Trans(national) Concepts of Self-Determination and the Future of Central Europe in the Late First World War, 1917–1918

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Abstract

My dissertation studies the concept of 'national self-determination' or the 'self-determination of peoples' in the historical context of the Habsburg Monarchy. I use the contexts of the Czech and Hungarian national movements of the long nineteenth century to argue against the scientific narratives that associate this term with that of the 'nation-state' and that interpret it as one that would have fundamentally opposed the idea of 'empire'.

My main thesis is that local actors rather embedded the concept of 'self-determination' into the political vocabularies of the local contexts before the First World War, which accommodated to the framework of the 'empire'. To support this argument, I study the evolution of the term along with those of its parallel concepts in this era ('nation', 'independence', 'autonomy', 'national minorities' etc.). I also analyze these terms as ones subject to cultural and ideological transfers between various national and political contexts.

I argue that 'self-determination' became associated with 'sovereignty', 'secession' and the 'nation-state' only during the late phase of the war (1917–1918). I claim that this was due to the shared impact of local and international political developments and transnational discussions on the local discourses. To this end, I analyze the political languages of Czech(oslovak) and Hungarian political representatives in the transnational contexts of Great Britain and Austria–Hungary.

I also claim that the subjects of 'self-determination' as a concept in this specific sense, the 'people' or the 'nation' did not only refer to ethno-cultural interpretations of communities in political discussions. I argue that the term 'self-determination' often applied to concepts of the 'nation' with political or civic features before and during the First World War, which came to shape the conceptualization, the political systems, and the local discourses of Central European nation-states in the interwar period. In relation to this issue, I identify various imperial legacies in terms of concepts and political languages.

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1. Introduction

What does the concept of 'national self-determination' entail, what does it imply for the world as we know it? – this must be the most important question which related studies attempt to discuss. Due to its transformative effect on international order in various historical periods, several accounts have aimed to explain the origins, the development and the discourses surrounding the principle.

My dissertation also focuses on the 'right of peoples to self-determination' or 'national self-determination' as a historical basic concept. However, I argue that various narratives have often been partial to certain historical regions (e. g. the 'West'), historical figures (Woodrow Wilson and V. I. Lenin) and certain historical frameworks (the nation-state). In contrast, I emphasize that one must integrate the concept into the dynamic relationship between the ideas of 'empire' and 'nation' in a constructive fashion. Thus, I will discuss it as embedded in the local, national, and transnational discourses in the context and in relation to the context of Austria–Hungary before the First World War. My main argument is that the era of the late First World War (1917–1918) was a point of discontinuity in discourses, in which the concept of 'self-determination' applied to an imperial–national relationship radically transformed due to the influence of local and international processes.

I will also study the concept of the 'nation' as the subject of 'self-determination' in the studied discourses. My main argument in relation to this issue is that it is erroneous to assume that the concept could only apply to ethno-cultural communities and could result in nation-states defined by such definitions of the 'nation'. I will rather point out that national concepts in the Czech(oslovak) and Hungarian discourses often

displayed civic or political elements (albeit indeed, mixed with ethno-cultural ones), which influenced the conceptualization of nation-states, the discourses and the political processes of the interwar period.

As for my methodology, my study will feature a conceptual approach to the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' through a combination of the recommendations of *Begriffsgeschichte* and the so-called 'Cambridge School'. Thus, I will attempt to reconstruct 'political languages' and 'political vocabularies' and embed the concept of 'self-determination' into these conceptual frameworks. I will attempt to identify the parallel concepts and the counter-concepts of the term, the continuities and discontinuities in its use, its adaptation into discourses through cultural and ideological transfers and the transnational influences on its normative load in various contexts.

This introduction will explain the importance of this approach in detail. I will start by exposing contemporary dilemmas regarding the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a concept of international law. Then, I will present the outline of historical narratives in relation to the concept and point out their problematic aspects. I will afterwards discuss my methodology and terminology that will define dissertation.

a. The 'Self-Determination of Peoples' in International Law and Modern Politics

It was Article 1 of the United Nations Charter (1945) that first named "the equality and the self-determination of peoples" as central "principles" of international law. It claimed that these support the development of "friendly relations" between nations and contribute to "universal peace". The UN Charter thus identified the 'self-determination of peoples' as a legally enforceable right, one that is applicable to all peoples and

territories. Since this claim effected non-self-governing communities the most, it often appeared in the context of Asian and African decolonization after 1945. [1]

Yet, no universally accepted definitions of the 'self-determination of 'peoples' as a complex term have appeared ever since. Neither 'self-determination' nor the 'people' have legally valid descriptions in the international sphere to this date. It is important to emphasize that the latter term, the subject of 'self-determination' often appears as the synonym of the 'nation' in various discourses. Thus, it seems hard to talk about the concept of 'self-determination' in this context without extending the discussion to the concept of 'nation-states', the basic structure of the contemporary international order. It is no accident a common interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples' in international law is to understand it as the 'right to independence'. [2] In other words, it is often identified with 'secession' and the attempts at the foundation of independent nation-states.

This identification of the principle is much due to the main contemporary connotations of the principle. It appeared in relation to the secessions of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Macedonia from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991–1992. The United Nations recognized the independence of these states in accordance with the outcome of local plebiscites. However, the lack of local Serbian participation in the Bosnian referendum, the threat of human rights violations against the Serbian community in Croatia and the forceful intervention of federal Yugoslav authorities into the local processes foreshadowed the conflicts and the genocides of the Yugoslav Wars (1991–1999). These processes adumbrated the problematic prospects of the local claims to the 'right of self-determination' and their international recognition. [3]

One must especially accentuate the impact of the Kosovo case, leading up to the declaration of independence by the former Serbian province in 2008 through the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples'. This resulted in the transformation of the official Russian viewpoint on the prospects of this right. After 1991, the Russian Federation committed itself to the various international treaties that recognized the territorial integrity of its neighbours in the post-Soviet space. Following the Kosovo case, the Russian government started to support and even facilitate local secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and intervened on their behalf in the Russo–Georgian War of 2008. [4]

The Russian Federation has also attempted to legitimize its annexation of Crimea (2014) and Donbas as well as four Ukrainian provinces (2022) through references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. This amounted to Russian-administered local plebiscites that sanctioned the secession of these territories from Ukraine. The international community did not recognize these outcomes, as the referenda violated most of the internationally accepted criteria. [5]

Thus, the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' does not appear as a universally accepted and applicable right to promote friendly relations between nations in the context of Russian foreign policy. It rather integrates into the political propaganda of an authoritarian government that has referred to democratic processes as a pretext for the destabilization, dismemberment or even the subjugation or the conquest of neighbouring countries and the expansion of its power in its geopolitical environment.

One must mention that the Ukrainian and Ukraine-friendly narratives also refer to the principle of 'self-determination' in the context of the Russo–Ukrainian War, albeit in a different sense. These accounts rather feature it as a 'right' to be defended

from the Russian attempts of conquest and rule. One must mention that these narratives interpret this policy of the Russian Federation as the continuation of similar historical attempts by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, a viewpoint supported by related Russian references to historical rights. [6]

However, conflicts in the international sphere do not only revolve around the interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples' as the 'right to secession'. The former principle has also emerged in the context of political debates in the European Union (EU). One must specifically mention the Eurosceptic rhetoric of the Orbán government in Hungary after 2010. This narrative refers to the principles of 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination' to support its 'national struggle' against 'Brussels'. This interpretation of the 'right to 'self-determination' refers to an 'independent' Hungarian policy that follows the 'interests' of the nation and the values proclaimed by the government ('family, nation, local patriotism'). [7]

It is also important to accentuate that the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' does not necessarily apply to the 'nation-state' in these debates. While it is customary to refer to the Russian Federation simply as 'Russia' (which implies that it would be a 'nation-state'), its constitution actually defines its community as a 'multinational people'. It also emphasizes that the structure of the federal state is in accordance with the principles of 'equality' and the 'self-determination of peoples'. The latter does not amount to 'secession' in the interpretation of the Russian Constitution, as it rather accentuates the sovereignty and the territorial unity of the composite state. [8] In terms of law, Ukraine has been no unitary nation-state either, as the territory of Crimea has officially been its 'Autonomous Republic' since 1992. [9]

The European Union is defined a supranational political and economic union, with a complex political and legal relationship to the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples'. One can find no specific recognitions of the principle in EU Law. National policy has also remained in the competency of its member states. However, the Founding Treaties of 1957 had already invited 'European peoples' sharing the 'ideals' of the Union to join its ranks through their 'right to self-determination'. This claim referred to the nations of European socialist structures, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War. EU Law also obligates its potential or current member states to apply the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' to their population in certain important cases. National plebiscites are to sanction the legal procedures of joining or withdrawing from the ranks of the Union. The EU also accepts the outcome of popular votes that decide upon the state allegiance of its regions. One must mention the referendum of Saarland in 1955 or that of Scotland in 2014 as examples in this regard. [10]

Similar to the Russian Constitution, the term 'people' refers to regional or state communities in the interpretation of EU Law. Its narrative thus describes the inhabitants of certain administrative structures as a 'civic' or 'democratic' national community, regardless of the other dimensions of their cultural identities. It is important to emphasize that the subjects of the 'self-determination of peoples' were also the political communities of colonial territories in the context of Asian and African decolonization after the Second World War. [11]

In contrast, the related rights of 'ethnic' populations and the related concepts of nationhood are problematic issues in international law. It is feared that the application of 'self-determination' as an 'absolute' right to 'ethnic' communities would result in

'anarchy' and constant turmoil in the international sphere, as national identities often transcend and debate traditional administrative borders. It is due to the flexible and debatable, yet influential concepts of 'ethnic' nationalism that the 'self-determination of peoples' rather than the 'self-determination of nations' or 'national self-determination' is the definitive term of international law. It is also because of the relationship between the 'ethnic' concepts of the 'nation' and the right to 'secession' in the discourse that state actors resist to attempts at defining the 'people' as the subject of the right to 'self-determination'. [12]

Nonetheless, the political mainstreams of national discourses do not always associate their 'right to self-determination' with 'secession'. The political and intellectual representatives of Transylvanian Hungarians rather demand 'autonomy' in the Romanian state through references to the former concept. [13] It is worth to accentuate that even though the rhetoric of the Orbán Government often invokes references to the irredentist idea of 'Greater Hungary', it does not promote the secession of Transylvanian, Slovakian or Serbian Hungarian communities and their unification with the Hungarian nation-state. [14]

The Orbán government also does not claim 'secession' from the European Union to be the ultimate goal of its demands for 'sovereignty'. Its representatives rather assert the devotion of Hungary to a 'common European cause'. Their rhetoric rather features the 'sovereignty' of the nation-state and the vision of a 'Europe of nations' in opposition to the 'federalist' interpretation of EU affairs and the alleged 'intervention' of EU organs into national politics. [15]

Given this complexity, it is not accidental that a multitude of legal, political, and historical studies have been dedicated to studying the 'self-determination of peoples' in

a historical context and the background of the issues related to the principle. Although it only became a universally applicable right in 1945, the general viewpoint is that it had already become an influential 'political principle' earlier. Various accounts claim that it was especially impactful during the First World War. However, these historical narratives often struggle with certain presuppositions or anachronistic approaches to the subject. I will present these issues and my related viewpoint in the next chapter.

b. Historical Narratives of 'Self-Determination'

Mere eight years after the declaration of Esthonian independence, Lauri Mälksoo elaborated on certain debates of international law his "Justice, Order and Anarchy: The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and the Conflicting Values in International Law" (1999). Mälksoo pointed out that the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' is in the crossfire of the narratives of "positivism", "realism" and "natural law". The representatives of natural law describe the principle as a 'natural right'. They claim that it is one of the principles of 'justice' that should ultimately guide political considerations in the international sphere. In contrast, positivists rather emphasize the importance of "order" in international affairs, along with the territorial integrity and the political unity of its main constituents, the states. They derive the state rights to 'territorial integrity' and 'political unity' derive from the principle of (state) 'sovereignty'. Finally, the realist camp discards the dichotomy between 'justice' and 'order' altogether. Its representatives claim that international order is a matter of power relations rather than ideal concepts of international law. [16]

Historical accounts that have studied the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' have also contributed to this discourse. These have attempted to discuss its

development as a 'natural right', its importance in historical contexts and its relevance in contemporary terms. However, it is worth to accentuate the often-partial nature of these narratives.

Such features for instance define the frequently quoted *National Self-Determination* by Alfred Cobban (1945). The historian discusses 'national self-determination' in the imperial contexts of the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and the United States. However, Cobban does not attempt to locate the 'theory' of term in historical sources throughout his narrative. He rather identifies it as a broad idea, a "political force" that contributed to "national independence" in local contexts. The author also features 'national self-determination' as connected to the concept of 'democracy' in historical terms. This depiction integrates into a dichotomy between 'democracy' and 'autocracy'. While Cobban features the political systems of Great Britain, France and the United States as 'democratic', he emphasizes the 'autocratic' and 'expansionist' features of the historical discourse in Germany (which would result in the war crimes of the Nazi regime). [17]

Thus, the viewpoint of *National Self-Determination* leans towards the depiction of Western, and especially Anglo-American political systems as ideal and as historical models. Cobban defines these contexts through the political forces of 'democracy' and 'national self-determination'. It is no accident that his historical narrative attempts to underline the impact of the American President Woodrow Wilson on the discourse of 'national self-determination' during the late First World War. It poses no difficulty for the author to identify the various political statements and proclamations of Wilson such as the Fourteen Points with 'his' idea of national self-determination. In contrast, he sparingly mentions the influence of other historical actors or contexts. [18]

In contrast, Arno Mayer's definitive *Lenin vs Wilson: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (1959) offers a historical account of the late First World War alternative to previous Anglo-American-dominated ones. His narrative remains influential to this date. This is due to the fact that the American scholar identifies a dichotomy between the ideological forces of "order" and "movement" during the late First World War (1917–1918). He argues that the impact of the war on internal politics resulted in the domination of progressive forces in discussions of foreign policy. Mayer especially emphasizes the impact of the February and October Revolutions of Russia during 1917, which popularized phrases such as the 'the self-determination of peoples'. As the "order" and the "Old Diplomacy" of (European) Great Powers collapsed under this pressure, the fate of the international order was up to the struggle between the representatives of "New Diplomacy" and its ideals of "movement", Woodrow Wilson, and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The author argues that Wilson's pacifist vision of moderate reforms was ultimately more promising to most contemporaries as opposed to the revolutionary agenda of Lenin. [19]

In the context of the Cold War, it was clear that Mayer's dichotomy between Wilson and Lenin attempted to explain the historical background of the contemporary ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was important in this regard that this narrative implied the global superiority of the former superpower in terms of ideology and attempted to foreshadow the triumph of the States through its analogy of the late First World War. Yet, the author was the first to depict these historical figures as equal in terms of impact and importance during the First World War. The adaptation of this narrative to the study of the 'self-determination of peoples' as a concept in historical contexts has benefitted scholarly generations ever since, as it

disintegrated the anachronistic viewpoint of 'Anglo-American domination' in this respect.

Jörg Fisch's recent historical contribution to the discourse of international law (*The Right of Self-Determination of Peoples: The Domestication of an Illusion*) integrates this approach into its narrative. One must mention that his work is especially detailed and managed to rekindle the interest in the subject. While it originally appeared in German (2010), it was also translated into English (2015). The Swiss author associates the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' with 'national sovereignty' and 'secession'. His main argument is important that the "absolute" right of the 'self-determination of peoples' must result in the establishment of nation-states. [20]

In contrast, the interpretation of the term as the 'autonomy' of non-dominant nations in states appears as only a "partial" validation of the right in the book of Fisch. The author thus positions himself against the traditional differentiation between "internal" and "external" modes of 'self-determination'. He claims that the term 'internal' is especially misleading, as it makes it seem that it is possible to decompose the 'absolute' right of self-determination and to discuss it independently of the right to 'sovereignty' as a concept. The author refutes this interpretation and claims that 'autonomy' is a limitation to the 'right of self-determination', describing it through the term 'partial self-determination'. [21]

Fisch also identifies a "tension" and a "competition" between the principles of the 'self-determination of peoples' and 'democracy'. The author argues effectively that the former term refers to a collective right of 'peoples' or 'nations' that effects international relations. In contrast, he claims that the principle of 'democracy' rather

applies to the relations within the states, since these communities already appear as 'self-determined' in the international context. [22]

The author constructs a historical narrative to support his arguments. Fisch identifies the American decolonization in the late eighteenth century and the French Revolution as the historical sources for the interpretation of 'popular sovereignty' as a principle central to international law. While he (rightfully) claims that no references to the 'self-determination of peoples' appeared in these contexts, Fisch nevertheless states that local discourses still produced "something approaching to the right of self-determination". [23]

While he identifies the concept of 'individual self-determination' with the German term *Selbstbestimmung* coined by the representatives of German Enlightenment in the late eighteenth century, Fisch discusses the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' separately. The author claims that it is impossible to "determine the language it was originally formulated". However, he points out that the term "spread particularly quickly" in the German cultural sphere. The Swiss historian claims that the "earliest of evidence of a German term [*Selbstbestimmung(srecht) der Völker* – L. B. B.]" is from 1865, when it appeared in the study of the German historian Theodor Mommsen dedicated to the issue of Schleswig-Holstein (a territory contested by Denmark and Prussia during the German process of state unification). Soon afterwards, Fisch also states the corresponding French term *des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes* first appeared in 1862. He also detects a reference of Czech deputies in the Austrian Imperial Council to the same principle from 1870. The author argues that it was the bourgeois nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century that initially used the term 'self-determination of peoples' to support its goals of national independence. [24]

However, Fisch also claims that references to the 'right of self-determination' only appeared "rarely" in this discourse after 1872; in contrast, it "gained importance" in the international labour movement. It had its specific role in the "social democratic debate" in relation to national conflicts in the 'multinational states' of Russia and Austria–Hungary at the turn of the century. Whereas Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks associated it with the collective rights to 'secession', 'sovereignty' and 'independence', the 'Austro-Marxists' identified it as the "individual right to retain one's cultural identity". As such, they embedded 'self-determination' into their proposals of "national-cultural autonomy" in Austria–Hungary – a limited vision in accordance with the interpretation of Fisch. [25]

Much similar to the previously discussed accounts, the first peak of this historical narrative is the era of the late First World War. Fisch claims that although it appeared as a part of political propaganda in the First World War, the 'right to self-determination' was not "initially at the centre of political conflicts". As for the former field, the author emphasizes that both wartime alliances: the Entente or the Allied and Associated Powers (with Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States as their prominent members) and the Central Powers (with Germany and Austria–Hungary as their dominant representatives) referred to the term to "instigate uprisings" as a part of traditional war-time policies. However, Fisch identifies the "fall of 1917" as the period of a break-through in the international sphere, in which the term appeared as a "formal weapon". [26]

As for this late era of the First World War between 1917–1918, the author identifies the Russian Bolshevik Lenin and the American President Wilson as historical figures to define the contemporary discourse. It is easy to identify the impact of Mayer's

'Lenin vs. Wilson' dichotomy here. As for Lenin, Fisch claims that it was the Bolshevik government of the Russian Empire in November 1917 that first proclaimed the 'right of self-determination' in the "sense of a worldwide secession for all peoples, including colonial peoples". The author emphasizes that this was due to the assessment of the contemporary political situation by Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Russian government, who "had nothing to lose" by embracing the concept. On the contrary, he could 'challenge' and attempt to destabilize the states of the "Allies" (the Allied and Associated Powers) and specifically the colonial empires of the age to achieve a "world revolution". [27]

Fisch claims that Wilson started to refer to the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' due to the influence of its Bolshevik interpretation. "Thanks to Lenin", the term was increasingly important and provided a "model for success" for the non-dominant peoples of the contemporary international order. The author claims that in the absence of alternatives, the American President borrowed the term to "play a central role in the debate for peace". He also states that Wilson attempted to reinterpret the 'right to self-determination' as analogous to his concept of 'self-government'. This term had been central to his previous political statements, which was equivalent to the "choice of government in a democratic state". This attempt, however, was unsuccessful, as Fisch claims that those "who had no right to full independent statehood were not on equal footing with other peoples and thus not fully self-determined". It was only due to the fact that Lenin lacked popular support in the international sphere that Wilson became the "great prophet of the right of self-determination" without him "wanting to" – as eventually, the international "public shared Lenin's understanding of the right of self-determination (…) but wanted to hear it from Wilson and not Lenin". [28]

Fisch derives the problems of the Peace Treaties and the interwar international order from this controversy. He states that 'self-government', Wilson's favoured term could have been the foundation of a "plausible and consistent program" for peace. In contrast, the creation of such a program was "impossible" with the 'right of self-determination' in the centre of the discourse, as it resulted in the domination of "factors that were not in the power of victors [the Allied and Associated Powers – L. B. B.] to control". These factors amounted to conflicting claims to nation-state formation driven by "objective" criteria (such as statistics of local populations) or "subjective" criteria (plebiscites that often favoured the defeated states). The author argues that in the end, Wilson and other peace makers could only lose, regardless of their choices to abandon or to tend to their previous promises with regards to the principle of 'self-determination'. If these politicians broke their "pledges to the defeated", they would have undermined their claims and attempts to create a "just" and "lasting" peace. However, the lack of their attention to American, British, French etc. self-interest would have resulted in their loss of popularity at home and a weaker position of their states in the new international order. [29]

To sum it up, the narrative of Fisch advances the 'Wilson vs. Lenin' dichotomy of Mayer in a peculiar sense. On the one hand, the author attempts to construct a *longue durée* narrative for the historical development of the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' before the First World War, which he identifies with the right to 'sovereignty' and 'secession'. Although the reasons behind the ideological adaptations (or the cross-ideological transfer) of the term are unclear, Fisch can still name the discourses of "bourgeois", liberal and radical nationalism and "socialists" as different contexts in which it appeared during the nineteenth century.

The peak of this narrative is still the late First World War (1917–1918). However, Fisch reverts the interpretation of Mayer as for the 'Wilson vs. Lenin' dichotomy. His account rather features the Russian Bolshevik figure as a dominant historical figure due to his global influence on national movements. In contrast, the American President appears a politician lagging behind and adopting the principle of 'self-determination' only due to the pressure and the impact of his opponent.

The even more recent account of André Liebich in his *Cultural Nationhood and Political Statehood: The Birth of Self-Determination* (2022) attempts to move away from this narrative and also approaches the history of the term 'self-determination' through a different angle. The title of the book already reveals that author discusses the principle through the relationship between the ideas of the 'state' and the 'nation'.

The main argument of Liebich is that these terms "must be separated conceptually". He describes the 'state' as a "political unit" of human existence, the official organization to represent its "formal" and "organizational" side. In contrast, the author describes the 'nation' as a "collective" or a "cultural unit". Liebich emphasizes the broad range of interpretations of this cultural community. He points out if one identifies 'language' as the most important factor in terms of national identity, then one can discover the existence of "some 6000 linguistically defined groups". However, if one associates the 'nation' with other cultural markers such as 'religion' or 'ethnicity', then the number of such communities appears to be "almost unlimited". [30]

The author integrates the term 'self-determination' into this dichotomy between 'nation' and 'state'. Importantly, he refers to this principle as "national self-determination" rather than the 'self-determination of peoples'. The term first appears in the context of the so-called "moral arguments", which support the formation of nation-

states according to Liebich. The author divides these into two sub-categories, the "axis of will" and the "axis of identity". The first "axis" is much related to the concept of individual 'self-rule' and its transposition to the 'nation' as a collective. [31]

It is here that Liebich quotes the statements of the Irish political scientist Brendan O'Leary in connection to the 'idea' of national self-determination. The latter claims that this is "the recursive principle of democratic consent: every nation should have the right to seek self-determination, including the right to secede to create its own state". [32]

Liebich describes this statement as simplistic and problematic from various aspects. First, O'Leary does not really define what he means by the 'nation' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination'. Liebich claims that this term cannot be equivalent to "whatever body" that "chooses to exercise the right to self-determination". In his viewpoint, the concept of the 'nation' would then become too broad to be comprehensible. Liebich also points out that "those who claim the right to self-determination" usually refer to a more substantial concept of the 'nation' as a "community of culture". [33]

There is an additional problem with regards to 'self-determination' and the parallel concepts of 'self-rule' or 'self-government'. Liebich points out that scholars usually define the latter terms as the "exercise of one's own will within a given political framework". In contrast, they theorize that 'self-determination' is the principle of a critical viewpoint, which addresses the "delimitation of this political framework". However, Liebich claims the 'right of self-determination' only amounts to that "due regard is made to one's views and interests and occasion is given for their expression".

In his viewpoint, the idea thus does not automatically justify the dissolution of existing states and the establishment of new ones. [34]

Liebich's description of the "axis of identity" also features problems surrounding the term 'national self-determination'. He emphasizes that national policies are often defined by a sense of "cultural essentialism" and thus handle the ideas of the 'state' and the 'nation' as "overlapping" concepts. Liebich points out that this is problematic, since the cultural community of the 'nation' is often defined through language, mythology or other cultural markers. If one associates this concept with that of the 'state', then the latter is not a political community, a result of "free association". [35]

The author attempts to discuss the origins of essentialist association between the 'state' and the 'nation' through his historical narrative. This spans from the French Revolution (1789) to the 21st century. Liebich explains the background of this approach through the argument that the idea of the 'nation-state' appeared much later than the modern international order of 'states'. He states that the latter system was the result of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. However, the author also positions himself against the "traditional" accounts of "historians" who claim that the association between 'nation' and 'state' appeared during the French Revolution. [36]

In the sixth chapter of his book, Liebich theorizes that this was rather a result of a transformation in the related discourse after the "Revolution of 1848", which started to focus on the 'principle of nationality'. He claims that the source of this development was the realization that national identities were formative ideas of the age. This resulted in the dominant contemporary viewpoint that 'nationalities' or national communities

"exist by right of nature" and that the end goal of their historical development was their transformation into dominant 'nations' through the establishment of their 'states'. [37]

In contrast, the term 'self-determination' appears in the ninth chapter. Liebich describes this concept as older than the 'principle of nationality', since he claims that "Christianity" referred to this idea to point at the limitations of 'the appeal of divine intervention'. He then features the concept as an "enlightened" idea that the free will of individuals are not limited by "outside authorities". [38] It is worth to point out these descriptions are rather broad. It is hard to comprehend who would conceive these ideas in the discourse of Christianity or who referred to 'self-determination' as the "characteristic of the enlightened person".

The author rather accentuates that 'self-determination' became an "explosive idea" when it was combined with the 'principle of nationality'. It is not unclear from the text when this happened, although the context implies that this development might have occurred during the 'Revolution of 1848' or in the 1850s. Nonetheless, Liebich claims that the idea of 'self-determination' reinforced "the notion that every nation was entitled to its own state". [39] Interestingly enough, the author does not use the concept of 'national self-determination' in this context, which term only appears twice in the chapter. He rather describes his term of interest simply as 'self-determination'.

Liebich emphasizes that there is "some scholarly debate" in connection to the importance of the term "before 1914". One side of this debate (e. g. Glenda Sluga) would claim that the concept of 'self-determination' was the subject of "widespread" discussions in this era. In contrast, Liebich quotes the viewpoint of Fisch as to represent the other side of this debate, which would theorize the idea was "virtually insignificant"

on the "international level" due to its "partisan connotations" in the discourse of the "Left". [40]

Liebich also describes the principles of 'self-determination' and 'nationality' as initially opposed to each other in the early phase of the First World War. He claims that this was due to the fact that those were the "Central Powers", specifically the German and Austro–Hungarian governments who referred to the German concept of *Selbstbestimmung* as their "battle cry". This was their attempt to support the interpretation of their wartime activities as in favour of the "liberation" of colonial peoples under French and British rule and of those that inhabited the borderlands of Russia. Importantly, the scholar does not support this claim with primary sources from the German or the Austro–Hungarian context. He rather refers to the post-war statements of the "Oxford classicist and prominent public intellectual" Gilbert Murray from 1922 in this regard. [41]

In contrast, Liebich claims the governments of the Entente would rather refer to the 'principle of nationality' due to the "Germanic connotations" or the "German usurpation" of 'self-determination'. The author also emphasizes that references to the former concept did not amount to a "new vision" for the international order after the First World War conceptualized by the French and British establishments. Their interpretation of the 'principle of nationality' was rather "grounded in the past": it referred to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Belgium, Serbia and other allied states attacked and occupied by the forces of the Central Powers. This was much due to the fact that if interpreted as the right of nations to establish their own states, the concept would have also had an "explosive potential" in relation to the colonial and land "empires" of the Entente. [42]

This narrative features the historical figure of Wilson and his concept of 'self-determination' in a much different light than the account of Fisch. Liebich claims that the American President declared in April 1917 that the United States 'was entering the War to ensure the principle' of self-determination. The author emphasizes the importance of "Wilson's peculiarly American understanding" of 'nation', the subject of the 'right to self-determination'. His interpretation of the community as "an inherently democratic unit" did not contradict the colonial interests of his British and French allies. It rather "relieved" them due to its "change of terminology and perhaps of emphasis" as opposed to the earlier claims of the Central Powers. [43]

Liebich also positions himself against the "unfair" claims that Wilson would have adopted the concept of self-determination "only after the Bolsheviks had done so and only to counter them". He supports this argument by pointing out that the President had earlier referred to "the right of every people to choose their own allegiance" (November 1915) or claimed that "every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which they will live" (May 1916). Liebich features these statements as essentially equivalent to Wilson endorsing the concept of 'self-determination'. Thus, his viewpoint is that the incorporation of the term into the political "vocabulary" of Wilson in February 1918 was a rather organic development. However, he does agree with the claim that this ultimately happened due to the American President's "fear of Bolshevik success". This is no paradox for Liebich, as he emphasizes that it is ultimately of little importance whether Wilson had used the term or not before. He claims that the American politician's "commitment to 'national self-determination' reflected an attitude rather than a policy, a creed rather than a principle of action". [44]

Nonetheless, Liebich also points out that the Fourteen Points of Wilson did not refer to the concept of 'self-determination', as it "promised merely 'autonomy' to the peoples of the Austro–Hungarian Empire". This would this disappoint both the "fervent partisans" of 'self-determination' and the "opponents" of the American President (although it is not clear from this narrative why the latter group would be disappointed). Liebich claims that the lack of the concept from the Fourteen Points was due to the "ignorant" nature of Wilson towards "European realities", a personal failure and something which "all commentators" of the American President's activities have agreed on. [45]

However, Liebich admits that 'self-determination' was ultimately a highly problematic and confusing idea for the United States and its allies. He states that the British and French governments feared that its application to the international order would result in the revolutionary reorganization of affairs in opposition to their interests. The author points out that even Robert Lansing, the American secretary of the state did not really understand whether the Wilsonian concept of 'self-determination' applied to "a race, a territorial area, or a community". [46]

To sum it up, Liebich prefers the term 'national self-determination' to the internationally accepted form, the 'self-determination of peoples'. He integrates the idea into the dichotomy between the cultural idea of the 'nation' and the political unit of the 'state'. Liebich claims that the association of the term with those of the 'principle of nationality' and the 'nation-state' happened around 1848. He features it as an 'explosive idea' to reinforce 'the notion that every nation was entitled to its own state'.

The author positions himself against the 'Wilson vs. Lenin' dichotomy and shift towards a more Wilson-centred narrative. As opposed to Fisch, he depicts the

'Wilsonian' concept of 'self-determination' as an original interpretation of the idea that developed independently of Russian Bolshevik influence. His references to Lenin and his political allies are rather marginal. His account rather assumes a dichotomy between the 'German(ic)' and the 'Wilsonian' ideas of self-determination. This viewpoint resembles the narrative of Alfred Cobban on the difference between the 'Anglo-American', 'democratic' and the 'German', 'autocratic' interpretations of the term.

However, the shortcomings of Fisch and Liebich are rather similar in my view. Although one cannot accuse them of neglecting historical sources and contexts, their interest is rather limited to certain cultural spheres. Fisch depicts the term as formed by discourses in the German lands and Russia. In contrast, the references of Liebich are primarily of English, French, German, or Italian origin.

The narrative of the authors also cannot move away from the traditional focus on the historical figures of Lenin and Wilson in the context of the Late First World War (1917–1918). Fisch and Liebich depict the contemporary discourse as a top-down process. The only difference is that the Swiss historian depicts the Russian Bolshevik leader as the dominant figure of the 'Wilson vs. Lenin' dichotomy, as his secessionist interpretation of the term "prevailed" on the "level of language" by early 1918. [47] In contrast, the role of Wilson is more prominent in the narrative of Liebich.

It is worth to mention in this regard that although the studies of Fisch and Liebich have similar aspects, recent studies have attempted to discuss the concept of 'self-determination' through a stricter focus on its 'transnational' history. This amounts to their interest in related discourses between historical actors of various national backgrounds during the First World War. The theories and the concepts of various

authors are important contributions to the field of intellectual history. I will describe these works in the next section of the introduction.

c. *Transnational Histories of 'Self-Determination'*

In my view, Erez Manela's *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (2007) is a truly impressive and ground-breaking study in the field of global intellectual history. The self-proclaimed goal of the author is to fill in the gaps in the "international history of the Paris Peace Conference" in 1919 and the "literature on the U. S. role in the First World War and at the peace conference". Manela argues that previous historical accounts of these topics marginalized "non-Western" regions and historical actors from the "standard narrative of the peace conference". [48]

As a result, he identifies a "Wilsonian moment" between the "autumn of 1918" and the "spring of 1919" as a formative historical period in the history of anticolonial movements and "the expansion of international society" in the twentieth century. Manela claims this was due to the adaption of "Wilson's rhetoric of self-determination" by "nationalist activists" in Africa and Asia. As a result, these historical actors constructed "transnational networks" that problematized the colonial and imperial "international" of their time as a part of a "global wave". [49]

On the one hand, Manela clearly distinguishes between the concepts of the 'international' and the 'transnational' in his study. He claims that the former term describes the interaction between established nation-states through diplomatic contacts or international organizations in contemporary political and historical studies. In contrast, he refers to the 'transnational' as a concept to denote various activities across

state-borders not necessarily performed by state actors. [50] As for myself, I find this distinction convincing; I will also refer to the 'transnational' and the 'international' throughout my study.

On the other hand, one must emphasize that Manela refrains from extending his concept of the 'Wilsonian moment' to Europe during the late First World War. He claims that it was rather the 'Lenin vs. Wilson' dichotomy of Meyer, their struggle for the influence over the European Left that informed the local debates of this era. [51]

Despite this rather clear description of intentions, Borislav Chernev still positions himself against the theories of Manela in his *The Brest-Litovsk Moment: Self-Determination Discourse in Eastern Europe before Wilsonianism* (2011). Chernev does not debate the relevance of the 'Wilsonian moment' for historical studies of anticolonialism. However, he still formulates the counter-concept of the 'Brest-Litovsk moment' to argue for the greater importance of V. I. Lenin in comparison to Wilson in relation to the "Eastern European" discourse of 'self-determination'. Upon this foundation, Chernev argues for the interpretation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (March 3, 1918) between the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia as the "first", "forgotten" peace treaty of the 'Great War'. He also claims that instead of paying "mere lip services" to the term, the leading figures of the German and Bolshevik Russian governments became "leading authorities" on "the application of the increasingly important concept of self-determination" in "Eastern Europe". This "application" amounted to the secession of various national territories (Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, Kurland, Lithuania) from the Russian Empire. [52] Thus, Chernev contributes to the historical narratives that assume that Lenin's role was instrumental in the interpretation of the 'self-

determination of peoples' as the right to 'secession' – an account supported by Fisch Jörg as well.

The primary concern of Manela and Chernev is the identification of the 'self-determination of peoples' as a watchword of broader intellectual and political discussions with regard to 'anticolonialism' and 'secession' in the era of the late First World War. The transnational, international and global aspects of their works are rather important. They point beyond the traditional national boundaries of political and intellectual discourses and emphasize the supranational dimension of contemporary discussions.

Although with a limited scope in comparison, others have also discussed the concept of 'self-determination' in the transnational contexts of the late First World War. Glenda Sluga's *Nation, Psychology, and International Politics*, *1870–1919* (2006) discusses the role of science and scientific experts in the contemporary discourse of nationalism and the construction of the future international order in Great Britain, France and the United States during the First World War. The chapter of her book titled "The Principle of Nationality, 1914–1919" specifically focuses on the "historical disagreement" with regard to "the invocation of nationality and self-determination to the reorganization of states and citizenship" in these contexts. The author also addresses the same topic in her article "What is National Self-Determination? Nationality and psychology during the apogee of nationalism" (2005).

Sluga specifically enlists the Britain-based transnational societies of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) and *The New Europe* as her primary examples to this end. She describes the transnational debates on the concept of the 'nation', 'psychology' and the international order during the First World War through these discourses. Sluga

presents the editorial board of the *New Europe* as a society of British and Central European actors and as "the most influential English-language wartime vehicle for advocating national self-determination as the basis of post-war democracy". In contrast, the UDC appears in this narrative as "a breakaway group of labourites and radical liberals" in Great Britain. [53]

While both appear as the "supporters" of self-determination in her narrative, Sluga argues that the positions of these groups were still different with regard to this issue. The authors of *The New Europe* referred to a psychological concept of 'nationality', a group of "collective mind" and its role in the reorganization of the international order through the foundation of "autonomous nation states". In contrast, the members of the UDC disapproved of such "fluid" concepts of 'nationality'. As a result, their vision of the future international order would subordinate national interests to transnational frameworks. [54]

There is a common factor that unites the studies of Manela and Sluga. These authors do not study 'self-determination' as a historical concept on its own or as one embedded in the political languages of various groups. They rather refer to the term as a broad principle, which they use to describe various standpoints regarding the importance of 'nationality' and the foundation of nation-states or alternatively, the issue of decolonization in the future international order. As such, they are the representatives of the tradition that discusses the principle of 'self-determination' in relation to that of the 'nation-state'. The narratives of Fisch and Liebich share this focus. By extension, the 'multinational state', the colonial or land 'empire' appear in these accounts as fundamentally opposed to the principle of 'self-determination', structures that were meant to dissolve as a result of its local applications.

However, I am not entirely convinced of the beneficial nature of such narratives for historical studies. I find the handling of 'self-determination' as a broad 'idea' with a prefixed meaning problematic. I rather identify it a historical 'concept' with its own individuality on the one hand, and as a part of diverse political vocabularies on the other hand. I find this important to emphasize, since my viewpoint on the relationship between the 'principle of self-determination' and the idea or the structure of the 'empire' is also different than those of the aforementioned authors. I will explain my viewpoint in detail in the section.

d. The 'Empire' in Historical Narratives of 'Self-Determination'

Although Liebich's book signifies a return to a Wilson-centred narrative, one must accentuate that the tenth chapter reveals a more sensitive approach from the author towards the historical agency of other actors in the context of the First World War. This section discusses the context of 'Czechoslovakia' and its secession from Austria–Hungary. It focuses on the "skilful politics" Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, this "exiled Czechoslovak leader and later president", his viewpoint and those of his allies between 1914–1918. However, this is limited to the description of their ideas of the 'principle of nationality' and 'self-determination' in the contexts of Great Britain and France. In contrast, references to Masaryk's earlier activities in Austria–Hungary and the viewpoints of his local opponents are rather passing. Even though he claims that most of the Austrian Czech politicians "had a pro-Austrian orientation, whether for Catholic reasons […] or on socialist internationalist grounds", Liebich does not describe their political thought in detail. He only identifies the Slovak *samobytnost* and the Czech *samostatnost* as terms central to the local criticism of Masaryk's concept of 'self-

determination'. He claims this amounted to "either autonomy or independence or something in between (whatever that might be)". [55]

This problematic depiction is connected to a general issue in the book of Liebich. His narrative contains a black hole due to its lack of references to the local context of the realms ruled by the Habsburg dynasty. Liebich only mentions Habsburg "Austria" or "Austria–Hungary" as a state "reveling in its status as a state of many nations", but nonetheless contradicting the "modern" 'principle of nationality' already in the nineteenth century. He often describes its structure through the term 'empire', which is fundamentally opposed to the concept of the 'nation-state' and the 'explosive idea' of 'national self-determination'. [56]

In contrast, the narrative of Fisch rather features Austria–Hungary as a "multinational state". Similar to the "Russia" or the Ottoman Empire, the author claims that its structure "could easily break apart if there were […] emphasis on the right of every nationality to its own state". [57] This, of course, is a natural result of his main thesis that the 'absolute' right of 'self-determination leads to 'secession' and the foundation of 'nation-states'. In contrast to Liebich, the Swiss authors spares any references to the local context or historical actors from Austria–Hungary.

However, such antagonization or marginalization of the 'empire' or the 'multinational state' is not necessarily beneficial for narratives of 'self-determination'. The everlasting legacy of the 'empire' is present in the modern discourses in connection to the principle. For instance, the Orbán government identifies the 'imperialist' designs of Brussels as the anti-thesis of its claims to 'sovereignty' and 'national self-determination'. Its references to the 'empire' of the EU and 'Brussels' as its 'imperial

centre' evoke Hungarian historical memories of the rule of 'Moscow' (the Soviet Union) [58] and 'Vienna' (the Habsburg Monarchy). [59]

References to the 'empire' and its relationship to the principle of the 'self-determination' are even more complicated in the context of the Russo–Ukrainian War. The Russian government has often evoked historical memories surrounding the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire to delegitimize the territorial unity or the very existence of Ukraine in the last few years. [60] It is clear that the rulers of the Russian Federation do not find their simultaneous references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' problematic. They only continue a Soviet tradition in the use of the principle, which can legitimize their narrative of 'imperial reintegration' in accordance with the will of local populations in Crimea, Donbas and other post-Soviet territories.

I am also not entirely convinced of the benefits of a dichotomy between the ideas of 'nation', its 'self-determination' and 'empire' in historical terms. I rather support the recent accounts of 'new imperial history', which approach this relationship through a "constructive fashion". As Pieter Judson puts it in his The *Habsburg Empire: A New History* (2016), these narratives assume that "concepts of nationhood and ideas of empire depended on each other for their coherence" historically and locally. [61]

Studies of new imperial history feature the era of the late First World War as a context in which this relationship devolved. This would not be the outcome of the sudden realization of local politicians that 'nations' can secede from the 'empire' in accordance with the principle of 'self-determination' as developed by Lenin or Wilson. The dissociation between the ideas of 'nation' and 'empire' would rather occur due to the impact of wartime developments: the political measures of the state, the

deterioration of the material conditions and that national(ist) conflicts reached their peak in the local context. [62]

Thus, my goal throughout this dissertation will also be to discover whether the principle of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' was embedded by local actors into these dynamic patterns of the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire' in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, I will move away from West-centred narratives of its history. I also think that instead of treating it as a broad idea, handling it as a historical concept will reveal its exact and diverse uses in historical discourses. This intention necessitates me to study the local history of the concept in a *longue durée* period, from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the end of the First World War (1918). I must address the issues of its identification with the terms 'sovereignty' and 'secession' by Jörg Fisch or with the 'principle of nationality' by André Liebich. Due to the focus of these authors on Lenin and Wilson, it will also be of paramount importance for me to identify the sources behind the local adaptations of and the references to the principle of 'self-determination'. As the transnational aspect is rather important in the studies of Manela and Sluga, I must also address this topic.

All these considerations necessitate me to focus on the 'national self-determination' or the 'self-determination of peoples' as a historical 'basic concept' of 'political languages', 'political vocabularies' or 'conceptual frameworks'. To this end, my methodology will rest on the foundations of *Begriffsgeschichte* and the so-called 'Cambridge School'. I will offer detailed explanations to this end in the next part of my study.

e. Conceptual History

The German school of *Begriffsgeschichte* ('conceptual history') has countered to tackle ahistorical approaches to historical terms since its institutionalization in 1950s. Thus, its representatives have attempted to identify and study "key concepts" or "basic concepts" (*Grundbegriffe*) in history. They have argued that these could translate into political action in various politicosocial systems and emphasized their importance in 'language' as medium for the communication between historical actors. [63]

The representatives of *Begriffsgeschichte* claim that is only possible to study 'key concepts' through a selected corpus of historical texts or so-called 'semantic fields'. Semantic fields feature a relationship between words and concepts (the so-called "representational aspect") and define the content of *Grundbegriffe*. On the other hand, concepts also undergo semantic changes, which is possible to identify through the study of texts in consecutive historical periods ("referential aspect"). [64]

Studies of *Begriffsgeschichte* often focus on the *longue durée* study of 'basic concepts' or 'key concepts' in certain politicosocial contexts. This approach defines the collected study of its main representatives, Otto Brunner, Werner Conze und Reinhart Koselleck: *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (1972–1997). This lexicon features the "historical basic concepts" (*Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*) of the so-called *Sattelzeit* (1750–1850) in the German cultural context. [65]

Although not as uniform in terms of methodology, the so-called 'Cambridge School' of political thought offers the Anglophone alternative of *Begriffsgeschichte*. Its most prominent representatives, J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner criticized the ahistorical approaches of studies in the fields of political thought and philosophy at

English-language universities before the late 1960s. Skinner claimed that these tendencies resulted in the establishment of the "mythologies" of "doctrine", "coherence", "prolepsis" and "parochialism". These lead to the misinterpretation of historical texts in service of prescribed narrative positions in the present. [66]

J. G. A. Pocock attempted to outline a more genuine history of political thought through his interest in "political languages". He explained that studies shall address the fact various "occupational" or "status groups" formed distinct "vocabularies" to discuss politics, a "synchronic" aspect of historical political discourses. However, a "diachronic" dimension also defined the individual development of political languages in history. Finally, Pocock emphasized the important distinction between the identifications of "language" as a whole and its incorporation of "particular performances" by historical actors. The reconstruction of the language of civic humanism in early modern Britain was a feat achieved by the historian through this methodology, as he was rather interested in the diachronic development of this specific political vocabulary. [67]

In contrast, Quentin Skinner was rather interested in the individual performances of "speech acts" and their synchronic relationship. He described this concept through his claim that speech does not describe the state of affairs, as it is rather used "to affiet", to organize the "world" of society. Thus, historical studies must handle political speeches as "speech actions" or "speech acts" and aim to reconstruct the "repertoire of socially given meanings and conventions" in historical contexts and the individual departures from these constructs. Skinner argued that through this approach, one could reconstruct historical "languages" or "ideologies". [68]

Thus, one can identify basic similarities and differences between the approaches of *Begriffsgeschichte* and the 'Cambridge School'. Their representatives attempt to reconstruct political thought in its historical context through their focus on 'language'. Nonetheless, the primary historical units of *Begriffsgeschichte* are the basic concepts, with a methodology modelled upon the practices of philology, linguistics and historical semantics. In contrast, Pocock, Skinner and their followers are rather interested in the analysis of discourses and ideologies. [69] The varying level of interests in the diachronic or the synchronic dimensions also differentiates between *Begriffsgeschichte* and Pocock on the one and Skinner on the other hand.

Nonetheless, modern 'conceptual historians' are not necessarily zealots of nor *Begriffsgeschichte* neither the 'Cambridge School'. Those are only the ideas that concepts "are used as tools or as weapons" in political discourse and that they 'acquire their meaning from their uses in their respective historical contexts' that remain shared in the community. In contrast, approaches to the history of concepts are rather different in various individual, national and international projects. This is much due to the different interests and perceptions as for the necessities of particular studies. [70]

Attempts have also appeared to widen the horizons of *Begriffsgeschichte* and the Cambridge School originally limited to national contexts. It is important to mention the "Historische Semantik als Diskurspragmatik: der Begriff *Nation* in Frankreich und Deutschland" of Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink in this regard (1997). The historian identifies a "cultural transfer" between the German and French contexts of the *Sattelzeit* in relation to the concept of the 'nation'. He shows that while the German discourse of the time adopted the modern French term and translated it into its own version of the *Nation*, it also reframed the term through the German concept of the 'people' (*Volk*). Ironically,

its representatives started to emphasize a 'German uniqueness' (*deutsche Eigenart*) in relation to concepts formed under the influence of the French discourse of the 'nation'. [71]

I must also mention the important considerations of *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe* (2016–2018) for my interest in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. The series feature the attempt of the authors, Balázs Trencsényi, Maciej Janowski, Monika Baár, Maria Falina, Michal Kopeček and Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič attempt to construct a "transnational intellectual history" for the region of "East Central Europe". They describe these realms as the "national cultures" and "countries wedged between the four empires up to 1918: Ottoman, Russian, Habsburg, and Prussian/German". Their aim is to formulate a "regional" narrative through the analysis of national discourses, but also of the "supranational and subnational (regional) frameworks of interaction". [72]

The theme of "transfer" or "transmission of concepts" is central to this account. On the one hand, this refers to the "imported Western terminology" of local political discourses. The authors claim that the "internal evolution" of the concepts in question was "organic" in their original Western European context. In contrast, they appeared in East Central Europe through "cultural receptions", since local discourses were defined by the models of the "civilized West" and its "asymmetric and relational notions". [73]

On the other hand, this processes of 'transfer' and 'reception' were not ones of simple copying. They rather resulted in an "intellectual climate where the different layers of modernity […] often clashed with each other and prompted reflection on modernity in terms of reception and/or indigenous development". The authors also emphasize that as a result, through the cross-ideological transfer of concepts, a

"complex intertwining" of ideological positions have occurred. This have "produced innumerable ideological hybrids over the last two centuries". [74]

Concepts, political languages, discourses, and their participants are subjects to a multi-dimensional approach in *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe.* The authors are cautious to not depict local actors only through a "national framework of references". They also describe them through their sociocultural contexts and various intellectual positions. Although they emphasize the opposition between "institutionalist/state-centred" and "culturalist/society-centred (organicist) discourses" in the local context, they pointed out the adaptation of related 'Western terminology' by their vocabularies (which is rather ironic in the case of the 'organicist' and localist discourse). On the other hand, the authors argue that the "semantics of nationhood' as the 'common integrative battleground' of political discussions in the historical context of East Central Europe. [75]

To sum it up, the studies of *Begriffsgeschichte,* the 'Cambridge School' and works with similar interests reveal a complex package of considerations. Concepts, discourses and ideologies can form the basic units of researches. Whereas related studies had originally observed the synchronic and diachronic mutations of political languages in national contexts, the rising interest has appeared as for the studies of 'cultural transfers' and 'transnational intellectual histories'. These aspects are the most important in relation to the studies of the Central European region and the historical state of the Habsburg Monarchy, contexts of my foremost interest. I constructed my own methodology with these considerations in mind, which I will present in the next section.

f. Methodology

My main interest is in the development of 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' as a historical basic concept in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy in diachronic terms. Nonetheless, the circumstances of it being embedded into political vocabularies and speech acts in synchronic terms are also important for me. Previous studies have already indicated that the concept appeared in various ideological contexts ('liberal', 'civic radical', 'social democratic' etc.) throughout its history. It is thus natural to assume that the differences between these conceptual frameworks defined its particular uses. On the other hand, traditional narratives also emphasize the role of historical figures such as Wilson or Lenin and the influence of their speech acts on discussions related to the concept of 'self-determination'. Thus, I must also discover the individual positions of other historical actors on this subject.

The diachronic dimension of the dissertation is rather given. Previous studies have identified the decades around the mid-nineteenth century as the historical period in which the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' appeared. The peak of related narratives is the era of the late First World War (1917–1918). I will be interested to study the development of the concept in this period in various contexts.

The concept of the 'nation' or the 'people' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination' necessitates me to discuss the development of these concepts in national discourses. The aforementioned ideological aspect already complicates this approach. On the other hand, I must also consider the socio-political background of the historical actors that contributed to these discourses. Finally, I find it important to discover the transnational debates in and between discourses with regard to the concepts of the 'nation' and its 'self-determination'.

I must reflect on the relationship between the ideas of the 'nation' and 'empire' in national discourses, but also the processes of cultural transfer and ideological transfer in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. On the other hand, previous studies have identified the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' as a concept of 'Western', German, or French origin. Thus, I am obliged to study the transnational sources behind the local adaptations of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' as a concept. The local influence of the Russian revolutions as an 'Eastern' source in the era of the late First World War will be the most interesting in this regard.

I selected my textual corpus in accordance with these and additional considerations. On the one hand, the 'self-determination of peoples' is often depicted as a 'natural right', which necessitates me to revisit historical laws and legal literature in search of the concept. On the other hand, it also appears as a 'principle' in political discourses, which obliges to me to identify its importance in political literature and discussions.

Previous studies have associated the concept of 'self-determination' with 'sovereignty', 'secession' and the 'principle of nationality', whereas their narratives have featured terms 'autonomy' and 'democracy' as its opposites. Thus, I must also search for parallel and counter-concepts to the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' in the studied texts. I hope that this will result in the reconstruction of the relevant parts of political vocabularies.

I selected and structured the case studies of the dissertation with these aspects in mind. My foremost interest is to study the historical relationship between the ideas of the 'nation' and the 'empire' and the related role of the concept of 'self-determination'

in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. Two of my chapters will start with the discussion of this issue in relation to the historical discourses of 'Austria' and 'Hungary' before the First World War, in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

This is the foundation for my studies of the political discourses of the Austrian Imperial Council, the Hungarian in the context of the late First World War (1917–1918). On the one hand, my study of the discussions of these legislative institutions of Habsburg-era Austria and Hungary will be the organic continuation of my previous studies of the long-nineteenth-century discourses. On the other hand, I will attempt to identify the reasons behind the transformation in the role of the 'self-determination of peoples' and its association with 'sovereignty', 'secession' and other parallel concepts in this era. I will refer to this process through the term 'discontinuities' as opposed to the alleged 'continuities' of the previous phase of local discourses.

The 'national discourses' I will discuss in my study are those of the Czech and Hungarian national movements. I will attempt to reconstruct their political vocabularies and to embed these into the political discourse(s) of the Habsburg Monarchy or specifically, Habsburg-era Austria and Hungary. On the other hand, I am also concerned with the mutation of political language due to the debates of national movements in local contexts. I will discuss this process through the identification of dichotomies between the Czech and German, the Hungarian and non-Hungarian national movements.

My handling of case studies will be asymmetric due to various reasons. The positions of national movements were rather different in their local context and in the imperial framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Hungarian national movement represented a 'dominant' nationality in the politicosocial conditions of the Hungarian

state. The *Ausgleich* of 1867 also (re-)affirmed the separate status of the Hungarian Kingdom from other lands ruled by the Habsburg dynasty. In contrast, the participants of the Czech national movement rather referred to their positions as that of a 'subject nationality' in Austria, as they never received any recognitions for their similar demands. In relation to this issue, I must also emphasize the fact that I will use German, Hungarian and Czech sources throughout the Austrian and Hungarian case studies. These will contribute to the reconstruction of political vocabularies in the local context. On the other hand, this choice also means that other national discourses will be underrepresented in the dissertation.

The study of the Czechoslovak secessionist movement and its integration into the transnational discourse of the *New Europe* might seem as radically different from the Austrian and Hungarian case studies. The Britain-based and English-speaking society of the *New Europe* discussed the future international order of nation-states in the late phase of the First World War (1916–1918). It is fair to assume that a 'Western', or at least Britain-based terminology defined its discourse. One can remember that André Liebich have also elaborated on the related ideas of Masaryk in the French and Anglo-American contexts, separate from the Austro–Hungarian one. I will also be interested to discover the related historical basic concepts of the British context and their adaptation into the conceptual framework of the Czechoslovak movement.

However, I find the fact rather important that the original context of Masaryk and his political allies was Austria–Hungary. I assume that their political vocabulary still incorporated references to the concepts of the local discourse. I will be interested whether the topic of 'cultural transfer' could apply to their case not through the 'West–East', but rather in the 'East–West' dynamic. In this sense, this case study will

complement the previous chapter on the relationship between the Czech national movement and the Austrian political discourse.

The primary interest of my study is to construct a narrative on the history of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' as opposed to the accounts of Fisch and Liebich. This intention might appear to be the easiest in relation to the context of the Habsburg Monarchy, as I have already claimed that their studies do not really discuss the history of the concept in local discourses.

Nonetheless, this does not mean I can just write an account with reflecting on the related historiographical traditions. I will in particular address the claims of new imperial historians in connection to the Austrian context, the general trends of Hungarian historiography in relation to the local discourse, and the existing literature on the history of the *New Europe* and Masaryk's Czechoslovakism. I will also critically approach the most relevant historiographical claims in connection to the local histories of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' and its parallel concepts.

Since my sources are diverse in linguistic terms and the language of my dissertation is English, I must address the issue of the translation of concepts. This problem is also the main interest of László Kontler in his "Translation and Comparison, Translation as Comparison: Aspects of Reception in the History of Ideas" (2009). The author considers this issue important to discuss, as he recalls the Mark Bevir's criticism of J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Bevir claims that the former scientists' ideas were fallacious, as in his interpretation, they would proclaim that "authors must follow the ruling conventions if they want to be understood" or they would restrict them to "bit

parts of the mouthpieces of the script-writing paradigms which constitute their conceptual frameworks". [76]

Kontler points out that this is a rather simplistic, borderline parodistic interpretation of Pocock and Skinner, who were rather aware of the "proposition that is legitimate to attribute to readers to constitute meanings". As a result, they were interested in "the complex mode of *Rezeptionsgeschichte* that is required of the historian". Pocock realized that the participants of historical discourses also had embedded earlier texts into their speech acts as their "readers" through "intra-lingual translation". The scientific discourse that followed in the field of the history of ideas identified the "translators" of historical texts as "authors" with "at least partially independent claims" due to their own "sense and subject" and "questions asked" during their "acts" of reading. It became evident for historians that translation thus constitutes a "path of reception" in the history of ideas. [77]

Kontler shows that there has been a similar "fascination" in *Begriffsgeschichte* with translation and the "comparative study of concepts in different languages". He specifically recalls Ulrich Ricken's study on the "possibilities of the interlingual comparison of concepts" in relation to this issue. This discusses the "discrepancy" between the terms to denote the discourse of the Enlightenment in German (*Aufklärung*) and French (*lumiéres*). Ricken points out that the German concept reflects on "the greater capacity of the German language to organize the lexical field in a 'mono-centric' fashion" due to the "infinite possibility of crafting composite words from the same root". Since one cannot replicate this process in French, it is only possible for them to paraphrase certain important German expressions of the historical discourse, such as Immanuel Kant's *in einem aufgeklärten Zeitalter* or *in einem Zeitalter der Aufklärung*.

Thus, the historian must be rather conscious of the "barriers in the way of the relevant vocabulary when transposed into a community of speakers with a different natural language". [78]

One must also mention related viewpoints in the field of translation studies. Lawrence Venuti, for instance, criticizes the so-called "American tradition" or "Anglo-American translators" for to their "domesticating" and "assimilationist" strategies of translation. He claims that although the latter emphasize that concepts are always specific and particular to their context, their translations still "domesticate" concepts, so that they become familiar to the Anglo-American audience. However, Venuti argues that this only results in an "illusionary effect of transparency", as translators still corrupt original texts for the benefit of the "preferences of their readers and publishers". [79]

From the viewpoint of this study, Venuti's description of the so-called "foreignizing" method of translation might be the most interesting. The theorist describes this approach through the statement that it stresses the "strange and unfamiliar elements in the original" texts to the English-speaking audience. Thus, it prevents "easy assumptions of domestic superiority" and promotes "respect for cultural differences". It is important to emphasize that Venuti assumes that this form is best suited to literary works as opposed to what he termed as "technical translation". He claims that the latter method has been "designed to support scientific research". He is doubtful that it would be concerned with "linguistic effects that exceed simple communication (tone, connotation, polysemy, intertextuality)". [80] One must, however, accentuate that it is precisely this interest that is the common factor between studies of conceptual history.

As for myself, I am well aware that the mere attempt at the translation of concepts into English will not suffice. Even if some terms do have their equivalents in

various languages, their historical and cultural contexts are rather different. In contrast, it is only possible to translate some concepts through paraphrases.

However, I do not find these barriers impossible to overcome. One of the main points of my study is precisely to identify the cultural or ideological transfer of concepts and the related issues of their translation. The most important issue from this viewpoint is the contextualization of translations in historical discourses. Thus, I will be interested in the "analysis of synonyms, antonyms, and complementary terms, as well as terminological correspondences and discrepancies within and between 'fields of meaning' or concepts". It is important to emphasize that Kontler claims that, ultimately, this method constitutes a "feasible path to trace transpositions" through the "subversion" of the consistency and the purpose of texts and concepts. [81] I will also use the foreignizing method of translation throughout the study as per the recommendations of Venuti.

Nonetheless, I must first clarify the terminology of my own study, the general terms I will use throughout the dissertation. In my view, this will help the reader to become familiar with certain terms that return throughout the whole study, whereas I will address specific terms related to local contexts in the relevant chapters. I will discuss the former concepts in the next section.

g. Terminology

It is of paramount importance for me to clarify my own references to the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' as a basic concept I will discuss in this dissertation. On the one hand, the term has been referred to as a 'natural

right' and a principle of 'justice' in the historical and the contemporary discourse. Yet, it has also been mentioned simply as a 'term', a 'watchword' or a 'principle'.

The phrasing of the concept as 'national self-determination' or the 'self-determination of peoples' constitutes a similar problem. International law identifies the 'self-determination of peoples' as a definitive term of its discussions. I have also noticed that the *Selbstbestimmung der Völker* is also most common form of the concept in the German cultural sphere. In contrast, English studies rather refer to the term 'national self-determination'.

While there is a connection between the concepts of the 'people' and the 'nation' as the constituent parts of these complex terms, their relationship is also rather conflictual, which issue is not irrespective of linguistic contexts. The term 'nation' can easily describe the community of the 'state' in English. In contrast, the concepts of the 'nation' or the 'people' often appears as separate from that of the 'state' in the German cultural context. The 'people' also remains a concept that lacks a definition in international law much due to this problem.

To tackle the most obvious or probable trappings in terms of general references to the concept, I will approach it through a contextualist method based on my selected corpus of historical texts. I will refer to it as the 'self-determination of peoples', the 'right of peoples to self-determination', 'national self-determination' etc. as featured in these sources. I will also attempt to explain the reasons behind use of these specific terms in the observed semantic fields.

I will also use the terms 'right', 'principle', 'watchword' etc. in accordance with this approach. Otherwise, I will refer to the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' a 'concept' or a 'term' throughout the study. Importantly, I will not

discuss the implications of the term 'self-determination' in connection to individual rights or the rights of social groups, except if these issues are strongly related to my study of particular cases. Thus, one must comprehend that my references to 'self-determination' will most often concern its national dimension.

The same contextualist approach defines my discussion of the 'nation', 'people' and related concepts in historical sources and contexts. In this regard, I would not like to and I am not able to contribute to the debate on nationalism as a 'perennial' or 'modern' ideology. It is rather the discourse on the topics of 'civic (or political) nationalism' and 'ethnic nationalism' I would like to touch upon.

These concepts have been referred to in scientific and political discussions with rather specific meanings. 'Ethnic' concepts of the nation are featured as ones that would interpret the community through 'ethno-cultural' factors such as common descent or language. In contrast, 'civic' or 'political' nationalism is claimed to view the community as one anyone could belong to, should they wish so. As a result, 'ethnic nationalism' and 'civic nationalism' are often referred to as 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' concepts of the 'nation'. They are terms that legitimize (or delegitimize) the political claims of national movements. [82]

However, Rogers Brubaker argues convincingly in the collective study *Ethnicity without Groups* (2004) that this dichotomy is rather flawed. He points out that even if traditionally perceived as 'civic', certain ideas of nationalism can still be exclusive and promote the domination of one ethno-cultural identity in the state. His primary example to this end is the alleged model of the 'civic nation' as it appeared in the context of revolutionary France. Nonetheless, the policy of the revolutionary French state had no problem excluding certain groups of the local society (*émigré*s, clergy etc.) from its

concept of the 'nation' or pursuing an aggressively assimilationist policy against the non-French communities of the state. [83]

The issues of 'ethnic' and 'civic' nationalism also appear in historical studies on the discourse of 'self-determination' in the late First World War. For instance, Tryvge Throntveit's "The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination" applies this dichotomy to ideological conflict between Wilson and Lenin. The American President appears in the narrative of the article as the representative of a "civic-nationalist" ideal. In contrast, Throntveit claims that the "conviction" of Lenin was that "ethnic nationalism" would result in the disintegration of contemporary states and would "help spread the proletarian revolution". [84] The account of Fisch also makes it seem that the problems of the Paris Peace Treaties and the post-war international order were much due to the domination of the 'ethnic' interpretation of the 'nation' and its 'self-determination' in the contemporary discourse. This appears as the "design" of Lenin, which the Allied and Associated Powers needed to accommodate to out of sheer necessity and to their own detriment. [85]

In contrast, the book of Liebich does not feature or refer to the concept of 'civic nationalism' at all, as he interprets the 'nation' as a "cultural community" as opposed to the identification of the state as a "political" unit. This narrative assumes that the association between the 'nation' and the 'state' was the historical result of "cultural essentialism", which interprets the concept of the 'state' through a sense of "national determinism" anyways.

I am, however, not entirely convinced of the benefits of separating the 'nation' and the 'state' in conceptual terms. I would rather argue that state policies and identities have always informed concepts of the 'nation' in their local contexts. Nay more, I would

emphasize the 'nation' was not always associated in discourses with the ethno-cultural interpretation of the concept. In contrast, the term incorporated supra-ethnic, 'civic' or 'political' elements in the narrative of certain national movements. (Which does not equal to the claim that these were purely 'civic' or 'political' concepts of the 'nation'.) As for the choice between the terms 'ethnic' or 'ethno-cultural', I prefer the latter concept of the Brubaker. In my opinion, 'ethnic' implies a more biological definition of the 'nation' and downplays the importance of 'culture' in the formation of identities.

I must also address the regional term evoked in the title of the dissertation, 'Central Europe'. I identify this concept with the German *Mitteleuropa*, since it was a widespread term of transnational discussions in the First World War and also a form of regional self-identification. Thus, I prefer this term to 'Eastern Europe' or even 'East Central Europe' in connection to the studied contexts. I will use this regional concept to describe a space ruled by three empires (Germany, Austria–Hungary, Russia) until the end of the First World War and the post-imperial space defined by independent nation states in its immediate aftermath.

It is important to emphasize that the territories of Habsburg Monarchy or in its contemporary form, Austria–Hungary were rather central to the descriptions of *Mitteleuropa* or Central Europe during the First World War. In general and as for the historical period prior to 1867, I will prefer the term 'Habsburg Monarchy', as in my view, it accentuates the composite nature of its realms as opposed to the terms 'Austria(n Empire)' or 'Habsburg Empire'. After 1867, I will also refer to this state as 'Austria–Hungary' or the 'Dual Monarchy' in accordance with its dualistic structure until 1918. [86] Whatever its designation might be, the Habsburg Monarchy also represents the idea of 'empire' I am concerned with. On the other hand, it also

constitutes a 'transnational' space, in which one can study the local discourses of national movements and their interactions either through debates or 'cultural transfers'.

I must clarify certain terms I will use in relation to the context of the Habsburg Monarchy throughout the study. Pieter Judson claims his opposition to the use of normative terms like 'Czechs', 'Germans' or 'Poles' in his book of 2016. The new imperial historian claims to prefer descriptive terms such as "Czech speakers" or "German speakers" (although he acknowledges that "this practice does not adequately describe the linguistic practices" of peoples in the Habsburg Monarchy). [87] As for myself, I will refer to interactions between the Czech and German 'national movements' rather than 'Czechs' and 'Germans', since I acknowledge that national elites attempted to transpose their identities onto a local population. Thus, if they appear in my study, 'Czech' and 'German' will refer to national identities rather than functioning as normative terms.

It is also important to clarify my use of the term 'nationalist conflicts' or 'nationalist tensions' in relation to this issue. A certain traditional narrative of Habsburg-related historiography associates the "age of growing mass politics" at the turn of the century with the intensification of the so-called "nationalities conflict" in the local context. This standpoint amounts to the claim that the "coexistence of different language groups or nations within a single empire inevitably led to social conflicts". These tensions would create a "powerful centrifugal political effect", one that would contribute to the eventual downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy according to these narratives. [88]

Judson attempts to reframe this issue through the term 'nationalist conflicts', since he argues that related conflicts were "primarily political in nature", not "natural

products of the multilingual character" of Austrian and Hungarian societies. He points out that although feelings of nationalism were of "critical importance" in "many public situations", they were rather irrelevant in others. Judson claims that in fact, "people often simply ignored nationalist demands for their loyalty". [89]

I also agree that it is better to frame contemporary conflicts as not ones between collective bodies, entire communities, the essential product of their co-existence, but rather as ones between national movements and those who identified with them. Thus, I will also use the terms 'nationalist conflicts' or 'nationalist tensions'. On the other hand, one must remember that the historical sources I will analyse rather described these conflicts as one of 'national' nature, a phrasing I will contextualize through the form 'national(ist)'.

During the First World War, Austria–Hungary was allied to the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, which states constituted the alliance of the so-called 'Central Powers'. Their opponents, the British Empire, the Empire of France, the Russian Empire and their smaller allies formed the so-called 'Entente', which expanded into the 'Allied and Associated Powers' with the joining of the United States of America in early 1917. Thus, I will use the terms 'Central Powers', 'Entente Powers' or the 'Allied and Associated Powers' to refer to these alliances.

The first chapter of my dissertation will attempt to apply my considerations of methodology and terminology to the context of Habsburg-era 'Austria' or 'Cisleithania'. However, the specificities of the local discourses will also necessitate me to expand my terminology and to reflect on the problems of related historiography. My national case study will be the discourse of the Czech national movement in this imperial framework.

2. Case Study: Austria

'Nation', 'Empire' and the 'Self-Determination of Peoples' in the Austrian Political

Discourse before the First World War

a. Introduction – Historical Narratives of the Relationship between 'Nation' and

'Empire' in 'Austria'

The terms 'Austria' or 'Cisleithania' refer to the conventional names of the 'Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the (Austrian) Parliament (or Imperial Council)', a constituent part of Austria–Hungary after the *Ausgleich* of 1867. [1] The inhabitants of this state, but also historical studies have often described it as a "nationalities state" (*Nationalitätenstaat*) or a "multi-ethnic empire" (*Vielvölkerreich*). [2]

These terms correspond to the concepts of the 'multinational state' and the 'empire' in the accounts of Fisch and Liebich. One can thus assume that their claims as for the contradiction between the state structure of the Habsburg Monarchy and the modern 'principle of nationality' or the 'self-determination of peoples' also apply to the state of Austria. It is also logical to anticipate in accordance with their narratives that the political representatives of local nationalities referred to the concept of 'self-determination' in support of their demands of 'secession' and 'sovereignty' already in the nineteenth century; or that at least, they would readily adopt the Bolshevik interpretation of the term during the First World War to break away from the 'empire'.

One could also make such assumptions upon reading certain and influential narratives of Czech history. These accounts would describe the developments of the nineteenth century, the early twentieth century and the First World War from the

retrospective knowledge of imperial disintegration and from the viewpoint of nation-state making. Thus, they feature Czech history as a process to lead towards the creation of the Czechoslovak state.

Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy by Lieutenant-Commander Edgar P. Young of the British Royal Army (1938) showcases this interpretation of national history and its adaptation from Czech(oslovak) historiography into English-language studies in the first half of the twentieth century. It is important to emphasize that this book had its own temporality, written during the May Crisis in 1938 (in the prelude of the Munich Agreement and the dissolution of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia). In this context, the British author positioned himself against the expansive attitude of Nazi Germany, but also criticized the policy of appeasement by the British and French governments. The claim of Young thus becomes understandable that "the (British) democrat's point of view" amounted to supporting Czechoslovakia, its alliance with the Soviet Union and France against the German Reich. This was to create a balance of power in his time and "that atmosphere of all-round security and mutual confidence in which the racial, territorial and economic disputes (…) could be amicably and fruitfully discussed". [3]

On the other hand, Young also adopts the mainstream narratives of contemporary Czechoslovak historiography as for the fundamental historical opposition between the ideas of the 'nation' and the 'empire'. He depicts Czechs as one side of this dichotomy and as a community with a collective mind. The members of the nation appear in Young's narrative as "filled with righteous indignation" upon the *Ausgleich* and the creation of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy in 1867, since they "were granted nothing" or "less than nothing" despite their loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty. The

author then claims that the Czechs "hoped against hope" that the Habsburgs would "realize in time the error of their ways" and would adopt a "federal constitution for their Empire". [4]

Young features the outbreak of the First World War and the "ensuing intensification of repressive measures against the subject races of the Empire" as a watershed in this regard. He claims that "any thinking Czech" could realise that "the only hope for his [sic] nation" would be the "defeat and the downfall" of the Habsburg dynasty. He then depicts the political representatives of the Czech nation during First World War as "carrying on" an "incessant campaign of agitation against their rulers and in favour of their national liberation". [5]

The paragraph following this statement then briefly discusses the local developments in the Austrian lands between 1914–1918. The political representatives of the Czech nation would create a "secret society" of the Maffia to carry on "revolutionary propaganda" and make "preparations for the coming revolution". The term 'revolution' refers to the foundation of the independent Czech(oslovak) nation-state in this context. The demands of "Czech representatives" as for the "reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a Federation of democratic, autonomous states" appears as parts of this political design in the narrative of Young. Thus, the claim of the author seems somewhat contradictory that it was only after early 1918 that Czech politicians ("except the Social-Democrats") realized that the "Habsburgs would learn nothing" and that there was a "growing feeling of sympathy" for the "Czechoslovak national aspirations in the Allied countries". This realization appears as the ultimate drive behind the unification of representatives in the "Czech National Committee" and their preparation for above-mentioned 'revolution'. [6]

In contrast, the author describes the foreign activities of "two great patriots and statesmen", Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Eduard Beneš during the First World War in considerable length. The author establishes early on that these individuals would become the Presidents of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period. He then depicts their activities to "gain support for the realization of national independence" as efforts to receive international recognition for the future state. They would thus prepare the ground for the national 'revolution' that started on October 28, 1918. [7]

To sum it up, Edgar P. Young's *Czechoslovakia: Keystone of Peace and Democracy* of 1938 features the Czech 'nation' as in fundamental opposition with the Habsburg or Austrian 'empire'. The role of the imperial framework in national history is marginalized and limited to this dichotomy. The references to its 'repressive measures' make its system appear as the complete opposite to 'national independence'. This narrative thus features the foundation of independent Czechoslovakia as the inevitable end point of Czech history. The historical agency of local actors, especially those of the Czech political representatives in Austria is also limited to their contribution to this process.

It is easy to identify the Czechoslovak sources of this narrative through Andrea Orzoff's *The Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe 1914- 1918* (2009). The author shows that Masaryk and Beneš both started to interpret the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation of Czechoslovakia as a national and democratic 'revolution' during the First World War. Masaryk would integrate this idea into his interpretation of the war as a "world revolution" (*světová revoluce*) in his memoirs of 1925. The narrative of Austrian 'oppression' against local nations (and especially Czechs) also found its source in these, originally wartime claims

of the Czechoslovak emigration. Besides the legitimization of the nation-state, this depiction of the national past also supported the political intent to "de-Austrianize" (*odrakouštět se*) the society of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period. Thus, the Czechoslovak elite attempted to fully marginalize the legacy of the 'empire' in historical and political terms. [8]

Studies such as Claire E. Nolte's "The New Central Europe of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk" also show that the national elite of interwar Czechoslovakia was successful in establishing a narrative with regard to its related concept of 'national self-determination'. This account featured Masaryk as the local actor "closest" to Woodrow Wilson in "philosophical" and "political" terms, sharing the "Wilsonian language of democracy and self-determination" and referring to these concepts in support a secessionist agenda.[9]

Even though "The Path to Independence" still appears as the sub-title of his book, H. Louis Rees is rather critical towards this narrative of the interwar period, but also its counter-narratives in socialist Czechoslovakia in his *The Czechs during World War I* (1992). The author points out that the "Czech historians" after 1945 "concentrated on destroying the reputations of the politicians who had dominated the interwar bourgeois Czechoslovak state". This was in service of the official narrative of the socialist regime, which "minimized" the role of "emigre leaders" and "virtually ignored" that of the "domestic politicians" during the First World War. It was rather the Russian October Revolution that appeared as one of the "most important" impetus for the "growth of a Czech independence movement" in this interpretation. [10]

As opposed to the Wilson- and Masaryk-centred accounts of the interwar period, the official historical narratives of Czechoslovak socialism would rather claim that it

was "Lenin's call for national self-determination" that inspired the "Czech working class" to overthrow the Habsburg dynasty. [11] Thus, one could identify a 'Lenin vs. Wilson' dichotomy when comparing the various phases of mainstream national historiography. The historical figures of Wilson and Lenin appeared as transnational points of references in accordance with the ideological considerations of the various Czechoslovak establishments.

In contrast to the earlier accounts, the book of Rees rather attempted to fill in a gap in Czech(oslovak) historiography in the context of 1992, through its focus on the "domestic situation" of the Czech nation in Cisleithania. While the author would still refer to the "October revolution in Russia" and the "radicalizing effect it had in Austria–Hungary", he also discusses issues which he views as "purely domestic". These include the "rebirth of parliamentary government" in Austria, the "attendant political responsibility forced onto the politicians" by historical processes and the "attitude of various governments in Vienna to the Czechs and particularly to question of [sic] the Czech-German struggle in Bohemia and Moravia". [12]

The term 'national self-determination' first appears in the book as the one of the "rallying cries" of Russian "revolutionaries" in March 1917. Rees claims that this phrase was appealing for "nationally conscious Czechs". On the other hand, his book features the statement that the entrance of the United States into the war also "had an effect" in this regard, since "the Americans" also "championed the cause of national self-determination". Rees then identifies additional influences which would contribute to contemporary developments in Austrian Czech politics. On the one hand, he shows that Masaryk and Beneš "pleaded" the local Czech representatives to publicly oppose the Austrian government, since the previous lack of such efforts undermined their

activities abroad. On the other hand, he claims that the "economic hardships" of an "increasingly unpopular war" produced feelings of "popular despair" in the previously "indifferent" Czech population. Finally, the Austrian government seemed to pursue a policy in favour of German national claims, which also necessitated the reaction of Czech representatives. [13]

All these processes resulted in the declaration of the Czech Union (the umbrella organization of most Czech political groups) at the opening session of the Austrian Imperial Council (*Reichsrat*) on May 30, 1917. Rees quotes this text in English. While I will analyse his translation and interpretation of the declaration in this chapter, it is worth to mention certain elements of the author's narrative here already. Rees shows that the arguments of the Czech Union included the "new" "principle of national self-determination" in addition to the "older", so-called "states rights argument". He claims that one of the main demands of national representatives was the "transformation of the monarchy into a federal state"; the other was the creation of a "free and equal national state" for the Czechs that would include "the Slovaks". [14]

Thus, the narrative of Rees points towards a new interpretation as for the integration of the concept of 'national self-determination' into the political vocabulary of Czech politics in Austria during the First World War. Although 'Americans' would still appear as supporters of the former term, the author features the February Revolution of Russia as the main influence on Czech nationalism in this regard. In contrast to previous narratives, he emphasizes the opposition between the viewpoints of local Czech politicians and the Czechoslovak political emigration. In fact, Rees claims that the idea of national secession was still "too extreme" for the 'majority of Czech politicians' as of early 1917. He states that they still showed concern for the "interests

of the (Habsburg) Empire" as opposed to the viewpoint of Masaryk and 'radical nationalists'. [15]

As opposed to a hereditary conflict between the ideas of the 'nation' and the 'empire', the dissociation between national and imperial interests developed gradually according to the author. Rees especially stresses the role of "abysmal material deprivation" in weakening "Czech support for the war effort and for the Monarchy" in 1917–1918. Due to this reason, Rees focuses on the "war's final two years" in temporal terms. He claims that all the issues observed by him, the ones that would contribute to the process of imperial disintegration "really began to come into play" in this period. [16]

The October revolution and Bolshevik policy do not appear as developments to start the process of dissociation between 'empire' and 'nation' in this narrative, but 'only' as external influences to contribute to the domination of 'radical' national demands in the Austrian Czech context. Even though the United States appears as a point of reference with regard to the concept of 'national self-determination', Rees mentions Wilson only four times in his book. The Fourteen Points does not appear as a declaration to inspire, but rather to disappoint the "Czech leaders within the empire" in this account, as these politicians had already reached the point by early 1918 where they pretty much dissociated from the Habsburg Monarchy. [17]

To sum it up, *The Czechs during World War I* of H. Louis Rees features the Austrian political representatives of the Czech nation as historical actors with their own agency. He constructs a new narrative in contrast to previous ones that had benefited the interests of Czechoslovak secessionism during and after the First World War, or those of the socialist regime after 1945. Although Rees features 'national self-determination' as a term that became important in the Austrian Czech context due to

the influence of the Russian revolutions in 1917, he does not subordinate local political activities to the influence of the Bolsheviks (and even less to that of Wilson). The author also does not interpret 'empire' and 'nation' as ideas fundamentally opposed to each other. He rather uses historical sources to show how their relationship devolved gradually. Rees argues that this process took place much due to the deterioration of economic conditions in Austria. On the other hand, he also shows that the actions of the imperial government further antagonized Czech representatives, as it co-operated with the German national representatives and supported for their claims against their Czechs counterparts.

The representatives of 'new imperial history' also focus on the relationship between the 'nation' and 'empire' in a similar sense than Rees, but in a broader sense. For instance, Andrea Komlosy rethinks this relationship in the Austrian context in her "Imperial Cohesion, Nation-Building, and Regional Integration" (2015). The author depicts Cisleithania as the "sub-empire" of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867. She claims that its framework would "establish the doctrine of multi-ethnicity" (albeit "under German leadership") as opposed to Hungarian policy of assimilation ("Magyarization"). While German would never stop "being the leading language, opening carriers in higher administration, academia, and political life", other nationalities could still "establish their languages on a local and regional level". [18]

Komlosy specifically mentions the context of the Austrian Imperial Council (*Reichsrat*) as one that would exemplify these trends. Although the use of "all customary languages were acknowledged" and possible in the discussion of this legislative institution, "minutes were only taken in German". Thus, Komlosy claims that the house rules of the *Reichsrat* "exercised pressure on non-German nationalities

to use German in debate". On the other hand, it was still important for the institution to acknowledge the "equality" of local languages. [19]

This latter point is important to emphasize, as Austria appears as a "multi-ethnic nation" in the narrative of Komlosy. Her key concept in this regard in Austrianness' (*Österreichtum*). Komlosy argues that while this term originally referred to a sense of loyalty to the "house of Austria" (the Habsburg dynasty), it developed into an Austrian state identity of citizens by the nineteenth century. The author claims that this was due to the effects of the Austrian codification of civic law, general conscription into the imperial army and the processes of "economic, cultural and political unification". [20]

Komlosy identifies a tension between this multi-ethnic concept of the 'Austrian nation' and the "ethno-linguistic understanding of nation-building". She claims that those who supported ethno-cultural interpretations of the 'nation' identified this vision of the community with the concepts of 'democracy' and 'national liberation'. They thus denounced the "neo-absolutist" policy of the Habsburg dynasty and "its multi-ethnic interpretation of nationhood". [21] [22]

Komlosy also states that "only German had the potential to represent the core nation of the empire" and the potential to "maintain stability" in the framework of the Austrian state. However, she also claims the political representatives of "Austrian Germans" (or "German-speaking Austrians") contributed to the downfall of the empire. Komlosy emphasizes that these political groups prevented the realization of the "right of every ethnic people" in an effort to maintain their cultural and political domination. (Although it is important to emphasize that the source and the exact content of the former 'right' not clear in this context of her text.) This would result in the "vision of

national self-determination first within – then beyond – the Habsburg Monarchy's boundaries" as developed by the representatives of non-German nationalities. [23]

The Czech national movement appears in the study as the primary example of these processes. Komlosy often refers to the concept of *böhmisches Staatsrecht* as a notion central to the conflicts between the imperial government, "Czechs" and "Germans". She translates this German term as "Bohemian Constitutional Rights", "Bohemian State Constitution" or "constitutional self-determination" (whereas Rees would refer to the same concept as "states rights"). Komlosy claims that this term referred to the demands to establish a "common parliament and government for the lands of the Bohemian Crown". The latter territorial concept refers to the provinces or the "crown lands" of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in her work. She emphasizes that this project of a common Bohemian administration was not that a 'nation state'. The concept of *böhmisches Staatsrecht* rather corresponded to the "regional identity" of local Germans and Czechs. The author states that this was also compatible with the allegiance to the 'imperial' and 'multinational' concept of Austria. [24]

However, Komlosy points out that local German and Czech elites started to identify with the national movements of the region by the second half of the nineteenth century. She argues that this was due to the fact that the imperial government did not institutionalize the "constitutional rights" of the Bohemian Crown. However, the identification of local elites with national movements resulted in a "battle for national possessions" and especially in a struggle for language rights between the "leading [German – L. B. B.] nation" and the non-dominant Czechs. This competition effected both the imperial and local contexts. [25]

Nonetheless, Komlosy also claims that the mainstream of the Czech national movement did not delegitimize "the imperial frame as long as economic integration was intact". This was due to the "economic success" that the "Bohemian and Moravian business elites" enjoyed in Austria. Komlosy argues that the "idea of the nation-state" would become dominant only upon the "disintegration of the empire following World War I". Beforehand, the "Czech–Slovak alliance" as a "regional variety of pan-Slavism" could not offer a viable alternative to the Austrian imperial framework in terms of economy. [26]

One can observe important differences between the narratives of Rees and Komlosy. The focus of Rees is still much limited to the context of the Bohemian, Moravian, and Silesian crown lands during the late First World War (although he also discussed the contributions of Czech representatives to the discourse of the Austrian *Reichsrat*). In contrast, the main interest of Komlosy is rather to integrate the local context into the imperial framework of the nineteenth century. The 'right of every ethnic people', the 'vision of national self-determination' or even 'Bohemian Constitutional Rights' appear as concepts of an empire-wide discourse in this narrative. Komlosy also pins the ethno-cultural interpretation of 'nation' against the multi-ethnic concept of the 'imperial nation' and the identity of 'Austrianness'. She claims that the latter "was present as a popular feeling" and 'only ceased being a cohesive force with the defeat in World War I.' [27] Her interpretation features the relationship between local elites and the imperial centre as one of historical importance for the entire Austrian state rather than for only certain regions. Nonetheless, one must also emphasize that both narratives accentuate the role of economic factors in the relationship between the 'empire' and the 'nation'.

The monography of Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (2016) complements previous studies through the concept of 'experiences of the empire'. The author refers to the effects of "imperial structures", "regional traditions", and the interaction between these frameworks through this term. He claims that these processes shaped the identities of both local elites and popular masses. [28]

"Political nationalism" also appears as a "product" of this relationship. The radical argument of Judson in this regard is that one must approach the concepts of the "empire" and the "nation" in a "productive fashion". Instead of constructing a fundamental opposition between them, one must realize that these "depended on each other for their coherence" in historical terms. [29]

The disintegration of the Habsburg Empire also does not appear in this narrative as the result of its "inevitable collapse" due to its "distinctive" and "anachronistic" structure. Judson rather claims that the First World War created "heretofore unimaginable new conditions", which "galvanized revolutionary forces" throughout Europe. The political processes in the Habsburg Monarchy were only parts of the same pattern. The "breakdown of imperial patriotism" was as a result of the fact that similar to other contemporary states, the "sacrifices" of the population "on the military and home fronts" were not recompensated by the "military and bureaucratic leaders" of the Habsburg Monarchy. The governments of Austria–Hungary failed to fulfil the "immediate physical needs" and the 'material expectations' of its citizens. This resulted in "severe crises of legitimacy" according to Judson. However, he refers to the "harsh, extra-legal military dictatorship" in Austria between 1914–1916 as a phenomenon specific to this state. Its repressive measures did contribute to the deterioration of the relationship between the "empire" and the "masses". Although this system of

governance was abolished in 1916, the Austrian state could still not keep its promises to "take more effective action" to improve its economic conditions, a failure that contributed to its demise. [30]

Judson specifically points at the Austrian attempt to construct a state-administered welfare system as one to ultimately dissolve the legitimacy of the 'empire'. While the Austrian government attempted to co-operate with private welfare organizations due to their "scientific expertise and popularity", these were owned by "nationalist organizations". Thus, when they started to supply food instead of the state, those were "local nationalists" rather than the imperial government that could "gain the confidence of the people". Judson features this process as one to prepare the ground for the foundation of new nation-states, the transition "from empire to republic" with the final collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in late 1918. [31]

Quite interestingly, the author refers to a "presumed link between a concept of national self-determination and its basis in a general acceptance of democratic values" that would be central to the narrative of "nationalist activists" during and after the First World War. This amounted to a "specifically nationalist way of understanding the meaning of democracy" that triumphed especially in the "nationalist political camps of the former Austrian empire". Judson claims that these groups would start to interpret the foundation of nation-states as a "direct consequence of their people's democratic battles for national emancipation". They depicted this process as a historical struggle that "had allegedly taken place in the half century before" 1918. The same narrative would refer to the imperial framework of the Habsburg Monarchy as a "prison of the peoples". Judson makes it quite clear that his viewpoint on historical reality is rather different. He would rather claim that the relationship between 'nation' and 'state' was

rather symbiotic before the war, and those were only economic and political developments between 1914–1918 that would end this relationship. [32]

Although the history of the Czech national movement is not in the main focus of the book, Czech references are constant throughout *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*. Judson refers to the studies of Gary Cohen to argue that the local administration of the Austrian state appeared to the representatives of the Czech national movement "literally as their own" rather than as a "foreign imposition that had served an alien empire". The author claims that this was due to the fact that Czech nationalists infiltrated the "civil service in Austria" before 1914. Thus, they succeeded in creating their own "effective and far-reaching 'empire within the empire'". The relationship between the ideas of the 'nation' and the 'empire' was so close that the new state of Czechoslovakia had to orchestrate an "orgy of renunciation of empire" through symbolic acts after the end of the war. It was also to this end that Masaryk would construct a narrative that depict the "modern" and "democratic" nation-state as opposed to the "anachronistic" "multinational empire". [33]

It is important to emphasize in this regard that Judson identifies a fundamental difference between the approaches of the Habsburg Monarchy and its successor states to the issue of ethno-cultural diversity. He claims that the national elites of the new states were "eager to ascribe nationhood on the basis of objective external factors". Their narrative would thus exclude Jews and other groups from the nation due to their "racial" differences. They would also view national minorities as "inimical to the nation's very existence". The result would be the development of "often authoritarian" national policies and the "generally horrific treatment of national minorities". In contrast, Judson interprets the multi-ethnic Habsburg 'empire' as a positive example for

its attempt to "negotiate the cultural differences that became a key factor in political life' and to integrate these differences into its 'political and social institutions". [34]

To sum it up, Judson interprets the relationship between the local and political ideas of the 'nation' and the structure of the 'empire' as a symbiotic one. Similar to Rees, he emphasizes the negative influence of material conditions on this connection during the First World War. However, he also accentuates the related impact of the Austrian military government between 1914–1916.

The narrative of Judson features 'a' (and interestingly, not 'the') concept of 'national self-determination' in a different sense than the account of Komlosy. The latter already refers to this term in the context of the Austrian discourse in the nineteenth century. In contrast, Judson describes this concept as a term of new secessionist agendas in the First World War. He also claims that it was in this period that the opposition between the 'modern, democratic nation-state' and the 'anachronistic, oppressive, multinational empire' appeared in discourses. These attempted to legitimize the foundation and the structure of nation-states in the post-Habsburg imperial space through their historical narrative, which endeavour also defined the contemporary discourse of the Czech(oslovak) national movement.

While their various viewpoints on the concept of 'national self-determination' are already interesting enough, the studies of Rees and new imperial historians also motivate me through their depiction of the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire'. In contrast to the narratives of Fisch and Liebich, I would also like to integrate the term 'national self-determination' into this framework in a constructive fashion. Rather than assuming a fundamental opposition between ideas, I am rather interested in how references to my concept of interest reflected on the imperial state of affairs from

the viewpoint of national representatives. Since the historical discourse of the Czech national movement seems rather important in relation to this issue, I will analyse its historical development and integrate into the imperial framework of Austria.

Thus, the aim of this chapter is to study the concept of 'national self-determination' in the political vocabularies of Habsburg Austria as an imperial and transnational context. The peak of my narrative is the era of the late First World War (1917–1918) and my study of the participation of Czech representatives in the contemporary discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council. However, I assume that this was not independent of the developments of the previous historical periods.

As a result, I will start with tracking the development of the term in the various national and ideological contexts of the period before the First World War. I will attempt to discover its parallel concepts in conceptual frameworks, and the political intentions that defined its role in discourses. I will attempt to discover 'cultural' and 'ideological transfers', 'continuities' and 'discontinuities' in this context, but also between the nineteenth century, the early twentieth century and that of the late First World War.

I will study the concept of the 'nation' as the possible subject of the 'right to self-determination' in the historical discourse of the Czech national movement. Nonetheless, I will also be interested in the relationship between the terms 'national self-determination', *böhmisches Staatsrecht* and other parallel concepts in its conceptual frameworks, their reflection on the imperial state of affairs and the connection between these political languages and the discourse on the imperial level. I will also show the importance of those transnational debates, in which the viewpoint of Czech representatives clashed with those of other national background. I identify the dichotomy between the Czech and German nationalist viewpoints as the most important

in relation to this issue, although my focus remains on the discourse of the Czech national movement.

Since I am equally preoccupied with the identification of 'self-determination' as a 'right' and as a 'principle', my textual corpus will incorporate legal and political texts. On the one hand, I will analyse the Kremsier Constitution (1849) and December Constitution (1867) as fundamental laws in the Austrian context. On the other hand, I will also use Czech sources in the form of political texts that reflected on the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire'. My main interest is of course to discover the importance of the term 'national self-determination' (or the lack thereof) in these texts.

I will contextualize my analysis of sources using secondary literature. The studies of Rees, Komlosy and Judson remain important points of references for my study, although I will also approach a certain number of claims critically, similar to those of other scholars.

I will feature concepts in their original, Czech, and German versions. I must emphasize that since German was the *lingua franca* of Austria, the presence of German concepts will dominate this chapter. Nonetheless, it will be even more interesting to compare some of these to their Czech alternatives.

The issues of translation will also be rather relevant for my study of 'self-determination' in this context. In accordance with the tradition established by previous studies, I have referred to this concept as 'national self-determination'. However, one must remind that I have also claimed the form 'self-determination of peoples' or *Selbstbestimmung der Völker* has been rather dominant in the German cultural sphere. It is up to me to support this claim through my findings in this chapter.

On the other hand, I must specifically raise awareness of the problem of 'assimilationist translations' in connection to the narrative of Rees. The historian refers to the concepts in the May declaration of the Czech Union (1917) through the English terms 'national self-determination', the 'Czech' or the 'Czechoslovak nation'. I will show that the original Germans of the text and its historical context: *Selbstbestimmung(srecht) der Völker*, *böhmisches Volk*, *tschechoslawisches Volk* etc. were both different and ambiguous terms due to their particular history in the local context of Austria–Hungary. I will elaborate on these issues and my particular choices of the translation of concepts at the relevant parts of this case study.

