “probably not too big.”⁶⁹ Each of these were from the spring, as it would be harder in the fall to argue that the coup was insignificant (even if it was still essentially impossible for it to succeed) when Karl did manage to gain a few thousand loyal troops. There is a sense in both these pieces that the coup was already over and in the past. An interesting pair of articles, one from each coup period, which complement each other can be found in the *Marburger Zeitung*. The first states that “today, the name Habsburg is nothing more than a ghost which no one fears,” and the second from a few days after the second coup ended referred to the Habsburgs with the phrase “the ghost is gone.”⁷⁰

Loyalty could also be shown through opposition to Karl and the Habsburgs. One of the most explicit examples I found bemoans the “harm” (*Schaden*) the Habsburgs had caused the “German people” (*deutsche Volke*) over “centuries” (*jahrhundertlange*).⁷¹ The same article also engages in a common practice among these articles of using the coups as a time to promote the *Anschluss*. It argues that unifying Austria with Germany (interestingly it uses *Mutterland*

⁶⁸ Christopher Brennan, “Hoch den Kaiser!: The Legitimist Cause in Early Postwar Austria,” in *Postwar Continuity*, 140. Also see 140-150 for the coups and Karl’s death. For the Austrian reaction to Karl and his death see Christopher Brennan, “Sinner, Saint—or Cipher? The Austrian Republic and the Death of Emperor Karl I,” in *Embers of Empire: Continuity and Rupture in the Habsburg Successor States after 1918*, Paul Miller, and Claire Morelon, eds. (New York: Berghahn, 2019). CZ, 13.10.1921 also provides an example of the Little Entente’s anti-Habsburgism.

⁶⁹ “wohl nicht allzu groß,” MZ, 7.4.1921, 1; and CZ, 3.4.1921, 2.

⁷⁰ “Der Name Habsburg ist heute nichts mehr als ein Gespenst, das niemand mehr fürchtet,” and “das Gespenst ist weg,” MZ, 7.4.1921, 1; and MZ, 9.11.1921, 1. It is a shame the second article contains many illegible portions.

⁷¹ CZ, 26.10.1921, 1. The following issue on 30.10.1921 also has good examples of anti-Karl sentiments.

not *Vaterland*) would decisively hurt the Habsburgs: “Then the Habsburg Monarchy would be buried forever.”⁷² In the spring, the *MZ* pushed hard to try and convince Yugoslavia that having a new German neighbor post-*Anschluss* would be worth it to strike a “broad stroke” (*grobe Strich*) against the Habsburgs.⁷³ The German periodicals did not explicitly declare that they as Germans loved Yugoslavia, but they demonstrated common interest and enemies. It was a balance between letting the state know they would not rebel, and also maintaining their nationalist interests to take a step towards a unified greater Germany.

To better understand these examples, I will suggest a few answers to the questions of why we do not see criticisms of the Yugoslav state and some support for the Habsburg past as we would in 1928. The first is that the focus was on the periodical’s genuine dislike for the Habsburgs. This could come from German nationalist views, most clearly expressed in the desire for *Anschluss* or perhaps from the general weariness and loss of legitimacy the dynasty experienced during the war.⁷⁴ A second reason is that 1921 was a much more dangerous situation than in 1928, not only because of the possible external war, but also because the Yugoslav German and Hungarian minorities would likely have been targeted in some way if they were suspected of disloyalty. One piece of evidence for this was that close to the border, Marburg was much quieter in its reporting in the fall when the threat was more real, compared to its spring coverage and compared to the *Cillier Zeitung*’s fall issues. Additionally, in 1928, the Croatian’s were the government’s main concern, which likely left the Germans with more options to consider. A potential third reason which I find unlikely is that the Germans in 1921 had not experienced seven more years of life in Yugoslavia like those in 1928. However, much of the restrictive legislation was already in place in 1921 and other articles not about the coup attempted to criticize the government. Given the shrinking population, one could interpret 1928

⁷² “Dann wird die habsburgische Monarchie für immer begraben,” *CZ*, 26.10.1921, 2.

⁷³ *MZ*, 1.4.1921, 1. See also 30.3.1921, 1.

⁷⁴ For second point see Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 441; and Brennan, “Hoch den Kaiser,” 115-116.

as a potentially more desperate time. The desire to not be censored is a more likely third reason. The *Gottscheer Zeitung* actually had its one article on the spring coup be half blotted out!⁷⁵ The published portion of the article seems fairly neutral and is never pro- or anti-Habsburg, thus I am curious what the government struck out. This also potentially stays in line with how the *GZ* appeared more strongly German nationalist in 1928.

A fourth reason to consider is that the articles on Karl's coups were significant moments of grappling with and coming to terms with the past. The repeated ideas of burying the dynasty or of it being a ghost are incredibly important in emphasizing that it is not coming back. (However, if we maintain the ghost metaphor, and recall seeing the Habsburg past manifest years later in 1928, this conjures up hauntology which insists that being a 'ghost' is not enough to remove an idea's power.⁷⁶ It seems the *MZ* was too eager to declare the Habsburgs gone in 1921.) There is the sense of closing a chapter and with the pro-Anschluss connection there is an alternate future one being opened. Even if in the short term the German minority must stay in Yugoslavia, maybe Germany could become their new neighbor. Essentially, one common element to this set of articles is that they are about moving on from the Habsburg past.

Conclusion

This chapter has elucidated a few key points. The first is that in the 1920s, the German speakers of Slovenia suffered as a result of government policy and that the German population had declined substantially since the Habsburg times. The second is that this weakened and oppressed group expressed a mixture of (dis)loyal feelings to both the Yugoslav and defunct Habsburg states during the decennial in 1928. The third is that during Karl's failed power seizures in Hungary, the German language press showed primarily negative views of the

⁷⁵ *GZ*, 15.4.1921, 1.

⁷⁶ For hauntology see Jacques Derrida's foundational *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, Peggy Kamuf trans. (New York: Routledge, 1993). The titular specters refer to the opening line of the Communist Manifesto, which uses *Gespenst* in the original German.

Habsburg past. The fourth is that in both these periods of mnemonic concentration, the past was instrumentalized to try and serve the contemporary interests of the minority, be that education rights or the Anschluss. Broadly, these two moments each offer a snapshot of a different stage of coming to terms with the past, with 1928 seeing more nuance as the breaks were less fresh and things were more settled.

Chapter II For the Past and the Future: Bukovina, Romania

“The author, provisioned with knowledge arising from records and documents, destroys the religious-like legend of the Habsburgs’ friendliness towards the Jews.”⁷⁷ This quote comes from a May 1928 issue of the Zionist *Ostjüdische Zeitung (OJZ)*, in a praising book review and demonstrates that the Habsburg past was not always reported positively, even in the Jewish press.⁷⁸ However, the review goes on to immediately qualify that the exception to the rule was Franz Josef, who was a friend of the Jews. This friendliness of the dynasty towards Jews was one element of the extensive “Czernowitz myth” which will be questioned in this chapter. In addition to this legend, the general patterns of how the German speaking press—Jewish, non-Jewish, and both—recalled the Habsburg past in 1920s Bukovina will be analyzed. For convenience *Germans* and *Jews* will be used as labels to distinguish the German press from the explicitly Jewish press, and the German speaking Jewish population from the non-Jewish one, but the reader is urged to remember that as much as actors tried to make these categories solid, they were anything but. To further narrow down the focus, Czernowitz, the capital of Bukovina, will serve as the case study. While this is to the detriment of the rural areas and other towns, Czernowitz was the local political and press center and represented the multi-ethnic/lingual/confessional mix of Bukovina quite well.

⁷⁷ “Die Kenntnis der dem Autor zur Verfügung gestandenen Akten und Urkunden zerstört die alle fromme Legende von der Judenfreundlichkeit der Habsburger,” *OJZ*, 27.5.1928, 2-4. [Note: “The knowledge arising from the records and documents which provision the author” is the more direct translation.] The review goes through examples from the end of the Vienna Jewish community in 1421 until emancipation in the 1800s. A Zionist angle also comes out of the review, where a parallel is drawn between the hopefulness of the *Vormärz* assimilated and eager Viennese Jews and the contemporary Jews in 1920s Vienna. The implication is that the current Viennese Jews will also not be fully accepted no matter what they try. The *OJZ* did not believe that Jews could become either German or Romanian, see Hildrun Glass, *Zerbrochene Nachbarschaft: Das Deutsch-Jüdische Verhältnis in Rumänien 1918-1938* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1996), 283-284. Also see *OJZ*, 28.9.1924, 4 for more on Franz Joseph not being an antisemite.

⁷⁸ Nora Chelaru, “Despre Habsburgi, fără regrete. Un sondaj retrospectiv în Ziarul *Czernowitzer Deutsche Tagespost*,” in *Limbă și cultură germană în România: (1918-1933): realități postimperiale, discurs public și câmpuri culturale*, vol 2., Andrei Corbea-Hoișie, and Rudolf Gräf, eds. (Iași: Polirom, 2023), 552 notes the nostalgia of the Jewish press, though I would add that there were cases which were not only nostalgia.

The first two sections provide background on the Czernowitz myth, and the struggles, particularly against Romanianization, that Germans and Jews faced in the 1920s. The last two sections return to Kaiser Karl and the decennial in 1928 respectively. Regarding the period of Karl's adventures, there were many instances of downplaying danger, but also a fascinating case of the *Ostjüdische Zeitung* expressing explicit past loyalty to the Habsburgs. The ten-year anniversary of the union with Romania was often portrayed as the end point of a decade of struggle to push for political action, though loyalty was still a dominant theme. More generally, there was often a lack of details or explicit references to the Habsburg Monarchy in these memory narratives. Thus, to appropriate a phrase, in public memory it seems as though 1918 acted as a *Stunde Null* (Zero Hour) of sorts for Czernowitz' German speakers.⁷⁹ In other words, the voids, silences, and implications regarding the Habsburg past also had meaning.

2.1 Mythical Czernowitz: Background

There is a mythical aura around Czernowitz and Bukovina, especially regarding Jewish life there, which persists today. This myth, which views the city/region as a utopia of coexistence, was present during the Habsburg years, but it took on a new life when it was heavily tinted through the lens of (post-)Holocaust experiences.⁸⁰ In the literature, it seems that the 1920s are overlooked in discussions of the myth, perhaps because it was absent or "shifted" more towards centering on German culture, or simply because the more commonly used literary sources, such as Paul Celan and Gregor von Rezzori, were not published in that decade.⁸¹ The objective of this section is not to provide a complete analysis of the myth from

⁷⁹ *Stunde Null* normally refers to the supposed complete break between Germany's Nazi past and its new future in 1945. I am not arguing that this complete break was the case or that it was equivalent, just that the press portrayal from 1928 makes it seem as though there a strong break.

⁸⁰ For a recent study on this, see Gaëlle Fisher, *Resettlers and Survivors: Bukovina and the Politics of Belonging in West Germany and Israel 1945-1989*" (New York: Berghahn Books, 2020). My specific reference here is p.4.

⁸¹ Florence Heymann, *Le crépuscule des lieux: identités juives de Czernowitz* (Paris: Stock, 2003), 42. She suggested that the Habsburg mythology was moved (*déplacer*) towards one focused on German Kultur in the interwar years among Jews, though she does not pursue this directly. Overall, the book is an excellent source for the myth from the 1970s until the early 2000s. For more on the myth and authors/literature mostly from the 1930s onwards see George Guțu, "Bukowina: Mythenkonstruktion und Mythenzerstörung," in

the nineteenth century until now, but instead to give enough of an overview to determine if the myth was present in the 1920s Czernowitz German press' references to the Habsburg past.

The Czernowitz myth and Bukovina myth are very similar, with the former a more focused subset of the latter. The Bukovina myth is succinctly summarized in a sentence by the historian Jeroen van Drunen as “Under the influence of Austrian monarchs Maria Theresa and Joseph II, the foundation was laid for a multicultural society in which the reigning elements of Habsburg civilization as well as ethnic and religious harmony eventually enabled the emergence of loyal Austrian model citizens with a culturally German orientation, the homo bucovensis.”⁸² Most of the key points which are repeated in the cases of the myth are identified here: multiculturalism, harmonious coexistence, Austrian loyalty and the Habsburg Monarchy, German culture, civilization, and some regionalism. The mention by name of two monarchs from the 1700s is a good example of how this fairly nostalgic view could exist *during* the time of Habsburg Monarchy itself. More generally, it should also be apparent that this myth of Bukovina paralleled the nostalgic version of the Habsburg myth.

Van Drunen actually provides a large historiographical overview for Habsburg Bukovina, with a specific focus on Bukovinian regionalism.⁸³ Regarding the myth, the conclusion he comes to is that the region was not some utopia of cooperation, but neither was it some hellscape of national hatred.⁸⁴ This seems to be the view of more recent works, where the myth is recognized as having some grounding, but that it should not be exaggerated. One risk of exaggeration by those who promote the myth is the concept of “German Jewish symbiosis.”⁸⁵ Essentially this approach, used by both Jews and Germans, emphasizes the

Deutschsprachige Öffentlichkeit und Presse in Mittelost- und Südosteuropa (1848 - 1948), Andrei Corbea-Hoişie, ed., 327-344 (Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 2008); and more generally Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, *et.al.*, eds., *Handbuch der Literaturen Aus Czernowitz und der Bukowina*. (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2024).

⁸² Jeroen van Drunen, “*A Sanguine Bunch*”: *Regional Identification in Habsburg Bukovina 1774-1919* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Pegasus, 2015), 449.

⁸³ van Drunen, “*A Sanguine Bunch*”, 39-91.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁸⁵ See examples cited in Andrei Corbea-Hoişie, *Czernowitzer Geschichten: über eine städtische Kultur in Mittelosteuropa* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003), 37.

closeness of Jews with German culture and cooperation between Jews and Germans. The risk is that this leads to the suppression of antisemitism in memory, in favor of an unreal fantasy.⁸⁶ If anything, there was a post-Second World War German and Jewish symbiosis in embracing the Bukovina myth (though for different reasons).⁸⁷ To circle back around, there are truth elements to this symbiosis idea, though it was more closely tied to culture than political cooperation because the Germans increasingly leaned into an exclusive nationalism.⁸⁸ While the increase in German nationalism began under the Habsburgs, I have not found mention in the scholarship of any substantial disloyalty among the German population of Bukovina. Despite this nationalism, both Germans and Jews did cooperate as they operated in a sphere between competing Ukrainian/Ruthenian, Romanian, and state groups.⁸⁹ Additionally, it is true that many Jews chose to identify with or assimilate to German culture to various degrees.⁹⁰ For an interwar instance, there is the argument that German language and culture for Jews in Romania could act as a nostalgic opposition to Romanianization efforts because of its roots in the Habsburg period.⁹¹ Furthermore, antisemitism does seem to have been less extreme than in other places, though it still existed across Bukovina's various national groups and at the popular level.⁹² In the previous chapter, there was no equivalent to the Bukovina myth where Slovenes and Germans were in idyllic harmony together. This is likely because of how the region was

⁸⁶ Leslie Morris, "Translating Czernowitz: The "Non-Place" of East Central Europe," *Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature* 31, 1 (2007): 189. Another interesting point in the article is how the translation of literature helped spread the myth after WWII.

⁸⁷ To be explicit, it was a time prior to the attempted extermination of the Jews, for both perpetrators and victims. The Germans could look back at a time before to downplay their complicity and Jews could recall a better time, for more on these post WWII developments see Fisher, *Resettlers and Survivors*.

⁸⁸ van Drunen, "A Sanguine Bunch," 81. See also Albert Lichtblau and Michael John, "Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz," in *Jewries at the Frontier: Accommodation Identity Conflict* edited by Sander L Gilman, and Milton Shain (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 51.

⁸⁹ Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 52-55. Also, Mariana Hausleitner, "Transformations in the Relationship between Jews and Germans in the Bukovina 1910-1940," in *Jews and Germans in Eastern Europe: Shared and Comparative Histories*, Tobias Grill, ed. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 199-206, where she argues that while Germans and Jews "developed cultural life together" under the Habsburgs and cooperated against Romanianization, this would stop in the 1930s.

⁹⁰ Lichtblau and John, "Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina," 42.

⁹¹ Fisher, *Resettlers and Survivors*, 40.

