THE SOVIET 1955 DECISION TO ACCEPT FOREIGN TOURISTS:

AN ONTOLOGICAL INSECURITY EXPLANATION

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ABSTRACT

Why is it that in 1955 the Kremlin decided to encourage foreigners to come as tourists to the Soviet Union? In a search for an answer, I embark on a turbulent trip through the fields of ontological insecurity, which becomes my theoretical framework. I go down the bizarre worlds of post-war Soviet society, which presents me with the empirical material. Finally, I arrive to the halls of 1954 Writer's Congress of the Soviet Union, where battles are fought for how much foreign is acceptable. At the end of this journey, I come to a conclusion that many individuals living in the Soviet Union after the Second World War were experiencing ontological insecurity, while the death of Stalin enabled them to communicate this through the literary circles to the corridors of power. The expansion of what was considered legitimate foreignness into the touristic realm is, I argue, a result of this process. I believe that this historical study challenges the conventional understanding of "soft power" and, thereby, has an implication for the contemporary policy of Transatlantic allies vis-à-vis Russia – it is illegitimate foreignness which challenges an isolationist regime and not just foreignness as such. Conditions must be formed to force the Russian regime to make bigger areas of foreignness illegitimate.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CC – Central Committee

CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DALO – State Archive of Lviv Oblast

DAMK – State Archive of Kyiv City

DAOO – State Archive of Odesa Oblast

TsDAHO – Central State Archives of Public Organizations and Ukrainica

INTRODUCTION

Why is it that on the 14th of July, 1955 the Central Committee's Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union[1] adopted the resolution "On Allowing Tourism of Foreigners and Carriage of Photo Cameras" (quoted in Goryaeva 2009, 316) and the wider Central Committee followed up on this with a resolution "On the Foreign Tourism" (quoted in TsDAHO 1955a, 3) which led to massive quantitative and qualitative expansion of incoming tourism? We do not know and we, perhaps, may never know given that until 1958 minutes were not taken during the CC Presidium meeting (Fursenko 2004, 8-14). However, Graham Alison was able to provide not one, but three explanations for the Cuban Missile Crisis without ever setting foot into Soviet archives. If this is possible for long and complex sequence of hasty decisions made through out July-October 1962, this must also be possible for a single day in July 1955, especially with 10 gigabytes of documents I have at disposal.

As many conversations over the course of my work on this paper suggest, tourism in the Soviet Union appears to the general audience to be as bizarre a subject as possible. On contrary, over the last 20 years this subject was given attention of multiple researchers. So what does the literature has to say on this decision?

Igor Orlov and Aleksey Popov are two Russian historians, both educated in Ukraine, who have published two massive volumes about Soviet tourism, first on outgoing tourism, then on incoming one. In the former, they take note of a resolution approved on the same day which, however, considered the outgoing tourism (Orlov and Popov 2016 , 38). In the latter, they, instead also take notice of the Soviet of Ministers (Sovmin) decision made on the very same

[1] The supreme authority in the Soviet system of governance.

14th of July, 1955 in regard to incoming tourism (Orlov and Popov 2018, 125). It was an established practice for CC and Sovmin to pass resolutions jointly or concurrently. This assemblage allowed to combine the norms of the "highest socio-political organization" (Kodan 2017, 205), the party, as well as the concrete steps defined by the executive branch. But it is no coincidence that the party is set on the first place. It is in the party that norms originate, while the Sovmin is there to execute them. Thereby, Sovmin's decisions demonstrate not the considerations behind the policy, but its implementation – and it is precisely the implementation that Orlov and Popov study. In their lengthy account of incoming tourism, they describe the conditions which caused an expansion of this industry in the post-Stalin Soviet Union: coincidental development of mass tourism markets outside the Soviet Union (Orlov and Popov 2018, 31-32), intensification of Soviet connections to abroad (Orlov and Popov 2018, 102-103), "voluntaristic conviction of Khrushchev" that tourism can be utilized as a self-sustained mean of propaganda (Orlov and Popov 2018, 451-452). Elsewhere they provide a similar reasoning for Soviet Union not terminating *outgoing* tourism – this would motivate Western countries to dissuade their citizens to visit Soviet Union which in turn would lose "significant profits in freely convertible currency" (Orlov and Popov 2016, 321-329). Nevertheless, they stop short of offering evidence as to how these factors were present in the considerations of decision makers. Orlov&Popov seem to recognize this shortcoming. The language they employ when deploying their arguments is a cautious one: in two different books they use the same phrase "as it appears" for this purpose.

Anne Gorsuch from the University of British Columbia has been a leading researcher of tourism in Soviet Union for the past 20 years. In her 2011 *All This is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin* she was first to point at a document which dates back to March 1954 and deals with incoming tourism to Soviet Union (quoted in Gorsuch 2011, 10). However, she has mistaken this document for a CC resolution. Instead, as Orlov and Popov later corrected

her, this was rather an inconsequential draft (Orlov and Popov 2016, 40). This, however, allows to infer that the discussions about tourism have been around at the Central Committee long before the 14th of July resolution. Gorsuch, same as Orlov and Popov, completely omits the 1955 resolution.

The July resolution is of importance, because it is for the first time when the deliberations at CC send waves to the areas outside of the metropole, with the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine (TsDAHO 1955a, 10-12), as well as, for instance, Stalingrad regional CPSU committee (Sokolova 2016, 248) passing a set of concrete steps to prop up the incoming tourism.

The day when Stalingrad regional committee agreed on these measures it also considered a different resolution about reception of foreign delegation. Once again, a resolution "On the improvement of reception of foreign delegations visiting USSR" was passed by the CPSU CC in summer 1955 and over autumn and winter trickled down into the decisions of Communist Party of Ukraine (TsDAHO 1955b, 13-17), Communist Party of Belarus (Havstow 2002, 142), Moscow Committee of CPSU (quoted in Khoroshailov 1969, 142) or Sverdlovsk Regional Committee (quoted in Beklenishcheva 2021, 541). In short, it is in the second half of the 1955 when the party started to formulate their view on the inclusion of Other into the body politic of the Soviet Union. This move was not simply happening in the center but over time spreading out into the various parts of the country.

What Gorsuch has to say regarding the reasons behind this policy? She believes that the Soviet policy change has to be rendered within the bigger "effort on the part of the new Soviet regime to reestablish and expand international contacts". In her view, the expansion was essential to fight the Cold War, "a cultural contest without precedent" (Gorsuch 2011, 14), in which Soviet Union was forced to "use state funds to impress foreign tourists" (Gorsuch 2011, 144). This is

true, but I believe that this monocausal explanation for a foreign policy ignores "sheer complexities and dynamics that pervade world politics" (Eun 2012, 778). First and foremost, what is contest? As Johan Huzinga, argues, the very origins of contest (*agon, Wettkampf*) are traceable to the concept of "gathering" (Huizinga 1962, 53). Contest is by definition social. Contest is enabled by existence of multiple actors within a delimited space (Caillois 2011, 14-17). For a contest to happen, a rival should be allowed to participate in it. As I will show in Chapter 2, this was not always the case during the existence of the Soviet Union. Such contest could only properly begin after foreigners were allowed to visit Soviet Union on tourism. Thereby, this approach does not explain the reasons behind the 1955 decision. I will update this claim by showing that while Soviet Union was trying to make others believe in its vision of modernity, it also tried to persuade its Self of its continuous existence and separateness from the Other.

