SATIRICAL CULTURES IN THE POSTREVOLUTIONARY OTTOMAN EMPIRE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF *KALEM* AND *EMBROS*, 1908-1909

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Abstract

This thesis explores the postrevolutionary satirical landscape of the Ottoman Empire through a comparative analysis of two influential journals: *Kalem*, published by liberal-minded Turkish elites in Ottoman Turkish and French, and *Embros*, published by an Ottoman Greek intellectual in Greek. Situating these publications within the context of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the study analyzes their distinct satirical calibers informed by their respective communal statuses and divergent approaches to the evolving sociopolitical milieu. While *Kalem* aligns with mainstream humor and reinforces constitutional norms, *Embros* embodies a marginalized perspective, challenging hierarchies and embracing ambiguity. Drawing from Bakhtinian theory, the research illuminates the carnivalesque spirit of the revolution and the tensions between consolidation and disruption as manifest in these satirical publications. Through close readings of primary sources, the thesis sheds light on the complexities of postrevolutionary discourse and contributes to a nuanced understanding of the late Ottoman Empire's cultural landscape.

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Introduction

On 24 April 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. This day marked the beginning of a war that would inflict an immense defeat upon the Ottoman Empire in less than a year, with almost all of its territory in the Balkans becoming de facto sovereign principalities as per the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 that ended the war. However, on 8 May 1877, two weeks after the start of the war, the Ottoman parliament was in a heated debate about something entirely different: whether to ban satirical publications. Russia made an appearance in this debate, as Vasilaki Bey, a Greek member of parliament from Istanbul, presented it in his speech as an antimodel: "Show me one state where, although there is progress, satirical journals are considered detrimental [to imperial sovereignty]. Satirical journals are banned only in Russia. They are published everywhere else; will we act as Russia?"[1]

Vasilaki Bey's remark encapsulates the struggles of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century: striving for progress and modernization, modeling itself on the West, and negotiating liberty within and without the empire. Such debates and expression of concerns in the Ottoman parliament, however, were eventually nullified. Sultan Abdülhamid II not only prorogued the parliament indefinitely in 1878, ending the reformist era known as *Tanzimat*, but also outright banned the publishing of satirical journals.[2] The end of Tanzimat era also undermined its social project of promoting a supranational and suprareligious identity known as Ottomanism. What crippled and eventually overthrew Abdülhamid's despotic regime was the Second Constitutional Period inaugurated by the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908, led

[1] "Bana bir devlet göstersinler ki, o devlette terakki olduğu halde mizah gazeteleri muzır görülmüştür. Mizah gazeteleri yalnız Rusya'da memnudur. Ondan mâadâ her yerde çıkar, biz de Rusya gibi mi hareket edeceğiz?" "Heyet-i Mebûsanın İctimâı," *Takvim-i Vekâyi* 1906, 1 Cemazeyilevvel 1294 / 14 May 1877, 3.
[2] Gökhan Demirkol, "Tanzimat Mizahının Sonu: 1877 Matbuat Kanunu Tartışmaları ve Osmanlı'da Mizah Dergilerinin Kapanması [The End of Tanzimat Humor: Debates on 1877 Press Law and the Banning of Humor Magazines in the Ottoman Empire]," *Hitit Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 9, no. 2 (December 2016): 687–710.

by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The aftermath of the revolution witnessed a resurgence of Ottomanist sentiment, shared by all members of society. With acute censorship measures of the Hamidian era lifted, the postrevolutionary period was one of heightened press activity, labeled as the 1908 press boom by scholars.

The press boom was "a physical manifestation of the revolution," as the new press was part and parcel of the euphoric and optimistic postrevolutionary atmosphere. Erol Baykal rightfully argues that the press was the clearest form of a break with the Hamidian regime[3] as it did not at all hesitate to disregard censorship and act autonomously from the onset. Perhaps the most exciting genre that made a great comeback in this period was satire. The number only of Turkish satirical publications that appeared in 1908 were 32.[4] This number increased in the years to come, and the non-Turkish ones also abounded.

In this thesis, I analyze two satirical journals that were published immediately after the revolution: the bilingual (Ottoman Turkish and French) journal *Kalem* and the Greek journal *Embros*. Both popular ones and replete with ostensible commitments to Ottomanist values, these journals had unique takes on the postrevolutionary sociopolitical arena, informed by their publishers' and readers' respective communal statuses within the empire. By comparing these two satirical publications, this thesis aims to draw a fuller tableau of the postrevolutionary discursive and political landscape where authors entrenched in different ethnoreligious cultures produced peculiar modes of satire. These literary modes of satire transpire as products of postrevolutionary imaginative possibilities informed by ethnic statuses and interethnic relations.

Primary Sources

Kalem was published by Celal Esad Arseven and Salah Cimcoz, both bureaucratic, intellectual, and liberal-minded Turkish elites with anti-Abdülhamid sentiment and support

[3] Erol A.F. Baykal, *The Ottoman Press (1908-1923)* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 43.
[4] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), 333–34.

for the Young Turks' ideals and constitutionalism. The journal first appeared on September 3, 1908 and ran weekly with interruptions until June 29, 1911. Representing the voice of liberal-minded Ottoman intellectuals in both Turkish and French, *Kalem* found itself a solid readership among likeminded Young Turk circles and diplomatic offices. As Ekin Enacar, author of a recent dissertation on *Kalem*, argues, satirical press helps trace the period's hidden sociopolitical anxieties much better than its non-satirical counterpart.[5] Despite an overall adherence to constitutionalism, the journal indeed targeted the regime for its frailties and vestigial authoritarianism, the period for its cosmetic modernization, and the society for its ignorance. The 16-page journal was composed of humorous stories and opinion pieces on everyday politics, as well as cartoons.

Embros appeared on August 2, 1908 and was fundamentally a one-man project. Published by a member of the Constantinopolitan Greek elite and intelligentsia, K.G. Makridis, it ran until December 6, 1920. Author of the only scholarly article on *Embros*, Efthymia Canner describes the circulation in its first year as "trifling," yet the journal rose to prominence onwards from 1909. Canner identifies Makridis as a typical Greek intellectual of Constantinople: loyal to traditional Greek-Orthodox values and an admirer of ancient Greek culture.[6] He was against Balkan nationalisms and foreign intervention, and loyal to the Ottoman state, as long as it protected the Greek community and its institutions. His "Ottomanism," therefore, was of a different kind than the publishers of *Kalem*. Unlike his loyalty to the state underwritten by a nostalgia for its pre-reform administration of millets, his adherence to constitutionalism was almost non-existent: what he saw in this Oriental constitutional regime was a masquerade.[7] Makridis satirized mainly in verse form, although

[5] Ekin Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery: Political Satire, Censorship, and Opposition in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1911)" (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, 2021), 86.
[6] Efthymia Canner, "La Presse Satirique Grecque d'Istanbul Au Lendemain de La Révolution Jeune-Turque : Le Journal *Embros* [The Greek Satirical Press of Istanbul in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution: The Journal *Embros*]," *Revue Du Monde Musulman et de La Méditerranée*, L'humour en Orient, 77–78 (1995): 112.
[7] Ibid., 117.

there were poignant commentaries on everyday politics and announcements written in prose. The central comic narrative revolved around the constant misunderstandings among two leitmotif characters, Ali and Pantelis, who recall a modern version of the Karagöz-Hacivat duo, the main characters of the popular Ottoman shadow play.[8] The 4-page journal usually had one cartoon on its third page that corresponded to the content of textual satire. Most of the cartoons were drawn by an artist nicknamed Papatrehas.

These journals certainly experienced a change in their ideological trajectories throughout their lifespans due to the CUP's increasing authoritarianism, the resuscitated censorship, the Balkan Wars, and rising Turkification policies. Nevertheless, I aim less to observe these trajectories than to situate the journals in their social-cum-discursive positionings within the postrevolutionary landscape of the Ottoman Empire. To do so, I examine their satirical targets, discursive and aesthetic qualities and patterns, and approach to everyday politics. My argument is that whereas *Kalem* represented national, mainstream humor via its unquestioned subscription to constitutionalism, *Embros* portrayed a more disruptive satire informed by its publisher's marginalized position in and panoramic view of the Ottoman society. In other words, *Kalem* was the journal of legitimate humor while *Embros* was the cynical voice of an outsider.

While I do not approach either of the magazines as representative of their ethnoreligious communities,[9] my research is concerned with their proximity to the constitutionalist zeitgeist which is inevitably informed by the publishers' dominant/nondominant status in society that determined the benefit constitutionalism would

[8] For an analysis of the shadow play in multiethnic (Greek-Turkish) context, please see: Anna Stavrakopoulou, "Ottoman Karagöz and Greek Shadow Theater: Communicational Shifts and Variants in a Multi-Ethnic and Ethnic Context," in *Ruse and Wit: The Humorous in Arabic, Persian and Turkish Narrative*, ed. Dominic Parviz Brookshaw (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 146–157.

[9] *Kalem*'s authors and cartoonists were in fact from various backgrounds, which caused the journal to maintain an equidistance to certain political events. Tobias Heinzelmann, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu, 1908-1914* [The Balkan Crisis in Ottoman Caricature, 1908-1914], trans. Türkis Noyan (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 134–41, 222–23.

deliver. What made these journals attractive as objects of research was their capacity to satirize the status quo, in which they certainly differed. They were both Ottoman, with different languages and modes of satire and authorship that determined this capacity.

This thesis will explore these modes in a Bakhtinian framework applied to the history of the postrevolutionary Ottoman Empire. Other revolutions have been widely recognized in their carnivalesque capacity, yet, as far as my research goes, the Young Turk Revolution has not yet been identified in those terms, although there are incidental attributes in the scholarship.[10] Using the concept in its literary and extraliterary dimensions, I will discuss both the revolution and its satirical journals as carnivalesque entities with varying degrees of moralism or nihilism, and address their distinct signals of a return back to the established order.

Historians have observed how revolutions frequently unfold in a celebratory and ambiguous manner, akin to a carnival atmosphere. The Young Turk Revolution was a prime example of this phenomenon, characterized by euphoria, optimism, and a sense of anarchy in the aftermath. With the downfall of Abdülhamid's despotism and the easing of interethnic tensions, Ottoman society experienced a leveling effect, embracing principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. However, this newfound sociopolitical space was not without its complexities. The Committee of Union and Progress, inexperienced in governance, navigated an ambiguous path toward constitutionalism amidst global trends of nationalization. The resulting ambivalence led to a struggle in accommodating communal differences within the new constitutional regime. Eventually, faced with the fragility of the constitutional order, the CUP turned to authoritarianism and nationalism.

[10] See, for example, Erol Köroğlu, "Osmanlı İmkansız ve Manasızdır: Türk Edebiyatında II. Meşrutiyet'in Hicivsel Temsili [The Ottoman Empire is Impossible and Meaningless: Satirical Representations of the Second Constitutional Period in Turkish Literature]," in *II. Meşrutiyet'i Yeniden Düşünmek*, ed. Ferdan Ergut (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009), 203–11.

This rise and fall of revolutionary euphoria mirrors Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of the carnivalesque: a temporary suspension of norms and hierarchies. Bakhtin's own experience during the Russian Revolution shaped his perspective, emphasizing the plurality of voices and cultures unleashed during such upheavals. The Young Turk Revolution, with its proliferation of voices through the press boom, exemplified this carnivalesque spirit. Satirical journals like *Kalem* and *Embros* represented differing approaches to constitutionalism, with *Kalem* adopting a more didactic tone aimed at guiding society towards a normative truth, while *Embros* embraced ambiguity and diversity, reflecting a marginalized perspective.

Bakhtin's distinction between negative and carnivalesque satire further elucidates these dynamics. Negative satire seeks to impose a normative truth from a position of superiority, while carnivalesque satire, inclusive of contradictions, breathes new life into its object without moralizing. In the postrevolutionary Ottoman Empire, *Kalem*'s satire leaned towards the negative, reinforcing constitutional norms, while *Embros* embodied carnivalesque satire, disrupting hierarchies and embracing diversity. This distinction mirrors the broader dichotomy between mainstream and marginal humor. Ultimately, the Young Turk Revolution's aftermath reflects a tension between consolidation and disruption, with differing satirical approaches embodying these conflicting forces. In the next chapter, I will lay out in detail what this means for the revolution, its satire, and postrevolutionary discursive possibilities.

The motives behind this research are several and much entangled with the existing literature. One of them is to counter the merely illustrative use of satirical press by current scholarship on this period, which prevents addressing this genre in its own literary-historical reality. As Enacar writes, "satirical journals are treated as the supermodels of Ottoman press. Everybody loves them for their attractive looks, but only a few actually care about what's on

the inside."[11] While this holds true, those few also concentrate on satirical press in Ottoman Turkish, meaning that even fewer people care about the non-Turkish press of the time. Another motive, therefore, is to put the non-Turkish press back on the postrevolutionary scene of the Ottoman Empire and analyze nondominant communities' patterns of social and political belonging via their discursive participation. This goal entails an opposition to national historiographies which tend to single out Turks as the main laborers of Ottomanism and identify—even blame, in the case of Turkish nationalist historiography—non-Turks as agents of nationalist and separatist movements. Whereas the thesis subscribes to an overall dominant-versus-nondominant binary, it will acknowledge the ideological diversity over time and space within Turkish and Greek communities regarding the constitutional revolution. Indeed, not all Turks were pro-constitution, and some Greeks were pro-dynasty and pro-imperial tradition despite nation-state Greece looming large in their everyday political and intellectual life.

Further goals that I try to achieve in the following chapters include reworking the prevailing narratives on the history of the late Ottoman Empire to accommodate the micronarrative of the Ottoman Greek community in all its political diversity. By doing so, I aim to show the symbiotic process in which communities and empires framed their national identities and citizenry. This is also mirrored in the technical approach of the thesis, since it is only in comparison to *Embros* that *Kalem* appears as the representative of mainstream humor, and vice versa. Approaching either of them in isolation may make both seem too innovative or too petty.

Literature Review

This research is situated within a nexus of scholarly works that draw on several strands: the scholarship on the Young Turk Revolution and the Second Constitutional Period,

[11] Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery," 1.

on the nondominant communities in this period, on Ottoman Greeks (Rums), and on postrevolutionary satire. The first one ranges from works that assume an essentialist tone to more recent works that capture the nuances. For the former group, a representative example would be Feroz Ahmad. Ahmad tends to see the revolution as backed by Ottoman Turks and constantly jeopardized by Ottoman Greeks: "Ottoman Greeks were loyal either to Athens or a resurgent Byzantium, two sides of the same coin. Ottoman, and later Turkish, revival was seen as the greatest threat to such aspirations and therefore to be prevented at all cost."[12] His essentialist disregard for the political variety among either group results in his failure to recognize the complexities of the revolution.

One very important revisionist work is Bedross Der Matossian's *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Der Matossian explores how Jews, Arabs, and Armenians' perceptions of constitutionalist values diverged from the dominant perception imposed by the CUP, resulting in the failure of the revolution.[13] Despite his exclusion of the Greek community, Der Matossian proposes a reliable perspective through which to comprehend the realities of the revolution without romanticizing it as a unifying force or outright condemning it as a factor leading to ethnic nationalism and violence. He instead carefully navigates the fluidity of such political values as Ottomanism over time and space and the ensuing failure of the revolution to create the kind of constitutional regime it had promised to establish. Nevertheless, Der Matossian not only ignores the political diversity within communities to a certain degree but also attributes disillusionment solely to nondominant communities' immediate postrevolutionary experience and fails to see the general discontent.

[12] Feroz Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Benjamin Braude (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 292–93.
[13] Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).

While there is substantial scholarship on Ottoman Greeks,[14] it is not very difficult to observe that this corpus has remained hesitant to touch the Greek sources and chose instead to deploy Ottoman sources on Rum communities. One recent amendment to this was an issue of the *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*. In the issue's introduction, Christine Philliou writes,

> Ottoman studies as a field has yet to acknowledge or even begin to reckon with the deeper consequences of including Rum (and by extension other non-dominant groups) in Ottoman history. By this I mean we have not even begun to tap into the vast store of knowledge—or its implications—that has been produced in the Greek language […] Many have dismissed this knowledge as antiquarian or as so nationalist in sensibility as to pretend that there was a Rum experience and a Rum history separable from Ottoman governance and therefore Ottoman history. […] In a sense, there were ways in which Rum communities were living in another dimension at the same time as co-existing with, and under their Ottoman rulers and administrators. We can only gain access to that dimension through this other tradition of knowledge, generated in Greek.[15]

It is exactly this Rum dimension and its standing vis-à-vis the master narratives of the late Ottoman Empire that I wish to explore in this thesis by evaluating the satirical caliber of the two journals. Whereas *Kalem* saw a badly operated regime, *Embros* attacked a regime that would not hold at all. This comparison will help discern the Rum dimension in the postrevolutionary arena.

The reason to choose satire as an object of study is outlined by Palmira Brummett in her seminal work on Ottoman cartoon, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911*: "Revolution is the exchange of the old familiar follies for unknown and untested follies. In the Ottoman satirical gazettes we find the suspicion that practicing constitutional government might not be as easy as imagining it—that the new follies might be

[14] Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Philip Issawi, eds., *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J: Darwin Press, 1999); Benjamin C. Fortna et al., eds., *State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945* (London, New York: Routledge, 2013); Benjamin Braude, ed., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014); Pinelopi Stathis, ed., *19. Yüzyıl İstanbul'unda Gayrimüslimler* [Non-Muslims in 19th-century Istanbul], trans. Foti Benlisoy and Stefo Benlisoy (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999).