⁹² van Drunen, "A Sanguine Bunch", 273 and 292.

not as diverse as Bukovina, for instance there were very few Jews, and most areas had either German or Slovenian dominance. Additionally, most parts of Slovenia were hereditary lands of the Habsburgs and closer to the center in Vienna.

The mixed view of the Czernowitz myth, where there were true elements among the exaggerations, reimaginings, and forgetting, is also present in the work of historian David Rechter, which focuses on Jews. He stresses that successes within the Jewish community in Czernowitz were also accompanied by inner divisions and failures. The Jews of Czernowitz were not forced to assimilate to a dominant group because there was no stable center in the city, thus Jews were neither and both insiders and outsiders, which allowed for some expression of a Jewish nationality.⁹³ This framing is nuanced because it can allow for various expressions of loyalty or disloyalty among the Jewish population.⁹⁴ On the topic of loyalty, one suggestion is that Bukovina's borderland status encouraged loyalty during the Habsburg period because neighboring Russia and Romania looked worse to Jews.⁹⁵ This sentiment would later be mirrored in an *OJZ* article which noted that things would be worse in Russia, Hungary or Poland for the Jews, so the Jews would stay loyal to Romania.⁹⁶ I would suggest that the loss of this centerlessness and the imposition of a Romanian center in the 1920s helps explain the identity struggles of the interwar period and certain feelings of fondness for the monarchy, because a Jewish identity and twin civic identity were now less viable. This did not stop Jews from trying however, with an early issue of the *OJZ* pushed for "double nationalities" (*doppelte Nationalitat*).⁹⁷ For the Germans, the dynamic environment of Habsburg Czernowitz had them

⁹³ David Rechter, "A Jewish El Dorado? Myths and Politics in Habsburg Czernowitz," in *Insiders and Outsiders: Dilemmas of East European Jewry*, edited by Cohen Richard, Jonathan Frankel, and Stefani Hoffman (Portland, OR: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010), 219-220. He also has a good overview of the myth of Jewish Czernowitz, 208-215. For a more extensive work also see his monograph *Becoming Habsburg: The Jews of Austrian Bukovina, 1774-1918* (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2013).

⁹⁴ See van Drunen, "A Sanguine Bunch," 405 and 410-411 for a brief look at some points for Jewish loyalty as well as some skepticism among the state regarding this loyalty.

⁹⁵ Lichtblau and John, "Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina," 57 and 51.

⁹⁶ *OJZ*, 10.5.1929, 1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26.4.1919, 1.

as a local minority, but still culturally dominant and secure within the Dual-Monarchy. In the Romanian period, they were suddenly a minority and isolated, thus it is little surprise the Habsburgs might be looked at fondly.

Another point to emphasize is that the growth of Jewish national identities began in the Habsburg years, thus any debates in the interwar years had precedents. This was in part a response to rising antisemitism among the other nationalizing groups.⁹⁸ National identity did not mean a rejection of an “Austrian” identity or the Habsburgs, though in the case of Bukovina’s Jews it was often tied to regional identity. Van Drunen makes a convincing case that the German language (often Jewish) press was the strongest advocate for a Bukovinian regional identity.⁹⁹ This press also often had a light Jewish national element.¹⁰⁰ This was all despite (or perhaps because of) the Habsburg refusal to recognize any Jewish national identity. For instance, the 1910 Bukovinian reform which sought to make elections more representational based on ethnicity/language/faith excluded Jews as a nation and Yiddish as a language. The historian and prolific author on the topic of Czernowitz, Markus Winkler, identifies this lack of recognition under the Habsburgs as one of the three factors that made interwar Czernowitz Jewry special in Romania. The other two are that they were a minority but local majority, and that unlike Jews in other regions, they had greater political experience under the Habsburgs.¹⁰¹ While there are perhaps other small cases which fit these criteria, it does a good job identifying the distinct situation Czernowitz Jewry faced in the 1920s, and also suggests further reasoning behind the myth. The question now remains if the myth was shattered in 1918 and resurrected later in the 1930s/1940s, or if there was stronger continuity.

⁹⁸ van Drunen, “*A Sanguine Bunch*”, 603. He sees nationalizing in Bukovina as occurring in response to other nationalisms.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 612.

¹⁰⁰ Jacob Toury, *Die jüdische Presse im österreichischen Kaiserreich: ein Beitrag zur Problematik der Akkulturation 1802-1918* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1983), 144.

¹⁰¹ Markus Winkler, *Jüdische Identitäten im kommunikativen Raum: Presse, Sprache und Theater in Czernowitz bis 1923* (Bremen: Ed. Lumière, 2007), 276. Other regions might check 2 of the boxes, but not all 3.

2.2 “The First Martyr of Our Community:” Romanianization

This section will investigate some of the struggles German speakers faced in 1920s Romania. One challenge of this thesis has been editing out accounts of the fascinating events of the 1918 transitions from the Habsburg Monarchy to its successor states. In brief, in November 1918, following four years of war where the city was occupied multiple times, Czernowitz was taken by Romanian troops (November 11th) and absorbed into Romania.¹⁰² If the region had not joined Romania, another leading option seemed to be to join some Ukrainian entity—the vagueness here is due to the ongoing status of the Russian civil war. On November 28th when a congress of national councils (German, Polish, and Romanian) from Bukovina met and voted to join Romania, the Jews and Ukrainians both refused to participate. The desire for Jewish autonomy appears to be one factor for the boycott, though this was tied to the simple fact that Jews were not equal citizens in Romania and another factor was the desire to appear neutral in a national conflict.¹⁰³ In contrast, the Germans were not entering into a state where they were denied equal civil rights and whose leaders “believed Romanian promises that their cultural life would remain unfettered,” thus they were able to support joining Romania.¹⁰⁴ From the Romanian occupation until as late as 1928 (though it was lightened in 1920), strict censorship of the press occurred in Bukovina because of an official state of siege regarding the Polish border. This encompassed all languages, though in particular targeted left-wing and national minority publications whose threat authorities exaggerated, with certain left-wing

¹⁰² Prior to this in early November, a Jewish self-defense force managed to protect the Jewish portion of the community. See Sternberg, “On the History of the Jews;” Manfred Reifer, “History of the Jews in Bukovina;” and Arie Leon Schmelzer, “The Jews in Bukovina (1914-1919): World War and Russian Occupation,” all in *History of the Jews in the Bukowina*, 2 vols, Hugo Gold, ed., and Jerome Silverbush, trans. (Tel Aviv: “Olamenu,” 1958-1962). Mariana Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina 1918–1944. Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Großrumäniens* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), 83-133 covers the transition, though more research on this transition period is needed.

¹⁰³ For the autonomy view see Schmelzer, “The Jews in Bukovina (1914-1919).” A document in this article shows the collaboration of liberal, Zionist, socialist, and socialist Zionist Jews for a Jewish national goal in late November just before the congress. For explicit mention of the desire for neutrality see CAZ, 29.11.1928, 3: the Jews maintained “strict neutrality” (*strikten Neutralität*) as they did not want to “be crushed under the wheels in this battle between two opponents” (*in diesem Kampf zweier Gegner unter die Räder kommen*). The two opponents were Romanians and Ukrainians.

¹⁰⁴ Hausleitner, “Transformations in the Relationship,” 201 and 204.

German and Yiddish periodicals even being shuttered.¹⁰⁵ Though it is worth noting that despite this censorship, the ability to publish in non-Romanian languages was protected.¹⁰⁶ The relevance of this is that newspaper writers and editors were aware that they would need to pass the censors, and likely by 1928 had a good understanding of what would be accepted.

In 1918, Romania also absorbed Transylvania and Banat from the Habsburgs and gained Bessarabia from Russia. This meant that in interwar Romania 30% of the population was not Romanian and Jews and Germans each made up about 4% of the country's population. In Bukovina, the group breakdown was as follows: 38.4% Ukrainian, 34.2% Romanian; 12% Jewish, 9.3% German, and then some Poles and others.¹⁰⁷ More than half of Bukovina's Jews and just over a quarter of its Germans lived around Czernowitz and both populations were disproportionately urban.¹⁰⁸ Generally in Romania, as with many interwar successor states, there was a deep rural urban divide, with antisemitism often being used to explain the crisis in rural modernization.¹⁰⁹ From 1918 until the 1923 constitution, Jews were denied full citizenship rights across Romania, despite the promises to respect minority rights in the Peace treaties, as well as in other Romanian laws.¹¹⁰ After 1923 the struggle for rights would continue and was one pattern which would be a constant in the *OJZ* reporting and campaigning.¹¹¹ This

¹⁰⁵ Mariana Hausleitner, "Öffentlichkeit und Pressezensur in der Bukowina und in Bessarabien," *Deutschsprachige Öffentlichkeit*, 448-449 and 459. She points out that social democracy was an important connector between different national groups.

¹⁰⁶ Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, "The German-Language Newspapers in Czernowitz/Cernăuți before and after the First World War," *Journal of Austrian Studies* 53, no. 3 (2020), 9.

¹⁰⁷ Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 9, 10, and 49. Statistics are from the 1930 census. Also note that; Jews were split between German and Yiddish speaking (ignoring the large amount of bilingualism).

¹⁰⁸ Hiltrun Glass, *Zerbrochene Nachbarschaft*, 46-48. This was the largest number of German speakers in a region of Bukovina, though Germans made up a higher percentage of the population in Kimpolung and Radautz.

¹⁰⁹ Sorin Radu, and Oliver Jens Schmitt eds., *Politics and Peasants in Interwar Romania: Perceptions, Mentalities, Propaganda* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), 1-2 and 58. Opposition to liberalism also grew steadily in interwar Romania.

¹¹⁰ An early example from the *OJZ* compares Romania unfavorably with Austria and Germany which had emancipated their Jews long ago, 21.10.1921, 1.

¹¹¹ While the constitution of 1923 granted equal rights for Jews, this did not stop discrimination, such as unofficially sealing off positions to Jews. Additionally, a 1924 citizenship law resulted in many of these Jews, along with many Hungarians, becoming non-citizens, see Mariana Hausleitner, "Antisemitism in Romania," in *Antisemitism in Eastern Europe: History and Present in Comparison*, Hans-Christian Petersen, and Samuel Salzborn, eds. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 206.

also meant that dual Jewish national and civically Romanian identity was not the most achievable or appealing. Radical Romanian nationalists more generally sought to reverse and further limit the rights of Jews in the interwar years.¹¹²

The Jewish vote simply did not matter for most Romanian political parties even after 1923, though the anti-Jewish vote did. Essentially, after 1919 the electorate in Romania almost doubled, mostly with newly included rural peasantry, thus this demographic became the key battleground for many political parties.¹¹³ In this battleground it was beneficial to tap into antisemitism. The historian Irina Livezeanu points out that the Romanian peasant was the “common denominator” across all regions of the country, but so was the urban Jew, which was the “antipode” to the idealized rural peasant in the Romanian imagination. She continues that it was thus easy to position Jews as an internal enemy and build on pre-war antisemitic narratives and tropes to have Jews also act as a stand-in for all that was liberal and Western. She also argues that Jews were the least acceptable of all of Romania’s minorities, not only for religious reasons and their association with the urban, but also because they were identified with the old Habsburg and Russian regimes.¹¹⁴ In the *OJZ*, reporting on instances of antisemitism was a common occurrence, but so were assertions of loyalty to Romania which seem to be in part a response to the perceived opposition of Jews to the “ideal Romanian,” as well as to accusations of loyalty to the Habsburgs. While Germans were not villainized like the Jews, their small population also meant that they often still did not have “any significant weight.”¹¹⁵ Depending on what one considered a sign of loyalty to the past, simply speaking German or continuing to embrace German as a cultural milieu could be seen as suspicious. And many Czernowitz Jews did continue to operate in German linguistically and culturally, as did

¹¹² Constantin Iordachi, *The Fascist Faith of the Legion “Archangel Michael” in Romania, 1927-1941: Martyrdom and National Purification* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2023), 60. See for more on the interwar Romanian radical right.

¹¹³ Radu, and Schmitt, *Politics and Peasant*, 29, 41, and 54.

¹¹⁴ Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 10-13 and 30.

¹¹⁵ Komjathy and Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich*, 106.

the Germans. Even if these were not done out of Habsburg nostalgia, the practice could still be “one of the ways in which they resisted Romanianization and its increasing social, political, and intellectual restrictions. In this sense, [...] “resistant nostalgia.”¹¹⁶ Thus, associational connections to the Habsburg past could (un)consciously oppose Romanianization efforts. While it goes beyond the scope of the thesis, Jews could also turn to Yiddish language and culture, and a more national Jewish identity to resist Romanianization.¹¹⁷ Though as the *OJZ* shows, German language/culture and Jewish national identity were still highly compatible, if at times in tension.¹¹⁸

A crucial battlefield for Romanianization in the 1920s was education. One contemporary source described the Romanianization of German schools as taking place “bit by bit” (*nach und nach*) via “pinprick politics” (*Nadelstichpolitik*).¹¹⁹ Under the Habsburgs, there were very strong and disproportionate German and Jewish presences at all levels of education, for example around ~30% of students were Jewish at Czernowitz’ elite gymnasia in 1910, Germans made up almost 25% of the students.¹²⁰ In 1918, the reorganization of schooling was an immediate concern for the Romanian state. This reform set up five ethnic based school

¹¹⁶ Marianne Hirsch, and Leo Spitzer, *Ghosts of Home: The Afterlife of Czernowitz in Jewish Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), xv.

¹¹⁷ Francica Solomon, “Bukovina’s Yiddish Landscape in Habsburg and Post-Habsburg Context,” in *Continuities and Discontinuities of the Habsburg Legacy in East-Central European Discourses Since 1918*, edited by Baran-Szołtys, Magdalena, and Jagoda Wierzejska (Göttingen and Vienna: V&R unipress Vienna University Press, 2020), 103-104, and 106. She also points out that Yiddish publication in Bukovina lasted much longer in the interwar years than before. Though the rise in Yiddish should not be seen as only because of a greater identification with it. A demographic change occurred because of WWI where many Jews closer to German culture left the city and were replaced by more Yiddish speaking Jews from further east, especially Bessarabia, see Lichtblau and John, “Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina,” 44. For a list of some local Yiddish periodicals see Susanne Marten-Finnis, “Wer sprach Jiddisch in Czernowitz?” in *Presselandschaft in der Bukovina und den Nachbarregionen: Akteure - Inhalte - Ereignisse (1900-1945)*, edited by Markus Winkler (Munich: IKGS Verl., 2011), 70. For an example in Yiddish from Czernowitz on the Habsburgs see “*Di Blutshuld der Habsburgerklike*” (The Blood Debt of the Habsburg Clique), *Di Frayhayt*, 9.10.1919, 1. Transliteration and translation of my own.

¹¹⁸ For “Germans paradoxical palace in Jewish nationalism” see Marc Volovici, *German as a Jewish Problem: The Language Politics of Jewish Nationalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021), 3 and 7-8 for how the prominence of German meant that it was hard to ignore for Jewish national activists.

¹¹⁹ Friedrich Albrecht, “Die Deutschen in Rumänien.” in *Das Deutschtum des Sudostens*, 76.

¹²⁰ Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 63, 68. Also see 72 for the massive jump in Jewish private schooling in the 1920s in response to the reforms. See the excellent second Chapter for an overview of the schooling conflict in the interwar period.

paths (Romanian/German/Jewish/Ukrainian/Polish) to explicitly target Ukrainians and to purposely separate the Jews from the Germans to attempt to break their German/Austrian identity. Jewish schools in particular were underfunded and lost resources even though Jews had to pay significantly more for Lycées and Jewish teachers were harassed or replaced. Combined with the denial of citizenship, this was the “end of an era in which Jews had enjoyed both equal rights and social privileges.”¹²¹ The school issue and lack of rights serves to highlight two major ways in which Jews in particular were undeniably worse off. Livezeanu summarizes a speech given by the prominent Jewish politician Benno Straucher in 1925 as “Happier times had preceded Bukovina’s stepchildhood, and the Jews had been the beneficiaries of that more auspicious, more autonomous past.”¹²² The loss of Czernowitz’ Franz-Josephs-Universität as a German institution was also a major blow to the continued place of German culture,¹²³ and employment for both Jews and Germans. Overall, German schools were less targeted than Jewish or Ukrainian ones because of Germans’ loyalty in 1918, their relatively small numbers, and the authorities’ beliefs that they had accepted the new status quo. Despite this, the Germans still wanted more *German* schools in both content and staff.¹²⁴

Four newspapers will form the bulk of the material in the following two subsections.¹²⁵ The *Ostjüdische Zeitung*, has already been cited in this chapter regularly. Like many Central European Zionist groups of the interwar period, the *OJZ* supported the protection of Jews locally and the establishment of a Jewish state abroad.¹²⁶ While a Jewish nationalist/Zionist voice does not speak for all the Jews of Bukovina/Czernowitz, the two other major German

¹²¹ Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 69-79.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 73-74.