The final issue of terminology I must address is in relation to the concepts of the 'Bohemian Kingdom', the 'Czech lands' or the 'Bohemian (crown)lands'. These terms have described the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia and the Duchy of Upper and Lower Silesia, individual provinces in the Habsburg Monarchy and Austria as a unit due to their shared historical past in the framework of the medieval and early modern Kingdom of Bohemia. One can already realize that one province even shares the name of the historical state; I must already emphasize that this was not accidental. Although I will use the terms 'Bohemian Kingdom', 'Czech lands' or the 'Bohemian (crown)lands' myself, I will keep this ambiguity in mind and attempt to contextualize my or historical references to these concepts.

The first section will discuss the history of concepts in a space I identify through the term 'Austria', which, however, I must contextualize. The term 'Austrian Empire' referred to all the realms ruled by the Habsburg dynasty in the early nineteenth century. However, the united nature of this entity was rather debated, since various national representatives emphasized the historical independence of their states (e. g. the

Kingdom of Hungary, the Kingdom of Bohemia). In this chapter, the term 'Austria' will refer to the crownlands of the Habsburg dynasty, the representatives of which would (attempt to) form the Austrian Empire in 1848, an entity separate from the Kingdom of Hungary. I will describe the related discourse in the next part of the dissertation.

b. *Liberty, Equality, Autonomy: Liberal Discourses in the 'Austrian' Context of the Early Nineteenth Century*

After the defeat of the Bohemian Revolt in 1620, the policy of imperial centralization dissolved the former historical unity of the Czech lands, the early modern framework of the Bohemian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy. The imperial government rather started to handle the so-called 'crownlands' (*Kronländer*) of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia separately in administrative terms. This policy substantially weakened the representative capabilities of provincial estates. [35]

Nonetheless, the political language of the estates would find its successor in the Bohemian liberal discourse of the early nineteenth century. This adopted and modernized the theory of *böhmisches Staatsrecht* as a part of its political dictionary. Upon this historical foundation, the liberal representatives of the crownland argued for the reconstruction of the Bohemian Kingdom as a historical state through the unification of the Czech lands and the restoration of their political independence in the Habsburg Monarchy. One must mention that these references to historical state rights were not exceptional in this context, as various national movements would form similar demands in the contemporary era. [36]

I must elaborate on the term *böhmisches Staatsrecht* to point out its contemporary ambiguities and to contextualize its translations by various authors.

Komlosy claims that this concept was referred to by the elite local to the crownland of Bohemia, although its sub-groups also had their German and Czech cultural affiliations. The English translations "Bohemian Constitutional Rights", "Bohemian State Constitution" or "constitutional self-determination" would accentuate the common references of this elite to the 'constitution' or the historical laws of the Bohemian Kingdom that defined and were to define its independent framework as a historical unit.

In contrast, other authors would translate the same concept as "state(s) rights" due to the different implications of this term in the Czech national context. Although the sub-groups of the Bohemian elite shared their claims as for the restoration of the Bohemian Kingdom and its constitutional rights, the Bohemian Czech representatives interpreted this framework as their historical nation-state. They also interpreted their own crownland, the Kingdom of Bohemia as its national 'core', in this sense, as 'Bohemia proper'. [37]

Nonetheless, one must emphasize the differences between the terms that referred to this region in the various local languages. The German name for Bohemia was *Böhmen*, which could refer to either the individual crown land of the Habsburg Monarchy or the historical Kingdom of Bohemia. This term was of Latin origin and originally referred to the Boii, a Celtic tribe that had formerly inhabited these territories in Antiquity. In contrast, the name of Bohemia in Czech was *Čechy*. This was the derivative of the Czech endonym *Češi* (or in its archaic form, *Čechové*). [38] This once again implied a strong connection between 'Bohemia proper', the historical state of the Bohemian Kingdom and Czech national identity.

The difference between *Böhmen* and *Čechy* also applied to the concepts of the *böhmisches Volk* and *český národ*, which would describe the local population of

Bohemia proper or that of the historical state. The German term *böhmisches Volk* defined the inhabitants of Bohemia proper as the "people of Bohemia" or the "Bohemian people", a political community of transethnic nature. In contrast, the Czech variant of this term, *český národ* was much less neutral. One could translate this as the "Czech people" or the "Czech nation", which could refer to either the political community of the Bohemian Kingdom, the Czech lands or the Czech ethno-cultural community. In contrast, the difference between the *böhmisches Volk* and the *tschechisches Volk* would be rather clear in German. [39]

As for myself, I would rather keep the German concept of the *böhmisches Volk* separate from the term "Czech nation". I will rather translate it as "the people of Bohemia" or the "Bohemian people" throughout my study. This is because I find the transethnic and political implications of the concept important to emphasize, a feature that I found to be consistent in the discourses of the nineteenth century, the turn of the century and the First World War. It is also worth to notice that one could, of course, translate the concept of the *Volk* as equivalent to that of the 'nation'. However, I think that the translation "people" is more authentic in this context, while it is not less ambiguous as for its possible political or ethno-cultural implications.

The difference between these concepts was only one source of the debates between German and Czech representatives in the Bohemian context of the early nineteenth century. The German members of the local elite identified a threat for their dominant status in the demands of the Czech national movement for the legal recognition and the emancipation of their language.[40] The representatives of local Germans also problematized that their Czech counterparts emphasized the role of

'language' and 'culture' in the formation of their national identity, which of course excluded Germans from their ethno-cultural concept of the 'Czech nation'. [41]

However, it would be erroneous to claim that the Czech viewpoint was that of national exclusivity. Despite the ambiguous connotations of certain concepts in Czech, the political representatives of the nation attempted to include the German population into their interpretation of the regional community. They would often refer to the concept of *Bohemismus* to this end, which term of the local Enlightenment emphasized regional and social dimensions of local identity as opposed to national ones. [42] The mainstream of Czech politics also interpreted the 'people of Bohemia' as a political community, one composed of Czech (*tschechische* or *böhmische*) and German (*deutsche*) "branches" (*Teile*). [43] In the context of the Czech national movement, the concept of 'Bohemian Germans' or 'German Bohemians' (*deutschböhmisch* in German or *česko-německý* in Czech) would refer to the Czech desire that local Germans would maintain this regional identity rather than developing an allegiance to the German national movement. [44]

Thus, one must at least contextualize the claim of Komlosy that the discourse of Bohemian state rights did not translate into the project of a nation-state. [45] It is true that neither the Czech nor the German representatives conceptualized the Kingdom of Bohemia as exclusively their own. They both referred to the 'Bohemian people' as a political community of the land. On the other hand, the discourse of the Czech national movement was much less neutral in its references to the historical state or the local population, as its terms always incorporated a certain ethno-cultural emphasis. It was no accident that the German representatives of the land would interpret the claims of

their counterparts as the determination to create a state dominated by the Czechs – a nation-state in their narrative.

This complex discourse of Bohemian state rights was embedded in the framework of Austrian liberalism in the early nineteenth century. One must emphasize the role of 'autonomy' (*Autonomie*) as a key concept of the latter. In its original, ancient Hellenic form (αὐτονομῐ́ᾱ), this referred to the legal independence of a particular community. In contrast, the German Enlightenment of the early modern period interpreted the concept rather differently. The intellectual authority in this regard was Emmanuel Kant, who applied 'autonomy' to the individual, their needs and capacity of to realize their potential through personal freedom. [46]

The modern liberal discourse in the crownlands of the Habsburg Monarchy referred to the rights of the individual and communities through the concept of 'autonomy'. This term appeared in political demands for the liberal reform of the absolutist political system and the centralized state. The liberal narrative of state affairs envisioned a constitutional reform and the guarantee of the state for the freedom of individuals and local communities. The crownlands and lower administrative units appeared as central to this vision of the imperial state, to which the concept of autonomy also applied. [47]

The Austrian historian Gerald Stourzh impressively points out in his famous study, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848-1918* ("The Equality of Nationality Rights in the Constitution and the Administration of Austria 1848–1918", 1980) that the term *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten* was also central to the liberal discourse of the time. It is this term that Komlosy translates as the "right of every ethnic people" or the "doctrine of multi-

ethnicity". However, I rather find the translation of László Péter convincing, who refers to this concept as the "equality of (nationality) rights". [48] This is because the term *Gleichberechtigung* did indeed refer to institutionalization of the 'equality of rights' for nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy. Stourzh describes that the role of Bohemian Czech politicians as formative in this discourse, since they predicted that reforms on the imperial scale would benefit their local national aims. [49]

The revolutionary era of 1848–1849 is often referred to as that "Spring(time) of Nations" in historiography, which would see attempts at the realization of various national and liberal ideas in the Habsburg Monarchy. It is worth to mention that the participants of liberal national movements in the era were not really the masses of the countryside, but rather the urban population of great cities such as Vienna or Prague. References to any "popular nationalism" by national activists were rather rhetorical than claims that would correspond to the history reality of the time. [50]

Nonetheless, liberal national elites were rather preoccupied with the status of the so-called *Volksstämme* in Austria. *Volksstamm* was originally a concept of German scholarship to describe groups of common origin and ethno-cultural markers. [51] The term would refer to groups with their distinct feeling of nationality in the Austrian context. It is due to this reason that various English translations for the concept include "ethnicity", "ethnic people" or simply "people" (used by Judson for instance). I personally find no problem in referring to the *Volksstamm* or in plural, the *Volksstämme* in their original German forms, as they are terms specifically tied to the imperial and local discourses of the Habsburg Monarchy. I rather find it important to emphasize that they referred to ethno-cultural interpretations of national communities as opposed to, for instance, the concept of the 'Bohemian people'.

Through their concepts of the 'nation' and *Volksstamm*, representatives of liberal nationalism debated the relationship between their national movements and the status of their communities in the imperial framework in 1848–1849. The political debates of the time would revolve around the relationship between the universalist liberal idea of "imperial citizenship", regional and ethno-cultural interpretations of the 'nation'. Those were especially the colliding territorial claims of national movements in terms of regional autonomy that would create conflicts between them. It was up to the representatives of the new Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*) of Austria to make attempts at the reconciliation of national movements and the legal implementation of liberal ideas. [52]

František Palacký, the "father of the Czech nation" contributed to this liberal discourse through his own influential vision of imperial reform. The Bohemian Czech representative of the Imperial Diet proposed the administrative reorganization of the empire in accordance with the territories inhabited by its national communities. He argued that it was beneficial for the Habsburg Monarchy to establish such units in its new, federal framework. Palacký designed these territories in accordance with the historical rights of various states, the communities of language and geographical factors. One constituent part of the reformed Habsburg Monarchy was of course the historical Kingdom of Bohemia in his narrative (which would also include the Slovak territories of the Northern Hungary in the revised versions of his original draft). [53]

However, the Czech liberal representative also emphasized the need for a strong imperial government and state unity, as he identified threats in the contemporary processes of German national unification and the expansive potential of tsarist Russia. The perspective of the Habsburg imperial disintegration brought along the threat that

local nationalities, including the Czech community would become subjects to new and alien rulers. In contrast, the Habsburg Monarchy appeared as a familiar and suitable framework for various national interests in the narrative of Palacký. This vision of the imperial state was not limited to him, as most liberal representatives of Slavic nationalities in Austria would also claim their loyalty to the empire (especially in its reformed form) through an imperial idea that has often been referred to as 'Austro-Slavism'. [54]

The liberal representatives of the German national movement would refute such visions of the Austrian state. To them, the state unification of the German lands was a priority to the national reform of the Habsburg Monarchy. The restoration of the Bohemian Kingdom appeared as especially problematic in this regard, as their narrative featured its lands as the constituent parts of the former Holy Roman Empire and the future German nation-state. Nonetheless, the German representatives of Austria also had to realize soon that the Habsburg dynasty could rebuild its former absolutism through the actions of the imperial military, which suppressed revolts in the Italian provinces, Vienna and intervened in Hungary for the interests of absolutist consolidation. The looming threat appeared that the dynasty could destroy the liberal vision of the imperial state if its representatives cannot co-operate due to their national differences. [55]

As a result, the constitutional committee of the Austrian Imperial Diet would start to prepare a fundamental law for the Habsburg Monarchy at Kremsier (today Kroměříž in the Czech Republic) in late 1848. The so-called "Kremsier Constitution" attempted to find a middle-ground between German and Slavic visions of the centralized or federalized Habsburg realms. [56] Due to this importance of the text and its

intentionality to feature a compromise between various viewpoints, I find it important to analyse the concepts it referred to.

The Kremsier Constitution defined the "Empire of Austria" (*Kaiserthum Oesterreich*) as a political and legal unit constituted by Habsburg hereditary lands. It featured this realm as separate from the Kingdom of Hungary, a state with its own historical constitution. It claimed the replacement of royal absolutism with the "constitutional" (*constitutionelle*) state. While the historical crown lands remained the administrative foundations of the Austrian Empire, the law recognized their "equality of rights" (*Gleichberechtigung*) and "autonomy" (*Autonomie*). As a result, they would become autonomous "imperial lands" (*Reichsländer*) and would provide the foundations of a political and legal structure alternative to the centralized absolutist state. [57]

The Kremsier Constitution described the layers of Austrian society in a refined manner. It defined the collective of Austrian citizens as "the people" (*das Volk*). This was the main community of state – which the law, however, did not define as a 'nation' (*Nation*). The Kremsier Constitution rather recognized the fact that certain groups of the 'Austrian people' also had their own national identities. The ground-breaking feature of the Kremsier Constitution was that it implemented the equality of rights for these groups, the *Volksstämme*. It also safeguarded the right of nationalities to maintain their identities. The legal equality of these communities also brought along the emancipation of languages native to the historical crown lands (*landesübrige Sprachen*). Local tongues were to become became equal in the spheres of education, state offices and public life. [58]

The Constitution proposed reforms of similar kind to the administrative structure of the crownlands. The law aimed to preserve the territorial integrity of historical provinces; it emphasized this intention especially in the cases of nationally mixed imperial. The national aspect rather prevailed through the establishment of a new administrative structure, the so-called "districts" (*Kreise*). The Constitution named six provinces as the ones to receive new internal divisions, which was to be done "with the most possible attention to nationality" (*mit möglichster Rücksicht auf Nationalität*). [59]

In contrast, references to the concept of 'self-determination' (*Selbstbestimmung*) were rather marginal in the Kremsier Constitution. The law only referred to this concept in relation to local communities (*Gemeinde*) and their right to handle their own affairs.[60] The idea that nationalities could be the recipients of the same right was absent from its text.

It was no accident that references to the German concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' (*Selbstbestimmung der Völker*) were also almost entirely absent from the contemporary discourse of the Austrian *Reichstag*. Throughout late 1848 and early 1849, the only representative to mention the term was Karel Leopold Klaudy. The liberal Czech politician had a background in civil law and was a lecturer at the legal faculty of the Prague University. [61] Thus, he could be familiar with concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' as a natural right. However, the related statements of Klaudy also reflected on the Austrian liberal discourse of his time.

On January 8, 1849, the Czech representative claimed that the Imperial Diet appeared as the representative organ of the Austrian Empire as a result of historical processes and the vindication of the "principle" (*Prinzip*) of the 'self-determination of peoples'. Klaudy featured the forces of absolutist counter-revolution as the only

opponents to these developments. The concept of 'self-determination' gained a liberal meaning in his narrative, as its vindication meant the establishment of a liberal political system in Austria in accordance with the joint will of its "peoples" (*Völker*). However, the shared ideas of liberalism resulted in the unification of these groups in the political framework of the Austrian "people" (*Volk*). [62]

Although Klaudy did not refer to any sources in relation to his invocation of the 'self-determination of peoples', it is worth to point out that this concept had already appeared in the international context of 1848–1849. For instance, André Liebich emphasizes that references to the concept appeared in the debates of the Frankfurt Parliament, which discussed the circumstances of German state unification. The term 'self-determination' appeared in this discourse in connection to the status of the Danish province Schleswig–Holstein. [63] The representatives of the Czech national movement were well aware of the debates in Frankfurt, as these implied the possible attachment of the Bohemian crownlands to a unified Germany. This prospect informed the development of their idea of 'Austro-Slavism'. [64]

Thus, it is hardly a stretch to assume that the 'self-determination of peoples' appeared in the claims of Klaudy due to through the cultural transfer of the concept from the German cultural and political context. However, whereas the German political discourse incorporated the German term into its discussion of nation-state unification, the Czech representative rather used it to reinforce the idea that the nationalities of the Austrian Empire were united in their will to constitute the imperial community of a constitutional state. Although the subjects of 'self-determination' were the 'peoples' of Austria, they were to form the 'people' of the 'empire' in the political sense according to this narrative.

One can also elaborate on the claims of Komlosy and Judson in relation to the statements of Klaudy. Both historians theorize a certain dynamic between the concepts of the 'empire' and the 'nation' in the Austrian context of the mid-nineteenth century. Ethno-cultural interpretations of the 'nation' would appear as counter-concepts to 'Austrianness' (*Österreichtum*) in the narrative of Komlosy. In contrast, Judson would emphasize that the liberal representatives at Kremsier entertained with both the universalist ideas of 'citizenship' and the ethno-cultural concept of the 'nation' in their attempt to "save the revolution". However, he also points at a certain German–Slavic nationalist dichotomy in this regard. Whereas "German nationalists" would enforce a centralized concept of the empire and imperial identity, their Slavic opponents would rather argue from the viewpoint of their nations (or rather national movements). [65]

References to the 'self-determination' and the 'self-determination of peoples' by Klaudy, but also in the text of the Kremsier Constitution reinforce the claim of Judson that the general tone of the parliamentarians was rather conciliatory. Although the *Volksstämme* were no subjects of the principle of 'self-determination' according to the Kremsier Constitution, their equality of rights was still recognized by the fundamental law. The members of these groups would also form the 'people' or the *Volk* of the Austrian Empire. Klaudy would also refer to the concept of 'self-determination' as one to unite the 'peoples' of the 'empire' in their endeavour to create a constitutional state and its liberal society. Thus, the liberal vision of the Austrian Empire would appear as the subject of active loyalty in these cases, one that could co-exist with the national affiliation of its various participant groups.

On the other hand, one must also raise awareness towards the fact that the contemporary imperial leadership of the Habsburg Monarchy also adopted certain terms

of the Austrian liberal political language and tried to use these for its own purposes in 1848–1849. On December 21, 1848, Francis Joseph addressed the Saxons of Transylvania as the new Austrian Emperor. The sovereign stated that the revolutions of the Habsburg Monarchy were the results of the "confusion of minds" (*Verwirrung der Gemüther*) and the "mishandling" (*mißbrauchen*) of 'liberty' and 'independence' (*Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit*) as "concepts" (*Begriffe*). As opposed to the disorderly circumstances of the revolution, the emperor promised the restoration of order and law through references to the *Gesamtmonarchie*, the idea of a modern and centralized empire. The Habsburg Monarchy was to become "the organic union of peoples" (*organische Verband der Völker*) in this narrative. The founding principles of imperial reconstruction were to be the "equality of rights and free self-determination of peoples" (*Gleichberechtigung und freie Selbstbestimmung der Völker*). [66]

Importantly, the declaration of Francis Joseph lacked references to the liberal concept of 'autonomy'. This notion had previously appeared in direct opposition to royal absolutism; it also appeared as the key concept of the liberal discourse that attempted to limit royal power and to establish the constitutional imperial state in 1848–1849. The narrative of the imperial government claimed these endeavours resulted in revolutionary 'disorder' of the time. In contrast, the 'equality of rights' and 'self-determination' of peoples as concepts appeared as compatible the absolutist imperial system of management in this account. As opposed to the liberal vision of a political system based on the rights of one sovereign Austrian *Volk*, the 'peoples' of the *Gesamtmonarchie* received their rights by the "grace" (*Gnade*) of the emperor. [67]

However, the 'equality of rights' and the 'self-determination' of 'peoples' also had their specific normative loads in the case of the Transylvanian Saxons due to their

position in the contemporary Hungarian context. The Hungarian Diet declared the state unity of the Hungarian Kingdom and the official status of Hungarian language in this framework in Spring 1848. Thus, the liberal laws of the Hungarian Revolution abolished the premodern privileges of the Saxon community in Transylvania. The Hungarian government also resisted Habsburg attempts of power restoration, which resulted in the Hungarian War of Independence. The Transylvanian Saxon elite sided with the dynasty in the conflict. [68]

As a reward for their loyalty, Franz Joseph promised the establishment of a direct connection between a "responsible (imperial) ministry" (*verantwortliche Ministerium*) and the administration of national communities (*Zentralnationalbehörde*) – in the Saxon case, the pre-modern "university" (*Nationsuniversität*) of this group. Additionally, the sovereign pledged that he would convene a new Imperial Diet which would incorporate the representatives of Transylvanian Saxons into its ranks. [69] The 'equality of nationality rights' and the 'self-determination of peoples' appeared as concepts that promised an antidote for Hungarian national hegemony through the establishment of a representative political system within the new *Gesamtmonarchie* – by the grace of the absolutist monarch. The political language of Habsburg absolutism thus mixed pre-modern ideas of empire and imperial rule with the liberal concepts of the time.

'Nation' or 'people', the subject of the right to 'self-determination' also showcased an interesting blend of concepts in this narrative. Franz Joseph referred to the pre-modern structure of the "Saxon nation" (*sächsische Nation*) in Transylvania, formed in accordance with its privileges gained in medieval times. However, promises of imperial reconstruction showed the influence of contemporary liberal concepts

('responsible ministry', 'Imperial Diet' and the representative political system) and opposed the concept of the modern Hungarian nation-state. This was also a conciliatory position between pre-modern and liberal concepts of community and empire.

In the end, it was the Habsburg counter-revolution that prevailed over liberal attempts of imperial reform in 1848/49. However, the imperial government continued to experiment with a conciliatory approach between the concepts of liberalism and absolutist ideas of rule. The Minister of Interior and Education, Count Franz Stadion, designed so-called Octroyed (or Imposed) Constitution of 1849 with this intent in mind. The fundamental law laid down the foundations of the *Gesamtmonarchie*, while it granted extensive rights to local communities. However, it lacked references to the liberal concept of 'autonomy' or to its possible application to historical crown lands. The imperial constitution also maintained the regulations of the Kremsier Constitution and the previous promises of the imperial centre with regard to the equality of nationality rights. Nonetheless, Francis Joseph suspended the fundamental law in 1851 and established a pure absolutist rule. [70]

However, this centralized system of governance was not sustainable in economic terms. The Habsburg Monarchy also suffered a humiliating defeat in the Italian War of 1859. These developments necessitated Francis Joseph to enact the so-called "October Diploma" of 1860, a fundamental law that would create a federal system through the restoration of local diets and the increased role of crow lands in the state. However, these concessions did not satisfy the elites of national movements, since they did not result in the liberalization of the political system. [71]

The "February Patent" of 1861 would thus create the "Imperial Council" (*Reichsrat)* as a form of a central parliament for the Habsburg Empire. However, this

development provoked the resistance of Hungarian and Czech representatives, who would campaign for the restoration of autonomy for their historical states. Judson claims that "a reasonable agreement with Hungary […] outside of the current system" finally appeared as the best alternative for the imperial government. The result was the *Ausgleich* of 1867, the creation of Cisleithania and the Hungarian Kingdom ("Transleithania") as the constituent states of the Habsburg Monarchy. [72] This, however, did little to silence the complaints of Czech representatives – the nature of which I will showcase in the next chapter.

To sum it up, 'autonomy' and the 'equality of nationality rights' were concepts central to the liberal political discourse of early nineteenth-century Austria. However, there were considerable differences between local ideas of imperial reform in 1848–1849 despite this shared conceptual basis. German representatives would rather support the state unification of the German lands in the international context and a more centralized vision of the Austrian constitutional state, with a universalist understanding of its society as the Austrian *Volk*. In contrast, Slavic and especially Czech politicians demanded the creation of national units in a federalized empire. It was only the threat of Habsburg counter-revolution that created a consensus and resulted in the creation of Kremsier Constitution.

The Bohemian representatives of the Czech national movement contributed to the Austrian discourse of liberalism as a result of the connection between the ideas of imperial reforms and their local political agenda in the Bohemian crownlands. Their concept of 'state rights' resonated with the term 'autonomy'; the imperial reform ideas of František Palacký featured the restored Bohemian Kingdom as one of the constituent lands of a federalized Habsburg Monarchy. However, the viewpoint of Czech liberals

collided with those of German representatives in the Bohemian Kingdom, who interpreted the Czech demands for equality and the domination of cultural and linguistic markers in Czech national identity as threats to their dominant status and the future of their community.

This conflict was much due to the different interpretations of the 'people' or the 'nation' in the Bohemian context. The German terms *böhmisches Volk* and *tschechisches Volk* differentiated between the supra-ethnic political community of the region and the ethno-cultural group of the Czechs. In contrast, the Czech concept of *český národ* could refer to both, while it emphasized the dominant status of Czechs in the historical Kingdom of Bohemia, interpreted as a 'nation-state' by the Bohemian representatives of the national movement.

The 'self-determination of peoples' was not a key concept in the context of the Austrian liberal discourse; however, its development still reflected the debates of the time. On the one hand, the Czech representatives of the Austrian Imperial Diet could adopt this principle through a cultural transfer from the contemporary political discourse of the Frankfurt Parliament, which discussed the conditions of German state unification and envisioned the incorporation of the Bohemian crownlands into this entity. However, the Slavic representatives rather preferred the federal reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy in accordance with their idea of 'Austro-Slavism'. The consensus between them and the representatives of the Austrian German community in 1848–1849 was that the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' should refer to the will of local nationalities to constitute the political collective of Austrian state citizens, the *Volk*. In return, the Kremsier Constitution institutionalized the *Gleichberechtigung der*

Nationalitäten or 'equality of rights' applied to the *Volksstämme*, the ethno-cultural communities of Austria.

Interestingly enough, the absolutist government of the Habsburg Monarchy borrowed the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' from the liberal discourse to reinforce its attempts of restoration during 1848/49. In its narrative, the concept referred to the equality of rights of national communities, their representation and the direct connection between traditional national elites and the imperial centre in the unified *Gesamtmonarchie.* Its counter-concepts were the (perceived) disorder of the liberal revolution, liberal attempts at the abolishment of royal absolutism and traditional privileges or the unification of the Hungarian nation-state. 'People' as the subject of 'self-determination' referred to the pre-modern concept of the nation and the local elites with pre-modern privileges. Nonetheless, references to the concepts of 'equality of rights', 'autonomy' or the 'self-determination of peoples' would be absent from the rhetoric of the imperial government in the era of Neoabsolutist rule between 1851–1867.

c.   The Establishment of Cisleithania and the Discourse of State Rights, 1867 –1871

While he would not really mention the contemporary context of the Habsburg Monarchy in his book, Jörg Fisch still refers to a certain instance in which the 'right of self-determination' appeared as a concept in the Austrian political discourse of the late nineteenth century. To be exact, the Swiss historian reports that a "memorandum of Czech parliamentarians" in the Austrian Imperial Council referred to this term on December 8, 1870. He quotes a statement from the document that "all peoples, whether large or small, have the same right of self-determination". Fisch also supplies the reader with the original version of this quote in German (*alle Völker, ob groß, ob klein, haben*

das gleiche Selbstbestimmungsrecht). Since the author does not contextualize this statement, his reader is left to assume that the Czech representatives were either "liberal" or "radical nationalists" as members of a "primarily bourgeois national movement". Fisch at least describes the 'right of self-determination' as a term used by such parties in this period of the nineteenth century. [73] In accordance with the narrative of the author, one could surmise that the concepts of national 'sovereignty' and/or 'secession' already appeared in this text in connection to the term 'self-determination of peoples'.

However, the analysis of the Austrian political context or the text itself do not really support these assumptions. I have already shown that the discourse of the Czech national movement integrated into the liberal discussions of the Austrian imperial framework in the first half of the nineteenth century, in which the *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten* or 'equality of nationality rights' and 'autonomy' appeared as key concepts.

Nonetheless, one must also emphasize that the political context of the Czech national movement transformed after 1867. The Austro–Hungarian Compromise established "The Kingdoms and Lands Represented in the Imperial Council" (*Die im Reichsrat vertretene Königreichen und Länder*) as a constituent part of the Dual Monarchy of Austria–Hungary. Cisleithania was compromised of the Austrian crownlands and functioned separately from the Kingdom of Hungary. The political system of this new "Austria" was constitutional due to the abolishment of neo-absolutist rule. Its administrative system was also no longer centralized, as communal management, the institutions of the historical crown lands and the centralized bureaucracy of the state operated separately within its framework. Its legislative

institution was the Imperial Council, with a jurisdiction now limited to Cisleithania. The citizens of Austria could delegate the candidates of their choice to the House of Representatives (*Abgeordnetenhaus*) in accordance with the electoral system of the state. However, the new state of affairs was not fair and square to all. The contemporary curial system resulted in the disproportionate representation of the German elite in the Imperial Diet and local politics. Francis Joseph also maintained his right to appoint governments as the Austrian Emperor, a remnant from the previous system of neo-absolutism. [74]

The representatives of the Austrian Imperial Council prepared, debated, and enacted the so-called "December Constitution" (*Dezemberverfassung*) in 1867. This fundamental law institutionalized the principle of *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten* and proclaimed the equality of national languages in provincial schools, state offices and public life (Article 19). The December Constitution also emphasized the right of the *Volksstämme* to maintain and cultivate their national identity, which it described as their sense of "nationality" (*Nationalität*). [75]

Gerald Stourzh points out in his influential study that the regulations of the fundamental law impacted the discourse of 'autonomy' in the context of Cisleithania. Whereas previous political claims would feature a primarily territorial interpretation of this concept, the Austrian discourse after 1867 would also include references to the cultural rights of communities in the administrative framework of the Austrian crown lands through this term. Thus, the regulations of the December Constitution could in part redirect the focus of regional and national discourses from 'state rights' to the 'equality of nationality rights'. [76]

Although the resolutions of the December Constitution resembled the German liberal vision of the centralized imperial state as opposed to Slavic demands of federalization in 1848–1849, not all members of the former group were enthusiastic of the political developments after the *Ausgleich*. For instance, Adolf Fischhof, the prominent historical figure of contemporary Austrian German liberalism was unsatisfied with the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867. The politician had participated in the construction of the Kremsier Constitution in 1848–1849 and remained supportive of the rights of nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy. As a result, his *Oesterreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes* (1869) would feature a reform vision of the Austrian state and would advise the introduction of extended autonomy for the crownlands in administrative and for the nationalities in cultural terms. [77]

However, this political thought had its inherent problems. Fischhof entertained ideas of German superiority over the Slavs and wanted to maintain the hierarchy of cultures upon the federalization of Austria. It has also been argued retrospectively that "Fischhof's justification for the existence of multiethnic Austria […] does not address the criticism of Austria on the grounds of what would later be called the principle of national self-determination". [78] One could thus expect that the 'self-determination of peoples' did not appear in the texts produced by the German liberal representative, or that he would feature this concept in opposition to the framework of the Austrian imperial state.

The analysis of *Oesterreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes* disproves these assumptions, as the book did incorporate important references to the concept of 'self-determination' (*Selbstbestimmung*). In fact, Fischhof described this term as the "purpose" (*Zweck*) of the modern state, the counter-concept to 'German rule' (*deutsche*

Herrschaft) and the 'system of centralization' (*Zentralisationssystem*). The 'nationalities' (*Nationalitäten*) of Austria appeared the subjects of this right in his narrative. 'Self-determination' in this context would amount to the implementation of the extensive framework of cultural rights envisioned by the author. [79]

On the other hand, one must emphasize that 'self-determination' still appeared only twice in the book. In contrast, references to the concepts of 'autonomy' (31 times), 'federation' (20 times) or even 'equality' (7 times) were much more frequent. Thus, it is rightful to say that the term 'self-determination' appeared in his book to support more important key concepts in its narrative.

Much similar to Fischhof, the representatives of the Czech national movement were deeply unsatisfied with the results of the *Ausgleich*. It was not only that the Austro–Hungarian Compromise would lack any references to the state rights of the Bohemian Kingdom, but Hungary would also regain its independent status as a state in accordance with its historical rights of the same kind. The political representatives of the Czech nation of course denounced this outcome as unjust and paradoxical from their viewpoint. [80]

A remarkable result of these processes was the Czech adaptation of various concepts prevalent in the Hungarian context of the time. For instance, the concept of the 'Lands of Crown of Saint Wenceslaus' appeared in the political discourse of the Czech national movement as a reference to the Hungarian term 'Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen', which would emphasize the historical unity of the Hungarian Kingdom. [81] I have also found evidence that the Czech representatives demanded rights for the 'Bohemian political nation' (*böhmische politische Nation*) in the Austrian Imperial Council. [82] I assume that this was a reference to the concept of the 'Hungarian political

nation' as codified by the Hungarian Nationalities Law in 1868 (for details, see the third case study).

The memorandum of Czech parliamentarians in 1870 was also a product of this specific historical context. While Fisch is right to point out that the memorandum referred to the 'self-determination of peoples' as a universally applicable right, I would rather emphasize the fact that this text was embedded in the historical discourse of the Czech national movement and was in service of its political goals in the framework of the Austrian state. I will support these arguments through the analysis of this text as reported by the journal *Der Osten*.

The list of the memorandum's authors incorporated the liberal elite of the contemporary Czech national movement, František Palacký included. Thus, it was only natural that the memorandum would claim that the *Ausgleich* of 1867 resulted in the "domination" (*Herrschaft*) of Germans and Hungarians over the Slavic "majority" (*Majorität*) of the Monarchy. In opposition to this 'oppression', the Czech representatives would emphasize the individual features (*Individualität*) of their Bohemian political nation and its distinct feeling of "nationality" (*Nationalität*). They would describe this identity as one of historical and political (*historisch-politisch*) background, or alternatively, as one with its sources in the historical and state rights (*historisch-staatsrechtlich*) of the Bohemian Kingdom. [83]

However, it was the innovative feature of the text that these arguments would not culminate in demands for 'autonomy', but rather for the application of the "right of peoples to self-determination" (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*) or the "right of nations to self-determination" (*Recht der Selbstbestimmung der Nationen*) to the 'Bohemian people' and the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy. As opposed to the

discourse of the Imperial Diet in 1848–1849, the term *Volk* would not refer to the collective of Austrian citizens in the memorandum as the subject of the 'right to self-determination', which also not referred to as a mere 'principle'. The *Volk* was rather the synonym of the "nation" (*Nation*) in the text. The authors of the memorandum did not describe this community through ethno-cultural means. As described above, their narrative would rather feature it as a historical product, a political identity defined by the concept of 'state rights'. [84]

One must also emphasize that the text implied differences between the concepts of the 'nation' and the *Volksstamm* as subjects of the 'right to self-determination' in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. Although one could find no definitions of these concepts in the memorandum, it seems that the term *Volksstamm* either referred to local groups that belonged to a greater national community (e. g. *verschiedene Stämme der großen deutschen Nation,* "various tribes of the great German nation",) or to communities that would lack the legal and historical criteria to constitute a nation (as the text did not describe the 'people of Bohemia' or even the Czechs as a *Volksstamm*). [85]

Such differentiation between nation-related concepts were not uncommon in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. One can for instance point out the differences between the concepts of the 'nation' and 'nationalities' in the Hungarian context. Even though the Nationalities Law of 1868 would apply the *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten* to the Hungarian context, it would still maintain the mainstream Hungarian viewpoint that the term 'nation' described a historical and legal community as opposed to the rather ethno-cultural concept of 'nationality' (even though it also emphasized the leading role of Hungarians in the state structure). (For additional details,

see my third case study.) Although the Czech representatives demanded equality for all communities in the Habsburg Monarchy, they would also differentiate between the historical and legal status of the 'nation' and the *Volksstamm*. A possible source of this phenomenon would be their vision of the 'Bohemian people', which would proclaim the unity between the local 'tribe' of Germans and the Czechs as the ethno-cultural 'branches' of the historical, regional and political community.

It is also important to emphasize that the application of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy would have resulted in the establishment of a "federation" (*Föderation*) according to the Czech authors. This would realize the full potential within the idea of national equality, as all the nations and the *Volksstämme* of the empire could receive "self-government" (*Selbstregierung*) and the right to maintain and develop their identities. The Czech representatives claimed that this the "world-historical mission of Austria" (*welthistorische Mission Oesterreichs*) was to become "the alliance of peoples" (*Völkerbund*) and to protect local communities from external threats. [86] On the one hand, is worth to emphasize that the term 'Austria' referred to the entire Habsburg Monarchy rather than Cisleithania in this context. On the other hand, one can notice similarities between these statements and the idea of 'Austria-Slavism' in the context of 1848–1849.

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to not to point out the foreign references of the text. On the one hand, these emphasized the importance of the contemporary international context from the viewpoint of the Czech national movement. On the other hand, these also contextualize the narrative of Fisch with regard to the memorandum and its historical environment.

The Czech authors of the memorandum claimed their support the process of German unification through the concept of the 'right to self-determination', even though this could potentially threaten the historical unity of the Czech lands. However, they also criticized the aggressive expansion of Prussia as detrimental to this right in the case of the Prusso–French War (1870–1871). In their viewpoint, it was the state of France that rightfully defended its land from the Prussian invasion. The authors of the memorandum also referred to the concept of 'self-determination' in the context of the Ottoman Empire and South-Eastern Europe. They emphasized the "inalienable right" of Greece, Romania, and Serbia to "self-determination" (*unveräußerliches Selbstbestimmungsrecht*). This amounted to the establishment of independent states (*solche staatliche Gestaltung*) in their narrative. The Czech representatives also claimed their support for their "kindred peoples" (*verwandten Völker*) in South-Eastern Europe, a reference to the Slavic population of the Ottoman Empire. The concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' entailed a civilizational component in this regard. The Czech representatives claimed that this population belonged to the civilization of Christianity and that only their "liberation" (*Befreiung*) could safeguard this status of theirs. [87]

These foreign references of the memorandum could support the narrative of Fisch with regard to the historical connection between the concepts of 'sovereignty', 'secession' and the 'self-determination of peoples' – in case one would disregard all the other parts of the text. It is true that the Czech representatives would point at the process of German unification and the secessionist movements in the Ottoman Empire as cases to which the 'right of peoples to self-determination' applied. However, this did not translate into their own demands of national secession in the Austrian context; the Czech parliamentarians rather supported their vision of imperial reforms and federalization

through the term. One could also understand references to the contemporary German Empire as a model of federalism as despite its hegemonic unification by Prussia, it still functioned as a federal structure constituted by various kingdoms. [88]

This federal concept of the imperial state would also not only appear as the result of the application of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' to the Austrian context, but also as the framework that could fulfil the promises dormant in the term *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten* or 'equality of nationality rights', a key concept of the Austrian and Czech liberal discourse. It is important to emphasize the new counter-concepts of these terms as opposed to the era of 1848–1849. Due to the constitutional reforms of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was no longer the political system of royal absolutism that appeared as opposed to these concepts. Those were rather the dualistic political structure of Austria–Hungary and the "racial rule" (*Racenherrschaft*) of Germans and Hungarians that the Czech representatives criticized through their key concepts. [89]

One can of course assume that the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' might have appeared as the key concept of the memorandum due to internal developments in the historical Czech discourse rather than the influence of the international context around 1870. However, the analysis of various contemporary texts does not really support such claims.

For instance, the *Idea státu Rákuského* ("The Idea of the Austrian State") by František Palacký had appeared five years prior to the memorandum (1865). The book featured 'federation' (*federace*) as the alternative to the counter-concepts of 'centralization' (*centralizace*) and 'dualism' (*dualismus*) in the historical context of the Habsburg Monarchy. [90]

However, the vision of Palacký applied to historical territories (*země*) rather than the *Volksstämme* (*kmen*) or the nations (*národ*) of Austria in 1865. He referred to the discourse of the Kremsier Diet (*Kroměřížský sněm*) in 1849 as a positive historical example in the Austrian context with its conciliatory approach to national debates and its application of 'autonomy' (*autonomie*) to the historical crownlands. As of 1865, the author described the territories of historical Hungary (*Uhři*), Croatia (*Chorvatská*), Galicia (*Halič*) or the Czech lands (*české země*) as the constituent parts of a reformed Habsburg Monarchy. This territorial arrangement in accordance with "historical rights" (*historická práva*) appeared as the alternative to the concept of "natural rights" (*přirozené právo*). Although the author did not debate the validity of this term and of its application to national communities, he recognized that this concept created conflicts in the imperial framework. [91] A certain one of natural rights, 'self-determination' (*sebeurčení*) did not even appear in the text.

Thus, I argue that the role of the 'self-determination of peoples' as a key concept in the memorandum of 1870 was not a result of internal developments in the discourse of the Czech national movement; I would rather emphasize the importance of the contemporary international context in this regard. Whereas Fisch would describe references to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' as a 'general' phenomenon of the time, I would rather claim that the Czech representatives of the Austrian Imperial Council adopted this concept from the contemporary German context, as one must remember that this term was central to the liberal discourse of German state unification. [92]

However, I would also argue that the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' had a specific role in the contemporary context of Austria. It is worth to notice

that the Czech memorandum of 1870 referred to this term, the 'Bohemian people', 'federation' and the 'equality of nationality rights', but not to 'autonomy', although this was also a key concept of the Austrian historical discourse. I claim that while it did not amount to claims of national secessionism, the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' could push the previous boundaries of this discourse due to its international connotations, specifically to the process of state unification in the federal context of the German Empire. Thus, it substituted references to 'autonomy'.

One must mention that in parallel to these claims, political representatives of the Czech national movement also attempted to find a solution to the Czech–German conflict in the Bohemian crownlands, specifically in the Kingdom of Bohemia. Gerald Stourzh points out that the local tension between national movements influenced the creative process that resulted in the December Constitution in 1867. The Bohemian German representatives feared that the demographic growth and the increased political influence of the Czech population could result in the future dominance of Czech culture and language in local terms. As a result, they were the ones to demand that the fundamental law would prohibit forcing the members of national communities to learn the tongue of another as a secondary language. While such measures seemed to contribute to the 'equality of rights' in general, the German representatives also hoped that they could protect the dominant status of their language and culture in the Bohemian crownlands through these means. [93]

The committee (*Komission*) of the Bohemian Diet (*Landtag*) attempted to address this problem through a constructive approach. Its liberal Czech members claimed that the restored Kingdom of Bohemia would respect the 'equality of nationality rights'. Thus, they referred to *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten*, a key

concept in the Austrian liberal political discourse, one contained by the regulations of the December Constitution. However, the commission also proposed the establishment of a system dubbed as that of "national curiae" (*Nationalcurie*). These collective bodies were to be the representative organs of local nationalities with a right of veto in local legislation. As a result, national policy could only develop as a result of a common discourse and decisions. [94]

While Francis Joseph and his government did entertain with the idea of vindicating the Czech demands and the state rights of the Bohemian Kingdom in 1870–1871, this did not come into fruition due to various reasons. On the one hand, even elaborate promises in relation to the equality of nationality rights in the Kingdom of Bohemia were not satisfactory to the local representatives of the German national movement. On the other hand, the Hungarian government also opposed the reform of the dualist system. The failure of this attempt resulted in the continued opposition of the Czech political mainstream to the contemporary political system of Austria–Hungary. [95]

Whereas references to the concepts of 'autonomy' or 'state rights' would still thrive in the upcoming years, the 'self-determination of peoples' did not remain a key concept in the discourse of the Czech national movement after 1870. In my view, this was due to the fact that the process of German unification ended in 1871; with it, the most important transnational point of reference disappeared from the international context. Thus, the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' would lose its importance and its normative load. Although it did not entirely disappear from the Austrian discourse or the Czech context, its role remained limited to rather marginal references and to supporting the above-mentioned key concepts.

To sum it up, I show that the *Ausgleich* established Cisleithania as the new political context of the Czech national movement. The liberal December Constitution of 1867 codified the *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten* and supported the rights of the *Volksstämme* to maintain their identities in the framework of the Austrian state and its crownlands. However, the Czech representatives of the Austrian Imperial Council were still content with these developments, as the Kingdom of Bohemia did not receive recognition as opposed to the Kingdom of Hungary despite its historical rights.

It was in this context that the 'right of peoples to self-determination' appeared as a transnational key concept in the memorandum of Czech parliamentarians in the Austrian Imperial Council (1870). Due to its encoded references to the German process of state unification, this term substituted the concept of 'autonomy' and pushed the former boundaries of the Austrian discourse. However, the 'self-determination of peoples' was not associated with the concepts of 'secession' and 'sovereignty' in this context as opposed to the narrative of Jörg Fisch. The Czech memorandum did not conceptualize any connections between these terms.

The term 'self-determination of peoples' rather reinforced the Czech demands of Habsburg imperial federalization and the restoration of the Bohemian Kingdom. The counter-concepts of the memorandum were the dualistic structure of Austria–Hungary and the 'racial' rule of Germans and Hungarians in this framework. It was no accident that the memorandum would feature the 'people' or the 'political nation' of 'Bohemia' as the main subject of the right to self-determination, which the authors of the text described through the historical concept of state rights. While the *Volksstämme* also appeared as the subjects of the right in the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy, this

concept referred to ethno-cultural communities that lacked the historical and legal criteria to be addressed as 'nations' in the narrative of the Czech representatives.

While the term of the 'self-determination of peoples' lost its importance in the Czech context after 1870, the failure at the vindication of state rights also effected other key concepts in the discourse of the national movement. The new political groups that appeared at this time challenged the viewpoint of traditional liberalism. Although they were also liberal in terms of ideological allegiance, the 'Young Czechs' contested the 'Old Czech' policy of negotiations and co-operation with the imperial government. The concept of 'state rights' was initially the subject of the same criticism; the Young Czechs would rather emphasize the 'natural rights' of the Czech nation, which they interpreted as a community of ethnicity and culture rather than regional history and law. [96]

This emphasis on 'natural rights' was not unrelated from the Positivist global shift in the discourse of nationalism in the late nineteenth century. Its representatives did not identify with the narrative frameworks of the earlier liberal generation based on 'historical rights'. They rather started to accentuate their viewpoint that the 'nation' was an 'organic' community and accentuated the importance of modern social and economic developments rather than those of historical structures. [97]

However, the Young Czechs also realized with time that the references to historical state rights were already too central to the Czech national identity to abandon. By the end of the nineteenth century, they would also demand "freedom", "independence" and "autonomy" (*Unabhängigkeit*, *Selbständigkeit*, *Autonomie*) for the Kingdom of Bohemia. [98] This accommodation to the historical traditions of Czech liberalism and the Austrian imperial discourse defined their activities in the era when

Young Czechs could briefly dominate the political scene in the Czech lands. [99] The Czech Agrarian Party or political Catholicism in the Czech context also adopted various concepts from the traditional liberal discourse and feature them in their narratives of the 'nation' and its status in the imperial framework of Austria. [100]

This process of accommodation, however, never applied to the discourse of Czech social democracy. The narrative of the labour movement rather featured alternative or in some cases, counter-concepts to the liberal interpretations of the 'nation' and 'state rights'. At the same time, it also adopted various concepts of the liberal discourse through their cross-ideological transfer. This viewpoint was in correspondence with the national debates in Cisleithania and the discourse of Austrian social democracy at the turn of the century, which processes I will showcase in the next sub-chapter.

d. The Nationalist Conflicts of Austria and the Discourse of Social Democracy

Judson describes the relevance of his term "nationalist conflicts" in the context of the turn of the century, the "age of growing mass politics". He applies this concept to the contemporary relationship between the Austrian government, the German, and the Czech national movements. A turning point in relation to these dynamics was the attempt of Prime Minister Count Casimir Badeni at issuing a language ordinance for the Kingdom of Bohemia in 1897. This would proscribe the equality of Czech and German in the inner functioning of local civil services. The political representatives of the German national movement reacted to the so-called "Badeni decrees" by initiating demonstrations and riots and by immobilizing the legislative process in the Austrian Imperial Council. Judson claims that this so-called "Badeni Crisis" of 1897 was a

"critical point in Austrian parliamentary history" (although he maintains "it did not necessarily prove the failure of Austria's institutions") and a peak for the tensions between the Czech and German national movements. [101]

One must also mention that the contemporary discourse of Austrian social democracy appears to include a specific concept of 'self-determination' in various historical accounts. Jörg Fisch discusses this issue through a dichotomy between "Austrian" and "Russian socialists", who would develop "differing but related concepts of self-determination". The author claims that this was due to the fact that these social democratic movements "were intensively engaged with the national question", as its solution was the "prerequisite for the solidarity of the lower classes". Fisch states that the social democrats of the Russian Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy were "not principally hostile toward the multinational states"; in fact, they were interested "in the preservation of the respective empires by means of a lasting solution to the national question". [102]

Karl Renner and Otto Bauer appear as the main representatives of "Austro-Marxism", a "dominant current" in this narrative. Fisch claims that both interpreted "self-determination as an individual right to retain one's own cultural identity". They would refer to the concept of 'national-cultural autonomy' and the so-called 'personality principle'. The author states that in their viewpoint, it was the cultural identity of individuals that would define national communities as opposed to the alleged connection between the 'nation' and the territory it inhabited. This interpretation of "Austro-Marxism" appears as opposed to that of the "Bolsheviks in Russia" in the narrative of Fisch, as the latter would claim that the concept of 'self-determination' amounted to the right of ethno-cultural communities to territorial secession. [103]

One must emphasize that this narrative is rather simplistic and lacks contextualization. Although one could understand the importance of Fisch's claim that Austro-Marxism and Russian socialists "created the prerequisites for the right of self-determination to become a watchword and a central political and legal concept in the twentieth century", [104] his depiction of these discourses as dominant in their contexts does not correspond to historical reality. One can realize that although "Bolshevik" means "one of the majority" in Russian, this term referred to the viewpoint of a political minority before 1917. On the other hand, one must also emphasize that the viewpoints of Bauer and Renner also represented only one side of the debate within the ranks of Austrian labour – a discourse in which Czech social democrats also participated.

Before elaborating on this debate, one must contextualize the activities of Austrian social democracy in the framework of Cisleithania at the turn of the century. One result of political, economic, and social modernization in Austria was that wider strata of the population could participate in politics. Austrian labour stemmed from this process and appeared as a new mass movement of the time. Its discourse reinterpreted the concept of the 'people', which included the marginalized proletariat in its narrative. This opposed the elitist standpoint of traditional liberalism, which limited the political category of the 'nation' to those with wealth and voting rights. Thus, it was only natural that Austrian labour would view the national and liberal elites of the time as its opponents. In contrast, its initial discourse did not really perceive the contemporary framework of the Habsburg Monarchy or nationalist tensions as problems of the same importance due to its internationalist focus. The leftist rhetoric of social democracy rather demanded democratic and social reforms. [105]

Substantial reforms of male suffrage in Austria in 1882 and 1897 allowed further space for the expansion of the labour movement, as these resulted in the transformation of political representation in Cisleithania. [106] Upon the introduction of general male suffrage in 1907, the Social Democratic Party of Austria had the most mandates in the new *Reichsrat*. [107] The Czech labour movement was not separated from Austrian labour, as it was one of its local sections until its secession in 1911. The processes of modernization also benefitted the social democratic cause in the local context: the Czech Social Democratic Party dominated the regional elections of 1907 and 1911 in Bohemia. [108]

However, it was no accident that Czech social democracy also gained interest in the representation of national interests in Austria at the turn of the century. One reason for this turn of event was of course the domination of 'nationalist conflicts' in the Austrian political discourse of the time. On the other hand, this was also due to the struggles of the group with the leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Austria, as the elite of Cisleithanian labour believed in the superiority of German culture to that of the "Slavs". Although they were not nationalists themselves, the German cultural context of their socialization still resulted in this viewpoint of theirs. In contrast, Czech social democrats would start to demand equal status for their group in Austrian labour and for their nation in the framework of the Austrian state at the turn of the century.[109]

The Brünn Programme of 1899 attempted to solve these conflicts and others of similar kind that threatened the cohesion of Austrian social democracy. Its resolutions thus advocated that Cisleithania should transform from the contemporary liberal state into a social, democratic and federal multi-ethnic state (*Nationalitätenbundesstaat*). Its program envisioned the reform of the provincial system through the establishment of

'self-governments' in accordance with the territories of local nations (*national abgegrenzte Selbsverwaltungkörper* or *Selbstverwaltungsgebiete*). It claimed that national communities shall manage their internal affairs in an autonomous manner (*seine Angelegenheiten völlig autonom besorgen*).[110]

It is worth to point that the Brünn Programme did not incorporate the term *Volksstämme*, as it rather referred to the ethno-cultural communities of Austria as "peoples" (*Völker*) or "nations" (*Nationen*). These groups appeared as entitled to the "same rights" (*gleiches Recht*) or the "equality of rights" (*Gleichberechtigung*). This amounted to the right of nations to form autonomous territorial units in the state. [111]

It is possible to interpret these statements in various ways. On the one hand, one might argue that Austrian social democracy distanced itself from the terms of the liberal discourse, especially the references to the concept of 'historical rights', the related interpretation of 'autonomy' in the territorial sense and the differentiation between privileged 'nations' and the non-privileged *Volksstämme*. On the other hand, one can claim that the concepts of the political vocabulary of Austrian labour adopted the 'nation', 'autonomy' and the 'equality rights' through a cross-ideological transfer from the political languages of liberalism and reinterpreted them in accordance with its own vision of society.

One must also emphasize that the support of Czech social democrats for the Brünn programme amounted to their application of the terms 'self-government' and 'autonomy' to the territories inhabited by the ethno-cultural community of the Czechs. This accentuated their dissociation from the state rights discourse, the previous Czech demands with regard to the federalist reform of the dualistic structure and the restoration of the Bohemian Kingdom.

The Brünn resolutions has been depicted as a program of "territorial self-determination", accompanied by the claim that the theories of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner attempted to "transcend" its political vision. [112] However, one must emphasize that the text of the Brünn Programme did not incorporate the concept of 'self-determination' at all. Even though the term appeared in the social democratic debates of the time, it only contributed to the discourse on the key concepts of 'autonomy' and 'nation'.

The contribution of Ignacy Daszyński, the representative of the Polish section to the Party Congress of 1897 showcased these dynamics. He claimed that the true meaning of the term 'autonomy' was the "free right of self-determination" (*freie Selbstbestimmungsrecht*) for the "large masses of the people" (*große Volkmassen*). [113] The subject of the 'right to self-determination' was the political community of the 'people' or the *Volk* rather than the ethno-cultural concept of the 'nation' and its territory in this context. It is fair to assume that the concept of 'self-determination' was also adopted from the Austrian liberal discourse into the political vocabulary of local labour. On the other hand, one might also consider that it could have stemmed from the emphasis on social rights, and especially that of the proletariat in the social democratic context.

Although he would have been the first one to welcome any territorial interpretations of the concept, Lenin, a contemporary and fellow social democratic politician also recognized in his *The Rights of Nations to Self-Determination* (1914) that the "Austrian social democrats did not include the right of nations to self-determination directly in their program" of 1899. Lenin nevertheless stated since Austrian labour did "allow the demand for national independence to be advanced by *sections* of the party",

this "in effect" amounted to its recognition of their 'right to self-determination'. [114] One can realize upon this circumstantial argumentation that it is more precise to describe the territorial interpretations of the 'nation' and 'autonomy' rather than the corresponding concept of 'self-determination' as central to the mainstream of the Austrian social democratic discourse. This must accompany the realization that Renner and Bauer primarily formed views alternative to the former concepts.

Nonetheless, Ramón Maiz and María Pereira still feature the theories of Bauer as mainly opposed to the 'principle of self-determination' in their recent article, "Otto Bauer: The Idea of Nation as a Plural Community and the Question of Territorial and Non-Territorial Autonomy" (2020). They claim that the latter concept "requires conceptually a territorial solution". It is important to emphasize in relation to this issue that the intention of the authors was to go "far beyond the field of study of the history of political ideas". Maiz and Pereira claim that the historical Austrian context was "exceptional for many reasons" and would "have little use for the current debates on the complexities of cultural, ethnic and national accommodation in the multinational states in the context of globalization". [115] Thus, they attempt to refer to the 'principle of self-determination' and other concepts not as historical, but rather timeless and general ones.

Nonetheless, the authors cannot evade the analysis of a text from the historical context of Austria, the *Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage* of Bauer from 1907 ('Social Democracy and the Question of Nationalities'). They claim that its author reinterpreted "the unilateral right of self-determination leading to secession […] as the Principle of internal self-determination" or as "autonomy". [116] The latter concept, however, would also appear in two senses in their narrative of Bauer.

Maiz and Pereira claim that him and Karl Renner, the intellectual authorities of Austrian social democracy theorized "territorial" and "non-territorial" interpretations of 'autonomy' much due to their peculiar views on the 'nation'. Bauer referred to the nationalities of his time as "cultural communities" (*Kulturgemeinschaft*) or "relative" communities "of character" (*Charaktergemeinschaft*). On the one hand, this interpretation could extend the concept of the 'nation' to "the masses", which pointed "towards an authentic and inclusive public community system". [117]

On the other hand, this concept of the 'nation' and the term *nationale Autonomie* would oppose the "national policy of power of the ruling classes" in another sense in the narratives of Bauer and Renner. Their cultural interpretation of the nation would offer the alternative to the concept of 'historical rights' in the liberal discourses of the time, the related definitions of the 'nation' by national movements and their claims to various territories. Renner would claim that these concepts referred to "neither social nor national individualities, but antidemocratic structures of domination" and could only result in the "systematic oppression of national minorities by the majority" in historical frameworks. This was due to the fact that the vindication of historical rights could only establish structures that would incorporate "several nations with various privileges". [118]

Bauer and Renner would rather apply the combined concepts of 'territorial' and 'non-territorial autonomy' (or the 'personality principle') to the Austrian nationalities. Whereas the former concept would refer to the establishment of administrative units in accordance with the lands inhabited by certain communities, the latter would appear "an element of correction" to this vision. It would prevent the "undesirable effects (oppression of minorities) of the application of the pure territorial principle" according

to Maiz and Pereira. The concept of 'non-territorial autonomy' would amount to the "free individual declaration of nationality" and the introduction of "dual management mechanisms" in the autonomous national territories. Thus, the application of the term was "proposed in the case of mixed cantons" and would "allow minorities the right to be cared for in school and in administration in their own language". [119]

One is tempted to test the narrative of Maiz and Pereira through the analysis of *Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage* by Otto Bauer (1907), which text, however, only partially supports their claims. The terms 'national autonomy' (*nationale Autonomie*) and the 'principle of nationality' (*Nationalitätsprinzip*) frequently appeared in the text and in the titles of its chapters. The former was without a doubt the key concept of the book, as references to it are constant and almost innumerable (but only almost: 155 times), whereas the 'principle of nationality' appeared less frequently (43 times).

References to the concept of 'self-determination' (*Selbstbestimmung*) were much less numerous in comparison (27 times) and did not really support the identification of the term with the 'principle of nationality' by Maiz and Pereira. Bauer discussed the latter concept in a separate section, within the chapter dedicated to the 'nation-state' (*Nationalstaat*). The 'principle of nationality' appeared in this context as synonymous to the nationalist slogans that "each nation shall establish its own state" (*jede Nation soll einen Staat bilden*) and that "each state shall only compose one nation" (*jeder Staat soll nur eine Nation umfassen*). [120] In contrast, the term 'self-determination' did not appear even once in this chapter.

Bauer rather featured this concept in the context of the multi-ethnic 'nationalities state' (*Nationalitätenstaat*). It most often appeared as the synonym of 'autonomy' and

applied to the right of nations to develop their cultures (*Weiterentwicklung ihrer Kultur*). Once again, this interpretation seems to have stemmed from the social democratic discourse of group rights, as Bauer claimed the concepts of 'autonomy' and 'self-determination' to be central to the "struggle of the work of the working class against capitalism" (*der Kampf der Arbeiterklasse gegen Kapitalismus*). While the narrative of the book featured the demarcation of territories in accordance with the linguistic boundaries between ethno-cultural communities (*Abgrenzung der Sprachgebiete*) as the possible precondition (*Voraussetzung*) to 'national self-determination' (*nationale Selbstbestimmung*), the author also problematized this viewpoint. He pointed out that 'national self-determination on the basis of the territorial principle' (*nationale Selbstbestimmung auf Grund des Territorialprinzipes*) or the territorial interpretation of 'autonomy' could only result in a struggle between nations (*nationale Kämpfe*) in the nationalities state. Bauer claimed that this was due to the presence of national minorities (*nationale Minderheiten*) in the regions claimed by various national movements. [121]

One could thus problematize the interpretation of Maiz and Pereira that 'self-determination' would have originally been a counter-concept in the narrative of Bauer in opposition to his concepts of territorial and non-territorial 'autonomy'. I claim that it was rather the 'principle of nationality' that assumed this role in his book. The authors themselves refer to the application of this concept by Bauer to the structure of the state (*innerstaatliches Nationalitätsprinzip*). However, the author explained this as equivalent to the concept of 'territorial autonomy', which would not oppose the framework of the 'nationalities state'. [122] In contrast, Maiz and Pereira translate the

German term *innerstaatliches Nationalitätsprinzip* as the 'principle of internal self-determination', which in my opinion, is a rather erroneous choice.

One can also point out that 'self-determination' was a much broader concept than to be confined to territoriality in the narrative of Bauer. He interpreted the term as the right of nations to develop their cultures. Although he did not discuss the concept in the context of the 'nationality principle' and the 'nation-state', one can draw parallels between these terms and that of the 'territorial principle' or 'territorial autonomy'. Nonetheless, the author emphasized that the establishment of autonomous territorial units in the 'nationalities state' was only one of the possible preconditions to the right of self-determination, not the only one necessary for its vindication.

One can also realize the importance of 'national minorities' as a parallel concept of Bauer to 'autonomy' and 'self-determination' in his book. This term was referred to in a new sense in the discourse of Austrian social democracy at the turn of the century. Our study shows that the concept of 'national minority' originally appeared in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy in the late nineteenth century. It did not, however, refer to a legal category in the imperial framework of Cisleithania, as the December Constitution rather codified the 'equality of nationality rights' in 1867. Austrian law did not distinguish between 'majorities' and 'minorities' in the national sense. [123]

The concept of 'minority' rather referred to local groups defined as "scattered and in a minority in relation to other peoples" in the liberal political discourse of the previous decades. For instance, Adolf Fischhof discussed this issue in the context of the Austrian crownlands in his *Oesterreich und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes* ("Austria and the Guarantee of its Existence", 1869). The author did not necessarily describe 'minority' as a group inferior in terms of its political status, as he rather

problematized the domination of German and Italian 'minorities' over the Slavic 'majority' in certain provinces. He also did not aim to institutionalize the rights of 'national minorities', but rather attempted to propose administrative solutions to the nationalist conflicts of the time. [124]

This rather quantitative approach to the term transformed with the debates of Austrian social democracy in connection to the concept of 'national autonomy' and the application of the 'territorial principle' to the framework of the Austrian state. We argue that it was especially the German–Czech conflict in the context of the Bohemian crownlands that informed this discourse and the related viewpoint of Bauer. The social democratic representative would formulate his concept of the 'personal principle' to offer a solution to the conflicts between national movements in Austria with regard to 'national minorities'. He interpreted the latter term in a qualitative sense and proposed that Austrian labour should apply the non-territorial concept of 'national autonomy' to these communities. Bauer claimed that this would result in the institutionalization of 'national minorities' as officially recognized communities and would prevent their harassment in the local context of the crownlands or other territorial units. [125]

Thus, 'national minority' seems to join the group of originally liberal concepts that appeared in the political vocabulary of Austrian social democracy through cross-ideological transfer. As opposed to the earlier, relational and quantitative interpretation of term by liberals, social democratic representatives started to refer it in a qualitative sense. They advocated the institutionalization of 'minority rights' in a reformed Austrian state and its autonomous territorial units.

This viewpoint was not unrelated to the German cultural background of Bauer and other participants of the Austrian social democratic discourse. Since German

communities were dispersed throughout the realms of Cisleithania, territorial ideas of imperial reform threatened with the prospective that these would become disadvantaged 'minorities' in the local contexts of the crownlands or other administrative units. [126] It was no accident that the Brünn Programme also addressed this issue, as it envisioned a reformed Austrian state that would enact the rights of national minorities. [127]

The related contributions of representatives with a German cultural background such as Viktor Adler, Josef Seliger and Wilhelm Ellenbogen were especially important to the debates of the Brünn Party Congress. One must point out that Adler and Seliger were native to the Kingdom of Bohemia. [128] [129] In contrast, the narrower homeland of Ellenbogen was the Margravate of Moravia. [130] Thus, their viewpoints were defined by the minority status of German communities in their local contexts, which were dominated by Czech majorities in numerical terms.

Ellenbogen emphasized the importance of considering the minority viewpoint of "workers with other tongues" (*Minoritäten der anderersprächigen Arbeitern*) in the local context of the crownlands. He claimed that these "comrades" (*Genossen*) must maintain the right of receiving education in their own language. Ellenbogen did not necessarily refer to a vision of legal reforms in this regard, but rather the December Constitution and its regulations to provide the equality of rights for Austrian nationalities – informed by the contemporary conflict between Czech and German national movements in Bohemia. Thus, the claims of Ellenbogen included references to both the proletarian concept of the 'nation' and the liberal laws of the contemporary Austrian state. He also argued for the establishment of national curiae throughout the administrative units of the empire and institutionalization of the rights of minorities to

cultural and linguistic autonomy.[131] Thus, his views resembled the later claims of Bauer in his book of 1907.

While Ellenbogen did not make any references to this fact, Josef Seliger did admit that his perspective was influenced by his Moravian German cultural affiliation. The representative pointed out that "German minorities" (*deutsche Minderheiten*) were to be found in all the provinces of Austria. When Seliger spoke of the rights of minorities to their own "cultural development" (*kulturelle Entwicklung*) and to preserve their national "character" (*Eigenart*), he had this focus in mind. He was the only social democratic representative at the Brünn Party Congress to mention the concept of 'personal autonomy' (*Personalautonomie*) and to claim that this should complement the application of 'territorial autonomy' (*territoriale Autonomie*) to the administrative framework of the Austrian state. Seliger also referred to the previous proposals of his Czech colleagues, who would advise that Austrian labour should form a joint standpoint on educational rights of nationalities. [132]

Nonetheless, the representative did not limit his claims to the rights of 'national minorities'; he also applied the concept of 'territorial autonomy' to the context of the Bohemian Kingdom in a specific sense. Seliger stated that the logical outcome of Austrian federal reorganization would be separation of the German-inhabited territories in Bohemia from the lands populated by Czechs. He referred to the concept of *Deutschböhmen* or 'German Bohemia' in this regard. The representative also claimed that this territory shall unite with the other German regions of Austria. [133]

To sum it up, I position myself against the narrative of Fisch that features Bauer and Renner as the 'dominant' intellectual authorities of Austrian social democracy and the ones to conceptualize an alternative understanding of 'self-determination' in this

context, one opposed to the Bolshevik interpretation of the term as the 'right to secession'. I rather pointed out that the role of concept of 'self-determination' was marginal in the contemporary discourse of Cisleithanian labour, which rather revolved around debates in relation to the 'territorial' and 'non-territorial' concepts of 'autonomy'.

I point out the importance of the conflicts between German and Czech political representations in connection to this issue. In parallel to the Austrian political crisis upon the introduction of the so-called 'Badeni Decrees' in 1897, Czech social democrats also started to demand their equality in Cisleithanian labour as opposed to claims of German cultural superiority by the Austrian social democratic elite. At the same, they also argued for the institutionalization of the equality of their nation in the Austrian state. This resulted in the resolutions of the Brünn Programme in 1899, which envisioned the transformation of Cisleithania into a federal state of autonomous national territories.

I emphasize that the terms the Brünn Programme referred to: 'nation', 'equality of rights' and 'national minorities' in part appeared in the political vocabulary of Austrian social democracy through their ideological transfer from the Austrian context of liberalism. On the other hand, I also point out that the representatives of Cisleithanian labour reinterpreted these terms in accordance with their political vision. Their concept of the 'nation' referred to a broad political community as opposed its liberal variant. Their interpretation of 'autonomy' debated the importance of 'state rights' in the liberal discourse They rather emphasized that the formation of national territories in a federal Austria was a part of the 'equality of nationality rights'.

I emphasize that 'self-determination' or the 'self-determination of peoples' was no key concepts of this discourse. Although it is possible that 'self-determination' was also adopted into the political language of social democracy through its ideological transfer from the liberal context, it is also important to emphasize its use in labour might have originated from the emphasis on social rights and the working class's 'right to self-determination'.

I claim that as opposed to the narrative of Ramón Maiz and María Pereira, Renner and Bauer positioned themselves against the social democratic current of their time rather than the 'unilateral right of self-determination leading to secession'. I emphasize that Bauer's book of 1907 did not feature the concept of 'self-determination' as equivalent to the 'principle of nationality' and the formation of 'nation-states', but rather described it as the right of nations to 'autonomy', to develop their cultures in the multi-ethnic 'nationalities state'. Although the application of the 'territorial principle' or 'territorial autonomy' to the nations of Austria appeared as one possible interpretation of this right, the author emphasized that the presence of 'national minorities' in the new autonomous national territories could easily result in conflicts between national movements. Thus, he offered the application of the 'personal principle' or 'non-territorial autonomy' to minority communities.

In accordance with the thesis of our joint article with Anna Adorjáni, I argue that this concept of 'national minority' was due to a new, qualitative interpretation of the term in the Austrian social democratic discourse as opposed to the liberal discourse of the nineteenth century. This was much due to the worries of representatives with a German cultural background that their dispersed communities would suffer from the

federal reorganization of Austria. Thus, they argued for the institutionalization of minority rights for these communities and their recognition by reformed Austrian law.

Nonetheless, I find it important to emphasize that one of these representatives, Josef Seliger referred to the territorial concept of *Deutschböhmen* or 'German Bohemia' in this discourse. This was not his own innovation; the idea that the German-inhabited parts of the Bohemian Kingdom shall separate from the Czech lands originally appeared in the German nationalist discourse of the early 1890s. On the other hand, I would like to accentuate that ideas similarly opposed to the political vision of the state rights discourse also appeared in the Czech national movement of the time. I will present these developments in the next sub-chapter.

e. The Counter-Discourses of 'German Bohemia' and the 'Czechoslav Nation' to 'State Rights'

The entry of *Politisches Wörterbuch für die Deutschen in Oesterreich* ('Political Dictionary for the Germans in Austria') featured the concept of 'autonomy' and its synonym, 'self-determination' in a specific sense in 1885. It described these terms as the political principle that the "lower (strata of the) administration" (*kleinere Verwaltungsgebiete*) should be independent from the "central government" (*Zentralgewalt*). However, it did not evaluate the application of these concepts to the historical crownlands of Austria in a positive light. The author of the entry rather stated that the broadened autonomy of the provinces would benefit the "Slavic majority" (*slawische Majorität*) of the local contexts, whereas it would create "dangerous" (*gefährlich*) circumstances for the local Germans. The author proposed the unification of "German-Austrian lands" (*deutsch-österreichische Länder*) as a solution to this

issue. This was no accident: it was a German nationalist political association, the *Deutscher Verein* that published the dictionary. [134]

This viewpoint was much due to the domination of nationalist conflicts in the Austrian political sphere, which resulted in a new interpretation of the status of the German community in the context of Bohemia at the turn of the century. The political discourse of radical German nationalism started to refer to the concept of *Deutschböhmen* ('German-Bohemia') in a territorial sense and demanded the introduction of national-territorial divisions in the Bohemian crownland from 1890. They supported this claim with the argument that the economic and demographic expansion of the Czech "majority" threatened the position of the German "minority". This resulted in a struggle for the survival of German identity in their narrative, one that Germans could only win through control over their "homeland". Thus, a new interpretation of *Deutschböhmen* appeared as a territorial concept to describe the boundaries of the latter realm, a vision also featured by contemporary maps. [135]

The discourse of radical German nationalism argued for the final separation of national communities in the context of the Bohemian crownlands through its term of *Deutschböhmen*. Since the representatives of local Germans interpreted their group as threatened by economic and social developments in Bohemia, the territorial separation of communities appeared as the sole alternative to the extinction of local German identity in their narrative. This opposed the claims of the historical Czech state rights discourse that "German Bohemians" would constitute the sub-group of the 'people of Bohemia', this regional and political community.

On the other hand, identifications alternative to the historical and regional concept also appeared in the framework of the Czech national movement. The discourse

of Neo-Slavism emphasized the ethno-cultural ties between Slavic nationalities. As a result, the representatives of the Czech national movement advocated the establishment of a co-operation between "small peoples" (*kleine Völker*) against the political domination of "great peoples" (*große Völker*). This primarily referred to the tensions between the Slav and German communities (or rather national movements) in the context of Austria. [136]

Although Neo-Slavism could not supersede the discourse of state rights in the political mainstream of the Czech national movement, it resulted in the reappearance of a distinct national concept, that of the 'Czechoslavs' (*Českoslovanský*). This term had emphasized the ethno-cultural connections between the Slavic populations in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and the Slovak community of Hungary in the Czech and the Slovak national discourses of the early nineteenth century. František Palacký was one of its representatives in this era; the concept of the 'Czechoslav nation' informed his drafts of imperial reforms in 1848–1849, some of which envisioned the territorial unity of the Bohemian crownlands and the Slovak-inhabited lands of Northern Hungary. [137]

There were more and less obvious considerations behind the Czech embracement of this concept. One reason to this end was the tension between the Bohemian and Moravian representatives of the nation. The members of the Moravian elite felt excluded from the Bohemian narrative of state rights. As a result, the fear appeared that the restoration of the historical state would only establish the domination of the Bohemian Czech elite over its framework. Thus, the Moravian representatives distanced themselves from the Bohemian claims with regard to the state rights of the historical Bohemian Kingdom. [138] The concept of the 'Czechoslavs' could side-line

these differences since it emphasized the ethno-cultural ties between the Slavic communities of Bohemia and Moravia.

On the other hand, the idea of Czech–Slovak kinship was also in service of the local and the imperial goals of the Czech national movement. This could create a stronger position against the influence of the German and Hungarian elites in the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. [139] Palacký could also reinforce the status of the Czechs as a numerical majority in the context of the Bohemian crownlands through the addition of Slovak territories to his proposed federal unit in 1848–1849. [140] The concept of the 'Czechoslav' nation could thus counterbalance the presence of a sizeable German community in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.

One must emphasize that the term 'Czechoslavs' was not limited to the Czech linguistic context, as it also appeared in its German counterpart. For instance, the fifteenth volume of the *Meyer Konservations-Lexikon* featured this term in 1889. It referred to 'Czechoslavs' (*Tschechoslawen*) as the synonym of 'Czechs' (*Tschechen* in German, although the lexicon also featured the Czech term *Češi*). The entry then described this ethno-cultural community as the *Volksstamm* of Northern Slavs (*Nordslawen*) in the Habsburg Monarchy, "primarily in Bohemia and Moravia" (*vorwiegend in Böhmen und Mähren*). The Slovaks only received a passing reference in the entry as the part of the group that inhabited the "North-Western part of Hungary" (*im nordwestlichen Teil Ungarns*). [141] Thus, the emphasis here was rather on the common identity of Slavs in Austrian Bohemia and Moravia rather than that of Czechs and Slovaks in the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy.

However, one must emphasize that the concept of the 'Czechoslavs' practically disappeared from the Czech political discourse after 1867. This was much due to the

disinterest of Czech parties in the issues of Hungarian Slovaks and the central position of the concept of 'state rights' in their political discussions. [142] It is also important to emphasize that the concept of the 'Czechoslav' nation fundamentally opposed any references to 'historical rights', the concept of the 'Bohemian people' and the Czechs claims to the historical lands of the Bohemian Kingdom due to its ethno-cultural emphasis.

It was no accident that this idea reappeared at the turn of the century in opposite to the state rights discourse and its concepts. One of its main representatives, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk started his political carrier as the representative of the Young Czech Party in the Austrian Imperial Council. Masaryk still supported the state rights discourse in his *Česká otázka* ("The Czech Question") of 1896, as he argued for the independence of the historical Bohemian Kingdom. This position of his transformed radically in the following years. As of 1900, Masaryk seceded from the Young Czechs and founded his own People's Party or Realist Party. This was much due to his viewpoint that the status of the Czech nation could not improve due to the futile adherence of its liberal political elite to the state rights discourse and the related hostilities between Czech and German national movements. Masaryk rather supported the ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'Czech nation' at the start of the new century. He emphasized that the "natural rights" (and not "historical rights") of this community shall legitimize the claims of its representatives to "self-government". [143] The People's Party program of 1900 accordingly identified the political force as a supporter of "autonomism" (*Autonomismus*) and demanded the "freedom" (*Selbständigkeit*) and the "independence" (*Unabhängigkeit*) of a "Czech state" (*böhmischer Staat*) in a reformed, federative Austria (*österreichische Föderation*). [144]

It is important to emphasize that Masaryk constructed a 'realist' viewpoint as critical of the traditional liberal discourse and its concepts as that of Czech social democracy. As opposed to 'state rights', he rather referred to 'humanism' (*humanitá*) as his key concept. This 'humanism' and the 'realism' of Masaryk's political and intellectual circle emphasized the importance of a democratic transformation, the introduction of a tolerant religious and national viewpoint in the Austrian political and the Czech national discourse. [145]

As for the German–Czech relationship, Masaryk claimed that the viewpoint of the Czech state rights discourse disregarded the rights of the German community, which resulted in the tensions between the national movements. He did not want to follow this path; thus, he argued for the establishment of national curiae in the diets of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia and the reconstruction of electoral districts in accordance with the territories inhabited by different nationalities. [146] Masaryk also approved of the possible extinction of 'Bohemian German' consciousness as a local identity. [147]

Thus, the leader of the Realist Party substituted the concept of the 'Bohemian people' with that of the 'Czechoslavs', the union of kindred Slavic 'tribes' in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Northern Hungary. One must thus point out that this ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'nation' and the related references to the 'natural rights' were in opposition to the vision of the Czech state rights discourse and its emphasis on 'historical rights'. In this sense, it was much similar to the social democratic discourse and its idea of 'nation', or the German radical nationalist interpretation of 'German Bohemia' and its community. Nonetheless, the 'Czechoslav' viewpoint of Masaryk and his political allies was of rather marginal importance in the contemporary Czech discourse as opposed to the popular status of Czech social democracy. [148] It is worth to

mention here that Masaryk's own personal background might have contributed to his (re-)conceptualization of the 'Czechoslavs', as he was born in the so-called 'Moravian Slovakia', back-then, the borderlands between the Moravian Margravate and the Kingdom of Hungary (his father was also of Slovak origin in ethno-cultural terms). [149]

To sum it up, the terms 'German Bohemia' and the 'Czechoslav nation' both appeared as counter-concepts to the 'Bohemian people' of the Czech state rights discourse at the turn of the century. The former was embedded in the conceptual framework of German radical nationalism, which demanded the territorial separation of German-inhabited lands from the Kingdom of Bohemia to "protect" Germans from the economic, social and political domination of the Czech national movement. In contrast, the latter rather appeared due to the rediscovery of and the emphasis on ethno-cultural ties between Bohemian, Moravian, Silesian and Northern Hungarian Slavs. This was much due to the Realist viewpoint of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk that the discourse of state rights could not improve the status of the Czech nation in Austria, but could only worsen the relationship between Czech and German national movements.

Thus, Masaryk conceptualized the Czech 'nation' as an ethno-cultural rather than a historical or political community by 1900 and argued for the vindication of its 'natural rights' in the Habsburg Monarchy. This concept soon expanded into that of the 'Czechoslav nation', which attempted to reinforce the positions of the Czech and Slovak national through their alliance against the Austrian and Hungarian elites.

f. Legal Debates and Political Attempts at Settling National Affairs in the State, Regional and Local Contexts

It is important to emphasize that discussions as for the status of various nationalities in Habsburg Austria were not limited to political debates of the time. Natasha Wheatley shows in her "Making Nations into Legal Persons between Imperial and International Law: Scenes from a Central European History of Group Rights" (2018) that the Austrian discipline of legal studies was also much preoccupied with the question whether the ethno-cultural communities of the empire could be recognized by Austrian law as individualities. This issue was much related to the lack of precise definitions in the December Constitution of 1867. Although the fundamental law proclaimed that "ethnicities equal in their rights and possessed the inviolable right to cultivate their language and nationality", it did not define the *Volksstämme* to as "legal persons" or as the subjects of these "collective rights". It rather sanctioned the rights of individuals belonging to these groups. [150]

It was no accident that the mainstream of Austria jurisprudence interpreted this legislation as nonsensical in conceptual terms. Ludwig Gumplowicz, Edmund Bernatzik, Adolf Exner or Georg Jellinek would all claim at the turn of the century that the nationalities of the Austria were not "persons" in the juridical or legal sense. This was much due to the fact that they did not perceive national belonging as defined by "objective" criteria or a "unified and organized will". They claimed that it rather corresponded to the subjective identity of individuals. [151]

However, the policy of the Austrian government at the turn of the century was not bothered by the lack of legal definitions for the *Volksstämme* or their collective rights. It supported or even designed "provincial compromises" between national

movements in the Austrian crown lands of Moravia, Bukovina, Galicia, and the Austro–Hungarian condominium of Bosnia-Hercegovina. These often amounted to the introduction of national or confessional registers and well-defined parameters for the representation of nationalities in the political structure of the individual provinces. [152]

It is important to emphasize that one of these "compromises" affected the relationship between Czech and German national movements in the context of Moravia. This was much due to the fact that as opposed to the Kingdom of Bohemia, nationalist tensions were not as high in this province. Nonetheless, the Czech elite kept increasing its social and economic importance, which foreshadowed its political domination in the Moravian Diet. As a result, the Moravian German deputies were willing to negotiate about the terms of political reforms in exchange for retaining their right to veto in the legislative institution. The compromise between national movements was also supported by the Austrian government and the Habsburg dynasty. [153]

The Moravian provincial constitution of 1905 thus introduced national subdivisions into the curiae of the electoral system. It allocated 73 seats to the representatives of the local Czech population, whereas German parties received 40 seats. Finally, it allocated 30 seats to the "great property holders", who would thus become a decisive element in the Diet. Nonetheless, one must emphasize that this was due to the fact that they were viewed as "nationally unaligned" by the Czech and German deputies. As such, they could constitute a neutral third party in the political debates of the Moravian Diet. [154]

At the same time, the compromise between national movements also restructured the administrative and the educational systems of the province. The Moravian administration switched to a bilingual mode of operation, with German and

Czech identities proportionally represented within its ranks. School boards were also partitioned into national sections. The provincial government also allowed the political control of national representatives over the institutions of secondary education. [155]

The terms of a similar compromise were also being discussed in Bohemia by 1914, although the local representatives of the German and Czech national movements were less willing to give up the integrity of their political programs. Nonetheless, their co-operation was still possible on the level of localities. This resulted in the creation of a new municipal charter for the city of Budějovice or Budweis. While this would also transform the German and Czech national communities into autonomous bodies, it went beyond the boundaries established by the Moravian Compromise. It also invested national representatives with the right to decide upon the separate taxation of communities and its spending. [156]

Along with the Austrian introduction of general suffrage in 1907, Judson describes the Moravian settlement and its counterparts in Bukovina, Galicia, Budějovice or Budweis as "bold political solutions to diffuse conflicts" between national movements, which generated "excitement and creativity around" these "reform projects". He also refers to these acts as examples of "imperial state-making" and implies that Habsburg Monarchy (or at least Austria) was an "empire with a future". The historian claims that contemporary narratives about imperial decline were due to an "elite mood of existential pessimism", the shrinking influence of traditional "military, bureaucratic, and aristocratic elites". [157]

This narrative even depicts the controversial Bohemian policy of the Austrian government in a more favourable light than traditional accounts. Judson reports that Prime Minister Karl Stürgkh "had the emperor dissolve the hopelessly deadlocked

Bohemian Diet and its executive committee", which institutions were replaced by an administrative committee. In response, "Czech nationalist deputies" started to obstruct the legislative process of the Imperial Council, "thereby compelling its suspension" by the emperor. [158]

Although the historian recognizes that the acts of the Austrian Premier were anti-constitutional and generated further problems, he still argues that it was a step made necessary by the local issues of the Bohemian Kingdom. He points out that the province had "teetered on the brink of financial crisis for months", since German and Czech representatives both obstructed the legislation of the provincial diet. Judson claims that the intervention of the Austrian government "greatly relieved" these actors, as it "resolved Bohemia's fiscal quandary" without them having to take "responsibility for the crisis". He also shows that there was a continuity between the dissolved provincial executive committee and the new special administrative committee in terms of personnel. Judson implies that one is able to interpret the intervention of the government as an act that could indeed "lead to a revived centralist Austrian state" or as one that would just "pave the way for yet another federalist agreement'" in the Bohemian context. [159] Nonetheless, he emphasizes that the First World War soon provided a radically new context for contemporary political projects.

To sum it up, I point out through the study of Natasha Wheatley that the status of Austrian nationalities was also a subject of debates in Austrian legal studies at the turn of the century. The contemporary intellectual authorities of this discipline rejected the possibility that the *Volksstämme* could become legal personalities due to subjective nature of national belonging, the lack of a united political will in national movements.

In contrast, the Austrian government supported local compromises between national movements and the related reforms of provincial or municipal constitutions through the application of 'non-territorial autonomy' to these local frameworks. This contributed to the reorganization of national affairs in Moravia, Bukovina, Galicia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Moravian Compromise amounted to the establishment of separate political representations and educational systems for the German and Czech nationalities. Nonetheless, the intervention of the Austrian government into the political affairs of Bohemia was rather controversial, as it presented an anti-constitutional attempt to solve the local political problems generated by the conflicts between national movements.

g. *Conclusion*

I identify the discourse of the Kremsier Constitution in 1848–1849 as the context in which the concept of 'self-determination of peoples' (*Selbstbestimmung der Völker*) would appear for the first time in the Austrian political discourse of the early nineteenth century. My narrative also features the Czech memorandum of 1870 as a historical source in which the term would appear as a key concept. I emphasize the role of Czech representatives and the influence of the political and intellectual discourse in relation to German state unification in both cases and argue for the cultural transfer of the term from the latter context.

Nonetheless, I also accentuate that the 'self-determination of peoples' was embedded in the liberal Austrian political vocabulary of this historical period. As such, it was not analogous to the concepts of 'sovereignty' or the 'right to secession'; its role was not central to the political discourse either. It rather appeared in support of the key

concepts of 'empire', 'autonomy', 'federation' and the 'equality of nationality rights' during the early nineteenth century. The term *Volksstamm* or *Volksstämme* was a distinctive element of the imperial discourse, as it referred to ethno-cultural communities in the Austrian context and their rights to maintain their cultural identity through their languages.

The discourse of the Czech national movement integrated into these liberal discussions of the time with its focus on the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire'. Its conceptual framework associated the concept of 'autonomy' with that of 'state rights' in the historical context of the Czech lands or the Bohemian Kingdom. The Bohemian representatives of the Czech nation conceptualized influential visions of federal reorganization on the imperial scale. They also contributed to Austrian discourse on the 'equality of nationality rights', as they hoped that this would affect their own attempts at the legal recognition and emancipation of Czech language and culture in the province of Bohemia.

However, I emphasize various ambiguities of the concepts of the 'nation' and the 'state' in this context. I pointed out that although the state rights discourse originally united the ranks of the Bohemian German and Czech elites, their conceptualization of the regional population was rather different. The German concept of the *böhmisches Volk* rather accentuated the political features of this community. In contrast, the Czech term *český národ* could refer to this regional and supra-ethnic or to the ethno-cultural interpretation of the nation. Even if used in a political sense, this concept still emphasized the majority status of the Czechs in local terms, the alleged leading role of their representatives in the state rights discourse and their attempts at the restoration of a 'nation-state'. Nonetheless, the liberal representatives of the Czech nation also often

emphasized that they interpret the regional populations of the Bohemian Kingdom and the Czech lands as one political community with its Czech and German sub-groups.

The Bohemian Czech proponents of these ideas referred to the "Kingdom of Bohemia" in a dual sense. On the one hand, this referred to the administrative unification of the Czech lands and the renovation of the historical Kingdom of Bohemia in accordance with its constitution. On the other hand, their discourse featured the crownland of the Bohemian Kingdom, 'Bohemia proper' as the 'national core' of the historical state. This resulted in debates between the Bohemian and the Moravian representatives of the nation, as the latter felt marginalized from this discourse and feared the Bohemian attempts at domination.

The 'self-determination of peoples' appeared as a term of central role in this conceptual framework only once, in the memorandum of Czech parliamentarians in the Austrian Imperial Council (1870). I position myself against the narrative of Fisch Jörg that references to the concept as a "universal right" would have implied its association with the terms 'sovereignty' or the 'right to secession' in this context. I rather emphasize that the memorandum was a reaction to the *Ausgleich* of 1867 and the transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy into the dualistic state of Austria–Hungary. Discontent with the one-sided recognition of Hungarian historical rights by the Habsburg dynasty, the liberal representatives of the Czech nation demanded the reconstruction of the Bohemian Kingdom.

The 'self-determination of peoples' substituted references to the concept of 'autonomy' in this context due to its international implications. The Czech representatives supported claims by pointing at the processes of German state unification, the secessionist movements in the Ottoman Empire and the Franco–

Prussian War and the central role of the concept of 'self-determination of peoples' in these cases. However, this did not amount to their demands to 'sovereignty' or the 'right to secession'. They rather referred to 'federation' as the ideal political system of the contemporary age, probably due to the federal structure of the German Empire. Thus, the application of the 'self-determination of peoples' was to end the rule of Germans and Hungarians and transform the Habsburg Monarchy or 'Austria' into a federal state.

The memorandum defined the *Volksstämme* and the 'nation' as the subjects of this right in the Austrian context. Whereas the former term referred to ethno-cultural communities, the latter referred to entities defined by historical and legal criteria. This applied to the 'political nation' of the Bohemian Kingdom with its distinct feeling of 'nationality' that resulted from the concept of 'state rights'.

I show that the failure of this attempt at the vindication of 'Bohemian state rights' resulted in political debates in the era of nationalist conflicts at the turn of the century. The Badeni Crisis of 1897 was a turning point in Austrian history, as the attempt at the introduction of a bilingual administration in the Kingdom of Bohemia resulted in a political crisis due to the negative reaction of German representatives.

I emphasize that the discourse of Austrian social democracy showcased the ideological transfer and the reinterpretation of various concepts that were previously the terms of the liberal discourse. On the one hand, the representatives of Austrian labour extended the political category of the 'nation' to the previously marginalized general population and the proletariat. They referred to these communities as equal to each other, a position against the liberal discourse of historical rights and the differentiation between communities as 'privileged' or 'non-privileged'. On the other hand, nationalist

tensions in Austrian social democracy resulted in debates with regard to the concepts of 'autonomy' and 'national minorities'.

I position myself against the narratives that the concept of 'self-determination' would have been central to this discourse. I point out that Karl Renner and Otto Bauer did not conceptualize their concept of 'non-territorial autonomy' against this term. They rather referred to 'self-determination' as the right of nations to develop their cultures. I also accentuate although it might have been adopted from the liberal discourse, the social democratic concept of 'self-determination' might have also stemmed from the emphasis of the discourse on group rights. I claim that 'non-territorial autonomy' was the counter-concept of 'territorial autonomy' rather than that of 'self-determination' in the conceptual frameworks of Renner and Bauer, as they alleged that the one-sided application of the 'territorial principle' to the structure of the Austrian state would result in national conflicts and the repression of local 'national minorities'.

I point out that the Austrian social democratic discourse reinterpreted the term 'national minorities'. Whereas this concept had referred to the minority status of groups in numerical or political terms as opposed to others in the context of the crownlands in the liberal discourse, the debates of Cisleithanian labour featured a qualitative interpretation of the term. This was much due to the contributions of representatives with a German cultural background to the discourse, who feared that their communities would be disadvantaged upon the federal reorganization of Austria. As a result, they demanded the institutionalization of minority rights on the provincial and the state level, a claim incorporated by Otto Bauer in his book of 1907.

I have shown that other counter-discourses to that of liberal state rights appeared in the German and the Czech national discourses at the turn of the century. German

radical nationalists started to refer to the territorial concept of 'German Bohemia' in their arguments as for the separation of German and Czech communities in the local context of the Bohemian Kingdom. They interpreted their endeavours as essential parts of a 'struggle for survival' due to their fears of Czech domination in the economic, political and social senses.

Masaryk and his political allies also rediscovered the 'Czechoslav nation' as their counter-concept to the 'Bohemian people'. This was a result of their perception that the state rights discourse could not improve the status of the Czech nation in Austria, whereas it contributed to the escalation of conflicts between the Czech and German national movements. Thus, Masaryk started to interpret the 'nation' in ethno-cultural terms and referred to its 'natural rights' rather than its 'historical rights' to 'self-government' at the turn of the century. The idea soon appeared that this ethno-cultural concept of the 'nation' referred to the 'Czechoslavs', the unity of Slavic tribes in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and the Slovak-inhabited parts of Northern Hungary. The viewpoint of Masaryk collided with those of German radical nationalists in the sense that he counted on the disappearance of 'German Bohemian' as a local identity in the context of the Bohemian Kingdom.

I have pointed out using the study of Natasha Wheatley that the legal status of nationalities or the *Volksstämme* in Austria was a debated subject in Austrian jurisprudence, with the majority of scientists claiming that these communities lacked the objective criteria or the common political will to constitute legal personalities. In contrast, I have shown through the study of Börries Kuzmany the Austrian government was rather preoccupied with the application of 'non-territorial autonomy' to regional and local frameworks of law. This resulted in "compromises" between national

movements in Moravia, Bukovina, Galicia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the context of the Moravian Margravate, this amounted to the separate political representation and educational system of nationalities. On the other hand, the intervention of the government into Bohemian political debates was rather controversial. Although it attempted to solve the financial crisis of the region which escalated due to the debates of political representatives, the Austrian establishment dissolved local legislation and replaced with its own administrative committee through an anti-constitutional act.

All these findings allow me to correct the statement of Komlosy regarding the "vision of national self-determination within the Habsburg Monarchy's boundaries" before the First World War. It is more precise to talk of "visions of autonomy" in the Habsburg Monarchy and Austria in this period, and to emphasize that the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' often supported references to the former term. However, I also think it is right to depict the 'self-determination of peoples' as a key concept of the Austrian political discourse of the late First World War. I will showcase the reasons behind this development, and the integration of the term into the conceptual framework of Czech political representation, the shifts in its interpretation, its parallel or counter-concepts in the next chapter.

The Concept of the 'Self-Determination of Peoples' in the Political Discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council (1917–1918)

h. Introduction

On June 13, 1917, Ernst Viktor Zeidler problematized the concept of the ‚self-determination of peoples' (*Selbstbestimmung der Völker*) to his fellow representatives in the Austrian *Reichsrat*. The representative of the German Liberal Party (*Deutsche Freiheitspartei*) pointed out its "duality" (*Dualität*). One interpretation of the concept was "political" (*politische*) with ties to the term 'democracy' (*Demokratie*). At the same time, 'the self-determination of peoples' was also a concept applied to ethnic (*ethnische*) or ethno-cultural groups and featured by national demands concerning the "independent existence" (*Eigenleben*) of communities within the Habsburg Monarchy. [160]

Thus, one can already identify 'self-determination', 'democracy' and at least one of their subjects, the ethno-cultural interpretations of the 'people' as important parallel concepts in the discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council during the late First World War (1917–1918). However, other terms also appeared in the debates of the *Reichsrat* on the relationship between the 'nation(s)' and the 'empire'. It is also important to emphasize that on the one hand, the historical traditions from the era before the First World War informed these discussions. On the other hand, the role of various terms along with the conceptual frameworks of this context could transform in accordance with the local and international developments of late First World War.