[15] Christine Philliou, "Introduction: Rum Geographies," *JOTSA* 9, no. 1 (2022): 14–15.

just as bad as the old."[16] Satirical journals unveil the underlying fears, anxieties, and concerns, yet mere analysis of cartoons in Turkish press, which Brummett undertakes, reveals an incomplete tableau. This thesis will try to redress both components of this problem by analyzing the textual parts and a Greek journal, as well. Nevertheless, Brummett's study remains a strong source to turn to, as it tackles various themes like modernization, gender, and anti-imperialism.

Brummett's exclusive focus on cartoons has been criticized by Tobias Heinzelmann, the author of *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu, 1908-1914* [The Balkan Crisis in Ottoman Caricature, 1908-1914]. In his analysis of three Turkish journals, Heinzelmann connects *Kalem*'s political equidistance to two main factors. First, its authors and cartoonists were of various backgrounds: Istanbul Turks, Rums, and Europeans dwelling in the city. Second, the journal adopted the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity as the measure against which it evaluated the regime's weaknesses. Heinzelmann acknowledges that the authors and cartoonists of *Kalem* "were free to present their different points of view, as long as they remained within a certain framework."[17] I argue that this framework, coupled with the above revolutionary ideals, was the constitutionalist idiom. Juxtaposing *Kalem*'s stance with that of *Embros* will unveil how the margins of Ottoman society interpreted this idiom.

One recent powerful work on *Kalem* is, as previously mentioned, Ekin Enacar's dissertation: "We Laugh at Our Misery: Political Satire, Censorship, and Opposition in the Ottoman Empire (1908-1911)."[18] Enacar not only deconstructs *Kalem* both visually and textually but also carefully locates the stories and cartoons in their everyday context. Her research, therefore, is a comprehensive and successful update to the historiography on postrevolutionary satirical press.

[16] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911*, 3.
[17] Tobias Heinzelmann, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu*, 222–23.
[18] Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery."

The only equally exhaustive work on *Embros* is, regretfully, an 11-page article.[19] Eftyhmia Canner's "La Presse Satirique Grecque d'Istanbul Au Lendemain de La Révolution Jeune-Turque : Le Journal *Embros*" [Greek Satirical Press of Istanbul in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution: The Journal *Embros*] identifies the main characteristics of *Embros* and observes its ideological trajectory from imperial to national loyalty. Canner pinpoints nation, state, and constitution as the keywords of Ali and Pantelis's (mis)communication and thereby draws the boundaries of Makridis's communal standing in late Ottoman Istanbul.[20] The patterns she detects constitutes the gridlines of my analysis on *Embros*.

Before a close reading of the journals, the thesis first attempts at a revisionary historiography of the late Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the first chapter reworks the macro and micro narratives of and on the period to underline the interethnic symbiosis underlying the nationalization processes. Once the revolutionary complexities regarding Ottomanism and constitutionalism are recast, I will turn to a Bakhtinian theoretical framework to further unfold the carnivalesque entanglements of revolution and satire from the perspectives of dominant and nondominant communities. The second chapter is a visual and textual close reading of the journals' first issues, situating them in their respective mainstream and marginal satirical categories in line with their communal statuses. The third chapter scrutinizes a selection of the journals' responses to everyday social and political events. Comparing their reactions will highlight the conservative nature of *Kalem* as opposed to the self-reflective lens of *Embros*.

[19] There are some sources in Turkish and Greek about the Rum press in Istanbul, yet even fewer on *Embros*: Stratis Tarinas, *İstanbul Rum Yayıncılık Tarihine Bir Katkı* [A Contribution to the History of Istanbul's Rum Press] (Istanbul: İstos, 2014); Lady Marina Marks, "I ellinikés ephimerídes tis Othomanikís Aftokratorías, 1830-1862 [Greek Newspapers of the Ottoman Empire, 1830-1862]," in *O Ellinikós Típos 1784 éos símera: Istorikés kai theoritikés prosengísis* [Greek Press from 1784 until today: Historical and Theoretical Approaches], ed. Loukia Droulia (Athens: Institute for Neohellenic Research / National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2005), 442–47; Eleni Mavridou, "I antidrásis ton romión tis Konstantinoúpolis stin epanástasi ton neótourkon kai stin epanaphorá tou sintágmatos (1908) ópos katagráphontai ston ellinóglosso típo tis Pólis" [Responses of Constantinopolitan Rums to the Young Turk Movement and the Constitutional Revolution (1908) as Recorded in the Greek-Language Press of Constantinople], (Master's thesis, Democritus University of Thrace, 2017).
[20] Efthymia Canner, "La Presse Satirique Grecque d'Istanbul."

Chapter 1: Imagining Constitutionalism, Ottomanism, and Empire in the Carnivalesque Mode

Whoever writes one day the history of this age
cannot do without the humor magazine,
where he will find the amusing criticism of its
characteristic features. Even if distorted, as in a
curved mirror, reality is reflected on its pages,
with the exaggeration of its true qualities.

Csicseri Bors (Adolf Ágai), "A 'Borsszem Jankó' története" [The history of *Borsszem Jankó*],
***Borsszem Jankó* (April 10, 1887): 11.**

In this chapter, I will first give an overview of the Ottoman Empire's long nineteenth century, with reference to events and opinions of non-Muslims wherever applicable. Then, I will study the same period through the Ottoman Greek experiential lens. Coalescing both narratives into the Young Turk Revolution, the third section will portray an ideological panorama of Ottoman Turks and Greeks regarding the aftermath of the revolution. After mapping out the trajectory from a euphoric rise to a disillusioned fall, the last section will lay out the connection between revolution and satire by virtue of the Bakhtinian theoretical basis of the thesis. By this way, this chapter will examine expressions of Ottomanism in various thematic and formal contexts unleashed by the revolution and turn to literary theory to understand satire's capacity to reflect this reality "as in a curved mirror."

The Long Nineteenth Century of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire witnessed a radical change in its organizing principles during the long nineteenth century. Especially in the Balkans, ideals disseminated by the French Revolution and Enlightenment were met with enthusiasm by the intellectual, elite classes, who adopted a nationalist, secular political outlook that pit them against not only the empire but also their clerical authorities. To counteract, the Ottoman state embarked upon a series of reforms to centralize the government and erode the impact of local uprisings, under the restraint, however, of financial deficiency and Western encroachment. Therefore, the

modernization and secularization currents that steered the Ottoman Empire were far from being one-directional paths to progress. The individual national movements, as part and parcel of the modernizing and nationalizing world, were one of the main forces to raise the question of who the Ottoman citizen was. The Greek Revolution that started in 1821 indeed perplexed the Ottoman authorities with its national character,[21] challenging them towards interrogating their own. Towards mid-century, the Ottoman state initiated the Tanzimat reforms and embraced the ideological concept of Ottomanism, propagated primarily on an urban elite level.

Launching the Tanzimat era in 1839 was the Edict of Gülhane, which, together with the Reform Edict of 1856, ensured the guarantee of life, honor, and property of all subjects regardless of ethnoreligious affiliation and the accommodation of each community's cultural specificities in the composite fabric of the empire. The Tanzimat era, therefore, is affiliated with the institutionalization of heterogeneity. In addition to the edicts, historians conventionally cite the Law of Citizenship of 1869 as yet another step in the formation of Ottoman citizenship and of patriotic identity,[22] although Will Hanley views it as a practicality required by international law since the law mainly concerns those people whose membership in the empire is most ambiguous, like immigrants.[23] Nevertheless, as Constantin Iordachi argues, the Law of Citizenship remains a reaction against the inclusive citizenship laws of the empire's neighbors: "the Ottoman citizenship law can be characterized … as reactive to nationality laws passed by neighboring Christian states, a feature highlighted by the

[21] H. Şükrü Ilıcak, ed., *"Those Infidel Greeks": The Greek War of Independence through Ottoman Archival Documents*, 2 vols., (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2021), 4–5.
[22] See, for example, Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities: Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, Jews, and Arabs, 1908-1918* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2014) and Kemal H. Karpat, "Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 141–69.
[23] Will Hanley, "What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 3, no. 2 (2016): 278.

delegation of citizenship matters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."[24] In that sense, the Law of Citizenship still corroborates the empire's need to delimit its own nationality and citizenry against the neighboring national movements or competing polities. Indeed, Greece, as a national center for Rums, attracted many of them for educational and commercial purposes, and Istanbul was similarly a metropolitan hub for Greeks of Greece. This exchange entailed migration and complex citizenry networks.

It is nevertheless hard to pinpoint the law as the genesis of Ottoman citizenship when earlier views on imperial citizenship are taken into consideration. Julia Phillips Cohen, in her book *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era*, cites a Ladino newspaper published in 1846 in Izmir. The newspaper's editor explained to his readers that "religious difference pertained only to matters of conscience … and would not interfere with their 'rights as citizens.'" Cohen further notes that the editor "referred to his compatriots both as 'subjects of the same sovereign' and 'sons of the same fatherland.'"[25] These few lines from the first Ladino newspaper of the empire give a glimpse of how non-Muslim Ottomans imagined the fusion of imperial loyalty and civic nationalism during the Tanzimat era.

This amalgam lay at the basis of the ideological concept of Ottomanism. Promoted by Tanzimat reformers, Ottomanism aimed to instill in Ottoman citizens loyalty both to the dynasty and the state, regardless of religion or ethnicity. Ottomanism was designed not only to forge a civic and secular category of nationhood but also to counteract foreign intervention and individual national movements. It was the social reflection of the Tanzimat project, and it ripened among the urban, educated sections of the Ottoman society who aspired for the integrity and continuity of the empire. At the onset, Ottomanism had a secular and patriotic

[24] Constantin Iordachi, "The Ottoman Empire: Syncretic Nationalism and Citizenship in the Balkans," in *What Is a Nation? Europe 1789-1914*, ed. Timothy Baycroft and Mark Hewitson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 131.
[25] Julia Phillips Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 12.

character to it. It considerably resonated with Muslims and non-Muslims both, as evident from the Ladino newspaper above. The edicts and especially the First Constitutional Period in 1876-1878 were its driving forces. It had, nevertheless, an ethnocentric potential that would intensify first under Hamidian rule and later during the Balkan Wars in the early twentieth century.

The autocratic rule and Islamist tendencies of Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) not only brought this period to an end but also forestalled the influence of Ottomanism on politics and society. His pan-Islamist vision, a conservative reflex to preserve a certain unifying core in the face of Western encroachment and nationalization, and rapprochement policies with solely the Muslim members of the empire alienated non-Muslim communities. In other words, at a time when Ottomans were collectively imagining their national community, Abdülhamid's rule intruded upon this process and painted it into Islamic, and to a certain extent Turkish, colors. As Selim Deringil writes, "From being ostensibly supra-religious during the heyday of the Tanzimat (1839-76), Ottomanism would undergo a shift in emphasis to become more Islamic in tone and nuance during the reign of Abdülhamid II."[26] Interethnic hostility peaked with Armenian massacres in 1890s, which earned Abüdlhamid the nickname "Red Sultan" by Western media. Deringil describes the policies of this period in Ottoman history as "destructive of much of the stability which had allowed the delicate symbiosis of various creeds in less turbulent times."[27]

That the dream of Ottomanism had not ceased under Abdülhamid's rule was revealed, however, with the Young Turk Revolution in July 1908. Young Turks were a dissident group who came together based on their shared resentment against Abdülhamid. Ottoman intellectuals in the diaspora composed one branch of this group. Another one was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a militant organization whose affiliated military

[26] Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 46.
[27] Ibid., 11.

leaders led the revolution and inaugurated the constitutional period anew. The immediate postrevolutionary environment was highly festive, characterized by the joyful suspension of interethnic tension and the celebration of newfound freedom. The spirit of Ottomanism was revived in the political arena opened up by the Young Turk Revolution. Abdülhamid's acute censorship was also lifted, leading to a press boom that reconceptualized the Ottoman public sphere.

Greeks in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Ottoman Empire

What has been told so far borders on the grand narrative of this more than one-hundred-year period in Ottoman history. Inevitably, this narrative falls short of reflecting the micronarratives that run through the history of the late Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. One such micronarrative that has started to find itself a place in Ottoman historiography in the twenty-first century is that of the Ottoman Greeks.

Orthodox Greeks comprised the largest non-Muslim community in the Ottoman Empire and an important part of the commercial bourgeoisie of the empire's urban centers. According to the 1881 census, they made up 17% of Istanbul's population, second largest after the 44% Muslim (Turks, Kurds, Arabs, etc.) population.[28] In addition, they held an important role within the *millet* system whose administrative logic divided the society along religious lines and granted a certain degree of political autonomy to non-Muslim communities. Being the cultural and linguistic bearers of Orthodoxy, Greeks were the dominant group within the Rum millet led by the Patriarchate which ruled over all the Orthodox Christian subjects of the empire.

As the rest of the elite class, Greek Orthodox elites of the empire were influenced by Enlightenment ideals from the mid-eighteenth century onward. Intensifying with the French

[28] Evangelia Achladi, "Rum Communities of Istanbul in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Historical Survey," *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 9, no. 1 (2022): 28.

Revolution, the influence of secularization and liberalism began to erode the power of the Patriarchate. Victor Roudometof writes,

> The French Revolution (1789) provided the impetus for a particularly stormy decade of conflict (1790-1800) between conservatives and liberals in the Balkans. […] The proponents of the Enlightenment increasingly called for "liberation"—i.e., the overthrow of Ottoman rule—and this call deeply affected the Church's rule and position. Whereas the vision of the new Orthodox intelligentsia postulated the sovereignty of a people in secular terms, the Church advocated a deliberately non-nationalist, theocratic position.[29]

The uprisings that started in 1821 and grew into the Greek Revolution were thus motivated by the Greek intelligentsia who aspired to transform the religious identity of Greeks into a secular one. Thanos Veremis conjures Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen* describing the Greek Revolution: "The political prototype of the merchant intelligentsia that imported western ideas along with goods in the Balkans was at the center of western enlightenment and revolution. […] Their goal was to transform peasant subjects into full-fledged citizens of a unified liberal state."[30] These developments mark the beginning of Ottoman Greeks' identity questioning and reconceptualization.

Along with the Greek Revolution, the establishment of an independent Greek state in 1830 significantly reconfigured the social position of Ottoman Greeks. Athens emerged as a national center, and a distinction between *Yunan* (Greek from Greece) and *Rum* (Ottoman Greek) began to crystallize. Ottoman Greeks, especially the prominent class of Phanariotes, found themselves alienated from their roles in the Ottoman state apparatus. Furthermore, the Greek state based its raison d'être upon the idea of liberating their ethnic brethren under Ottoman rule. This program, known as *Megali Idea*, served to extend the boundaries of the imagined community of Greeks beyond territorial limits. As a result, Greeks in the empire found themselves as the yet-to-be-redeemed part of a national community. Autochthonous

[29] Victor Roudometof, "From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 16, no. 1 (1998): 27.
[30] Thanos Veremis, "From the National State to the Stateless Nation, 1821-1910," in *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, ed. Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (Athens: Sage Eliamep, 1990), 9–10.

Greeks in Morea became *Yunan*; heterochthonous Greeks in the empire remained *Rum*. This marked a critical juncture for Greeks' perception of self-identity.

The Kingdom of Greece adopted as a chief mission Hellenizing Ottoman Greeks by imbuing them with the liberal and secular ideals dominating the Greek statecraft. Education was their primary medium to realize this. Diplomatic representatives of Greece in the Ottoman Empire, first established in 1834, exerted most power within the field of education. Throughout the nineteenth century, funding was channeled to the opening of Greek schools in and around urban centers. This trend was further facilitated by the reform charters of the Tanzimat era.[31]

The Reform Edict of 1856 did not only reiterate the equality of all millets before the sultan's authority but also recognized Rum millet's need for a secular/national governing apparatus along with the ecclesiastical one.[32] This was not well received by the Patriarchate whose power was eroded as the Rum millet switched to a two-pronged system: the Holy Synod would be accompanied by the Permanent Mixed National Council established in 1862. The latter was composed of eight lay and four clerical members and would oversee the operation and financing of the Rum millet's schools, hospitals, and other such institutions. In this way, the Tanzimat strengthened the non-Muslim laity and its commercial bourgeoisie, who gradually acquired more influence in their community, reinforcing the national component of their belonging patterns as opposed to the religious one.

The Rum millet, although dominated by Greek culture, included all the Orthodox subjects of the empire. Bulgarians were, therefore, always the second most influential ethnic

[31] Athanasia Anagnostopoulou, "Tanzimat ve Rum Milletinin Kurumsal Çerçevesi: Patrikhane, Cemaat Kurumları, Eğitim [Tanzimat and the Institutional Framework of the Rum Millet: Patriarchate, Community Institutions, Education]" in *19. Yüzyıl İstanbul'unda Gayrimüslimler*, ed. Pinelopi Stathis, trans. Foti Benlisoy and Stefo Benlisoy (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), 20.