¹²³ Iulia-Elena Zup, “Bewahren der Deutschen Identität und Sprache in Großrumänien. Das Vereinsleben,” *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Philologia* 66, no. 3 (2021), 99-100.

¹²⁴ For all of this on German schools, see Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 68.

¹²⁵ I was unable to access all of the relevant publications of the period, such as the socialist *Vorwärts*, though the *OJZ* will lean rather left at times.

¹²⁶ It was founded on 14.4.1919, by Meyer Ebner, a prominent Czernowitz politician, and began as a weekly paper, and by 1923 it had three issues a week until it was shut down in 1938. It had a circulation of around 4800, though it had a big influence on leading Jews in Bukovina. Winkler, *Jüdische Identitäten*, 291-293; and Zvi yavetz, *Erinnerungen an Czernowitz: wo Menschen und Bücher lebten* (Munich: Beck, 2008), 233-234.

language newspapers run by Jews in Czernowitz, also published Zionist articles. Thus, the ideas and views of the *OJZ* would not have been foreign to much of the population and these two other papers can provide a more varied Jewish and Jewish/German view. These two Jewish-edited, but not explicitly *Jewish* papers, were the *Czernowitzer Morgenblatt* (*CMB*) and *Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung* (*CAZ*).¹²⁷ It is important to note that these latter two were “read by all educated people in Czernowitz,”¹²⁸ and thus show overlap and blurring between the German and Jewish populations. The *Czernowitzer Deutsche Tagespost* (*CDT*) founded in 1924 was a more German nationalist publication. Unlike the Slovenian case where German speaking essentially meant German, in Czernowitz, Jewish voices were quite prominent.

Before diving into memory, the reporting on a violent episode in 1926 will further introduce the four periodicals, touch on the Czernowitz myth, and offer a largely unused opportunity to draw on the Habsburg past. In the issues from October 1926, I did not find references to the superiority of education under the Habsburgs when a scandal was unfolding about what was essentially an unofficial *numerus clausus* via rigged university entrance exams in Czernowitz which particularly targeted Jews, though all non-Romanians were hurt by this. Following protests by a united front of Germans, Jews and Ukrainians, where some Jewish students allegedly harassed some teachers, one of the students, David Fallik, was arrested and would be tried. However, that November he was murdered by a Romanian nationalist youth for partially antisemitic reasons. Fallik and others apparently espoused anti-Romanian government statements at the protest.¹²⁹ This is an interesting case of ethnic cooperation which goes against the general trend of resistance to centralization being foiled by the ethno-religious

¹²⁷ For the editors and more on the blurring and negotiation of German and Jewish, see Peter Rychlo, “Aspekt deutsch-jüdischer Kultursymbiose im Czernowitzer Morgenblatt,” in *Grenzdiskurse*, 142. The two paper’s circulation fluctuate between around 4000 and 10000, Winkler, *Jüdische Identitäten*, 291-293. Also see “Czernowitzer Morgenblatt: ein deutsch-jüdisches Blatt?,” in *Deutschsprachige Öffentlichkeit*.

¹²⁸ Hausleitner, “Transformations in the Relationship,” 201.

¹²⁹ For details of the incident see Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 79-86. The head of the oral exams was a known antisemite and within a few months would join the new Legionnaire movement. In court the murder admitted to premeditated murder and antisemitic motivations, but was acquitted 8-2. For a snapshot of the exam scandal see the *OJZ*, 10.10.1926.

and geographic differences of the population.¹³⁰ Representatives of the German and Ukrainian communities attended Fallik's funeral along with 40-50,000 others.¹³¹ This cooperation and solidarity could be taken as evidence for the persistence of the Czernowitz myth.

In the press after the murder, I found no references to the better life under the Habsburgs in any of the papers—likely because it was a tense time when invoking the imperial past would not have won any goodwill with the government or passed the censors. Additionally, editors might not have deemed it necessary because the crime was so overt, outside images did not need to be drawn, or as will be shown with the *CAZ*, other images were preferred. I recognize the problematic counterfactual nature of what was *not* used, but given the objectively worse education situation for German speaking Jews under Romania and the fact I have been unable to find reference to any comparable event under the Habsburgs, I think it is reasonable to believe that it at least crossed readers' or editors' minds that 'this wouldn't have happened fifteen years ago.' The German *Tagespost* reported on the murder and described it as something especially sad for the Jewish community. They also announced the funeral information.¹³² While this was not some explicit expression of solidarity, it showed sympathy and connection between the communities. All three other papers dedicated much more page space to covering the murder and I would suggest that this was at least implicitly because of the Jewish element of the case.

The *CMB* generally supported all minority rights, but emphasized the particular Jewish angle in this case, which was in complete contrast to the liberal *CAZ*, which almost never explicitly stated that Fallik was Jewish! On the 14th there was only a small mention on the fifth

¹³⁰ For the joint protest see Hausleitner, "Antisemitism in Romania," 207. She also emphasizes that this unity was not found in Bessarabia or Transylvania in similar school struggles. In a different piece she also sees Bukovina as being more united against censorship than Bessarabia, Hausleitner, "Öffentlichkeit und Pressezensur," 448-449. For the general trend of a lack of cooperation versus centralization, see Iordachi, *The Fascist Faith*, 57. Even among the German minorities in different regions of Romania, there were trouble relating to one another, Sacha E. Davis, "Constructing the 'Volksgemeinschaft': Saxon Particularism and the Myth of the German East, 1919-1933," *German Studies Review* 39, no. 1 (2016), 41.

¹³¹ For the funeral see *CMB* and *CAZ*, 16.11.1926.

¹³² *CDT*, 14.11.1926, 2.

page in the funeral information, and on the 16th, it was only through (rather explicit) context clues that Fallik was identified Jewish. In both cases, the cover story on the murder neglected any Jewish element to link it to broader struggles, either versus chauvinism—Fallik’s murder was compared to Codreanu murdering Manicu—or versus autocracy—with descriptions of the funeral compared to *Battleship Potemkin*.¹³³ The *CAZ* otherwise reported on Jewish issues and topics, thus this was a conscious choice to decenter Fallik’s Jewishness—perhaps to court wider support.¹³⁴ I have two observations from the *OJZ*’s initial pieces on the murder. The first is that when searching for references to express how shaken the community was, the 1903 Kishinev (Chişinău) pogrom was used, instead of a Habsburg or local Bukovinian example. The second is that Fallik is referred to as “the first martyr of our community” (*dem ersten Märtyrer unserer Gemeinde*).¹³⁵ This label is significant because it implicitly states that there were no martyrs before this, that the past, including the Habsburg period, was a less violent time. Or perhaps there was a silent view of a reset, a *Stunde Null*, of sorts in 1918.

Thus, when one goes searching for connections to the Habsburg past, one is able to find them even in apparent silences. Romanianization forced German speakers who opposed it to seek out different ways to resist, criticize, and/or court the state. Though invoking the Habsburg past was not automatic or extremely common and seemed to be more confined to specific moments of mnemonic concentration.

2.3 The Farce Is Over: Kaiser Karl in Life and Death

There was anything but silence in the Czernowitz press regarding the reporting on Kaiser Karl’s two coup attempts in Hungary in 1921, with cover stories reporting day by day

¹³³ *CMB* and *CAZ*, 14 and 16.11.1926.

¹³⁴ For an extensive overview of the *CAZ* see Nora Chelaru, “Die Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung, die langlebigste Tageszeitung der Bukowina (1903-1940),” in *Narrative des Peripheren in posthabsburgischen Literaturen des zentral(ost)europäischen Raum*, Ana-Maria Pălimariu and Wolfgang Müller-Funk, eds., 171-203 (Constance: Hartung-Gorre, 2019). I would suggest that more could be included on the 1920s though, and she does not address the Fallik case.

¹³⁵ *OJZ*, 14.11.1926, 1-2

events in the papers. Essentially, a pattern of downplaying the danger Karl posed while he was alive, often with humor, was prevalent, though outside of the *OJZ* after Karl's death, there was little positive said about the dynasty. Though *both* this minimizing, and as will be addressed later, expressing Habsburg loyalty, were used to demonstrate loyalty to, or at least acceptance of, the Romanian state.

Before looking at the *CAZ*, *CMB*, and *OJZ*, a few words on the *CDT*. It is disappointing for my desire to compare, that the *Tagesspost* only began publishing after the coups and Karl's death. To extrapolate from how the newspaper treated the Habsburgs in its pages before 1928, according to Nora Chelaru, there was a habit of criticizing the dynasty, though this was sometimes accompanied with equal criticisms of the Romanian state, and at other times with support for it, such as supporting Romania's historic territorial claims to Bukovina.¹³⁶ This lines up with what I found for 1928, and the other issues throughout the 1920s I read. Though there are exceptions, such as one occasion where sympathy for Kaiser Karl was expressed via a book extract.¹³⁷ Given this, on the whole I would expect the *CDT* to have published critical views of the Habsburgs in 1921-1922 if it had been in existence, though sympathy for Karl might also have shown up.

Loyalty to Romania was emphasized when even the thought of potential of Habsburg loyalty or a restoration appeared. Similar to the Slovenian case we find that both the *CMB* and *CAZ* acknowledged the danger of the Kaiser's "adventures," but simultaneously downplayed them, with the *CAZ* referring to the second coup as a "tragicomedy," and describing its end with the headline phrase "*Finita la Comedia* [sic]" (the farce is over).¹³⁸ As with the Slovenian case, the *CAZ* positions the Habsburgs as an "obstacle for th[e] unity" of the Germans, though

¹³⁶ Chelaru, "Despre Habsburgi," 552-554.

¹³⁷ *CDT* 18.1.1929, 3. The extract is from the defensive biography of Kaiser Karl by Polzer-Hoditz.

¹³⁸ *CAZ* October 1921: for danger see 26th; tragicomedy see 27th; and Finita see 29th (this last headline is potentially a reference to Pagliacci). Sadly, I do not have access to Spring 1921.

it does not actively promote an *Anschluss* between Germany and Austria.¹³⁹ Overall these two publications instrumentalize the Habsburg past less here than their counterparts in Untersteiermark. The *Morgenblatt* overtly addresses this danger-comedy dichotomy with the line “Now one could laugh at this comedy if it was not so shocking,” and undermines the Kaiser with the (correct) view that even the Austrian population did not want him.¹⁴⁰ As with the Yugoslav case, there are not any overt declarations of loyalty to the new state here, just general opposition to Karl/the dynasty, though the Slovenian Germans tried to tie their interest with the state’s. Following Karl’s death in April 1922, both the *CAZ* and *CMB* expressed certain sympathies to Karl, with the *CAZ* writing that he should not be a “scapegoat” (*Sündenbock*) for the Habsburgs because he was actually the “victim of the centuries long sins of Habsburg policies.”¹⁴¹ This opposition to the Habsburgs was the complete opposite of the support the paper showed the dynasty while it ruled.¹⁴²

Unlike these two papers, the *OJZ* brought an overt Jewish view to some of its coverage of Kaiser Karl. The *OJZ* showed the most explicit loyalty to the Romanian state. Three articles, looked at in chronological order, highlight this. The first article, from October 1921, is not nostalgic and treats the idea of a Habsburg restoration as an insane joke like the *CAZ* and *CMB*, because the Monarchy already failed and “success is the god of history.” Though the article recognizes that the attempt would result in war and violence which would not be worth the cost for anybody.¹⁴³ This fits perfectly into the context of the ongoing coup in Hungary, when any possible pro-Habsburg stance would appear as disloyalty. The second article from April 1922 focuses on Karl’s death and is quite mournful and full of pity because it seems the *Tragödie*

¹³⁹ “*Hindernis für ihre Vereinigung*,” *CAZ*, 30.10.1921, 1.

¹⁴⁰ “*Nun könnte man über diese Komödie Lachen, wenn sie nicht so erschütterlich*,” *CMB*, 26.10.1921, 1 and 2.4.1921,1.

¹⁴¹ “*Opfer der jahrhundertelangen Sünden der Habsburgerpolitik*,” *CMB*, 1.4.1922; 6.4.1922,1; and *CAZ*, 6.4.1922, 1.

¹⁴² Chelaru, “*Die Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung*,” 187-188.

¹⁴³ “*der Erfolg ist der Gott der Geschichte*,” *OJZ*, 28.10.1921, 1.

(tragedy) was finally over. An interesting point of emphasis is that such feelings were not dangerous because the article asserts the future of the Jews is with Romania. Thus, the *OJZ* puts forward the idea that you can belong to one state and still be sad about your “always vanishing past” (*immer entschwunden Vergangenheit*).¹⁴⁴ There is a strong sense in the article of Karl representing a tragic combination of both Habsburg myths, wherein the Monarchy was dysfunctional and had problems, but you could still miss it. Once Karl and the dynasty were (essentially) over, it was safer to speak positively. The final article, from October 1922, is one of the most interesting I read in the *OJZ*, and provided one of the opening quotes in the Introduction to the thesis, on how the Jews were loyal to the Habsburgs, but they could be loyal to the Romanian state now (“But the Jew can also love his King as he had loved his Emperor. But one must earn love”).¹⁴⁵ It offers an interesting leaning into the trope that the Jews held outside loyalties because it essentially uses prior outside loyalty to the Habsburgs as part of a job application with the Romanian monarch. Another point within the article makes it seem even more like trying to pass a litmus test:

“If the Habsburgs had had as many patriots like we Jews were, Emperor Karl would not have died in misery on a distant island. We Jews say this frankly and freely, and with a certain pride [...] because no one can expect the intelligent, realistically thinking Jewish people of Bukovina to still dream of Habsburg restorations. We say it with a certain pride because it is honorable to have been faithful and steadfast in times of misery.”¹⁴⁶

Thus, when stressing loyalty to the current state, Jews could also play with affection for some elements in the Habsburg past. Though it only seemed safe to do so once potential threats had passed. This could also be an example of coming to terms with the past—that the Habsburgs were finished—and accepting that courting a new dynasty was beneficial. The general lack of

¹⁴⁴ *OJZ*, 7.4.1922, 1.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.10.1922, 1.

¹⁴⁶ “Hätten die Habsburger lauter solche Patrioten gehabt wie wir Juden es waren, Kaiser Karl wäre nicht auf einer fernen Insel im Elend gestorben. Dies sagen wir Juden frank und frei und mit einem gewissen Stolze frank und frei sagen wir es, weil dem klugen, realpolitisch denkenden jüdischen Volke der Bukovina niemand zumuten kann, dass es noch von habsburgischen Restaurationen träumt. Mit einem gewissen Stolze sagen wir es, weil es ehrenhaft ist, in Zeiten der Not treu und standhaft gewesen zu sein.” *Ibid.*, 13.10.1922, 1. Karl died exiled on Madeira.

positive reporting on Karl or the dynasty, beyond personal sympathies could also be an example of the *CAZ* and *CMB* having already accepted the dynasty's end and not caring that much anymore.¹⁴⁷

Events surrounding Kaiser Karl allowed Germans and Jews to demonstrate that they did not want the Habsburg Monarchy to return as a real entity. Even the *OJZ*'s assertions of prior loyalty to the Habsburgs, for all the notes of nostalgia, were not restorative, but looking to replicate the positive of the past with the new Romanian state.¹⁴⁸ The *OJZ*'s loyalty is explicitly Jewish, though it falls in line with a broader myth of a "special" relationship between the Habsburgs and the Jews, and not the regional Bukovina myth. The Jewish editorship of the *CAZ* and *CMB* helps to highlight that there was no Jewish monolith. While the *OJZ* used Karl's final adventures to seek closer relations with the state, the *CAZ* and *CMB* did not. One suggestion for the different approach of the *OJZ* is that it was more willing to pursue specifically Jewish solutions as an explicitly Zionist publication, as opposed to the other two which sought wider solutions. This instrumentalization, or lack thereof, is in contrast to the Slovenia case of pushing for an *Anschluss*. Though all papers in both regions tried to downplay Karl's threat, often with humor, while he was alive. As we move to 1928, I do not want to suggest that a perfect temporal progression occurred, rather that danger and opportunity informed when the Habsburg past could be drawn on constructively. Essentially, I do not want to assert that the newspapers wrote things that they did not believe, but rather they considered an element of Realpolitik in how and when to express their beliefs.