To show this complexity of the political discourse, I will examine the political discourse of the *Reichsrat* and the participation of the Czech Union (*Česky svaz*) in its debates. One must emphasize that eighteen (18) parties or so-called "clubs" and 516

representatives were elected in the Imperial Council of 1911 upon the basis of general suffrage in Austria. All the major nationalities of Cisleithania were represented by political formations. In this *Reichsrat* reconvened in 1917, the Czech Union and its main competitor, the German National Alliance (*Deutscher Nationalverband*) were the strongest factions (at least until the dissolution of the latter in late 1917). Their membership included around 100 representatives each, one- and one-fifth of all deputies. [161]

The terms 'self-determination of peoples' (*Selbstbestimmung der Völker*) or the 'right of peoples to self-determination' (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*) appeared in the discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council right at its first session on May 30, 1917. My main interest in this part of the case study will be to find related 'continuities' and 'discontinuities' in the discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council in 1917–1918. I will focus on related processes that would contribute to the loss of "legitimacy" for the concept of the 'empire' and the growing importance of the concept of the 'nation-state'. On the other hand, I will be interested in identifying parallel concepts to the 'self-determination of peoples', one that would define its meaning(s) in this context. These will include the concept of the 'people' and its various interpretations as an imperial or national, a political or ethno-cultural community in the political vocabulary of the Czech Union and the discussions of the Austrian Imperial Council.

My study will in part discuss the development of the political discourse in a chronological order, as I identify certain temporal shifts in the interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples', the appearance of its parallel concepts or counter-concepts in the various phases of the late First World War. On the other hand, I will also attempt to discuss some of the studied concepts in a transtemporal dimension to showcase

related the transformation of their meanings and in parallel, that of the discourse surrounding them.

I will use the adjectives 'Czech' or 'German', the terms 'Czech' or 'German' 'representatives' in those cases where general trends were identifiable in the discourse in connection to the use of certain concepts. As for individual Czech politicians, I will feature their specific allegiances to political sub-groups within the Czech Union to showcase their ideological affiliations and to make their identification easier for the reader. On the other hand, I will only emphasize the specific political languages of sub-groups within the Union or the speech acts of certain individuals in those cases, where these differed significantly from its general political language.

I am well aware that the Czech Union did not collect all the Czech parties and their political representatives. Thus, I will use the adjective 'Czech' is a term of convenience, while I am bearing the former historical fact in mind. As for the sub-group of German representatives from the lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (and the community they represented), I will use the term 'Bohemian German' in accordance with their concept of *Deutschböhmen*. I think in this case, this is a convenient term that does not harm historical reality.

To contextualize this part of the case study, I will start with the discussion of Austrian political and economic processes in the early phase of the First World War (1914–1917). I find this important, as on the one hand, these defined the viewpoint of the Czech Union in the political discourse of the reopened *Reichsrat*. On the other hand, these processes contributed to the general 'loss of legitimacy' for the idea of 'empire' in the context of Austria.

i. Austria in the Early Phase of the First World War (1914–1917)

By the turn of the century, the approach of the Habsburg military elite was rather hostile to modern political and social developments. This was a result of rejection of popular politics, stemming from the Austrian and Hungarian debates about military budget. It was especially the Hungarian government that often attempted to use this issue as a leverage in its representation of national interests. The military elite also interpreted the state administrations as actors dependent on the influence of political parties. As a result, its members formulated a militaristic vision of their ideal state, alternative to that of civil society by the First World War. [162]

On the other hand, the rule of the Military High Command or the introduction of the so-called "military dictatorship" to Austria was also much due to the contemporary decisions of the Austrian government itself. Prime Minister Stürgkh suspended the Imperial Council and the provincial diets in 1914. Nonetheless, government rule remained constitutional, as the December Constitution did allow the Austrian Emperor or the government to impose legislation without the consent of the *Reichsrat*. The introduction of war censorship and a strict military law soon followed. The civil government also decided to place itself under military command. The military elite used this opportunity to impose its own vision of the imperial state on society. Pieter Judson shows that this amounted to "a system of strict hierarchies and discipline", that would "remove political conflict – indeed all politics – from the governance of the empire forever" according to its narrative. The historian interprets these developments as a "fundamental break in Austro–Hungarian history", since these constituted a "radical departure from the normal functioning" of the constitutional system. [163]

These developments also resulted in harsh measures against the Czech national movement in the context of the Bohemian Kingdom. Military authorities considered this area as especially problematic due to the alleged anti-Austrian sentiments of the Czech population. This led to the introduction of a harsh press censorship in Bohemia and a widespread wave of arrests. The cases of Karel Kramář and Alois Rašín, influential members of the Young Czech Party were rather infamous, since they were convicted of high treason and were sentenced to death. (Although one must emphasize that at least their sentences were not carried out and Emperor Charles pardoned the defendants in 1917). [164]

Although these measures might appear as specifically anti-Czech, Judson attempts to provide an alternative explanation. He points out that the policy of the military government was "not simply a manifestation of an anti-Slav prejudice", but rather that of the enmity against modern politics on the whole. [165] However, one must point out the same kind of military hostility towards German parties is absent even from the account of Judson, which rather emphasizes the anti-Slav feelings in the military elite and the related nature of its policy.

Besides the effects of the harsh military rule, the relationship between the Austrian population and the state due to the material conditions of the First World War. The Austrian government failed to fulfil its end of the contemporary "social contract" in exchange for the sacrifices of its citizenry. According to the popular interpretation, this should have amounted to the "food provisions" as a "fundamental right" and to the viewpoint that the state shall provide the population with food. [166] In the local context of the Bohemian Kingdom, popular discontent with the failure of the government to oblige to these demands resulted in violent demonstrations by early 1917. [167]

It was no accident that Emperor Charles dedicated his activities to reviving the legitimacy of the 'empire' upon his ascendence to the throne in November 1916. This policy amounted to the abolishment of military government and its wartime censorship (although the prewar standards of censorship remained in effect). The restoration of Austrian constitutional rule accompanied these acts, which resulted in the reopening of the *Reichsrat* in May 1917. [168]

This liberal policy of Charles motivated national politicians to announce their demands for political reforms. On May 30, 1917, the representatives of the so-called "Yugoslav Club" and the "Czech Union" presented their visions of imperial reform in the Austrian Imperial Council. This amounted to the call for imperial federalization and the establishment of a Czech and Slovak state in the latter case. [169]

This was no accident, as the restoration of constitutional rule was not only a possibility, but also a pressure on Czech representatives. This necessitated them to express a firm viewpoint in relation to contemporary issues in Austria, and to define their position in relation to the secessionist activities of Masaryk and other politicians in exile. This resulted in the establishment of the Czech Union in Autumn 1916, which incorporated the representatives of all but two Czech parties. The prospect of German nationalist domination in the *Reichsrat* resulted in the previously unlikely co-operation between the Young Czechs, Agrarians, Social Democrats, and their smaller political allies. In contrast, the Realist Party of Masaryk and the State's Right Progressives did not join this alliance. The former supported the secessionist activities of its leader, now a politician-in-exile promoting the secession of Czechoslovaks in the countries of the Entente. Conversely, it was much due to the radically nationalist position of the State's

Right Progressives that made their co-operation impossible with the more moderate Czech political mainstream at the time. [170]

The so-called "May Declaration" of the Czech Union in the Austrian Imperial Council was a result of various influences. Even though the political alliance declared its loyalty to the Habsburg Monarchy in January 1917, the Austrian Prime Minister Heinrich von Clam-Martinic still wanted to reform the administrative structure of the Bohemian Kingdom in a way that was favourable to the representatives of local German nationalism. This was due to the belief of the Premier that this was the only way to put an end to nationalist debates in Bohemia and to ensure the long-term survival of Austria. [171]

Masaryk and his political allies also applied pressure on the representatives of the Czech Union. They argued that another loyalist declaration would be detrimental to the interests of the nation, as it would support the interpretation of the Habsburg dynasty and the Austrian government as actors entitled to represent the "Austrian nation". This could result in the separate peace of the Entente powers with the Habsburg Monarchy and weaken the representative capabilities of Czech politicians against the Austrian establishment. Thus, the political emigration of the Czechoslovak movement asked the Czech Union to obstruct in the *Reichsrat* and to demand 'state rights' for the historical Kingdom of Bohemia. [172]

Finally, local public opinion also influenced the viewpoint of Austrian Czech representatives. Through the Writers' Manifesto of May 17, 1917, a sizeable collective of Czech authors demanded that the rhetoric of the Czech Union would endorse the "restoration of civil rights", "removal of all restrictions on public expression" and "amnesty for all Czech political prisoners". [173] All of these influences resulted in the

declaration of the Czech Union in the Austria Imperial Council on May 30, 1917 – one that would feature the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in a prominent role.

j. The Declaration of the Czech Union on May 30, 1917

Louis H. Rees provides the English translation of the text that František Staněk, the chairman of the Czech Union read aloud in the *Reichsrat* on May 30, 1917. [174] I have already claimed in my introduction that this translation is rather assimilative, interpretative, and thus corrupts the original meanings of the concepts that appeared in the declaration. This statement necessitates me to revisit the original German version of the text. [175] While I will forward arguments of my own, it is obligatory for me to compare my narrative with that of Reeves.

The first problem with the interpretation of Reeves is that he translates a German concept of the document (*Vertreter des böhmisches Volkes*) as the "representatives of the Czech nation". The translation on its own could be legitimate, especially if one can remember the variant of the term in Czech (*český národ*). However, I have already showed above this concept was rather ambiguous and thus, it would be important to contextualize it in relation to the May Declaration.

I rather interpret the related part of the text as its claim that the members of Czech Union were the representatives of 'the Bohemian people', the political community of the Czech lands. In my view, the references to historical rights (*historische Rechte*) as legitimized by previous acts of state (*Staatsakte*) or royal decrees emphasized this implication of the term. The Czech representatives still referred to this historical concept of the 'Bohemian people' as one that incorporated the non-Czech

population of the Bohemian, Moravian, and Silesian crownlands, including the group usually referred to as 'Bohemian Germans'.

In contrast, the adjective Czech (*tschechische)* in the ethno-cultural sense did not appear in the declaration. However, one must emphasize that the Czech Union still implied the majority and dominant status of their ethno-cultural community in the local context, as it referred to its members as the sole representatives of the local population.

Rees reports that the "natural rights of nations, on self-determination" and "free development" were the concepts to support the claims of the Czech Union. One is to notice his continuous use of 'national self-determination' in relation to this issue. It is important to point out the May Declaration actually referred to the 'right to self-determination' (*Recht der Selbstbestimmung*) of 'peoples' (*der Völker*).

On must consider the fact that the German concept of *Selbstbestimmung(srecht) der Völker* was a historical one already in the context of the Austrian political discourse before the First World War. On the other hand, I also must emphasize the influence of the February Revolution of Russia in 1917 on the role of the concept in the Austrian political discussions of the Late First World. Louis H. Rees points out that "Russian revolutionaries made national self-determination as one of their rallying cries". [176] This amounted to references to the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' (*право народов на самоопределение*) in the context of the Russian Empire in 1917. It is important to emphasize that the term was not associated with secessionist claims, but rather the autonomist demands of non-Russian nationalities in the Russian imperial context of the post-February Revolution period. These were parts of a political discourse of democratization, the reform of the centralized and autocratic tsarist state. [177]

Thus, the Czech references to the Russian context revealed a process of cultural transfer in relation to the concept of 'self-determination'. On the other hand, one must emphasize that this was also a case of ideological transfer in the case of the liberal Young Czechs. The Russian term *право народов на самоопределение* had originally been a part of a social democratic political vocabulary in the Russian context at the turn of the century. The viewpoint of Russian labour groups also defined the local discourse in the period after the February Revolution. On the one hand, this resulted in the commitment of the otherwise liberal-dominated Provisional Government to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' in its proclamations of foreign policy. On the other hand, the standpoint of Russian social democracy impacted the discourses of labour groups throughout Europe due to its transnational influence. [178]

The argument of Rees is important that the political processes and influences from the Austrian context also contributed to the incorporation of the term into the May Declaration of the Czech Union and to the formation of its contemporary program. The alliance of Czech parties had to address the radicalizing feelings of the discontent with the state in the ranks of the Czech population and the national movement. [179] Their opposition to the "dictatorship" of the military government and the deterioration of economic conditions paralleled the revolutionary discontent with the autocratic tsarist regime and the decline of life conditions in the Russian context.

In contrast to Rees, however, I do not think there was any American influence on the Czech Union's use of the concept of 'self-determination'. Modern scholarship seems to agree on that Woodrow Wilson did not refer to this term until early 1918. Even the revisionists of the 'Lenin vs. Wilson' dichotomy such as André Liebich approve of this observation. Thus, a Wilsonian influence could rather be identified if the

I agree with the statements of Reeves that such a loyalist narrative "could not have pleased" Masaryk and his political allies, as it was rather 'the renunciation of [their – L. B. B.] position'. On the other hand, I would emphasize even more the ambiguities of the May Declaration. To me, it seems much like that it repeated the historical tropes of the Czech national movement as for the federal reform of the state and the reconstruction of the historical Kingdom of Bohemia.

The major difference I identify between this text and previous ones is that it made no references to the concept of 'autonomy'. In my opinion, the 'right of peoples to self-determination' substituted this term for the same reason it did in 1870. Whereas 'autonomy' was confined to the Austrian political discourse, the latter concept pushed its boundaries in the communication between 'government' and 'opposition', 'centre' and 'periphery'.

On the other hand, I would also like to address the claim of Rees that the May Declaration demanded the "unification of all the branches of the Czechoslovak nation' in 'one democratic state". He states the Czech Union would demand the incorporation of the "Slovak branch" into this entity due to its "historical unity" with the "Czech lands". Rees then goes on to claim that the inclusion of Slovaks "struck at the two fundamental political realities of the empire", the integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom and the structure of Austria–Hungary itself. He describes these statements as ones to constitute the "ambiguity" of the declaration, since it would feature the "principle of national self-determination in the sense of Czechoslovak national unification, but in addition to the older states rights argument".

However, one must emphasize that the document rather demanded the unification of "all the tribes of the Czechoslav people" (*alle Stämme des*

tschechoslawisches Volkes) in one state, a population which was described to inhabit the lands within the historical boundaries (*historische Grenzen*) of the "Bohemian fatherland" (*böhmisches Vaterland*). It is true that the inclusion of Slovaks into a new nation state was a possible implication of this statement. However, the declaration did not emphasize the kinship of Czechs and Slovaks specifically. It was possible to understand its demand as still limited to the crownlands of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia; the declaration did not specifically mention the Slovak-inhabited territories of Northern Hungary.

I also claim that those were rather the simultaneous references to 'Bohemians' and 'Czechoslavs' that resulted in the "ambiguity" of the May Declaration. One must remember that these terms had originally been counter-concepts in the context of the Czech national discourse at the turn of the century. Whereas the more political concept of the 'Bohemian people' relied on references to the historical 'state rights' of the Bohemian Kingdom, the ethno-cultural term 'Czechoslavs' was reinforced through demands to the 'natural rights' of the 'nation'. It is also worth to point out the term 'Czechoslav' did not necessarily have the same implications as 'Czechoslovak', as it historically also emphasized the unity between the Bohemian, Moravian, Silesian branches of the Czech community – that the Czech Union also claimed to represent.

It is also important to accentuate that the connections between the 'self-determination of peoples' and the concept of 'democracy' in the declaration. The Czech representatives demanded the creation of a national, but also democratic state (*demokratischer Staat*) in the Habsburg Monarchy. As to be discussed later, this was a criticism of developments before and during the war that dismantled constitutionalism in Austria. At the same time, one must realize that the role of 'democracy' was also

important in the contemporary Russian discourse. As such, Czech references to this concept were of paramount importance.

I find it important to refer to the declarations of other national organizations in the Imperial Council on May 30, 1917, as I think these also contextualized the statements of the Czech Union due to their parallels and differences. The Ukrainian and the Yugoslav representatives also referred to the "state rights" (*Staatsrecht*) of the Galician crownland and the Croatian Kingdom [180] as the historical and legal foundation of their national claims. The declaration of the Ukrainian Club proclaimed in this sense that the 'Ukrainian' Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria had its own "right to self-determination" based on its "state rights" (*staatsrechtliches Selbstbestimmungsrecht*). [181]

Conversely, the statement of the Yugoslav Club did not refer to this concept. It rather demanded the creation of joint state for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the Habsburg Monarchy in accordance with the "national principle" (*nationales Prinzip*) and Croatian state rights (*kroatisches Staatsrecht*). Nonetheless, the declaration also emphasized that the Southern Slavs wanted to remain "under the sceptre of the Habsburg dynasty" (*unter dem Zepter der Habsburgisch-Lothringischen Dynastie*). [182]

Thus, the declarations of the Czech, Ukrainian and Southern Slavic representatives associated the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' with that of 'state rights'. The latter was the historical foundation for their arguments, which also a provided a specific normative load to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' adopted from the Russian context after the February Revolution. The term 'self-determination' thus supported demands of national unification, democratization and federal reorganization in the Austrian context. It also replaced 'autonomy' as a key

concept and pointed beyond the boundaries of the former imperial discourse due to its transnational connotations.

In contrast, the joint declaration of the German National Alliance and German Christian Socials did not feature the concepts of 'the right of peoples to self-determination' or 'state rights'. This was no accident, as the German representatives positioned themselves against the claims of the Czech Union. They stated that the Czech representatives disregarded the will of Bohemian and Austrian Germans. The German National Alliance and German Christian Socials also distanced themselves from the idea of a federalized Habsburg monarchy. They rather claimed their support for a strong, united "unitary state" (*Gesamtstaat*) of Austria. Thus, they prioritized the historical framework of the Cisleithanian state over ideas of federal reorganization and argued for its reinforcement and centralization. [183]

The opening session of the Imperial Council laid down the foundations of its political discourse in the late First World War. The Austrian Prime Minister Heinrich von Clam-Martinic soon summed up the contemporary debates from the viewpoint of the imperial government. On June 12, 1917, Clam-Martinic interpreted the conflicts of the *Reichsrat* as the opposition between 'extreme' forces: those in favour of "centralization" (*Zentralisation*) and those in favour of "autonomy" (*Autonomismus*). [184] The latter claim was a rather mild reinterpretation of the Czech (and Southern Slav) declarations. These did not feature the concept of 'autonomy' from the historical context of the Austrian discourse, but rather referred to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' adopted from the revolutionary climate of Russia.

In contrast, the Prime Minister claimed that the imperial government would continue to secure the free national and cultural development (*freie nationale und*

kulturelle Entwicklung) of Austrian peoples. [185] This statement was in accordance with the liberal foundations of the December Constitution. On the other hand, Clam-Martinic also did not promise any imperial reforms in the spirit of federalism (or centralization). It was to no surprise that this approach could not appease the representatives of Austrian nationalities.

To sum it up, I position myself against the interpretation of Rees through my analysis of the Czech Union's declaration on May 30, 1917. I point out that the document did not feature the concepts of the 'Czech nation' or the 'Czechoslovak nation'. It rather referred to the political concept of the 'Bohemian people' and the ethno-cultural term 'Czechoslav people', which were more ambiguous concepts. I also claim that the narrative of the historian was flawed with regard to the relationship between the historical concept of 'state rights' and the 'right of peoples to self-determination'.

I emphasize that the latter concept appeared in the political vocabulary of the Czech Union through its cultural and ideological transfers from the Russian context of the February Revolution in 1917. References to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' were parts of the autonomist demands of non-Russian nationalities and the political discourse of democratization in the Russian Empire. The viewpoint of Russian labour groups dominated these discussions, influenced the proclamations of foreign policy by the Provisional Government and the discourse of social democratic groups in Europe.

I rather point out that the Czech declaration featured the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in a specific sense. On the one hand, it substituted historical references to the concept of 'autonomy' with this term, which it adopted from the post-February

context of revolutionary Russia. Its references to 'democracy' also pointed in this direction. On the other hand, the 'right of peoples to self-determination' also supported historical arguments for the institutionalization of Bohemian state rights and the federal reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The national concepts referred to in the May Declaration were also rather ambiguous. On the one hand, the 'Bohemian people' described a political community as the subject of the 'right to self-determination'. On the other hand, the 'tribes of the Czechoslavs' referred to the ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'people'. It implied the unity of Slavic tribes in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and the Slovak-inhabited territories of Northern Hungary, although the declaration did not mention the latter region as a part of a future state.

The next sub-chapter will address the relationship between the concepts applied to the 'people' as a subject: 'democracy' and the 'right to self-determination'. This is to point out the political implications of the latter concept in the Austrian context. I will emphasize that the Czech representatives referred to the concept of 'democracy' to criticize political developments in the Habsburg Monarchy, which they interpreted as detrimental to the Czech community.

k. 'Democracy'

The political criticism of various Czech representatives after 30 May, 1917, often concerned the Austrian system of government that they identified as "absolutism" (*Absolutismus*). They referred to rule of the Austrian government through imperial decrees through this concept, which implied that the establishment disregarded the traditional independence of the crown lands as administrative units and defied the 'self-

determination of peoples' as a democratic concept. [186] At the same time, however, the concept of 'absolutism' also applied to the rule of the military government between 1914–1916. The Czech representatives interpreted this system as anti-national in its nature due to harsh measures of the Austrian chief of staff against their national movement. [187]

One must emphasize that this criticism of "absolutist" rule in part referred to earlier political contexts. On the one hand, the liberal reforms of Emperor Charles abolished the system of military government in 1916. On the other hand, the government rule through imperial decrees was introduced in 1914, but before the start of the First World War. This was much due to the obstruction of national representatives in the Imperial Council, which made it unable to function.

Besides the recent developments of the Austrian political system, Czech representatives also criticized the lack of national representation in the government. The politicians argued that the absence of Czech officials from the administration opposed the principles of modern democracy (*moderne Demokratie*). [188] Consequently, they interpreted this functioning of the Austrian government as one that prevented the democratization of the political system and the vindication of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'.

Interestingly, the political language of Czech social democracy as the sub-group of the Czech Union presented a diversion from these general tendencies due to its ideological content. Czech social democrats specifically argued that the political system of the state should reflect the will of the people (*Menschen*), workers (*Arbeiter*) and citizens (*Bürger*). [189] As such, they derived the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' from the rights of the "individual" (*Individuum*) and the worker rather

than the collective rights of the 'nation'. [190] The background of these statements was in the social democratic concept of the 'people'. In this regard, there was also continuity with the Austrian social democratic discourses at the turn of the century.

Czech references to the concept of 'democracy' also problematized the power relations between national representatives in Austria. In accordance with the historical traditions of the political discourse, the Czech Union specifically pointed at the dominant status of 'Germans' as a related issue. Its representatives argued that after the Russian Revolution of February 1917, the *Zeitgeist* turned in favour of democratic political systems as opposed to the rule of political 'minorities'. [191] Thus, the 'democracy' offered the alternative to the 'absolutism' of the imperial government and 'German rule' in Cisleithania.

The implications of 'democracy' were not limited to the level of state administration, as they were also important in terms of locality. As mentioned above, Czech representatives problematized that during the war (or in the Bohemian case, shortly before it), crown lands ceased to function as structures with their own autonomous administration. The argument also appeared the appointment of wardens and mayors in Austria were not the results of local elections, but rather reflected the preferences of the imperial government. Thus, the Czech representatives identified related threats for democracy and autonomous local self-government (*autonome Selbstverwaltung*). [192]

However, it was not only the government that prevented democratic transformation from happening in this narrative. Czech representatives also interpreted the German national character itself as one with inherent anti-democratic tendencies. The Czech argument appeared in the political discourse of the Imperial Council that

Germans as a nation were spiritual successors to the power-based philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (whereas Czechs would represent the ideas of Leo Tolstoy, a statement in line with the 'Neo-Slavism' of the *fin-de-siècle* period). [193] Alternatively, it was stated that the founding principle of German politics was the motto "power precedes law" (*Macht geht vor Recht*), one with its source in the German national character. [194]

The political language of the German National Alliance countered these critical concepts of 'democracy' and 'self-determination' by emphasizing the democratic and liberal traits of the Cisleithanian political system. German representatives argued that Austria was always a home to the "freedom of culture, thought and (national) development" (*Freiheit der Kultur*, *Meinung*, *Entwicklung*). They also stated that its political system allowed the democratic representation of national interests in the *Reichsrat*. [195] According to their interpretation, the 'self-determination of peoples' was a critical counter-concept to the already democratic Austrian political system. Thus, it was one without true foundations in the local context. The argument also appeared that Czech representatives themselves legitimized the political system of Austria through their historical participation in its discourse, which had already proved the democratic functioning of the state before the First World War. [196] As such, German representatives interpreted the viewpoint of their opponents as that of shallow criticism towards the political system of the Austrian state.

To sum it up, the 'self-determination of peoples' and 'democracy' were parallel concepts in the rhetoric of the Czech Union. The Czech representatives referred to these concepts to criticize the recent anti-democratic developments in the Cisleithanian political system. On the one hand, these terms reinforce their traditional criticism of the

Austrian establishment as anti-democratic due to the lack of connections between the imperial government and state legislation and the dominant political status of Germans in the state.

At the same time, these concepts also reflected on the system government rule through imperial decrees that had already started before the war, and the military government in Austria between 1914–1916. Czech representatives referred to these systems of rule through the counter-concept of 'absolutism' and argued that these disregarded popular will and contradicted the democratic spirit of the age. In contrast, German representatives attempted to delegitimize such arguments by emphasizing the liberal and democratic aspects of the Austrian political system. They specifically pointed at the role of the *Reichsrat* in democratic representation. From this perspective, 'democracy' and 'self-determination of peoples' were superficial counter-concepts used to criticize the policy of the Austrian government.

These debates with regard to the concept of 'democracy' and the 'self-determination of peoples' were important in connection to another point of conflict, the different political visions of the state. The Czech representatives argued that only the imperial federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy and the establishment of nation-states as its federal units could make their community immune to the transgressions of the Austrian government. In contrast, the German representatives claimed that only the unitary state of Cisleithania could ensure the stability of the region and the protection of the local German community. The next chapter will show the dynamics of these debates with regard to the 'federal' and 'unitary' concepts of the state.

l. The Federal Idea of 'Empire' and the Unitary Concept of 'Austria' (1917)

Discussing the political visions of 'Austria' in the First World War necessitates me to reflect on the historical narrative of Andrea Komlosy on the relationship between 'imperial' and 'national' identities. As described above, the historian interprets Austria as a "multi-ethnic nation" in her account through the concept of 'Austrianness' (*Österreichtum*). Her argument is that this was equivalent to the state identity of citizens by the nineteenth century. This was formed by their loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, the Austrian codification of civic law, the impacts of conscription into the imperial army, the process of "economic, cultural and political unification". Komlosy also claims that German political groups prevented the realization of the "right of every ethnic people" in an effort to maintain their cultural and political domination. This would result in the "visions of national self-determination first within – then beyond – the Habsburg Monarchy's boundaries". Nonetheless, she argues that the 'idea of the nation-state' would become dominant only upon the "disintegration of the empire following World War I". She features the "Czech–Slovak alliance" as a "regional variety of pan-Slavism". Komlosy claims that this could not offer a viable alternative to the Austrian imperial framework in terms of economy and would thus not become popular until 1918.

It is thus worth for me to point out that until late 1917, the debates of the Imperial Council often concerned two different political standpoints: one interpreted as in favour of state centralization (*Zentralismus*) and one as supporting the idea of autonomy (*Autonomismus*) in contemporary terms. However, it is also important to emphasize that these denominations were often derogatory. As described above, they referred to either or both sides as the political zealots of 'extremist' ideas. Thus, I would rather refer to

this discourse as the opposition between the concepts of the 'federal state' (*Bundesstaat*) and the 'unitary state' (*Einheitstaat*) in the Austrian context. The representatives of the *Reichsrat* rather used these terms in reference to their ideas.

It is essential to accentuate that although both sides argued for their idea of 'Austria', they did not refer to the same concept of the 'state' or 'empire'. The representatives of the Czech Union described the ideal, federal form of the Habsburg Monarchy through as the 'federal state' of 'Austria'. In contrast, the German National Alliance or its successor parties described 'Austria' as equivalent to the Cisleithania and to their ideal of the 'unitary state'. One must point out that the latter concept did not apply to the Kingdom of Hungary, whereas that of the 'federal state' implied a radical reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy. This was much in accordance with the historical claims of the Czech national movement, exemplified by the various drafts and declarations of its liberal representatives before 1870.

On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that 'Austria' also appeared as the official designation of the Cisleithanian state after 1915. [197] This development somewhat problematized the arguments of Czech representatives that by means of law, an 'Austrian' state did not exist. They claimed that the December Constitution defined the structure of Cisleithania as "The Kingdoms and Land Represented in the Imperial Council" (*Die im Reichsrat vertretene Königreichen und Länder*). [198] However, this statement was rather in support of the federal idea, as this designation accentuated the role of regions or crownlands in the formation and the legal functioning of the Cisleithanian state.

The representatives of the Czech Union claimed that their federal concept of the 'empire' offered solutions to the democratic problems of Cisleithania from both the

imperial and the national perspectives. The cornerstones of this structure were to be nation-states (*nationale Staaten*) with their democratic political systems, but also with their background in historical rights. The Czech representatives emphasized that their national goal was only to (re-)establish the political independence (*politische Selbständigkeit*) of the Bohemian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy. [199]

On the one hand, this claim was in accordance with the mainstream historical discourse of the Czech national movement. On the other hand, it also referred to a democratic *Zeitgeist*, and its implications that the rights of the 'people' and the 'peoples' of Austria could only be vindicated independent of the influence of imperial governments. Thus, the representatives of the Czech Union claimed to have constructed a program for the whole Austrian population (*Programm des ganzen Volkes*). [200]

At the same time, loyalist claims were important features of this conceptual framework. The May Declaration already emphasized the relationship between their concept of the 'federal state' and the 'interests' of the dynasty and the 'empire'. The Czech representatives also claimed that since the representatives of the 'Bohemian people' exercised their right of choice (*Recht der Wahl*) when they elected the Habsburg dynasty as their rulers in 1526, their successors only wanted to reaffirm this choice in 1917. [201] They interpreted the ruling family as the institutional connection between nation-states in the framework of the 'federal state' through the institution of "personal union" (*Personalunion*). Thus, the reform idea of the (Habsburg) 'empire' or 'Austria' remained the strong focus of active loyalty in the conceptual framework of the Czech Union.

It was no accident that the Czech representatives emphasized that their allegiance was not to the "absolutist" and 'German' state of Cisleithania. As the

representative of the Moravian People's Party, Adolf Stránský put it on June 12, 1917: there was only one concept of the 'homeland' (*Vaterland*) for the Czech community, the Kingdom of Bohemia. This statement countered the claims of the Austrian Prime Minister Clam-Martinic, who spoke of Austria as the 'broader fatherland' (*weiteres Vaterland*) of its nationalities. [202] Thus, the representatives of the Czech Union implied that the 'nation' could only be attached emotionally to its narrower homeland, or to an imperial structure reformed in accordance with its 'right to self-determination'. Their subject of active loyalty was this federal idea of 'Austria' rather than the contemporary Cisleithanian state.

Conversely, the representatives of the German National Alliance interpreted the federal concept of the Habsburg monarchy as one that opposed the 'sovereignty' (*Souveränität*) of the Cisleithanian state. This narrative featured the historical evolution, the geographical and ethno-cultural conditions of Austria as the background for the creation of a centralized administrative structure dominated by German culture. As opposed to 'outdated' historical rights, the legal foundation of this structure were the rights of the modern state (*modernes Staatsrecht*). Thus, this conceptual framework featured state centralization as a trend of modernity. In contrast, it depicted claims to self-determination of peoples as vindicated through the retrograde historical rights of ancient state structures. [203]

The representatives of the German National Alliance also feared that the appearance of nation-states in the Habsburg Monarchy would result in the loss of its imperial sovereignty and the dissolution of Cisleithania. They claimed that only the structure of the 'unitary state' could provide the order of the region and the freedom of

its inhabitants. [204] Conversely, its dissolution into "Czechoslovak and Yugoslav realms" threatened with regional chaos and the rule of 'anarchy'. [205]

The debates of the *Reichsrat* with regard to these ideas were not only theoretical in their prospects, as they also had rather practical dimensions. The representatives of the German National Alliance supported the institutionalization of German as the official language of the Council. While this development would have been rather symbolic (national representatives made their statements usually in German), Czech representatives still viewed this initiative as a step towards the increased political rule of German parties over Cisleithania. [206] Another practical issue was the question of imperial budget. The partial restoration of constitutional rule amounted to the representatives of the *Reichsrat* regaining their right to accept or veto the related plans of the government. The Czech Union (and other national organizations) used this opportunity to apply pressure on the government. [207]

It is important to emphasize that while the debates of the 'federal state' and the 'unitary state' defined the Imperial Council in the early phase of 1917, the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk during Winter 1917–1918 created a point of 'discontinuity' in this regard. The Czech representatives noticed that the foreign policy of Austria–Hungary recognized the 'right of peoples to self-determination' during its negotiations with the Bolshevik government of Russia. The Austro–Hungarian establishment approved this right and applied to it the peoples inhabiting the Western borderlands of the neighbouring empire. In contrast, it claimed that the relationship between governments and the local nationalities was the internal affair of the Austrian and Hungarian states. [208]

The Czech politicians problematized that the government thus did not take the opinion of Austrian nationalities (*Völker*) or the individual citizens (*Menschen*) into account. It only applied the 'right of self-determination' to the contemporary state (*staatliches Selbstbestimmungsrecht*) in the Austrian context. [209] From this point on, Czech claims became especially hostile towards the Austrian government, the state of Cisleithania, but occasionally the Habsburg dynasty as well. National representatives re-interpreted the history of Habsburg rule in the Czech lands. They claimed that the dynasty had always ruled the Kingdom of Bohemia through force. The Czech representatives now described the Cisleithanian state as the militaristic and bureaucratic state of coercion (*Zwangstaat*) with no support from its population. [210] The representative of the Moravian People's Party, Adolf Stránský even stated that the Austrian state was one without a name, a crown, a constitution, patriots, or the approval of its peoples (*ohne Name, ohne Krone, ohne Verfassung, ohne Patrioten, keine Zustimmung der Völker*).[211]

This interpretation delegitimized the structure of the 'empire' in its current form, as it stated the state was "imaginary" (*imaginär*), a mere abstraction. It was only the 'right of peoples to self-determination' could legitimize its structure. [212] From this viewpoint, the contemporary Cisleithanian state had little to no legitimacy – thus, the future of the Habsburg Monarchy was sealed. It was no accident that even references to a federal concept of the 'empire' disappeared from the rhetoric of the Czech Union. The concept of the 'sovereign nation(-state)' substituted it as one with a central role in its conceptual framework.

The concept of the 'federal state' reappeared for the last time with the desperate attempt of the imperial government in October 1918 to save the Habsburg Monarchy

from total dissolution. Emperor Charles proclaimed the so-called *Völkermanifest* ('Peoples' Manifest') on October 16, 1918. He declared the possibility of establishing "state communities" (*staatliche Gemeinwesen*) in the framework of Austria. Charles also promised that the reformed empire will vindicate the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. He claimed that "national councils" shall be formed, which were allowed to take over local administration from the imperial state. [213]

This step, however, did not save the empire; it rather fastened its dissolution. Four days later, on October 20, 1918, the Czech National Council could take over the administration of the Bohemian lands – as allowed by the *Völkermanifest*. That night, it also proclaimed the foundation of the independent Republic of Czechoslovakia. [214] At this point, this was in line the mainstream Czech interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples', which was equivalent to the sovereignty of the nation-state as an independent political, legal and economic structure.

It is possible to both contextualize and critically approach the narrative of Komlosy upon this analysis of the discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council in the late First World War. One can point out that the concept of 'Austrianness' could refer to different visions of the imperial state in this context. On the other hand, these were not independent of ethno-cultural affiliations; Czech representatives would refer to the federal concept of the Habsburg Monarchy, whereas their German opponents rather support the interpretation of Cisleithania as a 'unitary state'. However, 'democracy' and 'national liberation' were not necessarily the counter-concepts of the idea of 'empire' and its multi-ethnic community. The representatives of the Czech Union rather argued for the democratization of the political system of the Habsburg Monarchy in the name of their nation and the imperial community.

It is also essential to point out the 'discontinuity' created by the effects of the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations on this discourse. The ultimate refusal of the Austro–Hungarian establishment to apply the 'right of peoples to self-determination' to the internal structure of the Habsburg Monarchy resulted in its loss of legitimacy in the Czech Union by late 1917. Thus, the emphasis of the discourse shifted to the 'sovereignty' of the nation-state. Since this is a highly related subject, I will discuss it in the next sub-chapter of the dissertation.

m. 'Nation' and Nation-State, 'Independence', and 'Sovereignty' (1917–1918)

Rees reports that the "Bolshevik's inclusion in their peace initiative of the call for national self-determination" reinforced the political viewpoint of "radical nationalists" in the Czech Union. This would define the so-called Epiphany Declaration of January 6, 1918. This document referred to the "right of a free national life and of the self-determination of nations", which supported the Czech call for "state independence". It, however, "made no mention of a future role for the Habsburgs or the Empire". [215]

The Austrian government and the German representatives of the Imperial Council both denounced the Epiphany Declaration. Rees reports that those were especially the German nationalist deputies from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia who criticized the Czech Union in this regard. The quote of the historian from "deputy D'Elvert of Moravia" is the most interesting, who would 'rail against the "'Russian interpretation' of the right of self-determination" in the conceptual framework of the Czech Union. D'Elvert claimed that this amounted to the attempt at "tearing away of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia as well as 'Hungarian Slovakia'" from the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation of an "independent sovereign state". [216]

One must, however, accentuate the simultaneous presence of the terms 'Russian interpretation of the right of self-determination' and 'sovereign' in this textual context, the importance of which Rees does not realize in his book. It is worth to point out that the two terms had jointly appeared in the Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia, issued by the Bolshevik government on November 15, 1917. This proclaimed the rights of the nationalities in the Russian Empire to 'equality', but also to 'sovereignty'. It was this legal emancipation that resulted the 'right of peoples of Russia to free self-determination' in the Bolshevik narrative, which amounted to their possible "separation and the formation of an independent state". [217]

References to the concept of 'sovereignty' (*Souveränität*) soon followed in the claims of the Austrian Czech representatives, which resulted in a major point of 'discontinuity' in the political discourse due to their reinterpretation of the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire'. Czech references to the concept of the 'federal state' disappeared. In contrast, a new interpretation of the 'nation-state' appeared as the ideal structure in terms of national sovereignty. For instance, Gustav Habrman, the representative of the Czech Social Democratic Party described the future „Bohemian-Slovak state" (*böhmisch-slowakischer Staat*) as one with its own legislation (*Gesetzgebung*), executive power (*Executive*), fiscal and economic (*fiskalische und wirtschaftliche*) policy. [218]

The foreign policy of Bolshevik Russia appeared as an important point of reference in this regard. Habrman claimed that as opposed to the imperial government of Austria–Hungary, the program of the Bolsheviks truly supported the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. [219] One must emphasize that here that the representative's own political group, Czech social democracy was close to the Russian government in terms

of ideological affiliation. Habrman's reference to the Bolshevik concept of 'sovereignty' also did imply the secession of the 'nation' from the 'empire' in the Austrian Czech context.

At the same time, the concept of ‚sovereignty' also referred to the economic hardships of the Austrian population. As of Autumn 1917, Czech politicians already accused the Austrian government that it persecuted their national community in economic terms (*wirtschaftliche Persekution*) and that it pursued a "policy of starvation" (*Aushungerungspolitik*). [220]

In my view, these statements and the related interpretations of 'sovereignty' and the 'right of peoples to self-determination' reinforce the narratives of Judson and Rees and emphasize the importance of material conditions in the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire'. One must also emphasize that by this point, the Cisleithanian state administration had already delegated the tasks regarding food supply to the civic organizations of nationalities. [221] With these associations taking over the role of the state, the legitimacy of the 'empire' suffered a significant blow. It was at this historical point of time that the 'sovereign nation-state' appeared as its plausible alternative.

One must emphasize that the concept of 'Czechoslovaks' gained importance in this context. The earlier claims of the Czech representatives rather featured the term 'Bohemian people' (*böhmisches Volk*) and reinforced the historical implications of this term in reference to the political community of the Bohemian Lands. The historical concept of 'state rights' supported the rights of this 'people', including the natural one to its 'self-determination'. These terms also supplied a clear definition of boundaries for the nation-state, since they referred to the historical idea of state (re-)unification, the incorporation of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia into a single administrative and legal

unit. Czech representatives emphasized until late 1917 that their related goal was only to restore the political independence (*politische Selbständigkeit*) of the Bohemian Kingdom, which would become the federal unit of the Habsburg Monarchy. [222]

Nonetheless, one must point out that these concepts were loaded in the Austrian political context. On the one hand, the nationalist representatives of Bohemian Germans argued that no single 'people' of Bohemia existed. They rather described local Germans and Czechs as different communities with no common identity. [223] It was no accident that these Bohemian German representatives rather used the term 'Czechs' (*Tschechen*) than 'Bohemians' (*Böhmischen*) to describe the national affiliation of their political opponents. This designation emphasized the German nationalist viewpoint that Czech politicians only represented their ethno-cultural community. Thus, their vision of the 'Bohemian people's' interests disregarded the identity and the political will of the local German population.

On the other hand, the concepts of the 'Bohemian people' and the 'Czechoslav' people', the discourse of state rights and the vision of Czech–Slovak unity in the ethno-cultural and political senses were also hard to reconcile. The latter idea had appeared as the counter-concept of the former in the realist political discourse at the turn of the century. The national community described through the 'Czechoslav' concept was radically different than that of the 'Bohemian people'. It implied different boundaries for a future nation-state, as it secluded the local German community from the Czechs due to its ethno-cultural focus. Thus, it also delegitimized the Czech claims to the historical territories of the Bohemian Kingdom.

As a result of this ambiguity, initial Czech references to the Slovak 'branch' of the nation were rather scarce and limited until Winter 1917–1918. The representative

of the Moravian People's Party, Adolf Stránský briefly mentioned the Slovaks as a part of the 'nation' on June 12, 1917. However, he had to clarify that this population was not located in the Czech lands; it was to be found along the borderlands of these historical territories. Instead of references to historical rights, the Moravian politician could only problematize the suppression (*Unterdrückung*) of Slovaks by the Hungarian state. In opposition to this "oppressive" national rule, Stránský referred to the Slavic population's right to "free decision and self-determination" (*freie Entscheidung und Selbstbestimmung*). This non-historical argument supported the national unification of Czechs and Slovaks. [224]

On the other hand, the statements of the Agrarian representative Isidor Zahradník also made it clear why the Czechoslovak national concept was in part useful for the Czech representatives. On September 26, 1917, the politician claimed that the "Czechoslavs" were no "small people" (*kleines Volk*), as this nation united around 10 million people. [225] As such, the concept of Czechoslavism invested the demands of Czech representatives with special authority. In accordance with the ideas of Masaryk before the war, influenced by the discourse of Neo-Slavism, Czech politicians could speak in the name of a sizeable, important community.

It was due to the failure of the attempts at initiating political reforms that the federal concept of the 'empire' disappeared from the Czech political language. The concept of the 'Czechoslav' or by this point, the 'Czechoslovak nation' suddenly appeared to be more useful in this context. The main contemporary source of this idea, the Czechoslovak political emigration campaigned for the establishment of the independent nation-state since the beginning of the war. The Czech Union could also distance itself from the goverment, the Cisleithanian state and the whole 'empire'

through references to the "Bohemian-Slovak" (*böhmisch-slowakisch*) or Czechoslovak nation-state.

Importantly, the dissolution of the Russian Empire and the growing dysfunctionality of its Habsburg counterpart also pointed at regional processes of imperial disintegration. There was only a need for the 'empire' as long it could defend national communities from international threats – the expansion of other empires. As soon as the imperial state could not fulfil this function, its legitimacy depended on popular levels of satisfaction with its political system. In the absence of reforms that could provide legitimacy for the 'empire' as opposed to the processes of disintegration, the perspective of the nation-state was more and more probable and attractive.

It was no accident that along with 'sovereignty', the national concept of Czechoslovakism also gained prominence. The representatives of the Czech Union now more often described their ideal national state as "Bohemian-Slovak (Czechoslovak)" in its nature. The argument appeared that instead of historical rights, language was the main basis of national identity. National representatives were also confident in their interpretation of Slovaks as the "element of the *Volksstamm* to be integrated in terms of national and cultural policy" (*national-kulturpolitisch integrierenden Bestandteil des Volksstammes*). [226]

However, the counter-discourse of Bohemian German representatives also attempted delegitimize this national concept besides that of the state rights discourse. These politicians stated that Slovaks did not belong to the same nationality as the Czechs, as they had their own literary language (*Schriftssprache*). [227] As such, they emphasized the elementary differences between ethno-cultural identities – similarly to their interpretation of the Czech–German opposition. Bohemian German

representatives also claimed that the establishment of a nominally Czechoslovak state would result in the rule of 7,5 million Czechs over a population of minorities roughly of the same size. They argued that this structure of a supposedly 'national' state would result in a civil war (*Bürgerkrieg*) between national groups. [228] Once again, the interpretation of (Bohemian) German representatives distinguished between the "order" of the (unitary) imperial state and the "chaos" of the nation-state.

To sum it up, I contextualize the claims of Rees as for the Bolshevik influence on the Epiphany Declaration of January 6, 1918, and the Czech reinterpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a concept. I point out that on the one hand, it was the relationship between the terms 'sovereignty', the 'nation-state' and the idea of its 'separation' that resulted in a new normative load for the ‚self-determination of peoples' in the conceptual framework of the Czech Union at the turn of 1917–1918. On the other hand, the deterioration of material conditions in the Austrian state also contributed to this process, as the references to the concepts of 'sovereignty' the ‚self-determination of peoples' contained a strong economic component. It was in this context that the idea of the 'Czechoslav' or the 'Czechoslovak nation' started to gain prominence. Whereas it was previously a partisan concept to the concept of 'state rights' and the 'Bohemian people', it could now reinforce the distancing of Czech representatives from the idea of 'empire' through its references to the secessionist activities of the Czechoslovak movement abroad.

I point out that the Bohemian German representatives constructed a counter-discourse to that of the Czech Union. They debated the perception that there was a single ‚people of Bohemia', since they argued that there were only separate ‚German' and ‚Czech' ethno-cultural communities in the Bohemian crownlands, each entitled to its

own ‚right to self-determination'. They also attempted to deconstruct the concept of the ‚Czechoslav nation', arguing that Czechs and Slovaks were different in terms of national identities. At the same time, they argued that the rule of Czechs (or Czechs and Slovaks) over a nation-state would generate incontrollable internal conflicts due to the possible presence of numerous minority groups in its framework.

On the other hand, one must also emphasize that the concept of 'national autonomy' was also the important subject of the debates between the Czech and German representatives. Although the 'right of peoples to self-determination' substituted this term in the conceptual framework of the Czech political mainstream by early 1917, it is important to point out that some of its political groups did not initially share this viewpoint. At the same time, the Czech Union was still in need of solutions for its antagonism with the political representation of Bohemian Germans. Initially, it attempted to rely on the discursive traditions of 'national autonomy' in this regard, albeit with important alterations to the interpretation of the concept. The next sub-chapter will showcase these dynamics regarding the concept and its implications for the concept of 'the right of peoples to self-determination'.

n. 'National Autonomy'

After the May Declaration, references to the concept of national autonomy were mostly lacking from the conceptual framework of the Czech Union. Although the demands of Czech politicians were consistent with the historical discourse of 'autonomy' in Austria, their contemporary key concept was rather the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. This was due to the transnational implications of the notion. Its connection to the context

of the February Revolution in Russia created a stronger background for demands as opposed to the more negotiating tone of 'national autonomy' as a concept.

The exceptions from this general trend were the Czech social democrats. These politicians still demanded the creation of the "federal nationalities state" (*Nationalitätenbundesstaat*) through the concept of 'national autonomy' (*nationale Autonomie*) in the first half of 1917. [229] This claim corresponded to the political demands of the Czech Social Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party of Austria at the turn century. On the other hand, Czech social democrats did not position themselves against the state rights discourse or demanded autonomy only for the Czech-inhabited regions of Austria at this time. This was most probably a concession to the viewpoint of their political allies in the Czech Union.

Mořic Hruban, the representative of the Moravian Catholic People's Party also referred to the concept of 'autonomy' in relation to the imperial framework of the Habsburg Monarchy on May 15, 1917. The Moravian Czech politician interpreted the notion of the federal state as the alternative system of "centralized autonomism" (*zentralisierte Autonomismus*), a counter-concept to the 'autonomous centralisation' (*autonomische Zentralismus*) of the 'unitary state'. Hruban also spoke proudly of the fact that he and his circle of political allies were "autonomists" (*Autonomisten*). [230] It is important to stress that Czech Catholic political groups remained the most loyal to the empire and the dynasty during the war. [231] Thus, their conceptual framework was less combatant than those of their political allies. Nonetheless, those were only Hruban and the Czech social democrats who referred to the concept of (national) autonomy in their demands of imperial reconstruction.

Due to the impact of Bolshevik foreign and national policy and the application of the concepts of 'sovereignty' and 'the right of peoples to self-determination' to the ethno-cultural groups of the Russian Empire, the Czech social democrats also started to prefer these concepts over that of 'autonomy' during Winter 1917–1918. On July 18, 1918, the representative František Soukup made the reasons clear behind this choice. He stated that as opposed to the 'nation-state' (*Nationalstaat*), 'national autonomy' was a plausible alternative for the Czech community only before the First World War. By the last year of the war, he and his fellow Czech representatives rather emphasized "complete sovereignty of popular will" (*volle Souveränität des Volkswillens*). Soukup interpreted the latter concept as not only a demand for free cultural development, but also for the independent political and economic power (*politische und wirtschaftliche Kraft*) of the Czech nation. [232] Once again, the concepts of 'sovereignty' and the 'right of peoples to self-determination' incorporated a strong economic component.

In opposition to Czech demands to the 'right of self-determination', the German representatives of Bohemian origin rather referred to the concept of 'autonomy'. Their understanding of this term was territorial. They linked it to their concept of *Deutschböhmen* in the sense it appeared at the turn of the century: the separation of the regions of the Bohemian provinces inhabited mainly by Germans from the Czech-dominated lands. The Bohemian German representatives of the late First World War still interpreted the position of their community as being dominated by the Czech 'majority' (*Majorität*). [233] The division of local districts (*Kreiseinteilung*) along national lines and the establishment of a "German-Bohemia" with a separate position (*Sonderstellung*) in the Habsburg Monarchy was a means to liberate the (German) minority under this 'oppression'.[234]

On the other hand, the concept of 'autonomy' also appeared in the claims of Czech representatives during 1917 in relation to status of local Germans in the future Kingdom of Bohemia. These guaranteed that the national state would safeguard the "freedom" (*Freiheit*) and the autonomy of the local Germans. [235] Alternatively, this promise applied to all the non-Czech nationalities of the historical Bohemian Kingdom (*andere bewohnende Volksstämme des böhmischen Königreichs*). [236] This is important to emphasize. Although the focus of the local discourse was on the Czech–German conflict, other nationalities also lived on historical territory of the Bohemian Kingdom (for instance, Poles) or were effected by the contemporary Czech claims to the Slovak-inhabited territories (Hungarians).

Two interpretations are available as for the fact that 'autonomy' was not a detailed political program, but rather a mere slogan in these cases. The first is that the members of the Czech Union could not rely on previous historical traditions or simply did not want to make any promises in this regard. This is rather unlikely, as the historical discourse of the Czech national movement provided various historical examples in connection to the issue of handling ethno-cultural diversity.

The second, more probable explanation is that the Czech representatives referred to a consensual, or at least widespread understanding of 'autonomy' in the Austrian context. This was especially likely due to the fact that Czech politicians promised to *maintain* rather than to create structures of national autonomy. The lack of references to a territorial perspective in this regard implied that this concept of 'autonomy' applied the cultural rights of nationalities. Thus, it is safe to say that through 'autonomy', the Czech representatives referred to the 'equality of nationality of rights' as a political and legal principle in Austria, referred to by the December Constitution of 1867. The major

change in this regard was that they did not refer to the imperial 'nationalities state', but rather to the federal unit of 'nation-state' as a structure that would vindicate these rights.

The Bohemian German representatives vehemently protested the updated conceptual framework of the Czech Union. They argued that Czech demands for 'self-determination' exceeded the boundaries of the historical Austrian discourse on 'national autonomy'. In their interpretation, the latter still prioritized the interests of common state over national "self-government" (*Selbstverwaltung*) and those of the 'unitary state' over its constituent lands. [237] Until the very end of the war, the Bohemian German politicians insisted that their goal was to receive autonomy "in the framework of the Austrian state" (*in Rahmen des österreichischen Staates*), not in the Bohemian or Czechoslovak state. [238] Their references to 'national autonomy' were also parts of a loyalist stance against the perceived designs of Czech separatism.

The 'right of peoples to self-determination' appeared in this conceptual framework by late 1917 as a term to support demands of German autonomy as opposed to the "false" Czech claims to Bohemian state rights through the same concept. The argument appeared that the Czech insistence to keep the historical integrity of the Bohemian Kingdom as a 'nation-state' contradicted the 'self-determination' of local Germans. [239] The Bohemian German representatives emphasized that not only 'peoples', but local sub-groups of peoples (*Völkerteile*) were also recipients of the 'right to self-determination'. [240]

Importantly, the imperial government introduced plans of state reform in 1918 to counter the growing dissatisfaction of national movements and the increasing dysfunctionality of the Austrian state. The main architect of these drafts was Ludwig Polzer-Hoditz, the government's chief of staff between late 1917–early 1918. His plans

applied the "principles of national autonomy" (*Prinzipien nationaler Autonomie*) to the administrative framework of the Austrian crown lands. The local units of districts were to be reorganized in accordance with the territories inhabited by ethno-cultural communities. The plans of the government would have also allowed the cultural self-government of nationalities as corporative bodies. This was the non-territorial concept of autonomy by Otto Bauer and Austrian social democracy put into reality – with one important difference: the suggestions of Polzer-Hoditz envisioned the existence of a strong central government. [241]

The Austrian government introduced these plans of reform in the *Reichsrat* during Summer 1918. The answer of the Czech Union was predictable: its representatives claimed that 'national autonomy' within the historical crownlands was a satisfactory option only before the First World War. By 1918, this was no adequate substitute of 'right of peoples to self-determination' and the establishment of the sovereign nation-state. [242]. The Czech representatives were also hostile to the idea of dividing local districts along national lines in the Bohemian lands; they saw this as the concession of the Austrian government to the demands of local German representatives and a step towards the separation of *Deutschböhmen*. [243] In contrast, the Bohemian German politicians were of course rather enthusiastic of this idea and interpreted it as in line with the local population's right to self-determination. Nonetheless, the *Reichsrat* did not approve of these plans; as such, they did not come into fruition.

By October 1918, however, Bohemian German representatives also realized that Austria–Hungary lost the war; the imperial state could not protect them from the Czech majority of the provinces inhabited by them. At this point, they agreed for once with their fellow Slavic representatives: that it was 'too late' to establish their national

autonomy in the Austrian state. Thus, they rather demanded that their territories would become parts of the German-Austrian national state (*Deutschösterreich*). [244] With this, the concept of the unitary Austrian state lost its most dedicated supporters. Without any international, political and conceptual backgrounds to support its existence, Cisleithania was irredeemable; the road was open for national secessionism in the name of 'self-determination'.

To sum it up, 'national autonomy' appeared in the conceptual framework of the Czech Union in a rather specific sense until 1918. This amounted to the promises of the Czech representatives that the German community could maintain its cultural rights in the reconstructed Kingdom of Bohemia in accordance with the December Constitution of 1867. The federal unit of the 'nation-state' substituted 'Austria' or the 'empire' as the framework to which this concept of 'autonomy' applied.

In contrast, the representatives of the Bohemian German community rather referred to the concept of 'national autonomy' as a part of their loyalist claims to the Austrian state. They interpreted this term in a territorial sense, as they demanded the creation of their separate province in Cisleithania. Although originally opposed to the term due its connection with the discourse of state rights in the Czech Union, they embedded the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' into their conceptual framework to support their claims in late 1917.

The Austrian government also attempted to apply the concept of 'national autonomy' in a non-territorial sense to the Cisleithanian crownlands in its drafts of reform in 1917–1918. Whereas Bohemian German representatives welcomed this initiative, Czech representatives were rather hostile to them. On the one hand, they claimed that this concept of 'national autonomy' could not substitute their claims to the

'self-determination of peoples' and to their 'nation-state'. On the other hand, they perceived the content of these drafts as concessions to the Bohemian German representatives and a step closer to the separation of 'German Bohemia'.

One must emphasize that as the interpretation of national self-determination shifted towards national sovereignty at the turn of 1917/1918, the foundation of new states with clear national majorities appeared as a more and more realistic perspective. This resulted in a renewed focus of the Austrian political discourse and the political language of the Czech Union on the concept of 'national minorities' in this period, that replaced references to 'national autonomy' within the framework of the nation-state. The next chapter will showcase the development of this concept along with its implications for national self-determination.

o. 'National Minorities'

The conceptual framework of the Czech Union in the late First World War appears as an important example in our article with Anna Adorjáni, "National Minority: The Emergence of the Concept in the Habsburg and International Legal Thought" (2018). We show that this initially incorporated the terms of 'majority' and 'minority' in a rather political sense. References to the latter concept remained relational and problematized the 'disproportionate and despotic power of a numerically inferior group over others'. [245]

The Czech representatives indeed argued that the democratic *Zeitgeist* after the February Revolution in Russia made the "hegemony of minorities" (*Hegemonie der Minoritäten*) anachronistic. [246] As for the Austrian context, they used this argument to criticize the dominant position of Germans in the Austrian government and the political

system of Austria. These claims reflected on matters of the state level and problematized the rule of a political minority. The Czech representatives perceived that the members of the establishment belonged to the one national community, that of Germans. In contrast, they claimed that the political opposition represented the Slavic majority of the imperial population. [247]

However, we argue with Adorjáni that 'national minority' appeared in a new sense as a part of this conceptual framework in 1918: as a synecdoche, a compressed term that also defined the parallel terms like 'minority rights', 'minority protection', or 'minority question'. We show that the representatives of the Czech Union referred to the German national community of the Czech lands as a 'national minority' in a qualitative sense, one to be invested with special rights in the framework of their future nation-state. [248]

As for myself, I find it important to emphasize that this shift was in parallel to the reinterpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in accordance with the Bolshevik narrative of this concept and its relationship to 'sovereignty' in the rhetoric of the Czech Union at the turn of 1917–1918. It was no accident that 'national minorities' was a parallel concept of the 'nation-state' in this conceptual framework. The political discourse confined to the 'empire' rather concerned the *Gleichberechtigung*, the 'equality of nationality rights' and 'national autonomy' in the Austrian context. The term 'national minorities' appeared in the related social democratic debates at the turn of the century due to the implications of 'territorial autonomy' as a parallel concept. In contrast, the framework of the 'nation-state' defined one ethno-cultural community as a the 'majority', a dominant one in the local context. In the case of the Czech Union, this was the concept of the 'Czechoslav' or

'Czechoslovak nation'. Thus, there was a new urgency to settle the German–Czech conflict of the Bohemian lands and to propose precise solutions to the problematic status of Germans as a future 'national minority' in Czechoslovakia.

Importantly, references to the contemporary international context supported these endeavours of the Czech representatives. These defined the contribution of Antonín Klofáč, the representative of the Czech National Socialist Party to the discussion of the *Reichsrat* on January 22, 1918. Firstly, he rebutted demands of German separation from the Bohemian lands. He argued that the intermixed nature of the local population made it impossible to justly split the territories of the Czech majority (*böhmische Majorität*) and those of minorities (*Minoritäten*). [249]

As for a solution, however, Klofáč pointed at a fresh international example: the laws enacted by the Ukrainian People's Republic at the beginning of 1918. The 'Law on National-Personal Autonomy' applied the non-territorial concept of 'autonomy' developed in the discourse of Austrian social democracy to the administrative structure of the Ukrainian nation-state. As a result, the local groups of Russians, Poles and Jews were allowed to form official national associations. These organizations could represent national interests in the Ukrainian state and manage the internal lives of communities. [250] Klofáč interpreted this legal ordeal as the "Slavic comprehension" (*slawische Verstehen*) of the minority question. [251]

At the same time, the national socialist representative also referred to the Czech propositions made at the Bohemian Diet of 1870. Klofáč claimed that the system of national curiae provided a guarantee against the oppression of the (German) minority (*Garantie gegen jede Vergewaltigung der Minorität*). [252] Thus, his vision of the future Bohemian-Slovak state (*böhmisch-slowakischer Staat*) incorporated the Austrian social

democratic concept of non-territorial autonomy and applied it to the local Germans. At the same time, he interpreted this vision as in accordance with the historical traditions of the Czech political discourse. However, it was important that Klofáč referred to the concept of 'national minority' in the context of the Czech propositions in 1870 in an ahistorical way. These did not incorporate this term, as they rather referred to the 'equality of rights' in the local and the imperial contexts.

These promises of Klofáč were reaffirmed on the next day, January 23, 1918, by his associate from the Czech National Socialist Party, Karel Baxa. He also claimed that the 'national minorities' (*nationale Minoritäten*) of 'Bohemia' (*Böhmen*) will receive their 'equality of rights' (*Gleichberechtigung*) in the Czechoslovak nation-state. Furthermore, they were to gain full and equal national rights (*volle, gleiche Nationalrechte*) and proportional representation in the political system. [253]

Despite the concept's historical connections to the Austrian discourse on the 'equality of rights' and 'autonomy', I claim that the use of the term 'national minorities' still signified an important change in political thinking in the context of the late First World War. The concept of Cisleithania as an imperial state and a political community was originally one without a vision of a united 'nation' or a dominant 'national majority'. Thus, the December Constitution could provide true equality for Austrian nationalities in terms of law. The regional concept of the 'Bohemian people' also identified the national branches of the same community as equal in legal terms. The Czech Union's concept of the Bohemian Kingdom as a federal unit of the reformed Habsburg monarchy reflected these traditions even as of early 1917. Although it was clear that Czechs were to be the dominant community of this land, national representatives still referred to other nationalities as ones of equal status.

In contrast, André Liebich argues convincingly in his "Minority as Inferiority: Minority Rights in Historical Perspective" (2008) that the legal framework of the sovereign nation-state explicitly defined one community as dominant and entitled to rule the land. Conversely, the term 'national minority' was always to signify the inferior position of a community in the state in terms of numbers and representative capability. Furthermore, 'minority rights' were to be (inadequate) compensations for a community's loss of sovereignty, self-determination, and national unity. [254]

To sum it up, I have used our joint study with Anna Adorjáni to claim that the term 'national minorities' appeared in a new sense in the conceptual framework that the Czech Union in early 1918. On the one hand, its introduction to this discourse was due to the shift in the interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples' towards the 'sovereignty' of the 'nation-state', which conceptualized internal affairs as a dynamic between the 'majority' and 'minorities'. On the other hand, the legislation of Ukrainian provided an important transnational example to the organization of these affairs in the nation-state. It is important to emphasize that the Ukrainian law on national-personal autonomy was in fact the application of Bauer's and Renner's concept of 'personal' or 'non-territorial autonomy', originally elaborated as a part of the Austrian social democratic discourse at the turn of the century. Thus, Czech representatives indirectly referred to the traditions of the Austrian discourse as definitive for their organization of the nation-state.

Nonetheless, one must accentuate that the relationship between the legislation of the Ukrainian nation-state and the vision of the future Czechoslovakia was only one among the multiple transnational references of the Czech representatives. The next chapter will show how the conceptual framework of the Czech Union used the latter to

support its various political demands in the Austrian context. These were especially important to the 'self-determination of peoples' as a concept already adopted from the Russian context of the post-February Revolution period.

p.   Transnational References

Accusations of disloyalty and foreign allegiances were mutual between the Czech Union and the German National Alliance during 1917. These arguments were meant to delegitimize the arguments of political adversaries regarding the concepts of the 'unitary' or the 'federal state'. As for the Czech side of the debate, its representatives claimed that their German opponents followed the ideology of pan-Germanism; thus, their allegiance was to the German Empire rather than the Habsburg dynasty. [255] The Czech representatives claimed that the endeavours of the German nationalist politicians to create a unitary Austrian state was in service of the interests of Germany rather than those of the imperial community. This his narrative described the ultimate goal of German nationalist opponents as secession from the Habsburg Monarchy and the creation of a Greater Germany (*Großdeutschland*). [256]

However, certain Czech proponents of the 'federal state' did not speak of Germany in this negative light. On October 23, 1917, Bohuslav Franta, the representative of the Young Czech Party referred to federalization as the "answer of history" (*Antwort der Geschichte*) to contemporary problems. He claimed that the Habsburg Monarchy could follow the example of imperial Germany in this regard, as the allied state was actually federal in its structure. [257] This was not a new phenomenon in the historical discourse of Czech national movement. One can remember that back in 1870, the memorandum of liberal Czech politicians also implied that the federal

structure of the German Empire could be a model of reorganization for the Habsburg Monarchy.

In contrast, the representatives of the German National Alliance rather accused their Czech opponents with treachery in service of the hostile Entente. This allegation was also in connection to their interpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. German politicians argued that this was no serious concept and certainly no 'right', but rather the "demagogic phrase" (*demagogische Phrase*) of enemy propaganda. As such, it was meant to destabilize the states of the Central Powers. [258] Consequently, they argued that the vindication of 'Bohemian state rights' in accordance with this notion could only lead to the transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy into a "crumbling conglomeration" (*zerbröckelnde Konglomeration*) and the dethroning of its dynasty.[259]

These German representatives also attempted to redirect the discourse on the 'right of peoples to self-determination' by pointing at problematic issues in the imperial or national policies of the Entente Powers. The argument appeared that as opposed to the democratic political system of Austria, Great Britain, France and Russia oppressed their non-dominant nationalities. Those were not the Czechs or other Austrian nationalities, but the "people of Ireland" (*irländisches Volk*), the "Indians" (*Inder*), South Africa and Egypt who were deprived of their 'right to self-determination'. [260] These references to the problems of colonialism supported the depiction of the Entente Powers as democratic only on the surface (except tsarist Russia, which was not democratic even on the surface). Thus, the 'oppressive Entente colonial state' and the 'autocratic tsarist state' appeared as the counter-concepts of the 'democratic Austrian state' in the conceptual framework of the German National Alliance. It was only the

political system of Cisleithania that could vindicate the 'right of peoples to self-determination adequately' in this narrative. (Naturally, this criticism did not extend to Germany, also a colonial empire, but allied to the Habsburg Monarchy.)

German politicians further attempted to prove the "false" nature of the connection between the concepts of 'democracy' and the 'right of peoples to self-determination' through transnational references to the contemporary leading figures of hostile powers: Woodrow Wilson (the President of the United States), Herbert Henry Asquith and George Lloyd (Prime Ministers of Great Britain), Alexander Kerensky (the leading figure of the Russian Provisional Government). The German representatives argued that these politicians were the sources of the Slavic representatives of the *Reichsrat* when they demanded the federal reorganization of the empire in accordance with the former concept. Consequently, these claims were in service of enemy interests – and as such, they did not only threaten the unity of the empire, but the national existence of Germans as well. [261]

Importantly, Czech representatives did use transnational references to support their arguments – but they did not refer to the politicians of the Allied and Associated Powers. During. Besides the political implications of such an act, one must remember that most of these historical figures were yet to claim their support for the 'right of peoples to self-determination'.

The members of the Czech Union rather referred to the example of the February Revolution in Russia in connection to the concept. The "Russian revolutionary democracy" (*russische revolutionäre Demokratie*) and its creation, the federative republic of Russia (*föderative Republik des Russlands*) appeared in their narrative as structures that vindicated the 'right of peoples to self-determination'.[262] The Russian

Empire after the February Revolution was the main transnational model in the Czech conceptual framework until late 1917. According to the Czech representatives, the neighbouring, democratizing, federalizing, revolutionary empire provided the main example for the reform of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Russia remained this important transnational point of reference after the Bolsheviks' rise into power. It was especially the connection between the 'right of peoples to self-determination', 'nation-state', and 'sovereignty' in Bolshevik foreign and national policy that was a subject of interest and attention from the Czech representatives, disillusioned with the policy of the Austrian government. The way Bolsheviks perceived these 'rights' as the general foundations of the new world order as opposed to the ambiguous approach of Austria–Hungary was captivating to them. On December 5, 1917, Gustav Habrman, the representative of the Czech Social Democratic Party went as far to say that it was the Bolshevik Russian government that was in support of a just peace – as opposed to its Austrian counterpart.[263]

It was also at this point of history that the status of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy received a re-interpretation from the Czech viewpoint. Historically, the Kingdom of Hungary was the example at the successful vindication of historical state rights in the Czech political discourse. However, on December 4, 1917, Adolf Stránský compared Bohemia's and Hungary's right to 'sovereignty' as states. The representative of the Moravian People's Party especially emphasized the status of the 'Bohemian people' as a "sovereign state-nation" (*souveräne Staatsnation*). [264] It is important to realize that the terms referred to a multi-ethnic community, albeit they both emphasized the domination of a certain ethno-cultural element in the state (Czech or Hungarians). In this context, the concept of 'sovereignty' could refer to the important role of the term

in the contemporary Hungarian political discourse (as shown by the third case study of the dissertation). Besides Hungary, the new Ukrainian nation-state also provided an example for solutions in connection to the issue of the local German minority in the sovereign Czechoslovak state (as mentioned above).

In contrast, Czech references to Wilson were rather scarce; those were rather the Bohemian German representatives that started to mention the American President in their arguments by the end of the war. During Autumn 1918, these politicians argued that Wilson's declarations in connection to national equality opposed the Czech attempts at incorporating all the historical Bohemian lands into their nation-state. They also used the Wilsonian concept of 'national self-determination' to legitimize their arguments for the separation of *Deutschböhmen* from the Czech-inhabited territories. [265]

The government of the United States only appeared in the discussions of the *Reichsrat* as one of the political forces that accepted the idea of a Czechoslovak state by Autumn 1918. [266] This was no accident. As pointed out earlier, Rees shows in his book that Czech politicians were rather disappointed with the hesitation of the American President to sanction the creation of nation-states at the expense of contemporary imperial structures. Thus, his Fourteen Points of January 1918 were of little use to the Czech Union.

In my view, the name of Wilson rather turned into a strong point of reference in the Czech context with the end of the war, when Russia sank into the chaos of civil war and the Habsburg Monarchy was well into the process of dissolution. In this geopolitical context, the American President did become that influential and popular foreign figure who represented the 'new order' instead of a Bolshevik-style 'revolution' with its

devastation and chaos. This viewpoint of mine resembles the narrative of Arno J. Mayer (albeit it is limited to my account on the discourse of 'self-determination' in the Austrian context). I think it was in this geopolitical context that references to Wilson could truly reinforce various claims to national self-determination in the absence of other points of reference.

Besides transnational references, it was also important for Czech representatives to feature their key concepts as native to their historical national discourse. They attempted to retrospectively depict the Czech national community as both ahead of its time and with a contemporary political thought compatible with the trends of modernity. Within the next chapter, I will showcase which historical examples supported the contemporary national claims regarding the 'self-determination of peoples' and its parallel concepts.

q. *The Historicization of National Claims and the Concept of Self-Determination*

Although its transnational and international connotations were rather important, the conceptual framework of the Czech Union in the first half of 1917 also attempted to integrate the 'right of peoples to self-determination' into the historical traditions of the national discourse. Accordingly, a consistent interpretation of the concept was that it amounted to the historical state rights of the Bohemian Kingdom and its political independence within (or with time, from) the Habsburg Monarchy. At the same time, Czech representatives also referred to specific historical events or figures to support their conceptual framework.

In accordance with the traditions of the historical discourse since the early nineteenth century, the name of František Palacký appeared within various Czech

claims in connection to the federal concept of 'Austria' and the 'right of peoples of self-determination'. On June 12, 1917, the Young Czech representative Zdeněk Václav Tobolká referred to the 'father of the nation' in relation to his democratic interpretation of 'self-determination'. The politician claimed it was the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution of the eighteenth century that popularized the concepts of 'democracy', 'the right of peoples to self-determination' and 'free development'. Tobolká stated that since the early nineteenth century, the "old Bohemian program" (*altes böhmisches Programm*) corresponded to these ideas, as it focused on the democratization of the Habsburg Monarchy – in accordance with the contemporary viewpoint of Palacký. [267] Importantly, this retrospective historical interpretation had its flaws. The 'father of the Czech nation' did not really refer to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' throughout his carrier, with the exception of the Czech memorandum of 1870.

Alternatively, the Czech national socialist representative Jiří Stříbrný mentioned the name of the late politician with different undertones on June 14, 1917. The politician reacted to the government's insistence on a sense of 'Austrian patriotism' within the imperial population. Through this viewpoint, it attempted to delegitimize references to popular discontent with regard to the war-time developments of internal policy. Stříbrný disagreed with the assumptions of the government as for 'Austrian patriotism' of the Czech population. He rather quoted Palacký's statement from his *Idea státu Rakouského* in 1865, that 'Bohemia' existed before 'Austria', and it shall exist after its possible dissolution. [268]

These references to the 'father of the nation' happened at the time when the political discourse of the *Reichsrat* focused on the concepts of the 'federal' and the

'unitary state', with the Czech Union in support of the former notion. In this context, references to Palacký supported traditional Czech arguments for imperial reform and the establishment of a Bohemian Kingdom as politically independent unit of the Habsburg Monarchy. At the same time, the statements of Stříbrný incorporated a visible threat: if the Cisleithanian government does not bow to national demands of imperial reconstruction, it will provoke a severe loss of Czech loyalty and legitimacy for the 'empire'.

In this regard, the references of Rudolf Bechyně, the representative of the Czech Social Democratic Party to the Kremsier Constitution were also important. On June 26, 1917, the politician cited the fundamental laws of 1849 as ones that were in accordance with the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. He also referred to the constitution as the one to create a federal structure for Austria. [269]

However, the remarks of Bechyně were completely ahistorical. As opposed to the federalist demands of the Czech Union during the First World War, the Kremsier Constitution limited its regulations to the Empire of Austria and referred to the Kingdom of Hungary as a separate entity. The law also did not create 'nation-states' within the federal structure of the imperial state, but rather invested the historical crown lands with the right to 'autonomy'. Those were only the new 'districts' of the certain provinces that separated the local *Volksstämme* or ethno-cultural communities in a territorial sense. Last but not least, the Kremsier Constitution and the contemporary discourse of Austrian liberalism made little to no references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a concept, with the exception of one Czech representative, Karl Leopold Klaudy.

It was during early 1918 that Czech representatives rediscovered the texts of the Czech liberal political discourse from 1870/1871. By this point, the viewpoint of the Czech political mainstream already shifted towards the 'sovereignty' of the nation-state and the gradual delegitimization of the Habsburg imperial framework. On January 23, 1918, Mořic Hruban, the representative of the Moravian Catholic People's Party pointed it out with a right that the memorandum of Czech representatives in 1870 already recognized the 'rights of all peoples to self-determination and equality' (*Rechte der Selbstbestimmung und Gleichheit für alle Völker*) in 1870. Hruban used this reference to defend the Epiphany Declaration of January 6, 1918. In contrast to the accusations of the government and German nationalist representatives, he argued that Czech political parties and the Czech population were still loyal to the Habsburg dynasty. Hruban also expressed his hope that the royal family could still solve the "Bohemian question" (*böhmische Frage*) in the Monarchy through the vindication of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. [270] Importantly, this was an expression of loyalty in accordance with the contemporary political standpoint of Czech Catholicism. However, the statements of Hruban did not mirror the mainstream viewpoint of the Czech Union – much similar to his earlier remarks on the issue of 'national autonomy'.

A day before, Antonín Klofáč, the representative of Czech National Socialist Party also historicized the concept of the 'rights of national minorities' – and applied it to the framework of the future 'Bohemian-Slovak' state. He argued that the idea of national curiae, presented at the Bohemian Diet of 1870, was a historical parallel to the Ukrainian law on personal (or non-territorial) autonomy. His interpretation focused on the historical representation of the Czech nation as the vanguard of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' and the 'rights' of 'national minorities' before and during the

First World War. As opposed to the loyalist remarks of Hruban, Klofáč rather demanded the establishment of a democratic and national "Bohemian-Slovak" state. He also emphasized that this nation-state was to be emancipatory in terms of both national and social rights. [271]

This interpretation of national self-determination pointed at the sovereign nation-state as a political and legal structure in line with the concepts of modernity. In contrast, it strongly implied that the empire was retrograde, anti-democratic, anti-social and anti-national as a political structure. As a result, imperial legitimacy vaned quickly for the benefit of the sovereign national state. As mentioned above, the representatives of the Czech Union gained the chance to establish the democratic republic of Czechoslovakia by Autumn 1918 through the vindication of self-determination and to fulfil their promises with regard to the rights of minorities, democracy and social issues.

r. Conclusion

The findings of this chapter support the accounts of new imperial history which claim that the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire' transformed radically during the First World War. On the other hand, this observation also necessitates me to approach the narratives of Fisch and Liebich critically. One must point out that the historical vocabulary of the Austrian political discourse did not feature the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' as analogous the rights of 'sovereignty' and 'secession' before the First World War. 'National self-determination' or the 'self-determination of peoples' was also no counter-concept of the 'empire' in the historical discourse of the Czech national movement.

I identify the turn of 1917–1918 as a historical point of 'discontinuity' when the representatives of the Czech Union started to associate the 'right of peoples to self-determination' with the concepts of 'sovereignty' and 'separation'. I claim that on the one hand, this was due to the influence of Bolshevik national policy. However, I also point out that political and economic processes in the Austrian context resulted in the adaptation of this interpretation of the term.

On the one hand, one could apply the 'Brest-Litovsk moment' of Borislav Chernev to the contemporary discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council. The processes of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia resulted in the dissociation of the Czech political mainstream from the idea of 'empire'. This was much to their viewpoint on the foreign and national policies of the Habsburg Monarchy, which differentiated between the Russian and Austrian contexts in terms of the application of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'.

However, I also support the narratives of Rees and Judson that the contemporary deterioration of material conditions in Austria also contributed to this outcome. This process delegitimized the idea of 'empire' in popular terms, as the Austrian state could not fulfil his end of the contemporary 'social contract' and supply its population with adequate food. In an attempt to revive their legitimacy, state authorities asked nationalist civil organizations to take over their role. This, however, resulted in the increased popularity of those representatives who had already dissociated from the idea of 'empire' and who rather interpreted the 'nation-state' as the ideal framework in political, legal and economic terms.

Nonetheless, I also emphasize that the previous phase of the Austrian political discourse was rather defined by the theme of 'continuities'. I position myself against

the narrative of Rees and pointed out that the mere inclusion of the term 'national self-determination' was not an innovative feature of the May Declaration of the Czech Union on May 30, 1917. The 'self-determination of peoples' (*Selbstbestimmung der Völker*) had already been a concept in the Austrian political vocabulary before the First World War.

I rather claim that its role in the discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council became more important from May 1917 due its connections to the Russian context after February 1917. The Czech representatives thus referred to the revolutionary discourse of the Russian Empire and the central role of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' (*право народов на самоопределение*) in this conceptual framework, situated in that Russian imperial state that was still at war with Austria–Hungary. This was a case of cultural, but also ideological transfer since the liberal members of the Czech Union adopted a concept central to the discourse of Russian social democracy. This 'right of peoples to self-determination' substituted Czech historical references to the term 'autonomy', a central part of the Austrian political vocabulary before the First World War.

While I agree with Rees that the term appeared as a part of a rather loyalist standpoint on the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire' in the May Declaration of the Czech Union, I point out this was due to its relationship with the historical concepts of the Czech national movements. References to the 'right of self-determination' reinforced claims to the 'state rights' of the historical Bohemian Kingdom and the 'Bohemian people'. As opposed to Rees and his translation of the originally German concept as the 'Czech nation', I point out that it is more beneficial to translate *böhmisches Volk* as the 'people of Bohemia' in this context. I claim that this term still

implied the description of the regional community as a political one in the discourse of the Czech Union. However, I also emphasize that this concept was ambiguous historically, as its Czech variant accentuated the majority status of the ethno-cultural community in local terms.

I position myself against the interpretation of Rees that the May Declaration strongly featured the inclusion the Slovaks into its vision of the Bohemian Kingdom as a federal unit of the reorganized Habsburg Monarchy. I rather claim that its references to the concept of the 'Czechoslav nation' were rather ambiguous and unclear. I argue that this was due to the fact that the latter was historically a counter-concept to 'Bohemian people', as it substituted its vision of a political community with the ethno-cultural concept of the 'nation' and the references to 'historical rights' with those to 'natural rights'.

I point out in contrast to the claims of Komlosy, the ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'nation', 'democracy' and 'national liberation' were not necessarily the counter-concepts of the 'empire' and its community in the conceptual framework of the Czech Union. I rather claim that 'democracy' was the important parallel concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' in this context. These terms appeared in the criticism of Czech representatives towards the recent anti-democratic developments of the Austrian political system, the introduction of rule by decrees in 1914 and the military government of 1914–1916. In this context, the subjects of the 'right to self-determination' were the 'Czech nation' and the imperial community of the 'people'.

I argue that representatives of the Czech Union interpreted the 'federal state' as the result of democratization and the ideal form of the 'empire' or the Habsburg Monarchy until late 1917. On the one hand, this was in accordance with the historical

demands of Czech liberal representatives between 1848–1870. On the other hand, this amounted to their claim that only the 'democratic nation-states' of a federal structure could put an end to the transgressions of the Austrian government against the imperial population and its representatives. In contrast, the conceptual framework of the German National Council incorporated the counter-concept of the 'unitary state', which interpreted Austria or Cisleithania as a product of historical conditions and modern development as opposed to retrograde and particularism references to 'historical rights'. The narrative of German representatives also featured the state of Austria as one to vindicate 'the right of peoples to self-determination' through its democratic political system as opposed to oppression of colonial and non-dominant populations by the Entente.

I point out that the Czech representatives offered a solution to the Czech–German tensions of the Bohemian crownlands through the concept of 'national autonomy'. Theirs was a non-territorial interpretation of the term, which referred to the framework of cultural rights described by the December Constitution of 1867. Although they applied the concept to the federal unit of the 'nation-state', their interpretation maintained the relationship between this framework and that of the 'empire'.

In contrast, I showed by using our thesis with Anna Adorjáni that the term 'national minority' entered the conceptual framework of the Czech Union in parallel to the shift of its discourse at the turn of 1917–1918. The Czech representatives interpreted this concept in a qualitative sense, as a synecdoche that defined their viewpoint on 'minority rights'. This was a result of their focus on the 'nation-state' in accordance with their association of the 'self-determination peoples' with 'sovereignty', which

necessitated the construction of a vision for the organization of the affairs between the national 'majority' and 'minorities'.

On the one hand, I showed that the Ukrainian Law on Personal-National Autonomy appeared as important transnational point of reference in conceptual framework of the Czech Union in February 1918, described as the 'ideal' and 'Slavic' understanding of the minority issue. On the other hand, I pointed out that the Ukrainian law adopted its concept of 'personal' or 'non-territorial autonomy' from the discourse of Austrian social democracy at the turn of the century and the related theories of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. Thus, the Czech representatives indirectly referred to the political traditions of the 'empire' in their vision of the future Czechoslovak 'nation-state'.

I also emphasize that the representatives of Bohemian Germans attempted to delegitimize these concepts in their counter-discourse. They demanded 'national autonomy' in the framework of the Austrian state. The German representatives interpreted this concept in a territorial sense, as the separation of 'German Bohemia' from the Czech-inhabited lands. They claimed that there were no single 'people of Bohemia' as a political community or a unified 'Czechoslovak nation'. Their viewpoint amounted to the claim that the dissolution of the Austrian state and the foundation of a Czech-dominated nation-state would result in chaos and perpetual struggles between nationalities.

Transnational references supported the various Czech interpretations of the 'self-determination of peoples' and its parallel concepts in 1917–1918. The former concept was adopted from the Russian discourse after the February Revolution. References to Russian and German federalism supported the demands for the

reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy as a 'federal state' in the rhetoric of the Czech Union. On the other hand, the 'self-determination of peoples' was rather associated with the concept of 'sovereignty' after the turn of 1917–1918 due to the influence of Bolshevik Russian foreign and national policy. The Kingdom of Hungary appeared in this context as the example of a 'sovereign state' similar to the Kingdom of Bohemia. In contrast, I point out that references to Wilson or his concept of 'self-determination' were rather marginal until the end of the First World War.

Finally, I show that the Czech representatives attempted to depict their discourse as embedded in the historical framework of Czech nationalism. This amounted to often anachronistic references to political and legal texts from the nineteenth century as ones that would refer to the 'self-determination of peoples'. A notable exception from this trend was the Czech memorandum of 1870, rediscovered by the representatives of the late First World War.

In ideological terms, I seldom accentuated the difference between the claims of Czech social democrats, Catholic representatives, and the mainstream of the Czech Union. I point out that the representatives of Czech social democracy and Catholicism were alone in their application of the term 'national autonomy' to the imperial framework of the Habsburg Monarchy and their demands as for the establishment of a 'federal nationalities state' until late 1917. However, the social democratic politicians also appeared as the ones to readily adopt the Bolshevik interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples' in my narrative. In contrast, I emphasize the loyalist nature of the contributions of Catholic Czech representatives to the discourse of the *Reichsrat*.

Upon this overview, one must emphasize that the claim of André Liebich is rather simplistic and erroneous, when he features a dichotomy between Masaryk's

concept of 'self-determination' and the *samostatnost* ("either autonomy or independence or something in between") of his Czech opponents during the First World War. I have shown that the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' was central to the political vocabulary of the Czech Union along with a wide range of parallel concepts. It is important to emphasize that this term was a subject of cultural and ideological transfers in the context of the First World War. Thus, it is best not to limit its discussion to only certain ideological or national contexts with narrow boundaries.

Although my case study attempts to feature the conceptual shift from the 'empire' to the 'nation-state' in the late First World War, it is important to mention that certain studies still attempt to identify 'continuities' between these frameworks in the interwar period. For instance, Judson argues that the ultimate drive behind this narrative was the intent of the nation-states to differentiate themselves from the Habsburg Monarchy – which, however, was rather difficult. One must emphasize that it is one of the most interesting arguments of the historian that the various successor states were also multi-ethnic in their structure; he uses the terms "little empires" or *Vielvölkerstaaten* to stress their resemblance to Austria–Hungary. He points out that "imperial ways of thinking" or "imperial belonging" informed the national policies, the legal codes and the administrative practices of these states. [272]

I would like to address a related issue in the next case study, which will focus on the role of 'national self-determination' in the conceptual framework of Masaryk's Czechoslovakism and the integration of the latter into the transnational discourse of the *New Europe* in the late First World War. The main context of this section will be Great Britain, one much different from that of the Habsburg Monarchy due to various reasons.

This necessitates me to study the key concepts of the discourse local to Great Britain in before and during the First World War.

On the other hand, the next case study will also be the continuation of the present one in a certain sense, as my arguments will mainly concern the political language of Masaryk and his Czechoslovak movement in the late First World War. I will argue that the influence of the British context, the legacies of the 'empire' and the Habsburg-era discourse of the Czech national movement resulted in a complex framework of parallel concepts: 'the principle of nationality', 'national self-determination', 'national minorities' etc. in the discourse of the Czechoslovak movement. I will also theorize the conceptualization a Czechoslovak 'political nation' in its narrative framework as a developed version of the historical concept of the 'Bohemian people'.

3. Case Study: Czechoslovakia

The' Self-Determination of Peoples' in the Local Discourses of Great Britain before
and during the First World War, and the Czechoslovak Political Emigration

a. Introduction

In various historical accounts, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, one of the main historical
figures behind the foundation of the Czechoslovak nation-state appears as one to share
President Wilson's "language of democracy and self-determination". [1] This narrative
already appeared in the rhetoric of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1918. The
declaration of Czechoslovak independence by the Czech National Committee of Prague
featured Masaryk and Wilson as the "liberators" of the nation. [2] Official proposals soon
appeared to rename Pozsony (Bratislava), a city freshly acquired from the Hungarian
Kingdom to *Wilsonovo mesto* ('Wilson City') as a tribute to the American President. [3]
Although this plan did not come into fruition, the official name of the Main Railway
Station in Prague has remained *Wilsonova* since the end of the First World War. The
relationship between Masaryk and Wilson has also been subject to scholarly interest
due to the impact of this narrative in the studies of Czechoslovak history.

However, it is worth to reconsider this issue due to various reasons. As
emphasized already in the introduction, Wilson was also initially not very keen on
legitimizing the secessionist claims of the political emigrations such as the branch of
the Czechoslovak national movement under the leadership of Masaryk. [4] In fact, the
government of the United States did not officially recognize the Czecho-Slovak
National Council as its official partner (and thus, a future for the Czechoslovak nation

state) until September 1918. [5] Wilson also did not initially recognize ethno-cultural communities as that 'people' that would benefit from the 'right to self-determination'. As a result, it is hard to describe Masaryk and Wilson as historical figures with corresponding political languages at least until the very last months of the First World War.

It is no accident that André Liebich is rather cautious in his claims when he discusses the context of the Czechoslovakia in his *Cultural Nationhood and Political Statehood: The Birth of Self-Determination* (2022). Although he describes the nation-state as the "beneficiary of the doctrine of self-determination" in the discourse of the First World War, his chapter still features the latter concept rarely, only seven (7) times. Liebich claims that Masaryk referred to the 'principle of nationality' and "later, that of self-determination" to support his claims of Czechoslovak secession from Austria–Hungary. Yet, he does not clarify the exact role of the latter concept in the texts produced by the Czech politician. He also points out that for most of the First World War, "Wilson proved obdurate toward Masaryk's blandishments". [6]

Nonetheless, Liebich claims that the Czech politician's "main challenge […] lay in convincing the leading Anglo-Saxon powers", Great Britain and the United States of supporting Czechoslovak secessionism and the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. He also refers to the fact that Masaryk had allies in these contexts to side with his cause. Liebich names the British citizens Henry Wickham Steed, the former "foreign editor of The Times", and Robert Seton-Watson "an independently wealthy advocate of the 'principle of nationality'" as ones who would share the viewpoint of the Czech politician. These individuals also "already enjoyed an established position in English society" due to their expertise on Austria–Hungary. [7]

Liebich also refers to the *New Europe*, [8] "a bi-weekly journal of limited circulation but substantial influence" as platform "financed by R.W. Seton-Watson" and in which "Masaryk pleaded his case largely". [9] This is the same transnational society Glenda Sluga describes as one of the supporters of the concept of 'self-determination' and the foundation of independent nation-states in the context of Great Britain. It is rightful to assume that the discourse of the *New Europe* was a scene of a transnational discourse between British actors and those from Central Europe.

Yet, one cannot really find descriptions of a complex relationship even in the most comprehensive studies to discuss the history of the *New Europe*. Harry Hanak's *Great Britain and Austria–Hungary during the First World War: A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion* (1962) is a notable work, which discusses the history of the journal as a part of a study with the British public opinion of the First World War in its focus. Hanak attempts to identify groups that informed the local discourse with regard to the Habsburg Monarchy.

Importantly, the narrative of the author is partial to the *New Europe* and its discourse. Hanak depicts the journal as a platform of "very great influence" and uncritically adopts certain narrative elements from its articles. He describes the national(ist) tensions in the Habsburg realms as the struggle of "subject nations" (or "races") for their "emancipation" from the German and "Magyar" (Hungarian) "yoke". As a result, his narrative features the representatives and the supporters of national secessionism in Great Britain as those positively advocating the "liberation" of "small nations" to the local public. [10]

The identification of the *New Europe* as the representative of a "particular type of Liberalism" in the British context is important in this regard. Hanak claims that in

local terms, liberalism was the ideology to focus on the discussion of nationalist ideas. He describes this liberal discourse as "Western" in its nature, as it interpreted the 'nation' as the community and the historical product of the 'state'. While such a concept does not appear in the book, this description, of course, implies the existence of a different "Eastern" archetype of nationalisms – a reference to the modern scientific and political discussions with regard to 'Western' and 'Eastern', 'civic' or 'ethnic' nationalisms. [11]

Two decades later, Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson would discuss certain aspects of the *New Europe* in the biography of one of its British founders, their father, Robert William Seton-Watson. Their *Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria–Hungary* (1981) focuses on the activities of "Seton" between 1914–1920. In parallel, they also describe the political history of Austria–Hungary and its dissolution. In contrast to Hanak, the Seton-Watsons do not describe the *New Europe* or their father as a historical figure with a "very great influence". The authors emphasize the measurable, but "indirect" influence of Seton-Watson on British public opinion and the process of peace-making during the First World War. [12]

As for the internal structure of the *New Europe*, Hanak and the Seton-Watsons both construct narratives of 'co-operation' rather than that of a 'discussion'. The members of the editorial board and in particular, Masaryk and Seton-Watson appear as united in terms of intellectual and political viewpoints throughout the First World War. Hanak reports only one instance of differences during the meeting of the latter individuals in Rotterdam, October 1914. He states that Masaryk was "unpleasantly surprised" to hear from Seton-Watson that the British public opinion was partial to

claims of independence based on the 'principle of nationality' as opposed to his emphasis on the 'historic state rights of Bohemia'. [13]

The Seton-Watsons describe the same incident as Seton-Watson's "awareness" of the "contradiction" between "the principle of national self-determination" and that of "historic rights" (in this context, Bohemian state rights). As opposed to Hanak, the authors of *The Making of a New Europe* explain that the latter principle was problematic due to the territorial claims of the Czechoslovak national movement. These amounted to demands to certain historical territories of "Bohemia". which were inhabited by "more than two million" Germans. Nonetheless, the Seton-Watsons also claim that Masaryk could override the objections of their father through arguments that emphasized the strategic and economic needs of Czechoslovakia or as with his contemporary term, "independent Bohemia". [14] Seton-Watson appears as convinced by these claims in the narrative of *The Making of a New Europe*; references to the same or similar differences do not appear in the book.

Importantly, nor Hanak neither the Seton-Watson notice the important shift in Masaryk's interpretation of certain concepts. They refer to the fact that he claimed the 'historic state rights' of the Bohemian Kingdom; yet, they fail to realize that Masaryk's concepts of the 'Czechoslovak' (or 'Czechoslav') nation and 'natural rights' had originally been the counter-concepts of the former term. On the one hand, I find it natural upon the findings of my previous case study issues arose from the simultaneous references to these concepts during the First World War. On the other hand, I find it unlikely that this ambiguity did not result in additional debates between Masaryk and his British allies.