[32] "Hıristiyan rahiplerinin emvâl-i menkûle ve gayr-i menkûlelerine bir gûna sekte iras olunmıyarak Hıristiyan ve sâir tebeʾa-i gayr-i müslime cemaatlerinin milletçe olan maslahâtlarının idaresi her bir cemaatin rühbân ve avâmı beyninde muntehab âzâdan mürekkep bir meclisin hüsn-i muhafazasına havale kılınması," "1856 Islahat Fermanı," in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türk Anayasa Metinleri* [Turkish Constitutional Texts from the Ottoman Empire until today], ed. Ömer Kesikbaş, Haluk Kurnaz, and Şeref İba (Ankara: TBMM Kütüphane ve Arşiv Hizmetleri Başkanlığı, 2023), 17.

group within the Rum millet, having members in both the Holy Synod and the Permanent Mixed National Council. Roudometof notes that during the late eighteenth century, and even as late as 1824, ethnic identities within the Rum millet were extremely fluid, and "Greek" characterized a Grecophone Balkan intelligentsia. He illustrates Phanariot politician Theodoros Negris's writing in 1824, which "defined Serbs and Bulgarians as 'Greeks,' all of them lumped together in one sentence with the inhabitants of Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, and a number of Aegean islands and Anatolian cities."[33] Şükrü Hanioğlu also describes Greek as "the language of culture among the upper-classes" in the Balkans and cites a conversation among two upper-class Bulgarian merchants at a café in Varna: "'Dobrutro vi, gospodine' (Bulgarian for 'Good morning, Sir'), 'Ulan, Bulgar burada yok, 'Καλημέρα' desene! [Turkish for 'Hey, fellow, there is no Bulgarian here, say Καλημέρα (Greek for 'good morning')']."[34]

Notably, Richard Clogg argues that "the national movements of the Christian peoples of the Balkans were a response not only to Ottoman hegemony but also to Greek ecclesiastical and cultural oppression."[35] His caveat goes against national historiographies that single out Ottoman hegemony as the root cause of nationalization and highlights an important topic regarding the reconceptualization of Greek identity in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 was an important blow not only to the integrity of the Rum millet and the authority of the Patriarchate but also to the communal self-image of Ottoman Greeks. Kyriakos Gioftsios, in his master's thesis, analyzes two Greek newspapers of the Tanzimat era, *Konstantinoupolis* and *Thraki*, to argue that it was mainly the Bulgarian schism that provoked the question, "Who is the Ottoman Greek?"[36] These newspapers were loyal to the sultan and the Patriarchate and had a shared investment

[33] Roudometof, "From Rum Millet to Greek Nation," 21.
[34] Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 36.
[35] Richard Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Benjamin Braude (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 112.
[36] Kyriakos Gioftsios, "Between Greek Nationalism and Ottomanism: Contested Loyalties of Ottoman Greeks in the Periodicals of the Tanzimat Period (1869-1877)" (Master's thesis, Central European University, 2018), 44.

in Ottomanism. As the authors negotiated ethno-national elements to reach an answer, the Austria-Hungary model came to the forefront in an issue of *Thraki* from 1877: just as the Hungarians would run their country with Germans and Jews and accept their assistance, Ottomans (mainly Turks, Greeks, and Armenians) should also collaborate against the threat of pan-Slavism and complement each other's shortcomings.[37] This collaborative model would resurface after the Young Turk Revolution, as well.

These newspapers illustrate that, as other non-Muslims, Greeks in the Ottoman Empire were by and large in favor of a supra-national and collaborative Ottomanism. Yet, Ottoman Greeks were by no means politically monolithic. Despite a largely uniform support for the integrity and continuity of the empire, they held a wide range of opinions on the ways in which this would be achieved.[38] In addition, they were questioning the defining limits of their own national/communal identity vis-à-vis the Kingdom of Greece and the Bulgarian schism. The Young Turk Revolution breathed new life into this interrogation in all its political variety after Abdülhamid's 32-year-long rule that alienated non-Muslims from the dream of Ottomanism.

Imagining Empire after the Young Turk Revolution

As previously mentioned, the Young Turk Revolution was met with extreme joy by Ottomans of various creeds. Halide Edip Adıvar, a renown writer in the late Ottoman, early Turkish republican period, writes in her memoir,

> Men and women in a common wave of enthusiasm moved on, radiating something extraordinary, laughing, weeping in such intense emotion that human deficiency and ugliness were for the time completely obliterated. […] In three days the whole empire had caught the fever of ecstasy. […] To the crowd the change in its clearest sense spelled the pulling down of a régime which meant oppression, corruption, and tyranny, while the new, whatever it was, spelled happiness and freedom.[39]

[37] Ibid., 58.
[38] Veremis, "From the National State to the Stateless Nation," 18.
[39] Halide Edip Adıvar, *The House with Wisteria: Memoirs of Turkey Old and New* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 212.

A whole emotional vocabulary surrounding the revolution transpires in this passage: enthusiasm, laughing, weeping, ecstasy, and happiness were common words that contemporary authors and newspapers used to describe the atmosphere. Journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman highlights the multiconfessional dimension of this atmosphere: "People belonging to different races and creeds who had always avoided friendly intercourse, took delight in fraternizing with one another. […] 'We loved each other, but the despotic government did not let us become aware of it,' were words to be heard in every part of the city, on that first day of enthusiasm."[40]

Although disrupted by Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria's declaration of independence, and a variety of other factors, the festive atmosphere continued for months.[41] This euphoric stage, however, initially blinded the majority of Ottomans to the fragility of the CUP's constitutionalism, which stemmed from "the ambiguities and contradictions of the Revolution's goals and the reluctance of both the leaders of the Revolution and the majority of the empire's ethnic groups to come to a compromise regarding the new political framework of the empire."[42] This ambiguity is manifest in Halide Edib's lines above in which she could not find the words to describe the new regime: "while the new, *whatever it was*…" Bedross Der Matossian argues in *Shattered Dreams of Revolution* that the CUP's looming violation of constitutionalism and the divergent understandings of Ottomanism among dominant and nondominant groups caused the euphoria to eventually wane.

Satirical journals, however, were quick to reflect these ambiguities. In an issue of *Kalem* from early September, the multiconfessional interaction was cynically satirized: "Everyone's content, everyone's merry. In the streets, Muslims, Christians, and Jews fondle

[40] Ahmet Emin Yalman, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Columbia University, 1914), 87.
[41] For a detailed analysis, see Bedross Der Matossian, "The Euphoria of the Revolution," *Shattered Dreams*, 23–48.
[42] Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams*, 3.

and kiss each other… Yet one thing draws attention: they wipe their mouth afterwards. What does this mean?"[43] The apparent pessimism signals an imminent return of the interethnic tension and a looming discontent with circumstances. Notably, other Turkish authors of the era expressed outright discontent, again in the satirical mode.[44] Yet, their discontent was not only caused by a dissatisfaction with euphoria but also with constitutionalism.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy, modernist Islamist author notably of the Turkish national anthem, equates the euphoric celebrations with unleashing a madhouse. He is especially critical of liberty slogans and anti-despotism cheers, as his satirical voice communicates not only a disbelief in newfound freedom but also a strong belief in Abdülhamid's rule:

> As if all those chained were suddenly released,
> They tear down the madhouse and escape!
> […]
> Neither a government in offices, nor a knack in the crowd!
> Neither industry, nor education, neither buying, nor selling.
> […]
> Compulsory education of science is another despotism…
> Well then, kids, you're forever free![45]

According to Mehmet Akif, the pillars of a stable state apparatus have been lost to the revolution: competent government, education, industry, and commerce. In later years, with the CUP's rising authoritarianism led by the triumvirate Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pashas, Mehmet Akif's nostalgia is further amplified: "You were torn down and gone, the foul era of despotism / Yet you left an equally foul nostalgia in people's hearts … Thirty million people are thus condemned to three crooks."[46]

[43] "Herkes memnun, herkes handan. Yolda İslam, Hıristiyan, Musevi hep birbirlerini seviyorlar öpüyorlar... Yalnız bir şey nazar-ı dikkati celb ediyor o da herkes öpüşüyor... bu pek güzel. Lakin sonra yine ağzını siliyor. Bu ne demek?" "Şu, Bu," *Kalem*, September 10, 1908, 4.
[44] Erol Köroğlu, "Osmanlı İmkânsız ve Manasızdır."
[45] "Sanki zincirdekiler hep boşanıp zincirden, / Yıkıvermiş de tımarhâneyi çıkmış birden! […] Ne devâirde hükûmet, ne ahâlîde bir iş! / Ne sanâyi', ne maârif, ne alış var, ne veriş. […] İlmi tazyîk ile ta'lîm, o da bir istibdâd... / Haydi öyleyse çocuklar, ebediyyen âzâd!" Mehmet Akif Ersoy, "Süleymaniye Kürsüsünde," in *Safahat*, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, https://safahat.diyanet.gov.tr/PoemDetail.aspx?bID=7&pID=53.
[46] "Yıkıldın, gittin amma ey mülevves devr-i istibdâd, / Bıraktın milletin kalbinde çıkmaz bir mülevves yâd! […] Otuz milyon ahâlî üç şakînin böyle mahkûmu," Mehmet Akif Ersoy, "İstibdâd," in *Safahat*, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, https://safahat.diyanet.gov.tr/PoemDetail.aspx?bID=1&pID=28.

These lines not only counteract the optimistic zeitgeist but also unearth the much-neglected political diversity among Turks vis-à-vis constitutionalism. As opposed to Der Matossian's linking of disillusionment exclusively with nondominant communities, some of the Ottoman Turks were also disillusioned with the empire's leadership after the revolution. This is not to underrate the nondominant communities' much harsher experience of the revolution's aftermath, yet to disclose another component of late Ottoman history and also to underline satire's importance in revealing such complexities.

Another Turkish, and Turkist, satirist Ömer Seyfettin similarly raises concerns on the revolution, yet this time not with a nostalgia for an earlier era but with a fiery revulsion from Ottomanism. Unlike Mehmet Akif's anti-nationalist agenda, Ömer Seyfettin sees a multiconfessional masquerade in Ottomanist policies. In his story "Flags of Liberty," two Turkish characters go to a Bulgarian village to see up close what they thought from afar were red liberty flags, in hopes of a common celebration. The flags turn out to be red chili peppers hung outside to dry under the sun.[47] This is the bitter shattering of Ottomanism, as Ömer Seyfettin is sure that non-Turks would not participate in this dream.

As those of Turks, the ways in which Ottoman Greeks imagined constitutionalism and Ottomanism were equally heterogeneous. What will follow is a selection of some Rums' unofficial responses to these ideals through various institutions, all of them starting with enthusiastic participation and ending with bitter disillusionment. This political panorama will include urban elite Rums' reactions on cultural, economic, and political fronts.

Rums' central cultural institution in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the Hellenic Literary Society. Founded in 1861 in Constantinople, the Society was a product of the progressive and egalitarian climate of the Tanzimat era. Open to members of all creeds and ethnicities, the Society by and large subscribed to Ottomanism. Artemis Papatheodorou

[47] Ömer Seyfettin, "Hürriyet Bayrakları," in *Bütün Eserleri: Hikayeler 1*, ed. Hülya Argunşah (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1999), 229–37.

highlights in her article that at least two other organizations were founded by Rums after the revolution to endorse "the message of the Young Turks for equality in a constitutional political arrangement." Similar to the Tanzimat-era newspapers *Konstantinoupolis* and *Thraki*, a member of the Society stipulated in his speech at the first-year anniversary of the revolution "the possibility of all nations in the empire to work hand-in-hand for their shared homeland on freedom being offered sincerely, and equality before the law being secured for all Ottomans."[48]

This wary tone already conveys a certain distrust in the regime, which, after the Balkan Wars and the CUP's Turkification policies, turned into outright hostility. Cultivating a full-blown loyalty to Greece under these circumstances and an irredentist stance, the Society wrote in a 1919 petition, "the Turks, public servants or soldiers, remained in sum what they've always been, Barbarians making a life out of plunder and robbery."[49] The disillusionment and hostility manifested in these words are not only the result of ideological alienation, but also economic Turkification as signaled by such words as plunder and robbery.

Ottoman Greeks, along with Armenians and Jews, constituted the main urban bourgeoisie of the empire. Rums' commercial relations with the West had especially improved in the nineteenth century, which concomitantly stimulated their intellectual growth along with their socioeconomic status. In Fatma Müge Göçek's analysis, Turks transpire as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, whereas these nondominant groups occur as the commercial bourgeoisie of the empire.[50] In 1908, with Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a boycott culture crystallized in the empire. In 1909, due to Crete's declaration to unite with Greece, boycotts were directed at Greek products. Such a culture instilled in the Unionists the idea that foreign intervention could only be forestalled via the creation of a

[48] Artemis Papatheodorou, "The Hellenic Literary Society at Constantinople between Ottomanism and Greek Irredentism," *Yıllık: Annual of Istanbul Studies* 4 (2022): 117.
[49] Qtd. in Papatheodorou, 115.
[50] Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 87.

Turkish bourgeoisie. After the Balkan Wars, the government placed traumatized Turkish migrants from the Balkans "in jobs monopolized by the Greeks." Göçek concludes, "The increasing economic disadvantages felt by the Muslim elements in the empire, coupled with the attempts to generate a Turkish national bourgeoisie, thus accelerated the emergence of a Turkish national movement."[51] What followed after the Balkan Wars was a boycott against Rums. This first internal boycott consolidated the CUP's Turkification policies in the Ottoman economic life.

One political-economic newspaper published in Izmir after the revolution, however, complicates this picture. Anastasia Moroni's analysis of *O Ergatis* (The Worker) sheds light on the Greek bourgeoisie's vested interest in creating a national Ottoman economy. With a sentimental patriotic rhetoric and a hostility against Western economic penetration, the newspaper ardently supports the boycott against Austrian goods and calls for a multiethnic collaboration to replenish Ottoman economy.[52] It always assumed, however, a skeptical tone towards the regime similar to that of the Hellenic Literary Society. Its reservations were eventually validated after the Counterrevolution.

Right after the Counterrevolution of April 1909, *Ergatis* was shut down. On its last issue, the authors blame the Young Turks of violating constitutional values: "If behind the army's acts lies the great nation-saving work of the liberals, honor and glory to the leaders. But if this revolt is to take us back to absolutism, where shall we look for the culpable?"[53] Moroni locates the reasons behind *Ergatis*'s failure both in its own inconsistent politico-economic agenda and in the Young Turks' reluctance to accommodate a Greek-led economic nationalization project. Moroni claims that the authors did not see any contradiction in being

[51] Fatma Müge Göçek, "Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab Nationalisms," in *Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East*, ed. Fatma Müge Göçek (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 25.
[52] Anastasia Ileana Moroni, "*O Ergatis*, 1908-09: Ottomanism, National Economy and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire through a Greek-Language Newspaper of Izmir" (Master's thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004), 30–39.
[53] Qtd. in Moroni, 46.

both an Ottomanist and a Greek nationalist, the fusion of which constituted their understanding of an imperial identity and the collaborative basis for Ottoman economic nationalization. This, first and foremost, diverged from the dominant Turkish-Muslim community's understanding of Ottomanism—a divergence that laid the foundation for further disillusionment.

On the political front, an interesting outsider figure was in fact an officer of the Greek army. Athanasios Souliotes, dispatched to Constantinople to explore the potential for Greco-Turkish cooperation against Bulgaria's pan-Slavic ambitions, saw in the Ottomanist reorganization of the empire an arena more hospitable to the ascent of Greeks. He thought the multinational Eastern empire promised by the revolution would carve the space for Ottoman Greeks to achieve their full potential, as opposed to Greece's inhospitable parochialism. Souliotes concretized his unique convictions by establishing the Society of Constantinople. Although he attracted some followers, he was soon faced with the political heterogeneity among Ottoman Greeks, the Patriarch's support for the previous regime, and the CUP's mounting nationalism, which ended his idealistic project.[54]

Like Patriarch Joachim III who preferred the pre-Tanzimat system over the constitutionalist regime, *Embros*'s publisher K.G. Makridis was among those who were disillusioned in the first place. This not only justifies his inclination for satire but also constitutes the core of his satirical narrative. In an issue of *Embros* from August 1908, Pantelis complains to Ali about the Rum millet's loss of "ancient privileges" after the revolution. In these pre-Tanzimat privileges that recall the millet system, Pantelis sees an opportunity for the Rum millet to thrive and act out its best self, rooted in Hellenic glory.[55] Thus, for Pantelis, their national dignity is lost to ideas of liberty, equality, and secularization. It was the long-established system and its conferral of autonomy and privileges to individual

[54] Thanos Veremis, "From the National State to the Stateless Nation," 15–20.
[55] *Embros* 5, August 30, 1908, 2.

millets that allowed the Rums to flourish. For Makridis, constitutionalism is nothing other than a disservice to the empire.

These anecdotes should not, however, habituate us to the narrative of failure surrounding the revolution. In a recent publication, Erdal Kaynar undertakes a microhistorical approach to the Young Turk Revolution. In his analysis of the Young Turk leader Ahmet Rıza's opinions, Kaynar concludes that revolution was more a provisional means than a principle, as a result of which the revolutionaries immediately "extrapolated radicalism from the revolutionary event and stressed continuity over rupture."[56] He notably adds, "[the CUP] formulated its authoritarianism out of an elitist stance in reaction to […] the unleashed energies of the post-revolutionary society." The Unionists were, as a matter of fact, motivated to maintain the empire's fundamental hierarchies as they "saw [themselves] as the best representative of the Ottoman nation."[57]

Kaynar's work is significant in revealing the Enlightenment-driven core of the Young Turk Revolution—and perhaps of other revolutions, as well: the elitist impulse to transform a people who cannot propel the change themselves. The CUP's authoritarianism, therefore, in addition to being a circumstantial political response, was also at the very center of its revolutionary incentive. This corroborates the carnivalesque mode of revolutions, which explains the predestination of such mutinies to eventually endorse the maintenance of larger systems.