Gorsuch (2011, 4) buttresses her thesison the argument of Ted Hopf (2002, 79) that by 1955 "Soviet identity had already been secured" and thus capable of "opening up to the outside". Thus, Hopf (2002, 92) builds a nexus between developments at home and foreign policy and arrives at a theoretical conclusion that "[a]cknowledging difference at home made the acceptance of differences abroad less threatening". He bases his judgment about the Soviet identity on popular texts, such as press materials, novels, textbooks, proceedings of Writers' Congress and academic journals. Although my approach to the issue is somewhat similar, there are three key differences.

First, I do not agree with the attempts to connect internal to international, because this very division arises from the normative commitment to sovereignty and is unfit "modernist framing of all spatiotemporal options as an unquestionable given" (Walker 1993, 7). Instead I seek to look at various intersections as experienced in the society. This includes looking at how the self-narrative is impinged by external events, for instance, when members of the society go

abroad, get new experiences, return home with an updated sense of the self, and act upon it. Under such circumstances, internal, usually associated with "mundane", and international, usually associated with "serious" (Lisle 2016, 293), become closely intersected.

Second, Hopf (2002, 15) bases his analysis on textual analysis but also claims commitment to clothing, food and habits. However, the latter part of the data is not so evident in his study. I bring it up on my own by showing how, for instance, foreign clothing was consumed in the Soviet society. This demonstration allows me to see again that inside/outside boundaries are rather elusive, which generates ontological insecurity. Above all, a contrast between my conclusions and one drawn by Hopf also represents the divide in literature as to whether ontological security should be taken as a given or whether this security is a promise never fulfilled (Steele 2024, 117).

Third, while Hopf (2002, *xv*) only looks at year 1955, which was "after Stalin's death but not yet post-Stalinist", I also demonstrate how state of Soviet identity in that year cannot be properly understood without the Second World War experiences.

Western scholars also pay attention to the profit-thesis thesis. In a volume edited by Gorsuch, Shawn Salmon (2006, 190) adds another condition which is paradoxically antagonistic to the previous factor: "the higher costs of fighting the Cold War – especially those associated with the opening of military and intelligence outposts abroad" made Soviet Union seek hard currency from the incoming tourists., Diane Koenker (2013, 61) demonstrates that such income-seeking motivation can be traced back to the late 1920s when the Soviet Union started encouraging incoming foreign tourism for the first time.

In short, both Western and Russian scholars seem to focus on what Orlov (2010, 142-154) calls "Scylla of ideology and Charybdis of profit". At the same time, Russian scholars pay more attention to Waltzian first image, explaining the 1955 decision through Khrushchev's personal

convictions. Their Western counterparts demonstrate more interest in the second image, explaining the 1955 decision through the study of domestic factors such as security of identity or commitment to participate in the "cultural contest". Such juxtaposition to be expected, given on one hand the great man tradition of Soviet historiography starching back to the Stalinist revisionism of 1930s (Kaganovich 2014, 185-198), and the development of social sciences as an epitome of modernity in the post-World War II Western societies on the other hand (Manicas 2007, 7-31). But a closer look at these models reveals gaps.

Soviet tourism officials indeed went go great length to devise the ways how to extract as much money out of foreigner as possible. This was persuasively shown by Salmon (2006, 188), but not only. The very language of extraction I employ is not mine. It is quite literally a quote from a Soviet tourist official that "we must extract the maximum profit for the state from those capitalists" which Orlov&Popov (2018, 309) bring to us from the depth of Russian archives. Again, research in the Ukrainian archives corroborate this claim. In 1971 the Office of Intourist in Lviv Region was proud to assert that the "expansion of additional service, enhancement of their promotion resulted in the yearly plan [of foreign currency receipt] fulfilled by 124.3%" (DALO 1971, 15). Their colleagues in the Office of Intourist Kyiv City also worked hard in this regard. In 1978 they reported to their higher-ups that the plan as of mid-November has already fulfilled by 105%, not least due to a number of measures taken: bonuses paid to guides who were able to talk the foreigners into ordering additional services; printing of 66 thousand leaflets about additional services; luring tourists into "tasting" of Ukrainian wines etc (DAMK 1978, 191-192). However, as Salmon (2006, 191-192) shows, the marketization of incoming tourism only properly started after the deployment of wider Liberman-Kosygin reforms in 1965. The head of Intourist followed suit to argue in 1966 that incoming tourism can generate profit for the state. These reforms, however, were pursued "to give producers and sellers a real stake in their work and to link their material interest to the satisfaction of public demand"

(Marangos 2013, 117). The reforms were initiated because of falling productivity and returns on investment rates (Feygin 2023, 59-60) and had very little, if anything, to do with tourism. Above all, this happened only 10 years after incoming tourism to Soviet Union was reestablished. The Ukrainian archival evidence I cite above also represent the later stages of development. Therefore, there are little reasons to believe that the decision-makers of 1955 were mostly motivated by material considerations.

And what do the decision-makers' themselves have to say on the issue of motivation? Khrushchev's memoirs may provide some explanation of the 1955 decision. To begin with, a note on the source. The memoirs are edited transcripts of audio recordings that were made Khrushchev's country house after his fall from power. Its publication story (Khrushchev 2010, 142-221) is too difficult to recall here in any meaningful way, but the integrity of memoirs was preserved due to the larger than life struggle of Khrushchev's son. At the same time, the original narration was not a strict enumeration of events. As his son says, former Soviet leader "very often got inwrapped, moved away from the topic, recalling events touching en route on events far detached from the defined topic" ((Khrushchev 2010, 151). Khrushchev talks a lot about tourism when discussing the ways in which he learnt from the Yugoslav experience. He recalls that Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito impressed him with the profits his country was making from tourism. Together they visited multiple Yugoslavian hotels and other tourist facilities. "When I came home, I briefed [the CC] on their practices, so that our comrades could use Yugoslav experience. We approved a big program on the construction of hotels for tourists, seeking to enroll new people into this endeavor", Khrushchev (2016, 138) recalle. The Soviet leader visited Yugoslavia for the first time in May 1955, that is, right before the July 1955 resolution was passed. Thereby, it is very tempting to assume that Soviet leadership in a profit-seeking move indeed adopted the tourism policy from Yugoslavia. Similar scenarios, it has been shown, played out in Bulgaria (Stanoeva 2019, 25). Closer scrutiny reveals weakness of

this claim. As it was noted, the very first drafts of tourist policies go back in 1954. Furthermore, Khrushchev's first trip to Yugoslavia is well documented (Rajak 2010, 113-121) and there is no place for visits to hotels in it. Finally, it is not clear to which resolution on hotel construction he was referring, but a surge in number of hotels did not happen until mid 1960s (Orlov and Popov 2018, 318-319). Finally, it is documented that it was in September 1963 when after returning from Yugoslavia Khrushchev clearly said that Soviet Union should "study tourism experience in Yugoslavia" (Fursenko 2003, 735).