Thus, my main aim in this chapter is to reinterpret the *New Europe* as a 'transnational discourse' of international 'reorganization' rather than a mere 'joint effort' and integrate the political language of Masaryk and the Czechoslovak political emigration into this structure. My foremost interest are the roles of the 'principle of nationality', 'self-determination' and their parallel concepts in these narratives. I assume that the discourse of *The New Europe* informed the national concepts of the Czechoslovak political emigration, which underwent several changes throughout the First World War.

My narrative will peak in the study of Masaryk's *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* of late 1918. I find the fact rather informative that on the hand, this book (the only study of such comprehensive nature by Masaryk) appeared in English for the first time. In my view, the appearance of the 'new Europe' as a concept in the title also clearly showed the influence of the Britain-based discourse on the political language of the Czechoslovak emigration. It will be in my foremost interest to study the concepts referred to in this work and its 'Wilsonian' references (or the lack thereof) in this book (written already during the 'Wilsonian moment' of Erez Manela).

All of these considerations are related to the study of the 'self-determination of peoples' through specific means. Firstly, I will argue against the narrative that Masaryk was the representative of a 'Wilsonian' concept of 'self-determination', as I rather integrate his speech acts and the political language of the Czechoslovak political emigration into the discourse of the *New Europe*. Secondly, I will map the 'self-determination of peoples' along with its parallel concepts in this semantic field. I will especially emphasize the connection between the former concept and the 'principle of nationality' in this context.

My discussion of 'self-determination' necessitates me to study the 'Czechoslovak nation' as a recipient of this right in the related discourses. In this regard, I will contribute to a debate with regard to the 'ethnic' and 'civic' features of this concept in the interwar period. This issue has appeared in various modern studies, such as the dissertation of Elizabeth Bakke at the Oslo University (*Doomed to Failure?: The Czechoslovak National Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 1918–1938*) and its review by Peter Haslinger ("On the Limits of Nation-Building: The First Czechoslovak Republic"). Bakke claims in her study of 1999 that "the main features to constitute Czechoslovak unity" were "ethnic and cultural". She argues accordingly that the national minorities of Czechoslovakia "were never meant to be a part of the Czechoslovak nation project", as the national discourse represented Germans and Hungarians as "enemies" rather than possible co-nationals. In his review of 2001, Haslinger positions himself against this claim. He rather argues that "prominent Czechoslovak politicians" did not aim at the assimilation of these groups, but rather attempted to transform their members into "loyal citizens" through the "politics" of "de-Austrianization". [15] As such, Haslinger emphasizes the 'civic' elements of the Czechoslovak national concept.

Tereza Novotná approaches the issue from another perspective in her "Civic and Ethnic Conceptions of Nationhood in the First Czechoslovak Republic: Emanuel Rádl's Theories of Nationalism" (2008). Novotná identifies a fundamental difference between "theory" and "political practice" in Czechoslovakia in this regard. She argues that it was possible to interpret Czechoslovakia as a "multinational" or "a civic-national state" in accordance with its Constitution of 1920. However, she declares that in practice, the political framework of the state rather corresponded to the "ethnic" definition of the

Czechoslovak nation. The term "organic" also appears as the alternative of the "ethnic" concept in the study, in accordance with its focus on the interwar theories of the Czech political thinker Emánuel Rádl. [16]

I will attempt to contribute to this debate through my focus on the relationship between ethno-cultural and historical arguments, thus, the interaction between the concepts of the 'Czechoslovak nation' and the 'Bohemian people' in the discourse of the Czechoslovak emigration. I assume that the claims to the German-inhabited territories of the Czech lands might have influenced the originally ethno-cultural focus of Czechoslovakism. I theorize that this resulted in the incorporation of 'civic' or 'political' elements into its national concept. I would not find the possible co-existence of ethno-cultural and civic elements to be paradoxical, since I agree with the argument of Rogers Brubaker that even national concepts traditionally perceived as 'civic' have had strong ethno-cultural features.

The themes of 'ideological' and 'cultural transfer' will define this case study. I have already emphasized and shown that the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' appeared in and was adopted into various national and ideological contexts in Austria. I assume that the same applies to the British context, on the one hand. On the other hand, I will attempt to discover the related role of Masaryk and his Czechoslovak movement, the modes in which they adopted the concept of 'self-determination' and in the ways they referred to it in the transnational discourse of the *New Europe*.

My main sources will be the articles of the *New Europe* and *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* as for the era of the late First World War (in this case, the period between 1916–1918). I will use these to reconstruct two interrelated conceptual frameworks: that of the journal and that of the Czechoslovak political emigration. I will

also use documents from the Seton-Watson Collection of the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies to contextualize certain aspects of the *New Europe*. I will feature the concepts observed in English in accordance with their linguistic context.

It is important to address a specific issue of terminology regarding the terms 'expert' and 'politician' in the context of the *New Europe*. The editorial board of the journal did not form or represent one political formation in Great Britain (although it did have personal connections to the British Liberal Party). On the other hand, the medium did represent a specific political agenda and intent to influence political decision making in Great Britain. It is due to this reason that I do not find it problematic to describe its conceptual framework as a 'political language'.

On the other hand, the authors of the journal fashioned themselves and each other as 'experts' of specific topics in the field of nationalism. This was a position of intellectual authority; yet it was used to forward a certain political narrative. This was especially visible in the case of the Czechoslovak emigration. While his allies in the *New Europe* would often introduce him as the 'expert' of 'Central Europe', Masaryk wanted to secure the support of Entente governments for the foundation of 'independent Bohemia' as the head of the Czecho-Slovak National Council – interpreted as the 'provisional government' of the future nation state.

The Seton-Watson attempted to overcome this dichotomy through the depiction of Masaryk as shifting between the roles of a "philosopher-statesman" into a "political propagandist" during the First World War. [17] In my opinion, this is rather a play with words than a clear-cut description of developments in this biography. I find it much better to simply accept the duality of Masaryk as a historical actor in this regard. One can equally observe his contemporary speech acts as 'intellectual' and 'political' efforts

to provide the theoretical foundations of the Czechoslovak nation state and the win political support to this end. I myself will refer to him as a 'leader' of the 'Czechoslovak (political) movement' or 'the Czechoslovak political emigration'.

I would also like to address my general use of the terms 'Czechoslovak' and 'Czechoslovakia' throughout the chapter. In this case, this is a retrospective preference in my narrative to the contemporary alternatives of 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovaks' or even 'Bohemia' and 'Bohemians'. 'Czechoslovakia' only started to appear as a dominant term by the end of the First World War as opposed to 'Bohemia' that had formerly addressed the concept of the future nation-state in the rhetoric of the Czechoslovak movement. My argument is simply that 'Czechoslovakia' was the name in which the interwar state was eventually addressed, with the 'Czechoslovak' nation as its dominant community; precious concepts helped these ideas to develop. I will only use alternative terms if my contextualist approach to historical texts necessitates this.

Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the concept of the 'empire' will refer to not one, but two contexts throughout this chapter. The Habsburg Monarchy remains one of these. I will often refer back to the Austrian context as the 'original' one of Czechoslovak political emigration; I will also assume imperial traditions influenced its conceptual framework (one way or another). It will be important for me to find continuities and discontinuities in the political language of the Czechoslovak emigration in this regard.

However, 'Great Britain' must also appear as a historical context for the relationship between 'empire' and 'nation' due to my focus on the discourse of the *New Europe*. It is important to mention that studies of new imperial history have attempted to shift focus from the 'four nations' narrative in relation to British history. Rather than

observing the history of 'Great Britain' through the traditional 'Anglo-Saxon' viewpoint of the 'British nation' comprised of the English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish communities, related works are rather interested in the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire' and specifically between 'metropole' and 'periphery' in the same analytic fields. [18] However, I cannot and will not attempt to reinterpret the history of the British Empire in accordance with these considerations, as my interest does not lie in its structure.

Nonetheless, I have a concern in detecting the 'principle of nationality', its relationship with the concepts of the 'nation' and the 'empire', and its parallel concepts in the political and intellectual discussions of Great Britain before the First World War. I have two specific reasons for this determination. One of this is that the 'principle of nationality' is often referred to as a key concept in the transnational, but still English-language discourse of the *New Europe.* I assume that this term had its history in the context of Great Britain. On the other hand, one must emphasize that the *New Europe*'s discussions of 'international reorganization' largely focused on the topics of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Central European region. I also find the claims of Hanak rather interesting that Masaryk was initially not familiar with the local importance of this term and only adopted it during his activities in exile. However, this observation also points necessitates me to analyse the 'principle of nationality' as a key concept of transnational discussions rather than ones limited to the politicosocial context of Great Britain.

On the other hand, I must address the historical specificities of the British context in relation to the concept of 'self-determination'. In his book of 2022, André Liebich claims the source for the local adaptation of the concept in the nineteenth

century was the French term *le droit des peuples de disposer d'eux-mêmes*. He states that this was "rendered, literally, in English as 'the right of peoples to dispose of themselves' that became most common" mode of referring to the concept until the First World War. [19]

I am not entirely convinced of this theory, since I assume that local actors were familiar with the German term *Selbstbestimmungsrecht (der Völker)* due to its importance in the German political and intellectual discussions of the nineteenth century and their transnational influence on the British discourse. Thus, will study the translations and the possible appearances of this term and its parallel concepts in the British political and legal texts of this historical period.

Since I now switch to a British-centred narrative, the detailed account of André Liebich on the local and the transnational discourse on the 'principle of nationality' and 'self-determination' will be rather useful to me. I will also use the works of other authors to contextualize the historical context of Great Britain. Once again, I will also approach their claims critically, if my findings do not support them.

b. *The Role of the 'Principle of Nationality' in the British Discourse of Nationalism during the Nineteenth Century*

The already mentioned viewpoint of André Liebich in his *Cultural Nationhood and Political Statehood: The Birth of Self-Determination* (2022) is that the 'principle of nationality' rather appeared in the discourse after 1848. His narrative features the Italian jurist Italian jurist Pasquale Stanislao Mancini as one of the first scholars "to give a juridical basis to the principle of nationality" in his *Il Principio di Nazionalità* (1851). One must emphasize that the political and intellectual context of this dissertation was

the Italian discourse of state unification. It was no accident that Mancini described the 'nation' as a "moral unit" and a "consciousness" shaped by the common features of 'territory', 'language' and 'origin'. He claimed that international law "originates" from the 'nation' rather than the 'state' as a basic unit. Mancini also identified two types of states in the international context of this time: "creations of nature" and creations "of force or even consensus". The first of these terms referred to the structure of the "nation-state", defined by a "single nation". In contrast, the author claimed that "a state in which many vigorous nationalities are going to suffocate in a forced union is not a political body but a monster incapable of life". [20]

One can complement this narrative of Liebich with additional remarks on Mancini's theories. The Italian scholar described the nation-state as "immutable" and "eternal". [21] By extension, the multinational state could only be artificial and temporal according to this narrative. It is worth to remember that this description would apply to the Habsburg Monarchy in the context of the Italian process of unification, a composite imperial state and the main opponent of the idea of an Italian nation-state.

It is important to remark the claim of Liebich that the viewpoint of Mancini influenced the British discourse on the 'principle of nationality' in the 1860s. He states that John Stuart Mill, one of the intellectual authorities of British liberalism 'explicitly adopted' the position of the Italian scholar on the nation-state in his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861). Mill claimed that "[it] is in general a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities". He also constructed a narrative of a "hierarchy of civilization" with regards to related issue of ethno-cultural diversity in contemporary states. Mill stated that it was beneficial for the members of non-dominant communities

to assimilate into the ranks of "highly civilized and cultivated" peoples. He applied this theory of his to British context and referred to the "Welshman" or the "Scottish Highlander" as the "members of the British nation". [22]

It is important to emphasize, however, that Liebich does not mention the alternative to assimilation proposed by the British liberal political thinker. In contrast, this appears in Zoran Kurelić's "What Can We Learn from Lord Acton's Criticism of Mill's Concept of Nationality?" (2006). Kurelić describes a peculiar thought of Mill with regards to highly mixed politicosocial environments without no dominant cultures such as Hungary. Under these circumstances, the British liberal politician supposed that various peoples should remain in one state structure. At the same time, he claimed that local law shall provide their equality. [23] It is easy to recognize the parallels between these remarks and the Austrian concept of the 'equality of nationality rights'.

However, Kurelić's title "What Can We Learn from Lord Acton's Criticism of Mill's Concept of Nationality?" also points towards an important debate in the discourse of British liberalism. Lord Acton's essay, "Nationality" (1862) was a direct response to Mill's statements in the *Considerations on Representative Government*. Kurelić reports that the author identified the concepts of the 'sovereignty of the people' and 'national self-determination' as the products of the French Revolution. His reception of these was not positive. Acton claimed that modern nationalism destructed the order previously established by "history" and "tradition" and prioritized the making of the 'nation-state' to the idea of "liberty". [24]

Kurelić points out that Acton rather idealized 'multinational empires like the Austro–Hungarian'. The liberal political thinker interpreted the 'empire' as the ideal political framework for the "protection of individual liberties" and the general

"development of the people". This was because Milton thought that "diversity" prevented the tyranny of a "single authority" by "balancing interests" and "multiplying associations". This viewpoint, however, did not mean that the 'nation' had no positive role in the narrative framework of Acton. Kurelić reports that he supported the "purely political nationality formed by the state". The main example of Acton to this end was Switzerland, a "political nationality" composed of the otherwise "ethnically French, German or Italian" groups of its population. [25]

If one revisits the "Nationality" of Acton, it is becomes clear that the otherwise interesting narrative of Kurelić struggles with certain anachronisms. For instance, this essay of 1862 does not mention the 'Austro–Hungarian' empire, as this form of the Habsburg Monarchy only appeared in 1867. It is of paramount importance from the viewpoint of this study that Acton does not refer to the concept of 'national self-determination' either. It is rather the term 'national independence' that appears in his essay. [26]

Kurelić also does not mention the peculiar interpretation of the British state by Acton. "England" appeared as a "Teutonic" model state in the narrative of "Nationality", one that prioritized the establishment of "great independent authorities" and "liberty" in accordance with its historical traditions. In contrast, France was the representative of a "Latin" type of European modernity in the account with its focus on "equality". At a certain point of his text, Acton also referred to the realms of the "British Empire" in parallel to "Austria" (in this sense, the Habsburg Monarchy), which he describes as a state which "includes various nationalities without oppressing them". [27]

The representation of 'Great Britain' or the 'British nation' in the texts of Milton and Acton was important due to the local relevance of their debates on 'nationalism'.

The framework of 'Great Britain' appeared due to the Act of Union between England and Scotland (1707). In theory, this structure evolved into the United Kingdom through a similar agreement between Great Britain and Ireland (1801). Yet, England and its elite dominated these composite states from the start. Local political and intellectual actors often identified 'Great Britain' with 'England' by the mid-nineteenth century. In contrast, endeavours appeared within the framework of Scottish nationalism to maintain the self-government of Scotland and local identity as opposed to the 'English' influence. The representatives of the Scottish national movement interpreted 'Great Britain' as the joint state project of local communities. In contrast, the mainstream of Irish nationalism was rather radical, as its viewpoint was profoundly anti-Unionist. [28]

Thus, the two different interpretations of the 'nation' by Mill and Acton had their special importance in the contemporary context of Great Britain. The former would interpret its structure as a 'nation-state' shaped by the dominant culture of the English, in line with the continental and most of all, Italian trends in the discourse of nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century. In contrast, Acton would rather depict the state as an 'empire' with a British 'political nationality' of its inhabitants, who otherwise could identify as 'ethnically' English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish. It is worth to mention in this regard that the author of "Nationality" might have been sensitive to the viewpoint of less dominant cultures, as he himself was the member of the Catholic minority of Great Britain. [29]

It is important to emphasize in relation to their depictions of Mill and Acton that the main attempt of Kurelić and Liebich is to contribute to a long historiographical debate in the historical studies of nationalism in Great Britain during the nineteenth century. The 'Mill–Acton' dichotomy often appears as a central issue in this regard. For

instance, Hanak also describes this debate as one of historical importance with regards to the discourse of nationalism in Great Britain during the First World War. His interpretation depicts those in support of 'nationality' as a central theme of the future international order as the successors of Mill. In contrast, those problematizing this approach or denying the importance of 'nationality' appear as belonging to the tradition established by Acton. [30]

Nonetheless, this focus on the British liberal debates of the mid-nineteenth century marginalizes the viewpoint of local conservatives. One must emphasize that these individuals were also interested in the discussions of nationalism and the related political processes. For instance, Benjamin Disraeli (the future Prime Minister of Great Britain) discussed these topics as a part of his reflections on the 'Spring of Nations' in the British Parliament during 1849. The conservative representative identified 'nationality' as the "principle of political independence". His interpretation of the concept resembled that of Acton in the sense that he described national identity as the historical construct of the state. He emphasized the role of a stable political and legal system in this regard. In the British context, his primary example to this end was the influence of the constitution as a legal tradition on the unification of the local community. [31]

'Race' appeared as a counter-concept in the narrative of Disraeli. He described this idea as a "principle of physical analogy", the definition of groups through ethno-cultural or biological means. While he realized the central role of this concept in various continental contexts, he still perceived it as one with a destructive potential. Disraeli argued that the application of 'race' to international politics could only result in perpetual conflicts and the disintegration of contemporary states. On the other hand, he

also problematized the biological aspect of the concept and the tendency to establish a hierarchical relationship between communities in its name. This viewpoint corresponded to the personal experiences of Disraeli as a person of Jewish origin a predominantly English ethno-cultural environment. As a result, he rather attempted to interpret the 'British nation' as a community not of racial, but rather historical, religious and cultural foundations. [32]

In this regard, it is important to contextualize 'race' as a concept in the contemporary European (and British) discourse in the sense that it will reoccur in this chapter. As Nicholas Hudson shows it in his "From 'Nation' to 'Race': the Origin of Racial Classification in Eighteenth-Century Thought" (1994), the term originally referred to smaller groups or communities (such as the premodern 'nation') of the same origin in the early modern times. However, the European scientists of the Enlightenment reinterpreted the concept, as they applied 'race' to the alleged biological subdivisions of the human species. The modern term 'nation' appeared as a sub-category in this framework, in reference to various identities within the same 'racial' group. [33]

'Race', however, was increasingly associated with the concept of the 'nation' in the nineteenth century. This was due to a political fascination to identify the alleged biological foundations of national identities. [34] The example of Disraeli shows that there was a resistance to this "marriage" between the concepts, as their combination introduced internal divisions into the national community with different positions in terms of hierarchy. This, however, could not only apply to the issue of 'Jewish–Gentile' affairs. 'Race' could might as well effect the relationship between the 'Anglo-Saxons' (English) and the 'Celtics' (Welsh, Scottish and Irish) in the context of Great Britain – as described by Mill.

It is worth to point it out that Disraeli formulated his views two decades before the Milton–Acton debate, which points at the importance of British conservatism in the local discourse and the problem of its marginalization from local narratives of nationalism. On the other hand, it was also important that the 'principle of nationality' appeared as a shared point of reference within the ranks of British conservativism and liberalism. Its implications increasingly preoccupied minds in the British public, similar to the transnational discussions of the mid-nineteenth century.

The 'principle of nationality' also applied to and appeared in the German context of state unification, this time sharing a semantic field with the 'self-determination of peoples'. The British actors of time was aware of these political processes, but also the key concepts of the local discourse. However, their reception of these issues was quite particular, which I will showcase in the next chapter.

To sum the findings of this section up, the 'principle of nationality' appeared as a concept in the discourse of Italian unification after 1848, soon adopted into other politicosocial contexts. Influenced by the theories of the Italian jurist Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, John Stuart Mill emphasized the importance of national culture in the construction of the state and the liberal political system. He interpreted Great Britain as corresponding to the main continental trends of nation-state formation and promoted the assimilation of local nationalities into the English-dominated concept of the 'British nation'.

In contrast, the liberal Lord Acton and the conservative Benjamin Disraeli offered different interpretations of the state community. Both emphasized the importance of "history" and "tradition" in the construction of the state and its

community as opposed to the ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'nation' or 'race'. The 'nation' rather appeared as a political community in their narratives.

The 'Latin' state corresponding to the 'principle of nationality' appeared as a counter-concept to the "Teutonic" model of 'empire' in Lord Acton's "Nationality". The author interpreted imperial states such as Austria or Great Britain as providing ideal circumstances for 'liberty' through the diversity of local interests and the need for their co-operation. In contrast, the 'nation-state' rather appeared in this narrative as a 'tyrannical' structure in its attempt to provide 'equality' for the members of one ethno-cultural community but oppressing other groups in the process.

c. The Absence of the 'Self-Determination of Peoples' from the British Context before the First World War

The article of the *Westminster Review* titled "The Doctrine of Nationalities and Schleswig-Holstein" (1865) featured a considerable British attempt to discuss the continental process of German state unification. The anonymous author did not resort to the mere presentation of related news, but also attempted to contribute to the local and transnational debates of nationalism by referring to various sources important in the contemporary discourse.

The title already showed that 'doctrine' (or the 'principle') of 'nationality' was a concept central to this study of international politics. Much similar to the previous interpretations of Lord Acton or Disraeli, the author claimed that the concept only contributed to the creation of conflicts in continental affairs. Prussian transgressions towards Denmark in relation to the province of Schleswig-Holstein appeared as the primary example to this end. However, the article also featured the "attempts" of the

Habsburg imperial government to instigate "Croat against Magyar [Hungarian in the ethno-cultural sense – L. B. B.]" in Hungary in a negative light. [35]

This critical viewpoint did not concern the ideas of the 'nation-state' or 'empire', but rather various concepts of the 'nation' and political references to the interpretations of the term. The author claimed that the concept of the 'nation' could correspond to "racial", historical, geographical, or regional and in general, contested definitions of communities. They problematized the fact that despite this undefined nature, the 'doctrine of nationalities' still appeared as a concept in service of expansive foreign policies and facilitated the disintegration of contemporary states. [36]

Interestingly enough, the article mentioned *The Nationalities Question* of József Eötvös as a contemporary study with a most convincing theory of 'nationality'. The proposition of the Hungarian liberal representative that the 'nation' represented some kind of common identity sounded convincing to the British author. However, the "metaphysical" features of this description also appeared as too "impractical" to apply to the studies of contemporary political issues. The article rather featured a distinct definition of 'nationality' as a 'body of people with strong national characteristics' and with an "evident tendency to independent political action". In contrast, 'racial', linguistic or religious identities did not appear in the narrative as formative in the construction of national communities. [37]

The primary arguments of the article to this end might appear as borderline humorous in retrospect. For instance, contemporary Poland appeared as the strong model of a 'nation', in which language was not the primary factor of common identity. The author of the article stated it was paradoxical to call the inhabitants of Polish Volhynia "Ruthenians", since despite their distinct language, locals rather identified

with the Polish nation. The narrative of the article also opposed the claims of Prussia that the local population of Schleswig-Holstein was "German" due to their mother tongue, as it rather emphasized their local identity. [38]

Something approaching to the concept of 'national indifference' appeared in the article as an argument to support these claims. Once again, Galicia as the former territory of Poland and the contemporary province of the Habsburg Monarchy appeared as a strong example in this regard. The author recollected that according to local accounts, the agrarian population did not identify themselves as "Poles" or "Ruthenians", but rather "imperialists", the loyal subjects of the Austrian Emperor. The author channelled this claim into refuting the application of linguistic markers to the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holsten. They stated that locals would not identify as "Danes" or "Germans", as they lacked a strong sense of "nationality". [39]

The same characteristics applied to the description of the British context in the article. The author claimed the "English", the "Scotch" or the "Welsh" were no distinct nationalities. Their "general characteristics" distinguished these groups from the continental ones rather than from each other. The argument also appeared that the "political cohesion" of England, Scotland and Wales resulted in a firm foundation for the 'British nation'. The continental parallels were once again Poland, but also Hungary. The author claimed that these sub-groups of these communities were indivisible in terms of national identities. (Although one can only presume local actors would have deeply disagreed with this remark.) [40]

It was important that the author distinguished the 'doctrine of nationalities' from the 'right of a nationality to choose its own mode of government' – which they claimed was equivalent to the "*selbstbestimmungsrecht* of the Germans" [sic]. The author

referred to the latter as the "principle which should be adopted in the settlement of all matters where the fate of a nationality is involved". Italy, Poland and Schleswig-Holsten appeared in the text as contexts in which this "has been more or less universally admitted". [41] Since the author did not specify the circumstances of this "admission", one must suppose that this was a reference to the plebiscites in Italy during the process of state unification and the idea of holding a referendum in Schleswig-Holstein to decide its state allegiance between Denmark and Prussia. [42] No similar events took place in "Poland" – however, the article appeared not much after the January Uprising in the Polish territories ruled by the Russian Empire in 1863–1864.

The translation of *Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker* as the "right of a nationality to choose its own mode government" was not a specific feature of this article, but rather pointed towards the specificities of the British context. The term 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' did not appear in English for a long time. One for instance cannot really find the concept in the dictionaries of the nineteenth century. It only appeared for the first time in a supplementary volume to the Oxford English Dictionary in 1933. [43]

The lack of a corresponding English term was also noticeable in connection to Johann Kaspar Bluntschli's *Lehre vom modernen Staat* in 1852, translated into English as 'Theory of the State' in 1892. The Swiss scholar of international law described the 'right of self-determination' (*Recht der Selbstbestimmung*) as the important concept of the international order and applied it to the national affairs of the nineteenth century. He specifically thematized this 'right' in relation to the Viennese Congress in 1815, where the contemporary Great Powers sanctioned the partitions of Poland and prevented the Italian and German processes of unification. As such, Bluntschli's references to the

'right of self-determination' problematized the arbitrary and forceful policy of Great Powers as opposed to the popular will in national communities. [44] In contrast, the English version of his book framed this issue through the 'principle of the independence of nationalities' rather than the 'right of self-determination'. [45]

The German and English versions, however, were identical in featuring the 'principle of nationality' (*Prinzip der Nationalität* in the German original) as the drive behind the modern trends of state formation. Bluntschli claimed that this 'principle' defined international politics and the transnational discourse since the 1840s. He specifically referred to the processes of Italian and German state unification as "inspired" by the concept. [46]

Similar to Mancini, Bluntschli interpreted the 'nation-state' as the political model of modernity. In contrast, he depicted the structure of the multinational state as in fundamental conflict with the 'principle of nationality'. Assimilation appeared as a possible solution to national(ist) conflicts in these contexts, as a certain state could still rely on the dominant culture of one nationality to stabilize its framework. Bluntschli referred to the national policy of the Russian Empire as the primary example to this end. In contrast, the Habsburg Monarchy appeared in his narrative as defined by tendencies towards its "partition" (*teilen*) and their political separation of its nationalities from each other (*politisch auseinander zu gehen*). The *Ausgleich* and the transformation of the empire into 'Austria–Hungary' already appeared as the symptom of disintegration in this regard. [47]

It is important to emphasize that Bluntschli referred to different concepts of the 'nation' (*Nation*) as the subjects of the 'right to self-determination' in the consecutive editions of his book. In the text of the first publication in 1852, the former term referred

to the political community of the state. In contrast, the third edition of 1863 featured a more culturally defined concept of the nation. [48] To be precise, Bluntschi described the 'nation' as a natural community of spirit, mentality, and race (*Geistes-, Gemüts- und Rassegemeinschaft*) in this version of his book. [49] This shift between the interpretations of the national community was due to the different positions of Bluntschli in 1852 and 1863. As André Liebich puts it, within a decade, the Swiss scholar "moved away from a French conception of nation and people to one based on race". [50]

Although its basis was the third edition English of the *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, the English translation of 1892 maintained the viewpoint that the 'nation' was a political community (although this term now corresponded to the concept of *Volk* in the German text). In contrast, the subject of the 'principle of the independence' (and not 'the right to self-determination') was the 'nationalities' or the 'peoples' in the English text (as opposed to the German concept of *Nation*). [51]

One must consider in relation to this issue that the translator was the Scottish Hegelian, socialist and Idealist David George Ritchie. The philosopher idealized the political system of democracy. He claimed that this was the "sole regime, in which confidence was warranted" that minority groups could convince the "rest of society" to support their initiatives. [52] Thus, Ritchie would describe the 'nation' as a political community. This was not independent of the traditions of the British context, as a significant section of local liberals and conservatives did not agree with the possible interpretation of their community as ethno-cultural or 'racial'.

In my opinion, the claim of Liebich that the 'right of nations to dispose themselves' was the "most common mode" of referring to the concept of 'national self-determination' in English is rather debatable. I would rather argue that English

translations of the German term *Selbstbestimmungsrecht* consciously corrupted its meaning to the benefit of the 'principle of nationality', a concept of central role in the British discourse. One must also emphasize that although they in part do overlap, the terms 'principle of independence', the 'right to choose one's own mode of government' and 'self-determination' do not mean the same and cannot be used as synonyms. They are all broader concepts than that.

It is also important to accentuate that the term 'self-government' also appears in various studies as the English equivalent to the German *Selbstbestimmung(srecht)*. Paul Kluke assumes in his *Selbstbestimmung: Vom Weg einer Idee durch die Geschichte* (1963) that it was due to the presence of the former concept in the discourse that resulted in the lack of 'self-determination' from British historical sources. The German scholar claims that the latter only appeared as a term with a different meaning in the British context due to transformation of the colonial empire into the Commonwealth. [53]

Historical sources from the broader era of the First World War, however, do not seem to support the association of 'self-government' with 'self-determination' in the Anglo-American context. For instance, Gilbert Murray resisted this assumption in his article "Self-Determination of Nationalities", written in the immediate aftermath of peace making (1922). The classical scholar stated that one "should not confuse" these terms with each other. Murray claimed that the "phrase self-determination" was not a "natural one" in English. He identified it as the term *Selbstbestimmungsrecht* of German origin. Murray also stated that this was "adopted and became popular" in Great Britain a 'particular moment' of history. While he vaguely identified the latter as the time "when the end of the War was believed to be in sight", he never specified the process of its cultural transfer into the British context. [54]

These observations are important to emphasize, since André Liebich also studies the article of Murray in his book of 2022. His claim, however, is erroneous that the author would have described the term 'self-determination' as of "Germanic" origin. [55] Murray rather stated that the "idea first came from Germany", as 'Germans discovered in the very first weeks that they were fighting for the liberation' of the non-dominant nationalities of the colonial and land empires of the Entente. However, he also emphasized that he personally found no actual German references to the concept of *Selbstbestimmungsrecht* from the starting period of the First World War. [56]

Liebich also fails to contextualize Murray in terms of political and ideological position. In contrast, Glenda Sluga identifies Murray as the member of the Britain-based, but transnational society of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) during the First World War. [57] One must remember that although in support of the concept of 'self-determination', the liberal and labour-dominated discourse of the UDC was still resistant to the interpretation of 'nationality' as a concept central to the reorganization of international affairs. It formulated its viewpoint in opposition to that of the *New Europe*, which supported national secessionism from the Habsburg Monarchy.

Thus, I find important to study the role of 'self-determination' in the British discourse of the late First World War. I will specifically focus on the discussions of the *New Europe*. Besides its already established importance for the specific interests of this chapter, it is logical to suppose that a journal in support of national secessionism would refer to this concept as soon as it could. Thus, it becomes possible to pinpoint the appearance of the 'self-determination of peoples' in this discourse, the transnational source(s) for its cultural transfer, and its parallel concepts.

d. *The Spectrum of The British Discourse of 'Nationality' during the First World War*

The wartime opposition between Great Britain and Austria–Hungary attributed a specific importance to discussions in relation to the 'principle of nationality' in the British context. Hanak describes the contemporary streams of local public opinion through a 'liberal–conservative' dichotomy. His narrative features "most liberals" as "hostile" towards the 'rights of nationality' in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy. This was due to their pacifist opposition to continuation of the war and their pursuit for peace, which would have been rendered impossible if states were to fight for their very survival. In contrast, the dominant majority of conservatives would support the dismemberment of Austria–Hungary and the 'liberation' of subject nationalities due to "purely tactical" considerations of war-time policy (which viewpoint Hanak criticizes as not one of true conviction). [58]

Hanak, however, rather discusses the processes that contributed to the formation of the liberal public opinion. He depicts this procedure as a struggle between the "opposition" to the dismemberment of Austria–Hungary and the supporters of national secessionism. The first representatives of the latter viewpoint would include the "journalist" C. Ernest Fayle and the unnamed authors of the articles that appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Morning Post* in August 1914. [59]

In contrast, Hanak identifies a "group of socialists and radicals" as the main force behind the opposition to the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy, which topic he discusses in a separate chapter of his book. He mentions previously that this group continued the discursive tradition established by Acton, as they opposed the viewpoint that the concept of 'nationality' could operate as the foundation of the state and the international order. He then describes the individual political thought of Henry

Noel Brailsford, Noel and Charles Buxton to showcase the arguments against the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Hanak depicts these individuals as one to subordinate the 'principle of nationality' to geographic and economic considerations. The Union of Democratic Control appears in this narrative as the organization to unite these and other similar-minded individuals and to provide a common platform of significant influence in the British public. While Hanak interprets the UDC as driven by a genuine desire for peace and a belief in the "democratic control of foreign policy", he also claims that its members "knew little" and "cared even less" about Austria–Hungary and its nationalities. In general, the organization appears in his narrative as a platform which "raised insularity to a virtue" in its selfish, English-centred view of the outside world. [60]

In contrast, the *New Europe* appears in the book of Hanak as a platform for the "advocates of freedom for the oppressed peoples of Austria–Hungary" and as a liberal journal of 'very great' influence. He describes Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, Richard Burrows (the principal of King's College) and Frederick Whyte, a liberal representative in the British parliament as the four "founders" of the weekly review. Masaryk appears in this narrative as the Czech politician to "ai'" this process. [61]

The *New Europe* appears in this narrative as the antithesis of the UDC. Hanak describes it as a "journal of world affairs" that attempted to create a "permanent interest in continental affairs" and a "cosmopolitan consciousness" in the British public. This "international magazine" would have "collaborators" from the intellectual elite of Great Britain and other "allied countries". The audience of the journal included "like-minded people" in "Paris, Rome and Washington". The *New Europe* would also put forward

"practical suggestions" for democratic reform in British diplomacy as opposed to the "generalizations and pious hopes" of the UDC. [62]

Hanak also shares the narrative of the journal enthusiastically that "nationality was the only guide to the reorganization of Europe". He reports that the *New Europe* identified the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy as the "most important item of" its "plan" in this regard. He once again unapologetically echoes its narrative that the dissolution of Austria–Hungary was necessary since it was the "satellite" of Germany and since it "stood for that system of national oppression and aristocratic and military rule which had to disappear from the world". [63]

In contrast to this partial description and differentiation between the groups, the *New Europe* and the UDC rather appear as different sides of the same coin in the studies of Glenda Sluga. Both are referred to as "strands" of "political support for national self-determination"; it is only their viewpoints on 'nationality' that differentiates these groups in the narrative. The contributors to the *New Europe* would construct "psychological conceptions" of national identity and argue for their importance in relation to the reconstruction of Europe. In contrast, the members of the UDC would discard these concepts as too fluid and unstable. They would rather interpret national identity as corresponding to a "herd-instinct" rather than a "mature" collective personality. [64] It thus becomes understandable narrative why the UDC would refer to economic and other considerations as on pair with or superior to the otherwise supported concept of 'self-determination'.

However, Sluga also claims that the *New Europe* was "the most influential English-language wartime vehicle for advocating national self-determination as the basis of post-war democracy in Europe". The related role of Masaryk also appears to be

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stronger in this narrative. The article of Sluga features the "aspiring Czech politician-in-exile" as the one to "fund" the journal. [65]

It is also worth to notice that Masaryk appears in the role of the "founder" or at least the "supporter" in these narratives. As such, it becomes important to observe the activities of the Czechoslovak political emigration in the Entente countries and the contribution of its leader to the foundation and the discourse of the *New Europe*. The next chapter will showcase these processes before the analysis of the journal's discourse.

e. *The Activities of Masaryk in Great Britain and* The New Europe

In his post-war memoirs, the first President of the Czechoslovak Republic claimed that he ceased to believe in the possibility of reforms in the Habsburg Monarchy already before 1914. The retrospective study of his activities throws doubt onto this statement, as it seems that he only started to work actively for the foundation of independent Czechoslovakia with the start of the First World War. Although he organized the Czech members of his political alliance (Realists and Young Czechs) into a small informal circle called the 'Mafia' (*Maffie*), Masaryk did not really believe in the possibility of a local 'revolution'. He rather aimed to mobilize his foreign associates and gain external support for national independence. [66]

One of his most important contacts was Robert William Seton-Watson. Although of Scottish origin and with the identity of a proud Scotsman, the historian still integrated into the British nation through his education at Winchester and Oxford. [67] Seton-Watson was originally the enthusiast of the Hungarian national movement. However, his travel to Hungary during a period of political crisis altered his views on

the subject. His position shifted to that of the supporter of the 'oppressed' nationalities. [68] It is quite possible that this viewpoint was in correspondence with his Scottish identity, as he could find parallels to his nation's historical struggles for independence in local national narratives.

Seton-Watson met Masaryk for the first time in 1907. The two individuals slowly, but steadily built a relationship throughout the years. Masaryk encouraged Seton-Watson's plan of an English-language regular review to discuss continental issues of nationalism. However, it is important to emphasize that neither of these individuals was a supporter of national secessionism from the Habsburg Monarchy before the war. Seton-Watson rather hoped for limited national reforms such as a trialist reorganization in the Monarchy and the survival of the composite state as the important element of the European balance of power. [69]

While the start of First World War already shifted his viewpoint towards the support of national secessionism, it was Masaryk who provided the final push to this end. In Rotterdam, October 1914, the Czech politician convinced Seton-Watson to support his concept of an 'independent Bohemia' and by extension, the dissolution of Habsburg Monarchy. The nation-state proposed by Masaryk was to incorporate the territories inhabited by Czechs and Slovaks – and some more. [70]

It is worth to notice that the proposed name of the new state was originally not 'Czechoslovakia', but rather 'Bohemia'. It is easy to realize that this was due to the historical connotations of the name and Masaryk's related claims to the historical territories of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. In his 'original notes of conservations at Rotterdam with Masaryk', Seton-Watson reported of quite specific claims from the Czech politician. Masaryk argued that there was "extreme difficulty" in "drawing a

tenable frontier on a basis of ethnography" in local terms due to the mixed nature of local populations. Thus, he could not aim to construct a "Czecho-Slovak" state on a purely "racial" basis; he "had" to incorporate the historical Bohemian territories inhabited by Germans into this unit. [71]

It was at this point in the conversation that the 'principle of nationality', and not 'national self-determination' appeared as the counter-concept of 'historical claims'. In contrast to the claim of his sons, the notes of Seton-Watson did not contain references to 'self-determination' in any form. A difference rather appeared between borders on drawn on 'racial' (ethno-cultural) or 'historical' grounds. [72] However, Masaryk's arguments as to the economic and strategic needs seemed to override the concerns of Seton-Watson in this regard – at least this is what his sons reported in their work of 1981.

It is also worth to notice the shift in Masaryk's position in contrast to his viewpoint before the war. His concept of 'independent Bohemia' combined the historical vision of the state rights discourse and the ethno-cultural idea of Czech–Slovak unity – which had been counter-concepts to each other. It was no wonder that Masaryk had difficulties to explain the rationale behind his choices to Seton-Watson. In this sense, his problems were much similar to that of his fellow Czech politicians in the Austrian *Reichsrat* in 1917 (who adopted the concept of the 'Czechoslavs' from him).

The Austro–Hungarian authorities soon forced Masaryk into permanent political exile. After a short stay in Switzerland, he moved to London in September 1915 to stay until April 1917. According to his memoirs, Masaryk considered the British capital to be the "ideological centre" of the war. [73]

Around the same, his political group also started to establish its own organizational network. The so-called 'Czecho-Slovak Foreign Committee' appeared to this end and issued a public statement on November 14, 1915. This declared a national war against the Habsburg Monarchy and demanded the foundation of the independent nation state. The foundation of the "Czecho-Slovak National Council" soon followed as official representative of the "Czecho-Slovak" nation with Masaryk as its President. [74]

The leader of the group himself received the position of a lecturer at the new "School of Slavonic Studies". The founder of this establishment was Richard Burrows, the principal of King's College, who had conceived its idea with Seton-Watson. Masaryk used this position of the intellectual authority to intermediate the political language of the Czechoslovak emigration to the British audience. This was also the purpose of his inaugural lecture, "The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis". [75]

The same purpose drove Masaryk in his revitalization of Seton-Watson's previous plans concerning a weekly review dedicated to studies of nationalism. In their correspondence, the Czechoslovak leader argued that such a platform was necessary to counterbalance the local influence of Austrophile parties. [76] Masaryk hoped that such a medium could also help influence the British government to support national secessionism from the Habsburg Monarchy. [77]

The *New Europe* was a result of this initiative and the co-operation of various individuals, which processes are traceable in the narratives of Hanak and the Seton-Watsons. Masaryk's role was instrumental as for the main financer of the journal. This, however, did not extend to the entire history of *The New Europe*. According to my

findings, Masaryk only promised to support the starting phase of the review. [78] Afterwards, Seton-Watson was the one to invest the most capital into the journal, which was from being a successful enterprise in financial terms. [79] On the other hand, Masaryk also helped the British historian to select and invite the first round of collaborators to the *New Europe*. Robert William Seton-Watson, 'Letter to Prof. Pollard', 25 October 1916, box 2/3, fold. 3, Seton-Watson Collection.

His presence on the official list of collaborators also showed the exceptional role of Masaryk. Ever since the start of the *New Europe* in October 1916, this list featured Masaryk as a collaborator from 'Bohemia' similar to others from Belgium, 'Britain', France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Russia and Serbia. [80] This showed the attempt of the editorial board to legitimize his concept of 'Bohemia' as an independent nation-state. On the other hand, it was also noteworthy that the transnational network of the *New Europe* did not only incorporate British individuals, but a considerable number of intellectuals and politicians from the 'Eastern' countries of the Entente (Russia, Romania, Serbia). The group of the occasional authors included the citizens of even more countries or the representatives of Austro–Hungarian secessionist movements such as the members of the Yugoslav political emigration.

The role of Masaryk was also instrumental in defining certain key concepts in the discourse of the journal. The Czechoslovak leader was the one to write the very first leading article of the *New Europe*, which addressed the topic of German war aims under the title *Pangermanism and the Eastern Question*. [81] This theme would become recurrent in the discourse of the *New Europe* with a considerable influence on the perception of the British public. [82] Masaryk also provided the ideological foundations for the journal with his 'democracy–theocracy' dichotomy and the introduction of

certain regional concepts, which I will describe later. Finally, the Czechoslovak political emigration could provide a steady flow of news from Austria–Hungary to the collaborators of the review through the *Maffie*. [83]

On the other hand, it is also important to emphasize the role of Seton-Watson as the chief editor of the *New Europe*. [84] Although the claim of Hanak might be debatable that Seton-Watson wrote "most of the journal himself", it is for sure that the British historian wrote a considerable amount of articles either under his name or under the pseudonym 'Rubicon'. As the already established expert of Austro–Hungarian affairs and issues of local nationalism, he would often write about these topics. Other authors also had specialized interests: Rex Leeper issued articles on Russia, Salvador de Madariaga on Spain, while John Mavrogordato and Burrows would discuss topics in relation to Greece. [85]

The first issue of the *New Europe* (October 19, 1916) was thus the result of a considerable investment and co-operation. It featured a sort of invocation ("The New Europe") to summarize the intents of the journal. This defined the review as a "rallying ground" in support of "European reconstruction"; the key concepts in this regard were 'nationality', 'the rights of minorities', 'history' and 'geography'. [86]

These supported the endeavour of the collaborators to "read the meaning of history out of the brutal logic of facts" the foundation of their "constructive" approach to politics. The *New Europe* was also to create a "sane and well-informed public opinion" as a result of its activities. [87] This was the declaration of a clear political attempt to influence local elites in Great Britain, France and the United States and to gain support for the vision of "reconstruction". [88] "Sane" and "well-informed", of course, referred to those sharing of this vision. It is thus quite clear in retrospect that the

New Europe fashioned its political viewpoint as a scientific and objective one to gain the position of intellectual authority in the British public.

The introduction also featured the "emancipation of the subject races" in "central and south-eastern Europe" from "German and Magyar control" as a specific goal of the collaborators. This statement was consistent with the personal views of Seton-Watson, shared by the British collaborators of the review. However, one must emphasize that 'subject race' had already appeared in the British context with a specific meaning in the framing and the discussions of colonial imperial rule. This designation referred to 'non-native races' with an intermediate position between the European (British) 'colonizer' and the native 'colonized'. They were superior to the 'colonized' due to their recognition by civic law. Yet, these were also deprived of the rights of citizenship and were targets of specific discriminatory politics. [89]

Since the term also appeared in the discussions of Russian, Ottoman, and Austrian imperial rule during the nineteenth century, it provided a basis of comparison between the policies of the British Empire and these states. As for the *New Europe*, this meant that its discourse depicted the nationalities of Austria–Hungary (or any of the Central Powers) as subjects of oppressive, borderline colonial policies in states dominated by certain national groups (primarily Germans and Magyars). On the other hand, it did not problematize the national policy of tsarist Russia until the fall of the regime in the February Revolution.

Finally, it is also worth to consider the influence of national movements in Austria–Hungary on this discourse through the intermediation of secessionist movements. While the term 'subject races' had its history in the British context, its application to Austria–Hungary coincided with the narrative of various local groups as

for the German and Hungarian 'racial rule' (*Racenherrschaft*) in the Monarchy since 1867. It is much likely that Masaryk contributed to the formation of this discourse in the *New Europe* through his articles.

By extension, the hypothesis becomes natural that the 'self-determination of peoples' must have been the key concept of the review in its discussion of 'reorganization' and the 'new Europe'. However, this concept that did not appear in this discourse for a long time, especially with a central role. It was rather '(the principle of) nationality' that the collaborators often referred to. This was in connection to the specific interpretations of the 'nation' in *The New Europe* and its focus on the 'democratic state' as the definitive political model of modernity. Its counter-concept in this regard, however, was not necessarily the 'empire' or the 'multinational state', but rather the 'theocratic state'. Since I find these concepts important for the analysis of Masaryk's theories in the *New Europe* and his own book, I will dedicate the next sub-chapters to their study in the discourse of the review. I will start with the joint analysis of 'self-determination' and its parallel concept, the 'principle of nationality' on the pages of the *New Europe*.

i. The 'Principle of Nationality' and Self-Determination

'Nationality' as a political principle of 'reorganization' already appeared in the introduction of the *New Europe*; the 'principle of nationality' was also referred to in its full form in the first issue. [90] It seems that it needed no explanation in the context of the review that these concepts referred to the 'reorganization' of Europe and the 'nation-state' as the foundation of the future international order. The *New Europe* especially

supported the creation of 'Bohemia', Yugoslavia, Poland and a 'Greater' Romania through the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The 'principle of nationality', however, did not only have this organizational aspect, but also a specific normative load, since it was embedded in the dichotomy between 'democracy–theocracy' in the discourse of the weekly. The unnamed author of the article „The Reorganization of Europe" described it as a "democratic principle" of the "Allies" (the Entente Powers) in support of the solutions of "national questions" in Europe. In contrast, the Central Powers appeared as the alliance of "non-national" and "artificial" states. [91] The correspondence of Seton-Watson reveals that Masaryk was the author of this article, introduced otherwise only as a "distinguished authority" on the subject of 'Central Europe'. [92]

This was of course a narrative of wartime policy rather than an objective description of affairs. For instance, the 'democratic' or the 'national' nature of the Russian Empire as a member of the Entente was up to debates even in the contemporary context. However, it was much more important that the article featured a dichotomy between the 'national' and the 'non-national' state and that it emphasized the role of the 'principle of nationality' in the future 'reorganization' of Europe by the Entente, issues consistent in and central to the discourse of the *New Europe*.

This narrative could expand upon the announcement of "Allied" war aims in early 1917. This was a result of President Wilson's attempt to intermediate between the Entente and the Central Powers. Upon his call, the belligerent alliances both proclaimed their war aims. It was important for the *New Europe* that the so-called "Allied Note" incorporated the "liberation" of Italians, Romanians, and "Czecho-Slovaks" from

"foreign domination" as a political goal. This was the first official endorsement of such claims by the Entente. [93]

The collaborators of the *New Europe* were eager to integrate these claims into their narrative. "The Allies' Programme" was the first attempt to this end as the leading article of the issue on January 18, 1917. It celebrated the claims of the Entente as their official endorsement of the 'principle of nationality', the foundation of the future international order. The 'liberation' of 'subject' nationalities in Austria–Hungary of course amounted to the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation (or enlargement) of nation states in this interpretation. [94]

However, those believing in this narrative must have soon realized that there was no true commitment to the 'principle of nationality' in the wartime policy of the Entente. The 'Allied Note' rather attempted to gain sympathy and support in the American public through the depiction of the Entente as in support of the 'oppressed' nations and their 'liberation'. [95] On the other hand, such vague statements were also attempts at the "instigation" of nationalities against the Austro–Hungarian government (as Jörg Fisch would phrase it).

On the other hand, all of this shows that 'self-determination' was originally not a key concept of *The New Europe*, as it entered a discourse previously defined by the 'principle of nationality' in early 1917. It appeared for the first time in a short editorial note titled "Poland's Freedom" (April 5, 1917), in the context of Russian national policy after the February Revolution. Importantly, the role of the 'editor' referred to Frederick Whyte at this time, as Seton-Watson was drafted into military service in March 1917. [96] Thus, it was Whyte who reported that the Russian Provisional Government granted the 'right of self-determination' to Poland, formerly a mere province of the Russian

Empire. This amounted to the Russian official pledge to restore the independence of the state once partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburg Monarchy. Whyte approved this policy and demanded the application of the same concept of 'self-determination' to 'Czechs' and 'Yugoslavs'. [97]

There were indicative features of the review's discourse that already appeared in "Poland's Freedom". First, the editorial note was published before the official endorsement of 'the right of peoples to self-determination' by the foreign policy of the Provisional Government. It thus showcased a remarkable speed as for the flow of information from revolutionary Russia to the *New Europe*, most possibly through the 'Maffia' of the Czechoslovak political emigration. Second: although it appeared in a marginal section of the review (the 'editorial notes' followed the main articles), the editor was still enthusiastic in his reception of the concept and found it useful for the purposes of the discourse.

Employed by the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information, Seton-Watson soon started to forward to his superiors the claim the 'right of self-determination' appeared as a formative key concept in the ideological struggle of the First World War. In his first report titled *Special Memorandum On the Question of a Separate Peace with Austria*, the British historian stated the Russian revolutionary slogan of 'peace without annexations' posed a challenge to British foreign policy and its attempts at constructing a lasting peace after the First World War. Seton-Watson of course interpreted the 'break-up' of Austria–Hungary as integral to the latter issue. He claimed that to maintain its image and gain support for its cause, the British government was to "proclaim [its – L. B. B.] determination" to "secure every single nationality in Europe […] *the right to self-determination*". The historian argued that such a

declaration could reinterpret 'Allied' war aims as consistent with the democratic *Zeitgeist* after the February Revolution. [98]

It thus appears to be rightful to claim that the concept of 'self-determination' appeared through the process of cultural transfer in the discourse of the *New Europe*, as the February Revolution of Russia always appeared as its main point of reference throughout 1917. The main British collaborators of the journal also authored a document titled *Self-Determination / The Self-Determination of Nations*, which reinforced the narrative of Seton-Watson in his memorandum. The authors claimed that the foreign policy of "New Russia" meant a breakthrough in the ideological aspect of warfare. They attempted to convince the British government to proclaim its devotion to this concept and the "principles of democracy" as opposed to the *Realpolitik* and the secret treaties of the war. [99]

It was important that the collaborators of the *New Europe* found the concept of 'self-determination' to be compatible with the 'principle of nationality'. The editorial notes of the review featured excerpts of an interview with the Georgi Plekhanov, a representative of Russian social democracy on August 16, 1917. The interviewee referred to the 'right of nations to dispose themselves' as a "socialist formula" and the "application of the principle of nationality in its most democratic form". [100] Given the Russian social democratic context after the February Revolution, the 'right of nations to dispose themselves' was without a doubt equivalent to the 'right of nations to self-determination'.

On the other hand, one must also point out that the theme of 'ideological transfer' was also much relevant in connection to the adaptation of the concept into the discourse of the *New Europe*. In terms of ideological affiliation, the journal has been

described as 'liberal' in its tone; its main adversaries included the members of British labour. However, the 'right of peoples to self-determination' was a predominantly social democratic concept in Russia after the February Revolution. The authors of the New Europe adopted the term from this specific ideological context, as exemplified by their report of the interview with Plekhanov.

The application of this concept to international affairs was rather interesting in the latter article. In relation to the struggle between Romania and Austria–Hungary, Plekhanov referred to the Romanian aspirations as "just" and in correspondence with the 'right of self-determination' and the 'principle of nationality'. He understood the latter as equivalent to the Romanian designs of national unification through the 'liberation' of Romanians in Hungarian Transylvania and Austrian Bukovina. [101] As such, the 'right of self-determination' appeared as a parallel concept to support the 'principle of nationality' in discourse of the *New Europe.*

The article "*La Victoire Intégrale*" also featured the 'inherent right of every people to determine the nature of its political allegiance and the form of its governments' as central to the future reorganization of Europe in the next issue of the review (August 23, 1917). I claim that this was yet another alternative to the 'right of (national) self-determination' due to the similar British historical precedence of translating the concept as 'the right of nations to choose their own modes of government'. It is worth to notice the concept had already appeared previously in the *New Europe* in the form of the 'right of self-determination'. I attribute these inconsistencies of the translation to the still fresh appearance of the concept in the British context. However, the "*La Victorie Intégrale*" already interpreted this, and not

the 'principle of nationality' as the "true expression" of the *New Europe*'s ideals during the First World War. [102]

One can of course attempt to problematize my identification of the 'right of nations to dispose themselves' or the 'inherent right of every people to determine the nature of its political allegiance and the form of its governments' with 'self-determination' by simply juxtaposing it with my previous claims as for the English translations of the concept before the First World War. However, the 'right of nations to dispose themselves' appeared in an interview with a Russian social democratic representative after the February Revolution; I think that this context strongly supports my related claims. On the other hand, I do not consider the 'inherent right of every people to determine the nature of its political allegiance and the form of its governments' as a corrupt translation of 'self-determination', as it rather describes precisely the main normative loads of the concept in contemporary terms. It is also worth to remark that 'self-determination' also soon became the dominant form of referring to the concept in the context of the *New Europe*.

It is also essential to point out the shifts in the importance of the term. The concept of 'self-determination' appeared in the discourse of the review half a year after its opening issue had identified '(the principle of) nationality' as one of its key concepts. Although the founders realized its importance in the transnational discourse of the war, 'self-determination' appeared only for ten (10) times in the weekly issues of the *New Europe* between April – November 1917 (7 months). In contrast, the journal featured the concept sixteen (16) times in the period between November 1917 – January 1918, more than before in the duration of half the time (3 months). After January 1918 and

until the end of the war (end of November), 'self-determination' for twenty-six times (26) in the *New Europe* (11 months).

One must emphasize that the concept of 'sovereignty' was not really associated with the 'principle of nationality' and 'self-determination' in the discourse of the *New Europe*. It did appear in this context – but only for a negligible number of times. For instance, the Romanian politician Take Ionescu interpreted the 'principle of nationality' as the "extension of national sovereignty to interethnic relations" in his "The Greatest Danger" (May 17, 1917). [103] However, other authors did not really adopt this narrative.

'Self-determination' also appeared as the 'union of free, equal and sovereign will' in the article of Miloš Savčić ("A New Regime for Serbia*",* October 17, 1918). However, the author discussed a specific context, the political debates in contemporary Serbia in this piece. The identification of 'self-determination' with 'sovereign will' supported the interpretation of the Serbian opposition as 'democratic' in contrast to the 'anti-democratic' government of Nikola Pašić. [104]

It is worth to accentuate that the concept of 'self-determination' and the 'principle of nationality' were not synonymous to each other in the narrative framework of the *New Europe*. For instance, these terms appeared as separate from each other in an article that proposed a detailed program for the victorious Allied and Associated Powers at the end of the war ("Our Peace Terms", October 17, 1918). This piece identified 'self-determination' as the "right of every national to control its own destinies, and to decide its State-allegiance". In contrast, the 'principle of nationality' appeared as a "vital factor" in the creation of a new international order. [105] The former concept thus appeared as the offspring of 'subjective' national sentiments, whereas the latter was described through 'objective' terms as a general 'principle'.

This remark is important due to various reasons. One is historiographical in its nature: the concept of 'national self-determination' has often appeared as a synonym to the 'principle of nationality' in various works. The above-mentioned studies of Sluga, for instance, find no trouble in referencing to these concepts as interchangeable in the discourse of the *New Europe* or other contexts. However, the British historian E. H. Carr problematized the same conflation of concepts during the peace-making process after the First World War as of 1942 already. He claimed that such interpretations represented a severe "cardinal intellectual oversight". In contrast, local plebiscites at the end of the war showed that the identification of certain groups with particular nations due to their language did not always coincide with their allegiance to states. [106] My findings also support the separation of these concepts.

This observation is important not only for the studies of the *New Europe*, but the contemporary British context in general. It is anachronistic to discuss a local discourse of 'self-determination' until the late phase of the war since there was a lack of historical traditions in this regard. If there would have been any British heritage of such kind, it is hard to believe that the concept would have only appeared in the *New Europe* half a year after the start of its activities. It is rather rightful to speak of a local discourse of 'nationality' and identify the 'principle of nationality' as its key concept.

As I will also show it later in this case study, the adaptation of the concept from the discourse of the February Revolution in Russia refutes the interpretation of 'self-determination' as a concept of 'Anglo-American' or 'Wilsonian' in its origin, or the central role of Lenin in the initiation of the transnational discourse for that matter. It is rather beneficial to apply the concept of 'cultural transfer' to this issue. At the same, the

term 'ideological transfer' can easily apply to the adaptation of this originally Russian social democratic concept to liberal discourses in the British context.

One must also emphasize that rather specific concepts of the 'nation' appeared as the subjects of 'the right to self-determination' in the discourse of the *New Europe*. I will discuss this issue in the next sub-chapter. In this regard, Sluga's studies with their focus on the role of psychology in this discourse will become especially valuable. On the other hand, the opportunity arises the discuss the debates in this intellectual framework in connection to the 'ethno-cultural' or 'political' interpretation of the nation, one of the main concerns of the dissertation.

To sum this section up, the 'principle of nationality' was fundamental to the discourse of the *New Europe* ever since the start of its activities in October 1916. This key concept appeared in support of national secessionism from the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation of new nation-states. It was embedded in the narrative of the review as for the dichotomy between the 'democratic' nation states of the Entente as opposed to the 'anti-national' and 'artificial' states of 'theocracy' in the alliance of the Central Powers.

In contrast, the 'right of self-determination' for 'nations' appeared only in April 1917 in this discourse due to the transnational influence of the February Revolution of Russia. This initially appeared as a supplementary concept of the 'principle of nationality' in support of national secessionism and unification. While the founders of the review emphasized its great role in the ideological struggles of the First World War and it appeared frequently in the *New Europe*, it only gained a constant role in the journal by January 1918. It was important that it remained separate from the 'principle of the nationality' due to its interpretation as a 'subjective' matter of national feelings

rather the former, 'objective' principle of continental reorganization. I pointed out that besides the cultural transfer of the concept, its adaptation was also a case of ideological transfer into the British liberal discourse of the *New Europe*, as the term was originally a part of social democratic discussions in the context of the Russian Empire.

ii. 'Nation'

The subject of the 'right of self-determination' was the 'nation', and not the 'people' in the discourse of the *New Europe*. In contrast to the hesitation of historical international law and the international political discourse to define the 'people', the collaborators of the review were confident in referring to the 'nation' as their key concept. This was of course in correspondence with their view of 'nationality' as central to the 'reorganization' of the international order.

It is important to emphasize, however, that there were differences between the various definitions of the 'nation' in this discourse. Masaryk was the main representative of one side in this debate through his articles. His "Pangermanism and the Eastern Question" (October 19, 1916) already featured the ethno-cultural concept of the 'race' as equivalent to the 'nation'. It was this community that appeared as one with the "strong feeling of nationality" in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy at the late eighteenth century and in the consecutive period of the n century. [107]

It is important to remark that Masaryk depicted this 'nation' as the "natural organ" of humanity; he referred to the German philosopher of Enlightenment Johann Gottfried Herder as the original source of this claim. He stated that Herder had identified the "artificial organization" of state as the counter-concept of this 'nation' in the international context of the late eighteenth century. [108] In this regard, it is important to

emphasize that the German philosopher did not use the term 'race' as the synonym of the 'nation'. Herder rather emphasized the role of 'language' and 'culture' in the making of national identities; he even denied the existence of 'biological races' altogether in his works. [109]

The "Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations" (December 16, 1916) of Masaryk then depicted a close relationship between the ideas of the 'state' and the 'nation' in the early twentieth century. The latter ethno-cultural concept appeared as the firm foundation of contemporary political and administrative frameworks. The "Western zone" of Europe appeared as borderline ideal in this sense. Its states appeared as a result of organic historical developments, while local "national minorities" lacked "political claims". The Habsburg Monarchy, of course, embodied the counter-concept of the 'mixed' and 'artificial' state in this narrative with its lack of a "decisive majority". Masaryk claimed it was due to this feature that Austria–Hungary was a centre of "political unrest". [110]

Some other authors of the *New Europe* also referred to the concept of the 'nation' in a sense similar to Masaryk. One of them was John Mavrogordato, whose "From Nationalism to Federalism" described national identity as corresponding to language, religion, customs, biological markers, and the presence of political movements in the historical context of contemporary Spain. [111] It is worth to mention in this regard that the British author was of Greek background and remained "related" to "an international network of cosmopolitan Greeks" throughout his life according to Peter Mackridge's article in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. [112] This could not only help him to become the 'Greek' expert of the *New Europe* but could also contribute to his interpretation of the 'nation' as corresponding to ethno-cultural factors.

The approach of other British authors to this issue, however, was rather different. Ramsay Muir, for instance, differentiated between 'race' and 'nation' in his "Europe and the non-European Word" (June 28, 1917). He stated that national communities were too "mixed" for them to be identified only through ethno-cultural and biological markers. Muir also claimed that 'language' was not "essentially important" in terms of national identity; he pointed at the contexts of Ireland, Belgium, and Switzerland to support this statement. As such, the author debated the usefulness of 'race' as an ethno-cultural concept and especially its possible application to the 'reorganization' of Europe. He rather emphasized the importance of "national spirit" and the "unanimity of sentiment" in the formation of communities. [113] 'Nation' thus rather appeared as a political community in this interpretation.

Opinions more resistant towards the ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'nation', its relationship to the 'state' and especially the related viewpoint of Masaryk appeared in the broader intellectual framework of the *New Europe*. The British historian A. F. Giles sent a letter to the editorial board of the review to criticize the narrative of the Czechoslovak leader in "The Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations", which appeared under the title "What is Nationality?" in the issue of January 28, 1917. Giles claimed in direct opposition to Masaryk that 'race' and 'nation' were fundamentally different concepts. He interpreted 'nation' as the developed form of 'race', a result of a historical merge between various communities and the formation of their common identity. Giles emphasized the role of the 'state' as a framework in this regard. The author of the letter referred to Belgium, Switzerland and Scotland as such national communities to support his arguments. [114]

Despite the promises of the editor, Masaryk never discussed his concept of 'nationality' in a separate article; he only addressed the criticism of Giles in his correspondence with Seton-Watson. The Czechoslovak leader maintained his viewpoint that the foundations of "nations" were "racial". He claimed that the state could not create a "common sense" of "nationality", only a common sense of "citizenship" at best. He discarded the opposite statements of Giles as "typically English" in the sense that it "confounded" the concept of the "political nation" with "nationality". [115]

However, Masaryk also suggested to Seton-Watson that 'nationality' could provide a compromise between various national concepts in the framework of the *New Europe*. Positioned between the more ethno-cultural construct of the 'race' and the political state community of the 'nation', he claimed that this term could refer to the cultural identity of groups defined by language. [116]

In a certain sense, the correspondence between Masaryk and Seton-Watson was a part of the same debate, as the British historian also did not seem to interpret 'nation' as the direct equivalent of 'race'. "The Allies' Programme", his joint article with Henry Wickham Steed [117] showcased this viewpoint of his. The authors were enthusiastic to interpret of the 'Allied Note' as the commitment of the Entente to the 'liberation' of Italians, 'Slavs', 'Roumanians' and 'Czecho-Slovaks' and to the 'dismemberment' of Austria–Hungary. However, Seton-Watson and Steed also emphasized that besides 'race' and 'language', geography, economy, or other factors also contributed to the formation of national identities. The communities of Belgium and Switzerland exemplified this interpretation of 'nationality' in the text. [118]

Since Muir used Ireland and Giles referred to Scotland in support of their interpretation of 'nation' as a 'political' or 'mental' concept, it is worth to consider the

impact of the historical British discourse on their claims. It is also worth to recall the fact that Seton-Watson was also a Scottish member of the British political community. If one accepts the description of Hanak that the intellectual framework of the *New Europe* was primarily liberal in terms of ideology, then the tradition established by Lord Acton can easily come into mind in this regard – with the remark that similar concepts of the 'nation' had also appeared in the context of British conservativism. However, it is also important to refer to the importance of the 'four nations' narrative in the broader context of Great Britain in the nineteenth century. Thus, it becomes understandable that various British authors of the *New Europe* would not support the interpretation of 'race' as the foundation or the equivalent of the 'nation', as this could easily deconstruct the narrative of the 'British nation' as the political community of the state.

In this regard, it is worth to reconsider the statements of Masaryk and the reports of various historians with regard to his initial preference of 'historical rights' as opposed to the alleged domination of the 'principle of nationality' in the British context. These statements only stand true, if one emphasizes that the concept of 'nationality' was a part of specific narratives of the 'nation' in local terms and could become the subject of debates even in the *New Europe*. This observation also problematizes the interpretation of the review as 'united' in intellectual terms; I claim it is better to frame it as a 'discourse' or a 'discussion' of various concepts, 'transnational' in its nature.

Although she fails to frame or mention such dynamics, Sluga still brilliantly points out one important issue in the discourse of *The New Europe*: that its authors supported a Eurocentric and psychological interpretation of the 'nation'. She points out that Muir observed non-European peoples in accordance with a certain civilisational standard; he claimed that nationalism was a phenomenon restricted to Europe, since

only the populations of the continent were "mature" enough to develop national identities. This emphasis on the nation as a "collective identity" amounted to a "subjective" approach to 'nation' as an "individual" with its own mind. This showed the influence of psychology as a contemporary science of great politicosocial importance. [119] One could term this as a 'subjective' viewpoint on nationalism. It also becomes understandable that despite the 'international' outlook of the review, the concept of 'the new Europe' always remained central to its vision of reform.

However, my findings reveal out that it was rather the emphasis on 'objective' ethno-cultural and 'racial' markers that was typical for Masaryk's concept of the 'nation' or 'nationality'; the result was the appearance of a 'Czechoslovak–British' dichotomy in the discourse of the *New Europe*. This was no accident, given the political language of Masaryk's own group. The dissolution of the 'artificial' Habsburg Monarchy, the foundation of 'independent Bohemia' only appeared as necessary if there was a 'natural' connection between the ethno-cultural identity of the 'nation' and the secessionist claim towards the creation of one's own state.

This interpretation was also to support the basic concept of the 'Czechoslovak' nation, since its logical implication was that the Slovaks were not a group with their own will. This narrative made it seem that they identified with the Czechs due to their ethno-cultural kinship. It was no accident that Masaryk sometimes simply claimed that the "Slovaks are Bohemians [in this context, Czechs – L. B. B.]" without referring to any possible differences in identities or viewpoints. [120] [121] Finally, this narrative of Czechs and Slovaks as composing one, 'definitive' national 'majority' in 'Bohemia' was to convince those in doubt that the stable framework of their nation-state can replace the 'unstable' Austro–Hungarian Monarchy.

To sum it up, I frame the *The New Europe* as a platform of 'discussion' and a 'debate' for various concepts of nationalism as opposed to its previous interpretations as a 'united' discourse. I point out a dichotomy between the interpretations of the 'nation' as 'subjective', 'psychological' and 'political', or 'objective' and 'ethno-cultural' ('racial'). I claim that the former approach was typical for the British collaborators of the journal, whereas Masaryk (and some other authors with a background in 'central' or 'southeastern' Europe with the terms of the journal) were the representatives of the latter.

The relationship between the ideas of the 'state' and 'nation' was also central to this debate. Both sides supported the narrative that 'nationality' should be a key concept in the process of international 'reorganization'. However, Masaryk's interpretation implied that ethno-cultural 'race' and the related concept of the 'nation' should provide the 'objective' foundations in this regard. In contrast, various British authors rather conceptualized the 'nation' as a political and mental community of the state, different from and superior to the 'race' in terms of political development and identity. This was much due to their insistence on the 'British nation' as the political community of local nationalities.

The role of the concept of the 'empire' in the discourse could become especially interesting in view of these national concepts. Despite their differences, both sides of this debate emphasized the role of 'nationality' in the 'reorganization' of (European) international order and its close relationship with the 'state'. It is logical to assume that concepts parallel to the 'empire' or the 'multinational state' would appear as counter-concepts to the 'principle of nationality' or the 'self-determination of nations' in this framework. However, I will point out that the discourse of *The New Europe* was much

more complicated in this regard, as it rather differentiated between various forms of the 'state' and their relationship to these concepts.

iii. 'State'

Although it would be logical to expect its appearance as a counter-concept or a parallel concept to the 'principle of nationality' or the 'self-determination of nations', the authors of *The New Europe* did not describe any contemporary frameworks as "empires". Instead of the "Russian", "Habsburg" or "Austro–Hungarian" and "British Empire" for instance, they rather referred to these states as "Russia", "Austria–Hungary" or "Britain".

This was much due to their already established dichotomy between the 'national' and the 'non-national' state. The primary factor that distinguished these frameworks from each other was the presence of national 'majorities' (or the lack thereof). As described above, Masaryk depicted Austria–Hungary as an "unnatural" and "artificial" state due to its lack of a national majority. He also mentioned "centralism" as a distinctive trait of its framework and those of similar states in "The Reorganization of Europe". [122] However, he did not interpret the states of the Entente as 'decentralized' in their structure. The adjective 'centralist' did not refer to administrative, but rather political features.

This was due to the fact that the difference between the 'national' and 'non-national' state also ran parallel to the depiction of a dichotomy between 'democracy' and 'theocracy' in the narrative of the *New Europe*. Once again, Masaryk was the one to introduce this issue in his "Sub specie Aeternitatis" (December 21, 1916). He described the war as a "religious problem" in the sense that religious traditions

contributed due to the basic differences between the Entente and the Central Powers in terms of 'mentality'. He referred to 'theocracy' as the "peculiar unity" between state and the Catholic Church that first appeared in the medieval ages. While this relationship disappeared from many contexts due to the influence of Reformation, it still defined the 'ecclesiastical' policy of Austria and its support by "Prussia" (Germany). In contrast, Masaryk described 'democracy' as a "political organization" "distinct from religion". He claimed that "moral" and "spiritual" "regeneration" was as important for the future of Europe as the concept of political 'reorganization', which the Entente could only attain on a "purely democratic basis". [123]

The fact that Masaryk described 'democracy' as 'modern' was especially important in this regard. This adjective also applied to his description of 'nationality' and the demands of 'national unity and independence' as the phenomena of 'modern times'. [124] Since the Central Powers, but especially Austria–Hungary appeared as 'anti-national' and 'theocratic' or 'absolutistic' in this narrative, a logical consequence was that these states were essentially 'anti-modern' and did not correspond to the modern 'meaning of history' with the terms of the *New Europe*'s introduction.

It was this 'theocratic' and 'anti-national' state that appeared as the counter-concept of 'democratic' nationality. Consequently, the result of 'self-determination' in Austria–Hungary could only be the dissolution of its framework and the union of people with same 'race' and 'tongue' in particular states. [125] However, 'modern', 'democracy' or even the 'national state' never really received precise definitions, specific identifications with certain laws or institutions in the discourse of the *New Europe*. Their dichotomy with 'theocracy' or the 'anti-national' state was not 'objective' or scientific, but rather narrative in its nature. One can extend the Sluga's psychological

analysis of the discourse to this issue due to the 'moral' and 'spiritual' components of this interpretation.

In contrast, the 'empire' appeared as a rather marginal concept in the *New Europe*; this term did not describe contemporary political frameworks but was rather embedded in the narrative of the review in relation to war-time policies. For instance, Masaryk often described the ultimate war aims of Germany as the attempt to create a "World-Power" or "World-Empire" through conquests in Europe, Asia, and Africa. This appeared as the extension of historical Austrian expansion against Czechs, South Slavs and other local nations, described as "imperialism". [126] [127] While 'empire' and 'imperialism' both appeared with negative connotations in this narrative, it is worth to notice that neither of them referred to the political and administrative structures of the states in the alliance of the Central Powers. It was more important for the narrative of the *New Europe* to identify Austria–Hungary as a 'non-national state' rather than an 'empire'.

The *New Europe* could not entirely delegitimize the imperial state due to specific reasons; one was that its own context was British Empire itself. However, this did not mean that its 'constructive' approach did not apply to this issue. It is important to emphasize that the authors of the *New Europe* participated in debates of British imperial reform in the broader intellectual network of the journal. These discussions included the supporters of the 'Commonwealth' concept, the transformation of the British Empire into a more democratic framework. One of these individuals was the British historian Arnold J. Toynbee, who proposed reforms through the concepts of 'democratic imperialism' and 'self-government'. [128]

The study of the *New Europe*'s narrative with regard to the 'self-determination of nations' in this regard seems to offer an opportunity to slightly correct the account of Sluga. Although the focus of the discourse was definitely on the 'new Europe' and its communities, it also attempted to reinterpret the framework of the colonial empire. J. C. Powell contextualized this issue in his "Imperialism: British and German" (April 12, 1917). He claimed that the current form of the British Empire was not compatible with the concept of 'democracy' due to the "remnants" of "feudalism" and "plutocracy" and their influence in its framework. The imperial state was to transform on a "republican basis"; "free" and "self-determining" nations as well as "British imperial power" were to define it in the future. [129] A series of articles titled "Self-Determination and the British Commonwealth" discussed this issue of reform in detail and proposed the application of the concept of 'self-government' to various colonies. The article "*Le Paix Integrale*" (January 10, 1918) claimed accordingly that "self-determination should be applied" to India and Egypt specifically. [130]

The problematization of the structure of the 'empire' was also difficult due to the presence of Russia in the alliance of the Entente. It was hard to interpret the tsarist regime as 'democratic' or the structure of the state as 'national' in its essence. Until early 1917, the collaborators of the review rather did not really engage in the discussion of this issue. It was only Masaryk who attempted to argue that while there were still "influential circles" and politicians with dreams of "Russian Messianism", "national and political motives" started to "overshadow more and more" the "religious" in Russia – although he could not really provide examples to this end. [131]

Upon the February Revolution, he also stated in his "Russia: From Theocracy to Democracy" (March 22, 1917) that the "nationality problem" did not apply to the local

context. Masaryk claimed that as opposed to Austria–Hungary, Russia had a national majority and it only ruled over "uncivilized nations" which did not "belong" to any neighbouring "co-national" countries. [132] It is easy to understand the problems of this narrative as for the interpretation of the Ukrainian, Esthonian, or other nations as 'uncivilized'. The same ambiguity applied to Russian over Bessarabia; the mother tongue of the local majority was Romanian in a province neighbouring the Romanian nation-state.

It was due to these undiscussed or cautiously approached controversies that Seton-Watson was enthusiastic to notice the appearance of a 'Federal Republican idea' in the Russian discourse after the February Revolution in 1917. [133] Alex Leeper, the 'Russian' expert of the *New Europe* interpreted the results of the revolution as a process of the "liberation of all nationalities" in the empire. However, his narrative also featured the 'Ukrainian people' as opposed to the idea of the 'separation' of the nation from Russia and as they would only demand a 'territorial autonomy' for the nation. [134] Masaryk already claimed in his "Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations" that the nationalities of Russia "would be content with national autonomy" with the exception of the Polish national movement. [135] The narrative of the *New Europe* thus supported the federal reorganization of the Russian Empire and the introduction of national autonomies in this context rather than its dissolution. [136]

The counter-concept and the model of the 'anti-national' and 'theocratic' state rather remained limited to Austria–Hungary in the discourse; the concept of the 'new Europe' was equivalent to its "break-up". [137] The concept of 'self-determination' was implanted to this narrative. Seton-Watson interpreted the debates of the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiation in the Austrian *Reichsrat* in late 1917 and early 1918 as the opposition

between two different interpretations of this concept. Whereas 'self-determination' would intertwine with 'nationality' and 'democracy' in the discourse of "Slavic" parties, the government would only apply the concept to the 'state'. [138] This was the adaptation of the Czech and other national oppositional narratives in Austria (described in the previous case study). Yet, this narrative supported the interpretation of Austria–Hungary as resting on the "denial" of the 'self-determination' of its 'nations'. [139] Thus, the Habsburg Monarchy appeared as the counterimage of Russia and its federal discourse after the February Revolution.

However, it is worth to mention that while the 'nation', its 'principle', its 'self-determination' and its 'national' state were undeniably the key concepts of the *New Europe*, the concept of 'federation' also appeared in its discourse in relation to the Habsburg post-imperial space. This was in part due to the debate of the review with the British labour movement and its interpretation of Austria–Hungary as a large economic unit preferable to small nation-states. It was "An Open Letter to British Labour" that discussed this issue in the journal (February 21, 1918). Its author claimed that the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy in its current form only reinforced the oppressive rule of "dominant races" (Hungarians and Germans). However, they also reassured the other side of the debate that the dissolution of Austria–Hungary was not a "definite end" in the historical development of its geopolitical region. The author saw a possibility for the creation of a 'similar federation' in the future – if it was a result of the "free choice" of the local national populations. [140]

The article "Through Liberation to the New Commonwealth" (September 5, 1918) also interpreted the foundation of nation-states as the "first step" towards the creation of a "federal framework", the "Central European Government" – a "better"

version of the Habsburg Monarchy. [141] John Mavrogordato also claimed his "From Nationalism to Federalism" that "breaking up" Austria–Hungary was in service of the creation of a "stronger Federation" in its place. [142] However, it is important to emphasize that the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy was to precede such developments in each narrative. While the collaborators of the review supported 'federation' as the political program of the Russian government after the February Revolution, the concept rather referred to processes of integration initiated from below in the post-Habsburg imperial space.

To sum the findings of this section up, the discourse of the *New Europe* did not create a dichotomy between the 'empire' and the 'nation', but rather the 'national' and the 'anti-national' state. The identification of the former with 'democracy' as opposed 'theocracy' also supported a 'mental' or psychological interpretation of contemporary affairs derived from the role of religion in local contexts. The 'national state' also appeared as the model of 'modernity'; its foundations were the 'principle of nationality' and the concept of the 'self-determination' of 'nations'.

In comparison, the 'empire' was a rather controversial concept in the discourse. Although it appeared with negative connotations, it still did not really define any contemporary structures in the discourse of the *New Europe*. The 'empire' did not appear as a framework to be dissolved, but rather to be reformed in the contexts of Britain and Russia through the concepts of the 'Commonwealth' and 'federation'. The latter also appeared as a route for future national development in the Habsburg post-imperial space.

It was largely Austria–Hungary that appeared as the anti-model in this regard, with the concept of 'self-determination' limited to the state and denied from the 'nation'

in this context. The interpretation of the Monarchy as 'theocratic' state supported the narrative that its framework was 'anti-modern' as opposed to the 'modern' nation state. The local application of the 'self-determination of nations' was thus equivalent to the dissolution of Austria–Hungary in the narrative of the *New Europe*.

It was inevitable that this complex and controversial interpretation of the relationship between the concepts of 'self-determination' and 'state' would interact other definitions of terms in the discourse of the First World War. Thus, I find it important to observe the transnational references of the *New Europe* to other contexts in which the concept appeared. I will also study any attempts to construct a historical narrative for the concept of 'self-determination' in the discourse.

iv. Historical and Transnational References to the Concept of 'Self-Determination'

As previously described, the main point of reference with regard to 'self-determination' was initially the February Revolution of Russia in the discourse of the *New Europe*. The term appeared in the discourse of the review for after April 1917 through its cultural (and ideological) transfer from the Russian context. The role of 'New Russia' was instrumental as a model for the federal reform of the imperial state through the 'self-determination' of local nations. On the other hand, the foreign policy of the state appeared to support another interpretation of the concept in the discourse of the *New Europe*, national secessionism in the context of Austria–Hungary. It is to no surprise that the collaborators interpreted revolutionary Russia as the spearhead of European 'reconstruction' as opposed to the rather tame policy of the British government.

One must emphasize that this role of revolutionary Russia as a model of 'self-determination' seemed to subvert the traditional narratives of the 'Western centre' and

the 'Eastern periphery'. As I will showcase this later, this was typical for the presentation of certain issues in the discourse of the *New Europe*.

The October Revolution, however, disrupted this narrative of the Russian 'model'. The new Bolshevik government did interpret the 'self-determination of peoples' as the national right to 'secession'; however, it used this concept in all the wrong senses from the viewpoint of the *New Europe*. Russia ceased to function as a member of the Entente; it rather started to negotiate a peace with the Central Powers. The Bolshevik government did not support federative concepts of reform in Russia, as it rather sanctioned the dissolution of the imperial state. Since it ceased to continue the previous war efforts of the Provisional Government, it appeared that it was also fine with the expansion of the German sphere of influence in the former Western borderlands of the Russian Empire.

As a result, the Bolshevik interpretation and utilization of the concept of 'self-determination' received much criticism in the *New Europe*. The Russian expert of the *New Europe*, Alex Leeper claimed that the political theory of Lenin "negated" the "national idea" and had no regard for the "right of nationalities" at its core. 'Self-determination' was thus a "mere idle phrase" of Bolshevik propaganda. [143] Leeper claimed that this was because of the "internationalist" agenda of the new government and its pursuit of a "social revolution" as opposed the "interest of Russia as a state". His narrative featured the Bolsheviks as almost pushing Ukraine into secession, while he stated that Ukrainians rather supported the concept of 'federal Russia' due to their "racial" and historical affiliations with the imperial state. [144]

'Russia' was thus more and more controversial as a point of reference; as a results, attempts were made in the *New Europe* to construct alternative historical

narratives and to find new models for the concept of 'self-determination'. For instance, Seton-Watson described it as a "Mazzinian principle with a new name". [145] He alternatively described self-determination as parallel to the "Mazzinian principles" of nationality and democracy. [146] Thus, he attempted to identify the idea in the speech acts of Giuseppe Mazzini, the influential historical figure in relation to the Italian process of unification in the nineteenth century.

Stefano Racchia and Nadia Urbinati point out in the introduction of *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building and International Relations* that the republican tradition of Mazzini similarly appeared as a point of reference in the political thought of Wilson. [147] However, I have not found any references of Mazzini to the concept of 'self-determination' (*autodeterminazione*) or the 'self-determination of peoples' (*autodeterminazione dei popoli* in the modern Italian form). Thus, the narrative of Seton-Watson appears to be not faithful to historical sources. Its purpose was rather to find alternative points of reference to the Russian context.

Alexander Onou's "Patriotism and Internationalism: A Russian View*"* (April 18, 1918) was even more remarkable in this regard, as it attempted to construct a counter-narrative against that of the Bolsheviks. The 'Russian' adjective in the title referred the political viewpoint of the 'white' counter-revolution in the course of the Russian civil war, as Onou was also a member of this loose alliance. [148] In contrast, the Bolsheviks appeared as the extremist representatives of 'internationalism' in the article. [149]

The concept of 'self-determination' appeared in this text as absolutely separate from the discourse of Bolshevism in historical terms. Onou rather pointed at the idea of

'brotherhood and equality of nations' as the source of the concept. He claimed that this appeared in the late eighteenth century as the result of a collective influence that Christianity, humanism and the French Revolution had on European political thought. [150]

The author then identified the era of the Napoleonic Wars as the political context in which the "principle of self-determination" appeared as a political concept in opposition to "French imperialism". Although it was the discourse of "national liberation" that produced the "principle", Onou observed a "degeneration" in history in this regard. He claimed that it was soon "exclusiveness" and "imperialism" that dominated the national contexts of the principle, to which "Marxism" appeared as a reaction in terms of political ideologies. '1914' then saw the "proclamation of self-determination as a right" of all nations, put into practice by the February Revolution of 1917 and applied by the Provisional Government to the 'peoples' of Russia and other contemporary states. [151]

As for the Russian context after the October Revolution, Onou stated that the political ideology of the Bolsheviks was "unchecked" by 'patriotism' and that the ideas of Marxism did not correspond to "real life in Russia". In contrast, the author pointed as the anarchist political thought of Peter Kropotkin as a "counter-example" that featured a "union of patriotism and universalism". [152] His interpretation of self-determination followed suit: he separated the 'principle' from the 'internationalist' features of the Bolshevik interpretation and rather emphasized its importance in the 'patriotic' or nationalist discourse.

If one would accept the historical narrative of older historiographical studies, it would be also natural to anticipate references in the *New Europe* to Wilson throughout

its discourse. However, the Seton-Watsons claim that it was actually Wilson who "moved steadily nearer" to the "programme and the principles" of the *New Europe* during the war. The transnational framework, but especially the British collaborators of the journal thus appear as "'Wilsonian' long before Wilson himself" in their narrative due to their support of 'national liberation and self-determination'. [153]

Although to frame the *New Europe* as 'Wilsonian before Wilson' does not make much sense to me, the closer examination of its articles does support the claims of the Seton-Watsons; even more, it highlights the opposition of the collaborators to the policy of Wilson as late as the last year of the war. For instance, J. C. Powell's *Italy and the Liberation of the Slavs* (January 31, 1918) denounced the declarations of the American President. He claimed that the policy of Wilson was "friendly" to Austria–Hungary. Powell problematized that the rhetoric of the President depicted the "Balkan peoples" as "unruly and uncivilized" and thus, as ones that must "be ruled" by the Habsburg Monarchy. The peace offers of the United States (and Great Britain) appeared as promoting "half-solutions", a receipt for "disaster" in the geopolitical region of Austria–Hungary and as opposed to the desire of local nationalities for "independence" and "unity". [154]

As opposed to the American government, the author rather depicted its Italian counterpart as the one with a chance to "lead" the Allied and Associated Powers on the road to a "new and better Europe". [155] It is worth to mention that this interpretation was due to the opposition of Italian government to the friendly tone of Wilson towards Austria–Hungary. The fear of a separate peace with the Habsburg Monarchy (and the loss of the Italian chance to claim territories from it) prompted Italian foreign policy to seek reconciliation with the Yugoslav political emigration, a *protégée* of the *New*

Europe. [156] The concept of 'self-determination' appeared in the articles related to this issue rather than in reference to any 'Wilsonian' policy in this regard even by the end of the First World War.

To sum it up, the study of its articles does not support the interpretation of the *New Europe* as a 'Wilsonian' platform of 'self-determination'. The collaborators of the review rather denounced the peace policy of the American President. The February Revolution of Russia was much more important for the collaborators of them as their source for the concept adopted through the process of cultural transfer. They interpreted the local discourse as compatible with their vision of federal reform in Russia and the support of national secessionism in international politics.

However, the Bolshevik interpretation and application of the concept of 'self-determination' disrupted this narrative of the 'Russian model' due to its negative effects on Russian imperial and international politics from the viewpoint of the journal. Its historical narratives attempted to find alternative points of references in history. While Seton-Watson identified the republican tradition established by the Italian statesman Giuseppe Mazzini as the source of the concept, Alexander Onou rather interpreted the historical appearance of the term as a reaction to the 'imperialism' of Napoleonic France. He also framed it as the concept of the 'white' and 'patriotic' political language of those opposed to the 'red' rule of Bolsheviks in the Russian civil war.

Although I refute a 'Wilsonian' interpretation of 'self-determination' and the related discourse in the *New Europe*, the study of another concept often associated with the international vision of the American President is still necessary. Since national 'majority' appeared as the foundation of the 'national' state in the discourse of the journal, the appearance of 'national minorities' as a counter-concept was also inevitable

in its conceptual framework. It was no accident that the 'rights of minorities' already appeared as central to the introduction of the *New Europe*. I will discuss this issue in the next section.

v.'(National) Minorities'

It is important to emphasize that the concept of 'national minorities' did not really appear in the descriptions of contemporary affairs by the articles of the *New Europe*. The authors rather referred to "subject races" or "small nations" as communities disadvantaged in terms of power hierarchy, a parallel to the distinction between the *größe Völker* and the *kleine Völker* in the Austrian discourse. This was consistent with the depiction of the Habsburg Monarchy as a state without 'national' features; in lack of a 'majority', one could also not talk about 'minorities' in its framework.

Masaryk interpreted local 'small nations' as deprived of their independence at some point in their history and as falling victim to the 'imperialist' designs of the 'Germans', the states of 'Austria' and 'Prussia' in particular. [157] It was a logical result of this narrative that the 'liberation' of small nations by the Entente appeared as a solution to these problems. The oppressed populations could then become 'majorities' in the ideal framework of their 'national' states. The appearance of 'majorities', however, also presupposed the appearance of 'minorities'; these concepts could only co-exist as parts of a dichotomy.

It is also important to realize the related ambiguities of the concept of 'nationality' in the narrative of the *New Europe*. On the one hand, this key concept appeared as the foundation of European 'reconstruction'. On the other hand, it was also one of sources of the political unrest that resulted in the First World War. [158] The idea

that if there was a historical oppression of nations, then this could result in 'bitter memories' of their past, the development of 'intolerant' and 'bad' nationalisms in local terms also appeared in the review. [159]

Thus, it was rather alarming that general prescriptions for the future 'rights of minorities' rarely appeared in the *New Europe*. Only The "*La Victorie Intégrale*" mentioned this issue as only second in importance in comparison to the 'right of every people to determine its political allegiance' (the right to self-determination). The author claimed that national minorities were to be free in their "exercise of language, civil liberty, education and religion". Voluntary migration and the "expropriation" of populations (population exchange) appeared as the alternatives to minority status. [160]

The discourse of the *New Europe* only featured similar or slightly more detailed recommendations in articles that discussed certain national contexts in 1918. The concept of 'national minorities' appeared in relation one of such issues in the article of Dušan Popović, "The Macedonian Question" (March 23, 1918). The author was the secretary of the Serbian Social Democratic Party. [161] Popović discussed the problem of Macedonia as a contested province in the context of the 'Balkan Federation', a concept promoted by local social democracy (and supported by the authors of *New Europe*). [162]

As opposed to the annexation of the region by one state or its independence, the author rather proposed the reorganization of its affairs through a compromise between South-Eastern European nations. As for the "right bank of the Vardar" (Vardar Macedonia), Popović claimed that it should remain in the possession of Serbia. However, he then proposed the establishment of a condominium in the rest of the province, particularly in the region around Salonica. [163]

The 'rights of national minorities' also appeared as a part of this compromise. The author previously claimed that the idea of Macedonian independence was "absurd"; the province was inhabited by sixteen "racial groups", none of which had "racial predominance". Macedonia was thus the main symbol in his interpretation of the "Balkan" as a "kaleidoscope of nations", which made it impossible to draw precise ethno-cultural borders in the region. [164]

However, it is essential to notice that the concept of 'national minorities' did not appear in the context of the 'nation-state' and as opposed to a particular 'majority' in the article. It rather appeared as a parallel concept to that of (Balkan) 'federalism' in the local political languages of social democracy. These, however, extended even beyond the regional boundaries of South-Eastern Europe in the article. Popović namedropped (Otto) "Bauer" and (Karl) "Renner" as authoritative contemporary intellectual to define the 'rights' of national minorities and promised the application of their Austrian concepts to the framework of the Balkan Federation (although he did not provide details to this end). [165] Similar to the 'right of self-determination', the concept 'national minorities' appeared in the *New Europe* through its cultural and ideological transfer from the context of Austrian social democracy.

In contrast, this concept once again appeared in a rather simplistic sense in the context of the Italian nation-state in the peace program of the *New Europe* ("Our Peace Terms", October 17, 1918). Its author applied the concept of 'national minorities' to the issue of Italian–Yugoslav affairs, in particular to the problem of the future "frontier" between the two states. The "Our Peace Terms" claimed that Italy and Yugoslavia should mutually provide "free linguistic and cultural development" for these communities in their territories. [166] However, the article contained no specific

descriptions or used any references to define this phrase. It is also worth to notice that 'national minorities' did not appear among the "peace terms" as a concept that the any international organizations (such as the League of Nations) should integrate into its framework as an international organization; the author rather spoke of this issue as a matter of particular national contexts.

To sum it up, the 'rights of minorities' rarely appeared in the discourse of the *New Europe* despite its alleged importance emphasized by its introduction. The collaborators of the journal rather focused on the concept of 'small nation' as the future 'majority' of the nation-state. As a result, the article also did not really feature general prescriptions as for the 'rights of national minorities'. Civic equality, 'free linguistic and cultural development' was the most that the authors of the *New Europe* would offer in this regard. The concept more often appeared in the discussions of particular national or regional affairs in 1918.

The article of the Serb social democratic politician Dušan Popović was rather remarkable in this regard, as he referred to the concept of 'national minorities' not in parallel to that of the 'nation-state', but rather to the reorganization of regional affairs through the establishment of a 'Balkan Federation'. It was also exceptional in the sense that it featured the concept as a part of the social democratic political language in South-Eastern Europe. Additionally, the article contained transnational references to the Austrian theories of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer on 'personal autonomy' and promised their application in Macedonia as a condominium of the future Balkan Federation.

However, the concept of 'national minorities' would also appear as important in connection to the national context of 'Bohemia' in the articles of the *New Europe* and in Masaryk's own *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. I will argue for the role of the

review and its discourse as formative in the development of this book, the speech acts of Masaryk and the political language of the Czechoslovak movement. The next section will study the parallel concepts of the 'nation' and the 'state', 'self-determination' and 'national minorities' in relation to this issue; it will detect continuities and discontinuities through comparisons between the articles of Masaryk in the *New Europe* and his book, the narratives of the journal and that of his own.

f. Conclusion

I identify a lack of traditions in relation to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' in the British context before the First World War. Although local actors were familiar with the German term *Selbstbestimmungsrecht*, their translations featured inconsistent English versions of the concept ('right of a nationality to choose its own mode government', the 'principle of independence of nationalities' etc.) One must emphasize that the British intellectuals of the First World War-period identified 'self-determination' as a foreign concept adopted to the local context from others through the process of cultural transfer.

I claim that the key concept of local discussions was rather the 'principle of nationality'. Debates in the British discourse concerned the issue whether their context integrated into continental processes of nation and state making or was different from those. I have introduced the 'Mill–Acton' dichotomy as central to historiographical studies of the local liberal discourse; however, I have also pointed out that British conservatives were also interested in this subject.