A Bakhtinian Rethinking of the Young Turk Revolution and its Satirical Press

Historians are not unaccustomed to the juxtaposition of "carnival" and "revolution." Indeed, revolutions usually take place in the carnivalesque mode, celebrating and performing

[56] Erdal Kaynar, "The Logic of Enlightenment and the Realities of Revolution: Young Turks after the Young Turk Revolution," in *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Empire: The Aftermath of 1908*, ed. François Georgeon and Noémi Lévy-Aksu (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 49.
[57] Ibid., 60.

dehierarchization and ambivalence.[58] The Young Turk Revolution was no exception. Contemporary authors and journalists described the immediate postrevolutionary atmosphere by such words as euphoria, optimism, and anarchy. Not only Abdülhamid's despotism but also interethnic tension was lifted, leveling all the communities of Ottoman society and opening up a new public sphere framed by *liberté, egalité,* and *fraternité*.

Once the sultan's hegemony was eliminated, the new sociopolitical space was saturated with carnivalesque ambivalence and openness, embodied in the press boom. The ambivalence, however, was not only caused by a ubiquitous sense of equality but also stemmed from the CUP's inexperience in governing. Further pressured by global nationalization trends that encumbered the struggle for a supranational identity, the CUP was pursuing an ambiguous sense of constitutionalism. Consequently, the Ottoman state apparatus and the society found themselves exploring the ways in which they would or would not accommodate communal specificities in and contribute to the new constitutional regime. Faced with the fragility of the constitutional regime at the Counterrevolution of April 1909, the CUP eventually embraced authoritarian tendencies and an increasingly nationalist agenda.

Such rise-and-fall of revolutionary and egalitarian euphoria aligns well with Bakhtin's definition of the carnival: "temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order […] the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions."[59] Indeed, his experience of the Russian Revolution had a pivotal role in shaping Bakhtin's literary outlook:

> He lived through the revolutionary euphoria of the 1920s, participated in a text practice and culture that not only preached, but also practiced openness, hybridization,

[58] Scholarship that connects carnivalesque with revolutions range from works on the French (1789) and Chinese (1911) revolutions to the Arab Spring: Noel Parker, "Theatre and Festivals: Performing the Revolution," in *Portrayals of Revolution: Images, Debates and Patterns of Thought on the French Revolution* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 38-74; Zhang Shiying, "Subversive Laughter: Carnival in the 1911 Revolution," *Chinese Studies in History* 46, no. 1 (October 2012): 30–70; Nour Halabi, "The Contingency of Meaning to the Party of God: Carnivalesque Humor in Revolutionary Times," *International Journal of Communication* 11 (2017): 4032–45.

[59] Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 10.

> and dehierarchization. At the same time, he was witness to the process of increasing closure, isolation, and hierarchization taking place in Soviet society. For Bakhtin, however, it was precisely the experience of revolution, the swirling up of meaning that it brought forth, the experience of the plurality of worlds, of the intercrossing of cultures and languages, of texts, and genres that determined his approach to Rabelais. Bakhtin interpreted Rabelais as the representative of an upheaval in which he recognized his own time.[60]

Such plethora of discursive possibilities whose entanglements in real life Bakhtin witnessed in 1917 reflects the Ottoman experience of the 1908 revolution. The closure succeeding the whirlwind was similarly inevitable in both historical moments. Characterized by ambivalence, inversion, transgression, and disruption, Bakhtin's carnivalesque mode is interpreted by scholars as a "creative safety valve."[61] Once steam is let off, the safety valve functions to "guarantee the safe and continuing operation of the larger mechanism; it is not threatening but therapeutic, not revolutionary but conservative."[62]

I argue that carnivalesque is the most accurate discursive conceptualization of the Young Turk Revolution: palliative yet not remedial, subversive yet conservative. In its plurality of voices, delivered via the press boom, the Young Turk Revolution unfolded layers of discursive and authorial possibilities that imagined the new constitutional era from their own social positioning. Daniel Bowles writes, in *The Ends of Satire*, "the primary semiotic operation of Bakhtin's concept of the carnivalesque is one of inversion, a constitutive practice of satire and the means by which the social and cultural notion of the carnivalesque, derived as it is from the Saturnalian suspensions of official order in medieval carnivals, becomes literary."[63] Via their common inversive essence, the Young Turk Revolution and its satirical production intertangle in the extraliterary and literary senses of the carnivalesque.

[60] Renate Lachmann, "Bakhtin and Carnival: Culture as Counter-Culture," *Cultural Critique*, no. 11 (Winter 1988-1989): 116–17.
[61] Noel Parker, *Portrayals of Revolution*, 64.
[62] Rohan Maitzen, "'When Pit Jumps on Stage': Historiography and Theatricality in 'The French Revolution,'" *Carlyle Annual* 13 (1992): 49–50.
[63] Daniel Bowles, *The Ends of Satire: Legacies of Satire in Postwar German Writing* (Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), 47.

The plurality that sprang forth from the Young Turk Revolution gave voice to both the dominant and the nondominant communities. Publishers and authors of satirical journals were mostly from among the liberal-minded Ottoman intellectuals. In the case of *Kalem* and *Embros*, I argue, satirical idiosyncrasies were rooted in the degree to which the publishers were entrenched in the overarching idiom of the period, that is, constitutionalism. This degree inevitably depended on the individuals' social positioning and the potential benefit they would draw from the constitutional regime. Since the authors of *Kalem* were in a more advantageous position in Ottoman society, their satire reflected a normative, educational tone that aimed to uncover and correct the regime's frailties and discipline the masses. *Embros*, however, refrained from didacticism and pointed, from the first issue on, to the fact that constitutionalism was construed differently for different communities. It did so by creating two leitmotif characters with stereotypical Turkish and Greek names, Ali and Pantelis, whose constant misunderstandings of each other on matters of constitution, nation, and state[64] not only constructed the comic core but also exhibited its marginalized author's panoramic power to vocalize both communities.

In accordance, Bakhtin distinguishes between negative satire and carnivalesque satire. He identifies negative satire as a modern, bourgeois phenomenon: "The satirist whose laughter is negative places himself above the object of his mockery."[65] Modern theories also endorse this aspect of satire: Leonard Freedman writes, "since satire is a negative art, it tells us what [the satirists] are against rather than what they're for."[66] Jean Weisgerber argues that satire "presents its norm as an absolute rule that society is required to accept."[67] Ronald

[64] Canner, "La presse satirique grecque d'Istanbul," 113.
[65] Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 12.
[66] Leonard Freedman, *The Offensive Art: Political Satire and Its Censorship around the World from Beerbohm to Borat* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2009), 3.
[67] Jean Weisgerber, "Satire and Irony as Means of Communication," *Comparative Literature Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1973): 165.

Paulson says satire should point to "an ought or ought not […] take a moral stand, make a judgment, and place or distribute blame."[68]

Carnivalesque satire, on the other hand, does not spring from such didacticism, moralism, or sense of superiority. The explanation for this, in Terry Eagleton's words, is that "there are no spectators in the sphere of carnival to condescend to its participants."[69] Carnivalesque satire is inclusive of contradictions: it is a "familiar, friendly abuse" that negates, destroys, and affirms at the same time, breathing new life into its object. It is, furthermore, grotesque, the essence of which is "precisely to present a contradictory and double-faced fullness of life."[70] In accordance with Rabelaisian grotesque, carnivalesque satire is scatological, as well.

Negative satire, therefore, speaks from within an official discourse. It disrupts and criticizes in order to impose a normative truth. Carnivalesque satire, however, is free from ideological concerns and, in its discursive ambivalence and diversity, deviates from the modern mainstream way of ridiculing. In accordance, in his essay "Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin distinguishes between centripetal and centrifugal forces of linguistic heteroglossia. Standing for the coexistence of conflicting discourses in a textual space, be it a novel or a national language, heteroglossia harbors opposing strands: whereas centripetal forces strive for "verbal-ideological centralization and unification," centrifugal forces resist via "decentralization and disunification."[71] In the textual universe of the postrevolutionary Ottoman Empire, therefore, *Kalem* performed a negative satire and exerted a centripetal force that kept its audience on the path of constitutionalism. In contrast, *Embros* performed a carnivalesque satire, simulating personas of different social ranks and wittily inversing their

[68] Ronald Paulson, *The Fictions of Satire* (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019), 4.
[69] Terry Eagleton, *Humour* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2019), 157.
[70] Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 62.
[71] Mikhail Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin*, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 272–73.

hierarchy. Its power was centrifugal, directed away from the center and concentrating the force towards the edges of society.

It is timely to turn to Jefferson Chase's book *Inciting Laughter: The Development of "Jewish Humor" in 19th Century German Culture*. Chase prudently chooses to evaluate humor as "a political free agent, equally available for attacking or enhancing the authority of an existing social order."[72] It is the authorship, the audience, and the context that determine whether humor will excel in its disciplinary or oppositional capacity. Chase's recognition of humor's many faces is essential to his analysis of Jewish humor: distinguishing between the general, national, mainstream *deutscher Humor* and the marginal and acerbic *Judenwitz*, he identifies humor as the crux of majority/minority identity.[73] Mary Gluck, in her discussion of fin-de-siècle Jewish humor in Budapest, stresses this distinction: whereas general humor was "part of the national culture and served to integrate individuals into the community," its marginal counterpart was "subversive and leading to cultural negation and instability."[74] She defines her object of study, the Budapestian Jewish humor magazine *Borsszem Jankó*, as "the creation of rootless outsiders who could never fully master the native idiom or contribute to the collective values of the nation."[75]

In Bakhtin's world, national humor would be the centripetal and marginal would be the centrifugal force. The former aligns with *Kalem*'s negative and the latter with *Embros*'s carnivalesque satire. Indeed, *Kalem* satirized from within the constitutionalist idiom and portended the conservative essence of the Second Constitutional Period in its cautious, moderate tone, which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, even warned the press against pushing the limits of freedom. It aimed to prompt its readers towards a shared realm of

[72] Jefferson S. Chase, *Inciting Laughter: The Development of "Jewish Humor" in 19th Century German Culture* (Berlin ; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 10.
[73] Ibid., 6–11.
[74] Mary Gluck, *The Invisible Jewish Budapest: Metropolitan Culture at the Fin de Siècle* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2016), 105.
[75] Ibid., 105–6.

meaning, thus, towards uniformity. Whereas *Kalem*'s conservativeness signaled the carnivalesque in terms of ultimate re-hierarchization, *Embros* started off with an a priori awareness of this. *Embros* commenced by attacking the ambiguity and incapacity of this idiom, anticipating the doom more accurately from its marginalized position. In its particularity, it promoted ambivalence and exerted a force towards discursive diversity. It disrupted for the sake of disrupting, adopting an obscenity that approximates it to carnivalesque satire. In doing so, *Embros* did not pursue a didactic mission to achieve a social upper hand. It highlighted the corruption, the overall futility of this carnivalesque environment without coming off as self-righteous. In that sense, it was, precisely, the humor of the underdog. A visual and literary close reading of the journals' first issues in the next chapter will illuminate these points.

Chapter 2: "I laugh, so that I don't cry": Mainstream and Marginal Satire Cultures in *Kalem* and *Embros*

No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
Am an attendant lord, one that will do
To swell a progress, start a scene or two,
Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool,
Deferential, glad to be of use,
Politic, cautious, and meticulous;
Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse;
At times, indeed, almost ridiculous—
Almost, at times, the Fool.

T.S. Eliot, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock"

Shakespearean fools are servants to their authority figures. Depending on the social situation, they serve to entertain, to infuse reason, or to deflect conflict. They are ironically wiser than their masters, who occasionally find themselves in need of sound and realistic advice. At those times, the Fool is the one to make them confront the truth. Although being legitimate employees, they do not refrain from overstepping their station and bickering with their masters. As long as they continue to provide sound advice and light relief to the characters and the audience, they are safe in their licensed foolery. In that sense, there is indeed "no slander in an allow'd fool."[76]

In this chapter, I will analyze the descriptive qualities and the first issues of the two journals to argue that *Kalem* was the representative of mainstream humor, whereas *Embros* was the satirical voice of the outsider in the postrevolutionary Ottoman Empire. In its unquestioned embrace of constitutionalism, *Kalem* represented and confirmed its elite readership's ideals regarding the revolution. It criticized the euphoria kindled by the revolution, the despotism of the Hamidian regime, and the vain attempts at cosmetic modernization without a solid political and bureaucratic infrastructure. It cautioned its readers to take heed against rushing into a wave of optimism as an overnight revolution would not

[76] William Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, I.v.94.

provide a long-lasting solution to the empire's problems.[77] Vis-à-vis the CUP, it was the supportive yet satirical voice of reason. As for the sultan, it never clearly attacked him until his deposition but rather his despotic regime, known as *istibdâd*. Thus, *Kalem* maintained a corrective tone hidden under its dutiful humor. Just as Hamlet's attendant lord dissolves into the Fool in T.S. Eliot's lines, *Kalem*'s function in the public sphere occurs, in my analysis, as an amalgam of counselor and entertainer. In its entitled foolery, *Kalem* represented negative satire, placing itself in an instructive position above its targets and readers and aiming at ideological-cum-discursive unification.

Embros, on the other hand, inevitably had a larger agenda than that of *Kalem*. While addressing the same issues, it additionally targeted the internal issues of the Greek community, the Patriarch, other nondominant groups, Greece, and the empire's sociopolitical problems. With such an extensive repertoire of targets, *Embros* adopted a more panoramic satirical lens than that of *Kalem*. It was radically self-reflective at times on both imperial and communal levels, and this self-consciousness crystallized in the leitmotif characters Ali and Pantelis, both of whom Makridis gave voice to from his nondominant standing. Since the constitutionalist idiom, that common meaning-making principle of the era, did not serve Makridis's vision of the empire, his authorial voice was particularly and centrifugally positioned in the postrevolutionary discursive realm. Standing in stark contrast to *Kalem*, *Embros* aimed less to correct than to disrupt.

Descriptive Qualities

The first issue of *Kalem* was published on September 3, 1908 (Figure 1). Its masthead featured a calligraphic stylization of the journal's name in Ottoman Turkish. Right beneath the name, the journal was described as "A literary humor journal published on Thursdays." On the left, the journal's name appeared in Latin letters, under which was written "Humorous

[77] Ekin Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery," 11.

journal published on Thursdays" in French, followed by information on publishers and subscription. The same were repeated on the right in Turkish. From the third issue on, the journal began to identify itself merely as a "Literary journal" while the French counterpart kept "humorous." From the fourth issue on, there were one front cover in Ottoman Turkish and one back cover in French, both featuring large cartoons on issues of broad and current interest (Figure 2).

Figure 1. The masthead of *Kalem*'s first issue[78]

With the seventh issue, the journal introduced a new masthead: two men in traditional Ottoman attire carrying a pen on which the journal's name is hung like a curtain (Figure 3). These two men possibly represent the two co-owners: Celal Esad Arseven and Salah Cimcoz. Arseven, being a bureaucrat, had his name removed from the masthead from the fourth issue on in order to avoid legal trouble due to his profession, while Cimcoz's name remained in place.[79] The new masthead, however, points to Arseven's ongoing efforts for *Kalem*, as he unofficially continued to work for the journal. In a similar vein, it signals the collective labor behind *Kalem*, since it employed local and foreign authors and cartoonists of various backgrounds. One of those cartoonists is in fact Papatrehas, the illustrator of *Embros*'s nameplate and cartoons, who drew 116 cartoons for *Kalem* in 1910-1911.[80]

[78] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 1, September 3, 1908, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/2/PFKAL9080903001.jpg.
[79] Ekin Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery," 110.
[80] Tobias Heinzelmann, *Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu*, 66–67.

Figure 2. Turkish front and French back cover of *Kalem*'s fourth issue[81]



Figure 3. *Kalem*'s new masthead on French and Turkish covers in the seventh issue[82]

[81] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 4, September 25, 1908, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/34/PFKAL9080925001%20%281908-09-25%29.jpg and https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/45/PFKAL9080925012.jpg.

These men, diligent in their carrying of *Kalem*, look towards the left, revealing only their profile. The man on the left does not even reveal his eyes, again suggesting Arseven's covert contribution, whereas the one on the right has one eye visible to the viewer. The timidity in their posture and the humility of their attire are politically and satirically suggestive: *Kalem* was more hesitant to test the limits of freedom, to the extent that from the ninth issue on, it ceased to define itself even as a literary journal on its Ottoman cover, and only kept "published on Thursdays." Interestingly, with the same issue, the French cover adopted a new attribute: "Humorous and satirical journal published on Thursdays" (Figure 4). This move finalized the mastheads for both covers: logistical information on the Ottoman one and descriptive information on the French one. Since either of the languages would not secure *Kalem* from potential censorship,[83] this points to a change that addressed the readership. It is possible that lettered or foreign readers would prefer to see the genre identified, whereas for an audience literate only in Turkish, "literary humor journal" could come off as a threatening description in regard to the *ancien régime*.



Figure 4. *Kalem*'s new attributes on the ninth issue: Humorous and satirical journal[84]

[82] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 7, October 15, 1908, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/70/PFKAL9081015001%20%281908-10-15%29.jpg and https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/85/PFKAL9081015016.jpg.

[83] Hamidian bureaucracy had offices to inspect foreign language press, whether locally printed or imported. The bureaucratic apparatus, therefore, was used to auditing it. Especially with French being the intellectual language of the time, French-language press would not be able to circumvent censorship: Ipek K. Yosmaoğlu, "Chasing the Printed Word: Press Censorship in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1913," *The Turkish Studies Association Journal* 27, no. 1–2 (2003): 24.