Thus, I have shown that profit-seeking model for the Soviet decision to encourage foreign tourism, employed by scholars and a decision maker stop short of explaining it fully.

As argued above, I do not aim to refute that propaganda thesis. Indeed, Soviets attempted to influence the tourists, win out the sympathies and prepare the ground for political warfare, even if the cooperation between tourist agencies and KGB sometime had fictional character (Orlov and Popov 2018, 267-271). Nevertheless, in 1950s and 1960s such efforts were not extremely successful due to infrastructural reason: it is difficult to make someone believe that socialism is superior while also not being able to provide them with basic accommodation. But my point is not to deny this thesis but to contextualize it. Bakhtin (2003, 207) argued that "[t]he hero's attitude toward himself is inseparably bound up with his attitude toward another, and with the attitude of another toward him". Soviet external propaganda was underpinned by the same self-identity as the internal one, and thus ontological insecurity depended on the stability of both narratives.

My paper proceed as follows:

- In the first chapter I will sketch out the intellectual roots of ontological insecurity and its applications in the International Relations while also discussing the concept of foreignness. I will argue that this latter concept shall be central to an understanding of

accepting foreign tourists. How did the Soviet society render the Other when the decision regarding foreign tourism was made in 1955? Looking for an answer to this question, I will establish that after the Second World War foreignness was present in the everyday lives. Some elements of it would be accepted by the state agents as legitimate, while others would appear inconsistent with the Soviet self-narratives and was thus considered illegitimate. This erratic behavior is characteristic of ontological insecurity. I will show that tourism stands for embodied foreignness the contents and effects of which are almost impossible to control. A decision to invite more foreignness is an attempt to eliminate insecurity and could have been enabled by increasing self-reflexivity of the state agents. From this disposition a question arises: given that the state agents per se are unlikely to be capable of enhancing their self-reflexivity, who could have enhanced it? Possible options include foreign state understood as significant others or the Soviet society, understood as nonstate co-actors. Although an answer is to this question may only be a probabilistic one, empirically I will find that 1955 decision was passed before tourism was ever discussed on the Geneva Summit. This will push me to look more closely at the Soviet society.

- In the second chapter, I will propose an update to the ontological insecurity literature by shifting the focus from the discrepancies between the state self-narrative and the state police to the discrepancy between the way how Soviet self-narrative on foreignness was internalized by the individuals and the individual experiences of foreignness. I will argue that this discrepancy was enabled by the Second World War, a critical situation for the Soviet identity. The veterans who returned home after the war did not only foreign experiences with them but also foreign objects. The experience discrepancy and the state agents' repression against them I exemplify by the life of

Oles' Honchar. The objects discrepancy and the state agents' repression against them I exemplify by the coverage of the satirical magazine *Perets'*.

- In the third chapter, I will argue that Stalin's death was a traumatic event which made self-reflection possible. The usual assumption would be that self-interrogative capabilities of the state are enhanced by media, social movements or international organizations. In the Soviet society the literary circles perform this role. Thus, I will study how foreignness was dealt with in this milieu with a conclusion that Soviet authors were aware of the discrepancies discussed in the second chapter. They utilized the traumatic event to widen the area of legitimate foreignness. This move first dealt only with foreign books and their writers but appears to have spilled over farther on all the way to tourism as embodied foreignness.
- In the conclusion I will demonstrate three contributions this paper may provide. Namely, it will create a new model to explain 1955 decision; it will demonstrate applicability of ontological insecurity to undemocratic state; it will propose a different thinking on how ontological insecurity from the societal level may be transported into the state apparatuses. Additionally, I suggest that this historical study may be of use for policy design now and in the coming decades.

CHAPTER I. ONTOLOGICAL (IN)SECURITY & FOREIGNNESS

There are two most crucial concepts for this study: ontological insecurity and foreignness. In this chapter I will demonstrate the lives of ontological insecurity in International Relations and will connect foreignness to it.

1.1 The Origins of Ontological (In)security

In their influential "Text-book of Psychiatry for Students and Practitioners" two Scotsman, David Kennedy Henderson and Robert Dick Gillespie (1932, 262, 445) assumed that knowledge of one's own identity and ability to act according to it is a conduct typical of human in the absence of mental disorders. This textbook, it appears, had influence (Beveridge 2011, 199-202) on a fellow Scottish psychiatrist, Ronal David Laing, who went on to coin the term of "ontological insecurity" in 1960. This term stands precisely for one's inability to take their identity for granted which results in "in contriving ways of trying to be real" and enactment of these ways, given that "life must, nevertheless, go on" (Laing 1969, 44, 67).

Laing demonstrates three anxieties which arise from the insecurity and then proceeds with ways in which the insecure individual attempts to outmaneuver the anxieties by magical defenses. Namely,

- First is engulfment, that is, fear of any relationship with any person due to a perceived threat to the fragile identity (Laing 1969, 43-45);
- Second is implosion. Here Laing builds upon Donald's Winnicott (1988, 128-130) idea of "impingement", unpredictable and external to the life process of an individual, which interrupts the continuity of being. Individual may feel "empty" and there by any "impingement" results in "implosion", that is, total destruction of the identity. Again,

individual will then seek to isolate themselves, not only from other individual but reality as such. This in turn results in ever-growing emptiness (Laing 1969 45-46);

- Third is petrification/depersonalization. This anxiety arises from the fact that a degree of depersonalization against the Other is essential to possibility of social action. At the same time, if one attempts to treat the Other as a fully independent personality, "one is open to the possibility of experiencing oneself as an object". In this case, the ontologically insecure person can feel they has no identity of his own. A countermove against this tendency may be to conceal own's identity and pretend to be an object while in fact secretly treating everyone else as objects (Laing 1969, 48-54).

After Laing's death in 1989 his influence "had all but vanished in America" (Thompson 2015, 1). Indeed, Google Books Ngram Viewer ("Ronald Laing" 2024) suggests that the frequency with which his name has been mentioned in indexed books is currently as low as it was over 1980s. At the same time, "ontological insecurity" (2024) has been in almost constant rise since 1991. There is a clear explanation for this. Anthony Giddens (1979, 219), who has already been trying to apply this concept to the societal level in 1970s, published *Modernity and Self-Identity* in 1991, a book which makes ample use of Laing's model. Giddens (1991, 54, 114, 156, 167) argues that the ontological security depends on routinized practices which are mutually recognized in the social life. Breaking of conduct does not result in dramatic and immediate reactions, but rather in "loss of a sense of the very reality of things and of other persons" (Giddens 1991, 36). In saying so Giddens clearly follows Laing's (1969, 40) argument that ontological security is ability to deal with hazards of life from a firm sense of own's reality. Furthermore, the breaking of the rituals should not necessarily happen within the "immediate sensory perception" of the actor, because external reality is grasped via mediated experience [2]

[2] Giddens, A. (1991). op.cit. 43.

such as fictional literature and periodicals (Giddens 1991, 26, 43, 168). The varieties of these experiences must be accommodated within the self-narrative, that is, the way how the actor continuously understands themselves.