I have shown that Mill interpreted the nation-state as the foundation of international order and the liberal political system due to the influence of the Italian

jurist Pasquale Stanislao Mancini. In contrast, Acton embedded Great Britain in his "Teutonic" model of the 'empire" as the ideal framework of his liberal theory. He rather identified the nation-state with a "Latin" model of political system, which prepared the ground for the oppression of various groups in the name of "national equality". Mill described the British nation-state as defined by the dominant culture of the English in the local context; in contrast, non-dominant cultures such as the Welsh were destined to assimilate into its ranks. In contrast, Acton described local cultures as equally valuable, united through his concept of the nation as a political community.

I have used this foundation to study historiographical accounts of the British discourse during the First World War. I point out that through the main examples of the *New Europe* and the Union of Democratic Control, the partial narrative of Harry Hanak differentiated between the 'rightful' supporters and the 'flawed' opponents of the concepts of 'nationality' and 'self-determination' in the local context. In contrast, I have showcased that Sluga was much more balanced in her interpretation of this relationship. She claims that the *New Europe* and the UDC both supported the concept of 'national self-determination'. The difference in her interpretation was that the former interpreted the 'nation' as a psychological construct and the foundation of international reform; in contrast, the UDC refuted such claims due to vagueness and fluidity of this definition and identified 'nationality' as only one of the factors in the reconstruction of international order.

I problematize historiographical references to the *New Europe* as a supporter of 'national self-determination' ever since its foundation by pointing out that the concept was a relative newcomer in this discourse. My analysis has showed that the original key concept of discussions in this context was rather the 'principle of nationality'. The term

'Self-determination' was only introduced upon the February Revolution of Russia and gained importance gradually. I have pointed out that this was a case of cultural, but also an ideological transfer, as the liberal discourse of the *New Europe* adopted the concept from the context of Russian social democracy. As a result, I have claimed that it is anachronistic to depict the *New Europe* as a supporter of 'self-determination' without referring to these developments, as these also reflect on the general conceptual history of the British context. I emphasize the differences between the 'principle of nationality' and the concept of 'self-determination' in the discourse of the *New Europe*. Whereas the former referred to the 'nation' as the objective factor of international reorganization, the latter rather emphasized the importance of 'subjective' national feelings.

This latter observation was important for my narrative of the discourse with regard to the 'nation' as the subject of the 'principle of nationality' and the 'right of self-determination'. In contrast to Hanak, Sluga and Seton-Watsons, I do not reconstruct the discourse of the *New Europe* a mere 'common platform', but rather as a 'transnational discourse' due to its internal debates of nationalism. I point at a dichotomy between the national concepts of Masaryk and various British collaborators. The Czechoslovak leader identified the 'nation' as synonymous to the ethno-cultural community of the 'race' and as the foundation of the 'state'. In contrast, other British authors and readers rather interpreted the 'nation' as a political and mental community and the historical product of the 'state'. I agree with Sluga that these different interpretations still concerned a Eurocentric view of the nation. However, I claim that she only covered one side of this debate with her interpretation of the 'nation' as a 'psychological' concept in this discourse, as Masaryk rather emphasized 'objective' ethno-cultural markers in the formation of national identity.

The concepts of the 'nation', the 'principle of nationality' and 'self-determination' were embedded in the dichotomy between the 'national' and the 'anti-national' state in the discourse of the *New Europe*. I emphasize that this differentiation between the Entente and the Central Powers was not 'objective', but highly narrative in its nature. Masaryk's addition of 'modern democracy' and 'anti-modern theocracy' to this dichotomy supported this claim, as he stated that the ideological opposition between the hostile alliances were much due to the 'mental' or psychological differences between their societies. This was a result of religious traditions in his narrative. The Central Powers and in particular, Austria–Hungary showcased a 'medieval' and 'theocratic' relationship between the 'state' and the 'church'. In contrast, the 'modern democracy' appeared as typical for the states of Entente due to the separation between state and church after the age of Reformation.

The concept of the 'empire' appeared as a central problem with regard to this interpretation, although it only appeared marginally in the articles. The discourse of the *New Europe* could not delegitimize this concept due to its British context and the presence of Russia in the alliance of the Entente. Thus, the model of the 'anti-national' state remained much limited to Austria–Hungary.

Although it appeared with negative connotations and as opposed to 'democracy', the 'empire' was a framework not to be destructed, but rather to be reformed in the narrative of the journal. The collaborators supported the evolution of the British Empire into a 'Commonwealth' and a federal transformation of the Russian Empire. I have slightly corrected the narrative of Sluga in this regard, as the authors of the *New Europe* also applied the concept of 'self-determination' to the African and Asian colonies of the British Empire and claimed these territories shall receive 'self-

government' in the framework of the colonial empire. Support also appeared for the federal reorganization of the post-Habsburg imperial space (and South-Eastern Europe) through the application of 'self-determination' to contemporary frameworks.

I refute any 'Wilsonian' interpretations of the discourse in the *New Europe* with regard to the concept of 'self-determination', as the collaborators of the journal rather denounced the reconciliatory policy of the American President towards Austria–Hungary in 1918. I rather construct a 'Russian' model for its discourse. I argue that the themes of 'cultural' and 'ideological transfer' apply to the adoption of the concept from the social democrat-dominated Russian context of the February Revolution, a subversion of the traditional 'Western centre – Eastern periphery' dichotomy. The collaborators of the journal would interpret 'New Russia' as a model for 'self-determination' in the sense of internal federal reform and the application of the concept in international affairs in support of national secessionism.

I have pointed out that the October Revolution subverted this 'Russian' model due to the opposition between Bolshevik policy and the narrative of the *New Europe*. The concept of 'self-determination' appeared as a 'mere idle phrase' of the former in the discourse of the journal, subordinated to an 'internationalist' political language and the aim of 'social revolution'. As a result, various authors attempted to construct historical narratives to find alternative points of references to Russia in relation to the concept of 'self-determination'. Seton-Watson interpreted the term as continuing the republican tradition of Giuseppe Mazzini and his focus on 'nationality' and 'democracy' as key concepts.

In contrast, the 'white Russian' narrative of Alexander Onou depicted the evolution of 'self-determination' through its development as a counter-concept in

national and social democratic political languages. Whereas the national movements of the early nineteenth century referred to the concept as opposed to the imperialism of the Napoleonic French Empire according to this narrative, its incorporation by international labour appeared as a reaction to the national chauvinism of the late nineteenth century. Onou interpreted the loose political alliance of the 'whites' as the true successors of these traditions due to their balance between 'patriotism' and 'internationalism', as opposed to the extremist 'internationalist' approach of Bolsheviks.

Finally, I raised attention towards the rare appearances of the concept of 'national minorities' and the lack of general prescriptions for 'minority rights' in the narrative of the *New Europe*. I argued that this was much due to the focus of this discourse on the concept of 'small nations'. In contrast, only 'linguistic and cultural rights' appeared as central to the future position of minorities in nation-states dominated by majorities.

A peculiar exception from this scheme was the article of Dušan Popović in March 1918. The Serbian author did not discuss the future status of 'national minorities' in relation to the nation state, but rather the social democratic concept of the 'Balkan Federation' in South-Eastern Europe. 'National minorities' appeared in the context of Popović's recommendations as for the solution of national(ist) conflicts with regard to Macedonia. He claimed that the province should become the condominium of local states and local 'races' should receive protection as 'national minorities'. He superficially referred to Otto Bauer and Karl Renner as intellectual authorities with theories to be applied in the local context.

Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk's Quest for 'Independent Bohemia' in the 'New Europe'

and the 'Right of Nations to Self-Determination' (1917–1918)

g. Introduction

It is the logical continuation of the previous chapter that I integrate articles of Masaryk and the political language of the Czechoslovak movement into the intellectual framework of the *New Europe*. I also do not find it accidental that the great wartime work of Masaryk appeared under the title *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* in late 1918 or that the language of its first edition was English. These facts alone point at some kind of continuity with the discourse of the *New Europe* and the importance of the British (or the Anglo-American) context for the Czechoslovak movement.

My primary sources will be the articles of Masaryk in the *New Europe* in 1917 and his book of late 1918. I will study the 'self-determination' and its parallel concepts in these texts and will attempt to identify continuities and discontinuities in their interpretation in the conceptual framework created by Masaryk. I will specifically on his concepts of the 'nation', 'nationality' and 'race' to see whether the simultaneous references to 'state rights' and the ethno-cultural Czechoslovak community, or the discourse of the *New Europe* impacted them. I am also interested in the possible cultural and ideological transfers of concepts. The articles of Seton-Watson will feature the 'British' side of the dichotomy I had proposed.

The chapter will start with the description of the development *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. I find this important to showcase the transnational context of the work and the various impacts it had on the writing phase. Then, I will continue with the study of concepts in the speech acts of Masaryk, which I will of course feature in

English in accordance with their linguistic context. However, I will also point out the afterlife of these in the Czechoslovak context. I will use the Czech translations of Masaryk's English-language works and the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 as my main sources in this regard. In these cases, I will feature the observed concepts in Czech in accordance with their linguistic context.

h. The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint

Masaryk decided to leave London for Russia in April 1917. One of his motives was to reinforce his influence in the local section of the Czechoslovak movement. However, it was more important that he also started negotiations with the new Provisional Government as for the establishment of the so-called "Czechoslovak Legion" – a unit raised from the Czech POWs of the Austro–Hungarian Joint Army. [167] He stayed long enough to see the fall of this government and the takeover of the Bolsheviks as the result of the October Revolution.

It was during this time, the winter of 1917–1918 that Masaryk started to draft *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. The title indicated that the author interpreted the viewpoint of his Czechoslovak movement (and similar secessionist groups) as indicative of a general "Slavic" one in the course of the First World War. The original purpose of Masaryk with the book was to inspire the Czechoslovak soldiers in Russia by providing a detailed explanation of the causes behind the war. [168] Excerpts of the book accordingly appeared throughout 1918 in the *Československý denník*, the newspaper of the Czechoslovak Legion. [169]

However, Masaryk once again changed his location from Russia to the United States in Spring 1918, which affected the development of his work. He actually started

to revise it, and only finished with its final version by the end of the war – when he travelled from America to Europe. [170] Masaryk claimed to have submitted the manuscript to a "Russian publishing house" in his foreword. [171] However, it was the Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd. that eventually printed the first edition of the book in London, October 1918; the language of the final version was English. [172]

The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint discussed the issues of the war through five chapters. These concerned "The Historical Significance of the War", "The Principle of Nationality", "The Eastern Question", "War to the End" and "The New Europe". Three of these titles referred to key concepts of the work – ones that had also previously appeared in the discourse of the *New Europe*. W. Preston Warren and William B. West, the editors of the 1972 edition notice that the review and the book shared the same title and that the *New Europe* had already featured "many of Masaryk's ideas". [173]

Yet to my knowledge, no attempts have been made to integrate Masaryk's book into the discourse of the review or at least to compare their narratives – a surprising hiatus for various reasons. Otakar Odlozilik notices in his introduction to the 1972 edition that *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* "was not destined to have wide circulation" in the context of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia. [174] Yet, he fails to point out that the later shift of the book in terms of linguistic contexts somewhat reflected on the modification of this original intention.

In contrast, Jan Rychlík notices in his "*Nová Evropa – představy a skutečnost*" ("The New Europe – ideas and reality", 2018) that the first edition "was distributed in Paris amongst the diplomats and specialists who were organizing the peace conference". [175] This means that The *New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* did not only feature the same 'ideas' of Masaryk as the journal, but also transmitted them to the same audience of

Allied politicians and intellectuals. The claim of the author in the foreword of the first edition was that he had made use of at least "some American literature" to support his arguments also emphasizes the importance of the Anglo-American transnational context. [176]

As stated in the introduction, my study attempts to fill in this gap with the following analysis of Masaryk's articles in the *New Europe*, their comparison with his book of 1918 and the identification of transnational influences with regard to the sources of his concept, the related continuities, and the discontinuities in this regard. I will start this process with the study of certain regional concepts in these texts.

i. The Central Zone(s) of Small Nations and the Eastern Question

Masaryk and other representatives of secessionist movements appear with a formative role in relation to the regional concept of 'Central Europe' in the book of Otilia Dhand, *The Idea of Central Europe: Geopolitics, Culture and Regional Identity* (2018). As implied by the title, the author discusses the "narrative threads of the battle" for 'Central Europe' as a region, but also a concept. Dhand claims that this struggle took place at the "breaking points of modern history". [177] The concept of 'Central Europe' appears in this narrative as of "Pan-German" or German origin (*Mitteleuropa*) in the era of the First World War. The author emphasizes that the representatives of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Polish secessionist movement started to use the regional term as a "shared tactical tool" to support their claims as for the 'break-up' of Austria–Hungary and the foundation (or unification) of nation states. [178]

Masaryk appears with a formative role in this narrative due to this depiction of the concept. Dhand reports that he described 'Central Europe' as the "German political

programme of the war". On the one hand, Masaryk used the concept to refer to the regional expansion of the German Empire in its neighbouring lands. On the other hand, the term also appeared in his narrative to point at the establishment of a "Berlin–Bagdad axis" and ultimately, a German "world domination". Dhand points out that Masaryk started to forward these claims soon after the publication of Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* (1915), a popular book in the German cultural and political context. As shown by the title already, Naumann also used 'Central Europe' as his key concept and described it as region that mainly covered the territories of the German Empire and Austria–Hungary. This book was translated into English "almost immediately". It also appeared in Czech, Hungarian and other languages. Dhand claims that The *New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* "was pitched directly against Neumann's proposal". Masaryk depicted the "line of independent Slav states: Poland, Bohemia and Greater Serbia" as the "only way to prevent" the materialization of German war aims. [179] Dhand, however, does not identify any alternative regional concepts in the works of Masaryk.

In contrast, Tadayuki Hayashi discusses this issue in his "Masaryk's 'Zone of Small Nations' in His Discourse during World War I" (2007). The title already points towards the narrative of the author that the Czechoslovak leader referred to the 'zone of small nations' as his main region of interest. Hayashi refers to this concept as "one of the origins of spacial consciousness" in relation to the English term 'Eastern Europe' or its German variant *Zwischeneuropa*. He uses these concepts in accordance with their appearance in the *Eastern Europe between the War 1918–1941* of Hugh Seton-Watson (1945), his sole scientific point of reference. 'Central Europe' appears as the equivalent of these terms in the study, derived from Masaryk's works between 1915–1918. It is important to emphasize that Hayashi does not study any of these concepts in their long-

term historical context, nor does he integrate them into the discourse of the First World War. The *New Europe*, for instance, only appears as a journal of intellectuals that "shared" a "spatial consciousness similar" to Masaryk – as if they would not have exchanged any of their related concepts. [180]

The content of the first article of Masaryk in the *New Europe* (the actual leader of the first issue), "Pangermanism and the Eastern Question" (October 19, 1916) seems to support the narrative of Dhand. 'Central Europe' did appear in the narrative of the author as the "watchword" of German foreign policy. He referred to 'Pangermanism' as the ideological source of this endeavour. Masaryk identified the discourse of German national unification through this term, which he claimed to have adopted imperialist features by the late nineteenth century. The concept of 'Central Europe' thus appeared as a "programme" to create the "economic and political union" of the Central Powers, the annexation of the "Baltic and some purely Russian provinces" and the "reconstruction" of Poland under German leadership. This "scheme" of 'Central Europe' would then provide the foundations of German domination over the "Old World". Masaryk also claimed that this process of expansion would result in the marginalization of Great Britain and its eventual conquest by the German "world power". [181]

Dhand, however, fails to notice that the 'Eastern Question' was the concept to frame this interpretation of 'Central Europe' by Masaryk. The 'Eastern' component of the term originally referred to discussions of Ottoman imperial disintegration and the future of its territories in South-Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. [182] The term 'Question' would refer to the perception of this problem as a political issue of paramount importance. In this sense, the concept joined the list of other 'questions' or issues of transnational discussions during the nineteenth century. [183]

Larry Wolf emphasizes in his very recent *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe* (2022) that the influence of the discourse on the 'Eastern Question' informed the ideas of the American President in relation to Austria–Hungary. He identified with the viewpoint of the British Prime Minister William Gladstone, a liberal politician who would denounce the "tyranny" of the Ottoman Empire, its "oppression of Christian Slavs" and would demand the construction of a British "moral foreign policy" in their support. Wilson did not only inherit this Orientalizing view and disliking of the Ottoman Empire, but also applied it to his ideas on the "emancipation" of the "peoples of Austria–Hungary" in 1918. [184]

Thus, it was no accident that Masaryk handled his discussion of 'Central Europe' as equivalent to that of the 'Eastern Question'. He described the latter concept not as the problem of Ottoman imperial rule and disintegration, but rather German imperial expansion. His use of 'Central Europe' referred to the contemporary German concept of *Mitteleuropa,* which he interpreted as the foundational term behind the imperialism of the German state.

Dhand, however, points out effectively that this narrative did not really correspond to the realities of German foreign policy, rather guided by *Realpolitik* and temporary political interests. [185] It has also been proven that Wilhelmian Germany did not aim for a "world domination" either, as it rather wanted to establish a zone of influence to counter the power of Russia and Great Britain. [186]

The narrative of Masaryk thus rather emphasized the 'central' importance of a region in the geopolitical environment of Germany to the British public. It interpreted 'Central Europe' not as a limited geopolitical "programme", but rather the step towards the foundation of a German "world power". Masaryk also claimed that the citizens of

Great Britain would eventually gain first-hand experiences of German imperialism if the Entente does not stop the Central Powers in the realization of this concept.

Hayashi is right to point out that the 'Central Zone' of 'small nations' was important as a regional concept of Masaryk, one discussed by his related article in the *New Europe* ("Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations", December 14, 1916). It was the presence of 'small nations' that distinguished this area from the 'West' and the 'East' of Europe, inhabited by "large" nations. (The 'East', for instance, simply corresponded to the territories of the Russian nation.) Masaryk also delineated the 'Central Zone' in geographical sense, as he claimed that it stretched from "the North Cape to Cape Matapan" (from Norway to Greece in administrative terms). [187]

The dichotomy between the 'national' and the 'non-national' or in this case, 'mixed' state in the discourse of the *New Europe* applied to the geopolitical description of this 'Central Zone'. Germany appeared as a border case in this regard with the presence of various 'minorities' in the state. In contrast, Austria–Hungary was of course the ideal type of the 'mixed' and 'artificial' state with its lack of a 'national' minority. [188]

However, it was rather the 'racial' approach of Masaryk to the 'nation' that defined the area. The author described the 'Central Zone' through the list of the 'small nations', ethno-cultural communities that inhabited this land. To be exact, he described twenty-two different groups as local to the region. [189]

The major dividing factor between these communities was their desire for secession from the 'mixed' state, or the lack thereof in the text. The 'small nations of Russia' appeared in the article as if they would be "content with national autonomy in a bigger state". Masaryk marginalized secessionist claims from the Russian Empire through the remark that these were "fostered by Germany". [190]

In contrast, he claimed that the "subject-nations" of Austria–Hungary and "Prussia" "demanded independence" in the sense of territorial separation. He specifically pointed at the "Poles", the "Czecho-Slovaks" and the "Southern Slavs of Austria–Hungary" in this regard. Masaryk claimed that these nations were "free and independent in the past", had high standards in terms of "general education" and were "of European importance" in terms of their political and cultural contribution to the civilization of the continent. The "Bohemian Reformation" or the Hussite movement in the Czech lands appeared as the primary (and only) example to support this argument. It was ultimately due to the desire of these three nations for "freedom" and "unity" that Masaryk interpreted the Central Zone as the "centre of political unrest" in Europe. [191]

However, the Central Zone ultimately appeared as a region of even greater importance in the narrative. Masaryk claimed nothing less than that the "centre gravity of European history and of European politics" lied in this area. He supported this claim by pointing out that the First World War started with the hostilities between Serbia and Austria–Hungary in 1914. [192]

This was definitely a subversion of the original dynamics between 'centre' and 'periphery' in the discourse of European modernity. Masaryk's regional concept appeared as 'central' not only in the geographical sense, but also in terms of history and politics. The historical agency of the Entente states seemed to be limited in the sense that the narrative depicted them as bound to the fate of this zone: the realization of the 'Pan-German Central Europe' in the 'Central Zone of small nations' was equivalent to their demise and fall before a new 'world power'.

However, Hayashi is wrong to identify the 'Central Zone' as equivalent to 'Central Europe'. Even though his study also features the descriptions of these regions by

Masaryk, he fails to notice the differences in this regard. For instance, Hayashi reports that Masaryk wrote the *At the Eleventh Hour* in 1916, a document distributed to the British Foreign Office by his local network. The original version of this described 'Central Europe' as the 'East of Germany, Austria–Hungary, the Balkans, and the Western part of Russia (Poland)'. [193] This area was obviously smaller than a 'Central Zone' that stretched from "the North Cape to Cape Matapan". On the other hand, Hayashi is right to say that the broader region was equivalent to *Zwischeneuropa*. [194] Masaryk could also adopt this concept as it appeared in the German discipline of geography during the First World War. [195]

On the other hand, the *At the Eleventh Hour* also points towards a feature of Masaryk's 'Central Europe' that Dhand fails to notice. The concept did not only appear in his texts as a reference to the German *Mitteleuropa* or described a "political programme" of German expansion. It also referred to the area that the Entente had to liberate in the narrative of the author. The *At the Eleventh Hour*, for instance, claimed that the "political organization" of this region was the highest of priorities for both sides of the war. The 'Allied' version of Central Europe was, of course, equivalent to the "restoration" and the "liberation" of Poland, "Bohemia comprising the Slovak country of North Hungary". and "Greater Serbia". [196]

It is worth to mention that the regional concept had appeared in the context of Great Britain before the First World War. Local historians and geographers had adopted it from the contemporary German discourse as a broad term to describe the regions of the German Empire and Austria–Hungary. [197] Yet, it is equally important to emphasize that Masaryk transmitted a particular interpretation of the concept from the German context

of the First World War; he also formulated his own version of 'Central Europe' as the counter-concept of *Mitteleuropa*.

Thus, it is worth to apply the concept of 'cultural transfer' to this case; the adaptation of 'Central Europe' by the discourse of the *New Europe* especially supports this argument. The concept also appeared in this context as the translation of the German *Mitteleuropa*. However, it could also operate against this concept or independently from it. Due to the fascination of the *New Europe* with German war aims and the national issues of Austria–Hungary, the concept of the 'new Europe' in part referred to the 'reorganization' of Central Europe as already claimed by Masaryk in *At the Eleventh Hour*.

For instance, the article of Vladimir Nosek heralded the coming of a 'new Central Europe' as a future result of German defeat and the co-operation of local national movements in April 1918 ("Towards a New Central Europe", April 4, 1918). [198] The author was the participant of the Czechoslovak political movement as the member of its British section. [199] Thus, it would be possible to argue that Nosek only followed Masaryk in this regard. Nonetheless, his article still featured a version of 'Central Europe' that opposed the German concept of *Mitteleuropa*.

In contrast, W. J. Rose used the concept of 'Central Europe' without any references to German war aims in December 1918 ("A New Idealism in Central Europe", December 12, 1918). [200] One could of course argue that this was due to the defeat of Germany by November 1918, which rendered the discourse of *Mitteleuropa* to be one without perspective in the local context. However, this case still emphasizes my statement that 'Central Europe' could become independent of the German concept in the discourse of the *New Europe*.

It may be surprising that Masaryk's *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* did not feature this geopolitical concept in this sense at all. The author rather used 'Eastern Europe' as equivalent to the 'zone of small nations' and as the region affected by the 'Eastern Question'. Although Hayashi notices this phenomenon, he refers to 'Eastern Europe' as a mere synonym to 'Central Europe' in the texts of Masaryk. In contrast, I rather claim that this was a case of discontinuity in terms of concepts due to the transformation of international order and the related transnational discourse by late 1918. It was alarming in this regard that 'Eastern Europe' of *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* was not equivalent to the former interpretation of the author that the identified the region simply as "Russia". The concept rather seemed to refer to the entire "zone of small nations", specifically the "Balkans", Austria–Hungary and the former Western borderlands of the Russian Empire (the Baltic states and Ukraine). This was a broader geopolitical region in comparison to Masaryk's former descriptions of Central Europe.

I claim that this was due to the increased interest of the British and American public in the process of Russian imperial disintegration. Masaryk's main context in Great Britain was the *New Europe*; the authors of the review were fascinated with the local processes of Russia after the revolutions of 1917. British policy also watched the political turmoil of the empire eagerly. It is important to emphasize that the British government did not prefer the disintegration of the Russian state after 1917, but rather its consolidation and reintegration into European and global politics – even if under the rule of the Bolsheviks. [201] Wilson's Fourteen Points were quite broad in their references to the territories of Russia in January 1918 due to the same reason. [202]

To sum it up, the transnational context of the First World War informed the appearance of the regional terms 'Central Europe' and 'Eastern Europe' in the works of

Masaryk. He adopted the concept of *Mitteleuropa* as the subject of the contemporary German discourse and interpreted it as equivalent to the 'political programme' of German foreign policy. He framed this concept through his reinterpretation of the 'Eastern Question'. While the latter concept originally referred to the issues of Ottoman rule and imperial disintegration, the article of Masaryk rather featured it in reference to the 'imperialist' expansion of Germany in its neighbourhood. *Mitteleuropa* or 'Central Europe' in part referred to the latter in the texts produced by Masaryk and the discourse of the *New Europe*, which adopted this concept from him through the process of cultural transfer.

However, I position myself against the related claims of Otilia Dhand by pointing out the 'Central Europe' did not appear only in the sense in this context. It also became a counter-concept to *Mitteleuropa* and referred to a region independent from the influence of Germany and the Central Powers. The concept of the 'new Europe' appeared as synonymous to this 'Central Europe' in the texts of Masaryk before 1918 and the discourse of the *New Europe*.

I argue that Tadayuki Hayashi is wrong to identify 'Central Europe' (*Mitteleuropa*) as synonymous to the 'Central Zone of small nations' (*Zwischeneuropa*) or 'Eastern Europe' in the works of Masaryk during the First World War. I rather pointed out that 'Central Europe' covered only a part of the region that Masaryk described through the term '(central) zone of small nations'. This was much due to his interpretation of the Russian Empire as a context without national issues as opposed to the 'mixed' and 'artificial' state of Austria–Hungary, which of course was in relationship with the position of Russia as the member of the Entente Powers. Thus, his discussion of local affairs

remained limited to the delegitimization of Habsburg (and German) rule in Central Europe.

I also claim that the adjective 'central' did not only refer to a geographical position of the region as opposed to the 'West' and 'East' of Europe, but also to a normative load that subverted the original interpretation of the modern 'centre–periphery' dichotomy in the Western (in this case, British or Anglo–American) context. Masaryk interpreted the middle region of Europe as 'central' in terms of its historical and political importance, as its political control either contributed to the world-wide domination of Germany or the Entente.

Finally, I claim that 'Eastern Europe' was no synonym, but rather the replacement of 'Central Europe' in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* due to the changes in the international context of the First World War by 1918. I have pointed out that the British (and American) public, including the authors of the *New Europe*, were concerned about the process of imperial disintegration in Russia. Thus, Masaryk had to extend his discussion to the Western borderlands of the empire. 'Eastern Europe' thus represented a geopolitical concept broader than that of 'Central Europe'.

I find it important to introduce these regional concepts used by Masaryk not only because of their transnational importance, but also because he applied the 'self-determination of peoples' to these frameworks. I will showcase in the next chapter in what specific forms and through what relationships to other concepts this did (not) appear in the contemporary works of the Czechoslovak leader.

'(The Right of Nations to) Self-Determination'

The discourse of the *New Europe* adopted the concept of 'self-determination' from the context of the February Revolution in Russia in 1917 by the time Masaryk left Great Britain. Thus, the term could not really appear in the articles he wrote (or to be more precise, did not write for) the journal. Nevertheless, it is worth to mention that the concept of 'self-determination' still appeared in this *New Europe* in connection to the issues represented by the Czechoslovak movement.

"Poland's Freedom", the first article (editorial note) to feature the 'right of self-determination, already claimed that this concept should be applied to the "Czecho-Slovaks". [203] The "An Appeal to the Russian Soviet" problematized the shortcomings of the Bolsheviks in this regard on November 15, 1917. [204] Seton-Watson was eager to report in his "The Czechs and Austria" (February 14, 1918) the references to the concept of 'self-determination' by the Czech politicians in Austria throughout 1917 and 1918. [205]

It is worth to notice that Masaryk had already referred to the 'right of self-determination' (*Selbstbestimmungsrecht*) in the Austrian *Reichsrat* as early as 1892. However, this was not the concept adopted from the social democratic discourse of Russia, but rather a term of liberal origin in the Austrian context. He also still identified the regional community of the 'Bohemian people' rather than the ethno-cultural 'Czechoslovak nation' as the subject of this right at this point of his carrier. His references to the concept also contributed to the debates of imperial reform and national autonomy rather than secession in the context of Cisleithania. [206] In contrast, his interviews in Russia after April 1917 already featured the interpretation of 'self-

determination' as the 'right' to national union and secession. [207] Thus, he also adopted this concept from the Russian context through its cultural and ideological transfer.

And yet, whereas the concept of 'self-determination' elevated into a rather prestigious position in the discourse of the *New Europe* by late 1918, this was not so much the case in Masaryk's *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. No chapter titles defined this the key concept of the book. It was only a minor section of the second chapter that discussed the 'right of nations to self-determination', 'national self-determination' or the 'principle of self-determination'.

The real 'star' of the second chapter was the 'principle of nationality' as indicated by its title. This concept appeared for thirty-eight (19) times in this section of the book, in sharp contrast with the low number of references to the 'right of self-determination' (7). The 'principle of nationality' appeared as a "modern" phenomenon of politics, society, art and "life in general". The author interpreted it as a "historical fact" and a "political power" since the late eighteenth century. [208] This was much line with the previous statements of Masaryk in the *New Europe* and the general outlines of the journal's discourse.

In contrast, the chapter discussed the concept of 'self-determination' only in the context of the First World War. It appeared as a 'right' that incapsulated the 'principle of nationality'; it was this latter concept that the "Allies" (Entente) finally recognized through their (alleged) references to 'self-determination'. The "Allied Note" of 1917 and more vague references to the earlier declarations of "English and French Ministers" had appeared in the first chapter as proofs to this end. This was an anachronistic interpretation of earlier events, as the texts referred to did not actually incorporate the concept. Nonetheless, Masaryk explained the intrinsic relationship of the Entente with

the 'right of self-determination' through with the "democratic" and "national" traits of its states – a thesis he had formerly proposed in the *New Europe*. On the other hand, he also emphasized that the 'right to self-determination' or simply the 'right of nationality' was a rather broad concept, as it did not receive precise descriptions in contemporary law. [209]

It was remarkable that this interpretation of the term 'self-determination' lacked any precise historical or contemporary points of references. The author referred rather broadly to France, "England", Italy, and other "democratic states" as the original supporters of this right of nations. Masaryk claimed that "revolutionary Russia" only followed its (former) allies others recently ("now" as either during the developmental phase of the book or at the time of its publication). [210]

Although Wilson was a historical figure to appear in connection to the concept, Masaryk did not feature him as its direct supporter. The American President rather appeared to declare "that no nation shall be forced to have a government which is not its own nor for its own interests". This was the author's attempt to interpret Wilson's concept of 'self-government' as synonymous to the studied concept. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks also appeared only once in connection to 'self-determination', as Masaryk reported that they opposed the application of civilizational standards to the concept and its subjects, the nations in global terms. [211]

I attribute this lack of references and overall marginal importance of the concept in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* to its controversies in the international context of 1918. As opposed to the narrative of various studies, Wilson was visibly reluctant to adopt this concept and to support national secessionism. While the Bolshevik did interpret 'the self-determination of peoples' as the right to 'secession', they were no

friends of Masaryk, his transnational framework of the *New Europe*, or the Allied and Associated Powers in terms of ideology and global political aims. Thus, it was safer for the author to refer to 'principle of nationality' as a historical force and the objective guideline of international reorganization. This was already established as a key concept of the historical British (or Anglo-American) discourse as for the issues of nationalism.

On the other hand, it was of course impossible to entirely omit the 'right of nations to self-determination' from the narrative of the book by late 1918. Masaryk must have felt that in this case, it was beneficial for him to interpret the concept as rooted in the democratic traditions of the Western European nation states that formed the Allied and Associated Powers. Through this general description, he could avoid references to the contemporary Russian context without having to face its controversies.

As for its counter-concept, 'self-determination' appeared as opposed to the 'non-national' or 'anti-national' state in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. The narrative of Masaryk specifically contrasted the concept to the "principle" of the Central Powers that the Allied and Associated Powers were not allowed to interfere in their "internal affairs". Masaryk emphasized the "pharisaic" nature of such claims, as he interpreted this ban of intervention as a major contribution to the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire or the "oppression" of nationalities in Austria–Hungary. Thus, the concept of 'self-determination' was embedded in the same dichotomy between the 'democratic' nation state and the 'theocratic', 'oppressive' and 'anti-national' state as it did in Masaryk's articles in *the New Europe*. [212]

Much similar to his narrative in the "Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations", Masaryk differentiated between Austria–Hungary and Russia as cases, in which the applications of the 'right of nations to self-determination' provided different

solutions to the 'Eastern Question' and the issues of Eastern Europe in late 1918. He claimed that the discourse of the Russian February Revolution featured the term as synonymous with 'autonomy'. Only "radical factions" (such as the Bolsheviks, although Masaryk did not name them here) would interpret 'self-determination' as the "right to political separation". National secessionism in Russia was once again appeared as fostered by "Germans" and "Austrians" in the case of Ukraine. [213]

However, Masaryk did not leave the subject at this point as he had done in late 1916. His vision of the 'new Europe' in the book rather incorporated the claim that Russia should reorganize itself into a "federation of nations" – in accordance with the 'principle of the self-determination of nations'. The Baltic peoples, Ukraine, the "small nations of the Caucasus" and "Russian Asia" appeared to remain in the framework of the Russian state. Masaryk only proposed the application of 'national autonomy' to some of these communities. He specifically claimed that the peoples of Caucasus and the Asian part of Russia should receive this "in accordance with their degree of education, national consciousness and number" (thus, in accordance with a civilizational standard). [214]

It was also noteworthy that the author supported the secession of certain territories from the Russian Empire. He claimed that the part of the Polish nation in the territories formerly ruled by this imperial state "must be united into an independent state" with its Austrian and Prussian co-nationals. The "Roumanians of Russia" or the "Russian part of Bessarabia" would "join" the Romanian nation state in the narrative of the author. In contrast, such a support was rather implicit in the case of the Baltic nations and Finland. Masaryk stated that the former "could be" the members of the future

Russian federation. He similarly claimed that the Finns "may be" independent if they could "reach an agreement" with Russia to this end. [215]

It was important in relation to this discussion of territorial reorganization in Russia that Masaryk used the concept of 'federation' in parallel with another. He claimed such a framework could only be real if "nations are free to unite of their own accord". Thus, his concept of 'federation' described a process from below. This appeared in sharp contrast as opposed to governmental designs of imperial reform, the 'promises' of 'autonomy and federation' in Austria and other states during the late First World War. [216]

On the one hand, the claims of Masaryk were continuous with the federalist narrative in the discourse of the *New Europe*. On the other hand, it is worth to notice that the author partially moved away from the Eurocentric narrative of the 'nation' in the journal, although he still applied a certain civilizational standard to the peoples of Caucasus and Russian Asia. Finally, *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* finally showcased a support of secessionism from the Russian Empire as opposed to Masaryk's earlier articles in the journal. This, however, remained limited to a small set of national cases. In this sense, the narrative of the author coincided with the hope of the British and the American governments that Russia would not disintegrate entirely but would rather return into the international community as one of its Great Powers.

In contrast, the application of the concept of 'national self-determination' to Austria–Hungary appeared as equal to its political and moral "condemnation" and the final solution to the 'Eastern Question' in the book. The author interpreted "modern democracy and nationality" as historical factors that doomed this "old dynastic State", especially since its nations have been "striving to attain freedom and independence"

since the late eighteenth century. [217] It is borderline superfluous to point out the continuities between this narrative and that of the *New Europe*; without the "break-up" of the Habsburg Monarchy as a political goal, the concept of 'independent Bohemia' was meaningless.

It was more important that the subject of the 'right to self-determination': 'nation' or 'nationality' appeared in a different sense in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* in comparison to the previous articles of the author in the journal. I will showcase this in the next section.

To sum this section up, the 'right of nations to self-determination' appeared as subordinated to the 'principle of nationality' in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. This was in sharp contrast with the importance of the concept in the discourse of the *New Europe*. I attributed this discontinuity to the controversial role of the concept in the international context of late 1918. It was better for Masaryk to avoid references in this regard as nor Wilson neither the Bolsheviks could appear as to sufficiently support his secessionist claims.

The 'a-national' or 'non-national' and 'theocratic' state appeared in the book as the counter-concept of 'national self-determination'. The primary example to this end was of course Austria–Hungary; the result of this narrative was the conclusion that its framework should dissolve for the benefit of its nations. This interpretation of Masaryk was continuous with the statements of his previous articles in the *New Europe*.

On the other hand, the author repositioned his viewpoint with regard to Russia by 1918. While he had rather limited his discussion of this issue earlier, Masaryk included a detailed program of imperial reform into his vision of the 'new Europe' in his book. He did not support the disintegration of Russia, as he proposed its federal

reorganization in accordance with the 'right of nations to self-determination' and through the application of national autonomy to certain of the local communities. On the other hand, he also claimed that certain nations were bound to secede from the state.

These claims of Masaryk were in correspondence with the Russian federalist narrative of the *New Europe* and the context of British and American government policies towards the Russian Empire in late 1918. However, he did not follow the Eurocentric interpretation of the 'nation' by the review, as he considered some of the communities in the Caucasus and Russian Asia to be developed enough to gain national autonomy in the state. (Although he still applied a certain civilizational standard to this issue.)

j. 'Nation(ality)'

As opposed to his former statements in the *New Europe*, the term 'race' appeared in a radically different sense in Masaryk's *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. Masaryk claimed that it was a "general view" of the concept that it referred to the sub-divisions of mankind in accordance with the "physical and mental qualities" of particular groups. Thus, he used the concept in accordance with the traditions of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century rather than in the sense it was associated with the 'nation' during the nineteenth century – or as he had used it in his articles of the *New Europe* in 1916. In contrast, the author emphasized the "greatly mixed" nature of both races (in the sense of larger sub-groups of humankind) and nations in biological terms in his book of 1918. [218]

It was thus rather 'nationality' that appeared as a concept to describe national identities, defined by 'language' and 'culture' rather than any ethnic traits in the

biological sense. [219] It is worth to notice that this was the realization of that compromise between the ethno-cultural 'race' and the political 'nation' that Masaryk had proposed to Seton-Watson in their correspondence during 1917. It is safe to conclude that this was the result of the 'Czechoslovak–British' debate in the broader political and intellectual framework of the *New Europe*, as this did concern the various interpretations of the 'nation' by various parties.

A footnote of the second chapter included important additions to this subject. The author claimed that other than an ethno-cultural community, the concept of the 'nation' could also refer to the collective of citizens in an otherwise 'mixed state'. Switzerland, Belgium, Ireland, and Scotland appeared as primary examples to this end. Masaryk emphasized the importance of the influence of historical state independence as for the last two cases. He implied that the adjective 'mixed' would refer to the co-existence of English and Celtic languages in the context of the Irish and the Scottish 'nation'. [220]

One can realize that the A. F. Giles had problematized the 'racial' interpretation of the 'nation' by Masaryk through the very same examples. The Czechoslovak leader back then resisted the statements of the British historian that the 'nation' would represent a superior form of the 'race' and the common identity of the 'state'. Masaryk refuted this remark by stating that Giles "confounded" the concept of 'nationality' with that of the 'political nation' and that the state could not create a common national identity for its citizens. And yet, he would state in his book of 1918 that it was "of course evident" that the historical co-habitation of nations could create a common identity due to the formation of "identical" views, institutions, and traditions in the state. [221]

In my view, it is rightful to claim that the narrative of Masaryk transformed in this regard upon the British criticism of his views in the *New Europe*. It is also easy to understand the rationale behind this shift of viewpoints. The British (or Anglo-American) audience of the late First World War would have resisted a 'racial' interpretation of the 'nation', as this would have problematized concepts of a common national identity in Great Britain, or the United States for that matter. The following debate would have only diverted the attention from the vision of the 'new Europe' and the 'independent Bohemia'.

This proves the benefits of my framing of the *New Europe* as a 'discourse' rather than a 'common platform' as it appears in the narratives of Hanak, the Seton-Watsons, Sluga or others. This approach can pinpoint certain causes behind the difference between the interpretations of the 'nation' in the various texts produced by Masaryk. I of course do not and cannot claim that the Czechoslovak leader reformed his viewpoint solely due to the debates of the *New Europe*. However, this transnational and British-dominated framework still featured the expectations of various parties and platforms that Masaryk had to accommodate to in the context of the Entente countries to gain support for the foundation of 'independent Bohemia'.

As such, it was more beneficial for Masaryk to reinterpret his concept of 'nationality', so that it could correspond to mainstream viewpoints in the Anglo-American context. However, the term 'political nation' did not appear as a concept of "English" or Anglo-American origin in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. Masaryk rather claimed it was "scientific German literature" that described the "whole body of citizens in a mixed state" or the "ruling nation" of this framework through this concept. [222] I theorize that this was also due to the attempt to avoid debates with contemporary

actors in the Anglo-American context. It was better for Masaryk to simply feature the 'political nation' as a "German" concept – and thus in contemporary terms, 'alien' and 'hostile' to the British or the American context, without having to problematize the structure of local communities.

It was equally important that the author differentiated between the concepts of the 'nation' and the 'people'. The former appeared as employed in a "political sense" in national and transnational contexts, whereas the latter referred to the "masses of nation in a democratic sense". (Although Masaryk failed to notice that 'democracy' is a concept of political nature as well.) The author raised attention to the fact the relationship between these concepts was "unsettled" and "not very exact" in the 'important declarations' of the First World War. [223]

These statements contextualized Masaryk's choice to interpret the 'nation' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination' rather than the 'people'. It is most easy to theorize a relationship between this narrative and the various declarations of Wilson in the late First World War. The linguistic-cultural concept of the 'nation' appeared as the foundation of the 'new Europe' and the future international order *in The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. The concept of 'self-determination' primarily supported the right of this community to secession in its narrative. In contrast, 'self-government' as preferred by Wilson would accentuate a democratic reform of the international order through the political concept of the 'people' as the community of the contemporary 'state'. This did not necessitate the redrawing of international boundaries – or the foundation of an 'independent Bohemia'.

Czechoslovakia was bound to be impacted by the various national concepts of Masaryk. This was especially important due to the peculiar and controversial claims of

the Czechoslovak movement with regard to the future state. Czechs and Slovaks (or the 'Czechoslovaks') would of course appear as the ethno-cultural community to form the majority of the state. However, the concept of 'independent Bohemia' also incorporated claims to the historical territories of the Czech lands inhabited by a sizeable German community through his reference to the Bohemian state rights discourse.

On the one hand, this reference showcased the repositioning of Masaryk's viewpoint. He had forsaken the concept of the integral 'Bohemian Kingdom' and the political community of the 'Bohemian people' to the benefit of the ethno-cultural kinship between Czechs and Slovaks after 1900. On the other hand, the Czech–German antagonism and the opposition between the 'principle of nationality' (or 'self-determination') and historical rights appeared as worrisome even to the most dedicated supporters of the Czechoslovak movement such as Seton-Watson. Masaryk had to address these issues in his articles of the *New Europe* and in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*, which process I will showcase in the next sub-chapter.

To sum it up, *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* reinterpreted the relationship between the concepts of the 'race' and the 'nation'. These terms did not operate as synonyms anymore. The key concept of 'nationality' did not contain biological or 'ethnic' implications, as it rather emphasized the role of language and culture in the formation of national identities. Masaryk also did not interpret the 'political nation' as a concept of 'English' origin and a counter-concept to his 'nationality'; he rather identified this as a term of contemporary German science. The author stated that the formation of common identities was a natural result of the historical co-habitation of nations in certain states.

I claim that this shift in terms of national concepts between Masaryk's articles of the *New Europe* and his book of late 1918 supports my framing of the *New Europe* as a 'discourse' and was at least partially the result of the 'Czechoslovak–British' dichotomy in the debates of nationalism in this context. I have pointed out that Masaryk had already proposed substitution of the more biological 'race' with the more cultural 'nationality' as his end of a compromise in his correspondence with Seton-Watson. This shift and his approval of the 'political nation' in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* most likely was to avoid negative reactions from the contemporary Anglo-American context and to avoid diverting attention from the vision of the 'new Europe' and 'independent Bohemia'.

At the same time, his interpretation of the cultural concept of the 'nation' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination' positioned the author against Wilson, who preferred the reform of international order through the political concept of 'people' as the subject of 'self-government'. The 'national' preference of Masaryk supported his narrative that international boundaries shall be redrawn in accordance with the secessionist claims of those politicians who represented ethno-cultural communities such as the Czechoslovaks. Yet, the dichotomy and the Masaryk's shifts between the 'racial' and 'political' interpretations of the national community were also bound to impact the concept of 'independent Bohemia'.

k. 'Bohemia'

The future state of Czechs and Slovaks most often appeared as "Bohemia" in the discourse of the *New Europe* between 1916–1918. Masaryk's article "Bohemia and the European Crisis" (January 25, 1917) showcased the main importance of this concept

for the Czechoslovak movement. The text featured it in reference to the Austrian province of Bohemia but more importantly, to the historical state of the Bohemian Kingdom; as a term to designate the sum of the "Bohemian countries" (the Austrian crownlands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia and the territory of "Slovakia" in Hungary); and in relation to the future state of Czechs and Slovaks. [224]

Thus, the name 'Bohemia' provided a historical continuity between the medieval state, the state rights discourse of the Czech national movement in the Habsburg Monarchy in the nineteenth century and that of the Czechoslovak political emigration of the First World War. Yet, it is important to once again recall the fact that the 'Czechoslav nation' had been the counter-concept of Masaryk to the focus on the state rights discourse on the historical framework of 'Bohemia' before 1914 (as described in the first case study). However, the latter concept could legitimize the representatives of the Czechoslovak political emigration during the First World War, as their references to it depicted them as successors of the historical discourse. In my view, it was in part due to this reason that 'Czecho-Slovakia' rarely appeared as the alternative name of the future state in the *New Europe* until the end of the First World War.

In contrast, the name "Bohemian" only appeared in the first article of Masaryk in the *New Europe* in reference to a "race" of the Habsburg Monarchy. [225] He had been using this concept in the early phase of the war to conflate any differences between the identities of Czechs and Slovaks and to depict them as one integral community in ethno-cultural terms. [226]

In my view, Masaryk simply derived this term from 'Bohemia', the English designation of Latin origin for both the Austrian province and the historical state. On the other hand, one must also consider the possible importance of the German term

böhmisches Volk as a source, a concept often referred to in the Austrian context of Masaryk. In this case, one must emphasize that Masaryk identified 'Bohemians' as the common 'race' of Czechs and Slovaks, whereas he never referred to the German population of the Czech lands through this term. Thus, his 'Bohemians' rather showed parallels with the ethno-cultural implications of the Czech term *český národ*. However, references to this term could become a possible source of conflict after 1915, since they could bother the alliance established between Masaryk's political group and the Slovak League of America after the Cleveland Conference. [227]

As a result, the consecutive texts of Masaryk would rather feature "Czecho-Slovaks" as the designation of his nation(al concept). In the "The Future Status of Bohemia" (February 22, 1917), he claimed that this name referred to the union of Czechs and Slovaks. Yet, he emphasized that it implied a less intimate bond as "Czechoslovak" (or for that matter, "Bohemian") would. On the other hand, the author stated that only "radical Slovaks" attempted to interpret their nation as 'distinct' from the Czechs. He himself rather showed confidence that the "union" of the two groups would "grow" in the future, as this process was in accordance with the economic interests of "Slovakia". [228] It is worth to mention here that "Slovakia" did not correspond to any existing administrative units during the First World War; it was an abstract concept used by Masaryk in reference to the Slovak-inhabited territories of Northern Hungary.

Importantly, Masaryk also claimed that due to the "oppression" of Austria–Hungary, only the Czech and Slovak "politicians and emigrants of Europe and America" could represent their communities. [229] On the one hand, this statement legitimized the activities of the Czechoslovak political emigration. On the other hand,

it also marginalized its alternatives in the Habsburg Monarchy from the discourse. It is important to recall that in fact, the mainstream of Czech parties did not support the idea of secessionism or even the ethno-cultural concept of the 'Czechoslovak nation' before late 1917.

However, a distinctive feature of "The Future State of Bohemia" from the previous texts of Masaryk was that it referred to 'Bohemia' as a historical concept in a different sense than before. The Czechs and Slovaks appeared as the majority of the future state in the article. However, the author recognized the fact "minorities" would also constitute one-fourth of the population in accordance with the territorial claims of his movement. The historical lands of the Bohemian Kingdom and the territory of "Slovakia" would have incorporated 3,380,000 Poles, Germans and "Magyars" into a population of 12,380,000. Out of these groups, the German community was to be most numerous (3,000,000 individuals – 24,2% of the population). [230] This fact alone could easily destabilize the claims in the *New Europe* that the establishment of an 'independent Bohemia' would be in accordance with the 'principle of nationality'.

Although through the anachronistic use of one concept, the Seton-Watsons are right to report that the dichotomy of 'historical rights – national self-determination (or rather the principle of nationality)' also bothered their father – who was otherwise the supporter of Masaryk, the founder, and the editor of the *New Europe*. However, their claim that the economic and strategic interests of 'Bohemia' could override his worries is problematized by certain historical sources.

"The Czecho-Slovaks", the editorial note of Seton-Watson accompanied a map of the territories inhabited by the Czechs and Slovaks. This text appeared in the *New Europe* on January 25, 1917 – a month before the "Future Status of Bohemia". Through

his description of the future state and its demographic statistics, the author implied that Germans (3,5 million) would significantly outnumber even the Slovaks (2 million) in a population of 12 million. He claimed that the size of the German community could be significantly lower (with 0,5 million) through the revision of provincial frontiers in the context of the Czech lands. [231] The map that appeared as the appendix of the issue ("Bohemia – The Racial distribution of the Czechs & Slovaks") only featured the lands inhabited by the Czechs and Slovaks. Yet, it indicated that the process of border revisions could affect North-Eastern and North-Western Bohemia, Northern Silesia and North-Eastern Moravia, as it featured these regions as ones with virtually no Czech population. [232] [233]

Certain statements of Masaryk in "The Future State of Bohemia" were direct reactions to these claims. The author seemingly agreed with the possibility that one could consider the "rectification of political frontiers" in 'parts of Bohemia and Moravia' with a low Czech population. However, he immediately pointed out that the Austrian province of Lower Austria and Vienna also contained 0,5 million Czechs. The author also stated 'Bohemia' could claim Prussian Silesia, Glatz, Ratibor and Sorbian Lusatia on the same grounds. In sum, he featured the historical claims of the Czechoslovak movement as the "fair application of the principle of majority" in contrast to the contemporary rule of "Germans" over "Czechs" ("What is more just…"). [234]

Instead of border revision, it was rather the historical concept of 'Bohemia' that appeared as a solution to this end. Masaryk claimed that the adoption of designation would have been beneficial for the future state due to two reasons. One was that its lands were referred to as 'Bohemia' in various local languages. The other was that this term contained historical references to the community of the 'Bohemian Crown'. As

such, it would have been acceptable for "Polish and German minorities" as it evoked memories of their historical co-habitation with the Czechs. [235]

Masaryk thus returned to those concepts of the 'Bohemian people' and 'Bohemian German' identity he had so vehemently opposed before 1914. It is to be recalled that the 'Czechoslovak nation' was the result of his secession from the historical Czech state rights discourse. Yet, his "The Future State of Bohemia" featured the future state as one with a historical background in the early modern Kingdom of Bohemia and as the possible subject of active loyalty for its inhabitants regardless of their nationality. Although the 'Czecho-Slovaks' did appear as the local majority, the concept of 'Bohemia' remained inclusive towards local minorities. Masaryk implied that he himself preferred this designation much due to its importance in terms of historical memories of co-habitation and local identities.

Although the same explanation did not appear in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* of 1918, it still predominantly referred to the future state as 'Bohemia'. However, it is worth to notice that the "Czecho-Slovak State" also appeared in the text as a prominent alternative designation. For instance, Section 19 of the third chapter featured this name in its title instead of "Bohemia". [236]

Although 'Bohemia' was not referred to in the text as a historical concept to support the co-habitation of nations in the region, the issue of local identities appeared again as the important element of Masaryk's narrative. The author claimed that it was "just" that the "renewed state" would keep the "so-called German territory" in Bohemia and Moravia. He supported this statement by pointing out that this region had "many Czech inhabitants" – while "The Future Status of Bohemia" had claimed the exact opposite in 1917. [237]

The author also emphasized the historical relationship between Czechs and the "Germans in Bohemia". He stated that the national movements had co-operated until 1861, when their representatives would jointly demand the coronation of the Austrian Emperor as the King of Bohemia (and thus, the restoration of Bohemian state rights). Masaryk claimed it was only "brutal Pangerman agitation" that had separated Czechs and Germans in the late nineteenth century. He was confident that the latter community would "abandon the national fury" facilitated by chauvinists. The author finished the related sequence by claiming that "many German'" opposed the separation of their territories from Czech-inhabited lands. [238] These statements were complementary to the previous description of 'Bohemia' by the "The Future State of Bohemia".

While it makes sense to interpret such claims as the attempt of Masaryk to appeal to the foreign criticism of the Czechoslovak historical claims, it is also worth to point out that his speech acts and texts incorporated certain statements independent of such influences. The idea that only Pangerman propaganda agitated Bohemian Germans against the Czechs had already appeared in the conservation between Masaryk and Seton-Watson in Rotterdam, October 1914. The Czechoslovak leader then claimed that the "defeat of Germany" would put an end to this negative influence, and the German community of 'independent Bohemia' would return to its local identity. [239]

While this statement would return in *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*, Masaryk also referred to the (alleged) viewpoint of local Germans in 1914 in connection to another issue, the political system of 'independent Bohemia'. At this point, he envisioned the establishment of the future state as a constitutional monarchy. However, he claimed that the monarch could not be of Russian origin, since this would have been unacceptable for Bohemian Germans. [240]

Thus, I claim that the 'right of nations to self-determination' appeared in *The New Europe: The Slavic Standpoint* as applied to a 'Bohemia' or soon, to a 'Czechoslovakia' with civic and ethno-cultural features in late 1918. This amounted to the combination of those national concepts that were central to the opposing state rights and realist discourses in the Austrian context at the turn of the century. I support this interpretation of mine through the study of Masaryk's articles in the *New Europe* and their continuity with his book of late 1918. In my opinion, these historical sources once again reflect on the importance of the *New Europe* as a transnational discourse, but also on the debates as for the 'civic' or 'ethnic' (ethno-cultural) features of the Czechoslovak national concept. It is easy to identify a continuity between the debates in the framework of the *New Europe* and *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. I offer to apply my theory of the 'Czechoslovak–British dichotomy to this issue as well.

I specifically argue that those were Seton-Watson's doubts as to the size of the German minority in the future state that resulted in the direct adaptation of 'civic' features through the historical concept of 'Bohemia' as it appeared in the discourse of the *New Europe*. Masaryk was explicit in his claims that this designation was the best for the future nation state due to its implications for the historical co-habitation of local communities and the local identities of minorities. His *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* would emphasize the possibility that 'Bohemia' or the 'Czecho-Slovak State' could become the subject of active loyalty for its German inhabitants.

It is of course possible to interpret such claims and the transformation of 'Bohemia' as either a result of an external pressure or the genuine realization of Masaryk that such a shift would be useful to address various possible issues of the future state. At the same time, it is of course also important to emphasize that the 'Czecho-

Slovaks' had appeared as a modern substitute for the 'Bohemian people' as a (quasi-)supranational regional concept. The concept of future state had a certain majority and was meant to feature certain national elements in its framework.

This phenomenon, however, does not necessarily refute the argument that the concept of 'Bohemia' or 'Czechoslovakia' had 'civic' features in the works of Masaryk. The 'ethno-cultural' and the 'political' can co-exist in the definition of communities and the functioning of states. I have already showed the blurred boundaries between 'English' and 'British', the homogenization of the nation as opposed to the maintenance of local identities were subjects of debates in the context of Great Britain during the nineteenth century. It is also worth to point out that Wilson and contemporary American nationalism were also torn between exclusive and inclusive narratives of the United States as a 'civic' framework or as defined by the historical domination of "White Anglo–Saxon Christians". [241] The co-existence of the 'civic' and the 'ethno-cultural' in national concepts thus defined the Anglo-American transnational context of both the *New Europe* and *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*.

It is also important to recall the fact that the historical concept of the 'Bohemian people' also featured this dichotomy from the beginning in the Czech states right discourse. I showed that in my first case study that on the one hand, this concept did emphasize the historical ties between the Czech and German communities in Bohemia proper and the historical Kingdom of Bohemia. On the other hand, the Czech equivalent of the 'Bohemian people', *český národ* emphasized the local domination of Czechs as an ethno-cultural majority. Thus, it is right to say that the co-existence of 'civic' and 'ethno-cultural' traits defined the state rights discourse before 1914 – an ambiguity

adopted and inherited by the Czechoslovak political emigration during the First World War.

In a certain sense, the Czech reprint of the "The Future State of Bohemia" (*Budoucí Čechy*) from 1919 showcased this issue much better than the English original. The translation of Jan Reichmann, this Czech-American diplomat was faithful in the sense that although it reedited the structure of the article, it did not alter the original intentions of the author. Thus, it featured 'Bohemia' (*Čechy*) as the best alternative to "denote" (*označovati*) the "entire future state" (*celý budoucí stat*) of Czechs and Slovaks. On the one hand, this emphasized the "constitutional unity" (*ústavní jednotu*) of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the text. On the other hand, the text also referred to the preferences of local "German and Polish minorities" (*menšiny německé a polské*) to support this choice. [242]

It is important to recall that *Čechy* has always been in a close relationship with the endonym of 'Czechs': *Češi* (or in its archaic form, *Čechové*). As such, it was not as neutral as 'Bohemia' and its variants in foreign languages (e. g. the German *Böhmen*) of Latin origin. However, it was also problematic by the time of the First World War that the name "Bohemia" or *Čechy* marginalized Slovaks from the supposedly common narrative. It was similar to the term "Bohemians" in this sense (in contrast to 'Czecho-Slovaks').

Thus, "Czechoslovakia" (*Československo*) was ultimately a better alternative in 1918, but not one without its own controversies. Masaryk had already emphasized that this variant term implied a stronger bond between Czechs and Slovaks. This claim evolved into the official narrative of the First Czechoslovak Republic that the term 'Czechoslovaks' referred to the unitary nation of the two "branches". Slovak

nationalists were less enthusiastic of this interpretation. They favoured the form 'Czecho-Slovaks', as it rather implied the more distinct identity of their group. This so-called 'hyphen controversy' was to define the related debates of the interwar period. It also reoccurred from time to time up to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state in the early 1990s. [243]

However, the term 'Czechoslovak' also referred to the context of a centralized nation-state in a conflictual relationship with its 'national minorities'. The latter was a concept that Masaryk had addressed in his works during the late First World War, much due to the fact that it was a subject of interest in his transnational contexts. I will showcase his related viewpoint(s) in the next sub-chapter.

l. 'National Minorities'

André Liebich discusses the issue of '(national) minorities' in a historical study of 2008 ("Minority as Inferiority: Minority Rights in Historical Perspective"). He argues that from the Peace Westphalia (1648) to the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919, "minority rights" always appeared as a form of "indemnity offered to defeated parties". Wilson and 'Wilsonians' appear in this narrative as decision-makers to apply a "partial and necessarily messy" concept of "self-determination" to the contemporary international order. Although they "had not foreseen" the issues related to the problem of minorities before 1918, they ultimately devised the Minority Treaties as a "corrective corollary" in this regard. [244]

This resolution, however, did not satisfy any parties involved according to Liebich: nor the defeated Central Powers neither their successor states. The author claims this was due to the fact that "minority rights" are ultimately the "price of

statehood and of the satisfaction of national claims" on the one hand. On the other, they are "indemnification offered for the loss of sovereignty over part of one's state". It is due to the unsatisfactory nature of such offers that minority rights have found "no buyers" in the international sphere ever since the end of the First World War. [245]

While my study does not discuss the international effect or the reception of Minority Treaties after the First World War, I can still approach the statements of Liebich critically. I claim that is hard to imagine that the decision-makers "of Paris" would have not foreseen the issue of 'national minorities', as this concept was the subject of extensive transnational discourses during the war in their contexts.

The representatives of the Jewish national movement had already started to lobby for the international protection and recognition of their communities after the Russian pogroms of 1881. This materialized in their demands for the institutionalization of the 'rights' of 'national minorities' in the American and the Russian (post-)imperial context during the First World War. This concept of theirs referred to the status of non-dominant groups as protected by international and national law. The main beneficiary of such developments was of course the 'Jewish nation' in their discourse. [246]

'National minorities' also appeared as a key concept in the discourse of transnational associations such as the Central Organization for a Durable Peace and its 'Program Minimale' of 1915. The rights of minorities such as 'civil equality', 'religious liberty' and the 'free use of native languages' appeared as the one of the foundations of a peaceful future international order in this text. [247]

The *New Europe*, the transnational context of Masaryk also attempted to discuss the 'rights of minorities' as a key concept of its discourse, which I had already shown in a previous sub-chapter. It is only essential to recall here that only rather broad and

meagre general recommendations appeared in the articles to this end ("exercise of language, civil liberty, education and religion"). The collaborators were more interested to observe the issue in relation to particular (inter)national contexts, such as the Italo–Yugoslav relationship or the debated status of Macedonia in South-Eastern Europe.

It was only natural that 'independent Bohemia' would also appear in relation to this issue. The nation-state was to incorporate a sizeable number of Germans, Hungarians, and Poles. The Bohemian German community alone was to constitute one-fourth of the general population according to the statistics provided by the various collaborators of the *New Europe*. This was the result of Czechoslovak claims to the historical territories of the former Bohemian Kingdom. Masaryk's references to the historical co-habitation of communities and their local identities could not substitute the discussion of this issue and that of 'national minorities'.

"The Future Status of Bohemia" thus featured the attempt of Masaryk to solve this paradox behind the claims of the Czechoslovak movement in February 1917. The author stated that his political group could refer to the 'principle of nationality' and wish to "retain minorities" simultaneously due to one simple (or rather complex) reason. He argued that 'Bohemia' was a "nationally mixed country" to that extent that it was impossible to draw "clear ethnographic frontiers" between its communities. Masaryk especially emphasized the parallel presence of Czech and German groups in the industrial cities. [248] It is important to notice that although he would otherwise speak of a nation(al) state and 'Czecho-Slovaks' as its dominant group, here, Masaryk would describe 'Bohemia' as a 'mixed' state to support the historical claims of his movement.

On the other hand, the author also underpinned that the "national rights of minorities" were to be "assured" in the new nation-state and Europe alike. The

introduction of 'full rights' for national minorities appeared as a matter of "common sense" in the framework of 'independent Bohemia'. Masaryk emphasized in this regard that 'Bohemians' (Czechs) themselves had always strived for their recognition as equal, and not as superior to other nations (especially Germans) in terms of law in Austria. [249] It is easy to identify this statement as a reference to the discourse of 'equality of nationality rights' in the Cisleithanian context.

The author also referred to alternative solutions from other national contexts. He claimed that there was a "German and Austrian" idea that the number of minorities could be lowered through their 'systematic intermigration' between states. He pointed at Charles Roden Buxton, the representative of the British Liberal Party as one who would also propose the introduction of similar policies in the context of South-Eastern Europe. Masaryk did not support, but also did not oppose such ideas. He rather stated that these solutions were "risky", but an increased need for "men" would certainly appear in various professions and agriculture after the war. Importantly, Masaryk also claimed that an "International Court" should oversee the issue of national minorities after the war – an idea similar to the Permanent Court of International Justice in the framework of the League of Nations. [250]

It is easy to notice that the author never described what he really meant by the 'rights' or 'full rights' of 'national minorities' in the Bohemian context; his references were rather broad in this respect. The role of the concept was rather limited to supporting the historical claims of the Czechoslovak movement. If anything, the 'idea' of 'systematic intermigration' appeared more interesting for Masaryk to discuss. On the other hand, one can assume that through the term 'equality', he might have referred to

the discourse of 'equality of rights' in Austria and its implications for 'national minorities' in the context of the crownlands.

In contrast, the second chapter of *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* featured a more massive attempt to contextualize and discuss the concept of 'national minorities' in the general framework of the 'principle of nationality'. The 'state' would intertwine with the 'nation' in Masaryk's vision of the "reconstructed" Europe. However, he also claimed nation-states would still remain "mixed" in a certain sense. The existence of 'national minorities' was inevitable, as certain ethno-cultural groups were scattered along the territories of others. [251]

On the one hand, he claimed that to make the size of these groups "as small as possible" was a probable solution to this problem. The idea of "transmigration of quite large national minorities" once again appeared in this regard. However, the tone of *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* was rather negative in relation to this issue as opposed to neutral and contemplative narrative of "The Future Status of Bohemia". The idea appeared in the book of late 1918 as belonging to the political language of 'Pangermans' and as showcasing their intent to "weaken non-German minorities". Masaryk also claimed that it was "doubtful" that such solutions would not result in "compulsion" and "injustice" towards certain communities. His references to "emigration" or the Zionist concept of *Aliyah* as positive examples to this end were rather marginal in comparison. [252]

In contrast, the need to protect the "civic rights" of minorities appeared as of paramount importance in the book. The idea of an "international arbitration tribunal" once again appeared in this regard, accompanied by the proposition of an "international agreement for the protection of national minorities". [253] It is worth to emphasize that

Masaryk was not the one to invent such solutions; he rather implanted them to his text in reference to the transnational discourse of his time.

However, the recommendations of the author were once again rather broad. Masaryk seemingly discussed the concept of 'national minorities' to silence (or appease) any criticism of the New European vision. It was more of a priority for him to assert that a "radical solution of national problems" was necessary for the democratization and the "permanent peace" of Europe. The "independence of small nations" thus appeared as more central to this issue than 'national minorities'. [254]

However, it is also worth to connect these statements to the claims of the previous sub-chapter of the book, dedicated to 'Political Independence and National Autonomy'. Although this section focused on the subject of national independence, it also mentioned the term 'national autonomy' in the context of the social democratic discourse in Austria–Hungary. Masaryk claimed that the political representatives of Austrian labour proposed a solution for national problems through this concept. He specifically referred to Karl Renner, Otto Bauer and "Springer" (in reality, the pseudonym of Renner in some of his articles) as intellectual authorities to "give a detailed program" to this end. It is hard to not interpret this as a reference to the concept of 'personal' or non-territorial national 'autonomy' in the discourse of Austrian social democracy at the turn of the century. [255]

This realization is important in order to contextualize the statements of the last paragraph and the footnote attached to the one that preceded it. As for the former, it stated that "national autonomy honestly carried out, recognition of language rights in schools, public offices and parliament, may be sufficient in certain cases, *especially for national minorities*". In contrast, the footnote of the previous paragraph claimed that

there was a difference between 'territorial autonomy' applied to the "territories inhabited by one nation" and 'personal autonomy' applied to "scattered small minorities" after "the manner of the present religious minorities". A statement followed this sentence that "in Bohemia", Czech and German groups "recognized" minorities in "various proposals". [256]

It is worth to notice that although the relationship between the concepts of 'national autonomy' and 'language rights' were not entirely clear in the text, the simultaneous references to the term 'national autonomy' clarified this issue. The invocation of Bauer, Renner and the discourse Austrian social democracy made it clear that Masaryk did not interpret 'national autonomy' as a narrow concept and as equivalent to 'language rights'. Either 'territorial' or 'personal autonomy' had broader implications as for the status of national groups in the state.

Although *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* would then quite much repeat the claims of "The Future Status of Bohemia" in relation to the "Czecho-Slovak State", its previous discussion of 'national autonomy' implied the application of specific concepts to the German minority. Since it depicted Czechs and Germans as "intermixed" communities in the border territories of the Czech lands, the logical outcome of this narrative was that the new state would institutionalize the non-territorial autonomy of the minority community. (Since Masaryk recognized there that were territories in Bohemia where "only a few Czechs lived", it was also possible, although less realistic to interpret this statement as the foundation for the territorial autonomy of Germans in these areas.) [257]

The references to the discourse of Austrian social democracy showcase important continuities between the Habsburg imperial and the Czechoslovak national

contexts. My first case study has already shown that Otto Bauer conceptualized 'personal autonomy' in the context of the Austrian 'nationalities state' at the turn century. From the viewpoint of this chapter, it is most important to emphasize that the main issue for him were those nationalist conflicts that worked as centripetal forces against the imperial framework, but also the unity of Austrian labour. I have shown that Bauer interpreted these political struggles as ones with important implications for 'national minorities' in the local contexts of the Austrian crown lands. On the one hand, he described scattered or simply numerically inferior groups surrounded by a dominant majority through this term; he claimed that their existence would result in a perpetual conflict between national movements.

It is also important to emphasize, however, that Bauer also referred to the concept of 'national minorities' in a new, qualitative sense, groups entitled of certain rights. He conceptualized the concept of 'personal autonomy' as opposed to that of 'territorial autonomy' and proposed its application to minority communities. He problematized the national demands to create autonomous administrative units since in his viewpoint, the federal reorganization of the Austrian state would not have solved national(ist) conflicts on its own. The struggle regarding territories and national minorities would have continued according to his narrative. Thus, he rather recommended the organization of national communities, majorities and minorities alike into self-governing legal entities as a final solution to national(ist) conflicts in Cisleithania and Cisleithanian labour.

Masaryk adopted the concepts of both territorial and personal autonomy from this context of Austrian social democracy through their ideological transfer. The Habsburg imperial framework was also the context for his references to the mutual

recognition of 'national minorities' by "Czechs" and "Germans". Although he did not specify what he meant by the latter, the author of *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* could refer to the debates between the German and Czech groups of Cisleithanian social democracy, or a whole list of works by political representatives with allegiance to the national movements (e. g. Adolf Fischhof).

However, there was also a major point of discontinuity, a natural result of the shift in Masaryk's political agenda during the First World War. He did not apply 'national minorities' and 'national autonomy' to the (Austrian) 'nationalities state', but rather to the (Czechoslovak) 'nation-state'. The personal or territorial interpretations of 'autonomy' were to neutralize nationalist conflicts in the framework of the latter.

On the other hand, it is also possible to interpret these statements through the application of the 'Czechoslovak–British' dichotomy of the *New Europe* to Masaryk's work. One can interpret the statements of Seton-Watson in a *New Europe* article of February 14, 1918 ("The Czechs and Austria") as a precursor to the development of previously absent statements from the texts of Masaryk. The article of Seton-Watson discussed the demands of Bohemian German political representatives for the secession of their territories from the Czech-inhabited lands and the establishment of their own Austrian province (through their contemporary concept of *Deutschböhmen*). The British historian interpreted these claims as borderline non-sensical; he stated that 'independent Bohemia' would "naturally" institutionalize the territorial autonomy of the German-dominated region. Seton-Watson claimed that this community was indeed "fully entitled" to a province with its own diet and with German as its official language. [258]

Although these statements were not claimed in direct opposition to the conceptual framework of the Czechoslovak political emigration, they did not

correspond to its previous discourse either. Thus, it is once again possible to interpret them as a sort of British 'expectation' towards Masaryk and his group. Similar to the issue of including German-inhabited territories into 'Bohemia', Seton-Watson indirectly problematized the lack of the concept of '(German) territorial autonomy' from texts of Masaryk and his Czech (or Slovak) allies. *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* then responded to this claim by hinting at the application of the concept of 'personal autonomy' to the German minority.

It is possible to interpret "The German Minority in Bohemia: A Czech View" of Vladimir Nosek (November 14, 1918) as the intermediate link in the *New Europe* between Seton-Watson's article and Masaryk's book. The author was the prominent member in the Czech community of London and in the local section of the Czechoslovak movement. [259] He wrote his article around the time when *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint* was about to be published, but Masaryk was still on his way back to Europe. Thus, Nosek could issue statements instead of him in the *New Europe* as representative of a 'Czech view' on the matter of the German community in 'Bohemia'.

Nosek listed historical, strategic, ethno-cultural and economic arguments to support the incorporation 'German Bohemia' into Czechoslovakia. However, he also found this outcome to be compatible with the 'right of self-determination'. Nosek referred to this concept, when he claimed that certain German "liberals" and "socialists" were in support of this solution as opposed to "irresponsible" claims of secession. He also emphasized that the viewpoint of the local German majority was "unknown" in relation to this matter. [260]

The author then stressed that the "Czechs" were "ready" to provide 'national autonomy' for the German minority of Bohemia. This, however, was not a territorial interpretation of the concept, as it rather referred to cultural rights and the internal management of national affairs in the text. Nosek took effort to emphasize that the territorial separation of 'German Bohemia' could only result in the "exploitation" of local Czechs and that it would expose the Czech-inhabited lands to German influence due to economic pressure. [261] Thus, it was once again the concept of 'personal autonomy' that appeared a solution as opposed to the secession (or territorial autonomy) of Germans from Bohemia – much similar to the narrative of *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. Nosek, however, did not refer to the ideas of Renner and Bauer in this regard

It is worth to emphasize that by time Nosek's article appeared and Masaryk finalized his book, 'independent Bohemia' or 'Czechoslovakia' were no abstract concepts anymore. The Czecho-Slovak National Council issued its 'Declaration of Independence' on October 18, 1918. It referred to both the "natural and historical right" of the nation to independence – thus, combining previously opposite concepts in the discourse of the Czech national movement. It established the Czechoslovaks as the inhabitants of "Eastern Europe" – a region reorganized in accordance with the "national principle" or the "democratic and social principle of nationality" (but not the 'right of self-determination'). Finally, the Declaration of Independence stated that national minorities shall receive equal rights and a proportional representation in the political system of the new state. [262]

To sum it up, I have pointed out that the claim (or supposition) of Liebich that Wilson, the "Wilsonians" and the decision-makers "of Paris" would not have "foreseen" issues related to the concept of 'national minorities' is not supported by historical

sources. The contemporary discourse of national and transnational contexts discussed this rather extensively. For instance, the authors of the *New Europe* – Masaryk's transnational framework – were much interested in the 'rights of minorities'. Masaryk himself discussed the issue in his articles and *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint*. It is thus hard to imagine that the participants of the Versailles Conference, the shared audience of the review and the book were not familiar with the problem of 'national minorities'.

On the other hand, it would be right to point out Masaryk's "The Future Status of Bohemia" subordinated 'national minorities' to his main narrative. The concept appeared in the context of the historical claims of the Czechoslovak movement to German-inhabited territories in the Czech lands. The broad declarations in support of the 'full rights' of 'national minorities' were to appease the criticism of Seton-Watson or other actors of the transnational discourse in this regard.

In contrast, *The New Europe*: *The Slav Standpoint* featured attempts for a broader contextualization of this issue. Although the concept of 'national minorities' still largely appeared as subordinated to the 'independence of small nations' in the text, various ideas were referred to as possible solutions to related problems in the future nation-states. Masaryk specifically referred to the concepts of 'territorial' and 'personal autonomy' in this regard.

Since he specifically invoked the discourse of Austrian social democracy and the 'Czech–German' debates in Habsburg Cisleithania, the themes of 'ideological transfer, but also 'imperial legacy' much apply to this issue. Although they had appeared in the debates of imperial reform at the turn of the century, Masaryk applied 'national minorities' and 'national autonomy' to the framework of the 'nation-state' rather than

the 'nationalities state'. However, Masaryk still shared a certain political intentionality with Otto Bauer and Karl Renner despite their different ideological and political viewpoints: all of them attempted to neutralize nationalist conflicts in the state through these concepts.

On the other hand, the 'Czechoslovak–British' dichotomy also applies to this topic. Seton-Watson had indirectly problematized the lack of German 'national autonomy' from the vision of 'independent Bohemia' in his "The Czechs and Austria" that had appeared in *The New Europe* on February 14, 1918. Although his criticism was directed against the 'senseless' claims of Bohemian German secessionism in the Austrian Imperial Council, the British historian firmly claimed that the future Czechoslovak state would institutionalize the territorial autonomy of the German-inhabited lands. Masaryk and other members of the Czechoslovak movement reacted to these statements by indicating that the German community would receive 'personal autonomy' in the framework of future Czechoslovakia.

On the other hand, it is worth to notice that these authors also interpreted the 'right' of local Germans to 'self-determination' as consistent with their incorporation into future Czechoslovakia. The final test to these claims would of course be the period of Czechoslovak state-making and the interwar period. I will offer an outlook to related processes in the next sub-chapter.

m. *The 'Right of Peoples to Self-Determination' and the First Republic of Czechoslovakia*

Czechoslovakia received its Constitution in 1920. On the one hand, its text would of course reflect the viewpoint(s) of the political emigration and the local Czech parties on

this nation-state. The influence of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk was also considerable on the Constitution as the first President of the Republic. On the other hand, the government of the new state was also obliged to sign the Minority Treaties at the Versailles Conference and to incorporate their recommendations into national law. The Constitution of 1920 was thus at the crossroad of national and transnational discourses.

The concept of 'self-determination' (*sebeurčení*) appeared as a key concept in the preamble of the text. This section declared that the "Czechoslovak nation" (*národ Československý*) would follow the "spirit" of its history and of the "modern principles" contained in the "watchword of self-determination" (*duch moderních zásad, obsažených v hesle sebeurčení*). [263] Upon the stabilization of the nation-state and its borders, it was safe and timely for the Czechoslovak elite to refer to this popular term of the contemporary transnational context (although one can notice it was described as a "watchword" rather than a "right").

The Constitution emphasized the official status of the "Czechoslovak language" (*jazyk československý*), the mother tongue of its national majority. However, the concept of "national, religious and racial minorities" (*národních, náboženských a rasových menśin*) also appeared in the text. A separate section described the means of "protection" (*ochrána*) for non-dominant groups. This incorporated the right of "Czechoslovak citizens" (*československý občan*) to cultivate their national identities through their cultural institutions. The Constitution also described the duties of the state in the context of administrative units with a "considerable fraction" (*značný slomek*) of national minorities. The state was to guarantee the opportunity for the children belonging to these groups to receive education in their mother tongue. Czechoslovakia was also to contribute to the management of national cultural institutions in financial

terms. [264] These statements corresponded with the concept of 'language rights' in the book of Masaryk in 1918.

Although dichotomy between the 'majority' and 'minorities' could support the ethno-cultural interpretation of the concept of the 'Czechoslovak nation(-state)', one must emphasize that other sections of the Constitution featured more 'civic' elements. These claimed that the citizens of the state constituted its "people" (*lid*) regardless of their nationality. The phrase "us, the Czechoslovak nation" (*my, národ Československý*) in the preamble could refer to this community. The Constitution declared that this community was the only source of "state authority" (*státní moc*). [265]

I claim that these ambiguities showcased the continuities between the concepts of *český národ* and *Československý národ*. The terms 'Czech' and 'Czechoslovak' referred to a certain, dominant ethno-cultural element in the regional community of the Czech lands or the state population of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, one could interpret *národ* as either a 'nation' in the ethno-cultural sense or a 'people' in the political sense. In the latter case, the term 'Czechoslovak people' would inherit the implications of the 'Bohemian people'.

A territorial interpretation of 'autonomy' (*autonomie*) also appeared in the text, although not in the context of national minorities. The Constitution claimed that the territory of Czechoslovakia was a "unitary and indivisible whole" (*jednotný a nedílný celek*). However, it still defined the province of "Subcarpathian Russia" (*Podkarpátská Rus*) as an administrative unit with the "widest autonomy" (*nejširší autonomie)*. [266] In contrast, the fundamental law did not refer to the concept of 'personal autonomy' in relation to national minorities (or the 'territorial autonomy' of the German-inhabited

lands). This created a discontinuity with the speech acts of Masaryk (and other Czechoslovak politicians) in 1918.

The reason behind this hiatus might have been the eruption of nationalist conflicts that accompanied the Czechoslovak making of the state. These were much centred around the different interpretations of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. The political mainstream of the local German community, for instance, referred to this concept to support its secessionist claims and the unification of its territories with the state of German-Austria. The well-known concept of the *Sudetenland* also appeared in this context, although originally, it referred to only a part of the German-inhabited lands. The Czechoslovak government suppressed these attempts at secession through military intervention; this act resulted in casualties on both sides. On the other hand, one must emphasize that a minority of German political representatives actually asked for the intervention of the Czechoslovak state to restore order in local terms. [267]

The tensions between the Czech(oslovak) and German national movements continued after 1920. The political mainstream of German parties viewed the democratic political system of the state as a horseplay since it was imposed upon them by the Czechoslovak elite. On the other hand, their ideas of national superiority did not contribute to the reconciliation between communities either. This viewpoint of theirs was in accordance with the contemporary (and for that matter, the historical) intellectual trends in the German cultural context. [268]

However, the same political groups realized by the late 1920s that they could benefit from a co-operation with the Czechoslovak establishment. As a result, the so-called "activist parties" became members of coalitional governments between 1926–

1938. German social democrats and their co-nationals could thus receive their share of political and executional power. A new interpretation of the concept 'self-determination' appeared in this context by the Slavist Franz Spina, a German deputy of the Czechoslovak Parliament. In contrast to national discourse of the late First World War and its immediate aftermath, Spina claimed that local Germans could vindicate their 'right to self-determination' in Czechoslovakia. President Masaryk also welcomed these processes enthusiastically. He claimed that the foundation of the "Czech–German" coalition was "a historic moment" in local politics. [269]

In my view, this opinion of his was not independent of the concept of 'Bohemia' he advertised in his work during the First World War. On the other hand, one could also consider the legacy of the 'empire' in relation to this outcome. Just as Czech political parties strived to establish their 'empire within the empire' in Habsburg Austria, the German representatives could attempt to do the same in Czechoslovakia. Similar to the imperial framework before late 1917, the structure of the nation-state seemed to be compatible with a certain interpretation of the 'right to self-determination' in a non-dominant national discourse.

The Great Depression and the rise of Nazi Germany subverted these processes. The reputation of German activist parties and the democratic political system of Czechoslovakia suffered from the impact of the increasing rates of poverty and unemployment. The Sudeten German Party of Konrad Henlein started to shift back towards the interpretation of the term 'self-determination' as the right of the ethno-cultural (or by this point, racial) German community to secede. Heinlein and Nazi Germany predated on the economic and political crisis of Czechoslovakia with their anti-democratic and organicist interpretation of national affairs. [270] The speeches of

Adolf Hitler also started to feature the 'right to self-determination', as he claimed his support for the secession of Germans from Czechoslovakia and their unification with the German Reich. [271]

To sum it up, the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 featured the concept of the 'Czechoslovak nation' in a rather ambiguous sense. On the one hand, it referred to 'Czechoslovaks' as the ethno-cultural majority of the state as opposed to 'national minorities'. On the other hand, it defined the 'Czechoslovak nation' as a 'people' of equal citizens and the only source of state power. I claim that in this sense, the concept was continuous with that of the 'Czech nation' in the historical discourse of the Czech national movement, which could also refer to a regional community in the Czech lands or the ethno-cultural identity of Czechs.

Although I am aware of the fact that nationalist tensions defined the period of the Czechoslovak making of the state and the early 1920s, I also argue for the legacy of the 'empire' in the political system of Czechoslovakia. I support this statement by pointing out the reconciliation between German activist parties and the rule of Czech(oslovak)–German coalitions between 1926–1938. The German political attempts at the vindication of the 'right to self-determination' in Czechoslovakia paralleled that of the Czech national movement before 1917, when its representatives aimed to create their own 'empire within the empire' in Austria.

The Great Depression and the rise of Nazi Germany reverted this process. The discontent of German citizens with the effects of the economic crisis could be channelled into the political propaganda of the Sudeten German Party of Konrad Henlein and Adolf Hitler. In this context, the 'right to self-determination' supported

secessionist claims in the ethno-culturally or racially defined Czechoslovak German community.

n. Conclusion

The current chapter has appeared to be the continuation of the previous case study in a certain sense. Although I have focused on the political vocabulary of the Czechoslovak emigration of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and integrated it into the Britain-based political discourse of the *New Europe*, I have also pointed out several continuities between this conceptual framework and that of the historical Austrian political discourse and the Czech national movement.

On the one hand, the Czechoslovak political emigration embedded the concept of 'Bohemia' and the references to its 'state rights' in its political language. This legitimized the activities of the group abroad, as it could depict itself as the official representative of 'Bohemians' or 'Czech(o-Slovak)s' and as the successor of the national discourse. On the other hand, the simultaneous references to the ethno-cultural concept of the 'Czechoslovak nation' and the historical rights of the 'Bohemian Kingdom' created ambiguities. These terms had been counter-concepts to each other in the realist and state rights discourses of the Czech lands at the turn of the century. The 'independent Bohemia' was also to incorporate a sizeable German community.

These problems did not go unnoticed by the British ally of Masaryk, Robert William Seton-Watson. Albeit implicitly, he still problematized the political vocabulary of the Czechoslovak emigration in relation to these issues. Seton-Watson implied that the revision of historical borders in the Czech lands could lower the number of Germans in the future nation-state. He also pushed Masaryk to apply the concept of 'territorial

autonomy' to the German-inhabited lands. On the other hand, Masaryk's original association between the concepts of the 'nation' and 'race' also received criticism from the British audience of the *New Europe*.

As a result of this 'Czechoslovak–British dichotomy', Masaryk modified his terms, started to refer to historical concepts anew or adopted certain terms through their ideological transfer. His book of 1918 featured the term 'New Europe' in its title, an obvious reference to the title of the Britain-based journal. It was written with the intent to influence Anglo-American diplomats at the Versailles Conference, whose viewpoints was taken into consideration by the author. While his articles in the *New Europe* would initially interpret the concept of the 'nation' as a 'racial' construct, Masaryk's book of 1918 rather featured the term 'nationality' in reference to communities defined by language and culture. His texts contained references to the historical community of the Czech lands through the concept of 'Bohemia' and implied that the 'Bohemian German' identity could be reinforced upon the defeat of Germany.

The theme of 'ideological transfer' was of paramount importance in connection to Masaryk's description of the terms 'national minorities' and 'national autonomy' in his book of 1918. I have pointed out that he referred to these concepts of the Austrian social democratic discourse at the turn of the century. Whereas Renner and Bauer attempted to solve nationalist conflicts around 'national minorities' in the 'nationalities state', Masaryk implied that the 'nation-state' of Bohemia (or Czechoslovakia) would apply their concept of 'personal autonomy' to the local 'national minorities' (especially Germans).

As for the 'right of nations to self-determination', I have argued for that in contrast to the discourse of the *New Europe*, its role in the conceptual framework of

Masaryk was rather inferior in comparison to the 'principle of nationality'. His book of 1918 contained rather abstract references to the concept through the anachronistic interpretation of claims by the governments of the Entente or the Allied and Associated Powers. Nor Wilson neither the Bolsheviks appeared as strong points of references in the narrative. I have argued that this was due to the ambiguities surrounding the concept of 'self-determination' in the contemporary discourse. The ideological differences between Bolshevik Russia and Masaryk's allies were too broad for the politician to refer to the secessionist interpretation of the former. Wilson was of no use to him either, as the American President attempted to reinterpret it as the 'right of self-government' for political community of the 'people' rather than the ethno-cultural 'nation'. It is worth to notice that the authors of the *New Europe* were also opposed to the pacifist and internationalist Bolshevik policy or the conciliatory approach of Wilson to Austria–Hungary.

As for the implications of the 'right to self-determination' in local contexts, Masaryk supported the federalist interpretation of the Russian Empire similar to the discourse of the *New Europe*. He identified the concept of 'self-determination' with that of 'autonomy' in the local discourse, albeit as of 1918, he supported the secession of certain national groups (Poles, Romanians in Bessarabia) from Russia. In contrast, Masaryk argued that the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy was incompatible with the 'right to self-determination', which could only result in its dissolution. As opposed to his interpretation of Russian federalism as a process from below, he described federalist plans in Austria–Hungary as government-initiated and thus, not authentic.

This 'Russian–Habsburg' dichotomy is important to emphasize in relation to the regional concepts of Masaryk. I have emphasized the theme of 'cultural transfer' with

regard to 'Central Europe', a term introduced by Masaryk to the discourse of the *New Europe*. This concept was originally a part of German political and intellectual discussions in connection to the reorganization of the German Empire's geopolitical environment in accordance with its interests. Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* (1915) featured a vision of regional integration through the concept of 'Central Europe'. In contrast, Masaryk used the term to describe the German designs of regional and world-wide 'imperialism' in his articles of the *New Europe*. He also referred to this concept as a part of the 'zone of small nations' or the 'Central Zone', a term also adopted from the German cultural context (as it was equivalent to the geographical concept of *Zwischeneuropa*). The authors of the *New Europe* adopted these interpretations of 'Central Europe' from Masaryk, to which they referred to throughout the First World War.

In contrast, I have shown that Masaryk's book of 1918 rather described the affairs of 'Eastern Europe'. This was due to the specific contemporary interest of the Anglo-American audience in a region defined by the imperial disintegrations of Russia and Austria–Hungary. Masaryk had to address both issues. However, he also had to differentiate between the empires in terms of evaluation. While he had no option but to argue for the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, he had to refrain from such claims in connection to the Russian Empire, as the British and American governments or Masaryk's allies in the *New Europe* did not support the disintegration of Russia.

I have also argued for the legacy of the 'empire' and the interpretation of the 'Czechoslovak nation' as a political community in the interwar period. Although the end of the First World War featured attempts of German secessionism through references to the 'right of self-determination', German activist parties reinterpreted this

concept by the 1920s. This resulted in their integration into the democratic political system of Czechoslovakia and the rule of Czech(oslovak)–German coalitions. This German tactic paralleled the attempts of Czech parties to establish their own 'empire within the empire' in Habsburg Austria. The historical contexts of the 'empire' before late 1917 and the 'nation-state' in the late 1920s both featured non-dominant nationalist interpretations of the 'right to self-determination' as compatible with these frameworks. I have shown that the impact of the Great Depression and the influence of Nazi Germany reversed this process.

Whereas the previous two case studies featured certain continuities between the discourses of Habsburg Austria, the Czech lands and the Czechoslovak political emigration, the next one will concern a different context, that of Habsburg-era Hungary. The main reason behind this consideration is that albeit the First World War resulted in its defeat and dissolution, the concept of 'national self-determination' was and has been rather important in Hungarian political and intellectual discussions in relation to this context. The local concepts of the 'nation' were also as ambiguous and torn between the interpretations of the community as ethno-cultural or political in the Hungarian discourse of nationalism as it was in the Czech(oslovak) context.

4. Case Study: Hungary

The Concept of 'National Self-Determination' in the Hungarian Political Discourse
before the First World War

a. Introduction – Locating the Concept of 'National Self-Determination' in Modern
Hungarian History

In a certain sense, the fact that Jörg Fisch and André Liebich spare references to the context
of Habsburg-era Kingdom of Hungary is rather surprising. Although obviously situated in
the 'empire' of the Habsburg Monarchy and of multi-ethnic composition itself, the
classification of this state is still rather ambiguous in related historiography. Andrea
Komlosy, for instance, claims that on the one hand, Hungary was a "sub-empire" of the
Dual Monarchy after 1867. On the other hand, she argues that its elite pursued of a policy
of "national homogenization". This was an attempt at the "ethnic assimilation" or the
"Magyarization" of the local population as opposed to the Austrian "doctrine of multi-
ethnicity" and the Cisleithanian codification of the right of "every ethnic people to preserve
and cultivate one's nationality and language". [1] Obviously, one can interpret this
Hungarian attempt as one at the creation of a nation-state – a structure closely related to
the concept of the 'self-determination of people' or 'national self-determination' in the
narratives of Fisch and Liebich.

Hungarian historiography also traditionally identifies a vision of the nation-state
with related government policies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a
viewpoint only recently challenged by local studies of new imperial history. Gábor Egry
argues in his "Magyar birodalom? Regionális elitek, nacionalista politika, centrum-

periféria küzdelem Magyarországon a dualizmus utolsó évtizedeiben" ("Hungarian Empire? Regional Elites, Nationalist Politics, Struggle between Centre and Periphery in the Last Decades of Dualism", 2022) that in fact, the historical Hungarian Kingdom of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries rather "resembled an imperial framework", much "more than the general viewpoint of this country would assume". He argues the contemporary political handling of the relationship between 'centre' and 'periphery' supports the existence of a "hidden" or "informal" Hungarian Empire. [2]

The author claims that three local models of development appeared as a result: "self-colonization in accordance with feudal traditions", the "movement of regionalism", and the "local reorganization of the titular nation [Hungarians – L. B. B.] as the community of a national minority". Albeit different in their outlooks, these models would attempt to represent "local and regional interests and norms" in "a more and more centralizing, homogenizing and nationalizing, but multinational state". Egry refers to related examples to support his argument that the historical Hungarian Kingdom was an 'empire' rather than a 'nation-state' due to these informal features of its administration. [3]

Although I find this theory rather interesting and important to mention, unfortunately, I cannot really use it in my study. Egry himself points out the contemporary discourse of Hungarian nationalism interpreted the Hungarian Kingdom to be a 'nation-state'. Thus, one can only seldom find contemporary Hungarian references to Hungary as an 'empire'. [4]

On the other hand, one must emphasize that it is not the historical context of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in connection to which the term 'national self-determination' (*nemzeti önrendelkezés*) would appear the most frequently in Hungarian historical memory. In relation to this issue, the observation is Peter Ferwagner is rather

important as for the specific features of Hungarian memorial culture in connection to the First World War. In his entry "Centenary (Hungary)" to the *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (2020), Ferwagner emphasizes the central importance of 'Trianon' as a watchword in the Hungarian context. This slogan refers to the Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920) and through it, the disintegration of the historical Kingdom of Hungary as one of the local results of the First World War. [5]

A still-dominant Hungarian historical narrative blames the "unjust diktat" of the Entente Powers for this outcome, which would force Hungary to cede two-third of its historical territories. Ferwagner claims that it is due to this result that "Trianon is still perceived today as a trauma". [6] The author, however, fails to include references to another source of discontent in related Hungarian narratives. The Hungarian state did not incorporate one-third of its titular nation after the First World War. This part of the ethno-cultural community rather transformed into groups of national minorities in the new or enlarged nation-states of the region.