[84] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 9, October 29, 1908, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/117/PFKAL9081029016.jpg.

The first issue of *Embros* was published on August 2, 1908 (Figure 5). Its smaller nameplate on the left upper corner described it as a "political and literary satire journal published every week in Constantinople by K.G. Makridis (Mephistopheles)." Underneath the larger nameplate were two important attributes of *Embros* that signaled its foundational narratives: satyric and Mephistophelian. The words satirical and satyric, coming from different roots, are spelled differently in modern Greek. In both nameplates, Makridis chooses the one that stands for "satyric" [σατυρικός] rather than satirical [σατιρικός].[85] A brief look at contemporary Greek satirical journals reveals that "satyric" was commonly in use in that period to stand for "satirical," and that this was a later distinction. This overlap might cause confusion as to the attributes of the journal, whether it is only satirical or both satirical and satyric. Yet, considering that Makridis often refers to figures and concepts from classical Greek literature throughout his journal, it would not be surprising that he intentionally constructs his authorial persona based on a classical Greek figure, as well. Furthermore, the fact that he uses it along with Mephistophelian in the larger nameplate reinforces the possibility that he ascribes qualities to his authorship from two figures of different cultural traditions.

[85] It is ironic that *Kalem* made the same exact error regarding the word "satirical": when the description was introduced in the ninth issue, the masthead had satirical written as *satyrique* in French, meaning related to Satyr. On the tenth issue, however, this was quickly corrected to *satirique*.



ΕΜΠΡΟΣ

ΕΦΗΜΕΡΙΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΟΛΟΓΙΚΗΣ ΣΑΤΥΡΑΣ

ἐκδιδομένη καθ' ἑβδομάδα ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει

ὑπὸ

Κ. Γ. ΜΑΚΡΙΔΟΥ (ΜΕΦΙΣΤΟΦΕΛΟΥΣ)

ΟΡΟΙ ΕΓΓΡΑΦΗΣ

Ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει ..... γρ. 40
Ἐν ταῖς ἐπαρχίαις ..... γρ. 50
Ἐν τῷ ἐξωτερικῷ ..... φρ. 13

Ὅρος ἀπαράβατος ἐγγραφῆς: Προπληρωμή.

Ἕκαστον φύλλον παράδες 20

Φύλλα παλαιὰ γρ. 2 ἕκαστον.

ΣΑΤΥΡΙΚΟΝ — ΜΕΦΙΣΤΟΦΕΛΙΚΟΝ

ΓΡΑΦΕΙΑ: Ἐν Γαλατᾷ, Ἰσμυρλόγλου Χάν, ἀριθ. 12-13

Ἔτος πρῶτον ἀριθμοῦμεν
καὶ στὴν Πόλι κατοικοῦμεν

Νούμερο ἕνα
μ' ἄχαρι πέννα

Χίλι' ἐννιακόσια καὶ ὀκτὼ μηνὸς Αὐγούστου δύο
Κι' ὠδίνας πάλιν τοκετοῦ ἔχουν ἐν Φαναρίῳ.

Figure 5. *Embros*'s first-issue masthead[86]

Makridis is Mephistopheles less in the Faustian than in the Goethean sense: witty, cynical, and cultivated. In Goethe's *Faust*, Mephistopheles' duties are twofold: "causing Faust to forget any aim beyond that of self-indulgence" while using "his wit to obscure and ridicule every higher aspiration."[87] Makridis similarly aimed to entertain his readers while also instilling in them the idea that a better, more ideal postrevolutionary world is not on the horizon. As a cosmic outsider, Mephistopheles has an easy way noticing the folly in humanity and in the established order. A member of the nondominant Ottoman Greek community with ambiguous ties to the nationally-bound Kingdom of Greece, Makridis also views his world from a marginalized position and sees its harsh truths through his panoramic lens. As the embodiment of Faust's vice and corruption, Mephistopheles represents an inseparable counterpart, who, however, is doomed to fail in Goethe's narrative, similar to the Ottoman Greeks who were further antagonized with the Balkan Wars and eventually displaced with the population exchange of 1923.

[86] Source and digitization: Hellenic Parliament Library. *Embros* 1, August 2, 1908, https://digitallib.parliament.gr/display_doc.asp?item=36485&seg=0.
[87] Joakim Reinhard, "Goethe's Mephistopheles," *The Sewanee Review* 5, no. 1 (January 1897): 81.

Makridis is also the Satyr: playful, rowdy, obscene, in pursuit of worldly pleasure, a kind of hedonic nihilist; in other words, his is a grotesque satire. The genre known as the Satyr play in classical Greek canon provides a suitable analogy to the postrevolutionary Ottoman Empire as imagined by satirical journals: a hodgepodge of tragedy and comedy; in other words, a joking tragedy. As in Satyr plays, Makridis uses satire to ridicule authority figures and upset hierarchies. Another strong possibility is that the attribute is specifically to *Satyricon*: Petronius's prosimetric satirical narrative from the 1st century CE. Subject to the same debate, the name of this work was interpreted differently by early modern scholars. Whereas some associated it with being Greek-rooted, hence Satyr-like, some others connected it to the Latin root of satire, "satura," meaning a mixed, saturated dish. The latter group claimed that *Satyricon* was similarly a poetic medley.[88] *Embros*, equally prosimetric and burlesque as *Saytricon*, promotes discursive diversity not only in its social positioning but also in the layers of quotations in its form and content.

Starting with the third issue, the nameplate changes from mere title written in bold font into a stereotypical illustration of Mephistopheles himself (Figure 6). The new nameplate features the face of a typical evil tempter with pointed devil ears and chin. His eyes are piercingly directed at the reader, and his gaze and smile communicate nothing other than mischievous cunning and determination to speak cynical truths. His costume is that of a medieval jester or a Shakespearean fool: pointed shoes, tights, and closed breeches on the bottom (Figure 7). On the top, instead of a monk-like hood usually worn by the jester, Mephistopheles wears an aristocratic shirt and completes his costume with collars reaching his ears that highlight his insidiousness. His prop is a pointed blade fastened to his breeches. It is not aimed at anything or anyone, but its presence conveys a certain threat.

[88] "Introduction," in *The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Satyricon, Complete, by Petronius Arbiter*, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5225/5225-h/5225-h.htm#linkTHE_SATYRICON.

Figure 6. New masthead of *Embros*[89]

[89] Source and digitization: Hellenic Parliament Library. *Embros* 3, August 16, 1908, https://digitallib.parliament.gr/display_doc.asp?item=36485&seg=0.

Figure 7. Rendering of a medieval jester or a Shakespearean fool[90]

The name of the journal is written calligraphically, and Mephistopheles leans on the first letter, written larger than the rest of the letters, extending his legs towards the latter. While his right arm stands on the capital letter and his hand rests comfortably on his cheek, his left arm blocks the other letters, shutting them off from the first one. The smaller letters chain onto each other, almost as if resisting his strength. Mephistopheles lies comfortably, powerfully, and elegantly within *Embros*, meaning "forward" in Greek. He is indeed a product of progressive times, created within the forward-looking environment of the postrevolutionary Ottoman Empire. Yet, he does not allow progress to come into full effect, choosing instead to portray his playful cynicism about the times that delivered him.

[90] Source: "A Short Analysis of Feste's Song from *Twelfth Night*: 'The rain it raineth every day,'" *Interesting Literature*, https://interestingliterature.com/2018/10/a-short-analysis-of-festes-song-from-twelfth-night-the-rain-it-raineth-every-day/#.

Kalem's timidity in pronouncing itself as a humorous or satirical journal in Ottoman Turkish, coupled with its masthead's visual humility, stand in stark contrast to Mephistopheles' audacious aesthetics and Makridis's satyric tendencies. As will be discussed in the following sections, *Embros* was braver in meddling with any social and political issue, unlike *Kalem*'s moderate attitude.

Introductory Editorials

Kalem's first issue opens with an introductory editorial (*İfade-i Mahsusa*) which lays out the journal's ethos and the publishers' reasons for establishing it:

> Unbelievable! I was bewildered to see the proclamation of *Kanun-ı Esasi* [constitution] in the public notices section of the newspapers, where it is usual to see stuff like "275 children have been vaccinated." […] This was indeed an announcement like those about vaccinations. […] It was indeed a sort of sacred, sanitary, wise, scientific vaccination. At that moment, 40 million Ottomans were injected a vaccine of liberty. I was happy, yet I immediately began to think if the vaccine would be effective. Since I know that it would not be for a great deal of people, I took the responsibility of sharpening the "kalem" [pen] and giving them a "kalem" vaccine, as a small service to this holy land.[91]

In this passage, editor Salah Cimcoz carefully takes a trope of the Hamidian regime and reconfigures it according to the new constitutional context. The vaccination trope is a reference to Sultan Abdülhamid's government which was oppressively normative in nature but conducive to infrastructural advances in the empire such as railroads, improved health services, and various institutions of education.[92] As mass vaccination was an important aspect of this façade of improvement, it frequently made its way into the public notices sections. Yet unlike the previous ones, the one Cimcoz refers to is a new sort of vaccination that is on the

[91] "Hayret!.. Hergün '275 çocuğa aşı yapılmıştır' […] gibi şeylerin yazıldığı gazetelerin Resmi Tebliğler bölümünde Kanun-i Esasi'nin ilanını […] görünce hayretten, sevinçten şaşırdım… Aşı ilanı gibi bir ifade […] Bu da bir cins kutsal, sıhhî, âkil, fenni bir aşı idi. O dakika 40 milyon Osmanlı'ya hürriyet, serbestlik aşısı vurulmuş oluyordu… Sevindim, lakin biraz sonra aşının tutup tutmayacağını düşünmeye başladım. Her halde birçoklarına tesir etmeyeceğini bildiğimden bu mübarek vatana küçük bir hizmet olmak üzere onlara 'Kalem' aşısı vurmak göreviyle şu 'Kalem'i yonttum, açtım." "İfade-i Mahsusa," *Kalem* 1, 3 September 1908, 2.

[92] Abdülhamid was especially interested in Louis Pasteur's work on the rabies vaccine. After its development in 1885, Abdülhamid sent a research committee to Paris, who later founded a vaccination center in Istanbul and even produced their own rabies vaccines. Adem Ölmez, "İkinci Abdülhamid Döneminde Koruyucu Hekimlik ve Bazı Vesikalar [Preventive Medicine in the Era of Abdülhamid II and Some Documents]," *Belgeler* 34, no. 38 (2013): 87–99.

path of correct values: liberty, rationalism, and constitutionalism. Whereas the previous ones simply helped maintain a façade of advancement, this one is imagined to be veracious.

However, the editor is concerned that not everyone would be able to adopt the constitutional values: some people might not internalize the constitution at first, but more importantly, they might remain indolent in the face of oppressive measures that would linger. This is why a majority of the Ottomans would need the influence of the free press, and especially of satire, to know the values that should ideally be upheld in a constitutional regime and to be unsettled about its possible errors and illusions. Such idealism on the part of the publishers inevitably suggests an educational mission. Thus, *Kalem* begins its publishing life with an immediate didactic reflex, positioning itself as the humorous illuminator of masses.

The reflex is maintained on the following page in an article entitled "Caricature." This article lays out the main characteristics of this visual genre along with its history. Caricatures of French and English press are offered as contemporary epitomes. The reason behind publishing this informative article is the Ottoman readership's unfamiliarity with caricature. Although there were examples in nineteenth-century journals, they were usually referred to as pictures or images. Thus, *Kalem* takes on the mission to introduce caricature to its audience, and while doing so, it also frames the genre's moral boundaries:

> Caricature is the rendering of a model's certain parts, with its overall borders remaining intact, into an unconventional style. This is based on the condition that the model remains easily recognizable. Otherwise, we consider those caricatures on the streets, which even the smartest of men have difficulty understanding if not for their captions, as an offense to free press. Yes, the press is free. Yet one shall neither infringe upon people's morals nor offend the nation's fine aesthetic taste. In this political maelstrom, we have young teens and people who would enjoy personal assaults. They make collections out of these, take it to their homes; those ugly things that make their way into our private lives suddenly fall into the hands of our little ones and women, whose pure minds we refrain from tainting.[93]

[93] "Karikatür, modelin hudud-ı asliyesi tamam olmakla beraber bazı aksamını -teşhisindeki sühûleti muhafaza etmek şartıyla- garib bir tarza ifrağ etmektir. Yoksa altına yazılmış kelimeler olmasa ne olduğunu anlamakta en zeki bir adamı bile duçar-ı müşkülat eden sokak sergilerindeki karikatürleri serbest matbuata bühtan ve iftira gibi telakki ederiz. Evet, matbuat serbesttir. Lakin ahlak-ı umumiyeyi ihlâl, hüsn-ü zevk-i millîyi rencide

In these lines, *Kalem* delimits the moral confines of not only caricature but also press in general. It first promises to caricaturize within the limits of recognizability and then to satirize within the confines of social decency. The "yet" that follows the admittance of the freedom of press immediately negates this latter. In that way, *Kalem*'s standing in the arena of newfound freedom crystallizes as a conservative and hesitant one. In this self-righteous demarcation, *Kalem* manifests a firm belief in established social hierarchies and promises to maintain them, hence speaking from within the official discourse and hesitating to disrupt it.

The first-issue editorial of *Embros* is a long poem titled "Instead of a program and a diagram." It consists of twenty stanzas, with the first and last being the same. The anaphora of the poem is "I laugh (at)…" as almost each stanza begins as such while Makridis makes a list of his satirical targets. He is careful to allot each target a stanza wherein he goes into detail about his satiric attack. The stanza recurring at the beginning and the end is the longest and is as follows:

> I laugh in Constantinople
> As others also laugh
> When many tricksters
> Owe Michalou.[94]
> I laugh to drive away worries,
> I laugh to let off steam,
> I laugh oftentimes forcibly,
> I laugh nevertheless and forget,
> I laugh and I breathe
> I laugh… so that I don't cry.[95]

This stanza is Makridis's satirical manifesto: despite partaking in the boisterous postrevolutionary environment along with everyone else, he remains distressed by the corruption that runs in the politics and society of the time. He resorts, therefore, to laughter

etmemeli. Bu hayhuy siyasi içinde henüz çocukluktan çıkmamış gençlerimiz, taarruz-ı şahsînin kabalığından mahzuz olacak avamımız vardır. Bunlardan koleksiyon yapıyorlar, hanelerine götürüyorlar, harim hayatımıza kadar giren bu çirkin şeyler nazar-ı pak ve safını lekelemekten içtinab ettiğimiz miniminilerle kadınlarımızın ellerine düşüyor." "Karikatür," *Kalem* 1, 3 September 1908, 3.

[94] "To owe Michalou" is a Greek idiom meaning owing money to a lot of people.

[95] "Yeló ki egó stin Póli / Kathós yeloún ki állou / Ótan pollí marióli / Khrostoún stin Mikhaloú. / Yeló yia na xeskáno, / Yeló yia na xespáno, / Yeló pollákis me stanió, / Yeló en toútis kai xekhnó, / Yeló kai anapnéo / Yeló … yia na min klaío," "Ántí prográmmatos kai diagrámmatos," *Embros* 1, 2 August 1908, 1.

for its therapeutic effect, but even while laughing, misery is at his side. The postrevolutionary atmosphere further forcing everyone to laugh, coercing everyone into expectations of hope, optimism, and euphoria, adds to his sorrow.

The rest of the introductory poem has a caustic tone. It is a collective portrait of Istanbulites as seen through the acerbic perspective of a Rum. Among those that make an appearance are the Patriarch, priests, counselors of the Permanent Mixed National Council, the wealthy, diplomats, Jewish bankers, fortune-hunting men, virgins giving birth, gold-diggers, and whatnot:

> I also laugh at counselors
> Our nation's *proboulos*[96]
> The party's witlings,
> Who, as if they have no other
> Opponents,
> Grapple with each other.
> […]
> But also the bankers
> Jews with an itching palm
> When I see them I burst into laughter,
> Always and regularly
> What unreturned loans
> From them I borrow.
> […]
> I also laugh at diplomats
> Big sluggards
> The weak-kneed of salons
> And of women's petticoats
> And prostitutes' shows
> Elements inseparable.[97]

Through Makridis's eyes, we witness and laugh at the frailties of the elite of early twentieth-century Constantinople. He laughs at the Permanent Mixed National Council for engaging in futile quarrels, at bankers for their greediness, and at diplomats for their debauchery. Unlike

[96] Member of a preliminary deliberative body in Ancient Greece. Peter J. Rhodes, "Proboulos," in *Brill's New Pauly*, ed. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider, https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/proboulos-e1009160.

[97] "Yeló kai me Simvoúlous / Tou Yénous mas provoúlous / Tou kómmatos xephtéria, / Pou san den ékhoun állous / Karsí ton ántipálous / Érkhont' aftí sta khéria. … Allá kai trapezítas / Évraíon pió psorítas / San vlépo xekardízomai, / Pántote dé kai taktiká / T'áyírista ta daniká / Apó aftoús danízomai. … Yeló me diplomátas / Megálous miigokháftas / Ton salonión nevróspasta / Kai podoyíron yinaikón / Kai theamáton pornikón / Stikhía ánapóspasta." "Ántí prográmmatos kai diagrámmatos," *Embros* 1, 2 August 1908, 1.