1.2 Ontological (In)security in International Relations

Giddens mainly refers to ontological security rather than insecurity. Thus, according to Google Books Ngram Viewer, the former quickly overtook the later in use already in 1980s and has been rising aggressively even since ("ontological insecurity,ontological security" 2024). As a result, it became a concept that "did not just apply to mentally disturbed people but was a universal experience" (Beveridge 2011, 214). And although Giddens (1991, 15) only passingly mentions international relations, *Modernity and Self-Identity* became a springboard for IR scholars to delve into worlds of ontological security. At the same time, the cooption of the concept was not straight-forward, given that Giddens' ontological security conceptualizations contain hardly a mention of state, thus "limiting their more obvious relevance to international relations" (Shaw 1993, 174). Jef Huysmans (1998, nn. 17), an early proponent of ontological security in IR, even believed that he is borrowing the concept "without intending to borrow the specific meaning this concept has received in Giddens' theoretical framework". Nonetheless, there are clear spillovers: Huysmans argues that "the legitimacy of the state rests on its capacity to provide order - not a particular content of order but the function of ordering, of making life intelligible". Here one can see how Giddens' (1991, 37) "chaos that threatens on the other side of the ordinariness of everyday conventions" is repackged for the use in IR. Huysmans simply moves the responsibility for "orderings of convention in day-to-day life" (Giddens 1991, 62) from the level of individual into the realm of state. And then another jump happens, now to the international level: daily security, understood as postponement of death by countering objectified threats, is dependent on "rendering International Relations intelligible" (Huysmans

1998, 243). Intelligible to whom? To atomitic individuals who are united into political communities due to the "fear-of-the-power-of-others-to-kill-me" (Huysmans 1998, 235). Therefore, political agencies source their legitimacy from the ability to explain and order the threats (Huysmans 1998, 243). When they fail to do so, this task is carried out by the providers of mediated experiences in a less ordered way, resulting in individuals zapping from one threat to another (Huysmans 1998, 244). This dynamic was literally spelled out by Tony Blair (2001) who said after 9/11 that "[t]oday the threat is chaos", that is, absence of ordered threats.

Jennifer Mitzen (2006, 352) further developed the application of ontological security in IR. She grounds the applicability of ontological security in identity distinctiveness and coherence: it may as well be "fear-of-the-power-of-others-to-kill-me" that results in the creation of the state, but it is the preservation of the national group identity which is both carried out by the state and perpetuates its existence. Shall this be the case, a linkage is established between the individual, which seeks stable and distinctive personality, then the society, which consists of security-seeking individuals and is ontologically secure as long as its identity is continuously enacted through routines, and finally the state, which is fulfilling "the ontological security needs of their members" (Mitzen 2006, 352-353) by seeking recognition of this identity by other states over continuous interactions (Mitzen 2006, 358). It is only over these routinized interactions that states can "know who they are" (Mitzen 2006, 361). This last movement on the inter-state scale has been described as "inter-subjective" or "sociological" (Zarakol 2010, 7).

In parallel another strain of IR literature on ontological security is developed, an intra-subjective one, and mostly so by Brent Steele. Central to his argument is the assumption that "ontological security drives states to structure their action in ways which attend to their self-identity needs, sometimes in materially costly ways" (Steele 2008, 148). Such behavior is only possible due to self-interrogative reflexivity, that is, an ability to "effectively monitor and

amend their policies to confront identity threats" (Steele 2008, 150). Such amended policies may be costly, but not only in material terms, given that "[c]itizens of states might also have an interest in resisting self-interrogation as they internalize one version of their country's self-identity and emotionalize it in the form of patriotism" (Steele 2008, 151). Thus, an effort must be made for the amendment. Steele argues that these efforts are usually drawn by social movements, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and media (Steele 2008, 152-157). For this purpose they utilize reflexive discourse (verbal persuasion that calls out the discrepancy between a targeted state's actions and its self-narrative) and reflexive imaging (same model which uses visual material instead of verbal) (Steele 2008, 157-160).

1.3 Inter-State Approach to Ontological (In)security and its Shortcomings

Inter-state approach argues that states seek ontological security through "routinizing relations with significant others" (Mitzen 2006, 348-349). The need for security can be heightened by traumatic events which are located "outside the frameworks of normal social reality and thus outside the linguistic and other symbolic tools we have at our disposal for making sense of the world" (Edkins 2002, 246). Furthermore, they "disrupt both the sense that tomorrow will be like today and the confidence that existing political and social institutions can protect us" (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020, 246). Under such conditions a flexible and adaptable actor can attempt to rethink its being (Browning and Joenniemi 2017, 44-45). New symbolic tools, that is, updated self-narratives may adopted. Finally, states may seek to get the recognition of these updates by routinizing relations through reforms to policies.

This would imply that after Stalin's death the Soviet state may have sought to prove to others that its identity changed by adopting new practices. Let's see whether the empirical material

has to say about an alternative hypothesis derived from the interstate conceptualization of ontological security.

One such newly adopted practice may be as providing the Soviet society with legitimate forms of "foreignness". Eleonory Gilburd utilizes this term to describe all the "non-Soviet things, films, sounds, and stories" which existed in the Soviet Union not least due to being brought from Europe by veterans. The state agents were aware of this and legitimized some forms of foreignness through their policies, both Gilburd (2018, 277-278) and Juliane Fürst (2010, 93, 206) show. But if Gilburd focuses mostly on the post-Stalin period, Fuerst highlights this tendency under Late Stalinism. For instance, tens of thousands "trophy" films were made in Hollywood, exported to Nazi Germany, then captured by the Soviet forces, officially reexported to Soviet Union on trains, cars, planes, sledges (Tanis 2017, 60), edited in a way critical of capitalist society and finally shown to the Soviet public. Their consumption was entirely legitimate, while the consumption of most foreign clothes was not (Fürst 2010, 217-224). I argue that the radical difference between these two instances lies in the fact that consumption of film is necessarily performed in a collective and is controlled by the state, while the consumption of clothing individual and can only partially be controlled. However, the consumption of both foreign film and foreign clothes has already been common under Stalin, thus the hypothesis is not supported.

At the same time, tourism is different from films or clothing. Legitimization of foreignness implies first deciphering it in a way to attach a specific meaning to it and then connecting it with the Soviet identity[3]. The problem with the human beings is that their "meaning" can be controlled only through depersonalization techniques. Soviet tourism authorities tried depersonalizing tourists via fixed itineraries and programs. But even then, the unsanctioned

[3] For instance, by invoking authoritative sources (Gilburd 2018, 33-34).

elements of foreignness came through. Take, for instance, VI International Festival of Youth and Students which happened in 1957 in Moscow. The shear location made it extremely location – there was no doubt that such an event could happed without the approval of the ultimate authority. Festival's program included dance and musical performances both by locals and foreigners. If the festival as a whole was legitimate, then its content must have been legitimate too. Except – it is almost impossible to control how foreigners *move* on the stage, even if the songs they were to perform were approved by the authorities. Watching first Soviet and then foreign performers, Soviet Ministry of Culture remarked that the Soviet bodies "did not move with the same ease" as the foreign ones. This discrepancy was evident to the locals. For example, one Soviet journalist felt that it was "too defiant" to walk around the stage (quoted in Gilburd 2018, 96). These observations made such movements thinkable to the Soviet youth in the audience and they also started to move accordingly, "rocking to and fro, whooping, clapping wildly, and stamping their feet" (Gilburd 2018, 97). Such behavior signaled to the authorities how easily Soviet identity was completely withdrawn and how quickly foreign norms of behavior took root. These observations let me conceptualize tourism as embodied foreignness. This form of foreignness was formally legitimate but was difficult to govern and thus easily slipped over the border into the illegitimate.