It is no accident that the concept of 'national self-determination' have most often appeared in this context in Hungarian historical narratives, as a part of a critical approach to the post-war order. The article "Trianon: self-defeating self-determination" by the Hungarian cartographer and historian András Bereznay in *Regional Statistics* (2020) and its republication on the website of *Átlátszó* exemplify the traditional outlines of these accounts. The historian refers to the Treaty of Trianon in the latter version of his article as a "mockery" of the "principle" and the "right" of self-determination. [7]

Bereznay also defines the concept of 'self-determination' as a definitive "value" of "Western civilization", while he also claims that its "content […] widened through the ages". According to his narrative, it was "widely acknowledged" by the end of the First

World War that this "principle" also applied to "ethnic groups". Bereznay refers to "multinational Hungary" as a state collective that would share this viewpoint, having been a part of Western civilization "for over nine centuries". [8]

The author denounces the Treaty of Trianon for its contradictory measures. He claims the concept of 'self-determination' provided the rationale behind the detachment of "minority inhabited areas" [sic] from the historical Hungarian Kingdom. However, the Treaty of Trianon also featured a "frequent superseding" of the principle "when it came to masses of the Hungarian population". This amounted to "delegating over 3,3 million people, i. e. one third of all Hungarians into a minority position", which "contradicted unequivocally the principle of self-determination". [9]

Nonetheless, this narrative also attempts to evaluate the new regional and international order from the viewpoint of non-Hungarian "minorities". Bereznay claims that "being moved to another state meant no improvement" for these communities "from the standpoint of self-determination". Thus, the dissolution of the Hungarian Kingdom could bring improvement to the "position of only about 5,2 million people". This was "achieved […] at the price of worsening simultaneously the position of about 5.5 million other people". [10]

The main point of this argumentation is to doubt the benefits of the Treaty of Trianon and to defend the historical Hungarian Kingdom as a "traditional unit" and "one of the pillars of the state system of the West". Bereznay proceeds to claim that from a "general Western standpoint", the dissolution of the historical state "contributed to the destabilizing" of the "traditional" state system (whatever this means). Thus, it affected "the West as a whole detrimentally". The "principle of self-determination" also appears as degraded into a "mere catchphrase" in the rhetoric of the Entente Powers. [11] In contrast,

"Hungary" is more than a victim of this outcome. It rather represents the authentic, true, and 'Western' approach to the principle and a 'multinational' community wronged by the decision-makers at Trianon.

While the faults of this narrative are aplenty, it still showcases a specific Hungarian interest in the concept of 'national self-determination' in the historical context of the late First World War. It is important to emphasize that the account of Bereznay inherits its main features from the interwar narratives in Hungarian revisionism. The official rhetoric of contemporary state governments reinforced the popular vision of 'integral revisionism', that is, the reconstruction of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. This narrative would refer to the concepts of 'national self-determination' and the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as essential to vindicate its political goal, the revision of the "unjust" Peace Treaty of Trianon. [12]

However, Ferwagner points out that Hungarian state socialism produced a counter-narrative after 1945. The dominant historical account of this period described the First World War as "fundamentally unjust and imperialist in nature". Thus, it diverted focus from the revisionist interpretation of Trianon as exceptionally unjust to the Hungarian nation. This narrative rather emphasized a "class struggle" in the historical context of the First World War, that "the upper bourgeoisie and industrialists" subjugated the interests of "Hungarian soldiers" and "civilians on the home front" to those of their own. Hungarian historiography would only begin to "judge the country's engagement more objectively" from the 1960s, a process that would boom with the fall of the socialist regime. [13]

The *From Padua to the Trianon 1918–1920* of Mária Ormos (originally published in Hungarian in 1984) is one of the landmarks of this new scientific discourse. The historian identifies the "role of the French government" in the construction of the Trianon

Treaty as her main interest. She studies this subject in the context of the late First World War and its immediate aftermath. [14] The book thus features the analysis of the historical political processes and the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers that resulted in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920.

The "principle of national self-determination" appears in this narrative as the historical product of initiatives in Britain, France and the United States at "working out of a whole ideology to justify the planned peace solutions". The origins of the term are rather hard to pin in the book. Ormos claims that "the time of its emergence" was "at the beginning of 1917", in the "Allies' response of January 10, 1917". She refers to a part of the document (*la libération des Italiens, des Slaves, des Roumains de la domination étrangère*) to establish that its authors supported the "liberation of oppressed nations" or the "national principle". [15]

However, the context makes it clear that this 'Allied response' was actually the answer of the Entente governments to the "memorandum" of Wilson on December 16, 1916. The latter would feature the American President's "peace doctrine" for the first time. The Allied references to the 'national principle' and the 'liberation of oppressed nations' appear as "concessions" to this "Wilsonism" to "secure American support". Ormos describes the incorporation of the former concept into the Allied document as a specific "gesture" to the American President and his "idea of an association of nations based on the freedom and sovereignty of all nations". [16]

These Wilsonian references of the Allied response and the terms 'national principle', 'liberation of oppressed nations' and 'principle of national self-determination' all apply to the context of the Austria–Hungary in the narrative of Ormos. She claims that these left '"no doubt as to the fate of the Dual Monarchy" in the "Entente memorandum"

of January 1917. Ormos emphasizes that the "theme" of this document was not the "reform" of the Habsburg Monarchy. She rather implies that the concept of 'national liberation1 would have resulted in the dissolution of Austria–Hungary. [17]

However, Ormos points out that the Fourteen Points of the American President promised only 'autonomy', not 'independence' to the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nor did they support the territorial demands of Serbia or Romania against this state. The explanation of the author to this end is that the Fourteen Points was one of the "few tempting offers" made by the Allied and Associated Powers to the Austro–Hungarian government. This was due to their expectation that the "Habsburg Monarchy could really be expected to break free" from its German ally. [18]

The "spring of 1918", however, would rather enhance "the trend towards disintegration" in relation to the Dual Monarchy. Ormos claims that the "Allied governments" would alter their previous policies due to the conviction that the government of Austria–Hungary was unable to "take it out of the war" and that the "empire crumbled from within". Thus, this period would see the "revival of the propaganda campaign for the recognition of national self-determination" by the "national movements" of the Habsburg Monarchy, "now with Great Power assistance". [19]

Ormos describes the concept of 'self-determination' as "Wilsonian" in its nature, one in "strong association with the ideas of democracy and liberalism". She claims he Serbian and Romanian governments, the "London-based Croatian National Council2, the "leaders" of the Czech and Slovak national movements "adopted" this principle of self-determination. The author goes on to state that these actors "not only embraced, but also, to an extent, themselves prompted the Wilsonian doctrine". Ironically, their claims of secessionism would contradict the intentions of their main point of reference, Wilson. The

proclamations of the American President on February 11 and September 27, 1918 did not alter his statements made in the Fourteen Points or his conciliatory approach to Austria–Hungary. [20]

Ormos argues that the Versailles Peace Conference ultimately "reflected the Allied (re)interpretation of Wilsonianism". The British, French and Italian governments would identify with the "viewpoints of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia' rather than those of the 'enemy nations". Wilsonian "phrases" such as 'national self-determination' would enter the "vocabularies of the victors" in this limited sense, which 'had little to do with the original intentions of its architect". [21] The book makes it clear that this process resulted in the measures of the Trianon Treaty, which the Hungarian public opinion would consider to be 'unjust' ever since.

The narrative of Ormos showcases the interpretation of the concept of 'national self-determination' as 'Wilsonian' in its origin by the mainstream Hungarian historiography of the late 1980s. One can interpret this approach as a counter-narrative to the dominant historical accounts of the socialist era. The latter would rather refer to the "Leninian principle of self-determination". These accounts emphasized the role of the Russian Bolshevik leader in the conceptualization of the term during and after the First World War. In contrast, the association between the concept and the American President could support 'Westernist' narratives in Hungarian historiography in the 1980s, also reflected by the new-found references to the term 'Central Europe' and its variants. [22]

This trend resulted in the long-term marginalization of the Bolshevik contribution to the historical discourse of self-determination in Hungary and its regional impact during the late First World War. "Az együttélés vége: A nemzeti önrendelkezés érvényesülése 1918–1921 között a történelmi Magyarország területén" ("The End of Coexistence: The

Vindications of National Self-Determination in the Territory of Historical Hungary between 1918–1921", 2020) by Csaba Zahorán, a participant of the Trianon100 Project still reflects this tradition. The main interest of author is to study the "principle of national self-determination and its applications" in the territory of the historical Hungarian Kingdom between 1918–1921. Zahorán refers to the 'principle of national self-determination by Woodrow Wilson' as the one that "sealed the fate" of the Habsburg Monarchy and historical Hungary. In contrast, he claims that the "influence of the Bolshevik revolution" only contributed to this process indirectly. [23]

However, it would be mistaken to claim that the 'Wilsonian' emphasis of Hungarian historiography is only a result of the narratives that appeared from the 1960s or the 'Westernist' approach of the 1980s. It is important to emphasize that historical Hungarian actors also referred to a 'Wilsonian' concept of self-determination at the end of the First World War and in its immediate aftermath. Hungarian and Hungary-related historiography especially emphasises this feature of the Hungarian 'progressive' alliance.

Peter Pastor identifies two historical figures, Count Mihály Károlyi and Oszkár Jászi as the "leading Hungarian actors" who 'championed Wilson's ideas' during 1917–1918 in his "The Hungarian Critique of Wilsonianism" (1995). Jászi appears in this context as the leader of the so-called "Radical Party", but also a "reputable nationalist specialist". In contrast, Pastor refers to Károlyi as the leader of the "Independence Party". He would also become the "prime minister, then president" of the Hungarian Kingdom and the Hungarian People's Republic after the proclamation of national independence from the Habsburg Monarchy. [24]

The author points out the relationship between Károlyi's and Jászi's support of "democratic principles", "Wilsonianism" and their attempts to safeguard the "principle of

Hungary's integrity". Their references to the "Wilsonian principle of self-determination" were related to their belief that non-Hungarian "nationalities would vote to remain in a democratic Hungarian state". However, Pastor emphasizes that "Hungarians" did not realize that the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers rather "encouraged the nationalities to side with the victors". The Károlyi government would only alter its approach upon the "failure" of its "earlier expectations", "hoping to achieve at least an ethnically defined frontier". The author claims that by early 1919, this policy was as "anachronistic as the late October assumption (in 1918) that nationalities would be satisfied with autonomy" in the historical Kingdom of Hungary. [25]

The policy of the so-called "Károlyi government" and its alleged impact (or the lack thereof) on the disintegration of the historical state have been and still are highly politicized and controversial topics in Hungary. *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története* by Pál Hatos ('The Damned Republic. The History of the Revolution and Collapse of 1918', 2018) is a late contribution to this discourse. The author points out that the themes of 'defeat' and 'Trianon' have defined historical accounts of the Károlyi government in Hungary. The Hungarian political right would blame it for its "treachery" of national interests and its "illusionary" policy of Wilsonian pacifism. The latter resulted in the dissolution of historical Hungary according to this narrative. In contrast, the political left would interpret the Károlyi government as the blueprint of modern Hungarian democracy. Its representatives would argue that the partition of the historical Hungarian Kingdom was a process unrelated to the policy of the Károlyi government. [26]

Thus, the concept of 'national self-determination' appears in a special context in the Hungarian and Hungary-related historiography of the late First World War. The

mainstream narrative is that the local actors, to be exact, Hungarian progressives adopted this "Wilsonian" term and applied it to the "ethnic groups" of the historical state in the hope that they could preserve its integrity. The historical accounts of the Hungarian right would claim that this vision was illusionary and resulted in the dissolution of the Hungarian Kingdom. Leftist narratives would rather emphasize that the latter process was not related to the policy of the Károlyi government.

Nonetheless, a united "Hungarian criticism" of "Wilsonian self-determination" also exists. This would problematize the ambiguous applications of the principle by the Entente Powers. As a result, the Treaty of Trianon would lead to the disintegration of the historical Hungarian Kingdom and the minority status of more than 3 million Hungarians. This 'criticism' also implies that the non-Hungarian "ethnic groups", "minorities" or "nationalities" would have remained within the historical state, although the rationale behind their alleged positive relationship to "Hungarians" or the "Hungarian nation" and "multinational Hungary" is not clear.

This latter feature is important to emphasize, as the concept of 'national self-determination' also appears to support the secessionist movements of non-Hungarian ethno-cultural communities in various historical accounts. This interpretation of the term is line with its identification with 'secession' by Jörg Fisch. Ormos also refers to the 'national principle' as a parallel concept, much similar to the relationship between the terms 'principle of nationality' and 'national self-determination' in André Liebich's narrative. On the other hand, references to the term 'sovereignty' do not really appear in related accounts of Hungarian history.

Nonetheless, one must emphasize that these narratives are rather limited in their temporal and spatial focus, as they thematize the themes of 'defeat' and 'Trianon' or 'state

disintegration'. They also limit their interest in the concept of 'national self-determination' to these issues. In contrast, they have no interest in the term as one with its own history in the local discourse. References are also often lacking to the viewpoint of ideological streams other than that of the Hungarian progressives, to the historical occurrences of the term or even to the relationship between the different concepts of 'self-determination' and 'nation' in the local context.

In contrast, I am rather interested in the role of these terms and their parallel concepts in the political vocabularies of the Hungarian Kingdom before and during the First World War. Once again, I will attempt to discover cases of cultural and ideological transfers in relation to the concepts studied. The peak of my narrative will once again be the era of the late First World War, in which I will focus on the political discourse of the House of Representatives (*képviselőház*) in the Hungarian Diet (*országgyűlés*). (With a short-cut, I will refer to this institution as the 'Diet' in the relevant parts.)

My interest in the Hungarian history of the concept is much due to its lack from even the most comprehensive studies of Hungarian nationalism and its political vocabulary. For instance, one can find no references to the term 'national self-determination' in the *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története* by János Gyurgyák ('This is What Your Hungarian Homeland Has Become. The History of the Hungarian National Idea and Nationalism', 2007). This book is the latest attempt at the extensive historical review of Hungarian nationalism between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries. Gyurgyák starts his account with the so-called Hungarian Reform Era (1830–1848). He identifies 'liberal nationalism' as the dominant stream of Hungarian political thought in this period, which would unite its ranks until the turn of century. [27]

The author claims that the local tensions between national movements resulted in the development of various concepts of the 'nation' in the context of Hungarian nationalism during the nineteenth century. Gyurgyák identifies these through the terms of 'classic liberal nationalism', the 'political nation', the 'confederative state' and the 'unitary nation-state'. These appear in a sort of chronological order in the narrative, in which a new and stronger national concept always take the place of a weaker and disappearing one in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism. [28] It is important to emphasize that Gyurgyák accommodates to a certain narrative of Hungarian history, which would differentiate between the concepts of the Hungarian 'nation' and the non-Hungarian 'nationalities' in the local context (the reasons of which I will describe later).

From the viewpoint of this study, Gyurgyák's description of the 'political nation' might be the most interesting. The author states that the blueprints of this concept were the premodern *natio Hungarica* and the so-called "*Hungarus* consciousness" and that it had already existed during the Reform Era in its "rudimentary form". However, it was the Hungarian Nationalities Law of 1868 that codified this concept, which it defined through the statement that "the citizens of Hungary constitute one nation in the political sense […] which extends its membership to all citizens of the homeland equally regardless of their nationality". [29]

This legal interpretation of the concept was in accordance with the political thought of József Eötvös and Ferenc Deák. According to Gyurgyák, debates around the term would define the discourse in the "era of dualism" in Hungary between 1867–1918. The author claims that the term had emerged as the counter-concept of the 'confederative state', which he ties to the Hungarian political emigration of 1848–1849 and its local supporters. However, Gyurgyák states that the concept of the 'political nation' also substituted the

homogenizing vision of Hungarian 'liberal nationalism', which anticipated the "spontaneous" assimilation of non-Hungarians. [30]

The author claims that despite its conciliatory design and its survival in "theoretical terms" until the early twentieth century, the concept of the political nation "already received a fatal wound in the moment of its birth" and would become a "fig leaf" for the local representatives of national movements. The elites of local nationalities and the "Hungarian political elite" at the turn of the century both appear as responsible for this outcome. However, Gyurgyák rather emphasizes "the blindness and the stupidity" of the latter and its shift towards the concept of the 'unitary Hungarian nation-state'. He claims that the members of the Hungarian elite were "more and more inclined […] to understand the Hungarian nation as the literal political nation". In contrast, "Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak and Serbian national development" appear as objective processes in this narrative, historical forces to operate against the concept or the idea of the 'political nation' due to their emphasis on ethno-cultural identities. [31]

Thus, the statement of Gyurgyák becomes rather paradoxical that it was ultimately the 'civic radicalism' of Oszkár Jászi that would "blow up" the concept of the political nation and the previous cohesion of Hungarian liberal nationalism. Jászi appears in this narrative as the definitive intellectual authority of 'civic radicalism', in contrast to which ideology other 'progressive' viewpoints are rather marginalized. This is due to the claim of Gyurgyák that Hungarian social democracy lacked a "truly original mind who could measure the true importance of the national question". He rather describes 'socialism' and 'democracy' as innovative elements in the national concept of Jászi. The civic radical politician would theorize a counter-narrative to the "historical" viewpoint of the Hungarian liberal elite. He also adhered the "co-operation and reconciliation" of local small nations

concepts of the 'nation' existed in the context of Hungarian nationalism. The role of the 'state' was important as a parallel concept. The Hungarian term 'nationality' reflected on the viewpoint of the Hungarian elite on non-Hungarian national movements. The discourse of Hungarian nationalism only referred to the ethno-cultural community of Hungarians as the 'nation' in contrast to the other 'nationalities' of the Hungarian Kingdom according to the narrative of Gyurgyák. The alternative concept of the 'political nation' would establish a collective of state citizens regardless of their nationality.

In comparison, the posthumously collected studies of László Péter in *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions* (2012) feature a remarkable attempt at the "resurrection" of a "traditional vocabulary" from the 'Hungarian past'. Péter argues that one can reveal "a conceptual framework of considerable explanatory power for identifying the central and historically persistent features of the Hungarian political system" through this approach. [33] He thus focuses on the political and legal debates in the historical discourse of Hungarian nationalism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The narrative of the author offers a more focused reconstruction of historical key concepts in the context of the Hungarian political discourse than that of Gyurgyák. László Péter especially emphasizes the importance of the historical Hungarian 'constitution' as a concept and its "conversion" from a system of "customary rights" into a system "partly based on statue law". He claims that this framework defined concepts such as *ország* ('country'), *jogegyenlőség* ('equality before the law'), *polgári társadalom* ('civil society') or *közálladalom* ('the common state'), but also the 'nation' (*nemzet*) in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism before the First World War. [34] A particular feature of the work is that Péter often refers to terms in Hungarian rather than through their English translations.

The editorial preface of Miklós Lojkó explains the importance of this approach and the late viewpoint of Péter on Hungarian history. The editor reveals that the historian was educated in the scientific context of Hungarian historical scholarship in the mid-twentieth century. Péter had to emigrate to England in the aftermath of the 1956 Revolution. It was here that he developed a narrative, which would "revise the orthodoxies on Hungarian and Central European history". He opposed "canonical claims for Hungary's pre-1918 supremacy in the Danubian lands" as a part of his "anti-nationalist stance" (which developed much due to the influence of the Hungarian historian Ferenc Eckhart). Péter rather developed West-centric "theories and views on the history of Central European politics and society". [35]

Nonetheless, Lojkó also emphasizes that the late historian was "intensely textual, text- and language-centred". Péter developed a "preoccupation with precise linguistic representation". This resulted in his interest "in the history of legal and constitutional concepts and ideas and their semantic representation in historical narrative", which viewpoint Lojkó identifies with *Begriffsgeschichte*. However, the editor points out that Péter was "alone among historians of Hungary" in his conviction that certain Hungarian terms are "untranslatable" as a *terminus technicus*. Thus, he insisted that one must insert the Hungarian *ország* into English texts rather than 'country' or that one must refer to the *Ausgleich* of 1867 as a 'Settlement' rather than a 'Compromise' (as he argued that the former term was loaded in the historical Hungarian context). Péter considered the alternative of this approach to be a "disaster" as it would corrupt the original meaning of concepts. On the other hand, Lojkó also emphasizes the historian "idealised" the "western interpretations of governance and society" in his narratives, a viewpoint that influenced his own approach to concepts. [36]

One can thus view the approaches of Gyurgyák and Péter to the historical concepts of Hungarian nationalism as both different from and complementary to each other. Nonetheless, one can also notice a certain hiatus in their narratives. None of them refers to 'national self-determination' as a historical concept in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism before or during the First World War. One can only assume that the term interacted with the other historical concepts observed by the historians.

I will use the studies of Gyurgyák and Péter to reconstruct a 'historical vocabulary' in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism before the First World War, which will help me in identifying the role of 'national self-determination' in this conceptual framework. Hungarian and Hungary-related historiography will aid me through the reconstruction of specific political and intellectual contexts by various studies and their discussions of certain historiographical questions. Once again, I will approach these narratives critically, if my viewpoint is different from theirs based on my findings.

One must also emphasize the ambiguities of the 'nation' as a concept that could refer to the subject of 'self-determination' in this historical context. Gyurgyák points out that references to the Hungarian state community as a 'political nation' already appeared in the Hungarian national discourse before 1848. The Nationalities Law of 1868 codified this interpretation of the 'nation'. The narrative of Gyurgyák, however, also identifies an opposition between this concept and the ethno-cultural interpretations of the 'nation' in the contexts of the Hungarian and non-Hungarian national movements. Thus, I will be interested in which of these terms appeared as the subject of the 'self-determination' in the local discourse.

I will approach Hungarian history through a transnational angle. I will be interested the processes of cultural transfer, through which certain concepts appeared in the local

discourse. On the other hand, the book of Gyurgyák clearly shows that the interpretation of certain concepts was a subject of transnational debates between various national movements in the context of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. It is logical to assume that the political and intellectual representatives of national communities either used different terms which acted as counter-concepts to each other, or used similar terms with different interpretations, considerations that can apply to the concept of 'national self-determination' in the local context.

As Hungary was the constituent part of the Habsburg Monarchy until 1918, the concept of the 'empire' refers to a rather important issue. I myself will not refer to Hungary as an 'empire' throughout the study, since according to my findings, such a description of the state was not mainstream in the local discourse. The term will rather refer to the structure of the Habsburg Monarchy in the case study. I assume that the relationship between this 'empire' and the 'empire' could have influenced the interpretations of 'national self-determination' in the context of the Hungarian national discourse. At the same time, the Habsburg Monarchy also constituted an imperial and transnational framework for the discourse between various national movements and for the cultural transfer of various concepts.

As for the latter, I find it important to emphasize the differences between the positions of the Hungarian and Czech national movements, the main subjects of this dissertation in this historical period. The representatives of the Czech nation would refer to their community as a non-dominant one in the contexts of the Habsburg Monarchy and Austria. The discourse of Hungarian nationalism also referred to the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire' as a problematic one. However, it was also clear that the Hungarian elite dominated its local context in social and political terms.

Despite this dominant status, one must not marginalize the viewpoints of other national movements in the context of the Hungarian Kingdom. Due to limitations of content and linguistic skills, I will focus on sources written in Hungarian, which was the official language and the *lingua franca* of the state. However, I will often refer to the viewpoints of non-Hungarian 'nationalities' with regard to the concepts of the 'state' and the 'nation' in Hungary.

I will also be interested in the processes of ideological transfer in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism. János Gyurgyák indicates in his book that alternative concepts of the nation appeared in the discourse which he describes as 'liberal' despite its internal debates and in the political vocabulary of 'civic radicalism'. Although he features these as fundamentally opposed to each other, I assume that these discourses might have partially overlapped in terms of concepts. As for political texts, I will be interested in the political vocabularies referred to in political programs and in the discourse of the Hungarian Diet. I will feature the original form of the observed terms in Hungarian in accordance with their linguistic context.

I must elaborate on certain terms I will use in this chapter. Firstly, one can notice that János Gyurgyák uses a specific term, the 'nationalities question' (*nemzetiségi kérdés*) throughout his book. This is the Hungarian equivalent of the German *Nationalitätenfrage* (see for instance Otto Bauer's book of 1907). It has been used in historical sources and studies to refer to the conflict between national movements in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Hungarian Kingdom. Although I will rarely refer to this concept myself, it is still important to clarify it, as it will reoccur throughout this case study.

It is also important to mention the fact that older historical accounts (and sometimes, modern ones) would differentiate between the terms 'Hungarians' and

Magyars' (or in German, *Ungarn* and *Magyaren*). The former term would describe the members of the Hungarian state community regardless of their nationality, whereas 'Magyars' would refer to the ethno-cultural group of Hungarians. Pieter Judson claims that in the historical context of the Habsburg Monarchy, this distinction "makes little intellectual sense" to him. Thus, he does not use the term 'Magyar', only 'Hungarian' throughout his *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (2016). [37]

I myself will also use only the term 'Hungarian' due to specific considerations. Similar to the Czech concept of *český národ,* the Hungarian *magyar nemzet* or simply *magyar* could both refer to political or ethno-cultural identities. The legal term 'Hungarian political nation' or *magyar politikai nemzet* thus could describe a state community, its dominant political identity, and imply the leading role of Hungarians as an ethno-cultural community all at the same time. A more neutral term would have been the 'political nation of Hungary' (*magyarországi politikai nemzet*). [38]

Contemporaries were ever of these ambiguities. For instance, Robert William Seton-Watson attempted to translate the 'Hungarian' component of the 'political nation' into English as "Hungar" in his works before the First World War. [39] This was a reference to the Latin terms *Hungarus* ('Hungarian') and *Hungaria* ('Hungary'). These exonyms were historically derived from the name of a Turkish tribe alliance, that of the Onogurs, to which the nomadic Hungarians either belonged to, or to the former territories of which they moved at some point of history. [40] One can thus notice the similarities between the names 'Hungary' and 'Bohemia'. In contrast, the Hungarian designation for Hungary, *Magyarország* is closely related to the endonym *magyar* (similar to the relationship between the Czech *Čechy* and *Češi*).

I assume that the local actors were conscious of this ambiguity. Thus, their references to the various interpretations of the 'Hungarian nation' could support their different political and ideological purposes. It could have allowed them manoeuvre between (or to side with) certain viewpoints. Thus, I will also rather attempt to contextualize the specific meanings of the term 'Hungarian' in various contexts.

In contrast to Judson, [41] however, I will not substitute the term 'Magyarization' with that of 'Hungarianization'. Although one might argue that the policies under this name also attempted to reinforce the state identity of citizens, I think in this case, it is better to tend to the strong historiographical traditions around the use of the term. This tradition emphasizes the ethno-cultural considerations behind the Hungarian state policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In my view, this remark corresponds to historical reality (although it does not cover all of its aspects).

While I will use the term 'nationality' throughout this chapter, I must emphasize that in contrast to historical Hungarian references to this concept, it will not refer to a hierarchical relationship between communities. Similar to the Austrian context, I will only use it to refer to groups with their distinct identities.

b. Discourses of Liberal Nationalism in the Hungarian Kingdom (1830–1848)

The dominant stream of political thought in the Hungarian nationalism of the early nineteenth century was liberal nationalism. This discourse built on the local traditions of the early modern period, as it developed its national ideas from the concepts of *natio Hungarica* and *gens Hungarorum*. Whereas the former Latin term would describe the 'nation' as equivalent to the members of the privileged feudal classes, the latter would refer to the ethno-cultural community of Hungarians. Although Hungarian liberal nationalism made use of these concepts, it also attempted to substitute them with the framework of the 'Hungarian nation' (*magyar nemzet*) as a "civil" (*polgári*) society. The 'civil' element of the concept would refer to the modern bourgeoisie as the new dominant class of the nation. The contemporary representatives of the Hungarian political aimed to institutionalize the liberal framework of individual rights and to achieve their national goals at the same time, such as the developments of the Hungarian language or the "Magyarization" (*magyarosítás* as a national policy, *magyarosodás* as a spontaneous process), the assimilation of non-Hungarian elements in the local population. [42]

However, one must emphasize the importance of the 'constitution' (*alkotmány*) as a concept parallel to the 'nation' in the contemporary Hungarian political vocabulary. In Hungarian (just as in English), this term was derived from the Latin term *constitutio*. On the one hand, the liberal representatives of the Hungarian nobility interpreted this collection of historical laws as one "lending character" to the Hungarian nation. This was due to the fact that they identified it as a "potent and enduring source" of a shared past. On the other hand, they also wanted to defend this 'constitution' from the absolutist policy of the Habsburg dynasty. [43]

However, one must also emphasize that the important relationship between the concepts of the 'constitution' and 'legal independence' (*törvényes önállás*) in this period. The latter term appeared in the 'Oppositional Declaration' (*Ellenzéki nyilatkozat*) of the Hungarian liberal nobles. It emphasized the independent status of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy. The Hungarian concept of 'legal independence' opposed the attempts of imperial centralization and the absolutistic rule of the imperial government in the narrative of liberal representatives. [44]

There were notable similarities between the political program of Hungarian liberalism and those of other liberal discourses in the Habsburg Empire. The authors of the Oppositional Declaration claimed that the Habsburg 'Monarchy' (*monarchia*) or 'Empire' (*birodalom*) must reform in constitutional terms. The noble representatives of the Hungarian nation emphasized that only this could safeguard the legal independence of the Hungarian Kingdom. At the same time, they claimed this transformation could also establish the common identity of the imperial community due to shared interests of its sub-groups. [45]

The Habsburg crown lands were featured as important members of the imperial community in this narrative. The Oppositional Declaration claimed that since the absolutist policy of imperial centralization abolished the 'constitutional freedom' of these provinces, imperial reforms lacked stable foundations. The constitutional transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy was only possible if the communities of the crownlands "could also enter the ranks of constitutional nations in accordance with the standards of the age and justice" (*ha a kor s igazság kivánata szerint ők is az alkotmányos nemzetek sorába lépnének*).[46] One must emphasize that the concept of the 'nation' thus applied to regional historical structures in the narrative of Hungarian liberalism, which referred to the

crownlands of Bohemia, Moravia etc. as 'nations' of equal status with the Kingdom of Hungary.

This feature of the Hungarian national discourse is important to accentuate, given the tradition it established. Whereas its representatives would apply the concept of the 'nation' to 'Hungarians', they would use the term 'nationalities' in connection to the non-Hungarian communities of the Hungarian Kingdom. This differentiation between groups was especially visible in the political thought of Lajos Kossuth. This dominant historical figure of Hungarian liberal nationalism would state that the nation "possessed the traits of independent, sovereign statehood", whereas this would not apply to nationalities. This amounted to his viewpoint that only Hungarians could be the titular nation of the Hungarian Kingdom, whereas other communities could only remain 'nationalities' of a lower status. Kossuth and other liberal Hungarian representatives interpreted the 'nation' and 'nationality' as fundamentally different concepts in the sense that the "nation could be and is composed of various nationalities everywhere" and thus, could constitute a political community. [47]

One must emphasize that as opposed to related implications in Hungarian historiography, the conceptualization of the 'nation' as a supra-ethnic community was not limited to the discourse of the Hungarian liberal nationalism in the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. The previous case studies have showcased that the Czech and German concepts of the 'Bohemian people' also attempted to construct a common identity for the multiethnic population of the Bohemian Kingdom. On the other hand, one must emphasize that the differences between the terms of the 'nation' and 'nationality' were not clear-cut.

For instance, the Oppositional Declaration distinguished between the interests of the Hungarian 'nationality' (*nemzetiség*) and those of the 'nation' (*nemzet*). The former concept referred to the promotion of 'Hungarian' on the one hand, as the official language of the state. On the other hand, it also referred to the ideal state identity of the local population. The term did not necessarily appear in the ethno-cultural sense. Although the declaration claimed that "constitutionalism" and "nationality" shall unite the inhabitants of the Hungarian Kingdom, it also recognized the non-Hungarian "peoples with other tongues" (*másnyelvű népiségek*). The declaration emphasized the need of a deliberate state approach to these communities. [48]

In contrast, Oppositional Declaration referred to the unification of the historical Hungarian Kingdom as the primary interest of the 'nation'. [49] This was due to the fact that contemporary Hungarian national liberalism referred to the Hungarian Kingdom in the sense of Hungary proper as 'the country' (*ország*). This was to be unified with Croatia-Slavonia, the so-called 'Military Frontier' (*Militärgrenze*), Transylvania and the so-called *Partium*. The Hungarian liberal discourse interpreted these historical territories as one which constitute the historical Hungarian Kingdom as a single *regnum*. This amounted to the claim of Hungary proper to "repossess" the other territories or *regna* of the historical state, governed separately by the Habsburg dynasty in the previous centuries. [50]

One can thus identify parallels between the concepts of the Hungarian Kingdom and the Bohemian Kingdom in the contemporary context of the Habsburg Monarchy. On the other hand, referred to core territories, Bohemia and Hungary proper in the respective discourses of national liberalism. On the other hand, the Czech and Hungarian representatives of Bohemia and Hungary proper shared the intent to 'reclaim' rule over

those territories which the Habsburg dynasty separated from their historical states. References to the 'constitution' or 'state rights' supported these claims of theirs.

One must also emphasize in this regard that the concept of the 'nation' also applied to the regional communities of the historical Hungarian Kingdom in the Oppositional Declaration. For instance, it described the noble elites of Transylvania and Hungary as different "nations". On the other hand, it emphasized that these communities were "of one blood". [51] This could either refer to the Hungarian ethno-cultural affiliation shared by the nobilities of Hungary proper and a part of the Transylvanian nobility, or to the shared past of these elites as the parts of the same historical state.

In this sense, the 'nation' appears to be a parallel concept to the 'state' in the contemporary discourse of Hungarian nationalism. The source of the latter Hungarian concept was the Latin term *status* (the Hungarian translation of which would be *álladalom* before 1850). [52] On the one hand, the concept of the 'nation' described a "political community" of the state in the political thought of Kossuth or other Hungarian liberal politicians. [53] Nonetheless, it is also true that the 'nation' also referred to relationship between the 'Hungarian nationality' and other ethno-cultural communities in the Hungarian Kingdom.

I claim that it is thus beneficial to describe the Hungarian concepts of the 'nation' through two dimensions. The 'external' or 'political' dimension of the term referred to the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire'. In this regard, the representatives of Hungarian liberal nationalism described the community of the Hungarian Kingdom in a political sense, one of the 'nations' or 'states' in the Habsburg Monarchy. This interpretation of theirs was shaped by premodern traditions in the local context and the terms of the early modern era to describe administrative structures defined by historical,

legal, territorial and social traditions. The 'constitution' and 'legal independence' were important parallel concepts to define this dimension of the 'nation'.

On the other hand, the 'internal' dimension of this term referred to the relationship between 'nationalities' in the political or state community of the Hungarian Kingdom. Although it recognized the existence of non-Hungarian identities, the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism still referred to the Hungarian 'nationality' as the ethno-cultural community that defined (or that was to define) the state. Thus, the Hungarian term *magyar nemzet* was not as neutral as the Latin term *natio Hungarica* since it emphasized the dominant status of one ethno-cultural community in the Kingdom of Hungary.

One must also mention the fact that the name of 'Hungary' as a historical state is also derived from the Latin term *Hungaria* in the non-Hungarian languages of the region; one can mention for instance Slovak term *Uhorsko*. This has shown a preference for the interpretation of the historical Hungarian Kingdom as a political community. Slovak historiography and historical memory to this date emphasize the differences between *Uhorsko* (historical Hungary) and *Mad'arsko* (which term refers to the Hungarian nation-state after 1918). [54]

The interpretation of Hungarian as a dominant nationality in the Hungarian national discourse was much due to the leading role of the liberal nobility in the construction of the modern national concept. The vision of its representatives was that liberal reforms and the social emancipation of the general peasant population would result in the unification of the state community. It was due to this position of the nobility that the pre-modern term of the 'nation' connected to the modern concept of 'nationality' in the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism. On the other hand, one must emphasize that the 'Magyarization' of non-Hungarian 'nationalities' was an integral part of this vision. Despite its dominant

status, Hungarian nobility was in a minority in the community of the historical Kingdom of Hungary, much similar to the ethno-cultural community of the Hungarians itself. However, the masses of 'nationalities' were mainly peasant populations. The representatives of Hungarian liberal nationalism thus hoped that these groups would identify with the Hungarian nation and would gradually integrate into the ranks of the Hungarian nationality as a result of their social emancipation through liberal reforms.[55]

It is also important to accentuate the specific role of the concept of 'autonomy' in this national discourse. The mainstream discourse of Hungarian liberalism applied this concept to the administrative units of the "counties" (*megyék*). Its representatives interpreted these local frameworks as the "bulwarks of the constitution", defences against the attempts of imperial unification.[56] In this sense, Hungarian term 'county' was similar to the Austrian concept of the 'crownland'. Both referred to autonomous administrative units in the framework of the state and featured them as the foundations of local independence from the absolutist policy of the imperial government.

However, the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism did not apply the concept of 'autonomy' to the national communities of the Hungarian Kingdom, nor it referred to any concepts of national equality in the Reform Era. This was no accident, given its hierarchical viewpoint on 'nation' and 'nationality' and its emphasis on the unity of the historical state. The social and economic domination of Hungarian nobility also did not necessitate a conciliatory approach to other national movements.

While the latter factors appeared to strongly support of the modern liberal concept of the Hungarian nation, others pointed in the direction of its destabilization. This resulted in a strong vision of "national death" (*nemzethalál*) in the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism. The ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder fuelled these fears of Hungarian liberal

nationalists, as the German philosopher envisioned the assimilation of Hungarians into the local Slavic populations.[57]

As a result, the noble representatives of Hungarian liberal nationalism were especially afraid of 'Pan-Slavism' as a cultural and political concept. Miklós Wesselényi was the main theoretician of this issue, as exemplified by his related work, *Szózat a' magyar és szláv nemzetiség' ügyében* ('An Appeal in the Hungarian and Slavic Nationality Matter') of 1843. The Hungarian liberal nationalist identified the expansion of imperial Russia as the most imminent 'Pan-Slavic' danger for the historical Kingdom of Hungary. The constitutional vision of the Habsburg Monarchy was central to the Wesselényi's plan of defence. [58]

Nonetheless, one must emphasize that the Hungarian liberal nationalist did not only support the constitutional, but also the federal reform of the Habsburg Monarchy. Wesselényi claimed that the imperial government should support the establishment of historical and national units as the foundations for a strong community of 'Austria'. At the same time, he did not intend to federalize the structure of the Hungarian Kingdom. His vision of Hungarian reforms was not different from that of his contemporaries. Wesselényi claimed that the introduction of legal equality and the emancipation of the peasantry could create a strong sense of community between social, but also ethno-cultural groups. It was naturally the 'Hungarian nation' that would unite the collective of citizens in this narrative. The Hungarian politician also stated that it was highly possible that other ethno-cultural groups would also gradually integrate into the Hungarian nationality. [59]

It was no accident that the political representatives of Hungarian national liberalism attempted to codify their concepts during the Revolution of 1848. The Hungarian Diet of this era enacted the so-called 'April Laws' (*áprilisi törvények*). This act resulted in the

conversion of historical state rights into the rights of the 'Hungarian nation'. The April Laws also reinforced the independence of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy. It established a mere 'personal union' between Hungary and the Habsburg crown lands or by this time, the Empire of Austria (at least according to the interpretation of the Hungarian liberal mainstream). [60]

The April Laws also proclaimed the state unity of Hungary and Transylvania as "kindred homelands" (*testvérhon*). The important feature of this act of unification was the continuity between pre-modern and modern concepts of the 'nation'. The April Laws allocated seats to the representatives of Transylvanian Hungarians, "Székelys" (*székelyek*) and Saxons in the new Diet of the Hungarian Kingdom.[61] It is important to mention in this regard that although the political representatives of the local Romanian majority opposed the union with Hungary, they had no political rights in the local context. This was due to the fact that the political structure of Translyvania was still defined by medieval and pre-modern privileges. In contrast, two of the Transylvanian (pre-modern) 'nations', the Hungarian nobility and the "Hungarian-speaking" Székelys supported the act of unification in 1848. [62]

The April Laws also reinforced the status of Hungarian as the official language of the state, which regulation was in relation to its vision of liberal parliamentarism. Only those individuals were eligible for political candidacy who could speak Hungarian (albeit the law did not define the required level of linguistic skills.) [63] One could understand that these measures supported the political domination of the Hungarian nobility in the state. The requirement of Hungarian linguistic skills disadvantaged the potential representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities.

These observations somewhat contextualize the claims in Hungarian historiography that "important thinkers of the Hungarian political elite" soon had to realize that "the faith in the 'melting power of liberty'", the consistent representation of liberal principles, ensuring individual rights and legal equality could not autonomically solve the nationalities question' in the historical Hungarian Kingdom. [64] The April Laws rather showcased forceful attempts to ensure the domination of the Hungarian nobility and its concept of the Hungarian 'nation'. Related Hungarian studies also often reduce the contemporary demands of non-Hungarian national movements to territorial demands of autonomy. [65]

I, on the other hand, find it rather important to at least refer to these declarations and their concepts of the 'nation' and the 'state'. These provide a foundation for the comparison between the discourses of Hungarian and other nationalisms in the period. For instance, the representatives of the Serbian national movement at the so-called May Assembly of 1848 declared the "politically free" and "independent" status of the 'Serbian nation'. The homeland of this community was the 'Serbian Voivodeship', which territorial concept covered the lands of the Military Frontier and Southern Hungary (although Serbs did not constitute the majority in some of these regions). The Serbian representatives claimed that this political unit would enter into a "political alliance" with the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. The Assembly emphasized that 'freedom' and 'equality' were the basic conditions of this alliance. On the other hand, one must accentuate that these were not claims of national secessionism. The provisions of the Assembly defined the Serbian nation as a member of the "general Hungarian crown" (*közös magyar korona*) and under the rule of the "Austrian House" (the Habsburg dynasty). [66]

Importantly, the May Assembly supported these claims with historical arguments. The Serbian leadership stated that their community was politically independent ever since its inclusion into the Habsburg Monarchy. It was under the leadership of its own elected officials, a system approved by the dynasty. According to the interpretation of the May Assembly, the Serbian nation only reclaimed these rights in 1848 and applied them to the territorial notion of the 'Serbian Voivodeship'. [67]

Thus, the declaration of the May Assembly featured concepts both alternative and similar to those of the contemporary Hungarian liberal nationalist discourse. The 'Serbian nation' referred to the ethno-cultural community of Serbians in the Hungarian Kingdom. However, the idea of the 'Serbian Voivodeship' was embedded in a decentralized vision of the historical state, a homeland of its various 'nations' (instead of the one Hungarian nation). The subject of active loyalty was still Hungary in this national discourse, but its vision was alternative to that of the Hungarian national discourse. Historical arguments were important parts of this conceptual framework.

It is also important to mention the ideological connections between local national movements. For instance, the Hungarian and the Serbian elite shared a liberal ideological affiliation, which made their co-operation possible against the absolutist policy of the imperial government. The Hungarian government and the leadership of the Serbian national movement did attempt to discuss the terms of reconciliation during 1848–1849. However, the Hungarian government could not accept the establishment of a politically independent Serbian Voivodeship in the Hungarian state. As a result, the Serbian elite started to co-operate with the Habsburg dynasty. [68]

This co-operation was not only due to a coincidental share of political goals, as on the one hand, the imperial establishment deployed originally liberal concepts such as the

'equality of rights' and the 'self-determination of peoples' to support its consolidation of power (as shown in the first case study). On the other hand, it also constructed a counter-narrative to that of the Hungarian liberal discourse. The concept of the *Gesamtmonarchie* or the *Gesamtstaat* was the most important in this regard, as it referred to a modern centralist vision of the Habsburg Monarchy. László Péter goes as far as to claim that this term was the "Austrian response" to the Hungarian liberal interpretation of imperial affairs. He argues that as a result, the Octroyed (or Imposed) Diploma of March 1849 'broke up the kingdom of Hungary' and attempted to integrate each of its territories as crownlands into the centralized Habsburg Empire. One of these new administrative units was "Serbian Vojvodina" or the "Voivodeship of Serbia and the Banate of Temes". [69]

In return, the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution dethroned the Habsburg dynasty through their "Declaration of Independence" on April 19, 1849. This document emphasized the territorial integrity of the unified Hungarian state, and its new status as a "free and independent[70] European state" (*szabad, önálló és független európai státus*). The declaration problematized that the imperial government supported the non-Hungarian national movements against the Hungarian government of the Revolution. This resulted in a "civil war" (*polgárháború*) according to the Hungarian interpretation. The document also referred to the acts of the Octroyed Diploma as an "attempt of assassination" against the Hungarian nation. It claimed that the intent to reverse the acts of state unification, to abolish the legal independence of Hungary and to integrate it into the *Gesamtstaat* was one of the main reasons behind the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty.[71] Nonetheless, the attempt at the secession of the Hungarian Kingdom did not succeed due to the intervention of the Russian Empire and the triumph of the Habsburg dynasty at the end of the Hungarian War of Independence.

To sum it up, I theorize the 'external' (political) and 'internal' (ethno-cultural) dimensions of the 'nation' as a concept in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism. I argue that the former dimension referred to the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire', in which conceptual framework the former term described the political community of the historical Hungarian. The representatives of the Hungarian liberality drew on the pre-modern traditions of the local discourse to depict the state community as a 'nation' defined by its historical 'constitution' and with its own 'legal independence' in the Habsburg Monarchy.

In contrast, the latter dimension of the concept rather referred to the Hungarian 'nationality', its dominant status within the Hungarian 'nation' and 'state' and its superiority to the non-Hungarian 'nationalities'. In this respect, the discourse of Hungarian nationalism rather focused on ethno-cultural identities in the Hungarian Kingdom, and the related interests of 'Hungarians'. On the one hand, the April Laws attempted to codify this interpretation of the 'nation' in 1848. On the other hand, the representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities rather interpreted their communities as 'nations' of equal status with their own historical rights in the Kingdom of Hungary. This resulted in the 'civil war' of 1848–1849, in which the representatives of non-Hungarian national movements sided with the Habsburg dynasty.

One must accentuate that the dominant ideology of the local landscape was liberalism. This defined the political thought of Hungarian, but also non-Hungarian representatives of national movements. Although this common ideological affiliation could unite their ranks, the opposition of the Hungarian elite to recognize the 'independence' of national territories in the Hungarian Kingdom rather resulted in the co-operation of non-Hungarian national movements with the Habsburg dynasty. The latter

conceptualized the *Gesamtstaat* of the Habsburg Monarchy in opposition to the vision of the Hungarian state unification. The success of the imperial forces resulted in the domination of the former concept in the era of Neoabsolutism (1848–1867).

Gyurgyák claims that it was the defeat of the Revolution and the War of Independence that made the members of the "Hungarian political elite" rethink their previous concept of the 'nation', a process that would last for "almost two decades". One of the results would be the domination of the concept of the Hungarian 'political nation' in the local context. [72] I will showcase the developments of this period in the next sub-chapter of the dissertation.

c.   *From the 'Equality of Rights' in the Era of Neoabsolutism to the 'Hungarian Political Nation' after the 'Compromise' (1849–1868)*

The narrative of János Gyurgyák depicts the era of Neo-absolutism (1849–1867) as defined by the debate between the 'confederal' and the 'political' concepts of the nation in the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism. The former term was embedded in the political language of the Hungarian emigration of 1849 or more specifically, the political thought of its representatives, László Teleki and Lajos Kossuth. This viewpoint would "prefer the amicable settlement with the nationalities and the resistance to Austria". In contrast, the political thought of Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös would inform the development of the 'political nation' as a concept. They would claim that "it is more important to make a compromise with Austria, then comes […] the solution of the nationalities question". Nonetheless, Gyurgyák claims the common feature of both conceptual frameworks was the attempt "to reach a sort of *modus vivendi* with the nationalities of Hungary". [73] This

would amount to the reform of the Hungarian liberal nationalist concept of the 'nation', as the Revolution and War of Independence revealed the problems of this vision.

Thus, this account integrates into a series of Hungarian scientific attempts to study and compare the contemporary "programs of Hungarian and non-Hungarian national movements" as pointed out by Ágnes Deák in her "Az 1868-as nemzetiségi törvény ausztriai előzményei" (2009). The author, however, emphasizes that these narratives tend to entirely neglect the fact that the "national political elites in Hungary […] were impacted by encouraging and discouraging influences from the 'other side' of the empire, primarily from the imperial centre". Thus, she identifies a relationship between the policy of the Neoabsolutist government, the viewpoint of "Hungarian liberals" and their construction of a "nationalities law" (*nemzetiségi törvény*). [74]

Deák proceeds to show that during and after the Hungarian War of Independence, the imperial government attempted to introduce the 'principle of equality of national rights' (*nemzeti egyenjogúsítás elve*) or the 'principle of the equality of nationality rights' (*nemzetiségek egyenjogúsításának elve*) to the realms of the Hungarian Kingdom. Her footnote reference to the works of Gerald Stourzh reveals that these Hungarian terms refer to the German concept of *Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme* or *Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten*. Deák claims that the "Viennese government" recognized this "principle in several decrees" in the Habsburg Monarchy and in the Hungarian Kingdom. [75]

Péter also refers to the "principle" of *Gleichberechtigung* as one "played out by Vienna" against the Hungarian elite. He identifies the term as the counter-concept of Hungarian "historic right claims" in the context of the Hungarian Kingdom. He also translates the term into English as the "equality of rights", which I find adequate and will use myself (along with its variants) in this chapter. [76]

In my view, it is better to interpret the concept as opposed to the Hungarian liberal nationalist terms of the 'state' and the 'nation' rather than to 'historical rights'. Péter himself points out that the term referred to the "language rights" of individuals in education and in their "relations with the public authorities". [77] Thus, it would rather problematize the claim of Hungarian liberal nationalists that Hungarian must be the official language of the state rather than their arguments for the unity of the historical state. It was rather the Habsburg imperial concept of the *Gesamtstaat* that attempted to erode the historical rights of Hungary.

Nonetheless, both Péter and Deák point out that the Habsburg imperial policy influenced the Hungarian liberal representatives of the Neoabsolutist period. Péter claims although the possibility opened up by the 1860s "to reach a constitutional settlement with the crown", the Hungarian elite also had to incorporate the 'equality of nationality rights' into its vision of the Hungarian state. This resulted in the preparation of a 'nationalities law' by the Hungarian Diet of 1861. [78]

I must point out that the political representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities also contributed to this discourse through their transnational debates with the Hungarian elite. The Hungarian article of Svetozar Miletić, the Serb mayor of Novi Sad in *Budapesti Hirlap* (November 11, 1860) exemplified the outlines of this discourse. The author transmitted the contemporary concepts of the Serbian liberal elite to the Hungarian audience. On the one hand, these terms reflected on the previous rule of the imperial *Gesamtstaat*. Miletić problematized that the 'Voivodeship of Serbia and the Banate of Temes' was the construct of the imperial government, which corresponded to a "geographical-political" (*földrajzi politikai*) rather than a "national-political concept" (*nemzeti politikai fogalom*). The unconstitutional rule of the imperial *Gesamtstaat* did not

provide the necessary requirements for Serbian national development in this province, which was rather diverse in terms of population. [79]

On the other hand, the article also concerned the issue of reintegration into the Hungarian state, as the imperial government abolished the Serbian Voivodeship and incorporated its territories into the Hungarian Kingdom in 1860. Miletić claimed that this process could not happen without the approval of the 'Serb nation' and without legal insurances with regard to the cultivation of its national identity. To this end, the author argued for the 'territorial autonomy' (*területi autonomia*) of the Serbian Voivodeship in the Kingdom of Hungary. Miletić emphasized that 'territory' was of central importance in relation to the political independence and development of the nation. The status of Serbian as the official language of the Voivodeship could also provide the best means for the cultivation of its national identity. [80]

The concept of the 'constitution' (*alkotmány*) was also central to the article. While the Serbian Voivodeship was to receive legal independence as a result of its territorial autonomy, the author claimed that the Hungarian constitution also needed to enshrine the "privileges" (*privilegiumok*) of the Serb nation. These rights were rather historical in their nature: while the term 'natural rights' (*természeti jog*) appeared in the text, the author rather stressed the premodern rights and privileges of the Serb nation. According to Miletić, these provided the foundation for the Serb nation's 'historical equality of rights' (*történeti egyenjogúság*) to its Hungarian counterpart. [81]

However, 'autonomy' did not refer exclusively to the Serb nation's right to its politically independent territory. Miletić also offered solutions to the management of ethno-cultural diversity. The author proposed that Germans or Hungarians local to the Serbian Voivodeship could receive autonomy in the administrative units of localities and

districts. Additionally, these communities could communicate with Serbian government officials in their own language. [82]

These arguments reflected on the relationship between Serbian liberalism, its Hungarian counterpart, and the imperial framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. The discourses of Hungarian and Serbian liberal nationalism shared the references to the 'historical rights' of the nation, embodied by the 'constitution'. However, the Serbian concept of 'autonomy' in part referred to the territorial separation of the Serbian Voivodeship from the rest of the Hungarian Kingdom. In this sense, it resembled the interpretation of the term in the Austrian political discourse of liberalism. In contrast, the Hungarian liberal discourse referred to the term in the context of local municipalities. The article of Miletić also contained a reference to the Austrian concept of *Gleichberechtigung* and the related discourse through his application of 'autonomy' to the local communities of Germans and Hungarians in the Serbian Voivodeship.

However, the political representatives of Hungarian liberal nationalism did not hold this viewpoint. They associated the concept of *Gleichberechtigung* with the unconstitutional rule of Neoabsolutism and mocked it as the "equality of slavery" (*rabszolgaság egyenlősége*) in the Hungarian Diet. [83] They also maintained the viewpoint that only the 'Hungarian nation' existed in the Kingdom of Hungary (although they also recognized the status of Croatians as an autonomous community of the historical state). This was their counter-concept to the demands of non-Hungarian national movements for the introduction of 'territorial autonomies' into the lands of the Hungarian Kingdom. Since Hungarian representatives outnumbered their rivals in a ratio of 362:60 in the Hungarian Diet, they could easily refute their demands. [84] Nonetheless, the political pressure from the imperial government and the experiences of the Revolution and the War of Independence

still somewhat modified their standpoint. Gyurgyák claims that it was upon the initiative of Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös that the political vocabulary of Hungarian nationalism incorporated the principle of *Gleichberechtigung* (*egyenjogúság* or *jogegyenlőség* in Hungarian). [85]

The role of Ferenc Deák was also important in the construction of the *Ausgleich*, the 'Compromise' or the 'Settlement' of 1867. [86] László Péter points out that the Hungarian liberal representative "based Hungary's constitutional claims on *ország* rights" as opposed to concept of the 'state' (*állam*). Deák would avoid references to the 'Austrian Empire' (*osztrák birodalom*) in his narrative, although he "emphatically defended the view (…) that Hungary together with the other Lands of the monarch formed a *birodalom*". The historian claims this ambiguous standpoint was due to the association of the term 'state' with the policy of imperial centralization and the *Gesamtstaat* in the contemporary discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism. [87]

Deák summed up his political program in the so-called 'Easter Article' of 1865, which indeed featured the concepts of Hungarian liberal nationalism, but also a conciliatory approach to the imperial government. While Deák emphasized the 'constitutional independence' (*alkotmányos önállás*) of Hungary, he interpreted the rulers of Habsburg dynasty as the ones to save the country from historical attempts of imperial centralization. In return, he also featured the Hungarian nation as the loyal subject of the royal family. As such, the Habsburg rulers of Hungary appeared as 'good kings' and independent historical actors opposed to the 'oppressive' imperial governments. At the same time, the author also accentuated that the interests of "the countries beyond the river Leith" (the crownlands) were compatible with those of the Hungarian nation. [88]

Upon this foundation, Deák argued that the goal of the Hungarian elite was the "equalization" (*kiegyenlítés*, a literal translation of the German term *Ausgleich*) between different political interests: the constitutional independence of Hungary, that of the historical crown lands and the stability of the 'empire' (*birodalom*). The author stated that the dynasty and "common defence" provided the unity of the Habsburg Monarchy and that the structure of the imperial state was compatible with the constitutional political system.[89] On the one hand, this interpretation of imperial affairs marginalized the viewpoint of the Hungarian political emigration after 1849. The latter argued for the independence of the Hungarian state community from the Habsburg dynasty in accordance with the Declaration of Independence. On the other hand, Deák also seemed to be willing to make a compromise regarding the achievements of the Hungarian Revolution in 1848.

The 'Austro–Hungarian'[90] Compromise (*kiegyezés* in Hungarian, *Ausgleich* in German), was a result of ensuing political discussions between 1865–1867; the Hungarian Diet implemented the final terms of reconciliation into law in 1867. As such, Article XII claimed that the *Ausgleich* restored the constitutional independence of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy in terms of public law (*közjog*) and internal government (*belkormányzat*). It also emphasized that the interests of the whole empire, that the conditions of its "security and cohesion" (*biztosság és együttmaradás*) were of equal importance.[91]

Accordingly, the law claimed that the so-called "common issues" (*közös ügyek*): foreign policy and military policy were of joint interest due to the common need of defending the imperial state. These issues remained within the jurisdictional sphere of the imperial government and the Habsburg dynasty. The Hungarian Diet only retained the right to accept or veto the propositions as for its share in connected finances. The Fundamental

Article also emphasized that the political system of constitutional government (*alkotmányos kormányzat rendszere*) defined the framework of the imperial state and applied to "the other provinces and lands of His Majesty [Emperor and King Franz Joseph – L. B. B.])" (*Ő Felsége többi országai és tartományai*) as well. The delegations of Hungary and Austria (a state that appeared as the result of the Compromise) were to decide upon the joint finances through the system of "delegations" and the negotiations between governments. [92]

The restoration of Hungary's constitutional independence and the introduction of the system of Austro–Hungarian "dualism" (*dualizmus*) also meant that the dominant and pro-*Ausgleich* group of the Hungarian liberal elite could attempt to settle the conflicts between local national movements. The political views of József Eötvös were rather influential in relation to this issue, described in extent in his treatise titled *A nemzetiségi kérdés* ("The Nationalities Question") of 1865. Eötvös argued that local national(ist) conflicts mainly concerned to the concept of 'historical rights' (*történeti jogok*) and their implications for ethno-cultural demands. He stated that the Hungarian elite claimed dominance and strived towards the reinforcement of 'political nationality' (*politikai nemzetiség*) as the main identity of the Hungarian state community. In contrast, the political representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities viewed these attempts as detrimental to their free cultural development. Their demands of equality, however, reinforced Hungarian fears with regard to the integrity and the independence of the historical state.[93]

At the same time, these viewpoints also concerned the issue of 'centralisation'. Eötvös argued that the geographical position of Hungary made a certain level of state centralization inevitable to counter international threats (most probably a reference to the

Russian Empire). On the other hand, he comprehended the threat that the historical and social rule of Hungarian nobility and its national claims implied for other national movements in the Hungarian Kingdom. Eötvös also stated the political demands of national elites only concerned the cultivation of their identities, which was not incompatible with the security of the Hungarian state. [94] This was a rather mild reinterpretation of Hungarian and non-Hungarian political demands.

As for contemporary ideas to dissolve Hungary along national lines, the author only attributed these to (unnamed) Austrian politicians with the underlying intention to create the imperial *Gesamtstaat*. It is important to emphasize that it was this concept of the 'empire' rather than national 'secession' that Eötvös interpreted as a threat to the Hungarian Kingdom. However, he also argued that the political reorganization of Hungary along national lines foreshadowed the application of the same principle to the Habsburg Monarchy itself. This would result in the destabilization and the disintegration of the *Gesamtstaat* and the empire, but also the perpetual struggle between local nationalities for its diverse realms. [95]

The author stated that as both the assimilation of other nationalities into the Hungarian ethno-cultural community and the dissolution of historical Hungary were no realistic or desirable options, a compromise was necessary between the viewpoints of national elites. Eötvös argued that the political elites of national movements could use the administrative structure of the state for the interests of their cultural development, the cultivation of national identity. At the same time, the Hungarian liberal elite could reinforce the state community through the reconciliation between local nationalities. As these political goals did not contradict, what the various political representatives of national communities needed was a practical solution that satisfied all parties. [96]

In this regard, the author used 'self-government' (*önkormányzás*) as his key concept and applied it to the administrative structures of municipalities and localities. Occasionally, 'autonomy' (*autonomia*) appeared as the synonym of the term. The author stated that municipalities could resist attempts of state centralization through their 'self-government' or 'autonomy'. [97] This claim was in correspondence with the mainstream viewpoint of the Hungarian liberal elite before 1849. One must, however, emphasize that Eötvös had not shared this viewpoint before the Revolution, as he had rather supported the centralization of the Hungarian state in the local discourse (the idea of 'centralism'). [98]

Eötvös argued that the administrative structure of Hungary allowed the practical realization of the 'equality of nationality rights' (*nemzetiségi egyenjogúság*) as a political principle, since the management municipalities and localities could adopt to local national identities. The former term was without a doubt a reference to the Austrian concept of *Gleichberechtigung*, a term adopted into the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism through the process of cultural transfer from the Austrian context under the influence of Neoabsolutist policy. At the same time, Eötvös argued that it was in accordance with the interests of local nationalities that Hungarian would be the official language of state legislation and the central government. [99]

As such, the Hungarian liberal politician utilized a complex set of arguments reinforced with transnational and local references. Eötvös offered the application of *Gleichberechtigung* to the Kingdom of Hungary, a principle from the political vocabulary of Austrian liberalism, but also a concept applied by the centralist policy of the Neoabsolutist government after 1849. The author complemented this vision with the concept of 'self-government' in relation to local municipalities. Through these notions, the author also offered alternative means for the contemporary Hungarian elite to unify the

state community: the concept of a 'political nation' without a direct connection to the notion of 'nationality'. This vision was one without direct implications as for any hierarchies between national groups, or as for a pressure for assimilation. However, one must emphasize that the concept of 'self-government' was also the alternative to the 'territorial autonomy' of local national elites, a concept that Eötvös simply omitted from his narrative.

One year after the *Ausgleich*, but also the establishment of the December Constitution in Austria, a Hungarian legal article "On the Equality of Nationality Rights" (*1868. évi XLIV. törvénycikk a nemzetiségi egyenjogúság tárgyában*) codified these ideas in Hungary. According to the so-called 'Nationalities Law', the citizens of the state were equal within the framework of the Hungarian nation (*magyar nemzet*), this "indivisible" (*oszthatatlan*) and "united" (*egységes*) community constituted "in a political sense" (*politikai tekintetben*). This equality also applied to the official use of "various languages customary in the country" (*országban divatozó különféle nyelvek*). While the official language of the state remained Hungarian, the national tongues of local groups were allowed widespread opportunities in terms of local offices, education, and culture.[100]

As such, the Nationalities Law applied the Austrian concept of *Gleichberechtigung* to the state structure of Hungary in accordance with the earlier remarks of Eötvös and in parallel to Article 14 of the December Constitution in Austria. Besides this similarity, the term 'various languages customary in the country' also paralleled the concept of *landesübrige Sprachen* in Austrian law. Much similar to the December Constitution and its references to the *Volksstämme*, the Nationalities Law did not provide a legal definition for *nemzetiség* or 'nationality' as a community. These groups were no legal subjects in either of the cases. The Austrian and Hungarian regulations also shared the emphasis on

the rights of citizens belonging to various ethno-cultural communities and their cultural opportunities in the framework of local administrative structures. The provisions both countered national demands of 'territorial autonomy' or 'territorial self-government' and offered alternatives to these concepts within the framework of the liberal state and through the concept of the 'equality of rights for nationalities'.

At the same time, the Nationalities Law still emphasized that the Hungarian nation was the main community of the state through its concept of the 'political nation'. In contrast, the Austrian constitution did not refer to such a term, only that of the *Volk* without any national or ethno-cultural implications. While its concept of the 'Hungarian political nation' was not ethno-cultural, the Nationalities Law also did not really accentuate the fact that Hungarians constituted only one of the local nationalities or the idea that it was equal and not superior to others.

Although often praised for its 'liberal' design, studies of Hungarian history also often feature criticism of the Nationalities Law and its concept of the 'political nation'. Gyurgyák problematizes that the law of 1868 did not constitute a "general nationalities law", as it only resembled a mere "language law". [101] His account, however, does not take the fact into consideration that no precise 'nationalities law' existed in this historical period. The Nationalities Law was as vague in its resolutions as the December Constitution of 1867.

It is important to mention the instances of retrospective and considerable criticism in Hungarian historiography in relation to the Nationalities Law and its concept of the 'political nation'. János Gyurgyák also claims that the latter "already received a fatal wound in the moment of its birth". He states that this was due to the allegedly irreconcilable opposition between the ideas of Hungarian and non-Hungarian representatives. Gyurgyák

argues that although it was a clever attempt to rely on the traditions of the pre-modern era and the concept of *natio Hungarica*, these terms referred to a noble "political community that had existed in reality". In contrast, the concept of the 'political nation' would be a "dysfunctional historical-legal fiction" or an "illusion that covered up for Hungarian supremacy and the Hungarian feelings of superiority". As such, it could never satisfy the representatives of non-Hungarian national movements. The latter rather referred to the 'equality of nations' and 'territorial autonomy' as their counter-concepts. [102] The remarks of László Péter are also important to mention in relation to this issue. He claims that the "quasi-legal concept" of the 'political nation' did not "become a community which attracted loyalty". He supports this argument with the observation that "the population remained divided largely along linguistic lines" until the dissolution of historical Hungary. [103]

Although some of these observations do correspond to historical reality, it is also important to raise awareness to the shortcomings of these narratives. The reception of concepts is seldom unilateral in politicosocial contexts. This phenomenon does result in debates and disagreements, which, however, do not necessarily mean that terms are not shared between various conceptual works. Identity is not a one-dimensional structure either, as it is more beneficial to talk about layers of identities. Certain of these can be more prevalent than others in certain situational contexts.

These considerations also apply to the concept of the Hungarian 'political nation'. Gyurgyák himself points out later in his book that certain representatives of nationalities referred to this concept in a positive sense in the upcoming decades, while they also remained loyal to their ethno-cultural identities. [104] One can also emphasize that as opposed to the implications of Péter, the intentions behind this term were never the neutralization

of ethno-cultural identities. Eötvös and Deák rather attempted to create a community for the various nationalities of the Hungarian Kingdom.

I think it is more beneficial to claim that the concept of the 'political nation' attempted to accentuate the 'external' dimension of the 'nation' as a state community separate from 'Austria', the other constituent part of the Habsburg Monarchy in the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism. The application of the Austrian term *Gleichberechtigung* to the 'internal' dimension of the 'nation' reinforced this attempt. It established the 'equality of rights' for nationalities in the state community and unified their causes in its framework.

On the other hand, the term 'Hungarian political nation' or *magyar politikai nemzet* also featured concessions to the discourse of Hungarian nationalism, as it still displayed a connection between 'Hungarians' in the ethno-cultural sense and the political framework of the 'nation'. This did not result in the opposition of all non-Hungarian representatives to the concept. I will show it later that even as of the First World War, non-Hungarian representatives would still refer to the term as a dimension of their identities. I claim that these are signs that in a certain sense, the 'political nation' was as much of a 'compromise' as the political system established by the *Ausgleich* of 1867.

To sum it up, historical studies refer to the experiences of the Revolution and War of Independence in 1848–1849 and the policy of Neoabsolutism as influences that resulted in the appearance and the adaptation of new concepts in the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism between 1849–1868. Whereas János Gyurgyák interprets this process through the internal debates of the national movement, Ágnes Deák and László Péter rather point at the influence of the Austrian concept of *Gleichberechtigung* and its application by the imperial government to the Kingdom of Hungary. The latter would contribute to the

adaptation of the concept as the 'equality of nationality rights' in the Hungarian political discourse through its cultural transfer and the conceptualization of the 'political nation' by József Eötvös and Ference Deák.

I argue that the latter concept accentuated the 'external' dimension of the 'nation' in the Hungarian national discourse. This offered a 'compromise' for the national movements of the Hungarian Kingdom after the *Ausgleich* of 1867. As such, it defined the community of a state as a 'political' one, in which the concept of *Gleichberechtigung* could apply to all nationalities. On the other hand, it still accentuated the status of Hungarians as the 'nationality' to define the character of the state.

These features are important to emphasize, as references to the concept of 'national self-determination' also appeared in the context of the Hungarian political discourse in the 1860s. It is logical to assume that the concept of the 'nation' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination' corresponded with the conceptualization of this community as a 'political' one of the state in the contemporary discourse. I will showcase the related processes in the next sub-chapter of the dissertation.

d. *The Concept of 'National Self-Determination' in the Hungarian Political Discourse between 1861–1878*

In contrast to the heated debates in relation to the interpretations other terms, references to the concept of 'self-determination' were rather marginal in the context of the Hungarian Kingdom and the discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism in the early nineteenth century. The Hungarian version of the concept (*önrendelkezés*) already existed by this time as the translation of the German term *Selbstbestimmung*. It also appeared in the Hungarian scientific discourse. For instance, the review of Karl Theodor Bayrhoffer's *Beiträge zur*

Naturphilosophie ("Contributions to Natural Philosophy", 1839) by János Warga de Sziget featured this concept in Hungarian in 1842. The reviewer reported that the German philosopher identified 'continuous self-determination' (*folytonos önrendelkezés*) as one of the features of 'organic life', which distinguished it from lifeless 'natural elements'.[105]

While it also appeared in legal studies, Hungarian scholars of this field only applied the concept of 'self-determination' to the administrative context of municipalities and the rights of local communities before 1848. The 'city' or the 'locality' (*község*) appeared as the subjects of 'the right to self-determination' in *A szolgabirói hivatal* ("The Office of the Sheriff") by Ignác Zsoldos (1842). This amounted to the right of the local administrations to define the internal structures of these units.[106] The author himself pioneered the research of local administration in Hungary upon his studies in Vienna and Bratislava.[107] It is important to recall that the concept of 'self-determination' also applied to the rights of local communities in the contemporary Austrian context, which might have influenced the theories of Zsoldos.

The concept of 'national self-determination' did not really appear in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism during 1848–1849, even though various historical narratives feature it as a term of paramount importance in this period. The claim that Hungary "demanded the right to self-determination" during the Revolution and War of Independence has appeared in the rhetoric of the Orbán Government. This narrative features the Eurosceptic policy of the government as the continuation of the revolutionary tradition. "Brussels" appears as the modern version of 'Vienna' in this account, against which the Hungarian 'nation' would refer to the "motif" of 'self-determination'. [108]

Similar references to the term also occur in more objective Hungarian scientific texts. The recent article of Zoltán Fónagy on the website of the Hungarian Research Centre

for the Humanities also claims that the Hungarian government wanted to establish "the broadest self-determination possible in the framework of the [Habsburg – L. B. B.] empire" through the April Laws of 1848. [109] It is important to emphasize that historical sources do not justify these narratives. I have yet to found Hungarian references to the concept of 'national self-determination' in the historical context of 1848–1849. For that matter, one cannot really find the term in the contemporary political programmes of non-Hungarian national movements either.

Jörg Fisch mentions the English-language "lectures" of Lajos Kossuth, the now-exiled Hungarian liberal politician in London and the United States during the early 1850s as ones which would refer to the term 'sovereign right of every nation to dispose of itself'. [110] As opposed to him, I would not necessarily identify this expression as a "corresponding phrase" to 'self-determination'. This is due to the ambiguities of the latter concept from historical discourses in the Anglo-American context, which issue I have already explained in my previous case study. Nonetheless, it is important to remark that the later Hungarian versions of Kossuth's speeches would translate the term 'sovereign right of every nation to dispose of itself' as 'the right of every nation to self-determination' (*minden nép önrendelkezési joga*). György Bodrog would feature the latter concept in Hungarian in his 1944 compilation of these lectures. [111] By this time, such a reference of course had other implications than it would have had back in the 1850s.

I rather found strong evidence that references to the concept of 'national self-determination' appeared at the Hungarian Diet of 1865–1868 for the first time in the local discourse of Hungarian nationalism. The contemporary sessions of the parliament discussed the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire' and the possible terms of their 'compromise'. This issue was not only of contemporary importance. One must

emphasize that the questions around the status of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy also defined the political discourse of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The differences between standpoints were already clear at the Hungarian Diet of 1861. This resulted in the appearance of various political groups with different conceptual frameworks in the following years. Besides the term 'legal independence', the so-called "Deák Party" (*Deák-párt*) also referred to the 'state rights' (*államjog*) of Hungary as its key concept in accordance with the traditions of the Hungarian liberal discourse. Its members argued that the reconciliation with the dynasty would restore the historical rights of Hungary. At the same time, the Habsburg Monarchy appeared to the Deák Party as an imperial framework without a realistic alternative. Accordingly, its members argued that political concessions in terms of military and foreign policy were in the interests of both 'nation' and 'Monarchy' (*monarchia*, which in this context substituted the concept of the 'empire'). [112]

In contrast, the 'Left Centre Party' (*Balközép Párt*) and the 'Far Left' (*Szélsőbal Párt*) were Hungarian political groups critical of this viewpoint. Their political languages rather echoed the key concepts of the Hungarian Revolution, the War of Independence and its political emigration. Accordingly, the interpretation of Hungary's status as a 'free' (*szabad*) and 'independent' (*független*) state was central to these conceptual frameworks. [113] Importantly, social dimensions also defined the differences between political groups. Great landowners constituted the membership of the Deák Party, whereas the representatives of the Left Centre belonged to the ranks of Hungarian nobility with less wealth.[114]

It was in the context of these debates that the 'right of the nation to self-determination' (*nemzet önrendelkezési joga*) first appeared as a concept in the Hungarian political discourse. The members of the Left Centre referred to this term at the Hungarian

Diet of 1865–1868. The term was not of central importance to their oppositional narrative, as references to it rather supported the concept of 'independence' (*függetlenség*), applied to the Hungarian 'nation' in terms of military and economic policy. The representatives of the Left Centre argued that the interpretation of these issues by the Deák Party as 'common' in the imperial framework of the Habsburg Monarchy was detrimental to the interest of the Hungarian state community.[115]

Although this concept does not appear in the studies of László Péter, one can still integrate the term 'national self-determination' into his theories. The scholar points out that the debates of the pro-*Ausgleich* Hungarian elite and their opponents concerned their interpretation of the historical 'constitution' and the related rights of the Hungarian Kingdom. The settlement of 1867 would not put an end to this "constitutional question". In fact, the issue of common military policy remained central to the political discourse of Hungarian nationalism. [116]

One must contextualize the concept of 'nation' as the subject to the 'right of self-determination' in this period. This term did not refer to the 'internal', but rather the 'external' dimension of the Hungarian national concept. Thus, it did not describe the 'nation' as the ethno-cultural identity of Hungarians, but rather as the political community of the 'state' in the conceptual framework of the Left Centre. The Hungarian deputies of the Left Centre interpreted themselves as the 'true' spokespeople of 'national' interests, which referred to their political vision of the historical Hungarian Kingdom and its multinational community. Although it was eventually the pro-*Ausgleich* elite that codified the concept of the 'political nation' in 1868, one must emphasize that their opposition also interpreted the state community in a similar way. It is logical to assume that this was due

to the presence of pre-modern traditions and their continued influence on the discourse of Hungarian nationalism.

On the other hand, it is also important to emphasize that contemporary Hungarian references to 'national self-determination' were limited to the evaluation of the terms of the *Ausgleich* and their effect on the status of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy. No references to the international context or any transnational discourses accompanied these political claims. This was the case despite the fact that a parallel concept, the 'right of peoples to self-determination' had a prevalent role in the discourse of German unification.

The heated debates and the widespread rejection of the establishment resulted in a specific political and social viewpoint of the pro-*Ausgleich* Hungarian elite. This prioritized the stabilization and maintenance of the Austro–Hungarian Compromise to any political reforms that could threaten its system. The parliamentarism of Hungary after 1867 embodied this vision, as only 6% of the population could participate in national elections. Electoral frauds, gerrymandering, the system of open ballots, bribery and intimidation also contributed to the domination of pro-*Ausgleich* parties until the end of dualism. The dominant Hungarian elite thus limited the opportunities of its opposition and marginalized the political groups of nationalities. [117]

On the other hand, even these arrangements could not stabilize the Hungarian political system alone. Such a consolidation only happened with the fusion between the Deák Party and the Left Centre in 1875. As a result, the Liberal Party (*Szabadelvű Párt*) appeared on the Hungarian political scene as a strong government party. While the Left Centre and the common nobility gained economic and political advantages with this development, the Deák Party could finally stabilize the political system. [118]

It is important to emphasize that the Liberal Party interpreted the Austro–Hungarian Compromise of 1867 as the "foundation of public law" (*közjogi alap*) and national development. In contrast, the mainstream of the Hungarian opposition claimed to represent the viewpoint of "48" (*48-as*) or the "independentist" (*függetlenségi*) tradition of the Hungarian Revolution. [119] This amounted to the continuous claims of the opposition to the 'freedom' and the 'independence' of Hungary in terms of economic, military and foreign policy, the abolishment of 'common issues' with Austria, and the establishment of a mere personal union between Cisleithania and Transleithania.

Although it also appeared in this discourse, the concept of 'national self-determination' was only of supplementary role in comparison to those of 'freedom' and 'independence'. Similar to the earlier narrative of the Left Centre, the independentist representatives of the Hungarian opposition referred to the 'nation' (*nemzet*) [120] or the 'country' (*ország*) [121] as the subjects of the 'right to self-determination'. Their interpretation of these concepts was not ethno-cultural, as both terms referred to the state community of Hungary.

The Hungarian legal studies of this era also referred to these concepts in the same fashion. For instance, the term 'right of self-determination' appeared in the work of István (Ilméri) Kiss's *Európai nemzetközi jog* ('European International Law') in 1876. The Hungarian Doctor of Law described the state as a "national personality" (*nemzeti személyiség*), the official organization of the nation in international law. 'Self-determination' was one of the "original" (or "natural") "rights" of the state, which referred to the internal and foreign dimensions of national policy. As for the former, Kiss stated that the 'self-determination' of the nationally defined state incorporated its freedom to choose its guidelines of internal policy, its system of government or its forms of

international representation. In contrast, the same right allowed the state to support other communities in its foreign policy, to act as their legal guardian in case of their approval.[122]

The related sources of Kiss were German and English studies of international law. The author specifically cited the following works with regard to the concept of self-determination: *Elements of International Law* (Henry Wheaton, 1836); *Lehrbuch des Naturrechts oder der philosophischen Rechtswissenschaft* (Friedrich Adolph Schilling, 1859); *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten* (Johann Caspar Bluntschli, 1868). However, most of the cited books did not discuss the term at all.

It was only the Swiss jurist Johann Caspar Bluntschli, whose *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten* (‚The Modern International Law of Civilised States') did discuss the concept in its chapter, titled 'The Right of National Development and the Self-Determination of Peoples' (*Das Recht der nationalen Entwicklung und der Selbstbestimmung der Völker*). Bluntschli argued that the source of legitimacy with regard to state governments shifted from the dynastic principle to popular will. Royal families could no longer act as the "proprietors" of states, but rather as the "head" (*Haupt*) of the "people" (*Volk*), with their jurisdiction defined by public law and obligations (*öffentliches Recht, öffentliche Pflicht*).[123]

It was clear in this context that the subject of 'the right to self-determination' was the *Volk*, which referred to the community of citizens rather than an ethno-cultural group in the work of Bluntschli. This is important to emphasize, as the previous case study has shown that the Swiss scholar interpreted the concept of the 'nation' in an ethno-cultural or racial sense after 1863. This, however, was obviously not useful for the Hungarian discourse of nationalism due to its implications in a multi-ethnic society. Thus, Elemér

Kiss rather adopted Bluntschli's concept of 'self-determination' as a 'right' applied to the political community of the 'people' or in his interpretation, the 'nation'.

In the 1863 book of the Swiss scholar, the 'right of self-determination' referred to systems of government established in accordance with popular will. Bluntschli also emphasized that constitutional changes were internal matters of state rights (*staatsrechtlich*), and no subjects of international law (*Völkerrecht*). The latter regulated the relationship of states (*Beziehungen der Staten*) rather than individual states (*einzelne Staten*). As such, governments with internal legitimacy always counted as sovereign persons (*souveräne Personen*) in the international community. [124]

Hungarian law adopted this interpretation of 'self-determination' and its application to the community of the 'state' from German-language international law. The 'people' or the 'nation', the subject of this right was not an ethno-cultural group, but a political community, the will of which were to influence various fields of state policy. The 'right of peoples to self-determination' also applied only to the populations of states recognized by the international community.

It was clear from the start that this 'right to self-determination' primarily applied to the relationship between the Hungarian 'nation' and the Habsburg 'empire' in the context of Hungarian political debates. It was no accident that the Hungarian opposition referred to this term to problematize the state of affairs. In the narrative of German-language international law, the concept implied that full national control over all spheres of policy was the principle and the trend of modern times as opposed to terms of the *Ausgleich*. However, one must mention that the Hungarian government parties between 1867–1918 also seldom referred to the concept. Their narrative, however, featured the *Aussgleich* as

the 'foundation of public law' that successfully vindicated the right of the Hungarian nation to self-determination. [125]

Nonetheless, the concepts of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' (*népek önrendelkezési joga*) or the 'right of nations to self-determination' (*nemzetek önrendelkezési joga*) would accompany important international points of references in the Hungarian political discourse in 1879. This was due to the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Berlin Congress that ended this conflict. As opposed to the Russian-dictated Treaty of San Stefano, the Berlin Congress regulated the political transformation of South-Eastern Europe in accordance with the interests of other Great Powers. One important decision of the congress was that Austria–Hungary gained the right to occupy the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Hercegovina. As a result, the Habsburg imperial army could march into these territories in 1878. [126]

This was a rather problematic issue in the context of Hungarian nationalism and politics. A large part of Hungarian public opinion supported the Ottoman Empire during the war. This was much due to historical Hungarian fears of the Russian Empire and the memories of Russian intervention in 1849.[127] As opposed to these feelings of solidarity, Hungarian soldiers had to risk their lives and march into the Ottoman territories as occupants and agents of Habsburg imperial interests. Hungary was also necessitated to partially finance the costs of the military operation. [128] These issues provided practical examples as to how the *Ausgleich* effected the 'freedom' and the 'independence' of the country.

It was without surprise that the oppositional National Party of 1848 (*Országos 48-as Párt*, the immediate successor of the Far Left) problematized the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the Hungarian Diet through the concepts of the 'right of peoples to self-

determination' and the 'right of nations to self-determination'. Its representatives argued that the Great Powers forcefully decided the fate of peoples in South-Eastern Europe at the Berlin Congress. The National Party of 1848 Hungarian claimed that these measures contradicted the principles of international law, non-intervention and the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. Thus, the Berlin Congress provided a dangerous precedence that could threaten the "existence" (*fennállás*) of smaller states.[129]

In contrast, the oppositional representatives stated the 'Hungarian nation' had always respected the rights of peoples to self-determination. They also demanded that the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina would receive a treatment in accordance with this principle. The representatives of the National Party of 1848 argued that the occupation of the province could only happen with the approval of its lawful ruler (the Ottoman Sultan) and in accordance with the free decision of the population.[130]

The concept of 'national self-determination' thus appeared as concept through which the Hungarian opposition criticized the Austro–Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Once again, the term applied to the 'peoples' or the 'nations' of given administrative units, as it referred to the state community of Hungary and the provincial population of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is important to point out that despite the references to the international context, the local debates with regard to the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire' were also important in this regard. The Hungarian opposition implied that the Hungarian nation was not a voluntary participant in the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Thus, the military operations of the Habsburg Monarchy were detrimental to its right of self-determination as well. The opposition could also criticize the limitations of the political system as for the 'freedom' and 'independence' of Hungary through this concept.

However, references to the term 'national self-determination' remained marginal in the Hungarian political discourse after 1879. The term usually appeared in the claims of the Hungarian opposition to the freedom and the independence of Hungary in the Habsburg imperial framework. It was one of the arguments that occurred in the framework of discussion with regard the re-negotiations of the economic relationship between Austria and Hungary, which the political system of the *Ausgleich* allowed in each decade. [131]

To sum it up, references to the 'right of the nation to self-determination' appeared not in the Reform Era nor during the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence in 1848–1849, but rather in the context of political debates with regard to the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire' in the 1860s. It was a parallel and supplementary term to the 'freedom' and 'independence' of the Hungarian Kingdom in terms of economy, military and foreign policy in the conceptual framework of Hungarian opposition to the conditions of the *Ausgleich*. The discourse of Hungarian independentism inherited this critical vision of imperial affairs, and continued the references to 'national self-determination' after 1867.

Although the representatives of the Hungarian opposition did not point at transnational sources in this regard, it is clear upon the study of contemporary Hungarian legal scholarship that the concept appeared as the translation of the *(das Recht der) Selbstbestimmung der Völker* from the German-language studies of international law in the early nineteenth century. It was specifically Johann Kaspar Bluntschli whose work appeared as a source in this regard. In its original context, the 'right of peoples to self-determination' would refer to national will as the modern source of legitimacy as opposed to the dynastic principle and would feature royal dynasties as subjects to national law.

These implications of the concept were useful to the discourse of Hungarian independentism.

On the other hand, the interpretation of the *Volk* by the German international law of the mid-nineteenth century corresponded to the 'external' or 'political' dimension of the 'nation' in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism. Both described the 'people' or the 'nation' as the political community of the state rather than ethno-cultural groups. The representatives of the Hungarian independentist discourse would also interpret their position as the one faithful to the interests of the Hungarian Kingdom and its multinational population.

Although that the role of 'national self-determination' was relatively marginal in the conceptual framework of Hungarian independentism, it appeared as a central point of reference in 1879. The term appeared in the context of Hungarian political debates with regard to the regulations of the Berlin Congress. On the one hand, the representatives of the Hungarian opposition problematized the order the Great Powers imposed on South-Eastern Europe. On the other hand, their approach was also critical to the participation of Hungary in the occupation of Ottoman Bosnia-Hercegovina by the imperial army of the Habsburg Monarchy, which they interpreted as opposed to the will and the interests of the 'nation'. They also described the population of the Ottoman province through this term or that of the 'people', which emphasized their interpretation of the 'right to self-determination' as a concept applied to the multi-ethnic populations of historical administrative structures.

One must emphasize, however, that 'national self-determination' did not really appear in the context of debates between the Hungarian and non-Hungarian national movements. The programs of non-Hungarian political parties or the claims of their

representatives did not refer to this concept as one that would apply to the 'nationalities' or the 'nations' of the Hungarian Kingdom. As pointed out by Gyurgyák, they rather debated the framework of the 'political nation' and argued for the status of their communities as 'nations', which were to be 'equal' to their Hungarian counterpart in terms of law. However, one must also accentuate that the context of the Hungarian national discourse also soon changed, and the representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities had to argue against new concepts of the 'nation' and the 'state'. I will showcase these developments in the next sub-chapter.

e. The Hungarian Concept of the 'Unitary Nation-State'

Gyurgyák claims that around the time of the Austro–Hungarian Compromise, a "minority" viewpoint in the political discourse of Hungarian nationalism already "feared the development of local nationalities into nations" and were "inclined towards 'proselytism'", Magyarization in "linguistic terms". However, he states that the "unwavering authority" of Deák could "withhold" such determinations until his death in 1876. The "liberal foundations" of the Nationalities Law and its framework of individual rights would not waver "until the beginning of the First World War". [132]

Nonetheless, Gyurgyák still features the viewpoint of this Hungarian political minority as the seed from which the concept of the 'unitary nation-state' (*egységes magyar nemzetállam*) would grow by the late nineteenth century. The "members of the Hungarian schools of constitutional and legal history" appear in this narrative as the intellectual authorities to conceptualize this term. These scientists would "substitute the Eötvösian–Deákian concept of the political nation" with their idea, which "identified the Hungarian

state with the Hungarian nation [Gyurgyák implies this was an ethno-cultural concept – L. B. B.]" and supported this interpretation with historical and legal arguments. [133]

However, Gyurgyák also refers to "publicists" as influential contributors to this discourse, who would also not search for historical and legal arguments to justify "the transformation of the Hungarian state into a nation-state". Gusztáv Beksics appears as the first representative of this group. Beksics would argue for the importance of resources provided by the state for the establishment of the unitary Hungarian nation-state. Importantly, despite his militant rhetoric, Beksics never propagated the forceful assimilation of nationalities. He rather believed in their natural assimilation and identification with the Hungarian nation as a political community. [134]

Béla Grünwald was another important publicist to contribute to the conceptualization of the 'unitary nation-state'. He was originally of German and Slovak descent; later, he alo started a carrier in the Hungarian state administration and ultimately received the position of vice-ispán (*alispán*) in the county of Zólyom in 1871.[135] It is important to point out that Zólyom was a mainly Slovak-inhabited administrative unit in Northern Hungary, a region specifically referred to as *Felvidék* ("Upper Lands") in the contemporary Hungarian national discourse. Grünwald was the representative of the modern(izing) Hungarian state in this context, which spread its rule to this peripheral region of the country after the *Ausgleich*.

It is no accident that Grünwald emphasized the role of the state in relation to his national vision and leaned into the rhetoric of national warfare even more than Beksics did. Grünwald also proposed the centralization of state administration as a means to transform the Hungarian Kingdom into a strong, unitary nation-state. He identified a threat in the Slovak national movement in this regard, against which he acted zealously. It was due to

his initiative that the convention of political representatives in Zólyom demanded that the state would disclose the local cultural institutions of the Slovak community (the *Matica Slovenska* and all Slovak gymnasia) in 1874. Grünwald argued that these institutions spread 'Pan-Slavic propaganda'. [136]

Although János Gyurgyák identifies the concept of the Hungarian 'nationality' as a parallel term to the 'Hungarian nation' in the narrative of Grünwald, he does not contextualize Grünwald's use of these terms. Importantly, the historian also refers to the treatise of Grünwald titled *A Felvidék* ("The Upper Lands", 1878) and mentions its argumentation against the Nationalities Law of 1868. However, he does not describe these claims in extent.

I, on the other hand, find it essential to showcase the concepts used in this work, since I think these allow us to gain a better understanding on the Hungarian national discourse of the time. Importantly, Grünwald attempted to study the Slovak or with the archaic (and by this period, derogative) Hungarian term, *tót* nationality in his book. He also aimed to discuss the perspectives of the modern Hungarian state-building project. Importantly, Grünwald's concept of the 'Hungarian nation' was parallel to the term 'Hungarian race' (*magyar faj*) or 'nationality' (*nemzetiség*). Grünwald defined the latter concept as the consciousness of a separate national identity and the determination to translate this into political goals. [137]

As a result, the author argued that the Hungarian national community was not equivalent to that of the state. He rather depicted the internal dynamics of Hungary as the opposition between 6 million Hungarians and 7 million citizens with different identities. The latter were supported by the national movements of kindred peoples and the Russian imperial state through the concept of 'Pan-Slavism'. The end result of these processes was

either the destruction of the Hungarian state and 'race', or the 'assimilation' *(assimilatio)* of other ethno-cultural groups into the Hungarian nationality.[138]

This ethno-cultural interpretation contradicted the concept of the 'political nation'. It was to no surprise that Grünwald was highly critical of the Nationalities Law of 1868. The author stated that the law was a result of the 'lack of knowledge' and the 'weakness' of the contemporary Hungarian government. He claimed it was equivalent to the "abdication" of the Hungarian nation from its dominant status in the state. This was due to the hesitation of the liberal elite to provide a "Hungarian nature" (*magyar jelleg*) to the Hungarian state. Instead of this policy of "concessions" and "negotiations", Grünwald supported "struggle" and the "destruction of the enemy" in terms of politics. As opposed to the late emphasis of Eötvös on the importance of local self-governments and the role of municipalities in the Hungarian state structure, he also supported the formation of a strong central government. [139]

It is important to point out the transnational background of these features. Grünwald was, in fact, a Hungarian representative of a Positivist turn in the transnational discourse of nationalism. As opposed to the constitutionalist and historical focus of the previous liberal generation, this stream of thought rather emphasized the importance of 'organicism' in terms of social development. Positivism also introduced a new depiction of social relations, which accentuated the themes of 'natural selection' and the 'struggle for survival'. It was no accident that Grünwald's work was published at the same time when the first theories of Social Darwinism appeared. [140]

Accordingly, the focus of *Felvidék* shifted from historical rights to the notion of cultural (and economic) superiority in relation to the dominant position of Hungarians in the state. The representatives of Hungarian liberal nationalism before 1848 had hoped that

nationalities could integrate into the Hungarian nationality as a result of social and national reforms. In contrast, Grünwald emphasized the need to actively promote assimilation in national politics and especially through education. He depicted primary and secondary educational institutions as cultural spaces of paramount importance with regard to Hungarian nation-state building. [141]

Such ideals of the 'unitary nation-state' were widespread in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism at the turn of the century. They were not limited to certain political affiliations, as political representatives of '48' and '67' could share their support of this concept. This first resulted in the introduction of Hungarian as a compulsory subject in elementary education in 1879, followed by similar educational acts in 1883, 1891, 1893, 1898 and 1907. Hungarian opposition to these tendencies of the discourse was rather sporicidal and inconsistent. Kálmán Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister between 1879–1890 was the occasional partisan of this political thought, who would denounce administrative practices driven "by overzealous behaviour in connection to the Hungarian race" as "malfeasances". Yet, even the government of Tisza would in general tolerate these trends, whereas future ones would openly support them. [142]

However, one must emphasize that the Hungarian governments of this historical period did not necessarily identify with the viewpoint of 'Magyarization'. Those were often local political organizations that demanded the introduction of related measures in state policy. The introduction of Hungarian as a compulsory subject in 1879 also happened after the unsuccessful re-negotiation of economic relationships between Austria and Hungary. [143] Thus, it is possible to interpret the national policy of time as the concession of the Hungarian government to radical Hungarian nationalism, a process in parallel to global shifts in the discourse of nationalisms.

It is also important to emphasize that the appearance of the Hungarian discourse of the 'unitary nation-state' revealed a non-Hungarian support for the concept of the 'political nation'. The Slovak politician, Michal Mudroň for instance criticized Grünwald for his anti-Slovak rants. As opposed to the 'unitary nation-state', the Slovak politician supported that of the 'political nation', as he interpreted the Kingdom of Hungary as the political community of local nationalities. Thus, he opposed to the viewpoint of Grünwald, but also the Panslav ideas dominant in the discourse of the Slovak National Party. [144] This implies that the concept of the 'political nation' was not as widely refused by non-Hungarian representatives as argued by Gyurgyák, Péter or other Hungarian historians.

It is also important to emphasize that the official standpoint of the Hungarian independentists was more ambiguous than to simply say that they supported the concept of the 'unitary nation-state'. Their common platform from 1884 on was the Party of Independence and '48 (*Függetlenségi és '48-as Párt*). The political program of this formation, on the one hand, shared the criticism of administrative centralization by non-Hungarian representatives. However, it also emphasized the "territorial and political integrity" (*területi és politikai egység*) of the Hungarian state. [145] This claim opposed those of the non-Hungarian national movements, which rather demanded regional or national autonomy. For instance, the Romanian National Party declared in 1881 that one of its main goals was the "restoration of Transylvanian autonomy" (*Erdély autonomiájának helyreállitása*). [146]

In contrast, the program of the Party of Independence and '48 stated that the establishment of the independent, integral and "well-organized" Hungary was the common interest of local nationalities. The representatives of the Hungarian opposition argued that this framework could provide the equal and fair treatment of ethno-cultural communities

and the opportunities for the cultivation of their identities. The co-operation of nationalities could result in a "brotherly co-existence and development" according to this narrative.[147] Thus, the Party of Independence and '48 implicitly referred to the 'political nation' as its main concept in 1884.