¹⁴⁷ The general neutrality of the *CMB*'s reports on Karl's death from 1-6 April 1922 support this. It, and the *CAZ*, both actually misreported his death a day early, but do not seem too concerned by it in their corrections. (On 1.4.1922, the *CAZ* headline misreported the deaths of both Karl and Lenin!)

¹⁴⁸ For restorative nostalgia as opposed to reflective nostalgia, see Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

2.4 A *Stunde Null*? Failing at Forgetting the Habsburg Past

The ten-year anniversary of Bukovina joining Greater Romania fell during a general election campaign, which can partially explain the prevalence of political calls for action during commemoration articles. Anniversary articles were largely published between 28 November and 1 December, prior to voting, which took place from 12 to 19 December 1928.¹⁴⁹ The election was based on universal male suffrage and led to the National Liberal Party which had held power since 1922, falling to a decisive National Peasants' Party (PNT) victory. Many German speakers, Jewish and non-Jewish, supported the PNT in this election because of the harmful policies the Liberals had backed for six years.¹⁵⁰ In 1928, the German press implicitly and explicitly used the troubles of the previous decades to try to motivate their readers to vote for or against specific parties. One common strategy was to invoke a decade of struggle, while still maintaining loyalty to the state. The Habsburg past was generally treated in an indirect way, making it seem as though there was a *Stunde Null* in 1918.

In their anniversary articles, three of the four Czernowitz newspapers linked the events of 1918 with a decade of struggle. Before dealing with Bukovina, a brief sidestep to Banat is worthwhile. The *Banater Deutsche Zeitung (BDZ)*, based in Temeswar, explained that Banat Germans understandably “feel strongly” (*reichlich verspüren*) about the previous ten years and emphasized the many threats to German minority rights, but never described the events of 1918 in detail—the actual union was just the start of the narrative. The *BDZ* also explicitly supported the *Deutsche Partei* in the upcoming election and was quite hostile to the ruling Romanian government.¹⁵¹ In Bukovina, there was less overt aggression against the government than in

¹⁴⁹ Across Romania there were four different dates when the 1918 transition could be commemorated (December 1st Transylvania); November 28th (Bukovina); March 17th (Bessarabia); and May 10th, an official celebration date (in the 1920s at least) meant to subsume the others and had an association with the Romanian monarchy.

¹⁵⁰ For both the larger, predominantly Romanian parties, and the smaller, minority population parties, it often made sense to cooperate, such as when the *Deutsche Partei* supported the PNT in the 1928 election. Alliances benefited the large parties because the votes of a national minority could push them ahead of competitors or were necessary for a majority in certain regions.

¹⁵¹ *BDZ*, 30.11.1928, 1; and 1.12.1928, 1.

the Banat. For example, the *Czernowitzer Deutsch Tagespost*, called for greater German minority rights, but had its article about the previous decade end with the metaphor: “A lost child has found their way home to their mother where they had once belonged.”¹⁵² This was a show of loyalty to the state, supporting a *reunification*, not a unification, narrative. Loyalty was also directly stressed, with the Germans being “honest citizens” and the minorities (generally) having “unbroken loyalty to the state.”¹⁵³ The child metaphor also acts as a subtle distancing of Bukovina from its Habsburg past which lasted over 140 years.¹⁵⁴ Not quite a *Stunde Null* but a sign that 1918 was portrayed as a major rupture. Further evidence of a *Stunde Null* attitude of sorts comes from the expressed view that 1918 in Bukovina was the arrival of a “new national history” (*neue nationale Geschichte*).¹⁵⁵ An explanation for this different attitude between the two regions is that Germans made up a greater percentage of the population in Banat compared with Bukovina and so had a stronger power base to draw upon, and could thus risk being less subtle. Furthermore, the *CDT* might also simply have come further along in accepting the past and the new status quo than other publications. Compared to the Slovenian case, which was close to a German majority state, the Bukovinian Germans could not realistically even hint at some union with their compatriots or compared to the *OJZ* piece on Kaiser Karl which mourned the past, the *CDT* could see less of value there—especially with the imminent reforming Peasant Party victory. The same 1928 *Tagespost* article also criticizes the state, but treats the late Romanian King Ferdinand I, who was also in charge in 1918, as a protector of the minorities. This use of memory is an interesting way to indirectly and safely criticize the current monarch and government through a silent comparison.

¹⁵² “*Ein verlorenes Kind hatte wieder zu seiner Mutter heimgefunden, dem es einst angehört hatte,*” *CDT*, 29.11.1928, 2.

¹⁵³ “*ehrlische Staatsbürger; ungebrochener Treue zum Staat,*” *Ibid.*, 29.11.1928, 1.

¹⁵⁴ Bukovina first fell under Habsburg control in 1774. From 1861 it was a separate province, and from 1867 the province was part of the Cisleithanian half of the Monarchy. This lost child idea also recalls the *CDT* supporting the Romanian historic claim to Bukovina earlier in the 20s, see section 2.3. It is also different to Benno Staucher describing being under Romania as *step* childhood.

¹⁵⁵ *CDT*, 29.11.1928, 2.

The *Czernowitzer Morgenblatt* opens its anniversary article by reminding readers that the events of 1918 were still within “living memory” (*lebendiger Erinnerung*) and that they should not forget that the right of each *Nation* to “self-determination” (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht*) was not respected for minority populations.¹⁵⁶ National self-determination here refers directly to the Wilsonian postwar idea/practice. The *CMB* sets up the decade following 1918 as one of twin struggles: one of minorities generally, not just the German minority, against the National Liberal Party, and the other, of democracy against the old regime. National self-determination is the heavily implied solution to these two dual struggles for the *Morgenblatt*. The invocation of “living memory” is fascinating because it brings the past closer to the present and urges readers to recall on their own. Despite this reference to living memory, no praise or criticism is leveled at the recent and lived Habsburg past, the focus is on minority and democratic struggles which are portrayed to have begun fresh in 1918. The major difference and break with the Habsburgs is acknowledged, namely the contrast between the “national and ethnic relations” in the Dual Monarchy as compared to the Romanian “nationally unified state” (*national-einheitliche Staat*). To counter any hints of disloyalty, the article refers to the Romanian “*Mutterlande*” twice and is asking for promised rights to be respected. All of this is in line with the view published a few months later on the anniversary in May which supports the idea of loyal criticism because of the distinction that “the state is not identical to the government.”¹⁵⁷ The *CMB*’s articles seem to promote change from within the system for both Germans, Jews, and other minorities.

The *OJZ* frontpage anniversary article in 1928 recognized that there had been *Freud* (joy) and *Leid* (suffering) over the past decade for local Jews. The article was thankful for the Romanian state for establishing order because in 1918 “we as Jews were in more danger than

¹⁵⁶ *CMB*, 29.11.1928, 1.

¹⁵⁷ “*nationaler und ethnischer Beziehung*,” and “*der Staat ist nicht identisch mit der Regierung*,” *Ibid.*, 9.5.1929, 13.

the other inhabitants of the country, because chaotic conditions provide the ferment for riots against Jews, because base instincts always have an effect when there is no authority and woe betide us if these instincts are unleashed.”¹⁵⁸ This does not directly mention the Habsburgs, though it implicitly notes a change from Habsburg rule, and a clearly negative one at that. There is also a parallel here to the previously quoted view that the Jews could be as loyal to the Romanian monarchy as they were to the Habsburgs because the authority here which protected the Jews is vague, and could be fulfilled by Austria or Romania or another power. The article still sought greater rights for Jews despite any thankfulness for 1918 and recognized that on the whole there has been more *Leid* over the past decade for the Jews. An issue of the Czernowitz Zionist *Neue Jüdische Rundschau* from 1929 has an identical point where the balance from an assessment of the prior decade leans more to bad than good for Jews.¹⁵⁹ The overarching implication to this decade of struggle was that things had gotten worse since the transition.

The demand for the recognition of rights and opposition to antisemitism were also consistent. An anniversary article from 1927 which oozes with attitude is best summarized as: a congratulations to the Romanians on their special day, but you still promised us Jews equality years ago and we have not forgotten.¹⁶⁰ This bears a strong parallel to the Slovenian case of it being unreasonable to expect Germans to celebrate 1918, and the following example. An *OJZ* anniversary issue from May 1929 emphasizes that the minority populations (read especially Jews) were not happy with the end of the Habsburg Monarchy: “who could expect these minorities to have wished for the destruction of their fatherlands?”¹⁶¹ The plural of fatherland

¹⁵⁸ “*Uns als Juden drohte mehr als den sonstigen Bewohnern des Landes Gefahr, weil chaotische Zustände den Gärungsstoff abgeben für Ausschreitungen gegen Juden, weil niedrige Instinkte sich immer auswirken, wenn eine Autorität fehlt und wehe uns, wenn diese Instinkte losgelassen werden,*” *OJZ*, 30.11.1928, 1.

¹⁵⁹ *Neue Jüdische Rundschau*, 10.5.1929, 1.

¹⁶⁰ *OJZ*, 10.5.1927, 1. For a reference to antisemitism as a “dark shadow” over Romania see 10.5.1929.

¹⁶¹ “*wer könnte diesen Minderheiten zumuten, sie hätten die Zertrümmerung ihrer Vaterländer gewünscht?*,” *Ibid.*, 10.5.1929, 1. It would be anachronistic, but the image of a gay couple of two fatherlands is subversive.

is interesting because it implies that an individual could have multiple fatherlands, which was crucial for this interwar Central European Zionist variant which sought change locally, but still pushed for a Jewish state abroad. In the Habsburg context there could also be the implication of an Austrian nation one belonged to, in addition to a more regional or national one. Overall, these anniversary *OJZ* examples, except for this last 1929 one, were generally not praising the Habsburg Monarchy, but instead mainly using the past which happens to be Habsburg, to criticize the Romanian government. Instrumentalizing the past on commemoration events was not isolated to Bukovina. For instance, there were extensive debates in the Romanian press over what December 1st, 1918, really meant and who should receive credit for the successes since then.¹⁶² Jews in the old Romanian Kingdom also drew on the past to advocate for greater rights around anniversaries, though they instead emphasized their past loyalty to the Romanian crown.¹⁶³

The exception to this pattern of including the prior decade in their anniversary articles was the *Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung*. The *CAZ* wrote a piece which was rather celebratory and provided a pro-Romanian government chronology of events of fall 1918 without addressing the following decade.¹⁶⁴ The piece focuses on the German minority, and asserts German loyalty, that “in their fight for Czernowitz, the Romanians had the Bukowina Germans at their side.” This stands in contrast to what the *CAZ* actually published in 1918, which called for an autonomous Bukovina.¹⁶⁵ One explanation would be that the *CAZ* successfully came to terms with the past in the early 1920s; this is supported by the work of Nora Chelaru who

¹⁶² Maria Bucur, “Birth of a Nation: Commemorations of December 1, 1918, and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Romania,” in *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe 1848 to the Present*, edited by Maria Bucur, and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001), 296.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 294.

¹⁶⁴ *CAZ*, 29.11.1928, 1-3. The narrative here boils down to seeing joining Romania as a better option for the Germans than joining Ukraine, with the Jews remaining neutral.

¹⁶⁵ “*In ihrem Kampfe um Czernowitz haben die Rumänien die Bukowinaer Deutschen an ihrer Seite,*” Chelaru, “*Die Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung,*” 185. Of course loyalty and autonomy were not mutually exclusive, but the contrast from wanting regional autonomy to no criticism is striking.

argues that the *CAZ* transferred dynastic loyalty from the Habsburgs to the Romanian royals.¹⁶⁶ An explanation for this difference regarding the non-addressal of the prior decade, is that all the newspapers were expressing or selling a specific collective memory to their audience. The continuity the *CAZ* established did not require any description of events after 1918 because their narrative did not include any major struggle afterwards. Recall that the *CAZ* account of the murder of David Fallik in 1926 positioned regressive and radical *non-state* forces as the villains. For the groups the other newspapers represented, the events of 1918 were not neatly separated from the following events, and those events flowed naturally into the present. It does not matter if a member of the community had their rights ignored a decade ago or yesterday, the struggle and victimhood were one and the same one. More generally, and following Halbwachs, the expression of collective memory was not strictly periodized, where 1918 was automatically a distinct event from what followed.¹⁶⁷ However, 1918 was marked as distinct from the Habsburg period—a separate *before*—for all these groups. A sense of rupture hangs above these articles.

In commemorative articles a common practice was attempting to create a chain from the past to the future. The *Tagespost* exemplified this when it described the tenth anniversary as both “for the past and for the future.”¹⁶⁸ Newspapers most often moved from describing past and current struggles to calls for future political action to defend or strengthen rights—be they German, Jewish, or minority in general. These links from past to present to future, were not secular attempts to create religious-style chains of memory, though the idea of a chain does capture the intention of connecting the group to deceased, current, and future members.¹⁶⁹ Any

¹⁶⁶ Chelaru, “Die Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung,” 187-188.

¹⁶⁷ Halbwachs, “The Collective Memory,” 145.

¹⁶⁸ “für die Vergangenheit und für die Zukunft,” *CDT*, 29.11.1928, 1.

¹⁶⁹ For religion as a chain of memory see Danièle Hervieu-Léger, “Religion as a Chain of Memory,” in *The Collective Memory Reader*. Meyer Ebner, the editor of the *OJZ*, provided a piece on the Jewish perspective of the anniversary in the *CMB*, and wrote that “for us Jews, loyalty to the state is virtually a religious tradition” 9.5.1929, 13.

chain to the past seems to halt, or rather begin, in 1918. Of course, decennial thinking encourages this, but there is no reason a ten-year period could not simply form the most recent chapter in a longer story. Instead, the newspapers propagated political myths, drawing on the past decade, to indicate what current issues were most pressing to the community. The *OJZ* and *CMB* narratives could fit into George Schöpflin's "myth of unjust treatment" because they often point to themselves as a group singled out for victimhood, just like the Germans in Slovenia.¹⁷⁰ Though the Slovenian German press did not place this emphasis on the prior decade, perhaps because with the Romanian elections, the Czernowitz press felt they were building to something, while in Slovenia events were less hopeful.¹⁷¹ The unjust treatment myth is not a perfect fit though, as the *CMB* recognizes that a variety of groups were targeted, thus it would perhaps be better to speak of mutually existing, non-contradictory, and overlapping narratives of Jewish and German victimhood. The diversity of Czernowitz likely explains this contrast with the Slovenian case. The Czernowitz newspapers do not go beyond the previous decade when describing their suffering, which would indicate that this myth of victimhood was still in its infancy for these communities. The newness of the myth makes sense given the generally comfortable position of German speakers in the Habsburg Monarchy. Perhaps this is also why there seems to be a sense of *Stunde Null*: the narratives in 1928 are crafted to operate within a very different context than the pre-1918 situation. This could also be an indication of the silent survival of the Czernowitz myth, where the Habsburg times were to be idyllically free of criticism.

In Czernowitz, on Saturday 1 December 1928, a large government-organized unification festival, which attempted to invent a new tradition, took place. In the days leading up to this festival, announcements appeared in all four of the Czernowitz newspapers analyzed

¹⁷⁰ Schöpflin, "The Functions and of Myths," 24-25. There can be real victimization and the myth can still be present.