Kalem, *Embros* does not view these as problems let alone offering solutions, but only notices and satirizes them. In that sense, this satirical manifesto unveils Makridis's literary and stylistic qualities: grotesque in its use of swear words and obscenity, carnivalesque in its leveling of hierarchies among upper-class Istanbulites, ambivalent in its suspension of everyday moral values, and nihilistic in its refrain from offering corrections. Just as grotesque presents, in Bakhtin's words, "a double-faced fullness of life," the poem becomes more crowded and louder as Makridis laughs at each target, until the climactic tone drops in the final recurring stanza ending with "I laugh… so that I don't cry." Signed off by Mephistopheles, the poem's ending suggests a return to the author's isolation, to his marginalized, all-seeing corner in Istanbul's public life.

Notably, Makridis does not explicitly attack the CUP, the Ottoman state, or anyone from the dominant Turkish-Muslim community in the introductory poem. He does not even mention the revolution and does not attempt to cure an unsatisfactory state of affairs. This initial distance to politics confirms the poem's manifesto-like nature. Nevertheless, these topics come forth in the following pages of the issue.

First Issues

Turning the pages of the journals' first issues, satire affronts the reader in full vigor, yet with different agendas and varying degrees of normativity and ambivalence. One recurring French section in *Kalem* was "The Funny Section" [*Le Coté Drôle*]. In the first issue, this section appears with the subtitle "The Benefits of Constitution, The Rise of Industry." Deploying sarcasm and irony to again play on Hamidian industrial advancements, the author lists what he has heard from a friend at the government's Department of Industry regarding the industrial concessions that are underway in the Second Constitutional Era:

1. A repair shop to redress the errors inflicted on the country for thirty-two years;
2. An establishment of steamed grease-cleaning for individuals who have been fatting up on the people's sweat;

3. A cold store to indefinitely preserve liberty, equality, and fraternity. If needed, it will serve to deep-freeze reactionary projects;
4. A workshop for the construction of unbreakable ships of State;
5. A strong power plant to light the paths of justice.

The author announces that he will also embark upon an industrial career, and the first two concessions he will undertake are as follows:

1. Channeling the flow of future parliamentary eloquence to set in motion new flour mills;
2. Transforming the cascades of former prevaricators and falls of ministers into motor force.[98]

The author's list conveys two opposing sentiments: first, an unyielding optimism regarding the benefits of the constitutionalist regime; second, an underlying anxiety as to its possible demise. The author begins by attacking the Hamidian regime for its corruption in matters of government and bureaucracy, which had radically eroded the state's power. Therefore, measures are needed to compensate for decades of imperial institutions and governances' decay and also to prudently reconstruct them. The author's anxiety surfaces in the third point, where he wishes to preserve the organizing values of the era, liberty, equality, and fraternity. Afraid that they might again be lost, revolution should also be kept as a side option to recover these. His own concessions, finally, magnify his unwavering hope for a decent parliament and belief in the fall of Abdülhamid's bureaucrats.

In her dissertation, Ekin Enacar focuses extensively on the ensuing disillusionment experienced by the CUP supporters in bureaucratic ranks: their expectations of meritocratic reorganization were ruined by the CUP's unfair purge of harmless employees and safeguarding of high-level bureaucrats of the previous regime.[99] Thus, *Kalem*'s satirist was

[98] "1. Un atelier pour la reparation des torts causés au pays pendant trente-deux ans; 2. Un établissement de dégraissage à la vapeur des individus engraissés de la sueur du people; 3. Un dépôt frigorifique pour conserver indéfiniment la liberté, l'égalité et la fraternité. Au besoin, il servira à refroidir les projets réactionnaires; 4. Un atelier pour la construction des chars de l'Etat incassables; 5. Une puissante usine électrique pour l'éclairage des sentiers de la justice […] 1. La canalisation du flot de la future éloquence parlementaire pour actionner de nouveaux moulins à farine; 2. La transformation en force motrice des cascades des anciens prévaricateurs et des chutes … des ministères." "Le Coté Drôle," *Kalem* 1, 3 September 1908, 7.
[99] Ekin Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery," 192.

accurate in expressing his concerns, as he eventually could not witness the full downfall of those prevaricators. Nevertheless, the satirist writes from within the confines of a certain constitutionalist core framed by liberty, equality, and fraternity. The following analysis on *Embros* will reveal that remaining within this frame of reference was in fact a privilege granted to the dominant community. *Kalem* makes use of this privilege by underwriting its sarcasm with an educational and cautious tone so that its satire unifies the readers under the same constitutionalist values.

Embros, after proclaiming its satirical ethos, introduces its thematic narrative on the second page of the first issue: "Ali and Pantelis are now each other's best friend" is the title of the story in verse form. The dialogic poem opens with Pantelis's shock and disbelief at the proclamation of the constitution. While he expresses his amazement, he also does not refrain from making innuendos that inverse the hierarchy among the characters:

> I rub, Ali, my eyes and I still don't believe
> How he could have been born in this century
> A constitutional citizen, to find you across me
> And your lady to become a European *kokona*[100]
>
> I rub my eyes, Ali, and I can't understand
> How it was ever possible in a single day
> Without you slaughtering me and me killing you
> To have a Constitution and an air of Freedom
>
> I rub my eyes, Ali, I rub them with wonder
> And I have a hard time, I swear, to digest it still
> How then will we live here in freedom?
> And how will the soil you step on be my soil?[101]

Pantelis's speech is a sentimental one, reinforced by the dramatic anaphora "I rub my eyes…" at the beginning of each stanza. Pantelis is in a state of wonder and worry as to the

[100] "Kokona" is a Greek word used pejoratively in the Ottoman Empire by Muslims to refer to Christian women.
[101] "Trívo, Álí, ta mátia mou kai akómi dén pistévo / pós bórese kai yénike se toúton ton aíona / polítin sintagmatikón karsí mou na se évro / kai i khanoúm sou na yení évrópali kokóna. / Trívo ta mátia mou, Álí, kai den boró na nióso / pós íto dinatón pote se mían mónin 'méra / khorís na spháxis si émé kai egó na se skotóso / Síntagma n'apoktísomen ki' Eleftheriás aéra. / Trívo ta mátia, vré Álí, ta trívo m'áporía / kai diskolévomai, valá, na to khonéps' akóma / pós tou lipoú thá zísoume edó m'élefthería / kai pós to khóma pou patás than' kai dikó mou khóma." "O Álís ki o Pantelís phíli tóra prosphilís," *Embros* 1, August 2, 1908, 2.

practicalities of this constitutional regime, that is, the ways in which it will accommodate the ethnoconfessional heterogeneity. Pantelis's dialogue, although still satirical, comes out all the more sentimental and refined once Ali impatiently interrupts the next anaphora and says, "Enough with it, murmurous / Give up your grumbling and make your cross, / Let laughter spill on your ugly face."[102] Ali then continues by praising Allah and Abdülhamid and suggests Pantelis to glorify his own god. Both the rhythm and the tone change when Ali starts speaking. Pantelis's witty innuendos, like calling Ali's wife a *kokona*, and elaborately repetitive dramatic tone stand in stark contrast to Ali's unrefined entrance, vulgarism, and adherence to conventional norms of celebration.

In what follows, Ali asks Pantelis about constitutional institutions, like the Permanent Mixed National Council, as Rums already have constitutional experience via this latter. Pantelis's first response is an offensive one, although not coarsely but elegantly put: "The constitution […] is a supernatural and wondrous institution / that your own mind cannot reach / no matter how hard you try."[103] While Pantelis describes constitution as beyond human capacity, he in fact implicitly points at Ali's incapacity neither to understand constitution nor to navigate through his delicate discursive layers to get the joke. His layered and far-reaching remark, therefore, is lost on Ali, who thinks his interlocutor is simply joking. Ali replies thus shortly in crude Turkish: "Oi, rattlebrain, tell the truth…"[104]

The playful dialogue between Ali and Pantelis is reminiscent of Jefferson Chase's discussion of *Judenwitz*. Chase asserts that the satiric humor of *Judenwitz* writers "allowed them to develop authorial voices reflecting both their outsider background and sense of mainstream community membership."[105] Makridis's ability to give voice to both characters

[102] "Ártík soús ól, mourmoúri, / paraítise tín grína sou kai káne ístavró sou, / áphise yélia na khithoún stín áskhimí sou moúri," Ibid., 2.
[103] "To Sintagmátion […] ínai thesmós iperphiís kai thavmastós en pási / pou to dikó sou to mialó adínaton na phthási / ósps kai an kopiási," Ibid., 2.
[104] "Ólán, zevzék, dogroú soïle," Ibid., 2.
[105] Jefferson Chase, *Inciting Laughter*, 18.

corroborates this function of outsider's satire: Makridis reflects his own Rum-ness through Pantelis, who is elite, elegant, at times snobbish, and conscious of what is going on around him. He also reflects his familiarity with the dominant community by giving voice to Ali. He renders Ali into an unrefined yet genuine character, who is not as educated or eloquent as Pantelis and who enjoys a more comfortable political standing. Despite the political asymmetry, Makridis inverses established hierarchies between the two characters by conferring culture and wit to Pantelis and leaving guileless vulgarity to Ali. This distinction confirms Makridis's use of humor and satire as a "mode of interfacing with a hostile mainstream."[106]

Furthermore, Makridis's style, via the equilibrium between political and intellectual asymmetry between Ali and Pantelis, gravitates towards carnivalesque satire. The two characters almost cancel each other out, and no one comes off as preachy, moralistic, or self-righteous since both attack each other in their own peculiar ways: Pantelis through refined wit, Ali through his simple-minded presumptuousness rooted in his dominant communal standing. Their communication evolves upon "friendly abuses," as Bakhtin puts it, yet the ending manifests a rehierarchization that is inevitable for a nondominant community member like Pantelis.

Their dialogue continues with Pantelis's absurd explanation of the Permanent Mixed National Council, which reflects a self-satire, as well. The climactic point is the ending of the poem, when Ali asks Pantelis about the constitution in Crete. Crete, at the time, was de facto under Greek control and had its own state apparatus and constitution. Pantelis tries to evade Ali's question with diplomatic remarks regarding his disinterest. Ali, on the other hand, provokes the issue further by bringing up the idea of waging war on Crete and imposing their own new constitution. Pantelis again tries to fend off Ali's questions, this time with a cautious

[106] Ibid., fn. 25, 18.

yet impartial anti-war rhetoric. The poem ends with Ali's serial insults in Turkish and a finalizing act of violence: "Ah! Infidel, traitor, Christian dog, giaour, / Take my fists in your classical face."[107]

Constantinopolitan Greek daily *Proodos,* in its issue published on August 3, 1908, advertised and congratulated *Embros* on its journey. The blurb noted, "*Embros* […] is published in the shape and form of the 'Rum.'"[108] Only two weeks into the constitutional period, *Embros* reflected its readership's concerns and anxieties, although the euphoric stage was still ongoing for a majority of them. *Embros,* in this atmosphere, was the bitterly realistic yet comic voice, which explains its low circulation before the regime became more authoritarian: not many people wanted to see suspended hierarchies reestablished. Its diversity and multilayeredness of discourse, narrative strategies that derive from and, in turn, reinforce Makridis's ambiguous position in society entrench *Embros* in the carnivalesque tradition of satire. Being the underdog's satire, *Embros*'s discursive presence in this turbulent arena curtails the normativity of mainstream humor when juxtaposed with such an example. Although it is Makridis's authorial persona who fashions himself half-fool and half-devil, his communally rooted self-consciousness and biting satire eventually distance him from the mainstream humor that *Kalem* represents.

Kalem was, for the most part, indifferent to such multiethnic concerns due to its dominant social background resulting in an inevitable divergence in political expectations. Therefore, it could easily play the legitimate fool—entitled to teach, to delimit, and to entertain. Its concerns were circumscribed by the constitutionalist idiom and liberty, equality, and fraternity. By following political norms, *Kalem* represented a national humor culture that aimed to instill fine aesthetic taste regarding humor and caricature rather than a desire for offense. Further substantiating its stance, it exhibited reserve regarding everyday political

[107] "Imansíz, khaín eríph, kiopék Khristián, giaoúri, / órse grothiés katámesa stín klasikí sou moúri." *Embros* 1, August 2, 1908, 3.
[108] "To 'Emprós' […] exedóthi is to skhíma kai katá ton típon tou 'Romioú.'" *Proodos* 1354, August 3, 1908.

events and freedom of press. In the next chapter, the journals' responses to certain events will be scrutinized to further deconstruct their national and marginal discursive stations.

Chapter 3: External Enemies, Inner Demons: Everyday Politics in *Kalem* and *Embros*

> When we observe a picture for any length of time, even the most serious picture, we have to turn it into a caricature in order to bear it, hence we must also turn our parents, our superiors, if we have any, into caricatures, and the whole world into a caricature, he said. […] in art *anything* can be made to look *ridiculous*, any person can be made to look ridiculous, can be made into a caricature whenever we like, whenever we feel the need, he said. Provided we are in a position to make something look ridiculous. We are not always in that position, and then we are seized by despair and next by the devil, he said.
>
> **Thomas Bernhard, *Old Masters: A Comedy*, 90-91.**

Thomas Bernhard's incisive pen diagnoses a pervasive need to caricaturize. To come to grips with authority, one needs to create a burlesque of power, on the condition that they are in a position to do so. One possible preclusion to being in that position is being on top of the hierarchy, which prevents one from perceiving the ladder underneath and eliminates the need to cope with authority in the first place. *Kalem*'s alignment with the overarching constitutionalist idiom of the period and rootedness in the dominant communal discourse indeed preclude it from ridiculing everything. It does not, for instance, ridicule the sultan, the empire's internal predicaments, or itself for that matter, assuming a more conservative tone. *Embros*, on the other hand, commands a more panoptic vision directed both externally and internally. Its double consciousness yields it an anarchic bent wrapped in carnivalesque satire which poses a threat to anything that comes in its way.

In this chapter, I will analyze the satirical caliber of *Kalem* and *Embros* vis-à-vis everyday political issues such as the sultan's despotism, the Balkan Crisis, and censorship. My analysis will cover the period starting with the revolution and building up to the elections in November-December 1908 and then to the Counterrevolution in April 1909. Investigating this period, I argue that whereas *Kalem* externalized the causes of imperial problems by self-censoring, deflecting conflict, or targeting outside powers, *Embros* detected the "inner

demons" of the empire along with its external enemies, thus producing a fuller picture of the empire's troubles.

The period under scrutiny was characterized by chaos on several fronts in the Ottoman Empire. While the revolutionary hysteria continued, Ottomans witnessed the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria's declaration of independence in two consecutive days in October 1908. This shock prompted a collective hostility against Western powers and a nation-wide boycott against Austrian goods. In the same month, many other events of varying repercussions took place: assaults on Armenians intensified in eastern Anatolia, a Turkish-Greek couple was lynched in Istanbul, electoral strategies were being crafted at the expense of non-Muslims, anti-CUP parties were surfacing, and overall, cards were being reshuffled on the sociopolitical front after a euphoric rise of Ottomanism. Also, at the end of August 1908, Istanbul experienced the second largest fire in its history, causing uproar in the newly established press arena, as well.

After this distressful period, the Parliament was finally inaugurated in December 1908. The CUP's inexperience in governing properly unfolded before and during the elections since it chose its deputy candidates from among local notables for the sake of electoral success, instead of following a consistent political agenda. The ensuing lack of discipline in the parliament caused corruption and favoritism to resurface in bureaucratic ranks, similar to the Hamidian regime. In addition, the CUP had been sidelining many elements since the revolution, resulting in an increase in anti-CUP sentiments among groups of diverse political hues.

One such group was the conservative religious one composed of lower-level ulama and sheiks of dervish orders. Their demonstrations grew into a countercoup attempt on April 13, 1909, and it was supported by ideologically distinct yet anti-CUP elements, as well. Unionists were targeted and killed, and pro-CUP press offices were attacked. The CUP

reclaimed control after a military intervention took place on April 24. Three days later, Abdülhamid was deposed. All at the same time, the tension in the Adana province culminated in a pogrom against Armenians. Although not backed by the state, instigators included CUP supporters, which eroded non-Muslims' trust in the government. Once the CUP consolidated its reclaimed power, it substantiated its authoritarianism visibly through Turkification policies and press laws.

Although an unbridgeable gap persisted due to communal differences, *Kalem*'s stance actually transformed in this tumultuous period, approximating that of *Embros*. Faced with looming censorship, *Kalem* was stripped of its conservative reflex to a certain extent, instead criticizing the government's attacks on journalism. In addition, its counseling function in the immediate postrevolutionary environment faded out, since it continued to support constitutionalism yet the government was now committing to non-constitutionalist practices. Nevertheless, *Kalem*, until the end of its publishing life in 1911, adhered to its fundamental values, unlike *Embros* which maintained a penchant for not committing to any official ideology and ridiculing without limits.

Lampooning Abdülhamid and the CUP

The countercoup attempt in April 1909 resulted in the consolidation of the CUP's authoritarianism and the deposition of Abdülhamid. Until this date, *Kalem* had not caricaturized the sultan in full force, instead resorting to metonymic symbols that conjured his despotism. One of the visual symbols was the throne as featured on the Turkish cover of the seventh issue (Figure 8). In this graphic image, the throne, with the sultan's turban on it, is surrounded by a pile of skulls that recall bloodshed and calamity. In Enacar's reading, a second meaning appears out of the caricature regarding the Ottoman monarchy as a whole: a centuries-long regime of violence that was ought to be overthrown by constitutionalism. She

adds that the throne and turban are minuscule compared to the skulls, thus, to human misery. A monarchical regime, therefore, is fragile in its dependence on the people.[109]



Figure 8. "The results of war."[110]

[109] Ekin Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery," 173.
[110] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 7, October 15, 1908, 1, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/70/PFKAL9081015001%20%281908-10-15%29.jpg.