Going back to the inter-state hypothesis, I can now procced with the question: was the Soviet Union's 1955 decision on tourism motivated by seeking recognition of its identity by significant others?

Soviet Union's significant others certainly communicated that for it to be regarded as security-seeking, it must act in certain ways, including in the realm of tourism. In 1947 a Republican politician Harold Stassen was presented with a bizarre opportunity: to meet Stalin in the Kremlin. During this meeting Stassen (1951, 103) asked Stalin whether he looks forward "to a greater exchange of ideas and news, of student and teachers, of artists, of tourists" between the

US and the Soviet Union. Stalin answered that this is an inevitability under the condition of trade in goods between the two countries (Vneshnyaya politika 1952, 19). In 1950 Stassen (1951, 345) wrote a letter to Stalin urging him to open the border for tourists. A reply came, not from Stalin, but rather from a Soviet propagandist. On the pages of the main Soviet newspaper, he wrote that Stassen in end effect was asking Soviet Union to change its policy (Viktorov 1950, 4). "It is not difficult to see that Stassen is not only audacious, but also amusing to put forward such a wild request", – argued the propagandist and instructed the Soviet audience to ignore this letter, which was broadcasted via Voice of America. One may of course say that this article shall not be taken seriously, given that it was a propaganda counteract targeting domestic audience. But the next year a journal for foreign trade and tourism professionals wrote that tourism in the Western Europe is neatly interconnected with the "expansion of American economic, political and ideological monopolies" and ultimately is representative of "preparation for a new world war" (Gorchakov 1951, 39-41). Thus, when in late 1951 US delegate to United Nations General Assembly Mike Mansfield (1952, 79) called on Soviet Union to transform "the iron-curtain refugees of today" into "the tourists of tomorrow", it did not seem to produce much change. In other words, the Soviet Union demonstrated routinized behavior in the realm of international tourism.

However, when on July 22, 1955, the French delegation at the Geneva Summit proposed facilitating tourism in Europe (Proposal of the French Delegation 1988, 526), Soviet Union was more forthcoming (Kudriavtsev and Polianov 1955, 3). No wonder – roughly one week before that the Central Committee has already passed the resolution on tourism! Although the head of the Soviet delegation Nikolai Bulganin (1955a, 5) never mentioned tourism in his opening statement, he nevertheless did say that the Soviet Union supports "development of international contact". A historian believed that the tourist agenda resulted from French commitment to "the progressive reestablishment of European unity" (Barbier 2000, 114), but

to me such coincidences seen implausible. The Kremlin was briefed by its intelligence that France would try establishing working relations with the Soviets during the summit (Zubok 2000, 71). This was a logical conclusion from the fact that the French premier Edgar Faure spoke Russian, believed in "ancient links between the Gauls and the Slavs" and met with Soviet ambassador beforehand (Barbier 2000, 104-105). Unlike the other Western states, France came with proposals to the summit (Barbier 2004, 111). One may only guess whether or not part of these proposals was based on the communications from the Soviets, especially given that French delegation invited the Soviet one to an informal diner they day before the summit started (Barbier 2004, 115). This meeting happened on the 17th of July and was attended by the three Soviet top officials who most likely participated in the vote for tourism resolution three days earlier[4].

Although the French initiative was not discussed during the summit, it was passed on to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers that was happening in the fall of 1955. By August Bulganin (1955b, 23) already felt comfortable enough to say that Soviet Union is a "supporter of tourism development". By September small tourist groups from Denmark and the UK arrived in Soviet Union (Moss 1955, X29). In October, during the foreign ministers meeting, Soviet minister Molotov (1955, 236) said that "development of tourism would be useful". This topic was also included into the formal Soviet proposal (Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1955, 240).

These findings allow me to conclude that the delegation of the Soviet Union arrived at the Geneva Summit already prepared to welcome foreign incoming tourism. I was not able to find appeals by Soviet significant others which were made between 1953 and July 1955 and pushed for such policy. I argue that there is insufficient evidence to believe that Soviet Union was

[4] Although published documents regarding the meeting of the CC Presidium on the 14th of July were not found, the proceedings of the 12th of July, as well as the general list of Presidium members constitute a good reference. Compare with the list of Geneva attendees. (Fursenko 2003, 898), (Goryachev 2015, 158-159), (Eisenhower a chanté à l'Eglise américaine 1955, 6).

driven by the desire for the recognition by the significant others, when 1955 decision on tourism was approved.

Instead, I contemplate that this decision was enabled by internal co-actors who assessed the ontological insecurity in the Soviet society. To show this, in the next chapter I will interpret the Second World War as a critical situation for the Soviet identity, while the xenophobia is a policy choice resulting from inability to organize a stable identity (Steele 2008, 68-72).

CHAPTER II. THE SOVIET & THE FOREIGN

It is not difficult to see that Steele is decentering the state in his writings. At the same time, the extent to which he does so is not sufficient for my discussion here. I wish to further this move by looking not at the discrepancy between the state policies and its self-narratives, but instead at the discrepancies between the way how Soviet self-narrative on foreignness was internalized by the individuals and the individual experiences of foreignness. This move I am proposing is not motivated by a commitment to democratic values. Instead, as I will show throughout this chapter, the discrepancy was surveilled by the state agents and repressed, thus proving it politically influential even in an undemocratic state. I will do so using to examples: one of repressions against a war veteran novelist, another of repressions performed by a satirical magazine. But let's start with the general state of society in the wake of and after the Second World War.

2.1 Foreignness Before the War

In 1954, exactly 6 foreign tourists visited Odesa (DAOO 1995, 3), a city which according to Soviet spa scientists was a unique spa location without comparison in the Soviet Union and much competition in the West (Shkol'nikov, Sigal and Heyfits 1934, 12).

How can this juxtaposition be explained? A scholar of Stalinist culture Evgeny Dobrenko (2020, 6) argues that before the Second World War "the external world was almost absent from the Soviet imagination". The Other existed only in history textbooks and spy stories. This is also true for tourism – in 1936, when prewar incoming tourism peaked, it merely counted 79 foreign visitors per day (Orlov and Popov 2018, 146). Violetta Gudkova (2013:308-332) even coined the concept of "non-travel" to describe the presence of foreignness in the Soviet literature of the day. Under such conditions, a cult of border guard emerged, and a

corresponding depiction of a hero-officer remained on the Soviet currency until 1947 (Widdis 2000, 402). The literary representations of the border went all the way to conceptualize it as "the end of the world" (Levchuk 1936, 20), a metaphor which can be traced back to XVII century Muscovite cartography in which "[t]he world beyond the Russian border is rendered invisible" (Kivelson 2008, 176).