¹⁷¹ The *CDT*, *OJZ*, and *CAZ*, November 1928 anniversary articles are all hopeful for the future. The *CMB*, 29.11.1928, 1 explicitly sees the previous decade as leading to the present election moment.

here.¹⁷² The celebration lasted all day, from ten in the morning until seven at night and the first event was prayers for dead Romanian monarchs at the city cathedral. Further activities included a military concert, a military parade, and a civilian procession. Students were to celebrate in school, with the *CAZ* describing it as an internal “memory celebration” (*Erinnerungsfeier*).¹⁷³ The newspapers emphasized that civilian, military, and religious leaders were all in attendance. Without details in the press describing what these leaders did or said, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions, but their mere presence would have provided some legitimacy to the festivities. Until archival research is conducted to dispute this, it seems the festival promoted an official state memory of 1918 with its large military presence and emphasis on monarchy. The Czernowitz newspapers were not openly hostile to the Romanian state and seemed supportive of working within the system, but it does not appear that the papers embraced the festival: they announced it but did not report on it much after the fact.¹⁷⁴

The unification festival was an unsuccessful top-down attempt by the central government to invent a tradition. The state attempted to link Bukovina to a past where it was joyously reunited with a Romanian motherland—an ideal example of what Hobsbawm described as the attempt to create a “suitable historic past.”¹⁷⁵ This lack of success was likely due to three major reasons. First, in most German speakers’ collective memories, they saw themselves as victims within Romania, or at least of attempted Romanianization. Even the most pro-Romanian paper, the *CAZ*, has their article boil down to preferring falling under Romanian, rather than Ukrainian, control. Second, even though all the newspapers were supportive of

¹⁷² This account of events draws from all four Czernowitz papers between 28.11.1928 and 2.12.1928. There were also simultaneous festivals in Banat and Siebenbürgen.

¹⁷³ *CAZ*, 29.11.1928, 5.

¹⁷⁴ Neither the *OJZ* nor any other newspaper complained about the festival taking place on a Saturday—Shabbat. This requires further research, but on the surface indicates that the *OJZ* did not care much about the festival and that the central government did not care too much about Czernowitz’s large Jewish population. It also raises the question of whether Jewish religious leaders were present at the festivities. The exclusivity of the event could also be an illustration of exactly what the *OJZ* wrote a few days earlier describing the *Leid* of the Jews in Romania.

¹⁷⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Tradition,” in *The Collective Memory Reader*, 271. Of course, given the large military presence, there was also potentially an intimidation factor.

working within the state framework, and even referred to a Romanian Motherland or were generally positive about joining with Romania in 1918, those were *their* narratives in *their* papers. It was one thing to speak of positives while calling for respect of minority rights or more local power, it was another for the state to create a celebration without any indication of future improvements. The German speakers sought a past suitable for the advancement of their interests, which were distinct from those of the government. Third, this was the first time the festival was held, and following Hobsbawm, to invent tradition, there must be some ritualization or repetition. Thus, it would be fairer to judge the festival's success after a few years. The religious elements and presence of various local leaders also might indicate attempts to latch onto existing traditions to help ease the adoption of the newly invented one. Based on the press coverage, it simply does not seem that the 1928 celebration resonated with the German speakers of Czernowitz in the fashion the state had hoped.

Conclusion

There are many points to bring together from this chapter which broadly highlighted the diversity and nuance of views between and within publications. Firstly, after all of this, it does not seem like the *Ostjüdische Zeitung*, or any newspaper, advocated strongly for the Bukovina/Czernowitz myth in the 1920s. In Czernowitz, censorship, centralization, and Romanianization made it not only difficult and unlikely for a newspaper to be able to push for a mythical Habsburg past, but also for the continued reality of some idealized Bukovinian present to seem credible. This was despite signs of continued local minority group cooperation, or at least non-confrontation during the 1920s. My research here suggests that the myth, at least in the press, did indeed need to be revived in later decades. Secondly, all four periodicals supported the struggle for minority rights and opposed Romanianization, despite different focuses (such as emphasis on Germans or Jews) and degrees of opposition and loyalty to the government. No matter the exact reasoning or degree, the Habsburg past could be a tool for

opposing Romanianization efforts, but it was also a liability to be managed in the face of those very same Romanianization efforts. All the newspapers chose to work within the state framework, though with censorship these publications could not exactly have called for the end of the state itself, and there simply did not appear to be any realistic alternatives to remaining in the Romanian state in the 1920s.

Thirdly, the Habsburg past was generally used to show loyalty to the state. At times this was through disavowal of aspects of that past, though in the case of the *OJZ*, the Habsburg past was used to demonstrate what loyalty could be given to the Romanian state. These assertions of loyalty were often accompanied by advocating for greater minority rights and opposition to Romanianization practices, though they were never at total odds with the Romanian state itself. Any narratives, often with hints of a hopeful future, could be supplemental or complementary to a state approved narrative. Fourthly, the invocation of the Habsburgs did not necessarily follow a linear chronology, but was instead based on risk and potential gain. Thus in 1921 in was clearly too risky, but much safer with Karl's death safe in 1922. The responses to the 1926 murder of David Fallik also demonstrate a time when it was likely assessed that the Habsburg past was not useful (or if it was not even considered). The 1928 anniversary was a time of tentative hope given the election, and it seems a strategy of not rocking the boat was taken, when the Habsburg past was still tapped into it, but used more vaguely to not jeopardize the potential government change.

Finally, and crucially, I found no instance of the newspapers explicitly describing how life was better under Romania than under the Habsburgs. Again, given Karl's coups and the ten-year anniversary, one would expect that, if the German speakers believed life was now clearly better and that this view was widespread, it would have appeared in their writings. While the Habsburgs were criticized and even mocked, the times of silence—the opportunities

not taken—are also telling. This is why the seeming *Stunde Null* speaks volumes: implicitly the Habsburg past, the world of yesterday, was at least better than the current situation.

Chapter III Whose'detenland: Southern Moravia, Czechoslovakia

“Comprising about two hundred contiguous communities, including notable cities, whose population has been German since time immemorial, German Southern Moravia, as a closed territory, borders directly on the German-speaking area of the old monarchy to which it is also closely linked economically.”¹⁷⁶ This was part of a plea from German speakers in Southern Moravia (Südmähren) to American President Wilson to allow them to join with German-Austria in 1919. Despite this appeal to the right of self-determination, the German speakers here, as with all of the Sudetenland, were not given a chance to choose. Even an almost entirely German speaking town directly on the border, such as Nikolsburg (Mikulov), forcibly ended up in Czechoslovakia. This chapter, through the lens of references to the Habsburg past, will investigate whether the initial frustrations and violence of the transition were overcome and if German speakers accepted their new state. Südmähren is the region of choice because it bordered Austria, but not Germany (which would add in another variable); Moravia is often neglected in favor of Bohemia in scholarship; and there are numerous periodicals available from the region. The focus will be on publications from three municipalities: the border towns of Nikolsburg and Znam (Znojmo), and the further away, but larger city of Brünn (Brno).

The first section provides background to the situation in the 1920s, including a brief mention of the Jewish population. The subsequent two sections each address Kaiser Karl's coup attempts and the 1928 decennial, but unlike the previous chapters, are instead divided

¹⁷⁶ “An zweihundert durchwegs zusammenhängende Gemeinden, darunter namhafte Städte umfassend, deren Bevölkerung seit altersher deutsch ist, grenzt Deutschsüdmähren als geschlossenes Territorium unmittelbar an das deutsch Sprachgebiet der alten Monarchie, diesem auch wirtschaftlich eng verbunden,” NA 477/K7/76, “Deutschsüdmähren an Wilson,” 1919. For others of this publication from 1919 also on the subject of pushing for parts of the Sudetenland to join Austria see documents 71; 73; 75; 78; 79; 81; 91. It is worth pointing out that Brünn was not necessarily considered *Southern* Moravia at the time, more middle or central, though for my purposes here it is connected and sufficiently geographically close.

between newspapers which were, and were not, supportive of Germans working with the Czechoslovak state. As with prior cases, victim narratives come through strongly and an extensive range of perspectives on the Habsburg past are presented, ranging from condemnation to outright praise. How groups viewed the Czechoslovak government was largely reflected in how they remembered the Habsburg Monarchy.

3.1 Borderland Blues: Background

In line with academic trends from the past couple of decades, this chapter does not treat interwar Czechoslovakia as a special Central European “island of democracy” or approach it from the perspective of isolated national history.¹⁷⁷ The goal is to treat the subject in a nuanced manner, such as how one study of Czechoslovak German middle schools concludes with the assessment that the state was not simply repressive, but sought reasonable compromises with Germans and was able to work with German teachers to grant some liberties.¹⁷⁸ Despite this, the situation was not perfect and the school issue repeatedly arose in the German press in the 1920s. A partial explanation is that actual higher level state policy could greatly differ from how it was put in practice locally, which could be to the detriment or benefit of minorities.¹⁷⁹ One key aspect is not essentializing and taking the national conflict between Czechs and Germans as a given, though it is important to recognize that under the Habsburg Monarchy there were cases of animosity and violence between the groups.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Koeltzsch, and Konrad, “From „Islands of Democracy,“ 286, 309, and 322. For more historiography of the interwar see chapters 12 and 13 in David Schriffl, ed., *Schlaglichter auf die Geschichte der böhmischen Länder vom 16. bis 20. Jahrhundert: ausgewählte Ergebnisse zu den Österreichisch-Tschechischen Historikertagen 2006 und 2008* (Vienna: Lit-Verl., 2011). For more on the myth see Andrea Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: the Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

¹⁷⁸ Mirek Němec, *Erziehung zum Staatsbürger?: deutsche Sekundarschulen in der Tschechoslowakei 1918-1938*. (Essen: Klartext, 2010), 176; and 369.

¹⁷⁹ Only the detrimental half is pointed at in Komjathy and Stockwell, *German Minorities*, 24. The second half is my takeaway from Němec, *Erziehung zum Staatsbürger*.

¹⁸⁰ For the largest series of anti-German (and anti-Jewish) riots in the late 1800s, see Michal Frankl, *Prag ist nunmehr antisemitisch": tschechischer Antisemitismus am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Metropol-Verl., 2011), chapter 7. For an excellent local look at the development and process of those who would become Czechs and Germans see Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

Czechoslovakia was a very diverse country and required Czechs and Slovaks to be counted together as Czechoslovaks to form a majority. On a country wide level, Czechoslovakia contained around 3 million Germans, which made up 23% of the population. There were also sizable Magyar and Ukrainian minorities, a large Jewish population, and a smaller Polish minority. Given this, Czechoslovaks only made up between 65% and 67% of the total population.¹⁸¹ Interwar Czechoslovakia did not just see tension and cooperation between Czechs and Germans, but between Czechs and Slovaks, and between Czechs or Slovaks and other minority groups. The lack of unity among the Czechoslovaks, such as with the Communists, or Slovak groups among many others, encouraged compromise and coalitions because the ethnic domination of one group was simply not possible.¹⁸² Thus, the case study of Südmähren here is just one of many areas where minority issues could be found. While there were centralizing and “Czechization” currents, these do not appear to be as strong as in Romania or Yugoslavia.¹⁸³ As with the previous chapter, even though many Jews spoke German and identified nationally as German, I will use Jewish and German as separate labels to make distinctions, though this was in practice a blurry, shifting, and contentious division.

The votes in the 1920 election at the local level can provide insight into how German these border cities were.¹⁸⁴ In Nikolsburg directly on the border with Austria, of 14,160 votes in the election for the upper house, 13,085 (92%) were for German parties, with only 898 (6%) going to Czech parties, and 177 (1%) going to Jewish ones.¹⁸⁵ This really demonstrates how strong the argument was for joining German-Austria in 1918/1919 in border areas like

¹⁸¹ Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe*, 414. On the census, as an option, Jews were able to select Jewish as a nationality.

¹⁸² Michal Frankl, “Antisemitism in Bohemian Lands,” in *Jews and Germans in Eastern Europe*, 36.

¹⁸³ For Czechization in Brünn see Marta Filipová, “Ideology on Display: Continuity and Rupture at Exhibitions in Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1873-1928,” in *Embers of Empire*, 101, where she points to economic factors, along with the founding of multiple Czech institutes of higher learning, and basing the Czechoslovak supreme court in the city as all contributing.

¹⁸⁴ These statistics come from *Znaimer Tagblatt*, 20.4.1920, 1-2; and 27.4.1920, 1.

¹⁸⁵ By 1924 7.4% of the city was Jewish, which if voters were proportional, would mean over 1000 Jewish voters, though only 177 votes went to Jewish parties. For the 7.4% see *Hickls illustrierter jüdischer Volkskalender (HijV)*, 1925/1926, 68-69.

Nikolsburg. In the city of Znaim, around 10km from the border, there was a much closer split between German (49%) and Czech parties (48%), with the Jewish parties making up the 3% difference, though if one included the area around the city then in total Germans would have 61% and the Jewish votes would drop to around 1%. In Brünn, which was around 40km from the border, about 20% of votes went to German parties, and 1% to Jewish ones. In Brünn, most Jews did not vote for Jewish parties and likely voted for German ones.¹⁸⁶ Thus these three cities show different degrees of Germanness: an unquestionable majority, a more even balance, and a sizable minority. In the case of Znaim, it is worth noting that based on the 1910 census, 96% of the Znaim area had German as its language of everyday use;¹⁸⁷ this does not mean they identified as German, but simply indicates that many local Czechs were bilingual. This also demonstrates that for many Germans, even if they were not in a nationally 90+% German area like Nikolsburg, they could still perceive themselves as having been a part of a stronger majority, as the area still *felt or appeared* very German in the Habsburg period.

A few comments on the Jewish population of the region are necessary. Publications such as the major *Jüdische Volksstimme* from Brünn are excluded in this thesis due to access issues. A comparison with the Bukovina case would be fascinating, especially because the Zionist positioning of the *Jüdische Volksstimme* would make an ideal counterpart to the *Ostjüdische Zeitung*. However, that will need to wait for further research. Despite this, an overview of Czechs, Jews, and Germans in the 1920s Czech lands can hint at a few points to be aware of. Jewish was an officially recognized nationality in interwar Czechoslovakia and a narrow majority of Jews in the country, ~53%, selected it on the 1921 census, with 14.5% choosing German, and almost 22% Czechoslovak. However, in Moravia, this was much closer,

¹⁸⁶ Based on the 1921 census, there were over 13,000 Jews in Brünn, which would be close to 5% of the city population. This was about 29% of Moravia's over 45,000 Jews. *HijV*, 1923/1924, 26-28. Most Brünn Jews would have identified more with German than Jewish nationality-wise, though a plurality of Moravian Jews identified as Jewish nationally on the 1921 census, *HijV*, 1925/1926, 68-69.

¹⁸⁷ "Deutschsüdmähren an Wilson," 1919. They use this to argue that all the Znaim area should join Austria.

with 41% choosing Jewish, 30% German, and 13.5% Czechoslovak (the rest were foreign Jews). This was, for example, in contrast to Bohemia where only 14% chose Jewish as nationality and a plurality chose Czech(oslovak).¹⁸⁸ These statistics point to the complicated nature of Jewish identity in Czechoslovakia and how it varied across regions, which makes it tricky to apply research on Jews from Bohemia or Slovakia to Moravia. Simply, more research on Moravian Jewry in the 1920s is required.¹⁸⁹

One point is relevant for those Jews in Moravia who supported the local Zionist parties. An alliance was formed between Jewish nationalists and the Czechoslovak state in October 1918 and continued into the 1920s.¹⁹⁰ To the benefit of both groups, many Jews took a position of “neutral loyalty,” where they were able to identify as Jewish nationals to avoid getting caught between the Czech and German national struggle.¹⁹¹ For the state, the alliance seemed to decrease the number of Jews siding with Germans or Magyars.¹⁹² Jews gained a powerful ally in their fight for both local national rights and a Jewish state, coupled with public government opposition to anti-Jewish violence, including by President Masaryk himself.¹⁹³ Considering the *Ostjüdische Zeitung* courting an alliance with the Romanian state in Bukovina, this could point to a wider pattern, however, most of the newspapers in Czernowitz, Zionist or not, were looking to assert loyalty and gain the support of the state. Thus, while there were distinctly Jewish nationalist reasons for this alliance in Czechoslovakia, it might also simply fit into a wider pattern of minority and state interaction too. Overall, the presence of Jews in Südmähren is worth keeping in mind, as they perhaps recalled the Habsburg past differently,

¹⁸⁸ Statistics come from *HijV*, 1923/1924, 30; and 1925/1926, 68-69.

¹⁸⁹ One path would be to use the following excellent work on Bohemia as a model, Kateřina Čapková, *Czechs, Germans, Jews?: National Identity and the Jews of Bohemia* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). For historiography interwar Jews, see Koeltzsch and Ota, “From „Islands of Democracy,” 313-331.

¹⁹⁰ Čapková, *Czechs Germans, Jews?*, 27-31. See *Selbstwehr* 25.10.1918, 1-2; and 13.12.1918, 1.