The caption underneath, however, nullifies the dramatic imagery as it succinctly reads, "The results of war."[111] Enacar interprets this gap in tone as a strategy to avoid censorship: "The cartoonist is softening the initial harsh message of the imagery by writing a caption that would get the approval of almost everyone in the empire."[112] *Kalem*'s back-and-forth attitude in being disruptive and the resulting self-censorship corroborate its political moderation. Until the Counterrevolution in 1909, Enacar detects two caricatures in *Kalem* that depict figures with Abdülhamid's facial features.[113] Although these would be easily recognizable for the contemporary audience, the journal nevertheless took precautions to circumvent any potential legal trouble. Enacar further observes, "Instead of conspicuously attacking the sultan, the contributors of *Kalem* preferred to criticize the 'despotism' (*istibdâd*), as if despotism is a creature or an evil spirit that was independent from the person of the sultan."[114]

After the Counterrevolution, it was in fact the CUP's oppressive tendencies that materialized. Nevertheless, Abdülhamid's dethronement gave the press free rein to lampoon him. In *Kalem*'s second issue after the Counterrevolution, which corresponds to the thirty-fourth, there were three caricatures explicitly rendering Abdülhamid. Two of those were on the front and back covers. On the Turkish front cover of this issue, Abdülhamid is seen sitting, pondering in a tormented manner (Figure 9).

[111] "Netîce-i harb. / Conséquence de la guerre." *Kalem* 7, October 15, 1908, 1.
[112] Ekin Enacar, "We Laugh at Our Misery," 174-175.
[113] Ibid., 179-185.
[114] Ibid., 170.



Figure 9. “O Ebü’l-Hüda, where are you? If you were here, these would not befall me.”[115]

This is the first time *Kalem* caricaturizes the now deposed sultan, and the caption accordingly derides the sultan’s Islamism and favoritism: “O Ebü’l-Hüda, where are you? If you were here, these would not befall me.”[116] Ebü’l-Hüdâ es Sayyâdî was one of the religious officers of the Hamidian regime who rose to the highest office in the Rumeli jurisdiction (*Rumeli Kazaskeri*) under Abdülhamid’s rule and earned an infamous salary rise, as well. Among the

[115] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 34, April 29, 1909, 1, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129136/248/PFKAL9090429001%20%281909-04-29%29.jpg.

[116] “Ah Ebü’l Hüda neredesin? Eğer sen olsaydın bunlar başıma gelmezdi… / O Ebul-Huda où es-tu? Si tu étais encore là, tu aurais pu conjurer ce malheur.” *Kalem* 34, April 29, 1909, 1.

Young Turk circles, therefore, he was known as a henchman of the sultan. Several days before the countercoup, he had died in his home in Istanbul's Princes' Islands, leaving the sultan further helpless.[117]

In a similar vein, *Embros* took cover in the ambiguity of satire in its first explicit treatment of Abdülhamid. The fourth issue of the journal opens with a poem titled, "I rub my nose at the feet of Hamid." In this satirical verse, Makridis praises Abdülhamid for having proclaimed the constitution. His main source of joy, however, is the shock and awe that befell the ministers and diplomats of Western powers whose encroachment plans were breached by the revolution:

> First they robbed us
> and then they milked us
> as if we were cows.
> Now they bow before us
> one by one they bend over
> and do the *temenna*[118]

Notably, Makridis refers collectively to Ottomans in the first-person plural in this poem, whereas in Ali and Pantelis agons, a clear us-versus-them binary is present. Thus, when the topic is foreign intervention, a collective imperial belonging surfaces in *Embros*. Makridis is content with witnessing the reverence and apprehension of Sir Edward Grey of Britain, Georges Clemenceau of France, Alexander Izvolsky of Russia, and Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal of Austria vis-à-vis the Ottoman ascent. For instance, he gives voice to Grey in the following lines: "Grey says: 'I wonder / I can't figure out / how the reform came about.'"[119] Izvolsky is similarly in awe at the sight of the Yıldız Palace where the sultan dwelled, and consequently, he withdraws his plans.

[117] Tufan Buzpınar, "Sayyâdî," in *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi*, https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/sayyadi.
[118] *Temenna* is a formal greeting made by lowering the right hand below the knee and then raising it to the mouth and the head. "Próta mas elistévane / kai dós tou mas armégane / san námastan yeládes. / Tóra emprós mas kíptousi / sirá ilán prospíptousi / kai kámnoun temenádes." *Embros* 4, August 23, 1908, 2.
[119] "O Gkréï léyi: Aporó / na katalávo den boró / pós yénik' i rephórm." Ibid., 2.

Makridis sounds genuinely satisfied with the revolution's erosive impact on foreign intervention. Nevertheless, his tone in praising the sultan gives away his underlying feelings about him. Following a reproachful stanza on Western oppression, Makridis writes,

> However, the Sultan spoke,
> the Constitution he bestowed,
> he shook the earth
> and the dead rose,
> […]
> All of them, Sultan, you bewildered
> all, Hamit, you made them beg
> because you are the shrewdest
> Your eye foresees
> and all of them you put
> in the pocket of your vest.[120]

The hyperbolic description of Abdülhamid's autonomy conveys Makridis's latent thoughts: it is not Abdülhamid who willingly propelled constitutionalism and successfully fought Western encroachment. Indeed, he was obliged to proclaim the constitution as a result of the Young Turk coup. Nonetheless, the hyperbole would allow Makridis to circumvent censorship since he could have easily defended the sincerity of his lines against any potential legal trouble.

Be that as it may, *Embros* did not wait until the sultan's dethronement to lampoon him in its caricatures. Already in the twelfth issue, Makridis put a rendering of the sultan in a cartoon critical of the CUP (Figure 10). In this cartoon, Papatrehas illustrated a double-headed Unionist communicating with the sultan on the left and with the Patriarch on the right. The caption ironically reads, "Honest communications of the Committee" in accordance with the criticism directed against the CUP's electoral manipulation and its inconsistent promises to the sultan and the Patriarch. Although the emphasis is not exclusively on Abdülhamid, *Embros*'s braver attitude in rendering him, with all his infamous facial features like the nose which could easily expose the journal to legal trouble, again positions it as the centrifugal

[120] "Plín o Soultános lálise, / to Síntagma ekhárise, / eklónise tin yín / kai o nekrós anésti […] Ólous, Soultán, tous sástises / ólous, Khamít, tous aztíses / yiat' ísai pió kournázis / To máti sou provlépi / ki' ólous aftoús 's tin tsépi / tou yilekioú sou vázis." Ibid., 1-2.

discursive power of the postrevolutionary environment. *Embros* is not hesitant to disrupt even the most deep-rooted hierarchies thanks to and despite its marginal position.

Figure 10. "Honest communications of the Committee."[121]

Indeed, throughout the Ali-and-Pantelis agon in this issue, Pantelis complains to Ali that their rights as full-fledged citizens were being undercut by the CUP's electoral policies favoring the *millet-i hakime*, that is, the dominant community of Turkish Muslims. While Rums were trying to secure themselves a solid place in the parliament, the CUP was undermining non-Muslims' political participation. Consequently, Rums and Armenians began to have talks of electoral collaboration. Makridis allotted the rest of the twelfth issue to this topic, wherein he invited Armenians to collaborate: since the Turks "sideline us / and send

[121] Source and digitization: Hellenic Parliament Library. *Embros* 12, October 28, 1908, 3, https://digitallib.parliament.gr/display_doc.asp?item=36485&seg=0.

only Turkish deputies to the Parliament, / since they seek to annihilate us at all costs […] yes, yes, let's collaborate."[122]

In the same agon, Makridis brings forward other causes of unrest. In the same month, two issues of macro and micro levels were troubling Rums of the Ottoman Empire. First, the Ottoman government was signaling rapprochement with Bulgaria which infuriated the Rum community for whom Bulgaria represented not only imperial but also communal separatism. Second, on October 14, 1908, a Turkish woman and a Rum man were lynched by a crowd in the Beşiktaş district of Istanbul for wanting to get married. The Beşiktaş Incident was severely criticized in both Greek and Turkish press, and further justified Rums' concerns over their place in the Ottoman society. Pantelis's complaints to Ali revolved around these issues, in addition to another one concerning the Armenians: Ibrahim Pasha's, a Kurdish local notable who also led the forty-first *Hamidiye* regiment, massacres and oppression against Armenians in eastern Asia Minor. Pantelis's conclusion is that there is no meaning in either constitution or monarchy when such large problems are troubling the empire's communities. This conclusion signals Makridis's ability to self-reflect, on imperial and communal levels, whereas *Kalem* falls short of such level of self-consciousness.

Nevertheless, *Kalem* did not refrain from criticizing the Young Turks when the topic was elections. As mentioned previously in this chapter, the CUP was prioritizing prestige rather than politics in its selection of deputies. In the third issue of the journal, a joke appears under the French section "Trifles": "When you hesitate between two deputy candidates, never decide. You will always regret [not having chosen] the other."[123] Similarly, in the same issue, a cartoon satirized the CUP's preference for elderly local notables' candidacy (Figure 11). In

[122] "[…] mas parangonísoún / kai mónon Toúrkos vouleftás is tin Voulín na stíloun, / aphoú yirévoun coûte que coûte na mas ekmidenísoun / nai, nai, kollamporémous." *Embros* 12, October 28, 1908, 3.
[123] "Quand vous hésitez entre deux candidats à la deputation, ne vous décidez jamais. – Vous regretterez toujours l'autre." *Kalem* 3, September 18, 1908, 9.

the cartoon, a boy asks his father, who looks like a Young Turk, “Dad, who is that old man with a flag in his hand?” to which the father answers, “That’s a Young Turk, son.”[124]



Figure 11. “That’s a Young Turk, son.”[125]

The evident contrast in the caption is coupled with the discrepancy among the characters. The old man, who does not represent in his traditional attire the Young Turk values, achieves political power as signaled by the flag in his hand. The young father, however, cannot reach that position despite being a better representative. *Kalem*’s criticism against the CUP surfaces

[124] “Baba, bu eli bayraklı ihtiyar kimdir? Bir Genç Türk, oğlum. / Papa, quel est ce vieux Monsieur? C’est un jeune turc, mon fils.” Ibid., 4.
[125] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 3, September 18, 1908, 4, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/25/PFKAL9080918004.jpg.

here, along with its adherence to the Young Turk values. Again, therefore, *Kalem* points to an inconsistency between ideology and realpolitik and assumes a corrective, centripetal function towards the regime and its audience by steering them towards the constitutionalist path. *Kalem*'s unifying discursive role appears in its treatment of the Bosnian Crisis, as well, wherein it externalizes the problems of the empire in lieu of acknowledging its internal frailties.

The Bosnian Crisis in *Kalem* and *Embros*

The Treaty of Berlin signed in 1878 had placed Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian administration although it formally remained under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Thirty years later, on October 6, 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The annexation provoked the Bosnian Crisis, damaging relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Italy, and Russia. On the Ottoman side, the annexation, which was deliberately timed by Austria to coincide with the Bulgarian declaration of independence on October 5, 1908, caused great uproar. In the metamorphic postrevolutionary environment, these events marked the beginning of the Balkan Crisis, which would culminate in the Balkan Wars in 1912, and led to intensified concern over foreign intervention and a boycott against Austro-Hungarian merchandise.

The Bosnian Crisis, as an instance of foreign intervention, was again a unifying force among the dominant and nondominant communities. As mentioned previously, the problem of Bulgaria's independence had a communal dimension for Rums of the Ottoman Empire. In the period leading up to the agreement between the empire and Bulgaria in January 1909, Makridis was in fact furious that the Ottoman state was surrendering to this separatism at the expense of vexing the Rum millet. Despite the political convergence, a thematic gap is evident between *Kalem* and *Embros*'s treatment of the subject. The divergence in their satirical focus, the former's on Austria as the main external enemy and the latter's on a

variety of external and internal problems of equal weight, substantiates the essential difference in their sociopolitical belonging patterns. Whereas *Kalem* exhibits a privilege to settle for external deflection, *Embros* displays a more multidimensional disquietude vis-à-vis political developments.

Kalem's satire focuses on Austria-Hungary as a provocative, seductive, and hypocritical power that lured Bosnia and Bulgaria into annexation and independence, respectively. Furthermore, *Kalem* took pride in the Young Turk Revolution and constitutionalism as forces that bewildered foreign powers towards hastily taking these measures. Ottoman society's answer to this "craftiness" was the large-scale boycott against Austro-Hungarian goods, especially against the headgear fez which was almost entirely produced in Austria-Hungary and was the most important item of commerce among the two polities. In *Kalem*'s cartoons, we can observe that the harm the boycott inflicted on Austria-Hungary's economy became a source of pride for the Ottomans. As Tobias Heinzelmann argues, the overall sense of pride stems from *Kalem*'s and its readership's internalization of the aims and value system of the Young Turk Revolution.[126]

To begin with the former issue of Austro-Hungarian manipulation, in the issue published on October 15, 1908, a cartoon shows the Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand I being inflated like a tire by Franz Joseph (Figure 12). The caption title reads "Megalomania," and the conversation among them is as follows: "Franz Joseph: 'You have to overcome obstacles easily like a Michelin tire, do you understand?' Ferdinand: 'Enough, enough Franz, it will explode!'"[127] This cartoon depicts Franz Joseph and Ferdinand as foolish accomplices scheming together against the Ottoman Empire. Since Franz Joseph is the one operating the inflator, Ferdinand is reduced to the lower end of the hierarchy between them. In other words,

[126] Tobias Heinzelmann, "Osmanlı Karikatüründe Balkan Sorunu," 75.
[127] This is a translation of the French caption. The caption in Ottoman Turkish is an abridged version of the French one. "'Azametperestî. Fransua Josef: Yetişir mi? Ferdinand: Aman yetişir patlayacağım. / Mégalomanie. François Joseph: Il faut que tu puisses boire l'obstacle comme un pneu Michelin, entends-tu? Ferdinand: Assez, assez, Franz; ça va éclater!" *Kalem* 7, October 15, 1908, 4.

Ferdinand is the weaker figure being operated and manipulated by the powerful Franz Joseph who decides whether to pump up the other's political audacity in accordance with his own aims. This cartoon is meant to undermine Bulgaria's autonomy by mocking its connection to Austria-Hungary. The inflated self-confidence of Bulgaria is seen as an extension of Franz Joseph's egotism. Indeed, the asymmetrical power relation and complicity between Ferdinand and Franz Joseph became one of the topoi in the journal after this date.



Figure 12. "Megalomania"[128]

In the eighteenth issue published on December 31, 1908 after the inauguration of the Ottoman parliament, Austria again emerges as a Janus-faced power which simultaneously congratulates the event with a flower and maintains military regime in Bosnia and

[128] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 7, October 15, 1908, 4, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/73/PFKAL9081015004.jpg.

Herzegovina (Figure 13). This self-evident cartoon is combined with an evidently ironic caption that reads, "The way in which Austria is delighted over the inauguration of the Ottoman parliament."[129] The Janus is none other than Franz Joseph himself, and he has his sword in his sheath for the diplomatic address on the left whereas he has the sword pointing upwards to give orders to his military on the right side.

Figure 13. "The way in which Austria is delighted over the inauguration of the Ottoman parliament."[130]

[129] "Avusturya Osmanlı Meclis-i Mebusanını nasıl tebrik ediyor. / Comment l'Autriche se réjouit de l'ouverture du Parlement turc." *Kalem* 18, December 31, 1908, 11.
[130] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 18, December 31, 1908, 11, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/256/PFKAL9081231011.jpg.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, had gendered depictions in *Kalem*, which drew an analogy between the region and naïve femininity. Bosnia and Herzegovina were usually depicted as two young women who are cajoled, seduced, or even accosted by a man representing Austria-Hungary, usually Franz Joseph. A cartoon (Figure 14) published on October 29, 1908, for instance, is titled "Austria accosts" and the Turkish caption reads, "Mesdemoiselles, you're welcome to enter! I have been waiting for you for so long."[131] A tall, standing military man representing Austria is the speaker, indicating Franz Joseph. The women, on the other hand, are dressed in traditional clothes, and their posture and position communicate their hesitation over passing through the threshold of the door. These stylistic choices imbue them with an Oriental femininity which endorses the image of distant, chaste women belonging to the private sphere and in need of male protection. This situates the Ottoman Empire as the protective male of the Orient, whereas Austria is the shady foreign power ridding them of their chastity. This cartoon, therefore, conveys well the Ottoman concerns over modernization and westernization, as well, concretized in the figure of the traditional woman. It is a fitting reflection of the same concerns over gender that dominated the larger discourse in the Ottoman society, as illustrated in *Kalem*'s first-issue article on caricature which expressed this modern genre's infringement on the private sphere.

[131] *Kalem* 10, November 5, 1908, 7.

Figure 14. "Austria accosts."[132]

From another perspective, it is the Ottoman Empire itself that is coded as feminine in this cartoon, hence, vulnerable, pure, and in need of protection. Palmira Brummett explores more examples of female allegories of Bulgaria, Crete, Armenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. She concludes that these images communicate the Ottoman state's vulnerability either vis-à-vis Austria or due to internal conflict.[133] Yet, Austria usually transpires as the main conspiring figure, deeply invested in the partition of Ottoman lands.