However, the program of the Hungarian opposition in 1891 featured a different take on this issue. While it claimed support for the regulations of the Nationalities Law, it also demanded the introduction of a new, "patriotic" and "national" educational policy. The Hungarian opposition claimed that "freedom" and "culture" could only exist in an independent Hungarian state, which was to display "a national nature of Hungarianness" (*magyarnak nemzeti jellege*), "created" (*megalkot*), "defended" (*védelmez*) and "fed" (*táplál*) by the "national might of Hungarians" (*magyarnak nemzeti ereje*).[148]

The program of 1891 thus featured an ambiguous interpretation of the 'state' as a concept, as it started to emphasize its relationship to 'Hungarianness'. One must emphasize that this did not necessarily refer to the concepts of the Hungarian 'nationality' or 'race', as one could still interpret 'Hungarianness' as the political identity of the state community. Nonetheless, the expression 'national nature of the state provided by Hungarians' also appeared in the *Felvidék* of Grünwald and other contemporary works in support of the creation of a 'unitary nation-state'. One must also recall the fact that by this point, the pro-*Ausgleich* governments of the Liberal Party had introduced a substantial number of educational reforms in support of 'Magyarization'. One can thus understand the contemporary claims of Hungarian independentists as their participation in a 'race' to appeal to Hungarian national sentiments in support of the 'unitary nation-state'.

To sum it up, the concept of the 'unitary nation-state' appeared in the Hungarian political discourse a decade after the *Ausgleich*. This was much due to the Positivist shift

in the global discourse of nationalism, which emphasized 'organicism' and 'natural development' as opposed to 'historical rights'. As a result, the Hungarian proponents of the 'unitary nation-state' argued the homogenization or the 'Magyarization' of the population through the modernization and the unification of the administrative structure and through education.

This viewpoint came to dominate the political discourse by the 1890s, by which point the representatives of the Hungarian opposition also adopted this viewpoint. Whereas it formerly interpreted the 'nation' more as a political community and aimed to represent its interests against the 'empire' and the *pro-Ausgleich* elite, the conceptual framework of Hungarian independentism started to accentuate the need to reinforce the 'Hungarian nature' of the historical state. The pro-*Ausgleich* governments of the Liberal Party also introduced educational reforms after 1879, which fixed the status of the Hungarian language as a compulsory subject.

It is logical to assume that the Positivist shift in the interpretation of the 'nation' as an 'organic' community and the concept of the 'unitary nation-state' influenced the interpretation of the term 'national self-determination' in the Hungarian political discourse. On the other hand, one must emphasize that it was rather another concept, that of 'sovereignty' which finally unified the 'external' and 'internal' dimensions of the Hungarian 'nation' as a concept. It also appeared in support of national homogenization. I will present the role of this concept in Hungarian science and the political discourse at the turn of the century.

f. External and Internal Implications of 'National Sovereignty'

'Sovereignty' appeared as a parallel concept to the 'nation' and the 'state' in the Hungarian legal studies of the late 1880s. Studies often featured this term in relation to the "doctrine" of the "Holy Crown", which historical idea referred to the Holy Crown of St. Stephen as the embodiment of the Hungarian state and its community. This would operate independently and often in opposition to the person of the "King". References to the 'Holy Crown' thus often appeared in opposition to the policy of Habsburg rulers and reinforced the 'individuality' and the 'independence' of the Hungarian Kingdom. [149]

As for myself, I am rather interested in the implications of 'sovereignty' for the Hungarian concepts of the 'nation'. Thus, I will reconstruct the normative load of the term in the Hungarian legal and political discourse through the *Politika* ('Politics') of Győző Concha (1895). The author was one of the most influential Hungarian legal scholars at the turn of the century, with *Politika* recognized as his main work. [150] Concha enjoyed a widespread acceptance of his theories in Hungarian jurisprudence. [151] Despite this fact, he only receives a passing reference in the work of Gyurgyák, who describes his ideas as the attempt to "reconcile the principles of liberalism and conservativism" and him as the supporter of the 'unitary nation-state' concept. [152] Nonetheless, I would rather argue out that the works of Concha represented an important discursive shift in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism with its references to the 'sovereignty' of the nation, as the former concept combined the 'external' and 'internal' dimensions of the latter. I will attempt to prove this thesis through the analysis of *Politika* from 1895.

Concha defined the state as the official representative of the nation in his book, a statement which was in accordance with the traditions of Hungarian legal studies. However, he also described sovereignty as the "control of the state over its own will", or

in a more concrete sense, its "independence" (*függetlenség*) and its rule over its subjects.[153] Importantly, the term 'national self-determination' did not appear in this context, although the Hungarian legal studies and the political discourse of the earlier decades had used the concept in a similar sense.

As contemporary political debates still focused on the issues of the *Ausgleich* and Hungarian independence, Concha needed to elaborate on the concept of national sovereignty in this regard. The author emphasized this issue was of central importance as opposed to fruitless contemplations on the concepts of 'common issues' or 'dualism'. Concha claimed that the sovereignty of Hungary remained intact despite its relationship with Austria. He described the *Ausgleich* as the international treaty which established the "alliance", the "confederation" or the "personal union" of the two states.[154]

This statement was connected to the general viewpoint of Concha, who supported the Liberal Party and its interpretation of the Austro–Hungarian Compromise as the foundation of Hungarian national development. [155] His description of 'sovereignty' and the imperial political system supported this viewpoint. He referred to the problems of the imperial community in the historical context of the 1860s and the opposition between the 'Hungarian' and 'Austrian' viewpoints of 'personal' and 'real' union. [156] However, his account also marginalized the narrative of the 'independentist' opposition, as the sovereignty of Hungary did not appear as a problematic issue in the book.

As for the transnational sources of the terms 'national sovereignty' (*nemzetszuverenitás*) and 'state sovereignty' (*államszuverenitás*), the Hungarian author referred to Swiss and German works from the early nineteenth century. He specifically mentioned the Swiss economist and historian Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi as the scholar to define 'nation' as the subject of 'sovereignty'. In contrast, the author stated the

source of 'state sovereignty' as a concept was the German jurist Wilhelm Eduard Albrecht. [157]

As for 'nations' (*nemzetek*) and 'peoples' (*népek*), Concha claimed these designations referred to a hierarchical relationship between groups in society and politics. According to the author, 'nation' was a community with a strong sense of identity, which possessed a certain "value" (*érték*) in terms of human existence. The author emphasized that biological kinship, historicity, and linguistic ties were not the foundations of national existence: it was rather (political) "power" that allowed the nation to cultivate and protect its identity, the shared feeling of the community through the state. [158]

In contrast, 'people' did not appear as the community of state citizens, but rather a form of ethno-cultural identity that could provide the foundation of the nation, but which was also inferior in the "natural" and "moral" order of human existence. Accordingly, Concha interpreted the 'equality of rights' between nationalities as a theory of law that did not correspond to the reality of international relationships. The position of various communities was not set in this hierarchy: the author claimed that the rise and fall of nations and peoples was continuous in the international sphere in accordance with the reinforcement and the weakening of certain communities.[159] As such, Positivist interpretations of the community, and Social-Darwinist views of the 'struggle for survival' influenced Concha's concepts of the 'people', 'nation' and 'national sovereignty'.

As for the transnational sources of the national concept featured in 'Politics', the author pointed at the influence of German historical school of law on European science in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. He specifically mentioned Johann Gottlieb Fichte as the one to provide the theoretical foundations for the understanding of the 'nation'; according to the interpretation of the German philosopher, this was the natural

unit of human existence, the foundation of which was the joint identity of the community. However, Concha emphasized more the importance of Italian legal scholars in the field, who interpreted 'nation' as the basic community of the state and the main actor of international politics. At the same time, he also provided a criticism of the Italian view: the Hungarian author stated that Italian scholars only provided a "raw" theory of nationalism, which did not interpret the relationship of communities as a hierarchical one in accordance with their "values" to humanity. [160]

In accordance with this viewpoint, the author interpreted the concept of the 'political nation' and its implied 'equality of nationality rights' as dysfunctional. Concha argued that in states with diverse populations, only one people, the dominant 'nation' could define the "nature" of the state. He stated that nationalities could either adopt to the dominant national policy or could participation in the creation of a new nation through the fusion of communities into one entity. [161]

Thus, 'sovereignty' did not only refer to the independence of the 'nation' in the international sphere, but also to its unilateral national control over internal policy. In other words, it combined the 'external' and 'internal' dimensions of the 'nation' as a concept. It was also important that Concha interpreted the relationship between nations and peoples as a dynamic one of continuous struggle, in which the position of communities could not be taken for granted. This unsafe status implied that the policy of the state was to focus on the consolidation of national domination and that other 'peoples' posed a threat to this process and the contemporary *status quo*. While the author did not interpret 'assimilation' as a result of forceful acts or as a one-way project, the concept of the 'unitary nation-state' was clearly connected to his term national 'sovereignty' and its implications for the multi-ethnic context of the Hungarian Kingdom. It was especially notable in this regard that

Concha positioned his national concept against that of the 'political nation' from 1868, a viewpoint shared earlier by Grünwald and others.

The political representatives of non-Hungarian national movements sensed these tendencies and attempted to create a common platform of political co-operation through the "Nationalities Congress" (*nemzetiségi kongresszus*) of 1895, which convened in Budapest. The convention rallied the representatives of Slovak, Serbian and Romanian political groups. The resolutions of the Congress argued against the interpretation of Hungary as a state with Hungarian "national features" (*nemzeti jelleg*) and the "idea of the Hungarian nation-state" (*magyar nemzeti állameszme*). Besides the claim that Hungarians did not constitute most of the population, they also argued for the alternative interpretation of the state. This amounted to the claim that due to its ethnic composition and historical development, "only the sum of peoples in Hungary could associate themselves with the state". [162]

The participants of the Nationalities Congress also claimed the concept of 'nationality autonomy' (*nemzetiségi autonómia*) corresponded with the "natural" circumstances in Hungary. Importantly, they did not apply this concept to regions such as Transylvania or the former Serbian Voivodeship. The resolutions of the convention rather argued for the vindication of national autonomy in the counties. 'Language' was to provide a foundation for administrative reform only in the sense that the borders of counties were to adjust to the local boundaries between ethno-cultural communities. Through this concept of national autonomy, the Slovak, Serbian and Romanian representatives argued that the Hungarian state did not follow a policy in accordance with the 'equality of nationality rights' as a political and legal principle. According to their interpretation, the Nationalities Law only provided a benevolent façade for the Hungarian national policy of

intolerance. As a result, the convened argued for the vindication and the extension of its regulations. [163]

The formation of a common viewpoint offered an interesting alternative to the previously individual programs of national political groups. At the same time, the text itself was also different than the national declarations of the previous decades. The impact of the recent trial of Romanian representatives in connection to the case of the so-called 'Transylvanian Memorandum' was important in this regard. Upon its unsuccessful plea to Franz Joseph in 1892, the Romanian National Party published this text, which protested the Nationalities Law and its definition of the Hungarian political nation, the contemporary policy of Magyarization. The Memorandum also argued for the territorial autonomy of Transylvania and the equal status of the Romanian community to the Hungarian nation. Hungarian nationalists reacted to these claims with violent protests in Transylvania. As a result, the government pressed charges against the authors of the Memorandum in 1894, who were accused of "instigation" (*izgatás*) against the Hungarian state. Most defendants were imprisoned as a result of the trial. [164] This could explain the absence of claims to regional autonomy in the resolutions of the Nationalities Congress; the participants of the congregations were wary of the consequences of the Memorandum Trial as members of the political groups were affected by this event.

The tensions with regard to the conflicts between Hungarian and other national movements, but also the political viewpoints in support and against the political system of the *Ausgleich* reached their peak through the 'crisis of dualism' after the turn of the century. This was partially the result of the Hungarian opposition's increased dissatisfaction with the political system. The representatives of the National Party of Independence and '48 started to obstruct the work of the Diet, to which the Liberal Party answered with the use

of force. In protest to these measures, a sizeable number of representatives seceded from the Liberal Party in 1905. These individuals soon formed the so-called "Constitutional Party" (*Országos Alkotmánypárt*), which did not oppose the *Ausgleich*, but demanded certain reforms of the establishment (the protection of Hungarian agriculture and the increased national control in imperial military policy). [165]

The weakened position of the Liberal Party also resulted in the landslide victory of the oppositional political groups at the election of 1905; however, their coalitional government could not renegotiate the terms of the *Ausgleich* with King Franz Joseph. This resulted in the so-called "Coalition Crisis" of 1905–1906, during which the ruler imposed a government of his own liking upon Hungary. Although its resistance resulted in the dissolution of the political group, even the Liberal Party protested this turn of events. Eventually, the coalition of the once-oppositional parties could reconcile with Franz Joseph, but only at the price of its political goals with regard to the 'independence' and the 'freedom' of Hungary. [166]

Upon this failure, the Coalition could only compensate with a policy in accordance with its previous promises in relation to the national features of the Hungarian state. The result was the introduction of the infamous set of educational laws in 1907; the contemporary Hungarian and international public billed these under the name of "*Lex Apponyi*" after the Minister of Religion and Public Education, Count Albert Apponyi (the leader of the Constitutional Party). The law dictated a raise in the salaries of tutors within a short period of time in all Hungarian schools. Importantly, the regulations of the *Lex Apponyi* applied to all educational institutions of Hungary, which were overwhelmingly in private hands, owned by the local churches or national cultural organizations. The financial opportunities of these societies were limited; accordingly, the state offered support.

However, the legislation stated that besides the introduction of Hungarian as a subject, the instruction of students in Hungarian through classes of history, geography and mathematics was compulsory in exchange for state assistance. If an educational institution received more than the amount of two-hundred Austro–Hungarian crowns, the law authorized the Ministry of Religion and Public Education to tenure the tutors. [167]

It was without surprise that the few political representatives of the non-Hungarian ethno-cultural communities affected by the 'Lex Apponyi' protested its regulations in the Diet and argued that this law violated the right to autonomy in the context of Hungarian education.[168] In his reply to these complaints, Count Albert Apponyi argued that the interests of the state overruled the considerations for 'autonomy' and 'self-determination'. It is important to emphasize that the representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities applied these concepts to the local institutions of education. 'National' and 'state interests' as the counter-concepts to these terms in the political discourse of the Hungarian government. [169]

'Sovereignty' was a prominent concept in the context of these debates. The representatives of the Hungarian government coalition argued that the resolutions of the Diet and the Lex Apponyi realized the "national will residing in state sovereignty" (*az állami szuverenitásban rejlő nemzeti akarat*).[170] In contrast, the representatives of nationalities stated such a concept only promoted a specific interpretation of sovereignty in correspondence with the dominant national concept of the Hungarian political discourse. The member of the Serbian Liberal Party, Mihailo Polit-Desančić claimed this amounted to the "national sovereignty of the Hungarian race" (*a magyar faj nemzeti szuverenitása*), which marginalized the viewpoint and the interests of other ethno-cultural communities in Hungary. [171]

The introduction of Lex Apponyi did indeed correspond with the contemporary concepts of the 'Hungarian nation' and 'national sovereignty' in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism. According to the dominant interpretation of Hungarian law in the late nineteenth century, the self-determination and the sovereignty of the nation both applied to its external status and its internal policy. The shift of the national discourse towards the ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'Hungarian nation' also indicated that the national community could not reconcile its main interest, the development of the 'unitary nation-state' with the principle of 'equality of nationality rights'. This viewpoint prioritized the administrative centralization of the state and national homogenization. It viewed collective rights as detrimental to what it perceived as the trends of modernity. One must mention that this standpoint defined contemporary references to the 'right of Hungarians to self-determination', which concept appeared in support of the national policy of 'Magyarization'. [172]

Ultimately, its failure to renegotiate the terms of the *Ausgleich* and to consolidate the Hungarian political system favoured the political opponents of the government coalition, which had once formed the Liberal Party. The leading figure of this political group, István Tisza founded the "National Party of Work" (*Nemzeti Munkapárt*), which won the Hungarian elections of 1910. The new government once again interpreted the *Ausgleich* as the foundation of national development; its representatives argued that the political structure of the Austro–Hungarian Compromise allowed the full vindication of Hungarian national self-determination in the Habsburg Monarchy. The program of the National Party of Work also aimed at the restoration of relationships between 'nation' and 'king' – in other words, the normalization of relationships between the 'nation' and the 'empire' after rule of the coalition. [173]

Although István Tisza did not perceive that the concepts of the Nationalities Law as influential terms after the turn of the century, he never denounced the idea of the political nation, nor did he support the forceful assimilation of non-Hungarian nationalities. His viewpoint was rather defined by a traditional sense of liberalism. This amounted to the belief that the integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom could only be maintained if the Hungarian liberal elite's rule was not destabilized. His standpoint was also pro-*Ausgleich*, as Tisza thought that historical Hungary could only be safe as the constituent part of the Habsburg Monarchy. [174]

To sum it up, 'sovereignty' appeared as a concept of Hungarian legal studies to combine the 'external' and 'internal' features of the 'nation' as a concept. As such, the concept both referred to the 'independence' of Hungary and its right to administer a national policy in support of homogenization (Magyarization). The role of the term was especially prominent in the discussions in the era of the so-called 'coalitional government' (1906–1910).

Although it was originally a coalition of oppositional and independentist groups and won the elections of 1906, this political alliance had to surrender to the pressure of King Franz Joseph to stabilize its rule. Its national policy in the period between 1906–1910 attempted to recompensate for its abandonment of the independentist agenda through acts in support of 'Magyarization' such as the *Lex Apponyi* of 1907. The representatives of the coalition argued that these were in accordance with the 'sovereignty' of the Hungarian 'nation'. In contrast, the representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities rather identified this concept as equivalent to the 'sovereignty of Hungarians' as an ethno-cultural group ('race').

One must emphasize that this turn of the Hungarian national policy was not supported by all actors in the Hungarian political discourse. On the one hand, István Tisza, the Prime Minister of Hungary after the elections of 1910 did not really believe in it. On the other hand, the political representatives of the so-called Hungarian 'progression' also detested this national 'chauvinism' of the Hungarian political elite and attempted to design a more conciliatory approach to the relationship between the Hungarian 'nation' and 'nationalities'. Nonetheless, the contemporary discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism of the time still influenced their concepts. As this political and ideological stream is also important in historical narratives of the First World War and the role of 'national self-determination' in this concept, I will dedicate the next chapter to the ideas of Oszkár Jászi, identified as the main 'ideologue' of this group by János Gyurgyák.

g. Oszkár Jászi's Civic Radicalism

Oszkár Jászi seems to be a historical figure central to accounts of the late First World War and the Hungarian reception of the 'Wilsonian' concept of 'national self-determination'. On the other hand, he also appears as a rather important participant of the Hungarian national discourse at the turn of the century in the narrative of János Gyurgyák. Thus, it is obligatory for me to discuss the concepts of Jászi, the questions surrounding his political thought in Hungarian historiography, and his relationship to the concept of 'national self-determination' before the First World War.

The choice of Gyurgyák to feature Oszkár Jászi as the intellectual authority of Hungarian 'civic radicalism' (*polgári radikalizmus*) is not accidental. It rather stems from modern traditions in the Hungarian context. György Litván points out in his biography of 2003 (*Jászi Oszkár*) that Jászi is an important figure of historical narratives due to various

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reasons. His role is central to the accounts of the modern Hungarian left, as he united "various paths and streams" in the contemporary discourse of progressive political groups. His intermediation between these Hungarian "socialists" and the liberal nationalist "independentists of '48" contributed the formation of a common front against the liberal establishment of the time. His own concepts also reflected this conciliatory approach of his. [175]

On the other hand, Litván also refers to the viewpoint of the modern Hungarian right critical of Jászi, as it blames his "destructive criticism" of the Hungarian liberal establishment for "undermining the vitality and the self-confidence of the nation". [176] One can connect this remark to those of Pál Hatos, whose *Az elveszett forradalom* pinpoints Jászi as one of the "traitors" in the historical narrative of the Hungarian right. This interpretation of Hungarian history would feature his person as one of the representatives of a progressive and delusionary "revolution", which would result in the dissolution of the historical Hungarian Kingdom and the 'defeat' of the First World War.

Finally, and most importantly, historical narratives feature Jászi as a Hungarian historical figure with a conciliatory viewpoint towards the non-Hungarian national movements of his time. Litván reports that he could "establish a co-operation" with the "Romanian, Slovak and Southern Slavic national leaders". However, he achieved this feat "on his own", without supporters in the Hungarian political discourse. [177] Gyurgyák claims that Jászi "might have considered the promotion of reconciliation between the peoples which lived in the Danube valley to be one of his most important political goals". This viewpoint informed his ideas of nationalism. The historian describes the concepts of the civic radical representative as "truly original and influential" in the context of Hungarian nationalism. [178]

Nonetheless, György Kovács points out in "Jászi Oszkár és a 'hazafiság újrakeresztelése'" ("Oszkár Jászi and the 'Re-Christening of Patriotism'", 2017) that the modern evaluation of Jászi is once again ambiguous in relation to his national ideas. The author claims that modern historical accounts either accentuate the Hungarian "nationalist" or the Marxist, "internationalist" features of Jászi's political thought. In contrast, Kovács rather accentuates that Jászi's 'civic radicalism' attempted to harmonize the ideas of 'socialism' and 'patriotism' through his theory of "two patriotisms" (*kétféle hazafiság*). A certain kind of patriotism defined the "manipulatory ideology" of the liberal "ruling classes" in his narrative, which attempted to defend its "class interests" and "feudalism" through references to the "glory of the past". [179]

Jászi rather attached positive values to the concept of 'patriotism' he identified with the Hungarian liberal representatives of the Reform Era (1830–1848), especially József Eötvös. He praised attempts of this political generation at the "social and cultural emancipation" of the Hungarian population. Jászi claimed that only 'socialism' could continue this tradition in Hungary, since the Hungarian liberal 'ruling classes' reinterpreted this idea of patriotism as "religious and conservative" after 1867. [180]

Nonetheless, Kovács also points out that Jászi attempted to "rehabilitate" the ideas of socialism, perceived as "unpatriotic" even by those liberal nationalist representatives who otherwise had progressive social ideas. He attempted to do so through the incorporation of contemporary nationalist ideas into his narrative. Thus, he referred to the concepts of 'Hungarian state sovereignty' (*magyar állam szuverenitása*) and the 'historical leading role of Hungarians' (*magyarság történelmi vezető szerepe)* in the state as central to his ideas of 'civic radicalism'. This intermediate position between 'socialism' and

Hungarian 'patriotism' contributed to the establishment of political alliances between Hungarian social democrats, Hungarian independentists and civic radicals in the 1910s. [181]

This ideological transfer of liberal concepts into the civic radical political thought of Jászi makes his speech acts interesting from the viewpoint of this study. On the one hand, he appears as the agent of national reconciliation in various narratives. On the other hand, he referred to concepts parallel to that of the 'unitary nation-state', such as 'sovereignty' and 'Hungarian domination' in the contemporary discourse of Hungarian liberal nationalism.

The related observation of Litván is rather important, who points out that "Jászi has often been called out in retrospect for not proclaiming the principle of national self-determination and secession or the need to reorganize historical Hungary on a federal basis". [182] For one to validate or refute these narratives, one is obliged to search for references to the concept of 'national self-determination' in the works of Jászi. I will analyse his *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* („The Formation of National States and the Question of Nationalities") of 1912 to this end.

This book was the result of Jászi's decision to "work on the nationalities question" after 1907 as reported by Litván. On the one hand, his interest was scientific in this issue, as he was the early representative of sociology in the local context. Jászi would thus attempt to reconstruct and showcase national developments in the Hungarian Kingdom through the primitive application of historical demography and statistics. He also consulted foreign experts of this issue. This group of individuals included Robert William Seton-Watson, who shared Jászi's criticism of contemporary Hungarian national policy. [183]

On the other hand, the sociologist also claimed to find the "Archimedean point of democracy" in the 'nationalities question'. Through this term, he referred to the problem

that national(ist) conflicts prevented the discussion of other political and social problems in Hungary at the turn of the century. [184] It is important to emphasize that despite his own Hungarian cultural affiliations, Jászi did attempt to formulate a viewpoint sensitive to the interests of nationalities. He travelled to Northern Hungary and Transylvania to experience local conditions first-hand and contacted the representatives of the non-Hungarian national movements to this end. It is worth to mention here already that Jászi himself was of Jewish origin. Born in the city of the then Hungarian-dominated Nagykároly (today Carei in Romania), he was baptized as Protestant in 1875. [185] This minority background of his might have contributed to his sympathies towards the non-Hungarian nationalities of the time. [186]

On the other hand, Hungarian historical accounts rarely deal with the scientific sources of Jászi. The author claimed to borrow his concept of 'nationality' from József Eötvös. In contrast, he listed the English journalist Walter Bagehot and the Austrian sociologists Ludwig Gumplowicz and Gustav Ratzenhofer as the scientists to inform his description of the 'nation'. Jászi also cited Austrian, English and French studies of anthropology, sociology and history from the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.[187]

At the same time, the author defined 'nation' and 'nationality' in accordance with the mainstream interpretation of these concepts in the Hungarian liberal political discourse and legal studies. He thus identified a hierarchical relationship between these communities. 'Nationality' referred to the basic unit of communities in this narrative, defined through language and common identity. In contrast, Jászi protested that biology could play any role in the formation of nationalities or nations. The author claimed that 'race' (*faj*) and 'racial purity' (*faji tisztaság*) were concepts non-sensical in terms of human existence as the mixture and the assimilation of nationalities were historical and natural processes. [188] This

viewpoint was related to Jászi's own Jewish background, as his own assimilation into the Hungarian nation could not have happened on a 'racial' basis.

'Nation' referred to the higher form of 'nationality' as a result of historical conquests, the assimilation of other groups, a continuous struggle for domination in this narrative. However, Jászi defined its rule over the modern state as the most definitive trait of the 'nation' – a description that corresponded with the contemporary interpretation of 'sovereignty' as a concept in Hungarian legal studies. In contrast, groups subject to the rule of nationally defined states remained 'nationalities', obligated to exist under legal and economic circumstances "unfavourable" for their development. Jászi also differentiated between various positions of national communities, which either defined a state, strived towards state-formation, recently lost their dominant status or were historically subjects to foreign rule. [189]

The 'national state' (*nemzeti állam*)[190] appeared as the definitive political and economic framework and the model of modernity in the book. Jászi argued that this structure contributed to the formation of a feeling of "national solidarity" (*nemzeti szolidaritás*) in the local population. He referred to the English concept of the 'commonwealth' in this regard. Importantly, Jászi listed the United States, Belgium or Great Britain as positive examples to this end. He argued that the widespread possibilities of capitalist development and cultural freedom neutralized national(ist) conflicts in these states. [191]

In contrast, Jászi mentioned Hungary as one of those national states, in which militaristic and "feudal" elites unsuccessfully enforced a policy of assimilation. This oppressive and retrograde state policy resulted in the appearance of the 'nationalities question', as it instigated hostilities between communities. Jászi also claimed that the

Hungarian national policy of Magyarization was an aggressive and inefficient means to grapple with ethno-cultural diversity and only contributed to the alienation of non-Hungarian nationalities from the state. [192]

Jászi accordingly identified the political structure established by the *Ausgleich* as a retrograde political framework. The author argued that the Austro–Hungarian Compromise resulted in the continuation of the Hungarian nobility's 'feudal' rule. He claimed that the Hungarian fascination with national issues was also much due to this structure. Jászi identified the governments after 1867 as the actors to initiate this discourse in their attempt to counter that of 'independentism', to divert attention from political, social, and economic problems and to ultimately argue that only the structure of dualism could ensure the territorial integrity of Hungary. The author stated that the Hungarian 'chauvinist' discourse of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries only continued this line of argumentation. [193]

However, the author also pointed out that the nationalities question was a general phenomenon of economic peripheries. This remark also pointed towards his proposed solution of the 'nationalities question'. While he argued against the policy of forceful assimilation, Jászi still interpreted "unification" (*egység*) as the law of modernity. It was the 'national state' that provided the connection between the 'local' and the 'international', with the latter offering widespread opportunities of economic and cultural development. The author emphasized the importance of local languages in this regard, through which the national centre could transmit the ideas of modernity to the periphery. On the other hand, the members of otherwise marginal and undeveloped ethno-cultural groups could only utilize economic and cultural opportunities through their assimilation to that national culture, which defined the framework of the modern state. [194]

It was due to this ideological construct that the concept of 'Hungarian domination' was central to the narrative of Jászi. The author claimed that "Hungarians" were in a hegemonic position in the Hungarian Kingdom due to their economic and cultural status. It was due to this position that he did not problematize the assimilation of non-Hungarian nationalities. On the contrary, he rather supported this process, as it aligned with the trends of modernity in his narrative. [195]

Nonetheless, the author still supported a tolerant national policy as opposed to the controversial policy of Magyarization. Jászi summed up the guidelines of his "minimal program" in this regard as "good education, good administration, good jurisdiction in the language of the people". [196] He also thought that democracy in economic terms (*gazdasági demokrácia*) and its opportunities of "free exchange" (*szabad csere*) would provide automatic solutions to the 'nationalities question' in accordance with the trends of modernity. [197]

The historical template of Jászi's policy was the Nationalities Law of 1868. He described this act as representative of the authentic "viewpoint of Hungarian liberalism", which would support the "free cultural development" of local nationalities and would not enforce their assimilation through the policy of Magyarization. He blamed the national "chauvinism" of the later decades for desecrating the "honest codification" of these 'liberal' principles. [198]

However, one must emphasize that the author did not adopt the concept of the 'political nation'. He conceptualized the Hungarian 'nation' in opposition to non-Hungarian 'nationalities', as a community of higher status in terms of economy and culture, which interpretation corresponded to the Positivist context of the Hungarian national discourse. On the other hand, Jászi always mentioned the 'political nation' as the

construct of the feudal nobility or the "middle class" in the Polish, Hungarian and Transylvanian contexts of the nineteenth century. Thus, it appeared to be an outdated concept in his narrative in comparison to the idea of a 'democratic community of interests' in the national state. [199] This was also a rather Positivist viewpoint, as it distanced Jászi from the liberal discourse of historical rights.

The counter-concepts to and the sources of threat to the 'national state' of this narrative were not the "small Balkan states", but rather to the concept of 'Greater Austria' (referred to as *Gross-Österreich* in the text). Jászi first referred to this term in connection to the historical context of Neoabsolutism and its policy of imperial centralization. Nonetheless, he also claimed that this concept never "ceased to exist" and implied the strong potential of its return due to the absolutist designs of the Habsburg dynasty. [200]

It was no accident that the parallel concepts of 'Greater Austria' were 'federalism' (*föderalizmus*) and 'nationality autonomy' (*nemzetiségi autonómia*) in the book of Jászi. The author claimed that the oppressive policy and rhetoric of Magyarization created a weakness for the "Austrian Emperor" to exploit. Thus, the monarch could instigate the local nationalities against the Hungarian state. The Emperor could refer to the concepts of 'complete autonomy' and 'cultural development' to this end. This could amount to promises to establish provinces or crownlands (*Kronland*) for the Slovak, Romanian and Serbian communities in the Habsburg Monarchy and the invitation of their representatives to the Austrian Imperial Council. [201] This vision was obviously influenced by the historical memory of Neoabsolutism when the Austrian Emperor dissolved the historical unity of the Hungarian Kingdom and attempted to establish the *Reichsrat* as a legislative organization for the *Gesamtstaat*. This monarch was the same Franz Joseph, who ruled Hungary as its King as of 1912.

These claims contextualize the modern criticism of Jászi "for not proclaiming the principle of national self-determination and secession or the need to reorganize historical Hungary on a federal basis". They reveal that these narratives do not consider the different meaning of these concepts for the Hungarian civic radical politician. His emphasis on the territorial integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom was only one of the possible reasons for the lack of these terms in his narrative. Jászi identified 'federalism' and 'autonomy' with the idea of a 'Greater Austria' and the 'absolutism' of the Habsburg dynasty. These were also the counter-concepts to his modern vision of 'democracy' in the 'national state' of Hungary, its social and economic integration in accordance with what he perceived as contemporary and positive trends. These processes were also to solve the 'nationalities question' in his narrative, complemented by a Hungarian tolerant national policy. His account also featured the assimilation of non-Hungarian nationalities as a natural and desirable process.

On the other hand, the modern critiques of Jászi could notice that his narrative did feature the 'right of all peoples to self-determination' (*minden nép önrendelkezési joga*), albeit in a specific sense. His book incorporated a quote from an unidentified "German socialist leader" from the German province of Schleswig-Holstein, who referred to this concept as the "theoretical demand of socialism" (pp. 196.). Jászi featured this quote in the context of the local "struggle" between the German and Danish national movements. He used it to drive home his claim that 'democratization' (*demokratizálás*) was the only solution to this and similar problems. In contrast, the policy of forceful assimilation initiated by "military and bureaucratic feudalism" could only "artificially" create tension between nationalities. [202]

One must emphasize that this was the sole reference of the author to the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination', which he thus adopted through a cultural transfer from the German social democratic context. (I would not use the term 'ideological transfer' here, since Jászi also believed in socialist ideas.) While this did not appear as the right to secession in his narrative, it is important to emphasize that Jászi relied on the interpretation of the concept by German social democracy. This appeared as rather analogous to his concepts of 'democracy' and 'free cultural development' in the context of the Hungarian Kingdom. Thus, the narrative that he did not support the 'right to self-determination' misses the point entirely due to its lack of consideration for the contemporary context and the concepts used by Jászi.

One must emphasize that there was a similar lack of attention for the theories of Jászi in the Hungarian political and intellectual discourse around 1912. Litván reports that his book could not "initiate a broader, productive public debate, not to speak of practical initiatives or reforms" in the immediate aftermath of its publication. Although the political and ideological allies of Jászi praised his work, they did not really reflect on it critically. His opponents, on the other hand, denounced it for its incorporation of the "Marxist ideology of destructive radicalism". [203]

The political and intellectual representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities were also critical of the book. Litván reports the worries of the "Slovak leaders" that "Jászi and his stream only represented a more civilized and thus more dangerous version of maintaining the oppression of nationalities" in the discourse of Hungarian nationalism. Albeit Romanian authors praised the conciliatory approach of Jászi, they still claimed that his civic radical viewpoint was "alien" from that of the "Romanians faithful to their religion and nationality". [204]

One must emphasize that the theories of Jászi were rather influential on the longer run, well into the history of the First World War in the Hungarian context. It was in this historical period that his conciliatory position between the Hungarian groups of 'socialism' and national 'patriotism' seemed to contribute to the establishment of an alliance between political groups. It was in this context that the concept of 'national self-determination' appears in historical narratives, one tied to the conceptual frameworks of the Hungarian 'left'. This necessitates me to study the concept in the Hungarian context of the Late First World War, which I will do in the next chapter of the dissertation.

To sum this section up, one must point out that the modern criticism of Jászi with regard to the alleged lack of his references to the concept of 'national self-determination' disregard his texts. His book of 1912 did feature the 'right of all peoples to self-determination', albeit only once. Jászi adopted this concept from the context of German social democracy and its discussion of the German–Danish conflict in Schleswig-Holstein. The author used this reference to support his arguments for the reconciliation of national movements and against the forceful policies of assimilation that could only result in national(ist) conflicts in his narrative.

Nonetheless, Jászi's viewpoint of national affairs in the context of the Hungarian Kingdom rather corresponded to the contemporary Hungarian liberal national standpoint of this issue, although it was more tolerant than the mainstream discourse. The author's concept of the 'nation' as a superior community to 'nationalities' in terms of economic and cultural development corresponded to the interpretation of these terms by the Positivist national discourse of this time. The term 'sovereignty' also seems to have appeared in his studies through the ideological transfer of the concept. Although he praised the Nationalities Law of 1868 for its conciliatory and tolerant design, he featured the concept

of the 'political nation' as feudal and outdated in its nature in accordance with the local ideas of Positivism. He also referred to the 'national state' as the model of modernity and described the assimilation of non-dominant nationalities as a natural and desirable result of 'economic democracy' in this framework. The counter-concept of this term was that of 'Greater Austria' in this narrative. Jászi identified 'absolutism', 'federalism' and 'nationality autonomy' as parallel and attached to this term. As these opposed his concepts of 'democracy' and the 'national state' as a model of modernity, he could not and would not support the federalization of Hungary.

h. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have embedded the term 'national self-determination' in the Hungarian political vocabularies of the historical periods before the First World War. I have argued that the concept appeared in the context of the Hungarian Diet between 1861–1865 and referred to the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire' in its discourse. The term reinforced the arguments of those Hungarian representatives which were oppositional to the interpretation of economic and military policy as the 'common issues' of the 'empire' and rather argued for the 'freedom' and the 'independence' of the Hungarian Kingdom. The discourse of Hungarian independentism maintained these claims for the next decades of the nineteenth century and the turn of the century.

I identify the German-language international law of the mid-nineteenth century as the transnational source of this concept. I claim that (the right of) 'national self-determination' was the Hungarian translation of the German *(Recht der) Selbstbestimmung der Völker*. Upon the analysis of Johann Kaspar Bluntschli's *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten*, it is worth to point out that the Swiss scholar interpreted the *Volk* as a

political community and its will as the source of legitimacy in the state. This interpretation supported the Hungarian oppositional or independentist claims to the rights of 'nation', the political community of the Hungarian Kingdom to 'independence' and 'freedom'.

I have conceptualized this subject of the 'right to self-determination', the Hungarian 'nation' as having two 'dimensions' in the national liberal discourse of the nineteenth century. In my opinon, the 'external' dimension of this concept amounted to interpretation of the Hungarian Kingdom as a 'political' community or a 'state' in the Habsburg Monarchy, a 'political nation' defined by its historical 'constitution' and with its own right to 'legal independence' in the 'empire'. This dimension of the concept appeared in the Hungarian references to the concept of 'national self-determination'. In contrast, I identify the 'internal' dimension of the concept as the references to the relationship between the ethno-cultural communities in the Kingdom of Hungary. The 'classic' liberal concept of the 'civil nation', the 'political nation' or the 'unitary nation-state' would emphasize one dimension or another depending on the temporal or the political context of the discourse.

I claim that it was the concept of 'sovereignty' that eventually combined the 'external' and 'internal' dimensions of the 'nation' in the Hungarian political and legal discourse of the late nineteenth century. This term could emphasize the status of Hungary as a 'state' independent in the Habsburg Monarchy and in the international context, while it could reinforce national policies of homogenization and attempts at maintaining the status of the Hungarian 'race' or 'nationality' as the dominant group of this framework. Thus, the concept also modified the normative load of 'national self-determination' in the local context. Whereas Hungarian representatives had referred to the right of a political

nation to 'self-determination' in the Habsburg Monarchy, the same concept now amounted to the right of 'Hungarians' to control their own state.

As opposed to modern criticism, Oszkár Jászi, the founder of Hungarian civic radicalism did refer to the 'right of all peoples to self-determination', which concept he adopted from the German social democratic context. Albeit this was a rather marginal reference, it was still related to his ideas of national reconciliation. Nonetheless, I have also emphasized that this was a viewpoint that often coincided with the interpretation of national affairs by the contemporary Hungarian mainstream, otherwise criticized by Jászi. Thus, the civic radical politician referred to 'Hungarians' as a 'dominant' nationality in terms of culture and economics and idealized the 'national state' as a modern framework. He applied his concepts of 'democracy' and 'socialism' to this structure, and argued that while there was a need for a tolerant national policy towards the non-Hungarian 'nationalities', their assimilation into the Hungarian 'nation' was rather inevitable in accordance with modern trends.

I identify the *Gleichberechtigung (der Nationalitäten)* as the Austrian liberal concept applied by the Neoabsolutist imperial government to influence the conceptualization of the 'political nation' and the 'nationalities law' in the Hungarian political discourse of the 1860s. I also emphasize the impact of Positivism on Hungarian liberal nationalism, which shifted the emphasis from 'historical rights' to organic ideas of the nation in the late 1870s. This influenced the conceptualization of the 'unitary nation-state', 'sovereignty', but also the civic radical ideas of Jászi with regard to the relationship between the Hungarian 'nation' and 'nationalities'.

Although they shared the liberal ideological affiliation of the historical Hungarian elite in the early nineteenth century, the political representatives of non-Hungarian

communities conceptualized alternative ideas of the Hungarian state. They interpreted their ethno-cultural groups to be no mere 'nationalities', but 'nations' of equal status. They demanded the introduction of 'autonomies' in a territorial sense, either applied to the regions (Transylvania, 'Serbian Vojvodina') or the Hungarian counties inhabited by their communities. Nonetheless, references to the concept of 'national self-determination' did not occur in this context.

The 'Right of Peoples to Self-Determination' in the Discourse of the Hungarian Diet during the Late First World War (1917–1918)

i.   Introduction

This section of the case study will discuss the political discourse of the Hungarian Diet (*országgyűlés*), to be precise, that of its House of Representatives (*képviselőház*) in 1917–1918. (Although I will only refer to it as the 'Diet' for the sake of convenience.) This legislative institution hosted the political representatives of Hungarian and non-Hungarian representatives. In contrast to the general suffrage of Austria, the Hungarian electoral system was still based on a limited suffrage on the eve of the First World War. I will discuss its contemporary structure in this section of the dissertation.

As or the discourse itself, I will be interested in studying the role of the concept of 'national self-determination' and its parallel concept in the political vocabularies of parties present in the Hungarian Diet. I remain dedicated to find related cases of cultural and ideological transfers and transnational references. I will describe the discourse of the Diet through general trends and the speech acts of individual representatives. I will also attempt to identify specific 'Hungarian' and 'non-Hungarian' features in discussions.

One must recall the fact that narratives of Hungarian history in the late First World War feature the 'Wilsonian' concept of 'national self-determination' as a term adopted by the political representatives of the Hungarian progressive discourse. Traditional accounts also emphasize the relationship between this concept and the discourses of national movements in the contemporary context of the Hungarian Kingdom. The underlying issue is often the question whether the viewpoints of Hungarian actors were "realistic" or

"illusionary" and whether their policy contributed to the dissolution of the historical state and the Treaty of Trianon.

One can notice these features in Tibor Hajdu's biography of Mihály Károlyi (1970). The concept of the 'self-determination of nationalities' (*nemzetiségek önrendelkezése*) appears in this narrative in the context of the late First World War (1917–1918). Hajdu claims that the 'nationalities' already interpreted this term as the 'right to secession' by this point. The Hungarian political "left" appears to offer the alternative interpretation of the concept in the local context, which would "limit" its normative load to 'equal rights' and 'limited autonomy' in the framework of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. [205]

On the one hand, the author states that the personal views of Károlyi corresponded with this latter standpoint by late 1917. On the other hand, he claims that the politician also adopted the 'Wilsonian' concept of 'national self-determination'. Hajdu states that Károlyi interpreted this concept as compatible with the integrity of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. This was due to his background in the discourse of Hungarian independentism and its claims to the integrity of the historical state. However, the author also depicts Károlyi as a politician to genuinely believe in the "democratic pacifism" of Wilson, the vision of a 'just peace' without 'annexations and indemnities'. [206]

Nonetheless, this amounted to the "addiction" of Károlyi to an "illusion" in the narrative of Hajdu. The author states that Károlyi's interpretation of Wilsonian national self-determination did not correspond to reality, as the pacifist viewpoint of the American President was different than those of the Entente governments or that of "American politics" in general. He also claims that the Allied and Associated Powers had already decided upon the fate of Austria–Hungary by early 1918. This viewpoint is critical of Károlyi, but also a "misconception in historiography", which would interpret the policy of

Wilson as one not in support the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy until autumn 1918. [207]

One must emphasize Hajdu's evaluation of Károlyi is complex and reflects on the specific temporal context of his work. On the one hand, the author describes the political thought of Károlyi through the Marxist terminology of his time. Thus, the politician appears as the participant of a "national-civic" (*nemzeti-polgári*) discourse in this narrative and is described with respect to the interests of his "class". On the other hand, Hajdu also attempts to provide objective explanations for Károlyi's beliefs. He points out Wilsonism was the sole alternative for Károlyi as opposed to the prospects of German victory, the regional designs of the original Entente Powers or the "world revolution" of Bolshevik Russia, none of which seemed desirable to him. [208]

It is a similar feature of the biography that its author both praises and criticizes Károlyi's interpretation of 'national self-determination'. The Wilsonian viewpoint and the belief in the integrity of the historical Hungarian Kingdom appear as "illusionary" in this narrative. Nonetheless, the author claims that Károlyi was "honest" in his approach to the "principles of self-determination" and adopted the viewpoint of the Hungarian "left" by late 1917. This would shift the emphasis of his political thought from the 'domination' of Hungarians to the national 'equality of rights'. Hajdu states that Károlyi thus "surpassed his own class", as he became a partisan of the "chauvinist" tendencies in the discourse of Hungarian independentism. [209]

Hajdu and Litván both emphasize the role of Oszkár Jászi as a formative influence behind this shift in the political thought of Károlyi. Their narratives report the rapprochement between the two politicians in November 1917. The memoirs of Károlyi reinforce their accounts, as he admitted that his original viewpoint was that of Hungarian

supremacy. He would abandon this idea in 1917, as he "accepted the national policy of Jászi". Litván reports that the civic radical politician started to refer to Wilson and his 'right of peoples to self-determination' in October 1918 due to similar considerations as those of Károlyi. [210]

Thus, it would be logical to assume that the political representatives of Hungarian progression monopolized 'national self-determination' as a concept of their discourse. One could surmise that on the hand, this term was 'Wilsonian' in its origin. On the other hand, it supported the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom in the discourse of Hungarian progressivism. In contrast, the political representatives of nationalities would refer to this concept as equivalent to their right of secession.

My interest lies in finding out whether the trends in the discourse of the Hungarian Diet during 1917–1918 actually reinforce this narrative. To contextualize my study, I must describe the structure of the legislative organization at the time of First World War. I will do this in the next section.

j. The Hungarian Diet of the First World War (1914 – 1918)

Hatos Pál emphasizes the "illiberal" and "nationalist" features of the Hungarian political system on the eve of the First World (which is a clear parallel to the current political system of Hungary in his book). He points out that only 6,4% of the Hungarian population could vote on the elections of 1910, a ratio worse than in 1848 (7,2%). The peculiarities of the electoral system favoured István Tisza's National Party of Work. The new government party could delegate 255 representatives to the House of Representatives as opposed to the 125 representatives of the Hungarian opposition. This structure defined the Hungarian Diet

after 1910, even though most of the voters (428,000) supported the Hungarian opposition as opposed to the National Party of Work (380,000). [211]

One must emphasize that the viewpoint of the non-Hungarian national communities was transmitted only by the representatives of the Romanian National Party (5 deputies) and the Slovak People's Party (2 deputies) in the Hungarian Diet. [212] However, he does emphasize that the marginalization of these viewpoint was much due to the opposition of István Tisza to the reform of suffrage. The leader of the National Party of Work and Prime Minister of Hungary between 1910–1917 also did not even trust Hungarian voters, especially those who lacked a certain amount of wealth or a certain level of education. Tisza thought that his viewpoint would defend the integrity of historical Hungary and the "supremacy of Hungarians" (by which he meant the domination of the traditional Hungarian elite). [213]

One must also accentuate that as opposed to Austria, the Habsburg military elite could not enforce its rule upon Hungary in 1914. This was much due to the successful resistance of Prime Minister István Tisza to this possibility. Thus, the Hungarian Diet of 1910 could remain in session between 1914–1918 (although new elections were not hold because of the war). [214]

Mihály Károlyi was originally a member of this parliament as the representative of the United Party of Independence and '48. However, he seceded from this formation with a small circle of fellow deputies in 1916 and established the "Party of Independence and '48". The contemporary Hungarian public would often refer to this rather small formation as the "Károlyi Party" after its leader. [215]

It was not only this unofficial name, but also its distinct narrative of common affairs that differentiated the Károlyi Party from other representatives of Hungarian

independentism. Its program of 1916 referred to the specific temporal circumstances of the time, as it argued for the restoration of the Hungarian Kingdom as a "completely independent state" as the main lesson deducted from the events of the First World War. The Károlyi Party also demanded the introduction of general suffrage and the initiation of economic reforms in support of "lower classes" (*alsó néposztályok*). [216]

These claims showcased the ideological transfer of narrative certain elements form the discourse of Hungarian progressives. It was no accident that the Károlyi Party found its main political allies in the Civic Radical Party of Jászi and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. These parties established the so-called "Electoral Bloc" (*Választójogi Blokk*) in 1917 to create a common platform of democratic forces in Hungary. [217]

The related debates of democratization started in the Hungarian Diet in 1915, when the arguments of Hungarian oppositional representatives would feature suffrage reform as a way to recompensate the Hungarian population for its sacrifices. [218] Tisza and his National Party of Work could only avert these initiatives until the ascendance of Charles to the throne. The new King of Hungary supported the extension of suffrage, but also urged the Hungarian elite to pursue a more tolerant national policy. These initiatives were parts of an elaborate reform scheme, designed by Charles to improve the war-time situation in the Habsburg Monarchy. [219] This resulted in the resignation of Tisza and Charles's appointment of Móric Esterházy as the Prime Minister of Hungary in early 1917. [220]

One must emphasize that the concept of 'self-determination' appeared in a new and dominant form in this political context of the late First World War. The Hungarian political discourse before the First World War would more often feature the concept of 'national self-determination' (*nemzeti önrendelkezés*). The normative load of the term 'national self-

determination' was limited in Hungarian political debates to the 'independence' of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Although this topic was still relevant in the late phase of the First World War, the alternative concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' (*népek önrendelkezési joga*) rather had other implications. This term often applied to 'peoples' in the ethno-cultural sense in the contemporary transnational discourse. This problematized the traditional structures of imperial or historical states and was in relationship to demands for the transformation of the international order. Thus, one must emphasize that the difference between 'national self-determination' and the 'right of peoples to self-determination' was not semantic for the Hungarian representatives of the time. One of the implications of the latter was that external forces could decide upon the fate of the Kingdom of Hungary and apply the concept to its non-Hungarian nationalities, which could result in its dissolution.

The term thus gained importance gradually in the discourse of the Hungarian Diet. Its sessions featured the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' only a couple of times (8) between June 21 and December 1, 1917. In contrast, it was referred to twice as many times (15) over the course of the three following months (December 10, 1917–February 25, 1918), which coincided with the peace negotiations between Bolshevik Russia and the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. The concept would receive the same number of references (15) in the period between April 23 and July 19, 1918. The final months of the war would show a slight rise of its mentions (20) in the Diet between July 24 and November 16, 1918.

The following sub-chapters, however, will not necessarily follow a chronological order, although some topics were rather prevalent at certain sessions of the Diet. My intent is rather to identify the parallel concepts to the 'right of peoples to self-determination',

ones that I presume defined its content in this context. Since historical studies focus on the term in the context of Hungarian state dissolution, I will be rather interested in its appearances before October 1918.

The dimensions of my study will be ideological and cultural. On the one hand, I think it is worth to study whether it was only the Károlyi Party which referred to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in its political language out of all the Hungarian parties of the time. I will be interested in whether it was the 'political' or the 'ethno-cultural' concept of the 'nation' that appeared as the subject of the right in this discourse. On the other hand, I will also be interested in whether the representatives of the non-Hungarian nationalities used the term and their means of interpreting it. One must emphasize that to debate or to 'incite' against the 'integrity' of the Hungarian Kingdom was against the law in the local context. [221] Thus, it is fair to assume that the 'right of peoples to self-determination' did not appear in this sense, at least until the end of the First World War. Nonetheless, I suspect it could still support the claims of non-Hungarian representatives in other respects.

As before, I will feature the observed concepts in Hungarian in accordance with their linguistic context. I will use secondary literature to reconstruct the historical context. On the other hand, it is here that I can most effectively reflect upon the narratives mentioned in the introduction: whether the concepts of 'national self-determination' or the 'right of peoples to self-determination' were exclusive to the Hungarian representatives of the 'left' or whether it could only imply the disintegration of the historical Hungarian Kingdom in the late First World War.

k. The 'Independence' and the 'Sovereignty' of the Hungarian Kingdom

István Tisza was the first Hungarian representative who would refer to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' (*népek önrendelkezési joga*) in the Hungarian Diet on July 4, 1917. The representative of the National Party of Work mentioned this concept as a part of his references to the debates in the Austrian Imperial Council. Tisza mentioned the term by citing the answer of the Austrian Prime Minister to the claims of non-German representatives in the *Reichsrat*. Ernst von Seidler interpreted the concept as the propaganda phrase of the Entente, which used it to feature itself as the self-appointed guardian of non-dominant nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy. [222]

It is thus important to point out that Tisza referred to the term 'right of peoples to self-determination' in Hungarian through the translation of the German term *Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker* from the discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council. One can recall the fact that the Austrian representatives of the Czech Union referred to the contemporary context of revolutionary Russia as the source of this concept, which they adopted through its ideological transfer from the political vocabulary of local social democracy. Nonetheless, the Austrian Prime Minister rather interpreted it as a term that belonged to the political vocabulary of the Entente, which would utilize it against Austria–Hungary.

While Tisza agreed with this observation, he problematized the claim of Seidler that the Habsburg Monarchy was a *Gesamtstaat* with its own 'right to self-determination' and to administer its own national policy. Tisza protested the implication that the Habsburg Monarchy would constitute a unity in this regard. He rather claimed that national policy belonged to the jurisdiction of the Austrian and Hungarian governments.[223]

Tisza emphasized that the statements of Seidler could contribute to wrongful interpretations of the 'right to self-determination' in the international sphere, detrimental to the 'sovereignty' (*szuverénitás*) of the Hungarian state and its independent 'right to determination' (referred to by him through the Hungarian term *rendelkezési jog* or the German *Bestimmungsrecht*). He interpreted references to the imperial *Gesamtstaat* as the transgression of Austrian politics towards Hungary. As a result, he asked Prime Minister Esterházy whether his government could (or would) protect the rights of Hungary. [224]

One must emphasize that on the one hand, Tisza interpreted the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as the counter-concept of Hungarian 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination'. The latter terms referred to Hungary's right to administer its own national policy. Thus, it covered the same field as the term 'sovereignty' in the Hungarian political discourse at the turn of the century. On the other hand, while he was a supporter of the *Ausgleich*, Tisza was the representative of the oppositional National Party of Work, the former government party and opposed the reform ideas of King Charles. He in effect questioned the conviction of the new establishment to vindicate national interests in opposition to royal will, as it was the King who appointed it.

In his answer to Tisza, Prime Minister Esterházy reassured the representatives of the Diet that the government was ready to reinforce the 'legal independence' and the 'sovereignty' of Hungary, its rights reassured by the *Ausgleich* of 1867. At the same time, the Premier discussed the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in the context of the First World War. Esterházy emphasized that the new Hungarian establishment did not accept the Entente interpretation of the concept, that any groups of Hungarian citizens "could determine their own fate independently" (*külön rendelkezhetnének a sorsuk felett*). The Prime Minister stated it was the constitution of the

Hungarian state which determined the status of the citizens due to its right of state sovereignty. [225]

Esterházy claimed that the Entente term of the 'self-determination of peoples' was thus the counter-concept to the 'integrity' (*integritás*) and the 'political unity' (*politikai egység*) of the Hungarian Kingdom. According to Esterházy, this state could alone provide the status of a Great Power to the Habsburg Monarchy. At the same time, he referred to the structure of the historical state as the foundation of freedom and development for all Hungarian citizens.[226]

On the one hand, one must emphasize that references to the 'principle of nationality' (*nemzetiségi elv*) did not appear in this context, a feature that defined the references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in the discourse of the Hungarian Diet during the late First World War. Esterházy did not interpret the latter concept as one that would automatically amount to the dissolution of the Hungarian Kingdom along national lines. He rather problematized the implication that 'Hungarian citizens' could 'determine their own fate' independently, and that they would decide to secede from the Hungarian Kingdom in this case.

On the other hand, the discussion of the former and the succeeding Prime Ministers of Hungary revealed interesting dynamics in terms of political positions, concepts, and their relationship to the concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. Although it was the political majority of the Diet since 1910, the reforms of King Charles pushed the National Party of Work into opposition. Although he was a stern Hungarian supporter of the *Ausgleich*, the claims of Tisza would reflect this development. The former Prime Minister would refer to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a counter-concept to the 'sovereignty' and the 'independence' of the Hungarian state. However, he would also

use it to undermine the position of the new government and its alleged lack of measures against the interpretation of the Habsburg Monarchy as a *Gesamtstaat*. The position of Tisza would thus be much similar to that of his own independentist opposition before.

In contrast, Prime Minister Esterházy attempted to limit the discussion to the implications of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' to the 'historical integrity' of the Hungarian state. In his interpretation, it was not Austria or King Charles, but rather the Entente that posed a threat to the 'sovereignty' of the Hungarian state. Thus, he attempted to create a common Hungarian platform for defending the historical state.

During Summer 1917, the oppositional representatives of the National Party of Work continued to refer to the debates of the Austrian *Reichsrat* as a problematic issue. Gyula Madarassy-Beck interpellated the Esterházy government on July 5, 1917. He claimed that the liberal reforms in Austria during early 1917 that resulted in the federalist discourse of non-German representatives in the Imperial Council. Madarassy-Beck specifically mentioned the political claims of the "Czechs" (the Czech Union) in this regard.[227] Once again, the reforms of Charles received criticism from the representatives of the former Hungarian government party.

Madarassy-Beck also claimed that the impending Austrian domination of 'Slavic' political parties foreshadowed developments that threatened the 'sovereignty', the 'independence' and the 'self-determination' (*szuverenitás, függetlenség, önrendelkezés*) of the Hungarian Kingdom. He argued that the abolition of the dualistic state structure would result in a case of "majorization" (*majorizálás*), the overrule of Hungarian national will by those of other national groups. This threatened the 'rights' of Hungary to 'sovereignty', the 'independence' and the 'self-determination'. Importantly, the Hungarian representative did not discuss the 'self-determination of peoples' as a concept of the Austrian political

discourse, as he only mentioned the parallel concept of 'federalism' (*federalizmus*) from that context. [228]

One must notice that the concepts of 'independence', 'self-determination' and 'sovereignty' appeared next to each other in this narrative. The normative load of these concepts was rather similar in the Hungarian political discourse during the nineteenth century. However, it is important to recall the fact that on their own, they had different implications due to their historical individuality. This is important to emphasize in connection the terms of 'national self-determination' and 'sovereignty'. The former concept entered the Hungarian political discourse upon the transnational influence of German-language international law in the mid-nineteenth century, reinforced the term of 'independence' and claim to the independent status of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy. In contrast, 'sovereignty' was a concept introduced to the Hungarian political discourse at the turn of the century. While it also referred to the relationship between 'nation' and 'empire', it also applied to the national policy of Hungary. The statements of Madarassy-Beck reinforced this interpretation of the term, as he also emphasized the possibly detrimental effect of imperial federalization on the 'nationalities question' in Hungary.

In contrast to the tensions between the National Party of Work and the Esterházy government in early 1917, both in support of the *Ausgleich*, the role of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' was rather different in the Hungarian independentist narratives of early 1918. This was much due to the transformation of the local political context. Upon the failure of a moderate reform policy, Esterházy abdicated in August 1917; King Charles appointed Sándor Wekerle as the Prime Minister of Hungary. [229] Wekerle wanted to create a strong government party to support his policy, which attempted to reinforce the independence of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy. As a result of these developments,

inclusion of military and economic issues into the program of the Constitution Party of '48 on February 7, 1918. He also argued that the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations and the disintegration of imperial Russia necessitated such measures in national policy. [232] This position was much due to the independentist background of the Károlyi Party.

However, the political group soon turned critical towards the policy of the Wekerle government. It also started to refer to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a counter-concept to the 'territorial integrity' of Hungary. On June 20, 1918, György Platthy problematized the political language of the Czech Union, its interpretation of the term, and the apparent lack of countermeasures from the Hungarian government. The member of the Károlyi Party claimed that the Austrian Czech representatives were free to demand the incorporation of Slovak-inhabited territories in Northern Hungary into their future nation-state, a clear threat to the historical integrity of the Hungarian national state. As a result, he argued that it was necessary for the Hungarian government and the Hungarian elite to intervene into the internal politics of Austria. [233]

However, the concepts of 'national sovereignty', 'independence' and 'self-determination' did not only apply to the relationship between Austria and Hungary or the one between the 'nation' and the 'empire'. These terms also appeared in the discourse of the Diet in connection to the alliance with imperial Germany during May 1918. It was once again the governmental–oppositional dynamics that defined these discussions, as this issue divided Hungarian political groups throughout the war. Whereas most of these parties supported the alliance with Germany, the Károlyi Party strongly disagreed with this standpoint and argued for the reconciliation with the Allied and Associated Powers instead (although it lacked political connections to its governments). [234]

Importantly, the Spa Agreement on May 12, 1918, created a new international context for these discussions. This treaty between Austria–Hungary and Germany foreshadowed their political and economic integration. The Habsburg imperial government did not agree to this voluntarily, but rather under the pressure of the dominant imperial German leadership. As for the latter, imperial Germany did not seek to realize the popular contemporary regional concept of *Mitteleuropa* through this act. Those were rather practical than conceptual or ideological considerations behind the drive to extend German control over the crumbling Habsburg Monarchy. [235]

While in support of the German alliance, the contemporary Hungarian government was careful to claim its support for this political development due to its implications for the 'sovereignty' and the 'self-determination' of the Hungarian Kingdom. The representatives of the Constitution Party of '48 rather argued that while a closer alliance was necessary between Germany and Austria–Hungary as a result of the First World War, the interests of Hungary was remained their priority. [236]

In contrast, the political groups of the opposition interpreted the Spa Agreement as a clear threat to the 'self-determination' of Hungary. The National Party of Work and the Károlyi Party both shared this viewpoint. The political allies of Károlyi claimed that it was unprecedented for a nation to surrender its sovereignty, freedom, and independence for the interests of its allies. [237] Thus, Germany appeared as similar to the Habsburg imperial state in this context, with the same concepts of 'self-determination', 'sovereignty' and 'independence' applied to the relationship between the Hungarian nation to a higher imperial structure.

To sum it, the 'right of peoples to self-determination' appeared in the same semantic field as the historical concepts of Hungarian 'sovereignty' and the

'independence' in the discourse of the Diet in Summer 1917. The representatives of the National Party of Work were the first ones to refer to the former term, which they interpreted as a counter-concept to the historical rights of the Hungarian state. In part, this was a position against the hostile Entente and its claimed support for the non-dominant nationalities of Hungary. On the other hand, the representatives of the former government party also positioned themselves against the interpretation of the Monarchy as a *Gesamtstaat*, the intervention of Austrian politics, the federalist claims of Slavic representatives in the *Reichsrat* and the reformist King Charles into the internal affairs of Hungary. They questioned the competence of the new Hungarian government appointed by the monarch to defend the rights of the Hungarian Kingdom. In return, Prime Minister Wekerle attempted to emphasize the common Hungarian interest to oppose the interpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in defence of the 'integrity' and the 'political unity' of the state.

In contrast, the discourse of Hungarian independentism featured the concept in another sense from February 1918. The independentist forces that formed the Constitution Party of '48 interpreted the application of the term to the Western borderlands of the Russian Empire as a process with positive implications for Hungary, since they claimed that the 'right of peoples to self-determination' could also reinforce their historical demands for Hungarian 'freedom' and 'independence' in the Habsburg Monarchy.

While they originally agreed with this direction of national policy due to their background in the historical independentist discourse, the members of Károlyi Party soon turned critical towards the government of Sándor Wekerle. They sensed a threat to the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom in the references of the Czech Union to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in support of the state unification of Austrian

Czechs and Hungarian Slovaks. They criticized the government for its apparent lack of measures against these claims.

Finally, the concept of 'self-determination' also appeared in the Hungarian oppositional arguments, which problematized the closer ties between Germany and Austria–Hungary after the Treaty of Spa in May 1918. The term appeared to reinforce the references of the National Party of Work and the Károlyi Party to the 'independence' and the 'sovereignty' of the Hungarian Kingdom. In this context, it was not the imperial framework of the Habsburg Monarchy, but the dominance of Germany that threatened these rights of the state and the nation.

l.From 'Nationalities' to 'National Minorities' through 'Democracy'

'National self-determination' or the 'self-determination of peoples' was also a parallel concept of 'democracy' in the discourse of the Hungarian Diet. However, whereas this term would problematize the 'absolutist' rule of the military and the imperial governments in the Austrian context, it would rather appear in the debates of suffrage reform in Hungary. Groups of the Hungarian opposition which started to demand the update of limited suffrage in 1915. These representatives pointed at the sacrifices of the general population, and especially the soldiers that necessitated this development. In contrast, the National Party of Work and Prime Minister Tisza resisted this idea. Nonetheless, King Charles also supported the reform of suffrage in Hungary upon his descendance to the throne in late 1916. Consequently, the Hungarian governments appointed by him promised the institutionalization of this idea. The reception of these plans was controversial in the Hungarian political discourse, as suffrage reform would have reframed the hierarchy between the Hungarian elite, the Hungarian lower classes, and the nationalities.

This viewpoint of Giesswein also defined his positive approach to the issue of suffrage reform. He stated that democratization would not result in the disintegration of the Hungarian state. This development would rather create a 'healthy' political system, which could disprove any arguments in support of national secessionism. He also argued that "political freedom" (*politikai szabadság*) and the free opportunity of economic development could reinforce the loyalty of nationalities towards the Hungarian state. Giesswein stated that this would, in fact, reinforce the domination of Hungarians, as democratization would deter any attempts of foreign influence on the local ethno-national communities. [238]

It was important that through "foreign attempts" at the historical integrity of the country, Giesswein referred not to the propaganda of the Entente, but rather the to the political claims of "certain nationalities in Austria". [239] Similar to his opponents in the National Party of Work, he problematized the debates of the Austrian *Reichsrat* and their implications for the Hungarian state. However, the Christian Social representative used this reference to support the idea of democratic reform rather than to question the capability of the contemporary government.

In contrast to the heated debates of Hungarian political groups, the few political representatives of nationalities were largely silent during the political discourse of the Diet regarding the implications of the 'self-determination of peoples' until mid-1918. Nonetheless, they opted to contribute to debates of suffrage reform at this point. They also started to refer to certain concepts of transnational importance in the late First World War to support the interests of their communities in historical Hungary.

This was in part a response to the proposal of Dezső Polónyi, the representative of the Party of Independence and '48 with regard to franchise reform during Spring 1918. He

advised that the extension of suffrage could affect only those citizens, who were able to read and write in Hungarian. As it was an oppositional political group with a conservative social viewpoint after 1917, the National Party of Work adopted this idea into one of its counterproposals to the introduction of a widened suffrage. [240]

On May 14, 1918, Sándor Dobieczki, the representative of the former government party argued against the democratic interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples' and its implications for the Hungarian national state. While he described the economic difficulties of his homeland, Transylvania, Dobieczki claimed that he did not support the "separation" (*különállás*, *szeparáczió*) of the region from the rest of Hungary in administrative terms. He stated such arguments could only legitimize national separatism. Dobieczki also claimed that the new drafts of franchise reform only fuelled such desires, as the increased participation of non-dominant nationalities in political processes threatened with the marginalization of 'Hungarian' as the main identity of the state. Dobieczki claimed such a "development on the ethnographic basis" (*etnográfiai alapon fejlődés*) pointed towards "internationalism" and the dissolution of historical states. He specifically mentioned at contemporary Austria and Poland as examples to this end. [241]

'Democracy' appeared as a concept alien to the 'historical development' and the 'historical integrity' of Hungary in this narrative, much similar to the 'self-determination of peoples'. Dobieczki claimed that the application of the latter right to the territories of Poland resulted in the separation of smaller regions inhabited by "Ruthenians" (Ukrainians). This process of disintegration could also threaten Hungary on the longer run. As such, the concepts of 'democracy' and the 'self-determination of peoples' were not in service of the interests of the Hungarian state according to him, but rather those of the Entente and the Bolshevik government of Russia. [242]

One could argue through the study of Dobieczki's claims that 'democracy' and the 'self-determination of peoples' appeared as counter-concepts as opposed the main terms used in the political language of the National Party of Work. This party rather attempted maintained the old liberal concept of the 'nation' as a community limited in terms of political rights and handled the idea of democratization with the interests of 'Hungarian domination' in mind. Such a viewpoint was problematic for the representatives of non-dominant nationalities, which otherwise welcomed the initiatives towards franchise reform. At the same time, it was also clear that even a less radical democratization of the political system would affect the political hierarchy between ethno-cultural groups in Hungary.

It was in this context that the 'self-determination of peoples' appeared as a democratic right in the arguments of non-Hungarian national representatives. Ferdinand Juriga, a member of the Slovak National Party referred to the notion in this sense on July 4, 1918. The representative argued that a quantitative rise in the number of voters could not effectively resolve the problems of disproportionate national representation in the Hungarian political system. Juriga claimed that the Hungary should rather introduce the political representation of nationalities akin to the system of contemporary Austria. [243] However, he did not clarify what he exactly meant by this (although one can assume that he must have referred to national sub-groups in the *Reichsrat*).

The Slovak representative also emphasized the importance of national culture and language in the framework of political systems and in connection to the 'democratic right of self-determination' (*demokratikus önrendelkezési jog*). Juriga claimed that the discrimination of citizens based on their language contradicted this concept and the liberal foundations of the contemporary state system and law. Such a development could also

affect the international reputation of Hungary. The Slovak representative referred to 'nationalities' as the subjects of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. However, he also emphasized his allegiance to the concept of the Hungarian political nation. Juriga referred to himself as a member of this community ("us Hungarians", *mi magyarok*) despite his Slovak national allegiances. [244]

One can emphasize the importance of this declaration of loyalty in connection to the Hungarian concept of the 'political nation'. It does not really matter whether the statements of Juriga were 'genuine' or not in this regard. It is more important to point out that despite his oppositional and national standpoint, the Slovak representative still interpreted himself and his group as parts of the Hungarians state community and members of the Hungarian nation. Thus, the concept of the 'political nation' could 'attract' some kind of loyalty or could at least provide a common point of reference in the political discourse of the Hungarian Kingdom. However, while Juriga still referred to 'nationalities' in the local context, other non-Hungarian representatives started to refer to a new concept, that of 'minority' regarding the democratization of the Hungarian state.

I can use our study with Anna Adorjáni, "National Minority: The Emergence of the Concept in the Habsburg and International Legal Thought" to contextualize 'minority' (*kisebbség*) as a historical term in the Hungarian context. This was no legal concept. The Hungarian Nationalities Law of 1868 did not feature this term, as it rather emphasized the 'equality of nationality rights' – features it shared with the Austrian December Constitution of 1867. Nonetheless, the term still appeared in the contemporary discourse in a numeric and relational sense. 'Minority' referred to a scattered group, which was 'in a minority' in comparison to others in the local contexts of regions, municipalities, or localities. [245]

It is worth to mention that Eötvös described non-Hungarian nationalities as collectively 'being in a minority' (*kisebbségben állnak*). Nonetheless, it is equally important to emphasize that this term did not refer to their numerical inferiority. In reality, the majority status of the Hungarian nationality was relative to others. In general, it was in a minority in the population of the Hungarian Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century. The concept of 'minority' rather appeared in reference to the contexts of the state administration and the political system in this narrative, in which the Hungarian representatives were indeed a political 'majority' (*majoritás*) due to the limited suffrage of the time. [246]

The term 'national minority' (*nemzeti kisebbség*) only appeared for the first time in Hungarian in 1869. It was a review of Adolf Fischhof's *Oesterreich and und die Bürgschaften seines Bestandes* that featured this phrase. It was a translation of the German term *nationale Minoritäten* from the original book. It was only during the First World War and in 1918 specifically that 'minority' started to operate as a synecdoche or a compressed term in the Hungarian context, which prioritized its interpretation as a reference to the certain national communities and the need for their legal protection in the state. [247] I will show this development of the concept in this chapter, as it was in relation to the concept of 'self-determination' in the claims of non-Hungarian representatives in the Diet.

Rudolf Brandsch, a Transylvanian Saxon representative of the National Party of Work argued on July 2, 1918, that Hungarian suffrage could only be equal and general if it also applied and gave "rights and possibilities" (*jogot és alkalmat*) to the groups of "minorities", not to just "one part of the nation" (*nemzet egy része*). The spokesman of Transylvanian Saxons also defined himself as the representative of "a people, which is in a minority in this country" (*olyan nép, amely kisebbségben van ebben az országban*).[248]

Although 'minority' thus in part referred to the numerical inferiority of Transylvania Saxons in the population of the Hungarian Kingdom, the concept used by Brandsch pointed beyond this traditional interpretation of the term. The representative described 'minorities' as communities disadvantaged in the legal and political system of the Hungarian state. The rights of these groups must have been reassured upon the introduction of general suffrage. It is also worth to point out 'minority' substituted the historical concept of 'nationality' in this context.

On July 6, 1918, Ștefan Cicio Pop revealed a transnational source for his related interpretation of the concept of 'minority' in the Hungarian Diet. The representative of the Romanian National Party criticized the previous drafts of suffrage reform through references to 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a widely accepted concept of the age. In this regard, specifically pointed at the so-called the resolutions of the *Organization central pour une paix durable* (Central Organization for a Durable Peace) from 1915. The members of this transnational organization were scholars and public figures from the countries of the Entente, the Central Powers and neutral states. [249]

Pop referred to these resolutions as examples for the application of the 'self-determination of peoples' to 'nationalities' or 'national minorities' (quoted by him as *minorité nationale* in French). The Romanian representative emphasized that this 'right' referred to the cultivation of national identities, the autonomy of church organizations and educational institutions. [250]

One must emphasize that the Nationalities Law of 1868 attempted to provide the same opportunities to the ethno-cultural communities of the Hungarian Kingdom. However, Pop found it important to support his arguments rather through references to a transnational source. On the one hand, one could point out that an influential stream in the

discourse of Hungarian nationalism defied the concept of the Hungarian 'political nation' and the regulations of the Nationalities Law by the twentieth century. It rather emphasized 'national sovereignty' and the policy of national homogenization as the trends of modernity. There was no common point between this idea and those of the non-Hungarian national representatives. It was thus natural that the Romanian representative would rather refer to the rights of 'national minorities' as a transnational concept of the time, which appeared as the synonym of the term 'nationalities' in the political discourse of Hungary.

Importantly, Pop also emphasized that the 'Hungarian political nation' was a framework of co-operation between 'nationalities'. In contrast, he referred to the problematic drafts of suffrage as representatives of a regressive concept of the Hungarian 'nation'. He specifically mentioned the viewpoint of István Bethlen, the member of the Constitution Party as problematic in this regard. The Transylvanian Hungarian representative supported the idea of a suffrage reform that favoured Hungarian speakers. This was important in the local context of Transylvania, in which Romanians outweighed Hungarians within the population. Pop claimed that this concept of 'suffrage' and the nation as a political community paralleled the general Hungarian political viewpoint before 1848: that the 'nation' was equal to the elite, not to the 'population' (*nép*). The Romanian representative also stated that such a viewpoint contradicted the democratic *Zeitgeist*, the interests of the Habsburg Monarchy and the dynasty. [251]

To sum it up, the 'right of peoples to self-determination' was a parallel concept of 'democracy' in the context of the Hungarian debates of suffrage reform. The representatives of the political majority, the National Party of Work had opposed this idea already before the war and maintained this position until 1918. This was due to their fear that the introduction of a broader suffrage would destabilize the rule of the Hungarian elite

and the integrity of the historical state. On the other hand, the Hungarian representatives of the reformist minority claimed that democratization could reinforce and legitimize the historical structure of the state, while it would not threaten the domination of Hungarians.

The representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities joined these debates in July 1918, in reaction to plans of suffrage reform that were to discriminate their communities. One could realize a pattern that those were especially Hungarian representatives of Transylvanian background who supported the former ideas, as democratization would have subverted the local state affairs to the benefit of the Romanian majority. The concept of 'national minority' appeared as a concept in these debates, one that substituted the historical term 'nationality' as the subject of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. The representatives of non-Hungarian communities claimed that it was against the liberal foundations of the Hungarian political system and the *Zeitgeist* to distinguish between citizens based on language. The Central Organization for a Durable Peace appeared as a transnational point of reference to define the rights of ethno-cultural 'minorities' of the state. This substituted historical references to the Nationalities Law of 1868, the spirit of which had been rejected by the mainstream Hungarian political discourse of the last decades.

m. The Hungarian (Political) 'Nation'

Although various historical accounts would emphasize the relationship between the concepts of 'national self-determination' and the 'historical integrity' of the Hungarian state in the policy of the Károlyi government, one must point out that this was a common feature of Hungarian parties during the First World War. Irrespective of their status as a government party or an oppositional force or their relationship to each other, all Hungarian

representatives emphasized their primary interest in the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom. They also shared the opinion that if applied to the non-Hungarian 'nationalities' of the state, the 'right to self-determination' was a serious threat. Although they used the term to argue for the 'independence' of Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy, the representatives of the independentist discourse were also aware of this implication of the concept.

Consequently, the Hungarian independentist representatives always clarified that their interpretation of the concept could not threaten the 'historical integrity' of the Hungarian Kingdom or debated the legal and political structure of the 'political nation'. Quite contrary, they rather attempted to reinforce the legitimacy of these historical concepts through their references to the 'self-determination of peoples', realizing its importance in the international context.

This point was especially important to drive home by early 1918, when it was clear that the Russian Empire (and according to the viewpoint of the Hungarian representatives, its Austrian counterpart) was already on the road of imperial disintegration. The concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' seemed to accelerate this process through its role in international politics and the contemporary discourses. On the other hand, the representatives of Hungarian independentism attempted to downplay the ethno-cultural implications of these processes. They interpreted the Hungarian state community and the concept of the 'political nation' to be an exception in this regard, due to its alleged strength and background in history and geography. The Constitution Party of '48 and the Károlyi Party shared this viewpoint despite their differences.

On February 7, 1918, the contribution of Ákos Bizony to the Diet followed this pattern. The representative of the government party claimed that while it was possible to

interpret the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in a way that it supported the dissolution of Hungary along national lines, the Constitution Party of '48 did not agree with such allegations. He rather emphasized that historical background of the state community was strong enough to combat similar designs. [252]

Bizony attempted to prove to this end that the subject of the 'right to self-determination', the 'people' (*nép*) was not equivalent to 'nationality'. He claimed that the former term was rather equivalent to the 'nation' in the Hungarian context. This was due to the fact that according to him, the Hungarian nation was a political community with strong foundations in history and geography. [253] The representative thus downplayed the importance of ethno-cultural factors commonly associated with the term 'people' in the era. His interpretation of the 'self-determination of peoples' rather supported the concept of the Hungarian 'nation', interpreted as the political community of the state.

One could of course understand that this narrative attempted to counter the impacts of the Bolshevik interpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. By this time, various ethno-cultural groups seceded from the Russian Empire in accordance with 'Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia' in late 1917. It was thus important to reinforce the political structure of the Hungarian state through its interpretation as a state community 'immune' to the ethno-cultural interpretation of the concept.

The members of the Károlyi Party interpreted the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' in a similar manner. Mihály Károlyi claimed to support the independentist policy of the new government on February 7, 1918. He stated that this was in accordance with the 'right of peoples to self-determination', this transnational concept supported by the "entire educated world" and the foreign policy of Austria–Hungary. [254] This claim countered the standpoint of the National Party of Work, which opposed the independentist

turn in national policy and supported the maintenance of the political system established by the *Ausgleich*.

As opposed to this viewpoint of '67', Károlyi pointed out that the foreign policy of the Habsburg Monarchy favored the "full independence" or the secession of Estland (Estonia), Lithuania and Kurland from the Russian Empire. He emphasized that in contrast to Hungary, these new nation-states had no background in history. Károlyi implied that these ethno-cultural groups were ones with 'inferior' rights and claims in contrast to those of the independentist discourse, as the latter supported the historical rights of the Hungarian nation. [255] Through these claims, his narrative depicted the viewpoint of the National Party of Work as both irrational and antagonistic to the transnational discourse and the international political developments of the time.

However, the oppositional features of the Károlyi Party became rather strong by June 1918. By this point, its representatives criticized the independentist Wekerle establishment similar to the former opposition between the political forces in support of the *Ausgleich*, the National Party of Work and the Esterházy government. This turn accompanied a new approach to the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. The representatives of the Károlyi Party claimed that the Hungarian government and the Hungarian political groups should represent their interpretation of the concept in the transnational discourse.

One could notice these features in the statements of György Platthy on June 20, 1918. This member of the Károlyi Party claimed that Hungarian parties should initiate a debate with the Czech and Southern Slavic representatives of the Austrian Imperial Council. This was to discuss the differences between national concepts and the related interpretations of the 'right to self-determination'. As for himself, Platthy argued that the

primary subjects of the term were "small races" (*kis népfajok*) or "small nations" (*kis nemzetek*) in the ethno-cultural sense. However, he claimed that the main identity of the population in the Hungarian Kingdom rather corresponded with the "concept of the unitary Hungarian political nation" (*egységes magyar politikai nemzet fogalma*). He referred to this term as the ideological and legal construct of József Eötvös. The representative argued that this political identity in the state population was rather strong. This was due to the historical integrity of the community provided by the thousand-year-long existence of the Hungarian state. He claimed that as a result, 'right of peoples to self-determination' did not apply to Hungary. [256]

Thus, the representatives of the Hungarian independentist discourse seemed to abandon the previous Positivist position of the mainstream in the national discourse. One can recall that the Hungarian politicians at the turn of the century abandoned the concept of the 'political nation' due to its historical and 'civic' designs. They rather emphasized the superiority of the Hungarian 'race', 'nationality' or 'nation' in economic and social terms. In contrast, the concept of the 'political nation' seemed to be a better point of reference by the time of the late First World War, as it diverted focus from the ethno-cultural interpretation of the 'people' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination' in the contemporary discourse.

One must emphasize that despite these independentist references to the concept of the 'political nation', the concept of 'Hungarian supremacy' or the ideas of Magyarization did not disappear from the discourse of the Hungarian Diet. In fact, some representatives hoped that increased Hungarian independence in the Habsburg Monarchy in terms of military policy could support a policy of homogenization. Elemér Simon, the member of the National Party of Work claimed that the new "Hungarian army" could be a useful asset

to this end. Although he identified the 'right of nations to self-determination' as a counter-concept to the homogenization of the national state, he belittled the importance of this term as one with no larger historical significance. Simon was sure that the concept would soon lose its popularity and disappear from the Hungarian and the international political scene. [257]

To sum it up, the Hungarian independentist references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' coupled with the defence of the 'Hungarian nation' as a historical and political community in 1918. Thus, they accentuated the 'external' dimension of the concept and represented the state community as united towards the outside world. This was an attempt to downplay the ethno-cultural implications of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' and to depict the political concept of the 'Hungarian nation' as either in line with, or an exception from related trends, the disintegration of the Russian Empire as a result of Bolshevik policy. The underlying intention was to reinforce the historical concepts of 'integrity' and the Hungarian 'nation' as the political community of the state.

n. The Beginnings of State Disintegration in Late 1918

I find it important to discuss the period of late 1918 separately in this case study. This is much due to the distinguished attention of historical studies to this phase of the First World in Hungary and their references to the concept of 'national self-determination' in this context. It is here that the themes of 'defeat' and 'disintegration' as accentuated by Pál Hatos become rather relevant. As the constituent part of Habsburg Monarchy, the Hungarian Kingdom also lost the war by this point and started its process of dissolution started, much similar to the Habsburg Monarchy itself.

Contemporary references to 'Wilsonism' (*wilsonizmus*) and the Fourteen Points interconnected with the rhetoric of pacifism in the international context and that of the Hungarian Kingdom. However, the interpretations of related concepts and texts were rather different in the national discourses of the time. By this point, the representatives of the non-Hungarian nationalities interpreted the Fourteen Points as in support of their 'national self-determination'. In contrast, the promises of 'peace without victory', the establishment of the League of Nations and the end of 'secret diplomacy' rather made the Hungarian public enthusiastic. [258]

The *Völkermanifest* of Charles also had a direct impact on the Hungarian political discourse of the time. This amounted to the federalization of Austria, influenced by the Wilsonian concept of self-determination. Charles attempted to transform Cisleithania into an "alliance of free peoples". Although this did not affect the Hungarian Kingdom, the *Völkermanifest* effectively ended the dualist system of Austria–Hungary. The Wekerle government proclaimed the establishment of a "personal union" between Transleithania and the former lands of Cisleithania, which amounted to the ultimately successful vindication of Hungarian independentist claims. [259]

One must emphasize that it was also this point in history that references to the 'Wilsonian' concept of 'self-determination' entered the political discourse of the Hungarian Diet. This was a major point of discontinuity in contrast to the previous phase of political discussions. On October 16, 1918, Prime Minister Wekerle claimed that the "Wilsonian theses" (*Wilson-féle tételek*) of the Fourteen Points were reconcilable with the traditional political viewpoint of Hungarian independentism. He promised that his establishment will grant rights to the non-Hungarian nationalities if these were compatible with individual rights, the "integrity" and the "indivisible nature" of the Hungarian national

state. At the same time, Wekerle emphasized that this development would not occur as a result of negotiations between equal parties. While the government would "consider" the "wishes" of non-Hungarian nationalities, the Premier did not name any political groups as possible negotiators in this regard. He also emphasized that the government would decide and act alone in connection to reforms. [260]

Hatos claims that Wekerle "did not take the plans of the Entente Powers to dissolve Hungary seriously". [261] However, the contemporary statements of the Prime Minister somewhat problematize this statement. It appears that he did realize that the national policy of Hungary must change in accordance with the transnational streams and the international developments of the time. It was due to this reason that Wekerle started to refer to the "principles" of Wilsonism as applicable to the historical framework of the Hungarian Kingdom. On the other hand, the concessions he promised to non-Hungarian national movements were rather minor.

One must emphasize that Alexandru Vaida-Voivod was the first non-Hungarian representative to react to the offers of the Hungarian government on October 18, 1918. The representative of the Romanian National Party read the declaration of his political group in the Hungarian Diet and complemented it with his own claims. The Romanian representative stated while the non-Hungarian 'nationalities' had always interpreted their position as 'nations' of equal status to their Hungarian counterpart, the governments after 1867 handled them as "subordinate legal entities" (*alárendelt jogi alany*). According to Vaida-Voivod, this condition ceased with the plead of the Austro–Hungarian government for the armistice in accordance with the Fourteen Points of Wilson. The Romanian representative interpreted the latter document as one that would reaffirm the equal rights of nations in Hungary. He argued that the Hungarian government must accept "the natural

right of each nation to determine its own fate" (*azon természetes jog, hogy a sorsa felett minden nemzet maga rendelkezhessék*).[262] This was a reference to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in this historical context.

Accordingly, the declaration of the Romanian National Party denied that the Hungarian government or the Hungarian Diet could be the legitimate organs to represent the "Romanians of Hungary and Transylvania", as it rather reserved this right to itself. As for the 'right of peoples to self-determination', the declaration interpreted the concept as the right of the nation to choose "its allegiance regarding state institutions" (*intézményes állami elhelyezkedés*) and the "circumstances of its co-ordination among free nations" (*koordináltságának viszonya a szabad nemzetek között*). [263]

Hatos claims that this declaration and the speech of Vaida-Voivod were both "anti-constitutional" and attempted to gain the support of the Allied and Associated Powers for the secession of Transylvanian Romanians. [264] Nonetheless, one must point out that these texts were also in accordance with the political traditions from before the First World War, those of the late nineteenth century and the turn of the century. The complaint that as opposed to being a "subordinate legal entity", Romanians were a nation of 'equal status' had reoccurred in many historical texts produced by the political representatives of the national movement.

Nonetheless, it is true that the Romanian declaration did not incorporate any claims of loyalty to the Hungarian state community on October 18, 1918. This was a rather new development, a point of discontinuity in contrast to the history of the last half century. One can also notice the lack of the term 'national autonomy' from this text, or that it did not feature an alternative vision of the historical Hungarian Kingdom. The declaration did refer to any common local traditions in terms of concepts or political languages. It rather relied

on the Fourteen Points of Wilson as a definitive text. The demand for the nation to freely choose 'its allegiance with regard to state institutions' implied secessionism, which had not really appeared in the Romanian mainstream of the local political discourse after 1867.

Nonetheless, one must emphasize that the declaration also implied the possibility of a reconciliation between national movements in the Hungarian Kingdom. It referred to national problems as symptoms of a greater problem, the democratic problems of the Hungarian political system. Vaida-Voivod described a political structure based on "truly democratic, truly Christian, truly Wilsonian foundations" as ideal, one that could establish the equality of nations in Hungary. He argued this would allow the initiation of a transnational discourse between the political representations of local national communities regarding local affairs. The representative claimed that the statements in support of democratization were the ones to be truly "patriotic", as opposed to the interests of the Hungarian elite. [265]

The declaration of the Slovak National Council featured similar ambiguities on October 19, 1918, read by Ferdinand Juriga in the Diet. The Slovak representative still argued for the close relationship between the concepts of 'democracy' and 'the right of peoples to self-determination'. He interpreted 'nation' as the subject of the latter concept. However, his understanding of the notion was much different from his claims during Summer 1918, when he still supported the concept of the 'Hungarian political nation'. Now, Juriga stated that those were common languages which resulted in the appearance of 'nations' and the separate identities of ethno-cultural groups. [266]

The representative emphasized that the 'right to self-determination' was not an invention made during the First World War, but rather a natural and historical result of national developments. Juriga interpreted this concept as the transformation of nations

from "moral personalities" (*erkölcsi személyek*) to "legal personalities" (*jogszemély*). He argued that this development pointed towards the establishment of nation-states. However, the state of "all-humanity" (*összemberiség*) would appear as the final result of "federalization based on individual will" (*föderalizálás saját akarat alapján*).[267]

The declaration of the National Council applied these concepts to the Slovak nation. It identified a historical right of "political self-determination" (*politikai önrendelkezés*) for the nation through references to the Moravian Principality, which interpreted as the historical state of the Slovaks. Additionally, it claimed a "peculiar Slavic religious right to self-determination" (*sajátos szláv vallási önrendelkezési jog*) for the nation as a result of its Christianization by Saint Cyril and Saint Methodius in the 9th century. While the declaration stated that the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin subjected the Slovaks to alien rule, it also claimed that the national identity of the local population survived through its language. Eventually, the "magic spell" of the 'self-determination of peoples' resulted in the "resurrection" of the nation during the First World War. [268]

Much similar to the earlier Romanian declaration, the Slovak National Council denied the possibility that the Hungarian government or the Diet could act as the legal representatives of the Slovak population. It problematized the Hungarian electoral system, which resulted in the disproportionate political representation of nationalities. With almost the exact same words as its Romanian counterpart, the Slovak declaration demanded the right of the Slovak nation to choose "its allegiance regarding state institutions" and the "circumstances of its co-ordination among free nations". [269]

Nonetheless, one must point out that the Slovak National Council referred to the *Völkermanifest* of King Charles as the model of political transformation for the Kingdom of Hungary. It accordingly demanded the vindication of self-determination through the

establishment of a national state for the Slovak *Volksstamm* (*néptörzs* in the Hungarian text). On the other hand, the declaration applied its concepts to all the ethno-cultural groups of 'Hunnia' (Hungary). It demanded the same rights for the "Russian" (*orosz*, a reference to the Rusyn population in North-Eastern Hungary), "Germanic" (*germán,* German), the "Israelite" (*izraelita*, Jewish) or for that matter, the Hungarian 'nations'. [270]

One must emphasize that the territorial interpretation of the 'right to self-determination' could pose a problem in this regard, as many of the same communities (especially Germans and Jews) had diaspora populations throughout the territories of the Hungarian state. However, the Slovak National Council did not problematize this issue. The declaration also lacked references to the rights of the local Southern Slavic population.

Besides its demands for a state, the Slovak National Council also referred the concepts of 'federalism' (*föderalizmus*) and 'democracy', and the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as parallel concepts. The declaration emphasized that the trends of modernity pointed towards integration on a higher scale. Additionally, it stated that it was only a global democratic federation that could ensure "world peace". [271]

Juriga also claimed that it was the common interest of the Hungarian "proletariat", the political groups opposed to the traditional Hungarian political discourse and the non-Hungarian 'nationalities' to form an alliance in favour of reforms. He supported these arguments with references to Oszkár Jászi. Juriga claimed that the radical politician as the only individual to truly understand national issues in Hungary. He specifically recommended his fellow Hungarian representatives Jászi's book of 1912, 'The Formation of National States and the Question of Nationalities' to study. [272] It was most likely that Slovak representative referred to the main theses of Jászi from 1912: that local populations could participate through national cultures in the processes of 'integration' as the global

model of modernity and that national reconciliation was possible as a result of reforms in Hungary.

In contrast, Juriga was rather silent about the interpretation of the 'nation' in this narrative of Hungarian radicalism. This was no accident, as Jászi identified a hierarchy between contemporary communities, claimed the dominant status of Hungarians in the historical state and implied the eventual assimilation of other nationalities into the framework of Hungarian nation. Importantly, the viewpoint of the Hungarian sociologist did not significantly alter in this regard throughout the First World War. In contrast, Juriga interpreted the 'Slovaks' as a nation entitled to its own state, not one to assimilated by Hungarians.

Juriga, did not criticize this viewpoint, but not as it would be that of Jászi. He rather referred to the Hungarian political groups of the Diet in this regard. He claimed that the government and its Hungarian opposition were the representatives of the same social group: the Hungarian "feudal" elite, which only aimed at the protection of its privileges as opposed to trends of modernity. As a result, he emphasized that even the Károlyi Party would not understand the true meaning of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. By the time it would and design a political program in accordance with the *Völkermanifest*, it would be already too late. [273]

Hungarian parties reacted to the claims of their Slovak and Romanian fellow deputies with such hostility, that national reconciliation appeared unlikely. Their concepts of the 'Hungarian nation' of liberal origins and the democratic concept of the Slovak and the Romanian 'nation' appeared as mutually exclusive to each other.

One must emphasize that this criticism was not necessarily 'Hungarian' in the ethno-cultural sense against the claims of Juriga. Whereas he would identify himself as a

"Slovak", other deputies of Slovak origin rather emphasized that they are *tót*s, thus, aligned with the cause of the Hungarian political nation (*mi tótok vagyunk!*). [274] The representatives of the National Party of Work debated the legitimacy of Juriga's claims through references to the liberal political system before war. They claimed that the "*tót* counties" did not "authorize" the Slovak National Council to speak in their name back at the elections of 1910. [275] It is worth to remember that on the one hand, István Tisza himself was elected as a deputy in the electoral district of Biharugra, populated by a mixed population. He himself was sure even as of late 1918 that local Romanians would still vote for him instead of the representatives of their national movement. [276] On the other hand, the pro-Hungarian voices of the Diet show that at least in this context, there were still individuals of non-Hungarian origin who identified with the Hungarian political nation.