¹⁹¹ Tatjana Lichtenstein, “‘Making Jews at Home’: Zionism and the Construction of Jewish Nationality in Interwar Czechoslovakia,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 36, no. 1 (2006), 50.

¹⁹² Tatjana Lichtenstein, *Zionists in Interwar Czechoslovakia: Minority Nationalism and the Politics of Belonging* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 78-9.

¹⁹³ Čapková, *Czechs Germans, Jews?*, 112.

especially in the light of the strong anti-Jewish elements present from 1918 until the early 1920s.

While the actual transition between 1918 and 1920 is not the priority of this thesis, a few remarks are in order. A major theme of this transition period was anti-German and anti-Jewish violence in the form of attacks, riots, and pogroms. Often Jews were accused of being German or foreign, and symbols of the old Habsburg Monarchy were attacked, along with those who were believed to have profited from the war.¹⁹⁴ It should be noted that the anti-Jewish aspect was not merely a byproduct of the German and Czech national conflict, but as Michal Frankl persuasively argues, a separate and related phenomenon.¹⁹⁵ For example, the local German population was not targeted in the 1918 Holleschau (Holešov) pogrom. The night of December 3rd, Czech soldiers entered the Jewish part of the Moravian town and plundered it with the help of local Czechs. The pogromists looted over 50 buildings, set fires, assaulted people, desecrated the synagogue, and murdered two Jewish men. The violence only stopped on December 4th when nearby government troops intervened.¹⁹⁶ There were also cases of mainly anti-German violence, with the most infamous being the violent suppression of several demonstrations on March 4th, 1919. The German social democrats had called for a general strike to protest not being allowed to democratically join German-Austria, and in multiple cities/towns, mostly in Bohemia and Northern Moravia, Czechoslovak soldiers opened fire on

¹⁹⁴ For the anti-Austrian aspect see Wingfield, "Statues of Emperor Joseph II," 193-197; for the anti-German and anti-Jewish aspect see Ines Koeltzsch, *Geteilte Kulturen: eine Geschichte der tschechisch-jüdisch-deutschen Beziehungen in Prag (1918-1938)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 157-167; for the wider context of the pogroms see Michael Miller, "The Forgotten Pogroms 1918." *Slavic Review* 78, no. 3 (2019); and for postwar violence more generally see Ota Konrád, "Two Post-war Paths: Popular Violence in the Bohemian Lands and in Austria in the Aftermath of World War I," *Nationalities Papers* (2017).

¹⁹⁵ Frankl, "Prag ist nunmehr antisemitisch", 287-289; see also his "Sonderweg of Czech Antisemitism? Nationalism, National Conflict and Antisemitism in Czech Society in the Late 19th Century." *Bohemia* 46, no. 1 (2005); and Koeltzsch, *Geteilte Kulturen*, 153.

¹⁹⁶ This account is based on Čapková, *Czechs*, 110; *Dr. Bloch's Oesterreichisches Wochenblatt*, 13.12.1918, 393; *Jüdische Korrespondenz*, 12.12.1918, 2; *Selbstwehr*, 13.12.1918, 1; *Tagesbote* 6.12.1918, 3; and *Jüdisches Volkstimme*, 12.12.1918, 2.

the crowds, killing at least 54 and wounding many.¹⁹⁷ The historian Karl Braun argues that the 4.3.1919 events were a moment when a distinctly *Sudeten* German identity formed because prior to these events, under the Habsburg Monarchy, the various Germans of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia had little by way of a common identity.¹⁹⁸ The next section of this chapter will add supporting evidence for this already persuasive argument, in the case of Germans in Südmähren. Overall, much of the violence directed at Germans and Jews in 1918 was not state directed, but bottom-up and local, though this violence was still largely done for state-building or securing purposes.¹⁹⁹

A key question for the German speaking minority in Czechoslovakia was how much to cooperate with the state. I am particularly interested if the rocky start—if one can even reduce the violence and killing to such a phrase—impeded Germans from working with the state. Over the 1920s, two approximate responses occurred, one “activist” which recognized and cooperated with the state to promote and represent Germans, and the other “negativist” which wanted self-determination (autonomy or to leave Czechoslovakia) and refused to work with the state. In 1926, some German parties joined the ruling coalition and would continue to work with the government for the rest of the twenties. This resulted in at least one party, the Farmers’ League (*Bund der Landwirte, BdL*) actually seeing many of its more negativist members leave. In Südmähren this change was clear with the 1927 foundation of the *Sudetendeutscher Landbote* newspaper in Brünn, which supported a negativist party which split from the *BdL*.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷ For an account of the events, including a discussion of the death toll, see Karl Braun, “Der 4. März 1919. Zur Herausbildung sudetendeutscher Identität,” *Bohemia (München)* 37, no. 2 (1996).

¹⁹⁸ Braun, “Der 4. März 1919,” 374-375, and see 509-510 for an English summary.

¹⁹⁹ V. Šmidrkal, “‘What a Republic It Was!’ Public Violence and State Building in the Bohemian Lands after 1918,” *Contemporary European History* 28, no.3 (2019), 303-305. In the case of Holleschau and similar pogroms, I am currently developing an argument that Zionists in Bohemia and Moravia responded to the violence with a counter-state building effort through allying with the Czechoslovak state, for some evidence see *Selbstwehr* 13.12.1918, 1; and 1.8.1919, 7. The relevance here is simply the idea that even as the violence was ongoing in 1918 and after, the state was not automatically always blamed. For an example of the transition in the borderlands see, Kathryn Densford “Feldsberg/Valtice and the Lower Austrian Towns That Became Czech, 1918-1920,” in *Postwar Continuity*.

²⁰⁰ *Sudetendeutscher Landbote*, 8.11.1928, 2 to see its anti-activism, as well as anti-Czech positioning where it brings attention to a non-Germanic name of a German representative with a “(!).” For the election see

One method to look at the negativist and activist divide is with elections, because as of 1926, the *BdL* and the German Christian Social Peoples' Party (*Deutsche Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei, DCVP*) were in the coalition government, thus comparing the 1925 and 1929 elections can stand in as the first big report on how Germans perceived activism. Electoral districts shifted and populations changed, and I do not always have directly equivalent statistics but looking at percentages with some caution, conclusions can still be drawn for Südmähren. People boycotting the vote is not something I am fully accounting for as I do not have concrete statistics for it, but additional research at the local level would be helpful. A further note is that I am counting the German National Party (*Deutsche Nationalpartei, DNP*) and German National Socialist Workers' Party (*Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei, DNSAP*) together as both were loudly negativist and often worked together, and both would have many of their members join the Sudeten German Party (*Sudetendeutsche Partei, SdP*) and eventually the Nazis in the 1930s.²⁰¹ I will refer to this duo of the *DNP* and *DNSAP* as the "nationalist parties." Additionally, I am basing percentages off the percent of votes cast for German parties (not total votes), though Germans could still have cast votes for Czech parties or the non-national Communists.

One notable trend is that in both Nikolsburg and Znaim, the nationalist parties made large gains, going from 12% to 32% and from 6% to 25% respectively!²⁰² In Brünn they remained at around 18%. This would be worth comparing with other areas of the country, because on the whole, the nationalist parties did slightly worse in 1929. For Südmähren, this is a sign that border proximity and/or higher concentrations of Germans made areas more

24.10.1929, 1. 1.11.1928, 1 also brings up the victims of 4.3.1919, which as will be shown, fits the negativist pattern.

²⁰¹ This is an oversimplification for convenience and because I have not found any 1920s *DNSAP* papers for Südmähren from the three cities/towns, thus I will assume that for local newspapers those *DNSAP* voters would look to the *DNP* papers.

²⁰² These percentages are comparing the cities in 1925 with the wider areas in 1929 for Nikolsburg and Znaim, thus that could be one factor to explain changes, however, given the *BdL* split, I do not think that the additional more rural votes alone would account for this upswing. Stats in this section come from the following sources, though I calculated the percentages: *BTP*, 16.11.1925, 1; 29.10.1929, 3; and *Tagesbote*, 29.10.1929, 2.

nationally charged, as the chance of joining Austria, which was just a stone's throw away, seemed more likely, or that the missed opportunity in 1918/1919 seemed all the more bitter. This relationship is supported by the facts that Nikolsburg boasted both the largest percentage of nationalist votes, the highest German population percentage, and was closest to the border, while Brünn was the opposite in all these respects. In all three locations the split of the *BdL* over whether to be activist or negativist was clear in a loss of votes, with a decline from 63% to 27% (Znaim); 41% to 18% (Nikolsburg); and 31% to 23% (Brünn). In all cases the *BdL* went from the largest party to second or in Nikolsburg, third place. The *DCVP* remained steady in Brünn and grew in the border towns, and the German Social Democratic Workers' Party (*Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, DSA*) actually jumped to be Brünn's largest party (31%) and almost tripled its percentage in Znaim. This socialist presence could indicate the relative industrialization of these locations compared to Nikolsburg.

This all should not be read purely as a change in the number of activists or negativists from 1925 to 1929, because in 1925 one could have voted for any of the parties and not expected it to join the coalition. Rather in 1929, more voters made a conscious decision about whether to support German parties being in a government coalition.²⁰³ An average of 25% of German voters in these three areas chose the explicitly negativist national parties in 1929, but almost 55% on average chose to vote for parties in the coalition. If one brings in the 20% average socialist vote, and divides the *BdL* and the *DCVP* into their 23% and 32% respective averages, there is a fairly close split between the parties. The next section addresses the 25% of negativist voters.

²⁰³ Komjathy and Stockwell, *German Minorities*, 22, provides the assessment that overall, on the national level, the 1929 election showed the approval of the Germans for cooperating with the state.

3.2 No Tears for the Habsburgs: Negativist Recollections

This section analyses three periodicals, one from each of Brünn, Nikolsburg, and Znaim, which broadly supported the negativist nationalist parties, specifically the German National Party (*DNP*). The topic of German self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*) was a regular and popular topic for all three papers, and broadly, while these periodicals would have preferred life prior to 1918 than after it, compared to the other newspapers in this study, this negativist trio also had the least (even implicitly) positive things to say about the Habsburg past. I would suggest this came from dashed hopes in 1918/1919 which saw a rise in expectations of self-determination, the failure of which the newspapers saw as not only Czechoslovakia's fault, but also the Habsburgs Monarchy's. The three papers will not be completely separated for analysis because the ways they recall the Habsburg past were very similar. This is despite them differing in some ways with their broader coverage and the varied support (from 18-32%) for local nationalist negativist parties.²⁰⁴

In 1918, the *Nikolsburger Wochenschrift (NWS)* wanted to avoid ending up in the “*čechoslovakischen [sic]*” state “by any means necessary.”²⁰⁵ This attitude would continue on as negativism once it was part of Czechoslovakia. In general, the *NWS* did not comment on Karl's coups in 1921; however, it generally did not contain much international news at the time. The first major mention I found was an article on November 12th relieved that his adventure was over, but the article's main focus was on a deadly clash in western Bohemia between local Germans and Czechoslovak troops mobilized in response to Karl's coup.²⁰⁶ After Karl died, the *NWS*'s obituary was not flattering. It noted that for their loyalty Germans only received “ingratitude” (*Undank*) from the Habsburgs, who also refused to hang (*aufhängen*) even proven

²⁰⁴ For instance, the *BMB* was more antisemitic than the *NWS*. For example, see *BMB*, 3.4.1922, 4; and compare it to *NWS*, 14.1.1928, 1 and 21.1.1928, 7 where they at least published a response to their platforming an anti-Jewish speaker.

²⁰⁵ “*mit allen und äußerste Mitteln,*” *NWS*, 2.11.1918, 1. My translation here is the best English equivalent expression. The spelling of Czechoslovakian (*tschechoslowakisch*) also indicates how the state was still far from established on the ground because there was not yet a standard German name.

²⁰⁶ *NWS*, 12.11.1921, 1. They reported 12 killed and 20 serious injuries in Graslitz.

“traitors” (*Verrat*) from among the “non-German peoples” (*nichtsdeutschen Völker*). Additionally they stated that Karl himself also went behind Germany’s back during the war.²⁰⁷ For these reasons, the Germans of Czechoslovakia “wept no tears for the Habsburgs in general, and Karl in particular.”²⁰⁸ In 1926, the idea of the Habsburgs failing to keep the other nationalities in check is repeated, though the point of ingratitude shifted to the Kaiser “applying his entire power against the German national consciousness.”²⁰⁹ With the same article suggesting that the Germans in Czechoslovakia could copy the strategies the Czechs used under the Habsburgs. Overall, an image opposed to the Habsburgs and Czechs emerges, as well of one supporting a broad German nationalism which was not limited to only Austria or Germany.

This negative view of both the Habsburgs and Czechs, and broader German nationalism, were also apparent in the twice weekly *Brünner Montagsblatt (BMB)* and *Znaimer Wochenblatt (ZWB)*. In its obituary of Kaiser Karl the *BMB* described the Habsburg dynasty as a “powerful obstacle to the unity of the German people.” The obituary continues on to chastise the Czechs for being critical of the dynasty when it gave them the space to develop nationally.²¹⁰ A key take-away here is that Czechs are not allowed to be victims in any regard, that is the exclusive position of the Sudeten Germans. This parallels the Germans of Untersteiermark arguing that the Slovenians had nothing to complain about under the Habsburgs. In the cases of Romania and Yugoslavia, I argued that the German minorities

²⁰⁷ The view was that through seeking separate peace through diplomatic means, Karl was essentially undermining Germany, see also “While people at home had often heard in the past: ‘As long as the old emperor lives, it will be alright; but what will happen when he dies?’ doubts and concerns grew louder when the matter of the ‘Sixtus letters’ arose. Patriotism, both at home and at the front, suffered a severe loss” (*Hatte man in der Heimat schon früher oft gehört: “Solange der alte Kaiser lebt, wird es gehen; was aber wird geschehen, wenn er stirbt?” so wurden die Zweifel und Bedenken lauter, als die Sache mit den ‘Sixtus-Briefen’ aufkam. Der Patriotismus, ebenso in der Heimat wie an der Front, erlitt eine schwere Einbuße*), *BHA/SDA/Heimatberichte* /166, Felix Bornemann, “Der Zusammenbruch der Donaumonarchie und Südmähren: Persönliche Erinnerungen,” 2. For his account of German dissatisfaction with the 1920 election in Znaim, see 167.

²⁰⁸ “weinen den habsburgern im allgemeinen und dem Exkaiser Karl im besonderer keine Tränen nach,” *NWS*, 8.4.1922, 1.

²⁰⁹ *NWS*, 4.12.1926, 1.

²¹⁰ “mächtige Hindernis einer Vereinigung der deutschen Stämme,” *BMB*, 4.4.1922, 1. The article also expresses some sympathy for Karl, but it is through sexism by suggesting his wife and her “French blood” negatively influenced him.

writing negatively about the Habsburgs during Karl's coups was a way to assure their states that they were loyal. In the negativist press I do not believe that this was the intention or reception given the often-accompanying anti-Czech remarks. Furthermore, these periodicals did not even want to be seen as loyal, let alone actually be loyal to the state. In another article, the *BMB* continues this denial of any victimhood to the Czechs by positioning them as a group the Habsburgs *should have* restrained: “[The Habsburgs] in their now Slavic-oriented, albeit seriously misguided, policy of dynastic power, had done everything to deprive the Sudeten Germans of any possibility of opposing Czech violence by appropriate means with any prospect of success.”²¹¹ This denial of victimhood is not as clear in the *Znaimer Wochenblatt* though it was still staunchly negativist and opposed to the “rotting Danubian Empire.”²¹² An interesting case was the *ZWB* using the Habsburg Monarchy as a metaphor to threaten Czechoslovakia, or at least that is the implication I gather because a great deal of the article is censored.²¹³ Censorship, while not as strong as in Bukovina, still occurred fairly regularly in these negativist papers throughout the 1920s.

This heavily censored *ZWB* issue was actually about the ten-year anniversary. In general, the rhetoric around October 28th excluded minority populations.²¹⁴ For example, in schools there was not much effort to include or integrate German students into the celebration in some way with adjustments to the narrative.²¹⁵ In her comparative study of the national day celebrations in interwar Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the historian Andrea Talabér comes to

²¹¹ “Dieses hatte in seiner jetzt slawisch orientierten, allerdings schwer verunglückten Hausmachtspolitik alles getan, um den Sudetendeutschen jede Möglichkeit zu nehmen, mit einiger Aussicht auf Erfolg der tschechischen Gewalt mit angemessenen Mitteln entgegenzutreten,” *BMB*, 13.9.1924, 2.