Then came the Second World War which made the presence of the Other within the Soviet space more viable after the Second World War, given that the British-Soviet-American alliance "destabilized longstanding ideological oppositions" (Toropova 2020, 95). Furthermore, the war can be conceptualized as a "critical situation", because to most of the Soviet agents it was a "disjuncture of an unpredictable kind" which threatened their continuity of selves. This effect was exacerbated both by the openings and the closure of the war.

- First came the discontinuity of 1939, when after years of propaganda against Nazism Soviet Union suddenly teamed with it, which left a soldier in Kyiv Military District asking "how is it possible that the sworn enemy became the closest friend?" (quoted in Grynevych 2012, 71).
- Second came the German invasion. In June 1941, following the Soviet pre-war self-narrative, some workers in Leningrad were discussing whether the Soviet army will be able to make it to Berlin in one week (Kulagin 1978, 17). Soon after the questions were rather why the Soviet army is retreating and why does it have so few tanks and planes[5]. Thus, the Soviet citizens turned into critical actors that demonstrated "the inconsistencies between the actions of a state and the ‘‘biographical narrative’’ that state uses to justify those actions" (Bolokina 2009:42).

[5] TsDNI. F. 7849. D. 27578-c. L. 14. as quoted in: Болокина, L. (2009). Настроения жителей Калининской области в начале Великой Отечественной войны. Вестник Тверского государственного университета. Серия: История, (4). 42.

- Third, and most importantly, many Soviet soldiers also became critical actors and here is how.

2.2 Soldiers – Tourists – Importers

When in 1945 Stalin (2006, 359) was hosting the Czech president Edvard Beneš in 1945, he said that "The Red Army made a great journey from Stalingrad to the gates of Berlin. They made this journey not as tourists, they made it under fire". This is, of course true. In the course of 1943-1945 offensives the total casualty rate suffered is estimated around minimum of 4 million (Krivosheev 2001, 402). Thus it is no wonder that on 1944, once the Soviet troops were nearing the 1941 borders of their country, the state was faced with the novel task – to persuade the soldiers that fight on the foreign soil was desirable. The problem was two-fold. First, the exhaustion of the fighters. Second the fact that, as noted above, throughout 1930s everything outside the Soviet border was considered "counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet" (Salmon 2008, *xiii*). This is why the Soviet propaganda tried to portray further advances as an adventure (Merridaly 2006, 244). Irrespective if it was this selling pitch or rather the capital punishment for disobedience that made the soldiers proceed, they went forward and were shocked by the "real face of capitalism", not the one they were indoctrinated about (Merridaly 2006, 247). Peasants and workers of yesterday saw relative plenty even in Poland (Merridaly 2006, 248), left alone Eastern Prussia where Soviet "[s]oldiers marvelled at the solid-cut stone manors in the countryside of East Prussia, filled with preserved foods, polished furniture, and full-sized mirrors, filled with everything unavailable in their impoverished villages back home" (Slaveski 2013, 6). As the veterans travelled home, they brough with themselves not only the traumas, but many of the items they encountered abroad: "watches, motorcycles, pianos, radios, furniture, paintings" etc (Edele 2008, 31).

This issue was well known to the Soviet authorities. As Mark Edele (2006, 177) notes, the post-war authorities blamed the "anti-kolkhoz feelings", "kowtowing before bourgeois science" and "love of Western comfort" on veterans' presence in different communities, whom they even compared to the Dekabrists. For instance, in 1947 a group of veteran friends ended up arrested after meeting over beer to discuss wartime experiences (Edele 2008, 58-60).

2.3 Oles' Honchar Abroad and At Home

Oles' Honchar was one these soldiers who returned home. Soon he became the ultimate Soviet Ukrainian writer of veteran generation. To understand his importance, one shall take in account the role literature played in the Soviet society. Generally, it has been argued that literature-centrism of the Russian imperial projects has its roots in the XIX century but "reached its peak" during the Soviet times (Kozlov 2013, 2). In practice it meant that "literary realm remained the principal setting in which alternative ideas emerged, dissent was voiced, and opinions were formulated and exchanged" (Kozlov 2013. 4). This is also true for the post-war years when the literature refused to continue functioning as the wartime pure propaganda machine and instead attempted to "purposefully engage in anesthetization of experienced trauma" (Dobrenko 2020, 43). In other words, it was a literature of dealing with ontological insecurity.

To show this tendency in more detail I will develop an external viewpoint on a few years of Oles' Honchar's life to "reveal the actual functioning of political systems and mechanisms" (De Haan 2016, 58). In this case my focus will be on his articulations of foreignness between 1944 and 1947 and how these were perceived and repressed by the state.

Unlike many other Soviet authors, he served on the frontline and did not occupy one of the cozy journalistic-propagandistic jobs in the army rear. At the end of the day, it is not that he ever had such an opportunity: when the war broke out, Honchar was still a student early in his literature career. He volunteered to serve, was captured, received multiple wounds, and

ultimately stayed in active service until 1945. While Honchar (2008, 34) was, as he later said, wandering Europe, he did not have time to read any periodicals except for the warfighting log. Nevertheless, during war Honchar was writing a diary which can be read as an "modernist impulse for deliberate self-creation, whether in an aesthetic or in a political key" (Paperno 2004, 563) and as an "project of self-inquiry" (Wolfon 2004, 620).

His diary contains rich entries on the experience of interacting with foreignness. While driving through Czechia Honchar (2002, 91) saw "real Europe". In Europe you are *supposed* to eat chocolate and if there is no chocolate around, yeast in packaging similar to one of chocolate may suffice. This, at least, what his brothers-in-arms thought while munching on yeast. After Czechia Honchar (2002, 96) went to Vienna in which "beautiful building laid in ruins" and "divine cathedrals also had deep wounds". When he proceeded to Budapest, his rising ontological insecurity became evident. Anxious of engulfment by the foreignness while at the same time attracted to it, he reimagines the Budapest space as one of the Ukrainian city where he studies. Thus, Honchar (2002, 103) was strolling through the "faimiliar ancient blocks" "as if going from the library in Kharkov through the Pushkisnkaya street late in the evening". As a result, he conflates the socialist Home and capitalist anti-Home (Lotman 2002, 457). Another tactic he deploys against engulfment is an attempt to persuade himself that soon enough he will forever separate himself from foreignness. Visiting Balaton Lake Honchar (2002, 111) notes: "Beautiful places. And everything causes an incurable sadness, since I am going to see this only one, one time in my life. For the first time and the last time".