Embros approaches the Bosnian Crisis less from a dominant community's perspective than from the point of view of a nondominant community with a more panoramic take on the local and global struggles of the Ottoman Empire, its state, and its communities. The first piece in the issue published right after the crisis on October 11, 1908 assumes less a comic than a bitter tone of satire. As is usual in *Embros*, this text is in verse, and each stanza targets

[132] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 10, November 5, 1908, 7, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/124/PFKAL9081105007.jpg.
[133] Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press*, 169.

a different figure, foreign power, or event. Unlike *Kalem*'s rather one-dimensional approach against foreign powers, *Embros* laments both the external assaults and the internal conflicts that were jeopardizing the Empire:

> Sir Edward Grey
> "behave yourselves," he says,
> "I'm with you."
> And the Vizier believes him,
> he reverently bows to him
> and makes us mute.
> […]
> What does it matter if the others
> squeeze us into bottles
> and make us pickle?…
> They wouldn't bother…
> we also slaughter giaour
> down there in Beşiktaş.
> […]
> Everybody's tearing us to pieces
> whatever he finds, he grabs
> but what with this?...
> We also slaughter Christians
> in Van and in Viran
> and the dance is on.
>
> Such an excellent constitution
> takes a mind to understand it
> [but] is inconceivable to me.[134]

In these stanzas, Makridis creates a mise-en-scène full of illicit activity committed by both external and internal figures. It is a dynamic crowd where on one hand, Ottomans yield to Western powers and on the other, carry on conflicts and killings among each other. Sir Edward Grey, British statesman responsible for foreign policy, appears a two-faced figure and the Ottoman Grand Vizier an obedient servant that betrays his own people in diplomatic negotiations. The author, while chiding the Vizier, does not distance himself from the Ottoman society, to the extent that he continues to use the pronoun "we" when referring to

[134] "O sír Édouárdos Gkréi / 'phrónima kathíste, léi, / kai mazí sas ím' egó.' / Ki' o Vezíris ton pistévi, / évlavéstata prosnévi / kai mas kámni ton moungó. […] Ti pirázi 'sán i álli / mas strimónoun sto boukáli / kai mas kámnoune toursí? . . . / Den to kámnoune oumoúri. . . / spházoume ki' emís giaoúri / káto sto Vesiktasí. […] O kathís mas kommatiázi / óti évri mas arpázi / allá kai me toúto ti? . . . / Spházoume ki' emís Khristián / ís to Ván kai sto Virán / ki' o khorós kalá kratí. / Tétio éxokho Kanoún / na to niósis théli noún / den khorí stin kephalí mou." *Embros* 11, October 11, 1908, 1-2.

the lynch against the couple in Beşiktaş and the killings of Armenians in eastern Asia Minor. Although his inevitable sarcasm remains audible, the self-directed criticism is nevertheless powerful.

While this poem covers Bosnia, Crete, Russian envoys, the assault against the Turkish-Rum couple, and of course Bulgarians, all these events emerge as single entities in a long list of imperial defects. Placing equal poetic-satirical weight on these incidents demonstrates that the Greek Orthodox community was preoccupied with a larger set of adversities that included but did not prioritize the threat against the empire's territories. Makridis's comprehensive standpoint does not represent a group unconcerned with the empire or even betraying it, as opposed to what dominant historiographies advocate. On the contrary, it makes the community a group trying to reconcile between communal concerns and imperial troubles. In fact, Greece makes an appearance towards the end as yet another conspiring entity but without any money to realize its aims.

The cartoon accompanying the poem above (Figure 15) focuses on the Balkan peninsula, each part of which is being held onto by a different power: Italy, Russia, Bulgaria, Austria, and Greece. The Ottoman Empire is represented as a man in traditional religious attire, with his head on Constantinople, hands holding onto Asia Minor, and his buttocks are the Balkans. The caption accordingly reads, "One pulls from here, the other from there, and they will not let us go from the buttocks."[135] This cartoon does not only reduce the importance of the Balkans by equating it with the buttocks but also derides the powers that so avariciously focus on that part. The Ottoman man's uneasy-looking face, on the other hand, communicates the internal hardships. His traditional looks further point to the Islamist and conservative sultan Abdülhamid II and implies the need for a more secular and civic structure

[135] Ibid., 3.

to save the Empire. This cartoon confirms that *Embros*'s criticism of foreign intervention and the empire itself has a more realistic and exhaustive stance than that of *Kalem*.



Figure 15. "One pulls from here, the other from there, and they will not let us go from the buttocks."[136]

Thus, Ottoman reception of the Bosnian Crisis varied depending on the different communities in the Empire. Whereas *Kalem*, targeting a larger elite circle, kept the satire at a macro level and externalized its objects of ridicule, *Embros*'s discourse proved to be more encompassing due to the audience's imperial concerns spanning both macro and micro levels. Despite the overall imperial belonging of both, *Embros* restrained from singling out the

[136] Source and digitization: Hellenic Parliament Library. *Embros* 11, October 11, 1908, 3, https://digitallib.parliament.gr/display_doc.asp?item=36485&seg=0.

Austro-Hungarian Empire as the sole enemy and assumed a more down-to-earth and far-reaching approach towards the problems troubling the Ottoman Empire. *Kalem*, on the other hand, attributed problems to outside forces, perhaps rightfully so in order to keep its larger readership under a unifying Ottomanist umbrella.

Censorship in *Kalem* and *Embros*

The analysis of *Kalem*'s first issue has already revealed its stance regarding freedom of press. The journal was careful to satirize and caricaturize within the confines of recognizability and decency in order not to exploit the newfound freedom. The inherent conservatism in this, which goes against the modern understanding of freedom, was destined to yield to an excessive concern over journalism after the Counterrevolution, when the CUP drafted a new Press Law at least as arbitrary and strict as that of the Hamidian regime.

Shortly after the Young Turk Revolution, on August 23, 1908, Istanbul experienced the second largest fire of its history. The abundance of publications led to many rumors being spread among the society, ranging from revolution-rooted bad luck to arson. Against the extensive press coverage and the ensuing paranoia, the Ministry of Police released an official communiqué against publishing overstated reports on such rumors. While some newspapers abided by the warning, some others, like *Mizan*, were infuriated by the accusations of exaggeration.

As Enacar narrates in her dissertation, pro-CUP newspaper *Tanin* had published an article blaming the latter group of being the "incendiaries in the press" who upset public order and security by publishing rumors. *Kalem* followed suit and published a cartoon on its Turkish cover of the fifth issue with the same caption (Figure 16). The cartoon shows diligent Ottoman journalists studying at an "Ottoman press" desk while others are vandalizing it from underneath. *Mizan*'s publisher Mizancı Murad is seen on the right cutting the foot of the desk. *Mizan* was temporarily shut down by the postrevolutionary government after these criticisms

unfurled. Enacar concludes, “the contributors of *Kalem* had the naïve idea that the postrevolutionary government would never interfere with the press, unless the journalists were obviously harmful to the constitutional regime. Therefore, according to *Kalem*, *Mizan* had ‘deserved’ to be abolished by spreading false news that undermined the public peace.”[137]

Figure 16. “Incendiaries in the press”[138]

[137] Ekin Enacar, “We Laugh at our Misery,” 101-106.
[138] Source: İBB Atatürk Library. Digitized by SALT Research. *Kalem* 5, October 1, 1908, 1, https://archives.saltresearch.org/bitstream/123456789/129477/46/PFKAL9081001001%20%281908-10-01%29.jpg.

Nevertheless, *Kalem*'s conservative reflex transformed after the Counterrevolution in April 1909, during which many press offices were attacked. The insecurity journalists found themselves in reached its crisis with an anti-CUP journalist's murder and the CUP's strict Press Law. From then on, *Kalem* constantly expressed concerns over journalists' safety and financial security, the stigma around newspapers, and the masses' and deputies' depreciation of press. It was after the Counterrevolution that *Kalem* began to signal disillusionment.

Embros's concerns over censorship had begun before the Counterrevolution in February 1909. In this month, the government had appointed Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha as the Grand Vizier. Hüseyin Hilmi was known for his amicable ties with Abdülhamid and moderationist stance between the sultan and the CUP. Although both parties had relied on him, there were criticisms against his ties with the sultan. Eventually, his incapacity to navigate the Counterrevolution led to his resignation after two months in office.

Makridis was one of the critical voices against Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha. After his appointment, *Embros* expressed concern over the resurrection of censorship, since the Pasha represented the ways of the ancien régime. The cartoon on the journal's thirty-fourth issue illustrates censorship being resurrected from its grave and hailed by Hüseyin Hilmi and Unionists (Figure 17). Censorship is embodied by an old, weak woman with scissors in hand. On her gravestone, we see that she had died in July 1908 and resurrected in March 1909. Although the Counterrevolution had not taken place yet, *Embros* accurately signals a shift in the CUP's press policies, which Makridis foresaw with the appointment of a Hamidian bureaucrat to the highest rank in government.



Figure 17. Resurrection of censorship[139]

After the Counterrevolution, constitutionalism properly lost its already precarious meaning for *Embros*. For the first issue after the event, corresponding to the thirty-sixth, Papatrehas illustrated a cartoon with four panels, each one exhibiting the new condition of the Young Turks' four values: fraternity, equality, progress, and unity (Figure 18). In each panel, caption and image produce an incongruity. Fraternity illustrates the murder of anti-CUP journalist Hasan Fehmi on the Galata Bridge. Equality shows the unequal allocation of even the most basic of resources. Progress mocks a Turk riding a donkey backwards, pointing to the not only traditional but also illogical practices holding back the empire. Unity shows warring factions irreconcilably separated on two sides of an incomplete bridge.

[139] Source and digitization: Hellenic Parliament Library. *Embros* 34, March 21, 1909, 3, https://digitallib.parliament.gr/display_doc.asp?item=36485&seg=0.



Figure 18. The Committee's agenda: Fraternity, Equality, Progress, Unity.[140]

Embros's disillusionment sharpened its satirical tone, as well, since in the commentary section of the same issue, Makridis expresses poignant opinions on the Unionists. One such comment refers to Hüseyin Cahit, founder of pro-CUP *Tanin* newspaper and deputy. Not only was his newspaper office attacked by a mob during the countercoup attempt, but also insurgents wanted to outright murder him. Fortuitously, two other members of parliament were mistaken for him and Ahmet Rıza and thus accidentally killed by the insurgents, while Hüseyin Cahit managed to escape. Makridis acrimoniously commented: "the army shot and killed the Minister of Justice and the MP of Latakia […] A series of misrecognitions. Didn't we misrecognize Ahmet Rıza and Hüseyin Cahit? Didn't we consider

[140] Source and digitization: Hellenic Parliament Library. *Embros* 36, April 4, 1909, 3, https://digitallib.parliament.gr/display_doc.asp?item=36485&seg=0.

them constitutionalists and they turned out to be totalitarian in the end? Misrecognition! Sorry, it was a mistake!"[141] Makridis adds that Hüseyin Cahit had demanded from his readers only a week ago to attack the Greek newspapers *Neologos* and *Proodos*, which is why he is genuinely satisfied with the attacks on *Tanin*. Notably, this was the period when *Embros*'s circulation increased. This could be due to the Ottoman Greek community's increasing divergence from the Young Turk values as they were faced with anti-constitutionalist and nationalist policies. *Embros*, therefore, proved to be a necessary satirical voice.

Towards the End

The journals' descriptive qualities towards the last issues deserve to be revisited before ending this chapter. Throughout their lifespans, both journals suffered from censorship and temporary closures. *Kalem* had to pause publishing for months, and *Embros* had to appear under different names. During this harsh journey, *Kalem* added another attribute to its description on the French cover. In September 1910, it was promoted for the first time as a "*political* humorous and satirical journal." Although the Turkish cover remained cautious, the new French description implies that *Kalem* shed its normative stance due to its divergence from the government's authoritarianism and the ensuing disillusionment. After unearthing its political nature, *Kalem* could endure nine more months, until it stopped publishing in July 1911.

Embros's masthead featuring a cynical yet elegant Mephistopheles similarly turned sour over the years. The new masthead featured a war-ridden Mephistopheles further alienated from the empire (Figure 19). His eyes no longer display the enthusiastic cynicism of 1908, and the calligraphic style of the journal's name is also more somber.

[141] "o stratós epirovólise kai ephónefse ton ipourgón tis Dikaiosínis kai ton vouleftín Laodikías paragnorías aftoús. Sirá paragnoríseon. Mi den íkhomen paragnorísi ton te Akhmet Riza kai ton Khousín Tzakhít; Mi den tous enomízomen sintagmatikoús kai ékini vyíkan sto télos apolitarkhikí; Paragnórisis! Yiagnís ólntou!" *Embros* 36, April 4, 1909, 4.

Figure 19. *Embros*'s final masthead[142]

In the last issue of *Kalem*, a play was published. In this play, a member of parliament reads *Kalem* and gets furious over its rendering of a deputy. He obsessively asks his wife whether he has such a crooked nose. He insists that he will report *Kalem* to all the necessary offices for drawing him in such a manner. In the second part of the play, the MP is writing reference letters to his wife's acquaintances, before he goes on to write his complaint letter about the journal. The author of the play thus creates a postrevolutionary moment much reminiscent of the ancien régime: limitations on press, censorship, favoritism, bureaucratic ranks filled with incompetent employees, and whatnot. Whatever *Kalem* hoped would happen after the revolution remains out of reach in the Ottoman Empire. It is significant to dwell on *Kalem*'s self-reflexivity in this play. Its increasing focus on journalism after the Counterrevolution had already set the scene for *Kalem*'s tendency towards meta-reference.

[142] Source and digitization: Hellenic Parliament Library. *Embros* 2.4, September 1, 1908, https://digitallib.parliament.gr/display_doc.asp?item=36269&seg=3583.

The pressures and authoritarianism that unfolded after the Counterrevolution changed *Kalem*'s discursive positioning in the Second Constitutional Era. It never renounced supporting constitutionalism, liberty, equality, and fraternity, which is why it was alienated from the authoritarian realpolitik executed by the CUP. Sidelined by these developments, *Kalem* acquired a self-reflexive muscle whose culmination we see in the play. The author places *Kalem* in a realistically crafted mise-en-scène where the journal is extremely precarious, pointing to his fuller vision of the sociopolitical drawbacks.

In an issue of *Embros* from its last months in 1920, Ali and Pantelis take the lead again, yet this time we barely hear Ali's voice. It is Pantelis's farewell to the Ottoman state and to Ali, as he now supports Greece and Eleftherios Venizelos:

> The true *Hürriyet* [freedom] now arrives for me
> It is you, today,
> Who has to feign to rejoice
> Who has to conceal his bitterness
> As I did in the past
> This is the beginning of a new era
> For both of us
> […]
> You will never ever celebrate Talat or Enver
> But you will learn to pronounce, impeccably,
> The name of Lefteri [Venizelos].[143]

This issue was published on the twelfth anniversary of the Young Turk Revolution and during the Greek victory over the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Pantelis's tone in this agon is vengeful against Ali. It is evident that there are no longer any commonalities among them. Pantelis admits the euphoric veneer he put on in 1908 and now expects the same from Ali, whose turn it is to feel bitter in the face of defeat, failure, and imminent alienation.

[143] *Embros* 2.89, July 11, 1920, 2-3.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have compared two satirical journals representing different ideologies and discursive calibers after the Young Turk Revolution. My analysis has shown that whereas *Kalem* aligns with the normative and national humor culture of the period, *Embros* engages in cultural negation and therefore represents a marginal satirical culture. Their descriptive qualities and first issues already set the scene for an intricate comparison, as a result of which I detected timid aesthetics and moderate political tone in *Kalem* as opposed to *Embros*'s audacious attitude promoting ambiguity. The discrepancy in their satirical calibers stems from *Kalem*'s entrenchment in the dominant constitutionalist idiom of the period, whereas *Embros*'s nondominant communal standing produces a skeptical approach evident from the very beginning.

The journals' responses to everyday political events and looming censorship similarly differ. *Kalem* usually assumes a corrective tone while engaging in political criticism and does not steer away from constitutionalism. *Embros*, on the other hand, negates the constitutionalist idiom and behaves more boldly in the face of unfurling political incidents, most prominently by directing its satirical weapon at the empire itself. *Kalem* mostly refrains from self-directed criticism until the Counterrevolution in April 1909, which unveiled the CUP's authoritarian and nationalist inclinations, leaving both journals disillusioned. Nevertheless, the journals exhibit convergence on matters of foreign intervention.

The theoretical framework for this thesis has been a Bakhtinian one categorizing the journals according to their centripetal-national-negative satire and centrifugal-marginal-carnivalesque satire. This Bakhtinian gridline has helped illuminate the social positionings of the journals via placing them in their respective discursive stations.

The argument of this thesis is not in any way meant to be conclusive. It instead seeks to provoke further questions about the cultural scene of the postrevolutionary Ottoman

Empire. Both journals' publishers, for instance, wrote and staged theatre plays commenting on their political environment. Celal Esad Arseven wrote *Selim-i Salis* [Selim the Third], and K.G. Makridis wrote *Exo Phrenón* [Furious] along with Greek playwright Polyvios Dimitrakopoulos. Both advertised their plays on their journals' pages. Another question concerns the public history emanating from this period. It is telling that there is no monument, although there were plans to build one, commemorating the Young Turk Revolution while there is one celebrating the crashing of the Counterrevolution. This latter in the Şişli district of Istanbul is named the Monument of Liberty and has Enver and Talat Pashas' tombs surrounding it. Historiography currently remains short of providing a fuller picture of this period from a cultural historical perspective, which would complete the political historical dimension thus far studied more extensively.

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