²¹² “des marschen Donaureiches,” *ZWB*, 27.10.1928, 1; and 27.10.1923, 1.

²¹³ *ZWB*, 31.10.1928, 1-3. One device used is the repeated reference to a “sharp wind” bringing change.

²¹⁴ Nancy Wingfield, “National Sacrifice and Regeneration: Commemorations of the Battle of Zborov in Multinational Czechoslovakia” in *Sacrifice and Rebirth: The Legacy of the Last Habsburg War*, Mark Cornwall, and John Paul Newman, eds (New York: Berghahn, 2016), 145.

²¹⁵ Némec, *Erziehung zum Staatsbürger*, 218-220.

the conclusion that in Czechoslovakia it failed to bring the population together.²¹⁶ In a note she suggests that perhaps a longer time period was needed to judge the celebration more fairly, much like I did in the Bukovina case in Chapter II. In the Romanian and Yugoslav cases I found that the narratives the German minority put forward were still compatible with some version of the state narrative, but for these nationalist negativist Sudeten Germans there was no attempt.

The *NWS* describes a decade of struggle and loss in one of its decennial articles and in the other focuses on a resolution put forward by a collection of nationalist negativist parties, including the *DNP*.²¹⁷ The resolution, which was read in the lower house, earned a negative reaction from the Czech parties, as it culminated in a call for a continued struggle for German freedom. The opening points out that October 28th did not mean positive things for Germans, instead it meant “the beginning of unjust and oppressive Czech rule over 3.5 million Germans.” The Germans were “robbed of their national freedom” because “contrary” (*entgegen*) to Wilson’s 14 Points, the right to self-determination (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht*) was not given to them (which would have meant joining with Austria and Germany). This resolution parallels the idea from both Bukovina and Slovenia that for Germans, the decennial meant something very different. However, the Habsburgs were in general absent from these articles.

For these negativists there was another event which fulfilled the rhetorical potential of using the Habsburgs to refer to a better past: March 4th, 1919. All three papers regularly commemorated the victims of the German protestors who Czechoslovak troops killed. Common elements included listing the names of the victims and ages; emphasizing how it hurt all (Sudeten)Germans, not only those from the local areas where the events occurred;

²¹⁶ Andrea Talabér, “COMMEMORATIVE CONUNDRUMS: THE CREATION OF NATIONAL DAY CALENDARS IN INTERWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY,” *Bohemia (München)* 56, no. 2 (2016), 436. She does not go into detail on the specifics of the German minority.

²¹⁷ *NWS*, 26.10.1928, 1; and “den Beginn der ungerechten und erdrückenden Herrschaft des tschechischen Volkes über 3.5 Millionen Deutsche;” “ihrer nationalen Freiheit beraubt,” 2.11.1928, 1.

advertising memorial ceremonies; and referencing that self-determination was not respected.²¹⁸ I suggest that this commemoration of the victims of March 4th (seemingly) every year in March was a clear counter memory to that put forward by the Czechoslovak state. March 4th as counter memory fits with the view that it was a decisive moment for Sudeten German identity formation, as well as how the state attempted to conceal the events.²¹⁹ For the negativists, the past that mattered was not the Habsburg one, but the brief window from fall 1918 until March 1919 when it seemed as though they were going to join a great German state. One *BMB* article from March 1928 described that German self-determination from the Habsburgs occurred in October 1918 and that “the unification of all of German Central Europe in one state is almost imminent.”²²⁰ It is this attachment to the phase of heightened expectations, fueled in part by the end of the Habsburg Monarchy, followed by the sudden collapse of those expectations, which sets apart these periodicals from the rest.

A counterfactual question could help explain this further: why did Germans in Untersteiermark not latch onto Marburg’s Bloody Sunday in a similar fashion? The first is that while Untersteiermark was also physically close to Austria, its level of organization for joining German-Austria in 1918/1919 was much lower. The Germans of the Sudetenland had representatives ready to send to Vienna, but I have not found as ready a political program among the Germans of Slovenia, perhaps because of stricter Yugoslav occupation and the fact that Bloody Sunday occurred before the election. The second factor is their relative strength in the interwar state, where the Sudeten Germans made up almost a quarter of the total population Yugoslavian Germans (or Romania) could not come close. The third was the more democratic nature of Czechoslovakia, which seems to have tolerated more opposition, though there were limits and censorship still. Both of these latter two point to practical concerns for why such a

²¹⁸ For a variety of examples see: *BMB*, 3.3.1925 and 2.3.1929, 1; *NWS*, 8.3.1924, 3 and 1.3.1929,1; and *ZWB*, 3.3.1920, 3 and 2.3.1929,1.

²¹⁹ Braun, “Der 4. März 1919,” 372.

²²⁰ “Die Vereinigung aller Deutschen Mitteleuropa in einem Staat schein bevorstehend,” *BMB*, 3.3.1928, 1

strong counter-state commemoration would not be tolerated or as likely in Slovenia (or Bukovina). Of course, the relative number of (pan) German nationalists in these areas prewar also merits comparison, while the strong presence of Germans willing to cooperate with the Czechoslovak state from Südmähren indicates that the hypothesis holds enough water as it is. The size of the German population and more democratic state could also partially explain these more successfully state aligned groups among the German minority.

3.3 “Wistful Memories:” Activists and the Habsburg Past

The *Volkswille* (*VW*), a weekly German social democratic organ from Brünn could fit in either section depending on the time period, as the German Social Democrats only joined the government coalition in 1929. I have chosen to place it here not for symmetry, but because even if they were not supporting the coalition, they were seeking to make the state a socialist one, rather than the nationalist programs outlined in the previous section. That being said, one of the decennial articles the *VW* published discusses how another German socialist paper from Prague was severely censored for their coverage of the anniversary, however details are sparse—likely to avoid being censored.²²¹ I take this as a sign that the Socialists were not on good terms with the government/state. The rest of the coverage of the tenth anniversary does not address the Habsburgs in any notable way, though one could read the Habsburg past as implicitly fitting into the paper’s wider focus on class struggle.²²² It is clear that the *VW* opposes the Habsburgs, for example there were two cases in the later twenties of the *VW* associating the Habsburgs with fascism and ‘reaction’ broadly. One case saw the socialists worried about fascists taking over a brewery from socialists just across the border from Znaim.²²³ Generally, Habsburg memory is absent from the issues of this publication around the anniversary and

²²¹ *VW*, 3.11.1928, 3. I doubt the censorship had to do with the socialists expressing positive views related to the Habsburgs.

²²² *Ibid.*, 20.10.1918, 6.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 15.4.1928, 2; 22.1.1927, 1; and 2.11.1929, 8.

Karl's coups (though I am missing fall 1921 and April 1922). Given this, and the lack of other equally leftist periodicals in the other case studies, I cannot draw conclusions beyond that it does not seem like the *Volkswille* thought much about the Habsburg past. This is notable because it helps highlight the more implicit cases of remembering the Habsburg Monarchy, such as the Bukovina case with the illusionary *Stunde Null*. Essentially, not all absences are the same. It is also worth noting that even though socialists organized the March 4th, 1919, assemblies which were attacked, the *VW* does not engage with commemorating or acknowledging this event, which sets it apart from the negativists.

The Brünn twice daily *Tagesbote*, was fairly conservative and agrarian and while not directly affiliated with any party, supported the *BdL* (Farmers' League), even after its split over the activist/negativist question.²²⁴ The tension of the split comes through in the pages, because while the *Tagesbote* supported working with the state, it was still highly critical of it. The *Tagesbote* did not address the Czechoslovak state much in its extensive coverage of the former Kaiser Karl in 1921 and 1922. Instead, emphasis fell on supporting democracy and opposing monarchism. For example, they played with the view that monarchism, and Austria-Hungary in particular, were backwards and that "the Habsburgs belong to the past."²²⁵ Or simply that "it is one of the few fruits of the world war that King-fetishism has been outlived."²²⁶ This would likely not fly in Romania or Yugoslavia given that even if they were democratic, they were still monarchies. Furthermore, unlike the Bukovinian and Slovenian cases, the *Tagesbote* did not downplay the danger of the coup or use humor. The reason is likely partially because the *Tagesbote* had other ways to assure the state they were not seditious, namely that loyalty was assured through emphasizing democracy. In particular, the linking of Germanness and

²²⁴ Another paper in the same city, the *Deutscher Landruf für Mähren, Schlesien, Slowakei* also supported the *BdL*; though I do not have any relevant comments from comparing them.

²²⁵ "Die Habsburger gehören [...] der Vergangenheit," *Tagesbote*, 6.11.1921,1.

²²⁶ "Es ist der wenigen Früchte des Weltkrieges, das der Königs-Fetischesmus [sic] sich ausgelebt hat," *ibid.*, 30.3.1921,1.

democracy together with ideas like “the German nation is still democratic at its core.”²²⁷ After the danger of the spring coup had passed, the paper did promote the Anschluss of Austria and Germany as something democratic.²²⁸ Thus, advocating for democracy could also be slightly subversive.

In its coverage of the decennial in 1928, the *Tagesbote* was highly critical of Czechoslovakia. As in Czernowitz, a decade of struggle was the center of their narrative: “The first ten years of the Republic meant the constant suppression of the German element everywhere, especially in the school system, and the endeavor to squeeze the Germans, who had such a prominent role in the life of this state, into an insignificant minority.”²²⁹ This invokes the idea that the past was better for Germans and builds up to the quotation featured in the introduction, that “history has shown that the old Austria perished above all because it did not understand in time to unite the divergent nationalities in pursuit of their common goals. Even today, 10 years after the creation of the Republic, we are further away than ever from a national balance.” One point of note here is that no break with the past, no *Stunde Null*, is present regarding the nationality conflict, which is shown to be a continuity carried over from before 1918. Another key point is that the *Tagesbote* is implicitly threatening Czechoslovakia that if it does not solve the German question, the state will dissolve like the Habsburg Monarchy. The activist angle here is that the article ends with calling on the state to form a “compromise” (*Ausgleich*) with the Germans to solve the problems. In this context, following a mention of old Austria’s national balance issues, *Ausgleich* seems to be a loaded term conjuring images of the 1867 *Ausgleich*, when the Kingdom of Hungary essentially achieved autonomy within the

²²⁷ “Das deutsch Volk ist in seinem Kern noch immer demokratischen,” *Tagesbote*, 23.20.1921, 1; also see 24.10.1921, 1.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.4.1921, 1.

²²⁹ “Die zehn ersten Jahre der Republik bedeuten allerwärts, namentlich auch im Schulwesen, die unablässige Verdrängung des deutschen Elemente, das Streben, die Deutschen, denen ein so hervorragender Anteil im Leben dieses Staates zukommt, zu einer bedeutungslosen Minderheit herabzudrücken,” *ibid.*, 28.10.1928, 1.

Habsburg Monarchy. While I do not want to read that much into it, this interpretation would set a high bar for the desired result of activism.

In the *Tagesbote's* anniversary issue there was also an interesting reference to schooling under the Habsburgs. According to the *Tagesbote*, Brünn used to have the best teachers in the entire monarchy and at schools even the Czechs were “treated equally” (*gleich behandelt*).²³⁰ This conjures up the example of the *Cillier Zeitung* arguing that Germans would be happy to be treated as the Slovenians had been under the Habsburgs. This also subtly undermines any possibility of a Czech victim narrative. The *Tagesbote* continued that “after the overthrow everything became different.”²³¹ At a glance, this stands in contrast to the point the paper made about how the national imbalance continued across 1918, but in reality, like the *Cillier Zeitung*, the *Tagesbote* was upset about the reversal of the national conflict so that the Germans were in a less powerful position. The Habsburg past summoned here is used to remind their readers that what came before was better.

The last newspaper to examine is the biweekly Christian Socialist supporting *Brünner Tagespost*. The *BTP* emphasized Catholicism and generally opposed the further left parties, such as in 1928 when they called for Germans to not vote based on class (*Klasse*), but rather vote for the *Volk*—which to the paper meant the Christian Social Party (*DCVP*).²³² Recall that the *DCVP* made up on average the most voted for party in Südmähren for 1929, and the second most voted in Brünn in both 1925 and 1929, which indicates a stable base in the cities. For the *BTP*, supporting the German Volk was not opposed to supporting the Czechoslovak state, in fact they supported the *DCVP* entering the government coalition in 1926, where it stayed for several years. In its first two years active, 1923 and 1924, the *BTP* noted and commemorated the March 4th, 1919, massacre of German civilians, but from 1925 until 1929 it did not

²³⁰ *Tagesposte*, 30.10.1928, 4.

²³¹ “*Nach dem Umsturze wurde alles alles anders,*” *ibid.*, 30.10.1928, 4.

²³² *BTP*, 26.10.1928, 1.

reference it.²³³ I would argue that this shift to non-commemoration was not only a sign of loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, but also a sign of coming to terms with the past and accepting that the Germans were now part of Czechoslovakia and that the opportunity for self-determination in 1918/1919 was lost. Even if I missed a mention of the March 4th events in this period, the point would simply need to be adjusted to the more nuanced view that the *BTP* did not bring up 4.3.1919 nearly as prominently and consistently as the negativists.²³⁴ Additionally, I would also postulate that through not commemorating 4.3.1919, that the narrative of the transition as a moment of stolen self-determination, was no longer necessarily the dominant one.

The *Brünner Tagespost*'s coverage of the decennial clearly demonstrated their commitment to working within the Czechoslovak state, but also how they were under no illusions that it was perfect. The publication defended German parties in the coalition government, emphasizing that the “negativist” (*negativistischen*) approach was no way to engage with politics. The *BTP* also attacked “national chauvinism” (*nationale Chauvinismus*)” as the product of “egoism” and “selfishness” (*Egoismus* and *Selbstsucht*) and promoted the view that looking back at the past ten years was not enough, that the next 10 years were important too.²³⁵ This look to the future is based on the continued successful partnership between German parties and the state, and seems more credible than those made in the case of Bukovina, which while hopeful had a pleading edge to them because they were uncertain if the government would listen.

Despite all of this support the *BTP* had for the Czechoslovak government in their ten-year anniversary article, the opening section of said article almost directly states that Habsburg

²³³ *BTP*, 6.3.1923, 2; and 4.3.1924, 1-2.

²³⁴ This point also naturally applies to the *VW* and *TB*'s avoidance of 4.3.1919 as well.

²³⁵ *BTP*, 26.10.1928, 2.

Monarchy was better than Czechoslovakia. It does not explicitly use these terms, instead employing a before and after formulation, which produces this quote:

There is no doubt that an entire list could be made against October 28th. One could set up an interesting public opinion poll and let the period before and after the world war stand as candidates. The new order would fail. But such a survey would not be carried out. It would be pointless as well, because in between lies the World War. At the bar, you can still hear wistful memories exchanged about the time when a quarter of wine and a goulash cost less than an “Egyptian” today. So, if you make comparisons between what we had and what we have today, you inevitably end up with a deficit.²³⁶

The first thing to note is how the *BTP* accepts that most people would agree that the implicit, but obviously, Habsburg past was superior to Czechoslovakia. This is not actually inconsistent with their activist program outlined earlier, which was future oriented, and therefore lines up with the argument for not comparing to the pre-war past. To connect this with my argument from the Bukovina example, I see the *BTP* as attempting to push for a stronger break with the past, for a *Stunde Null* moment which would hopefully help them attract voters.