And so it ends. In 1945 Honchar returns home to continue his studies. Due to the housing crisis, he is not able to do so in his Kharkiv alma mater, going to Dnipropetrovsk where his relatives have a small private house in the proletarian outskirts. Despite this, his ontological insecurity remains severe. Marriage was "an important step in the establishment of a civilian existence" for a veteran in the post-war society, in which males were "scarce goods on the marriage

market" (Edele 2008, 65, 71). But Honchar (2008a, 39) did not marry straight away and instead confessed to a friend that while he sits in his room "with songs about a foreign woman". This confession in of course, not a fleeting one. Sexual encounters between Soviet fighters and European women were common throughout 1945, and took both consensual and nonconsensual forms, although the line between these is a confusing one in the time of total disintegration of state and society (Grossmann 2004, 127). Honchar's diary is full of references to mostly anonymous women of Central Europe. In 1946 he sends his first post-war novel *Modry Kamin* to Petro Panch, his "literature godfather" from the pre-war years. Panch is editing a periodical and accepts the novel for publication. The text describes an encounter between a Soviet artillery scout and a Slovak girl. They meet in mountains only for a brief moment when the scout seeks warmth in a Slovak hut after days of crawling in snowy peaks. Soon after the scout leaves, the girl sees him off, while local police forces trace the steps in the snow leading to the hut. They wrongly assume that the steps belong to the father who escaped labor mobilization. The girl is forcibly disappeared by the police. The novel ends with a spiritual reunion in "irreal time-space" (Prylipko 2020, 46).

What neither Honchar nor Panch could comprehend at the time was the coming wave of state-led xenophobia. It started in 1946 and continued until 1952. In its early days it was targeted against "kowtowing before the contemporary Western bourgeois culture" (Yakovlev 1999, 588), which, according to Stalin himself, is a "big sin" (Babichenko 1994, 200). This campaign can be seen as "anti-Western thrust of Soviet policy during the early Cold War" (Azadovskii and Egorov 2002, 67). It is indicative of a crisis being constructed in relation to the state identity which suffers from ontological insecurity (Steele 2008, 70-72). The policy chosen to terminate the crisis is not a self-interrogation reflexivity, but rather aloneness with the imaged advantages of "freedom from others, self-sufficiency, and control" (Laing 1969, 46, 78).

In the Stalinist society newspapers functioned as an instrument to mediate mass campaigns from central authorities to the micropolitical level (Lenoe 2004, 43). This also holds for Honchar case. In spring 1946 *Modry Kamin* is published. On the 9th of August Stalin signals the start of xenophobic campaign (Babichenko 1994, 200). On the 21st of August the directives regarding "kowtowing" are published in the biggest newspaper of the Soviet Union (O zhurnale «Zvezda» i «Leningrad», 1). On the 25h of August the biggest Ukrainian newspaper published its own interpretation of the directive, attacking among others, Honchar for "propagating apostasy to the motherland" (quoted in Kysla 2018, 98). On the 27th of August the novel was decried by the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine as "harmful" (quoted in Kysla 2010, 49). By September these accusations made it back to Dnipropetrovsk, where a literary theorist from Honchar's university repeated these accusations (quoted in Honchar 2008b, 11). On the 2nd of September Honchar (2008a, 59) thought of ceasing literature activities altogether, especially given that others are able to "live without literature, drink beer", while considering a career of "a herdsman or a sea fisherman" instead. Thus, he was instructed that even an irreal reunion with the foreignness is not thinkable. This attack, going all the way from the ultimate authority to the local level, demonstrates that the actors were aware of the discrepancy between the way how Soviet self-narrative on foreignness was internalized by the individuals and the individual experiences of foreignness.

After this Honchar (1988, 664) was on the brink of losing the job at university he recently got and was betrayed by friends. But instead of becoming a fisherman, Honchar continued to write, but in a Stalinist way. In 1946-1948 he publishes his magnum opus, *The Standard Bearers*, which would go on to be translated in languages as diverse as Korean and Portuguese (Pikhur 2013, 197, 204). Every subsequent draft of it became more and more Stalinist (Kysla 2010, 123-125). Honchar immediately receives the status of "a living classic" and Stalin's Prize two times. According to Tamara Hundorova (2008, 196), this novel argues that "the victory in the

war came about not because of the bravery of simple soldiers and not because of military commanders' wisdom, but only because of the Leninism's determinant power and its personification – Stalin". Unlike in Honchar's dairy, Budapest's beauty is absent in *The Standard Bearers* (Hundorova 2008, 198). The Soviet soldier demonstrates disregard for Europe's material values, whose inhabitants are miserable and bowed (Hundorova 2008, 197-198). In other words, Honchar creates a narrative based on "linearity to the development of a state's self-identity" (Steele 2008, 55): Soviet self-suffiency before the war –> during the war –> after the war. In other words, he lies, and his lies are used by state agents to suspend self-interrogation. Figuring how he fits into the Stalinist literature, Honchar seems to be so "consumed with social dependence" (Steele 2008, 197-198) that he suspends his self. Throughout 1947 he appears to ignore his "real feelings of sadness or anger" (Lifton 1996, 21) by not writing a single entry to his otherwise very lively diary. "The project of self-inquiry" fails because sincerity – a quality Hochar cherished[6] – would raise insecurity and endanger his material well-being.

2.4 Foreignness by *Perets'*

Similar attempts to keep the linearity within the Soviet self-identity by marking foreignness as illegitimate may be found at the pages of *Perets'*, Soviet Ukrainian satirical magazine. Party believed that satire in general and this magazine in particular should help "eradicate defects in Soviet society and degrade the external enemies" by reacting to the timely displays of both (Yeremieieva 2016, 52-53, 81, 112). Presence of illegitimate foreignness at home is precisely the point at which these targets melt together and thus must be of special interest to the editorial team of the magazine. It is not, of course, that the satires could choose whatever topics they

[6] See Honchar 2002, 84; Honchar 1988, 407, 420-421, 489, 579, 587, 613, 629, 645.

found suitable. During the period of interest, censures could either directly intervene and prevent publication of a text (Yeremieieva 2016, 75-78) or "correct the line" via post-publication critique, although the latter process not always led to intended consequences(Yeremieieva 2016 78-89). This allows me to interpret the texts of *Perets'* as indicative of party's directives (Yeremieieva 2016, 175), although distortions were unavoidable (Yeremieieva 2016, 176). The directives are, in turn, indicative of party's ability to surveil the discrepancies between the way how Soviet self-narrative on foreignness was internalized by the individuals and the individual experiences of foreignness.

I surveyed every issue of *Perets'* between 1946 and 1955 for criticism against illegitimate foreignness in Soviet society. What I ignored is criticism of foreign culture if depicted abroad. Total N of issues is 246. I counted 21 observations of criticisms against illegitimate foreignness. I operationalize this concept building upon my discussion of it in Chapter 1, as well as upon Kateryna Yeremieieva's (2016, 33) categories of formal and informal markers.