Even though the Károlyi Party claimed to oppose the national 'chauvinism' of the old establishment, its political language also showcased the fundamental differences between national concepts in Hungary during late October 1918. 'Democracy' was a key concept in the conceptual framework of the political group. However, the 'territorial integrity' of historical Hungary was also central to its discourse. On October 16, 1918, Mihály Károlyi claimed that these concepts were fundamental in relation to his proposed solution of the local 'nationalities question'. He stressed that the ideas of his party were not limited to the introduction of general suffrage. Much similar to the claims of the Romanian and Slovak representatives, Károlyi stated the Fourteen Points of Wilson were to be the foundations of the reconciliation between 'nationalities' and 'Hungarian-speaking' citizens. In contrast to the standpoint of the government, the representative also emphasized that negotiations were necessary between the political elites of these communities. [277]

János Hock read the related public memorandum of the Károlyi Party in the Diet. This featured the 'right of peoples to self-determination of peoples' in a rather specific sense, much different from the claims of the Romanian National Party and the Slovak National Council. The program of the political group did not interpret the concept as a historical phenomenon, but rather claimed that it appeared as a result of the First World War. While the application of this right to the international context resulted in the "liberation" of "small nations" (*kis nemzetek*) during the war, the memorandum stated that "the Hungarian nation with a solid foundation in history" (*szilárd történelmi alapon álló magyar nemzet*) was also a natural recipient of this right. [278]

In accordance with the traditions of the independentist discourse, the declaration of the Károlyi Party specified that the 'right of peoples to self-determination' applied to the relationship between the Hungarian 'nation' and the Habsburg 'empire'. It claimed that the *Ausgleich* deprived Hungary of its "national independence" (*nemzeti függetlenség)* and the "completeness of its state life" (*állami élet teljessége*). It emphasized the related historical issues of foreign, military and economic policy. [279]

However, the references of the memorandum were not only of historical nature. It also supported its claims for the restoration of Hungarian self-determination with modern arguments. The Károlyi Party stated that 'independent' Hungary was to become the bastion of European peace. The nation would follow the example set by the public statements of Wilson. However, one must mention that the memorandum also referred to Germany as the contemporary example of "democratic and constitutional transformation" (*demokratikus és alkotmányos átalakulás*). [280]

The declaration also claimed to understand the 'nationalities question' of Hungary in the same spirit. It interpreted the 'Wilsonian principles' as guidelines for a "timely" and

convenient solution for this issue. This opposed the "narrow-mindedness" of traditional Hungarian politics, which identified threats in the political movements of "non-Hungarian-speaking compatriots" (*nem magyar ajku honfitársak*). [281]

While the Károlyi Party distanced itself from the traditional establishment, its declaration also reflected on important differences between its discourse and those of the Romanian National Party and the Slovak National Council. Firstly, it did not claim the equal rights of national groups. It still differentiated between Hungarian-speakers and others in terms of status. Secondly, the memorandum emphasized the individual rights of citizens to cultivate their national identities rather than the status of 'nationalities' as groups with collective rights. Finally, it did not mention the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a relevant concept in the latter respect. [282]

It was no accident that according to the interpretation of the political group, the application of the 'Wilsonian principles' to Hungary could only result in the increased political participation of non-Hungarian citizens in the political system. The Károlyi Party additionally claimed an 'inclination' to initiate legal reforms that would provide the free economic and cultural development of all citizens and allow the free use of all languages in administration, local self-governments and legislation. According to the political group, the result of such reforms was to be an 'independent' and 'free' Hungary, which could provide terms of free cultural and economic development to all of its 'peoples'. [283]

Thus, fundamental differences appeared between the narratives of political and national groups in the Hungarian Diet, all of whom referred to a 'Wilsonian' interpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. The declarations of the Romanian National Party and the Slovak National Council claimed that as 'nationalities', their communities were disadvantaged in a state structure defined by the concept of the 'Hungarian political

nation'. They stated that non-Hungarian ethno-cultural groups were rather 'nations' of equal status, with the right to choose their state allegiances. The references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' were especially important in the declaration of the Slovak National Council, which featured the concept in a territorial sense. Through the transnational examples of the Austrian *Völkermanifest* and the declarations of President Wilson, the representatives of Slovaks demanded the establishment of national states in Hungary. Importantly, this goal did not necessarily defy the legitimacy of the Hungarian state community. The Slovak statements rather implied that the co-operation of local communities was only possible through their shared and positive approach to the concept of 'federation'.

In contrast, the Hungarian political groups only applied the 'right of peoples to self-determination' to the framework of the Hungarian state and its political nation. This interpretation of the concept and the Fourteen Points of Wilson prioritized the 'territorial integrity' of the Hungarian Kingdom to the introduction of collective rights. Whereas the Hungarian government offered some kind of individual treatment for the local nationalities, it did not intend to negotiate with non-Hungarian political groups as the legitimate representatives of communities. In contrast, the increasingly dominant Hungarian political group, the Károlyi Party envisioned negotiations between the representatives of ethno-cultural communities. However, it denied the possibility that collective rights would be introduced in Hungary and implied the solution of the nationalities question through the introduction of individual rights, akin to the provisions of the Nationalities Law in 1868.

These claims, of course, appear as signs of an "illusionary" and "wishful" thinking in the modern Hungarian discourse. However, one must emphasize that the extent to which

the concept of 'historical integrity' was a staple of Hungarian political thought. On the other hand, it is also important to point that certain non-Hungarian representatives also did not perceive the disintegration of the Hungarian Kingdom as beneficial for their national interests.

For instance, Rudolf Brandsch opposed both the federalist and the secessionist interpretations of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. He described the position of Hungarian Germans in relation to this issue on October 23, 1918. The representative claimed that the members of this dispersed and diverse community were in no position to attempt secession or to reach for a union with any of their possible kin-states. He also stated that the interests of the German community were different than those of the Slovaks, Romanians, or Southern Slavs. The "smaller or larger rights" or "independence" (*kisebb-nagyobb jogok*, *kisebb-nagyobb önállóság*) of the latter nations through the applications of 'right of peoples to self-determination' in Hungary could be detrimental to the local possibilities of Germans to cultivate their identity. Accordingly, he demanded national laws to protect the right to cultural development and the free use of German language in various areas of public life. Similar to members of the Slovak National Council, he also referred to the Kingdom of Hungary as a common "homeland" (*haza*). [284] Such claims corresponded with the viewpoint of Hungarian political groups and implied a possibility that the historical integrity of the national state could be preserved.

It is also important to emphasize that the most Hungarian political groups of the Diet lost legitimacy and perspective with the end of the First World War. The opposition between the viewpoints of '48' and '67' became irrelevant with the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. The ordinary Hungarian citizen could only associate the National Party of Work or the Constitution Party of '48 with the hardships of the war and the old

political system. Their representatives could only appear in the diplomatic relationships with the victorious Entente as representatives of the defeated enemy. In contrast, the 'Károlyi Party' and its allies appeared as pacifist political groups that supported democratic reforms, reconciliation with the Entente and the territorial integrity of Hungary throughout the First World War. [285]

As a result of this popularity, the Károlyi Party, the Civic Radical Party and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary formed the "Hungarian National Council" (*Magyar Nemzeti Tanács*) on October 24, 1918. It shared its name, 'National Council' with the national executive organs of other communities in the region. The members of the Council published a political program that claimed to feature "goals to save the country" (*országmentő célok*). As such, it intended to apply the 'right of nations to self-determination' (*nemzetek önrendelkezési joga*) to the "non-Hungarian-speaking peoples" (*nem magyar ajkú népek*) in the country. In practice, the program offered "cultural and municipal self-government" (*kulturális és helyhatósági önkormányzat*) for the local nationalities in the framework of the Hungarian national state. This claim echoed the earlier statements of Károlyi in the Diet. The National Council stated that such measures would result in the reconciliation between non-Hungarian nationalities and would reaffirm the territorial, economic, historical and geographical integrity of the state. [286]

Thus, a "brotherly alliance between equal peoples" (*egyenrangú népek testvéri szövetsége*) would replace the "old, poisoned difference between the nation and the nationalities" (*a nemzet és a nemzetiségek közötti régi, megmérgezett különbség*) according to the declaration. [287] One can understand that this was a new feature of the Hungarian political discourse in contrast to the historical arguments of the Hungarian national mainstream and its hierarchy between the Hungarian 'nation' and the non-Hungarian

'nationalities'. It was no accident that the phrase 'right of nations to self-determination' appeared in the declaration and applied to all ethno-cultural communities of the historical state.

The Hungarian National Council could soon form the national government on October 31, 1918. It only needed the consent of King Charles to this end, not that of the Hungarian Diet, which had its last session on October 26, 1918. Nonetheless, the Károlyi government enjoyed the support of the contemporary Hungarian elite, since it was the only Hungarian political force not discredited by the war. The Károlyi Party was also the only Hungarian political formation that seemed to have a chance to appeal to the victorious Allied and Associated Powers due to its Entente-friendly rhetoric during the war (although it had no official government connections). The Károlyi government was also popular in the lower classes of the Hungarian population, associated with the concepts of Hungarian 'independence', 'democracy', but also the 'republic', which referred to the popular hostility against the Habsburg dynasty by the end of the war. This resulted in the proclamation of the Hungarian People's Republic (*Magyar Népköztársaság*) on November 13, 1918. [288] Nonetheless, the government also received the hard task to face with the processes of imperial and state disintegration.

o. Transnational References

It is important to accentuate that the Hungarian representatives did initially not refer to 'right of peoples to self-determination' in a positive sense and as the (social democratic) concept of the Russian Revolution upon the introduction of the term to the discourse of the Diet in June 1917. The term rather appeared as a counter-concept to the 'historical integrity' and the 'sovereignty' of Hungary in the discourse of Hungarian political groups

in support of the *Ausgleich*. The representatives of these parties also perceived the concept as the phrase of the Entente propaganda against the Habsburg monarchy, which featured the hostile alliance as the guardian of non-Hungarian nationalities.

However, the role of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a counter-concept was also in service of the oppositional position of the formerly governing National Party of Work. Its representatives could question the competence of the new establishment to represent the interests of the Hungarian state. This was to be done not only against the claims of the Entente, but the Austrian representation of the Monarchy as a *Gesamtstaat* with its own 'right to self-determination' or the federalist claims of non-German representatives in the Austrian Imperial Council.

In its attempt to provide a solid answer to these issues, the Wekerle government also claimed to refute the 'Entente interpretation' of the concept. As mentioned above, the Prime Minister himself interpreted the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a reference to the perceived right of non-Hungarian nationalities to act as independent political actors as opposed to the 'sovereignty' of the Hungarian state. As a result, the concept threatened the 'historical integrity' of Hungary. At the same time, Wekerle claimed that it was only due to the 'political unity' of the Hungarian state that the Habsburg Monarchy could act as a Great Power in the international sphere. The 'Entente interpretation' of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' appeared as a threat in this regard as well.

The discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council with regard to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' remained a transnational point of reference in the Diet during 1917–1918. Various Hungarian political groups perceived a threat from this direction to the integrity of the historical state. Similar to the National Party of Work,

Hungarian Christian Socialists or the Károlyi Party, the representatives of the Constitution Party interpreted the claims of Czech, Southern Slavic, and Ukrainian parties to the establishment of their nation-states in the Habsburg Monarchy as ones that openly supported national secessionism. [289]

One must point out that the shift in the Hungarian perception of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' that occurred due to the international developments of Winter 1917–1918. The narratives of Hungarian independentism started to feature the term as a key concept rather than a counter-concept in relation to their political goals. The influence of the Russian imperial disintegration was especially formative in this regard. The 'Constitution Party of '48', the political group behind the contemporary Wekerle government and the Károlyi Party both argued that the appearance of new nation-states was a positive development, one in service of the independence of the Hungarian 'nation' in the Habsburg 'empire'.

Even though it would be possible to interpret this narrative as a result of an ideological transfer from the Russian Bolshevik discourse, one must emphasize that the Hungarian representatives did not refer to the 'self-determination' as the 'right to separation' of 'peoples' in the ethno-cultural sense. They limited their claims to Hungarian 'independence' in the Habsburg Monarchy, with the political community of the 'nation' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination'. This was due to the fact that the Bolshevik interpretation of the concept would have been detrimental to the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom as well.

The deputies of the Constitution Party rather emphasized related threats in the international context, although the political group was also officially a member of the government coalition. Its representatives pointed at the fact that the 'right of peoples to

self-determination' was a concept central to the Bolshevik revolutionary agenda and a pretext for the Bolshevik Russian intervention into the affairs of Poland, Ukraine and Finland. This was the case despite the fact that Russia itself had recognized the right of these territories to secession. Gyula Andrássy the Younger, the representative of the Constitution Party also argued for a historical tradition in the discourse of "Russian revolutionaries" since the early nineteenth century, which supported "Pan-Slavism" and the expansion of the Russian Empire. Thus, he relied on the historical fears of the Hungarian elite in his interpretation of this subject. According to him, this threat necessitated democratic reforms and the vindication of Hungarian independentist claims to solidify the position of the historical state. [290]

The relationship between the 'right of peoples to self-determination' and the concept of 'national minorities' was also supported through transnational references by the representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities. As mentioned above, the member of the Slovak People's Party, Ferdinand Juriga pointed at the Austrian Imperial Council as a model for the proportionate representation of nationalities in a democratic political system. In contrast, the Central Organization for a Durable Peace appeared as a point of reference in the arguments of the Romanian representative Ștefan Cicio Pop. He mentioned the transnational discourse of the organization to legitimize his demands with regard to the rights of 'nationalities' or 'national minorities'.

President Wilson only appeared as a definitive point of reference in relation to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in the Diet by the end of the First World War. Hungarian and non-Hungarian political groups both used his figure to legitimize their different interpretations of the concept. The claims of the American President and his Fourteen Points appeared in service of the Hungarian independentist discourse, but also

the integrity of the historical state in the claims of Hungarian political groups. In contrast, the representatives of non-dominant nationalities argued that the Wilsonian principles legitimized their rights to choose their state allegiances.

However, one must emphasize that the Slovak National Council also referred to another transnational source on October 22, 1918. The Austrian *Völkermanifest* appeared to support its interpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. The Slovak representatives stated that the declaration of King Charles legitimized their quest for the foundation of a Slovak state. The Austrian concept of the *Volksstamm* appeared in this context to support their claims. These also featured 'federalism' of the Austrian style as a possible route of development for the Hungarian Kingdom.

However, the Hungarian political groups were rather in search of international examples to support the integrity of the historical state. On October 17, 1918, the Christian Social representative Sándor Giesswein referred to Switzerland as the model for the solution of the 'nationalities question' in Hungary. The Hungarian christian social representative argued that the Swiss political system neutralized national(ist) conflicts through its application of 'democracy'. Despite the multi-ethnic structure of the population, the local introduction of 'territorial autonomies' was not necessary. [291]

Importantly, references to Switzerland were also important in the policy of the Károlyi government. However, its interpretation of the Swiss model was radically different. It similarly aimed to apply the 'right of peoples to self-determination' in a new sense to historical Hungary.

To sum it up, transnational references to contemporary contexts in the international sphere supported the interpretations of the 'self-determination of peoples' as a basic concept or a counter-concept in the discourse Hungarian Diet. As for the latter, those were

Hungarian representatives that interpreted the concept as opposed to the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom, its sovereignty, independence and freedom. The discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council, the propaganda of the Entente, the foreign policy of Bolshevik Russia appeared as contexts, in which the references to the 'self-determination of peoples' were detrimental to the interests of Hungary.

In contrast, transnational references to a 'Wilsonian' version of the concept only appeared in late 1918, when the process of state disintegration started. The Hungarian representatives attempted to interpret the term as in accordance with the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom and which only necessitated democratic reforms, not the reform of the administrative structure through the introduction of territorial autonomies. Switzerland appeared as the primary example to this end, as Hungarian representatives claimed its democratic political system could neutralize the tensions between local 'nationalities' (national movements). On the other hand, the 'Wilsonian' concept of self-determination reinforced the arguments of non-Hungarian representatives for 'federalism' and the right to choose their state allegiances. References to the Austrian *Völkermanifest* also supported these claims in the case of the Slovak National Council.

p.   The National Policy of the Károlyi Government

Even though it does not belong to my narrower field of interest in terms of this study, I must shortly describe the national policy of the Károlyi government in late 1918 due to various reasons. This is in relation to a fundamental shift in the contemporary Hungarian discourse. On the one hand, most of the traditional Hungarian nationalist claims lost their values due to dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy; there remained no 'Austria', 'dynasty' or 'empire' for the 'nation' to oppose. On the other hand, the sufferings and the

defeat of the First World War also discredited the previously militant tone of Hungarian nationalism. Thus, only the references to the ideals of 'pacifism' and 'democracy' could provide legitimacy for the new establishment. [292]

This shift of the discourse defined the Hungarian attempts at safeguarding the historical integrity of the state, in which the role of Oszkár Jászi was instrumental. It is worth to recall the fact that Károlyi, Jászi and most of their political allies had supported the domination of the 'Hungarian nation' in the historical state. In contrast, the Károlyi government declared the transformation of Hungary into a "democratic federalism", an "Eastern Switzerland" (*Keleti Svájc*) of all its 'nations' in late 1918. The role of the 'Wilsonian' principle of 'self-determination' was central to this conceptual framework. The "Ministry of Nationalities" lead by Jászi attempted to reconceptualize the term to support the historical integrity of the Hungary in opposition to national secessionism. [293]

The *Kis káté a Magyarországon élő nemzetek önrendelkezési jogáról* ("Small Catechism on the Right of Self-Determination of Nations Living in Hungary") by László Domokos (1919) was one of the contemporary texts to support these efforts in the contemporary context of the Hungarian national discourse. The author was a sociologist with a close relationship to Oszkár Jászi. [294] Thus, Domokos would refer to the same concepts as Jászi to describe them as the ideals of the *Zeitgeist*, but also as ones to support the reinterpretation of Hungary as the 'Eastern Switzerland'. [295]

The 'right of nations to self-determination' (*nemzetek önrendelkezési joga*) appeared in a specific sense in this text, as a parallel concept to that of the 'federal state' (*szövetségi állam*). The latter term referred to the establishment of 'national realms' (*nemzeti imperiumok*) in the 'common homeland' (*közös haza*) of the Hungarian Kingdom. Domokos interpreted this outcome as the result of the application of 'self-determination'

and the adaptation of the Swiss canton system to the structure of the Hungarian state (hence the name 'Eastern Switzerland'). [296] One must realize that on the one hand, these claims were in accordance with the historical demands of the non-Hungarian national movements, which, however, both the Hungarian political elite, Károlyi and Jászi opposed until the end of the First World War.

On the other hand, the differences between the contemporary terms 'the right of nations to self-determination' and 'the right of peoples to self-determination' or the historical concept of 'national self-determination' were substantial. In a historical sense, 'national self-determination' referred to the rights of the Hungarian nation to 'independence' and 'freedom' in the national discourse around the time of the *Ausgleich*. Although the Hungarian attempts to identify this with the 'right of peoples to self-determination' during the war were in part successful, the latter concept still had broader implications. It was often used in reference to the rights of 'peoples' in the ethno-cultural sense in the transnational context, often in connection to their right of 'secession'. The term 'right of nations to self-determination' had yet another implication in the Hungarian context. This amounted to the recognition of the former non-Hungarian 'nationalities' as 'nations' of equal status to their previously dominant Hungarian counterpart by the contemporary Hungarian political discourse. While the declaration of the Hungarian National Council already featured these concepts, the Károlyi government and its allies attempted to apply them to the administrative framework of the Hungarian state. This was an attempt to protect the integrity of historical Hungary as opposed to the secessionist implications of the 'right to self-determination'.

Nonetheless, Domokos also referred to other concepts as parallel ones to the 'right of nations to self-determination'. He claimed even though it was a legitimate desire,

national secession should always get confirmed through the institution of the 'plebiscite' (*népszavazás*) in Hungary. He described this as the practical form of national self-determination. In contrast, old-fashioned 'imperialism' (*imperializmus*) was his counter-concept in reference to the policies of Romania and the new Czechoslovakia. The author stated that the governments of these states were interested in their territorial expansion rather than in the needs or the opinion of the local population in the Hungarian Kingdom. He rather interpreted the policy of the Károlyi government as representative of a truly democratic political system, which followed the trends of modernity. Finally, Domokos featured the interests of local 'minorities' (*kisebbségek*) as more in line with the concept of Hungarian federalism than the policy of the neighbouring states. He claimed that the Hungarian establishment would provide territorial autonomies in the lower strata of administration for these communities as well. [297]

Pál Hatos claims that this conceptual framework was not attractive to the non-Hungarian national movements due to various reasons. Besides the historical "offences" of the non-Hungarian elites, the historian also points out that the developments of the First World War "accelerated" the process of "alienation" from the idea of the "Hungarian state". This resulted in the secessionist proclamations of non-Hungarian national movements in late 1918. On the other hand, he states that although non-Hungarian representatives had demanded the federalist reconstruction of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Diet, these claims rather disguised their desire for "imperial state-making" (by which the author means their policies of expansion). In contrast, the Károlyi government appears in this narrative as the sole historical actor to represent a "lone and paradoxical policy of pacifism" in the local and the geopolitical contexts of Hungary, driven by nothing but the wishful thinking of its leaders and that of the Hungarian society. [298]

Nonetheless, there was an an exception to these trends. The negotiations between the Károlyi government and the representatives of the Ukrainian national movement resulted in the establishment of "Ruska Krajina". This autonomous realm of the Hungarian Rusyns could exist for a short period of time before the occupation of its territories by Romania and Czechoslovakia.[299]

One must also emphasize that the continuities between the conceptual framework of the Károlyi government and interwar Hungarian revisionism. On the one hand, the references to 'national self-determination' or the 'right of peoples to self-determination' supported the 'integral' reconstruction of a "Greater Hungary" (*Nagy-Magyarország*) in the latter discourse. On the other hand, it is also important to point out the Hungarian revisionist did not necessarily argue for the restoration of a 'nation-state' dominated by 'Hungarians'.

The concept of the 'Empire', the 'Crown' or the 'State Idea' 'of St. Stephen' (*Szent István birodalma, koronája, Szent István-i állameszme*) offered the alternative of this approach. This was rather dominant in the Hungarian political and intellectual elite of the Second World War, the era in which the restoration of the Hungarian Kingdom seemed the most plausible. [300] One of its main representatives was the Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki, who interpreted the community of the past and future state as a 'political nation' of 'peoples'. [301] The supporters of this idea also offered the non-Hungarian communities and their elites the reintegration of the former Hungarian territories as 'autonomous lands' (*autonóm országok*). [302] This would have amounted to the (re)establishment of a federal state, much similar to the claims of the Károlyi government.

On the other hand, one must point out that the Hungarian actors of the interwar period and the Second World War could refer to this 'external' concept of a political

community, but also to a rather limited interpretation of the Hungarian nation in its 'internal' dimension. This was due to the domination of antisemitic ideas in the Hungarian discourse of these eras. Prime Minister Teleki, for instance, referred to the Jewish population of Hungary as a 'separate race' (*szeparált faj*). He claimed that as opposed to the former 'nationalities' of the Hungarian Kingdom, Jews were no part of the 'European commonwealth' and could not participate in the 'State Idea of St. Stephen'. Teleki stated that they should rather be stripped of their rights by the 'Hungarian nation' in an act of "self-defence". [303] This was the discourse that prepared the ground for the introduction of anti-Jewish laws in Hungary and the Hungarian holocaust.

To sum it up, the shift of the Hungarian national discourse from the militant ideas of 'nationalism' towards the concepts of 'pacifism' and 'democracy' influenced the reinterpretation of the Hungarian state community by the Károlyi government in late 1918. The rhetoric of the establishment proclaimed the transformation of Hungary into a 'federal state' in accordance with the 'right of nations to self-determination'. This concept applied to former non-Hungarian 'nationalities' of the state, now recognized as 'nations' of equal status by the mainstream of the contemporary Hungarian discourse. The latter claimed to represent the 'democratic' ideal of the 'common homeland', the interests of local 'nations' and 'minorities' as opposed to the 'imperialism' of the neighbouring states.

These efforts, however, were mostly fruitless, as these ideas were not attractive to the representatives of the non-Hungarian national movements. On the other hand, the discourse of Hungarian revisionism inherited the federal idea of the historical Hungarian state from the conceptual framework of the Károlyi government and transformed it into the 'State Idea of St. Stephen'. This amounted to offers of territorial autonomy to the former nationalities upon their reintegration into a common state. While this idea attempted

to attract these communities through its tolerant designs, it ran in parallel to the exclusive and antisemitic features of the Hungarian national discourse.

q. Conclusion

My analysis showcases important features of the political discourse in the Hungarian Diet, previously missed or misinterpreted by historical narratives. I have pointed out that the references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' first appeared in this context in July 1917. It was the Hungarian translation of the *Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker*, a term that appeared in the discourse of the Austrian Imperial Council, in which context it was adopted from the political discourse in the Russian Empire after the February Revolution of 1917, as a concept dominant in the political vocabulary of local social democracy. Thus, the origins of the concept were nor 'Leninian' neither 'Wilsonian' in the discourse of the Diet.

Continuities and discontinuities both defined the Hungarian references to the term in this context. On the one hand, the representatives of independentist parties identified it in early 1918 as in support of their traditional political vocabulary, the 'freedom', the 'independence' and the 'national self-determination' of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy. I identified the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations and the dissolution of the Russian Empire as formative impacts in relation to this Hungarian interpretation of the concept. The 'right of peoples to self-determination' applied to the relationship between the 'nation' and the 'empire' in this narrative, defined by the traditions of political debates after 1867. The former concept referred to the political community or the 'nation' of the Hungarian Kingdom as the subject of the 'right to self-determination', albeit Hungarian narratives featured 'Hungarians' as the dominant ethno-cultural group of the

local landscape. This interpretation of the concept countered the implications of its Bolshevik narrative, which featured it as the 'right' of ethno-cultural groups to 'separation'.

On the other hand, the term also appeared as a counter-concept in the narratives of Hungarian representatives in 1917–1918, one to oppose the historical concepts of 'integrity', 'freedom' and 'sovereignty' in their national discourse. This was due to the transnational applications of the concept to the 'peoples' in the ethno-cultural sense, identified as the non-Hungarian 'nationalities' of the Hungarian Kingdom in the local context. I have pointed out that in this chapter that references to the 'principle of nationality' did not appear in the same textual contexts. Hungarian representatives did not interpret the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as a concept that would automatically amount to the dissolution of the Hungarian Kingdom, but rather problematized the implication that Hungarian citizens could determine their own state allegiance and would decide to secede from the historical state.

In contrast, non-Hungarian representatives stared to refer to the concept only in July 1918. Their contributions to the debates of Hungarian suffrage reform emphasized the interpretation of a term as a 'democratic principle'. This applied to the rights of non-Hungarian communities in the local context to political participation and cultural rights. Importantly, their representatives did not refer to their ethno-cultural groups as 'nationalities' in the Hungarian concept, but rather adopted the concept of 'national minorities' from the transnational discourse. The Central Organization for a Durable Peace appeared as a transnational source to support their claims rather than the Nationalities Law of 1868. On the other hand, some of them still interpreted their status as members of the Hungarian 'political nation'.

I identified late 1918 as a temporal point that resulted in a major point of 'discontinuity' in the discourse due to the defeat of the Habsburg Monarchy and Hungary in the First World and the beginnings of their state disintegration. On the one hand, I pointed out that references to a 'Wilsonian' concept of 'self-determination' first appeared in this context in the Hungarian Diet. On the other hand, I emphasized the fundamental differences between the mainstream interpretations of Hungarian and non-Hungarian representatives. The Wekerle government and the Károlyi Party both referred to the 'Wilsonian' principle as one in support of the Hungarian Kingdom's 'historical integrity', albeit also as one that necessitated the reform of national policy and cultural concessions to non-Hungarian 'nationalities'.

In contrast, the representatives of the latter applied to the 'Wilsonian' right of 'peoples to self-determination' to their communities in a radically different sense. They claimed that non-Hungarian ethno-cultural groups were no 'nationalities' of inferior status, but rather 'nations' equal to their Hungarian counterpart. Thus, they demanded the 'right to self-determination' to 'choose' their 'state allegiances' or to establish their own 'states'. The declaration of the Slovak National Council also referred to the Austrian *Völkermanifest* and the concept of 'federalism' to support its claims. This implied a common future for Slovaks and Hungarians in a reformed Hungarian state community.

On the one hand, these observations position my study against traditional historical narratives of this era in Hungarian history and of 'national self-determination' in this context. The 'right of peoples to self-determination' was not limited to the conceptual framework of the Károlyi Party or the Hungarian 'progression'. The political representatives of non-Hungarian communities also did not always interpret it as their right to secession. It was only the developments of late 1918 that resulted in these features of

the local discourse. In contrast, the debates of the Hungarian Diet until this period rather revealed different interpretations of the concept and its application to the Hungarian 'political nation' or the local 'nationalities' or 'national minorities'.

On the other hand, I must point out that local sources do not support the theories of Fisch and Liebich. 'National self-determination' or 'the right of peoples to self-determination' did not appear as the synonym or the parallel concept of the 'nationality principle' in the local context. Although it appeared in the same semantic field as the Hungarian concept of 'sovereignty' at the turn of the century, this did not amount to secessionist claims in this national context. The latter concept rather emphasized the rights of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy and the right of the Hungarian nation (interpreted in the ethno-cultural sense in this case) to administer its own national policy in support of its dominant status. The interpretation of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' as the right to 'secession' only appeared in the context of late 1918. Even the political representatives of non-Hungarian nationalities had not referred to the concept in this sense beforehand.

One consistent Hungarian interpretation of 'national self-determination' or the 'right of peoples to self-determination' was that it applied to the 'political nation' or the state community of the Hungarian Kingdom. Thus, it accentuated the 'external' dimension of the term in reference to the independent status of the historical state in the Habsburg Monarchy. Nonetheless, as for the 'internal' dimension of the concept, Hungarian representatives always emphasized the 'hegemony' or the dominant status of their ethno-cultural community in the state. This Hungarian interpretation of the concept only disappeared in late 1918, when the Károlyi government attempted to reframe Hungary as a 'federal state'. The 'right of nations to self-determination' applied to this structure in its

conceptual framework. This amounted to the recognition of local communities as 'nations' of equal status and the claim that it was only the Hungarian 'federal state' that could represent their interests as opposed to the 'imperialism' of neighbouring nation-states.

5. Conclusion

My conceptual history centred around the term 'self-determination' (either in the forms 'national self-determination', the 'self-determination of peoples' or the 'right of peoples to self-determination) has revealed that the associations of the concept with the terms 'sovereignty', 'secession', the 'sovereign nation-state' or the historical figures of Lenin and Wilson are the results of rather generalizing and thus, flawed narratives that do not consider the historical reality of local contexts in the Habsburg Monarchy. The latter appears in related accounts as one of the 'empires' or a 'multinational states' that had no chances but to dissolve as a result of the application of the concept to the geopolitical sphere of Central Europe.

I have rather pointed out that in the Austrian and Hungarian contexts of the First World War, the concept of 'self-determination' was a part of the changing dynamics between the ideas of the 'nation' and the 'empire'. I have emphasized the 'continuity' of historical discourses in this regard, whereas I identified various phases of the late First World War (1917–1918) as points of 'discontinuities' in local contexts. I have shown that the association between the terms 'self-determination', 'sovereignty', 'secession' or the 'right to choose state allegiance' developed in various stages of this time period in the local contexts.

On the other hand, I have also noticed that it was not obvious even for the secessionist Czechoslovak movement of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk to legitimize the dissolution of the 'empire' and the foundation of the 'nation-state' through references to the concept of 'self-determination'. I have emphasized that even as of late 1918, the latter term was not central to this discourse as opposed to the 'principle of nationality'. I have

theorized that this was much due to the central position of the latter term in the Anglo-American context, and the contemporary ambiguities around the concept of 'self-determination'.

My case studies have shown that references to the term 'self-determination of peoples' or 'nations' in the political discourses of the First World War did not start due to the influence of Bolshevik policy or 'Wilsonism'. I rather emphasize the influence of Russian discourse after the February Revolution of 1917 on the transnational contexts of the Austrian Imperial Council, the Hungarian Diet and the *New Europe*. Besides this case of cultural transfer, I also accentuate the inter-ideological dimension behind the adaptations of the concept. Local actors of liberal ideological background adopted a concept originally of social democratic origin in the context of the Russian Empire at the turn of the century.

Nonetheless, I have shown that even though the importance of the concept was new-found in these contexts, its use was initially in line with the previous trends of local discussions from before the First World War. This observation necessitates me to sum up and to compare my findings on the political dictionaries in the Austrian, Hungarian and British contexts of and the role of 'self-determination' in local conceptual frameworks. It is also here that I can conclude my findings about the relevance of ideological factors, the terms 'transnational', 'cultural' and 'ideological transfers' to my study.

a. *The Liberal Political Vocabularies of the Nineteenth Century*

One must emphasize the dominant status of liberalism as the mainstream ideology in the contexts of the early nineteenth century. I identified the Habsburg Monarchy as the 'empire' in a relationship with the 'nations' discussed by the discourses of the Hungarian

and Czech national movements and a 'transnational' framework for the discussion and adoption of concepts. The local contexts I largely focused on were the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Bohemia in the meaning of 'Hungary proper' and 'Bohemia proper'.

The liberal representatives of the Czech national movement identified their concept of 'Bohemian state rights' (the reconstruction of the historical Bohemian Kingdom) and their demands to emancipate Czech language and culture in the local context with the terms 'autonomy' and 'equality of (nationality) rights' in the imperial discourse. Whereas the latter concepts were not of central role in the claims of Hungarian liberal representatives, they also demanded the 'legal independence' and the unification of the historical Kingdom of Hungary through references to its 'constitution'.

The concepts of the 'nation' featured 'political' and 'ethno-cultural' elements in both cases. The concepts of the 'Hungarian nation' and the 'Bohemian people' both described regional, multi-ethnic communities of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nonetheless, one must also point out that both the Hungarian *magyar nemzet* and the Czech *český národ* had different implications than the Latin *natio Hungarica* and the German *böhmisches Volk*. One must also refer to the difference between the Hungarian *Magyarország* and the Slovak *Uhorsko* in relation to this issue. Although of pre-modern origin, the terms *magyar nemzet* and *český národ* were products of modern national movements and emphasized the dominant status of a certain ethno-cultural community in local terms.

This created conflicts between the Czech and German, the Hungarian and non-Hungarian national movements, which also applied to the field of concepts. The liberal representatives of Hungarian nationalism identified the non-Hungarian communities of the common homeland as 'nationalities', which could not reach their status of the 'nation' due

to their lack of historical rights and the absence of their historical nobility. The Bohemian Czech representatives attempted to emphasize the allegiance of local Germans to the regional community rather than their national movement through the concept of 'Bohemian Germans'.

The first climax of the tensions between national movements was in the era of 1848–1849. The political representatives of the Hungarian national movement attempted to unify their historical state and institutionalize its independence through the April Laws of 1848. Bohemian Czech representatives demanded the recognition of 'Bohemian state rights' at the Austrian Imperial Diet and the reconstruction of the historical Bohemian Kingdom as the federal unit of a reformed Habsburg Monarchy.

In contrast, the non-Hungarian national movements demanded their recognition as 'nations' with their own territories in the Kingdom of Hungary. This resulted in their armed conflict with the Hungarian government and their alliance with the Habsburg dynasty despite their common liberal ideological affiliation with the former. The German representatives of the Austrian Imperial Diet would have also preferred the integration of the Bohemian Kingdom into a unified Germany as opposed to the imperial vision of their Czech fellow representatives. However, the threat of Habsburg absolutist consolidation resulted in the reconciliation between these viewpoints. The outcome was the Kremsier Constitution of 1849, which recognized the rights of the ethno-cultural *Volksstämme* in the one Austrian *Volk* through the institutionalization of the 'equality of nationality rights' in the Austrian Empire. However, it did not reorganize its crownlands along national lines, nor did it recognize the 'historical rights' referred by certain national movements.

According to my findings, that the 'self-determination of peoples' or the 'right of the nation to self-determination' appeared in the Czech context for the first time in 1848–

1849, but the role of the term was more prominent in the Czech memorandum of 1870. In contrast, the concept was first mentioned in the Hungarian context at the Diet of 1865–1868, and its role was prominent in the political discussions of 1879.

The negotiations leading to and the state structures defined by the *Ausgleich* or the Austro–Hungarian Compromise of 1867 informed these references to the term. A group of Hungarian representatives opposed the interpretation of military, economic and foreign policy as 'common interests' of the 'empire'. Thus, they referred to the concept of 'national self-determination' to support their claims to Hungarian 'independence' in the Habsburg Monarchy. In contrast, the Czech representatives evoked the 'self-determination of peoples' in support of their demands for the federal reform of Austria–Hungary and the recognition of 'Bohemian state rights'.

I theorize that the concept appeared in these contexts through the cultural transfer of the German term *(Recht der) Selbstbestimmung der Völker*. References to the term in the discourse of German state unification informed its use by the Czech representatives. In contrast, I identify studies of international law written in German, specifically those of Johann Kaspar Bluntschli as the source from which Hungarian representatives adopted the term 'right of the nation to self-determination'. They associated the term *Volk* with their concept of the 'nation' or at least its 'external' dimension, as an independent state community in the Habsburg Monarchy.

I emphasize that the subject of this 'right' was a 'nation' or a 'people' interpreted in a political sense in both cases. The Czech memorandum of 1870 applied the 'self-determination of peoples' to a 'Bohemian people' or 'nation' defined by the legal and historical concept of 'state rights'. The Hungarian oppositional representatives also

referred to the external dimension of the Hungarian concept of the 'nation' and described it as a state community at the Hungarian Diet of 1865–1868 or the Diet of 1878–1881.

The December Constitution of 1867 and the Nationalities Law of 1868 informed these concepts of the 'nation'. Both applied the concept of 'equality of (nationality) rights' to the political communities of Austria and Hungary, albeit with different implications. Although the term was of liberal origin, it was originally codified by the imperial government of the neo-absolutist era. The December Constitution of the liberal Austrian state continued this part of imperial policy and applied the 'equality of rights' to ethno-cultural communities or the *Volksstämme* of the local context. This amounted to the recognition of the rights of nationalities to cultivate their identities, and the equality of their languages in the administrative framework of the crownlands. On the other hand, the December Constitution did not recognize the historical rights or the territorial autonomy of any nations in Austria.

The intellectual and political authorities of the pro-*Ausgleich* Hungarian elite, Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös also adopted the Austrian term 'equality of rights' due to the influence of the imperial government, but also due to their intent to construct a compromise between the Hungarian and the non-Hungarian national movements. As a result, the Nationalities Law of 1868 applied this concept to the 'nationalities' of the Hungarian Kingdom, which amounted to the recognition of their cultural rights in the context of municipalities. On the other hand, the law defined the state community as the 'Hungarian political nation'. Although this concept rather accentuated the 'external' dimension of the 'nation' as a political collective, the Hungarian term *magyar politikai nemzet* still emphasized the dominant role of Hungarians in the state community.

However, the developments of the international context also informed political claims to the 'right of self-determination' in the Austrian and Hungarian contexts. The Czech memorandum of 1870 evoked German state unification, the secessionist movements of the Ottoman Empire and the Franco–Prussian War as examples for the central role of the 'self-determination of peoples' in political processes. The establishment of the German Empire supported their interpretation of 'federation' as a result of the application of the 'right to self-determination' to state structures. They described the federal structure as the ideal political system of modernity.

In contrast, Hungarian oppositional references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' were rather critical to the resolutions of the Berlin Congress in 1878. They emphasized that the Great Powers imposed an order on the states and the peoples of South-Eastern Europe in accordance with their interests. They argued that this was especially detrimental for the population of the Ottoman province of Bosnia–Hercegovina and its 'right to self-determination'. This standpoint was important in relation to their own political position as Hungarian 'independentists', as the occupation of Bosnia by Austria–Hungary necessitated the participation of Hungarian soldiers and the financial support of the Hungarian state for the activities of the imperial army.

In comparison, I argue that the key concept of liberal political discussions in Great Britain in connection to nationalism was the 'principle of nationality'. This was much due to the influence of Italian and German-language legal scholarship. While local actors were familiar with the concept of *Selbstbestimmungsrecht* from the context of German state unification and studies of international law written in German, their translations of the term were assimilatory, inconsistent and corrupted its meaning. As opposed to its descriptions in English as the 'principle of independence', the 'right to choose one's own mode of

government' or the 'right of nations to dispose themselves', the concept of 'national self-determination' only appeared in this context during the late First World War through its cultural and ideological transfer from the social democratic context of the Russian February Revolution.

I also claim that the identification of the 'self-determination of peoples' as a concept of central role was rather sporadic in the political vocabularies of Czech and Hungarian liberal nationalism. References to the concept remained rather marginal after 1870 and 1879. In contrast, demands to 'Bohemian state rights' or to 'Hungarian independence' remained constant. However, national, social democratic and civic radical discourses started to debate the traditional political languages of liberalism in the Austrian and Hungarian contexts at the turn of the century. This was a result of the intensification of nationalist politics and the appearance of mass party politics (although the latter feature remained limited to the Austrian political system). The concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' was also embedded in the conceptual frameworks of this period.

b. *Social Democratic, Civic Radical and Realist Political Vocabularies at the Turn of the Century*

The introduction of mass politics to Austria at the turn of the century ran in parallel to the intensification of debates between the political representatives of national movements. This resulted in the so-called "Badeni Crisis" of 1897 in Austria or the financial crisis of Bohemia in 1913 due to the immobilization of imperial and local legislation. In contrast, the rule of the Hungarian elite remained relatively stable due to the limited suffrage of the local political system. However, its national policy of Magyarization, supported by the

legal concept of 'sovereignty' and the Hungarian nationalist drive to create a 'unitary nation-state', also resulted in a common experience of crisis by the turn of the century.

Although originally of internationalist design due to their socialist ideological affiliations, Austrian social democracy and Hungarian civic radicalism were both impacted by the increasing nationalist conflicts at the turn of the century. The Czech–German nationalist tensions defined the discourse of Cisleithanian labour, since Czech representatives demanded the recognition of their equal rights as opposed to the elite viewpoint of German cultural superiority. Oszkár Jászi, the founder of Hungarian civic radicalism also attempted to find a solution for nationalist tensions in the Hungarian context, since he promoted the facilitation of a common platform for democratic forces in the Hungarian Kingdom.

As a result, the political vocabularies of Austrian labour and Hungarian civic radicalism featured a peculiar reinterpretation of liberal concepts. The Brünn Program of Austrian social democracy in 1899 promoted the application of 'autonomy' in a territorial sense to the ethno-cultural communities of Cisleithania along with the recognition of the 'rights of national minorities'. In contrast, Jászi referred to the Hungarian Nationalities Law of 1868 and its promotion of the 'equality of rights' as positive attempts at the reconciliation of national movements and promoted the implementation of a tolerant Hungarian national policy along these lines. In contrast, he did not support the concept of the 'political nation', as he identified it with outdated historical rights due to his Positivist stance.

Even though these terms appeared through their ideological transfer from the liberal discourses of the time, the conceptual framework of Austrian social democracy applied the concept of 'autonomy' to a 'nation' different from the interpretation of its liberal rivals. Its

representatives interpreted this community not as a limited, but a broad political community extended to the general population and the proletariat. Their references to 'autonomy', 'nations' and their 'equality of rights' also opposed the traditional differentiation between 'privileged' communities, 'nations' with 'historical rights' and those without them.

In contrast, although he denounced the Hungarian 'chauvinism' of the liberal political mainstream, Jászi's concept of the 'nation' much resembled those of the mainstream in the Hungarian liberal national discourse at the turn of the century. His depiction of communities was also rather Positivist in the sense that he identified the 'nation' as a superior community to 'nationalities' in terms of political, cultural and economic development. He did not describe the community of the Hungarian Kingdom as a 'political nation'; he rather emphasized the economic and cultural 'superiority' of the Hungarian nation. He believed that the assimilation of the non-Hungarian population was a result of the trends of modernity, 'integration' and will be accelerated by the introduction of an 'economic democracy' to the local context.

The concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' was implanted to these conceptual frameworks. I argue against the interpretation of term's role as central in the Austrian social democratic discourse. In contrast, I have shown that the modern criticism of Jászi neglects the fact that he also referred to this concept, which he adopted from the discourse of German social democracy.

I have also shown that Austrian social democratic references to the 'self-determination of peoples' featured the concept as one equivalent to 'autonomy' in a specific sense. These terms supported the demands of Austrian labour for the group rights of the proletariat, the political rights of the general population and the cultural rights of

local nations. The territorial interpretation of 'autonomy' only appeared as one of the means to ensure the 'self-determination of peoples' in the Austrian context.

The implications of 'autonomy' in the territorial sense also resulted in the reinterpretation of the concept of 'national minorities' in this discourse, adopted from the liberal discussions of earlier decades through its ideological transfer. Whereas the representatives of the Austrian liberal discourse had earlier referred to this term in a relational sense, social democrats rather to started use it as a synecdoche and in a qualitative sense, which defined their references to 'minority rights'. The term 'personal autonomy' also appeared as a result of these discussions. Otto Bauer and Karl Renner applied this concept to the national territories of a reformed Austria to prevent the harassment of minorities and the related conflicts of national movements.

I have shown that the sole reference of Oszkár Jászi to the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' also supported his critical viewpoint on the results of assimilatory policies in Hungary and nationalist conflicts. This term appeared in his description of the Danish–German conflict in the context of Schleswig–Holstein and the related ideas of German social democracy. It appeared as a parallel concept to his idea of a 'minimal program' for a tolerant Hungarian national policy.

One must raise awareness towards the fact that although of marginal influence in comparison to that of social democracy, the ideas of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and his Realist Party also represented a counter-discourse to that of state rights in the Czech context. This amounted to their democratic vision of Austrian politics, but also to their rediscovery of the 'Czechoslav' concept at the turn of the century. They emphasized the 'natural rights' of the 'nation' interpreted in the ethno-cultural sense and identified this community through their vision of a kinship between Slavic tribes in Bohemia, Moravia,

Silesia and Northern Hungary. This idea substituted and opposed the liberal references to 'historical rights' and the political community of the 'Bohemian people' that included 'Bohemian Germans'.

I have shown that in this sense, the vision of Masaryk was similar to the German radical nationalist demands as for the separation between 'German Bohemia' and the Czech-inhabited lands. The former concept appeared in a territorial sense at the turn of the century. Its adherents argued for the separate status of this territory to maintain the identity of local Germans as opposed to social, economic, and political expansion of Czechs.

The status of nationalities in Austria was also a topic of legal debates and an issue addressed by imperial politics. Austrian legal scholars refuted the idea that ethno-cultural communities could become legal personalities due to their lack of a common will and the lack of objective criteria in terms of their identity. In contrast, the Austrian government supported or even constructed compromises between national movements in the contexts of Moravia, Bukovina, Galicia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.

c. *The Political Discourses of the Late First World War*

I studied the role of the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'nations' in the transnational political discourses of the Austrian Imperial Council, the Hungarian Diet and the *New Europe* during the late First World War (1917–1918). I specifically focused on the conceptual frameworks of the Czech Union, Hungarian representatives, and the Czechoslovak political emigration in these contexts.

I have emphasized the importance of various local processes in relation to these discourses. One must point out the effects of the military government and the deterioration of economic conditions on the Austrian discourse between political groups. I have

accentuated the impact of political reforms initiated by King Charles in the Hungarian context. In contrast, I have integrated the local activities of the Czechoslovak movement into British discussions on the concept of 'nationality' and the future international order.

I have identified the Russian discourse after the February Revolution of 1917 as the transnational source for the cultural and ideological transfer of a certain concept of the 'right of peoples to self-determination' into these contexts. I argue that on the one hand, the German *Selbstbestimmung(srecht) der Völker* and the Hungarian *népek önrendelkezési joga* emphasized the contemporary international and local implications of the Russian social democratic concept of *право народов на самоопределение.* On the other hand, Czech and Hungarian representatives embedded these concepts in the historical framework of their political vocabularies. The term 'self-determination of peoples' supported references to the 'state rights' of the Bohemian Kingdom and the reconstruction of the Habsburg Monarchy as a 'federal state' in the Czech case until 1917. The concept rather appeared as opposed to 'historical integrity' of the Hungarian Kingdom, but also as one that problematized its 'independence' and 'sovereignty' in the Habsburg Monarchy.

I identify various periods of 1917–1918 as 'discontinuities' in terms of these historical discourses, the first of which occurred in parallel to the peace negotiations of Brest-Litovsk and the related process of disintegration in imperial Russia. I have pointed out the government and the oppositional representatives of the Hungarian independentist discourse started to reinforce their claims to the 'independence' of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Habsburg Monarchy through references to the 'right of peoples to self-determination' and its impact in the Russian Empire. Nonetheless, one must emphasize that they attempted to downplay the importance of ethno-cultural factors and their implications for the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom in relation to this issue,

as they identified the political concept of the 'Hungarian' as the subject of the 'right to self-determination'. In contrast, the lack of imperial reforms, the deterioration of economic conditions, the influence of the Bolshevik political language and the ambiguous policy of the Austro–Hungarian elite resulted in the association of the latter concept with 'sovereignty' and the 'Czechoslovak nation-state' by the representatives of the Czech Union.

I also identify late 1918 as another point of discontinuity in the Hungarian context. One must point out that the defeat of Austria–Hungary in the First World War and the process of its disintegration resulted in local references to the 'Wilsonian' concept of 'self-determination', albeit in various senses. Hungarian representatives associated this term with a reformed national policy, which was to support the 'historical integrity' of the Hungarian Kingdom through minor concessions to the non-Hungarian national communities. In contrast, non-Hungarian representatives supported their claims to the foundation of their 'nation-states' and the 'right' of their groups 'to choose state allegiances' through references to the American President.

The adaptation of the Russian social democratic concept and its English translation as the 'right of nations to self-determination' supported the viewpoint of the *New Europe* and the participants of its discourse. This stood for the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation of independent nation-states in its post-imperial space ever since the foundation of the platform in late 1916. On the one hand, the concept of 'self-determination' reinforced references to the 'principle of nationality' as the foundation of its conceptual framework. On the other hand, the discourse of the *New Europe* depicted the 'New Russia' of the post-February Revolution as the international model for the

internal reform of the imperial state through its application of 'self-determination' onto its own structure.

As opposed the various discourses of imperial Russia, references to the 'Wilsonian' concept of self-determination' were not important in any of the studied contexts until the end of the First World War. The narratives of the Czech Union in Austria, the *New Europe* or Masaryk did not feature the American President as a central historical figure to support their claims. References to 'Wilsonism' also appeared in the Hungarian context only by the end of the war.

The various concepts of the 'nation' as subjects to the 'right to self-determination' in these contexts featured interesting amalgamations between the 'political' and the 'ethno-cultural' interpretations of the community. The term 'Bohemian people' was embedded in the conceptual framework of the Czech Union, which defined this regional community through the 'state rights' of the historical Kingdom of Bohemia until late 1917. In contrast, the identification of the 'self-determination of peoples' with the concepts of 'sovereignty' and the 'nation-state' rather reinforced references to the 'Czechoslav' or 'Czechoslovak nation' after the turn of 1917–1918. This resulted in a shift in the role of the latter ethno-cultural term, which was originally the concept of Masaryk and his 'Realists' opposed to the liberal discourse of state rights.

Interestingly enough, Masaryk himself developed in the opposite direction with his concept of the 'Czechoslovak' nation. His articles in the *New Europe* presented the term 'nation' as equivalent to the ethno-cultural concept of the 'race', which also applied to the Czech and Slovak community of 'Bohemians'. Nonetheless, the British authors and audience of the journal opposed this interpretation of the 'nation', since they identified it as the political and historical community of the 'state' (especially in the context of Great

Britain). As a result, Masaryk's *The New Europe: The Slav Standpoint of 1918* featured 'nationality' as a key concept, as a compromise between the terms 'race' and 'nation'. The author also emphasized the historical community between Czechs and Germans in 'Bohemia' in his book and his articles in the *New Europe* and hinted at the reconstruction of their political community through the foundation of independent Czechoslovakia. Thus, he incorporated implicit references to the concept of the 'Bohemian people' into his texts and constructed a concept of the 'Czechoslovak nation' that incorporated ethno-cultural and political (or civic) features.

In contrast, the Hungarian representatives of the late First World War attempted to reinforce the 'historical integrity' of the Hungarian Kingdom through references to the 'political nation' as the local subject of the 'right of peoples to self-determination'. Nonetheless, it was also a shift towards the earlier liberal emphasis on the external dimension of the state community as opposed to the previous Positivist tendencies in the Hungarian national discourse to differentiate between the superior 'Hungarian nation' and the inferior 'nationalities' in ethno-cultural terms. In fact, the attempts at the preservation of Hungarian state integrity resulted in the declarations of the Károlyi Party and its political allies as for the abolishment of the difference between the concepts of the 'nation' and 'nationalities' in the local context.

The associations between the concepts of 'democracy' and the 'right of peoples (or nations) to self-determination' were common features of the political discourses. The representatives of the Czech Union identified the 'absolutism' of the Austrian military and civil government and the retrograde rule of the German political minority as opposed to these 'modern' ideas. Masaryk and his associates in the *New Europe* also identified the 'democracy' of the 'national state' as a modern ideal against the 'oppressive', 'a-national'

and anti-modern structure of the 'mixed state' (of Austria–Hungary). The 'right of peoples to self-determination' also appeared in the context of democratic debates in the Hungarian Diet. Reformist Hungarian representatives argued that the application of 'democracy' to the political system of the Hungarian Kingdom could reinforce its legitimacy as opposed to the ethno-cultural interpretation of the former concept. In contrast, non-Hungarian representatives argued against the discrimination of their communities in terms of suffrage and for the universal extension of voting rights in the local context.

One must emphasize the concept of 'the self-determination of peoples' substituted historical references to 'autonomy' in the conceptual framework of the Czech Union. It also superseded the traditional demands in the discourses of non-Hungarian national movements to the introduction of 'autonomies' in the historical framework of the Hungarian Kingdom in late 1918.

Nonetheless, I claim that 'autonomy' still remained the important concept of contemporary discussions in relation to other issues. The Czech representatives offered the application of 'autonomy' to the German community of a Bohemian Kingdom reconstructed as the federal unit of the Habsburg Monarchy. On the one hand, the term referred to a non-territorial framework of cultural rights in accordance with the political and legal traditions of Austria. On the other hand, it substituted references to the 'empire' with those to the 'nation-state' as the primary framework for the introduction of 'national autonomies'. In contrast, German representatives demanded the application of 'autonomy' in a territorial sense to the lands of 'German Bohemia' as a new Austrian crownland.

I also identify 'national minority' as the important parallel concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'nations' and 'national autonomy' in these contexts. I argue that this term referred to the position of certain communities in the framework of the

'nation-state' and was reinterpreted in a qualitative sense in 1918, as a synecdoche in reference to the 'rights of minorities' in contemporary terms. The representatives of the Czech Union and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk implicitly or explicitly referred to the Austrian social democratic concept of 'personal' or 'non-territorial autonomy' from its imperial discourse at the turn of the century as a solution to the issues of minorities in future Czechoslovakia. In contrast, the non-Hungarian representatives substituted the concept of 'nationalities' and references to the Nationalities Law of 1868 with the term. They argued for the cultural and political rights of their communities in the Hungarian Kingdom through the concept in the context of democratic debates in mid-1918.

In contrast to 'national minorities', the interaction between the concepts of the 'self-determination of peoples', 'federation' and 'empire' were rather different in various contexts. The Czech Union demanded the reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy as a 'federal state' of 'nation-states' until the turn of 1917–1918. In contrast, the German nationalist representatives of the Austrian Council supported the development of Cisleithania as a 'unitary state'. The Slovak representatives of the Hungarian Diet also claimed their support for imperial federalism in late 1918 as opposed to the Hungarian claims to the historical integrity of the Hungarian Kingdom. The concept of the 'federation' would also appear as opposed the 'freedom', 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination' of the Hungarian Kingdom in the narrative of Hungarian representatives throughout the war. Masaryk also interpreted the 'promises of federation' of the Austrian government or its Habsburg imperial counterpart as one that could not result in the 'freedom' of local peoples. However, he supported the federal reorganization of the Russian Empire due to the popularity of this idea in the transnational context of the *New Europe* and the Anglo-American political discourse.

The concept of 'Central Europe' appeared in the discourse of the *New Europe* through the cultural transfer of the German term *Mitteleuropa*. The role of Masaryk was formative in this process, who described the alleged designs of German foreign policy and the territories of Austria–Hungary, Russian Poland, and South-Eastern Europe through this term. 'Central Europe' also appeared to describe the same post-imperial state of independent nation-states in this discourse. Nonetheless, Masaryk substituted this concept with that of 'Eastern Europe' in his book of 1918. I argued that this was due to processes of imperial disintegration in the Russian Empire, a subject of interest in the Anglo-American audience.

d. The Disintegration of Historical Hungary, the Foundation of Czechoslovakia (1918–1920) and the Discourses of the Interwar Period

One can interpret historical Hungary and the Republic of Czechoslovakia as laboratories for the application of the concepts of 'self-determination' developed in the last stages of the First World War. It is important to emphasize that the former context was defined by the processes of disintegration in a historical state, whereas the period of 1918–1920 was that of the establishment of the nation-state in the history of Czechoslovakia. The interests of state elites also collided due to the debated status of the Slovak-inhabited lands of Hungary.

Nonetheless, both tackled with the same problems of ethno-cultural diversity and conflicts around different concepts of the 'right to self-determination'. The representatives of non-Hungarian national movements and the German community of the Czech lands declared their secession through the concept. In contrast, Hungarian and Czechoslovak

references to the 'self-determination' of the 'nation' supported the historical integrity of the territories claimed by their national movements.

The Károlyi government thus proclaimed the transformation of Hungary into a 'federal state' in late 1918 upon the initiative of its Minister of Nationalities, Oszkár Jászi. This amounted to the viewpoint that only the pacifist Hungarian establishment was faithful to the interest of the local population as opposed to the 'imperialist' designs of Czechoslovak, Romanian and Serbian foreign policy. The Károlyi government promised to introduce autonomous 'national realms' into the administrative structure of the Hungarian state. This attempt, however, was only successful in the case of Subcarpathian Rus. In contrast, the Constitution of 1920 rather interpreted Czechoslovakia as a unitary 'nation-state'. However, the territory of Subcarpathia also appeared in its narrative as an exception since the fundamental law recognized it as a land with the 'widest autonomy' in Czechoslovakia. This was the result of negotiations between Masaryk and the American representatives of the local Rusyn population in late 1918.

The Károlyi government applied the 'right of self-determination' to those communities, which it recognized as the 'nations' of the common Hungarian homeland. The Constitution of 1920 rather defined the 'Czechoslovak nation' as the subject of the concept. Although the fundamental law differentiated between the 'majority' and 'national minorities', it also displayed civic or political features, as it defined the citizens of Czechoslovakia, the 'Czechoslovak nation' as one 'people', the collective and only source of 'state authority'. I theorize that the concept of the 'Czechoslovak nation' inherited these ambiguities from the historical concept of the 'Czech nation' in the liberal state rights discourse of the nineteenth century.

These interactions between the term 'right of peoples to self-determination' and the 'political' concepts of the 'nation' continued in the political discourses of the interwar period. The 'activist' section of German parties identified the democratic political system of Czechoslovakia as its sphere of 'self-determination' by the late 1920s, which resulted in the rule of Czech(oslovak)–German coalitions between 1926–1938. Only the effects of the Great Economic Depression and Nazi foreign policy could subvert this co-operation of political groups. In contrast, the discourse of Hungarian revisionism referred to the 'State Idea of St. Stephen' as a concept to provide the continuity between the historical community of the Hungarian Kingdom and its reconstructed version of the future. The 'right of peoples to self-determination' referred to the voluntary choice of the 'former nationalities' to reintegrate into this state; in return, the Hungarian representatives of this idea offered the introduction of 'territorial autonomies'. Nonetheless, some of the same individuals could represent 'racial', antisemitic and unfortunately, influential interpretations of the 'nation' in the context of the Hungarian political discourse.

e. Historiographical Considerations

I think the main achievement of my dissertation is the reinterpretation of the relationship between the concepts of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination', the 'empire' or the 'multinational state' in the historical context of the Habsburg Monarchy. My own account is close to the new imperial histories of Andrea Komlosy, Pieter Judson, and authors with a similar outlook. This is due to the fact that I have approached the concept of 'self-determination' through an alternative take on the relationship between the ideas of the 'nation' and the 'empire'.

Thus, I hope to have constructed a narrative alternative to the modern accounts of Jörg Fisch and André Liebich, which have a rather 'Western' focus. Although Fisch is not necessarily erroneous to associate the term 'self-determination of peoples' with those of 'sovereignty', 'secession' and the 'nation-state', one can only accept his theories with certain restrictions. This identification of the three concepts with each other only happened in the late First World War in one case in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy as a 'multinational state'. This applied to the Czech national discourse and only after late 1917. In contrast, simultaneous references to the 'rights to self-determination' and 'sovereignty' had different implications in the contemporary Hungarian context. It rather reinforced claims to 'independence' of the Hungarian Kingdom in the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. Although the 'right of nations to self-determination' supported secessionist designs in the political vocabularies of the *New Europe* and the Czechoslovak emigration, it did not appear in parallel to the concept of 'sovereignty'.

I also position myself against Fisch's interpretation of the conceptual relationship between the 'self-determination of peoples', 'democracy' and 'autonomy'. There seems to have been no competition between the concepts of 'democracy' and the 'self-determination of peoples' in the context of the Late First World War, as Hungarian, Czech(oslovak) and British actors referred to these terms as ones that reinforced each other. The interpretation of 'autonomy' as only a 'partial' and thus, insufficient form of self-determination also appeared only in this time period. Discourses before the First World War had rather featured simultaneous references to these concepts.

However, my viewpoint is also different on this subject than that of André Liebich. The term 'national self-determination' (or rather the 'self-determination of peoples') was not associated with the 'principle of nationality' in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy

before the First World War. Although it appeared in critical narratives as for the 'delimitations' of the imperial political framework, it was not that much of an 'explosive' idea at this time. It did not amount to the refusal of the 'idea' of the 'empire'. Related conceptual frameworks of different national and ideological background rather criticized the state of affairs of their time and forwarded reform ideas. I have shown that the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' was embedded in these political vocabularies by local actors. Although it was definitely not 'virtually insignificant' in the local discourse, it was still a concept of relatively marginal role, as it supported the key concepts of the time ('autonomy', 'federal state', 'state rights' etc.) If it replaced the concept of 'autonomy', that was to push the boundaries of the political discourse due to its international implications.

I have shown that it is not beneficial to assume that local actors opposed to the idea of imperial dissolution did not refer to the concept during the First World War. In contrast, the cultural and ideological transfer of the concept from the context of the February Revolution in the Russia of 1917 resulted in its new-found importance in local discourses, which otherwise still supported the reform of imperial affairs. This finding of mine also opposed the interpretation of the term as of 'German(ic)' origin in the discourse of the First World War.

I also do not support the claim of Liebich that it is 'necessary' to conceptually separate the cultural unit of the 'nation' and the political organization of the 'state'. State policies and identities have had a fundamental influence on concepts of the 'nation'. Interpretations of the community mixed ethno-cultural and political elements. It is similarly erroneous to theorize that it is one general, either 'ethnic' or 'political', 'inclusive' or 'exclusive' general concept of the 'nation' that defines local or transnational

discourses, state structures in the local or the international order. It is rather fruitful to realize that although with varying strength, various concepts of the 'nation' co-exist in and develop through discourses. These can display 'inclusive' or 'exclusive', 'ethnic' or 'civic' dimensions in various contexts. The simultaneous existence of political and ethno-cultural features can define even those nation-states that are traditionally perceived as based on 'ethnic' foundations.

My interest in the topics of 'cultural transfer', 'ideological transfer' and 'transnational discourses' also points beyond the fascination of Fisch, Liebich and traditional accounts with the historical figures of Lenin and Wilson and their influence on the discourse of self-determination in the Late First World. One must emphasize the initial impact of the 1917 February Revolution in Russia on local discourses. This was due to the cultural and ideological transfers of the social democratic concept of 'the right of peoples to self-determination' from the Russian revolutionary context. I have also pointed out that the influence of certain terms from the Austrian social democratic discourse at the turn of the century. Those were especially the ideas of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner that were rather significant on the discussions of other concepts, especially 'autonomy' and 'national minorities'. Ethno-cultural and political concepts of the 'nation' as the possible subjects of the 'right to self-determination' were not necessarily discussed due to the influence of Lenin and Wilson either, as local national discourses had already elaborated on the interpretations of the national communities during the previous phases of their history.

In part, I do support the narrative of Fisch that the interpretation of the concept of 'self-determination' shifted due to the influence of Bolshevik Russian policy. However, I find it equally important to emphasize the importance of local political processes and the

deterioration of economic conditions in the Habsburg Monarchy, much like the narratives of Louis H. Rees and Pieter Judson.

Besides my focus on the relationship between the ideas of the 'nation' and the 'empire' in local discourse, the imperial framework or that of the 'multinational state' also appeared in my study as a transnational space for the cultural and ideological transfer of concepts. I have emphasized through this feature of my study that no political discussions or national discourses are isolated to local contexts or subjects to one or two transnational influences of their time. They rather integrate into discourses in local terms, on the state, regional, continental, and global level.

This is not to say I do not understand the motives behind accounts of Fisch, Liebich and similar narratives. The 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' is a concept of modern international law, and it has played its part in the transformation of the international order in the twentieth century from the system of colonial and land 'empires' to 'nation-states'. It still appears in contexts of national secessionism and related conflicts.

Nonetheless, if we limit our interest to these processes, that will only define *how we think* about the concept of 'self-determination', and will limit the ways of *how we can think* about it. In reality, the concept of the 'self-determination of peoples' or 'national self-determination' can interact with a wide range of concepts in local terms. The concept of 'secession' is only one of these, whereas other parallel concepts do not necessarily problematize the territorial integrity or the very existence of certain states. The interpretation of concepts, the 'right to self-determination' included, are subject to various influences, the range of which scales from the local to the global level. All of these factors define its implications as for the international context. One also cannot think of the concept

independent of the ideological dimension, as it is shared, but also debated between conceptual frameworks of various ideological background. Finally, the common interpretation of certain concepts is up to negotiations and discussions between various parties.

Nonetheless, I also do not want to go as far as to claim that the concept of 'national self-determination' or the 'self-determination of peoples' is a mere, empty 'phrase' or 'slogan' that can basically mean anything. Its possible association with a multitude of parallel concepts only means that it has been a broad term similar to 'independence' or 'freedom'. It has been widely adopted through cultural and ideological transfers into discourses, much similar to one of its subjects, the concept of the 'nation'. Whether we can associate the concept of 'self-determination' with 'autonomy', 'sovereignty' or 'secession', 'minority', nationalities', 'peoples' or 'nations' is thus context-dependent and requires our attention to the complexity of discourses and their vocabularies.

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
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[223] 'Haus der Abgeordneten. - 6. Sitzung der XXII. Session am 14. Juni 1917.', 251.

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[234] 'Haus der Abgeordneten. - 7. Sitzung der XXII. Session am 15. Juni 1917.', 295.

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[244] 'Haus der Abgeordneten. - 87. Sitzung der XXII. Session am 4. Oktober 1918', in *Index zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Reichsrates*, 12. Wahlperiode. XII. Session. (Letzte Session des Reichsrates.) 30. Mai 1917 bis 12. November 1918 (Wien: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1920), 4433-4434.

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[219] Masaryk, 58.

[220] Masaryk, 64-65.

[221] Masaryk, 65.

[222] Masaryk, 64-65.

[223] Masaryk, 65.

[224] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 'Bohemia and the European Crisis', *The New Europe* 2, no. 25 (25 January 1917): 34-35., 47.

[225] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 'Pangermanism and the Eastern Question', 2.

[226] Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948*, 39.

[227] Betty Miller Unterberger, *The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia*, 60.

[228] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 'The Future Status of Bohemia', *The New Europe* 2, no. 19 (22 February 1917): 163.

[229] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 163-164.

[230] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 171.

[231] 'The Czecho-Slovaks', *The New Europe* 2, no. 15 (17 February 1917): 64.

[232] 'Bohemia (The Racial Distribution of the Czechs & Slovaks). Supplement to „THE NEW EUROPE" January 25th, 1917.' (The New Europe, 25 January 1917).

[233] The appendices of the dissertation include this map (pp. 551.).

[234] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 'The Future Status of Bohemia', 171-172.

[235] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 163-164.

[236] Masaryk, *The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint)*, 172.

[237] Masaryk, 183.

[238] Masaryk, 183.

[239] Robert William Seton-Watson, 'Original Notes of Conversations at Rotterdam with Masaryk', 4.

[240] Hugh Seton-Watson and Christopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, 110.

[241] Lloyd E. Ambrosius, 'Woodrow Wilson and The Birth of a Nation: American Democracy and International Relations', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, no. 18 (2007): 711.

[242] Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, *Budoucí Čechy. Přeložil a Úvodem Opatřil Dr. Jan Reichmann* (Otto Girgal, 1919), 7-8.

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[243] Carol Skalnik Leff, *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State*, Nations of the Modern World: Europe (New York - London: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, 1996), 24.

[244] Liebich, 'Minority as Inferiority: Minority Rights in Historical Perspective', 243-244., 262.

[245] Liebich, 262-263.

[246] Szalayné Sándor Erzsébet, *A kisebbségvédelem nemzetközi jogi intézményrendszere a 20. században* (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadói Kör - MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2003), 50-55.

[247] Fannie Fern Andrews, 'The Central Organization for a Durable Peace', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66, no. Preparedness and America's International Program (July 1916): 19.

[248] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 'The Future Status of Bohemia', 171.

[249] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 171.

[250] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, 171-172.

[251] Masaryk, *The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint)*, 84-85.

[252] Masaryk, 85.

[253] Masaryk, 84-85.

[254] Masaryk, 84.

[255] Masaryk, 82-83.

[256] Masaryk, 83.

[257] Masaryk, 141-143.

[258] Rubicon [Robert William Seton-Watson], 'The Czechs and Austria', 149.

[259] Harry Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion*, 1962, 111.

[260] Vladimir Nosek, 'The German Minority in Bohemia: A Czech View', *The New Europe* 9, no. 109 (14 November 1918): 117.

[261] Vladimir Nosek, 117.

[262] Thomas G. Masaryk, Milan R. Stefanik, and Edward Benes, 'The Czechoslovak Republic: Text of the Declaration of Independence Adopted by the Provisional Government', *The New York Times Current History* 9, no. 3 (December 1918): 492-494.

[263] 'Částka 26', in *Stejnopis Sbírky Zákonů a Nařízení Státu Československého.*, 1920, 255.

[264] 'Částka 26', 266-267.

[265] 'Částka 26', 256.

[266] 'Částka 26', 256.

[267] Matthew Vink, 'The Competition for Self-Determination in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1919', *New Zealand Slavonic Journal* 46 (2012): 43-46., 55-57.

[268] Eva Broklová, Ondřej Formánek, and John Comer, 'Opinions of German Activist Parties in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938', *Czech Sociological Review* 6, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 190-191., 193.

[269] Eva Broklová, Ondřej Formánek, and John Comer, 195-196.

[270] Eva Broklová, Ondřej Formánek, and John Comer, 196-197.

[271] Stefan Dölling, 'Hitlers unerklärter Krieg', 10 2016, https://www.spiegel.de/geschichte/sudetenkrise-und-muenchener-abkommen-1938-adolf-hitlers-unerklaerter-krieg-a-1114119.html.

4. Case Study: Hungary

[1] Andrea Komlosy, 'Imperial Cohesion, Nation-Building and Regional Integration in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1804-1918', 371-372., 377.

[2] Gábor Egry, 'Magyar birodalom?: regionális elitek, nacionalista politika, centrum-periféria küzdelem Magyarországon a dualizmus utolsó évtizedeiben', *Sic Itur ad Astra*, no. 76. (2022): 37-38.

[3] Gábor Egry, 39.

[4] The term 'Hungarian Empire' (*magyar birodalom*) would seldom appear on maps and in various works before the First World War. However, this rather reflected on imperial ambitions in the national discourse rather than a mainstream interpretation of the Hungarian Kingdom as an 'empire'. As we shall see, it was more important for the political and intellectual representatives of the Hungarian nation to interpret it as a 'nation-state' or at least, a 'nationally' defined state.

[5] Peter Ferwagner, 'Centenary (Hungary)', in *1914-1918-Online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, trans. Eric Thomas Jennings (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 20 October 2020), 1-2.

[6] Ferwagner, 2.

[7] András Bereznay, 'Treaty of Trianon was a Mockery of the Principle and Right of Self-Determination', *Átlátszó*, 9 June 2020, https://english.atlatszo.hu/2020/06/09/andras-bereznay-treaty-of-trianon-was-a-mockery-of-the-principle-and-right-of-self-determination/. Accessed 12 December 2022.

[8] András Bereznay, 'Trianon: Self-Defeating Self-Determination', *Regional Statistics* 10, no. 1 (2020): 1.

[9] András Bereznay, 1-2.

[10] András Bereznay, 2.

[11] András Bereznay, 2.

[12] Nándor Bárdi and Csaba Zahorán, 'Bevezető', in *A szupremácia és az önrendelkezés igénye: Magyar javaslatok, tervek az erdélyi kérdés rendezésére (1918-1940)*, Források a Romániai Magyarság Történetéhez (Csíkszereda: Pro-Print Könyvkiadó Kft., 2014), 44.

[13] Ferwagner, 'Centenary (Hungary)', 2-3.

[14] Mária Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon 1918-1920*, trans. Miklós Uszkay (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990), 13.

[15] Mária Ormos, 23-25.

[16] Mária Ormos, 23-24.

[17] Mária Ormos, 24.

[18] Mária Ormos, 28.

[19] Mária Ormos, 28-29.

[20] Mária Ormos, 26-28.

[21] Mária Ormos, 140-141.

[22] Gábor Gyáni, 'A nacionalizmus és az Európa-kép változásai Magyarországon a 19–20. században', *Történelmi Szemle* XLIX, no. 4 (2007): 483-484.

[23] Csaba Zahorán, 'Az együttélés vége. A nemzeti önrendelkezés érvényesülése 1918–1921 között a történelmi Magyarország területén', in *Az együttélés történelme: nemzetiségi*

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[24] Peter Pastor, 'The Hungarian Critique of Wilsonianism', in *Wilsonian East Central Europe: Current Perspectives*, ed. John S. Micgiel (New York: Pilsudski Institute, 1995), 2.

[25] Peter Pastor, 2-4.

[26] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, Modern magyar történelem (Jaffa Kiadó, 2018), 9-10.

[27] János Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története* (Budapest: Osiris, 2007), 14-16., 22.

[28] Gyurgyák, 22-23.

[29] Gyurgyák, 22-23.

[30] Gyurgyák, 22-23.

[31] Gyurgyák, 23-24.

[32] Gyurgyák, 157., 169., 174., 182–83.

[33] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 3.

[34] László Péter, 6-8.

[35] Miklós Lojkó, „Editorial Preface", xiv-xvi.

[36] Miklós Lojkó, xvi-xviii.

[37] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*, ix.

[38] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 24., 76.

[39] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 191.

[40] László Fejes, 'Honnan ered Magyarország idegen neve?', 12 October 2010, https://www.nyest.hu/hirek/honnan-ered-magyarorszag-idegen-neve. Accessed 12 December 2022.

[41] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*, ix.

[42] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 27.

[43] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 191-194.

[44] '29. Pest, 1847 június 7. Az Ellenzéki Nyilatkozat Deák Ferenc által összefoglalt végleges szövege', in *Kossuth Lajos 1848/49-Ben*, vol. 9., Kossuth Lajos összes munkái, n.d., https://www.arcanum.com/hu/online-kiadvanyok/Kossuth-kossuth-lajos-osszes-munkai-1/kossuth-lajos-osszes-munkai-xi-CE85/kossuth-lajos-184849-ben-i-kossuth-lajos-az-utolso-rendi-orszaggyulesen-184748-CE8D/i-az-orszaggyules-elokeszuletei-18451847-nov-10-CE8E/29-pest-1847-junius-7-az-ellenzeki-nyilatkozat-deak-ferenc-altal-osszefoglalt-vegleges-szovege-D038/.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 30-31.

[48] '29. Pest, 1847 június 7. Az Ellenzéki Nyilatkozat Deák Ferenc által összefoglalt végleges szövege', in *Kossuth Lajos 1848/49-Ben*, vol. 9., Kossuth Lajos összes munkái, n.d., https://www.arcanum.com/hu/online-kiadvanyok/Kossuth-kossuth-lajos-osszes-munkai-1/kossuth-lajos-osszes-munkai-xi-CE85/kossuth-lajos-184849-ben-i-kossuth-lajos-az-utolso-rendi-orszaggyulesen-184748-CE8D/i-az-orszaggyules-elokeszuletei-18451847-nov-10-CE8E/29-pest-1847-junius-7-az-ellenzeki-nyilatkozat-deak-ferenc-altal-osszefoglalt-vegleges-szovege-D038/.

[49] Ibid.

[50] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 203.

[51] Ibid.

[52] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 55.

[53] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 30.

[54] Miroslav Michaela, *Trianon labirintusaiban: történelem, emlékezetpolitika és párhuzamos történetek Szlovákiában és Magyarországon* (Békéscsaba - Budapest: Magyarországi Szlovákok Kutatóintézete - Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 2016), 11.

[55] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 40-41.

[56] Trencsényi et al., 'Political Visions of the Vormärz', 215-216..

[57] Dušan Ljuboja, 'Herder's Ideas and the Pan-Slavism: A Conceptual-Historical Approach', *Pro&Contra*, no. 2 (2018): 69-70.

[58] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 33-34.

[59] Miklós Wesselényi, *Szózat a' magyar és szláv nemzetiség' ügyében* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1843), 235-236., 286-287.

[60] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 207-208.

[61] 'Magyarország és Erdély egyesítéséről', Pub. L. No. 1848/VII. (1848).

[62] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 203.

[63] 'Az országgyülési követeknek népképviselet alapján választásáról', Pub. L. No. 1848/V. (1848).

[64] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 54.

[65] Gyurgyák, 54.

[66] Lajos Hőke, *Magyarország újabbkori történelme 1815-től 1892-ig*, Átdolgozva s a provisorium és Erdély történetével bővitve, vol. 1 (Nagybecskerek: Pleitz Fer Pál Könynyomdája, 1893), 253.

[67] Lajos Hőke, 1:253.

[68] Trencsényi et al., 'Brotherhood and Disappointment: 1848 and Its Aftermath', 241-242.

[69] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 208-209.

[70] *Önálló* and *független* both translate to 'independent' in Hungarian. I did not want to translate either terms as 'sovereign', as the equivalent of the latter would rather be *szuverén* in Hungarian. This, however, is a term of foreign origin, one with transnational implications, the use of which could lead to possible confusions in the understanding of the text.

[71] Tamás Katona, ed., '82. A magyar nemzet Függetlenségi Nyilatkozata. Debrecen, 1849. április 19.', in *Kossuth Lajos. Írások és beszédek 1848-1849-Ből* (Budapest: Neumann Kht., 2003), http://mek.niif.hu/04800/04834/html/kossuth0083/kossuth0083.html. Accessed 12 December 2022.

[72] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 54.

[73] Gyurgyák, 56., 64.

[74] Ágnes Deák, 'Az 1868-as nemzetiségi törvény ausztriai előzményei', *Magyar Kisebbség* 14, no. 1-2. (2009): 17.

[75] Ágnes Deák, 18., 27.

[76] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 346.

[77] László Péter, 346.

[78] László Péter, 346.

[79] Dr. S. M. ty., 'A Szerbvajdaság kérdése', *Budapesti Hirlap*, no. 261 (11 November 1860): 3214.

[80] Dr. S. M. ty., 3214-3215.

[81] Dr. S. M. ty., 3215.

[82] Dr. S. M. ty., 3215.

[83] 'XXVI. ülés 1861. május 22-kén.', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 1, 1861, 188.

[84] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 345.

[85] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé Lett Magyar Hazátok. A Magyar Nemzeteszme És Nacionalizmus Története*, 71-72.

[86] Although I understand the considerations behind László Péter's preference, I will refer to the *Ausgleich* as the 'Compromise' in accordance with historiographical tradition.

[87] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 222.

[88] Ágnes Deák, 'Deák Ferenc Húsvéti Cikke a Pesti Naplóban. Pest, 1865. április 16.', in *Deák Ferenc: Válogatott politikai irások és beszédek*, vol. 2. 1850-1873, Deák Ferenc Munkái (Budapest: Osiris, 2001), https://www.arcanum.com/hu/online-kiadvanyok/Deak-deak-ferenc-munkai-8751/deak-ferenc-valogatott-politikai-irasok-es-beszedek-6973/ii-kotet-18501873-7510/x-fejezet-a-kiegyezes-megallapodas-1865-1868-7BF9/deak-ferenc-husveti-cikke-a-pesti-naploban-pest-1865-aprilis-16-7BFA/.

[89] Deák.

[90] Although I also use this term in accordance with historiographical traditions, one must emphasize that this 'compromise' was not one between the states or the communities of 'Austria' and 'Hungary', but rather the Habsburg dynasty (the 'Austrian House') and a part of the Hungarian liberal elite.

[91] 'A Magyar Korona országai és az Ő Felsége uralkodása alatt álló többi országok között fenforgó közös érdekü viszonyokról, s ezek elintézésének módjáról', Pub. L. No. 1867/XII. (1867).

[92] A magyar korona országai és az Ő Felsége uralkodása alatt álló többi országok között fenforgó közös érdekü viszonyokról, s ezek elintézésének módjáról.

[93] József Eötvös, *A nemzetiségi kérdés* (Pest: Ráth Mór, 1865), https://mek.oszk.hu/06800/06839/06839.htm#3. Accessed 12 December 2022.

[94] Eötvös.

[95] Eötvös.

[96] Eötvös.

[97] Eötvös.

[98] Trencsényi et al., 'Political Visions of the Vormärz', 215-216.

[99] Eötvös, *A nemzetiségi kérdés*.

[100] 'A nemzetiségi egyenjogúság tárgyában', Pub. L. No. 1868/XLIV. (1868).

[101] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 78.

[102] Gyurgyák, 75-82.

[103] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 191.

[104] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 100.

[105] Sz. J. W, 'Beiträge zur Naturphilosophie. Von Dr. Karl Theodor Bayrhoffer, ausserordentlichem Prof. Der Philosophie an der Universität zu Marburg. Erster Beitrag. Das System von Naturentwicklung, als allgemeine Grundlage. Leipzig, 1839, Verlag von Otto Wigand. 12 1/2 Ív, 6-Adr. Ára 1 Ft. 30 Kr. e. p.', ed. Pál Balogh Almási, *Tudománytár Közre bocsátja a' Magyar Tudos Társaság* 6 (1842): 225.

[106] Ignácz Zsoldos, *A szolgabirói hivatal. Közrendtartási rész* (Pápa: Református Főiskola, 1842), 191-192.

[107] Ágnes Kenyeres, ed., 'Zsoldos Ignác', in *Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon A-Z. Javított, átdolgozott kiadás*, n.d., https://www.arcanum.com/hu/online-kiadvanyok/Lexikonok-magyar-eletrajzi-lexikon-7428D/z-zs-787F8/zsoldos-ignac-78904/.

[108] '„Az önrendelkezési jogokat követelte hazánk 1848/49-ben és 2017-ben is"'.

[109] Zoltán Fónagy, '„Fontosabbat törvényhozásunk évlapjai nem ismernek" - Az 1848-as áprilisi törvények szentesítése', *Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont* (blog), 11 April 2020, https://abtk.hu/ismerettar/evfordulok/1426-fontosabbat-torvenyhozasunk-evlapjai-nem-ismernek-az-1848-as-aprilisi-torvenyek-szentesitese. Accessed 12 December 2022.

[110] Fisch, *The Right of Self-Determination of Peoples: The Domestication of an Illusion*, 117.

[111] György Bodor, ed., 'Kossuth beszéde Amerikába érkezésekor New-Yorkban, 1851 december 4-én.', in *Kossuth a magyar igazságért* (Nemzeti Könyvtár, 1944), 11.

[112] Gyula Mérei and Ferenc Pölöskei, eds., '5. A Deák-Párt programja (1865. május 7-9.)', in *Magyarországi pártprogramok 1867-1919*, vol. 1, Magyarországi Pártprogramok (Budapest: ELTE - Eötvös Kiadó, 2003), 80-81.

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[113] Gyula Mérei and Ferenc Pölöskei, eds., '6. A Balközép programja (1867. június 26. Pest)', in *Magyarországi pártprogramok 1867-1919*, vol. 1, Magyarországi Pártprogramok (Budapest: ELTE - Eötvös Kiadó, 2003), 87.

[114] Gyula Mérei and Ferenc Pölöskei, eds., '16. A Szabadelvű Párt programja. (1875. március 1. Budapest)', in *Magyarországi pártprogramok 1867-1919*, vol. 1, Magyarországi Pártprogramok (Budapest: ELTE - Eötvös Kiadó, 2003), 123.

[115] "CVIII. országos ülés. (Marcz. 22. 1867.)," 4-5.

[116] László Péter, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective - Collected Studies*, 360., 363-364.

[117] László Péter, 316-318.

[118] Gyula Mérei and Ferenc Pölöskei, eds., '49. A Nemzeti Munkapárt programja. (1910. február 15. Budapest)', in *Magyarországi pártprogramok 1867-1919*, vol. 1, Magyarországi Pártprogramok (Budapest: ELTE - Eötvös Kiadó, 2003), 123.

[119] Ervin Csizmadia, *Domináns pártok a magyar politikában. Három korszak (a dualizmus, a Horthy-Korszak és napjaink) pártfejlődésének összehasonlítása* (MTA PTI- Napvilág Kiadó, 2018), 151.

[120] '16. országos ülés november 14. 1878.', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 1. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1878, 3-32.

[121] '297. országos ülés. November 15. 1880.', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 14. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1880, 370.

[122] István Kiss, *Európai nemzetközi jog* (Eger: Érsek-Lyceumi Kő-és Könyvnyomda, 1876), 76., 80-81.

[123] Johann Caspar Bluntschli, *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten: Als Rechtsbuch dargestellt* (Nördlingen: Druck und Verlag der C. H. Beck'schen Buchhandlung, 1868), 47.

[124] Bluntschli, 46-47.

[125] Mérei és Pölöskei, „A Nemzeti Munkapárt programja. (1910. február 15. Budapest)", 266.

[126] László Bencze, *Bosznia és Hercegovina okkupációja 1878-ban*, 46., 50-51.

[127] Katalin Schrek, 'Gróf Vay Dániel és a cívis polgárok megmozdulása Az 1877-1878-as orosz-török háború idején', *Speculum Historiae Debreceniense*, no. 26 (2021): 263-264.

[128] László Bencze, *Bosznia es Hercegovina okkupációja 1878-Ban*, 52., 83.

[129] '95. országos ülés márczius 24. 1879.', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 5. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1879, 14.

[130] '95. országos ülés. Márczius 24. 1879.', 14.

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[138] Grünwald, 9-10., 21-22.

[139] Grünwald, 78-79.

[140] Trencsényi et al., 'The Rise and Fall of "National Liberalism" after 1848'.

[141] Grünwald, 130-158.

[142] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 82-84., 101.

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[156] Concha, *Alkotmánytan*, 1:603.

[157] Concha, 1:263-264.

[158] Concha, 1:68-69.

[159] Concha, 1:69.

[160] Concha, 1:78-79., 81-83.

[161] Concha, 1:70-71.

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[163] Mérei és Pölöskei, 174.

[164] Zoltán Szász, 'XIII. Political Life and the Nationality Question in the Era of Dualism (1867-1918)', in *History of Transylvania*, ed. Zoltán Szász and Béla Köpeczi, vol. 3 (From 1830 to 1919), East European Monographs, DXCIX. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), https://mek.oszk.hu/03400/03407/html/422.html. Accessed 12 December 2022.

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[168] Dolmányos, 495-497.

[169] '137. országos ülés 1907 április 12-én, pénteken', in *Képviselőházi napló, 1906. VIII. kötet: 1907. április 4–április 24*. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1907, 171-172.

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[171] '131. országos ülés 1907 április 4-én csütörtökön', 23.

[172] „484. országos ülés 1913 deczember 5-én, pénteken", 424.

[173] Mérei and Pölöskei, '49. A Nemzeti Munkapárt programja. (1910. február 15. Budapest)', 263-264.

[174] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 118-122., 125-126.

[175] György Litván, *Jászi Oszkár*, 8-9.

[176] György Litván, 10-11.

[177] György Litván, 9.

[178] Gyurgyák, *Ezzé lett magyar hazátok. A magyar nemzeteszme és nacionalizmus története*, 179.

[179] Dávid Kovács, 'Jászi Oszkár és a "hazafiság újrakeresztelése"', *Orpheus Noster* IX., no. 1 (2017): 28-30.

[180] Dávid Kovács, 30-31.

[181] Dávid Kovács, 30-31.

[182] György Litván, *Jászi Oszkár*, 83.

[183] György Litván, 81-83.

[184] Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest: Nap, 1912), VII.

[185] György Litván, *Jászi Oszkár* (Budapest: Osiris, 2003), 17-19., 81.

[186] However, one must emphasize that Jewish assimilation into the Hungarian nation was widespread at this time. Individuals of Jewish background could also share the viewpoint of the Hungarian national mainstream at the turn of the century.

[187] Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés* (Budapest: Nap Kiadó, 1912), 2., 9.

[188] Jászi, 1-8.

[189] Jászi, 2., 9-10.

[190] I did not translate this term as the 'nation-state' in view of Jászi's specific standpoint on this subject. He also did not use the term *nemzetállam* in his work, the Hungarian equivalent of the former English term.

[191] Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés*, 12-13., 530-531.

[192] Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés*, 525-532.

[193] Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés*, 349-350., 355-358.

[194] Jászi, 532-534.

[195] Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés*, 375-377.

[196] [...] a nemzetiségi béke megvalósításának két sine qua non föltétele van: Az egyik: jó iskola, jó közigazgatás, jó bíráskodás a nép nyelvén. A másik: minden nemzetiség ama jogának elismerése, hogy nyelvét, kultúráját szabadon fejlesztheti ki. Jászi, 497.

[197] Oszkár Jászi, *A nemzeti államok kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés*, 531–532.

[198] Oszkár Jászi, 341-342., 349.

[199] Oszkár Jászi, 163., 332., 342., 508.

[200] Oszkár Jászi, 375., 508-509.

[201] Oszkár Jászi, 509-510.

[202] Oszkár Jászi, 163-198.

[203] György Litván, *Jászi Oszkár*, 84.

[204] György Litván, 85-86.

[205] Tibor Hajdu, *Károlyi Mihály*, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978.), 239.

[206] Tibor Hajdu, 254-255.

[207] Tibor Hajdu, 254-255.

[208] Tibor Hajdu, 255.

[209] Tibor Hajdu, 268.

[210] György Litván, *Jászi Oszkár*, 117-118., 134.

[211] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, 64-65.

[212] András Schwarz, 'A képviselet megkésett modernizációja. A magyar parlamenti képviselők összetétele és a politikai modernizáció, 1884–2006.' (Budapest, Corvinus Egyetem, 2008), 101-102.

[213] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, 65-66.

[214] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*, 392.

[215] Gyula Mérei and Ferenc Pölöskei, eds., '54. A Függetlenségi és 48-as (Károlyi) Párt programja (1916. július 17. Budapest)', in *Magyarországi pártprogramok 1867-1919*, vol. 1, Magyarországi Pártprogramok (Budapest: ELTE - Eötvös Kiadó, 2003), 324.

[216] Mérei and Pölöskei, 325-326.

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[221] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, 110-111.

[222] '734. országos ülés 1917 julius 4-én, szerdán', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 36. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1917, 236.

[223] '734. országos ülés 1917 julius 4-én, szerdán', 236.

[224] '734. országos ülés 1917 julius 4-én, szerdán', 237.

[225] '734. országos ülés 1917 julius 4-én, szerdán', 240.

[226] '734. országos ülés 1917 julius 4-én, szerdán', 240.

[227] '735. országos ülés 1917 julius 5-én, csütörtökön', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 36. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1917, 249-251.

[228] '735. országos ülés julius 5-én, csütörtökön', 251.

[229] Hajdu, „A hátország", 159-160.

[230] Szabó, 'Parlamenti pártok Magyarországon (1867-1919)', 32.

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[232] '768. országos ülés 1918 február 7-én, csütörtökön', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 38. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1917, 260.

[233] '796. országos ülés 1918 június 20-án, csütörtökön.', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 38. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 470.

[234] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, 118-120.

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[237] '797. országos ülés 1918 június 21-én, pénteken', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 39. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 504.

[238] '746. országos ülés 1917 október 23-án, kedden', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 37. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1917, 144

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[242] '784. országos ülés 1918 május 14-én, kedden.', 165.

[243] '804. országos ülés 1918 julius 4-én, csütörtökön', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 40. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 281.

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[246] Eötvös, *A nemzetiségi kérdés*.

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[249] '805. országos ülés 1918 julius 5-én, pénteken.', in *Képviselőházi Napló, 1910. XL. Kötet: 1918. Junius 25–Julius 19*. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 304.

[250] '805. országos ülés 1918 julius 5-én, pénteken.', 304.

[251] '805. országos ülés 1918 julius 5-én, pénteken', in *Képviselőházi Napló*, vol. 40. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 303-304.

[252] '768. országos ülés 1918 február 7-én, csütörtökön', 255.

[253] '768. országos ülés 1918 február 7-én, csütörtökön', 255.

[254] '768. országos ülés 1918 február 7-én, csütörtökön', 260.

[255] '768. országos ülés 1918 február 7-én, csütörtökön', 260.

[256] '796. országos ülés 1918 június 20-án, csütörtökön.', 470.

[257] '772. országos ülés 1918 február 20-án, szerdán', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 38. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1917, 336.

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[261] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, 110.

[262] '825. országos ülés 1918 október 18-án, pénteken', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 41. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 314-315.

[263] '825. országos ülés 1918 október 18-án, pénteken', 315.

[264] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története,* 110-111.

[265] '825. országos ülés 1918 október 18-án, pénteken', 316.

[266] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 41. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 347-348.

[267] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', 348.

[268] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', 349-350.

[269] „826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton.", 350.

[270] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', 350.

[271] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', 351.

[272] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', 352-354.

[273] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', 352.

[274] '824. országos ülés 1918 október 17-én, csütörtökön', in *Képviselőházi Napló*, vol. 41. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 301.

[275] '826. országos ülés 1918 október 19-én, szombaton', 350.

[276] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, 109.

[277] '823. országos ülés 1918 október 16-án, szerdán', 280-281.

[278] '823. országos ülés 1918 október 16-án, szerdán', 281-282.

[279] '823. országos ülés 1918 október 16-án, szerdán', 282.

[280] '823. országos ülés 1918 október 16-án, szerdán', 283.

[281] '823. országos ülés 1918 október 16-án, szerdán', 282-283.

[282] '823. országos ülés 1918 október 16-án, szerdán', 282-283.

[283] '823. országos ülés 1918 október 16-án, szerdán', 282-283.

[284] '828. országos ülés 1918 október 23-án, szerdán', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 41. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1918, 418-420.

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[289] '752. országos ülés 1917 november 20-án, kedden', in *Képviselőházi napló*, vol. 37. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, 1917, 380.

[290] '766. országos ülés 1918 február 5-én, kedden.', 218-219.

[291] '824. országos ülés 1918 október 17-én, csütörtökön', 310.

[292] Pál Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság: az 1918-as összeomlás és forradalom története*, 251.

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