A second key aspect is the view that people were regularly talking about the Habsburg past, which supports the need for further research on the subject. More broadly, when studying the legacy and memory of the monarchy, a distinction should be drawn between a distinctly *Habsburg* nostalgia, and nostalgia more generally. Taking the example in the quote, are the drinkers nostalgic for a specifically *Habsburg* past, or simply the good old days when things were cheaper? I could read into the inclusion of goulash to point to a legacy of the connection with Hungary, but variations of the dish were widespread and localized around Central Europe at that time, including the Czech lands. The distinction is of course blurry, especially if one considers the economic connections severed in 1918. Thus, a point to draw from this is that

²³⁶ “Eine ganze Liste konnte man gegen den 28. Oktober anführen, da ist kein Zweifel. Man könnte eine interessante Volksbefragung anstellen und als Wahlgegner die Zeit vor und nach dem Weltkrieg kandidieren lassen. Da würde die neue Ordnung durchfallen. Aber eine solche Befragung wird nicht durchgeführt. Sie wäre auch zwecklos, denn dazwischen liegt der Weltkrieg. Beim Bierkrügl hört man wohl noch immer wehmütige Erinnerungen austauschen über die Zeit, wo das Viertel Wein und das Gulasch weniger als eine heutige „Egyptische“ gekostet haben. Wenn man also Vergleiche anstellt zwischen dem was wir früher besessen und was heute, dann kommt unweigerlich ein Defizit heraus,” *BTP*, 26.10.1928, 1. Egyptian here refers to cheap cigarettes, thank you to Ines Koeltzsch and Martin Jemelka for this detail.

further research should look at more mundane and daily nostalgia to balance out the commemoration and crisis points of mnemonic concentration I am studying.

The negativists would likely have a major problem with this quote even if they agreed with the basic sentiment that before was better. The quote openly acknowledges that the creation of Czechoslovakia was highly flawed, but then goes on to argue against comparing the Habsburg Monarchy and Czechoslovakia. The wistful nostalgic feelings the *BTP* describes are for the Habsburg past, not the flawed transition to and creation of Czechoslovakia. The negativists did not primarily care about the Danubian Monarchy, they cared about the lost opportunity of self-determination in 1918/1919, hence the prominence of memory of the 1919 March 4th massacre in their press coverage. This points to the activist groups and negativist groups processing the past in different ways. Both groups accepted that the Habsburg Monarchy was gone and had moved on from that (or rather expressed a desire to move on, which might not have been reflected in readers' habits, based on the supposedly common nostalgic beer talk). The *BTP* and parties in government had accepted that Czechoslovakia existed, that the Habsburg Monarchy was gone for good, *and* to let go of the 1918/1919 moment of possibility as a political program. It is this last one which the negativists clung to and refused to come to terms with being lost.

Conclusion

To bring this chapter to a close there are two points I would like to emphasize. More could be written here, but to avoid repetition, the results of the comparison between the three case studies, and what they mean for the Habsburg legacy, are found in the next and final part of this thesis. The first is that this research suggests a strong connection between negativists and not having come to terms with the past because the missed opportunity of 1918/1919 formed a core aspect of their beliefs. The reverse is true, with activist groups accepting their situation by working for the future and demonstrating that the violent transition into the

Czechoslovak state did not prevent their acceptance of the new status quo. This is nothing groundbreaking, but shows that memory politics can be a useful lens for understanding interwar Czechoslovakia.

The second point is that all of these examples indicate that there was no single path that the Südmähren Germans were locked into which inevitably led to fascism. In a fairly small area, there were a variety of political programs with proposals for the future. Even supporting the nationalist and negativist *DNP* did not mean that one would automatically embrace the Nazi party in the 1930s, and the opposite, supporting an activist group, did not stop many Sudeten Germans from joining the radical right in the 1930s. Even with signs of later fascist elements and growing support for negativists, the 1920s also saw the majority of Germans voters back parties willing to work with the state. As conditions changed, people were not locked in, they made choices.

Conclusion

Humpty-Dumpty sat on a wall,
Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall,
All the Kaiser's horses and all the König's men,
Couldn't put Humpty together again,

The ultimate result of the comparison of how the German speaking minorities in Bukovina, Moravia, and Slovenia recalled the Habsburg past will come at the end of this conclusion and is regarding the cross-regional manifestation of a Habsburg legacy. Before that, there are many smaller points and comparisons to make, and the extensive limitations and gaps to be addressed. To begin with the limits, the comparisons here remain fairly surface level and are not causal because in my balancing breadth and depth, I cut out the necessary context both within the 1920s and from the final years of the Habsburg Monarchy. This means that I am unable to search for deeper explanations for differences and similarities, as well as determine how much the available traditions and narratives the newspapers' invoked were novel or even agreed with. These oversights will be remedied in my future research. Other gaps to address in order to flesh out a comparison would be to use my research to also contextualize the 1930s, as well as to compare with German minorities in the Hungarian half of the monarchy to see if my findings are of the Habsburg legacy or of only a *Cisleithanian* Habsburg legacy. This also raises the need to look at narratives beyond the German language, but those are beyond my current capacity.

Regarding commonalities among all three cases, a crucial note is that Habsburg memory was not very common or popular across the 1920s in the press. This is also why selecting moments of mnemonic concentration was critical for this research. The 'lack of remembering' could be because German speakers were still processing the past and trying to move on, or simply that they had other priorities. The Sudeten negativists illustrate that it was not simply a broad lack of remembering the recent past in total, because they regularly engaged with the memory of the civilian massacre on 4.3.1919. Temporal changes in how memory

manifested did not seem to line up with a linear chronological progression but instead responded to events. This means that there was not a steady increase or decrease in support for the Habsburgs, but instead that German speakers chose to deploy various strategies in response to contemporary events as it seemed suitable to them. A majority of the newspapers also wrote something positive *and* negative about the Habsburg Monarchy over the course of the decade, as well as something critical or supportive of the state (with the negativists forming an exception). Across the three cases, the struggles of balancing loyalty and disloyalty to the state while attempting to use memory to achieve specific goals, were very common. Another repeated trope was using narratives of victimhood.

Overall, a few differences stand out about the cases when they are placed beside one another. For Südmähren, the divide between the negativist and activist camps was clearly visible, though the negativists were more ideologically united. Neither of the other two cases had a situation at all similar, which does suggest that while one should not entertain the interwar democratic paradise myth, the democratic landscape of Czechoslovakia did allow for both the most extensive participation within the state, as well as the harshest rhetoric against it. This makes sense when one considers that Czechoslovakia had by far the largest population of Germans both in actual numbers and percentage wise of any successor state (barring Austria), which means that a case could be made for democracy allowing Germans to have a weighty voice and influence, or the opposite, of not needing democracy to achieve goals because they were strong enough without it. Of the press I read, Czechoslovakia had the furthest right positions, though this was balanced with activist parties who seemed the most integrated into the state. In contrast, Czernowitz appeared to be the least anti-state case across the board and some reasons for this might include its distance from German majority states, the strict censorship it was under until 1928, and simple genuine acceptance of the state. On the topic of Bukovina, other than the few cases where solidarity was exhibited between national groups, I

did not find signs of a special ‘multicultural’ Bukovina, and think it is safe to say that if the Czernowitz Myth was around in the 1920s, it was not in the pages of those periodicals. Czernowitz also stands out from the other two cases as the only place to not deny the victimhood of another group, which could be because Bukovina was simply more ethnically diverse. The Slovenian press falls into a sort of middle ground, where there was certainly upset directed at the government, but it was generally more restrained. This does make sense given that Slovenia did border Austria, but had a much smaller German population than Czechoslovakia.

Across the cases, a few factors seem to have encouraged or discouraged positive associations with the Habsburg past. High levels of German nationalism like that of the negativists, as well as *Gottscheer Zeitung* (though it had a stronger localist tinge), tended to point to negative views of the Habsburgs, with the idea that the dynasty betrayed the German people being quite common. It is also noteworthy that across the regions, though in Moravia and Slovenia in particular, the press did not seem to support Austria *or* Germany, rather they invoked both states together as a broader German idea. On the other side, it seems that Jewish newspapers, or those which had predominantly Jewish staff, would not be too directly critical of the current or former state. A further comparison with Jewish papers from outside of Bukovina is however required to support this point beyond being a mere hypothesis. Lastly, and not surprisingly, in dangerous situations, such as during Karl’s coups, more negative views of the monarchy were expressed.

The Habsburg legacy in discourse is still most easily and often identified with the narratives of backwardness and nostalgia. This lines up fairly closely with Maria Todorova’s work on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, where “alien” or “inhibitor” are contrasted with

“organic” and “symbiosis.”²³⁷ She also proposes looking at the legacy from two angles: “continuity” and “perceptions,” with the former being more academic and linear, and the latter being more insider and experiential. The sources I have been dealing with fall more to the perception side, though one could propose that the continuity of the German minorities themselves were an example of the Habsburg legacy in the interwar years. Recall how German culture could be a tool to resist Romanianization, or how the transition violence in Czechoslovakia blended anti-German, anti-Jewish, and anti-Austrian elements together. Returning to the legacy in perception, the periodicals I examined offered a wide range of views. It would be somewhat anticlimactic at this stage to simply say we need to think about Habsburg legacies, as opposed to a single legacy. This is of course true, especially with extremely different cases, for example the *Ostjüdische Zeitung* and a Sudeten negativist paper, but I do believe that a cross Cisleithanian Habsburg legacy phenomenon exists.

In the 1920s among the German speaking minorities, one can generalize that most instances of referencing the Habsburgs fell into three categories. The first two categories need no introduction and are the classic nostalgic and backwards ones. The third is a bit harder to define, but more widespread. It is the silences and voids, but it can also manifest as neutrality or almost apathetic. Chapter II on Czernowitz featured this view prominently, though a quote from Nikolsburg in 1923 will best capture the essence: “[he] was not a great admirer of the old Austria and the Habsburgs, but it must be said that conditions in the ‘democratic’ republic have not improved.”²³⁸ Things were not great, and things are still not great. If one were to treat the nostalgic view and the backwards inhibitor view as thesis and antithesis (or vice versa), then the synthesis between them is what I am identifying as the cross regional Habsburg legacy. It

²³⁷ Maria Todorova, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in *Imperial Legacy*, Carl Brown, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). “Inhibitor,” recalls the many times the Habsburgs were accused of being an obstacle for Gemrna national goals.

²³⁸ “Redner sei kein großer Verehrer des alten oesterreich und der Habsburger gewesen, aber des müsse es sagen, besser find die verhältnisse in der 'demokraten' Republik nicht geworden,” NWS, 31.3.1923, 2.

ends up as a more balanced middle ground between the longing the *Brünner Tagespost* described, and the attempts to position the Habsburgs as the great obstacle to the German nations and an Anschluss.

The Habsburg legacy, the perception of the monarchy, among the former Cisleithanian Germans in the 1920s was more often than not a mixed bag. While strongly nostalgic or oppositional cases came out, the inconsistencies, voids, and implications were more common and representative. If “mythic ‘re-creation’ has forgotten that periods far from it were not idyllic,”²³⁹ then many German speakers were not yet far enough away in time to see an idyllic past. The opposite was also true, with notable exceptions especially among the Sudeten negativists, the 1920s were also somehow not close enough for anger and hatred to wallow up. This is perhaps because of the argument that with the postwar, time appeared to speed up and “the last years of Austria-Hungary seemed to represent a past much more remote a decade after the monarchy’s breakdown than, say, the turn of the century had represented in the spring of 1914.”²⁴⁰ The 1920s Habsburg legacy was a compromise, much like the Dual Monarchy itself. For example, the Habsburg legacy was the view and practice of respecting the dominant group’s ability to celebrate their national day, but asking them to let you not participate. The newspaper editors and writers had experienced the Habsburg Monarchy and those memories, along with those of the war and transitions, were still fresh and forming. The legacy was often caught in this middle ground, while not necessarily as exciting as the extremes, it was a way to wrestle with coming to terms with the past.

The Kautsky quote which began this thesis compared the Habsburg Monarchy to Humpty Dumpty. While recent scholarship might dispute exactly how fragile or out of position the Dual Monarchy was, the nursery rhyme certainly still has use when one is thinking about

²³⁹ Heymann, *Le crepuscule*, 38. Translation mine.

²⁴⁰ Kożuchowski, *The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary*, 11.

the Habsburg legacy in the 1920s. I have a slightly strained interpretation of the tale, which is that as Humpty lies shattered on the ground and is unable to be put together again, there is transformative potential. Kautsky used the quote to emphasize that the Habsburg Monarchy could never be reconstructed, but the broken pieces were still there. In the field of ideas and memory, the Habsburg legacy was what people did with and thought about these broken pieces, and often the answers were not clear.

Appendix A: Abbreviations

Archives and Digital Collections

AUK—Archiv Univerzity Karlovy
ANNO—Austrian Newspapers Online
BHA—Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv
DiFMOE—Digitale Forum Mittel- und Osteuropa
NA—Národní archiv
NK—Národní knihovna
sLib—Digitalna knjižnica Slovenije
SdA—Sudetendeutsches Archiv

Newspapers

BDZ—Banater Deutsche Zeitung
BMB—Brünner Montagsblatt
BTP—Brünner Tagespost
CAZ—Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung
CMB—Czernowitzer Morgenblatt
CDT—Czernowitzer Deutsche Tagespost
CZ—Cillier Zeitung
DLM—Deutscher Landruf für Mähren, Schlesien, Slowakei
GZ—Gottscheer Zeitung
HijV—Hickls illustrierter jüdischer Volkskalender
JVS—Jüdische Volksstimme
MZ—Marburger Zeitung
NJR—Neue Jüdische Rundschau
NWS—Nikolsburger Wochenschrift
OJZ—Ostjüdische Zeitung
SDL—Sudetendeutscher Landbote
SW—Selbstwehr
TB—Tagesbote
VW—Volkswille
ZTB—Znaimer Tagblatt
ZWB—Znaimer Wochenblatt

Other

BdL—Bund der Landwirte (Farmers' League, Czechoslovakia)
DCVP—Deutsche Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei (German Christian Social Peoples' Party, Czechoslovakia)
DNP—Deutsche Nationalpartei (German National Party, Czechoslovakia)
DNSAP—Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei (German National Socialist Workers' Party, Czechoslovakia)
DP—Deutsche Partei (German Party, Romania)

DSA—*Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei* (German Social Democratic Workers' Party, Czechoslovakia)
NSDAP—*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (National Socialist German Workers' Party)
PdD—*Partei der Deutschen* (Party of the Germans, Yugoslavia)
PNL—*Partidul Național Liberal* (National Liberal Party, Romania)
PNȚ—*Partidul Național Țărănesc* (National Peasants' Party, Romania)
ORJUNA—*Organizacija Jugoslavenskih Nacionalista* (Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists)
SCS—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (*Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* or *SHS* in Serbo-Croatian)
SdP—*Sudetendeutsche Partei* (Sudeten German Party, Czechoslovakia)

Appendix B: Selected Place Names

The German names of places have been given precedence unless there is a recognizable English standard (e.g. Vienna not Wien). This is to emphasize the focus on the German language in this thesis investigates. Additionally, I have limited the list here to only a few languages.

Czechoslovakia

Ordered: (English if it exists); German; Czech; Yiddish

- (Bohemia); Böhmen; Čechy; Behmen
- Brünn; Brno; Brun
- Holleschau; Holešov
- (Moravia); Mähren; Morava; Mehrn
- Nikolsburg; Mikulov; Nikalshburg
- (Prague); Prag; Praha; Prog
- Znaim; Znojmo

Romania

Ordered: (English if it exists); German; Romanian; Yiddish; Ukrainian

- (Banat); Banat; Banat
- (Bukovina); Bukowina/Buchenland; Bucovina; Bukavina; Bukovyna
- (Kishinev); Kischinau; Chişinău; Keshenev; Kyshyniv
- Czernowitz; Cernăuți; Tshernowits; Chernivtsi
- Kimpolung; Câmpulung; Kimpulung (second vowel varies); Kympolung
- Radautz; Rădăuți; Radevits; Radiwzi
- (Transylvania); Siebenbürgen; Transilvania
- Temeswar; Timișoara; Temeshvar

Yugoslavia

Ordered: (English if it exists); German; Slovene

- (Carinthia); Kärnten; Koroška
- (Carniola); Krain; Kranjska
- Cilli; Celje
- Gottschee; Kočevje
- Laibach; Ljubljana
- (Lower Styria); Untersteiermark; Spodnja Štajerska
- Marburg; Maribor
- Pettau; Ptuj

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Brünner Tagespost

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Czernowitzer Morgenblatt

Czernowitzer Deutsche Tagespost

Cillier Zeitung

Deutscher Landruf für Mähren, Schlesien, Slowakei (Brünn)

Dr. Bloch's Oesterreichisches Wochenblatt (Vienna)

Di Frayhayt (Czernowitz)

Gottscheer Zeitung

Hickls illustrierter jüdischer Volkskalender (Brünn)

Jüdische Korrespondenz (Vienna)

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Neue Jüdische Rundschau (Czernowitz)

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