- Illegitimate foreignness can be established through formal marker by literally calling it foreign, but such occurrences are rather rare. For instance, in 1947 Perets' published a sketch called "Worshipper of The Foreign" in which a man in a jacket is depicted asking librarian to give him "Gogol, but please, in translation from French" (Veisbord 1947).
- Far more often criticism is deployed against illegitimate foreignness signified by informal markers. These are more ambiguous because they require the reader to connect the marker with foreignness. The category includes foreign clothing, hairstyles, leisure activities, jargonisms or gastronomic items. For instance, in the 1946 Perets' published a sketch called "They Sewed Fools of Themselves" showing a male and a female leaving atelier [Be-Sha 1946]. The man is wearing wide-shoulder overcoat, a reference to zoot suits which were popular in the American 1940's fashion and could include "as much as 6 inches of stuffing" in the shoulders (Schoeffler and Gale 1973, 26). The

female instead is wearing a short skirt which came into fashion in the UK during the war fabric shortages (Mower and Pedersen 2013) and in the US right after the end of the war (Jack and Schiffer 1948, 735). In Soviet Union instead, the skirt was rarely worn during the war (Zhuravlev 2019, 350), a trouser-skirt was proposed instead (Modeli sezona 1942, 5), while the short skirt will remain illegitimately foreign throughout the 60s and 70s (Zhuravlev and Gronov 2013, 196, 357, 426, 449-450). What is ever more important, the female is also wearing a fox scarf, which is an established sign of capitalism – the very same foxes were rustling under the legs of Honchar's (1987, 303) standard bearers who set up a battalion HQ in a Budapest thrift shop. Although the image altogether is indeed extravagant, deep contextual knowledge is needed to decode informal markers.

- A mix of both formal and informal markers is possible too. In 1947, during the aforementioned campaign against "kowtowing" *Perets'* publishes a sketch showing a couple. A woman is seated at the mirror with exaggeratedly long eyelashes and big lips, thus contrasting against the Soviet norm of moderation in make-up. A man is seated at the table sifting through papers. He asks the woman not to wear anything foreign for his lecture. She inquires about the topic of the lecture. "On unworthy appearances of kowtowing before the foreignness", he answers. The title of sketch neatly sums up everything – "A Principled Comrade". The sketch not only attacks foreignness in the eyes of mass public, but also surveilles the private sphere of intellectual elite, thus instilling fear of repressions and blocking potential counter-narratives to the identity. The combination of formal and informal lessens the ambiguity of informal markers by connecting them to formal and thus allowing the reader to learn how informal markers look like.

Table 1

Year	N of instances
1946	2
1947	3
1948	1
1949	0
1950	0
1951	0
1952	3
1953	1
1954	5
1955	6

Table 1 shows the chronological spread of the observations. It is clear that that illegitimate foreignness was criticized in a campaign-like, resurgent fashion both before Stalin's death and after. These waves may have been triggered by admission of additional reports on discrepancies between the way how Soviet self-narrative on foreignness was internalized by the individuals and the individual experiences of foreignness.

Although the campaigns did not stop after Stalin's death, it is in 1948-1949 that these attacks became most xenophobic and started to incorporate anti-Semitic elements. By 1951-1952 Jewishness became their main focus. This development shows "the fragility and mutability of Stalinist ideology" (Tomoff 2006, 152). The state agents have been creative in ways of establishing the links between foreignness and Jewishness. Take, for instance, a 1952 feuilleton published in Perets' and titled "The Toad-Eaters". It was written by Ostap Vyshnia (1952:9), famous satiric who was subject to Stalinist repression but survived the camps and was then returned to the "cultural front". In this feuilleton Vyshnia criticizes four young individuals who do not labor and instead live off the money made by their parents in influential offices. Some of these individuals have Jewish names. Vyshnia does not focus on what exactly these young people do, yet illustrations suggest they spend time dancing foxtrot and listening to foreign music. This represents the highest point of Soviet xenophobia as policy choice resulting from inability to reconstitute an identity that would be stable and include some elements of newly present foreignness. Instead, fearing engulfment, the state attempts to repress every feature of uncontrolled and thus illegitimate foreignness. Soviet authorities were subject to "hysterical post-war obsession" which sought

"redefine what was right and moral" (Fürst 2010, 61) and translated precisely into differentiation between forms of foreignness.

However, what Vyshnia and his illustrator failed to acknowledge is that consumption of Western music and dance was not limited to the imagined Jewish elite they were attacking. In fact, Daily Mail correspondent who visited Soviet Union in late 1940s believed that foxtrot was so popular that it could be considered a national dance (quoted in Fürst 2006, 362). It was common even in provincial Siberia despite the resistance of authorities (Fürst 2010, 204). Same holds for listening to Western music generally. The veteran-imported Western music recordings were copied on x-ray plates and then distributed via black market or stolen from school dances (Taigin 1999).

The Stalinist terror and paranoia did not prevent the illegitimate foreignness from massively engulfing the Soviet identity despite the recurrent campaigns. The inner circle called Stalin "the Owner" (Hlevnyuk 1995, 92), so once the Owner was dead, the property was left with inherited ontological insecurity on top of the trauma arising from his death. In the subsequent chapter I show that the death of Stalin was not the reason, but the opening which used by co-actors to enhance the interrogative capabilities of the state through a counter-narrative (Steele 2008, 150-152).

CHAPTER III. THE WRITERS & THE PARTOCRATS

Steele (2008, 68) argues that democracies are better at self-reflection. His list of co-actors is also grounded upon the notions of civil society in the liberal democracy universe: social movements, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and media. To say that these did not exist in the Soviet Union would be an exaggeration, but their operations were very different. As Denis Kozlov (2013, 4) writes, for the past 200 years literature was "an important venue for social commentary" in Russia due to absence of other mechanisms of democratic contestation, while during the Soviet times many people felt freer in literature than in other public realms despite its intimate ties with the state agents. Despite their privileged position in the Soviet society, some of the literary bonzas attempted to remain cognizant of the concerns typical of their less privileged compatriots. Partly this was the case because the most powerful writers would also occupy seats in various parliaments what forced them to correspond with their voters. Through this venue they would also be able to get mail on the discrepancies discussed above. Thus, literature agents can be seen either as amplifiers of larger societal moments or as self-sufficient agents. One way or another, this privileged position allowed the literature to play the pivotal role in multiple societal transformations which happened after Stalin's death. In other words, literature co-actors successfully challenged the state narrative. I argue that this is also the case for tourism as embodied foreignness.

3.1 Ehrenburgian Critique

The very word *thaw*, which is used to describe post-Stalin times, has been penned by a famous writer Ilya Ehrenburg just a year after Stalin's death. Ehrenburg was considered "the most European of all Russian writers" (Zamyatin 2010, 333) who "served as a bridge between Soviet and Western culture" (Rubenstein 2002, 45). It is, thus, no wonder that he has an intriguing

connection to tourism. In 1934, during the first epoch of Soviet foreign incoming tourism, he vehemently criticized the operation of Soviet tourism agency. Ehrenburg (1966, 639-647) argued that the tourists were shown not the real Soviet state with its "new people" and "dirty canteens", but some "clumsy parody of a European *chantant*". Additionally, Ehrenburg (1954, 732) criticized the agency for its little awareness of the foreignness that hampered communication: allegedly, a worker of the agency was showing a phone to the group of French tourists guessing that this device will shock them, while in fact they were absolutely bored. Allegedly, Ehrenburg's criticisms (1990, 28) scared away a few tourists, but some workers of agency recognized that his arguments were just (Belaya and Lazarev 1975, 220).

In 1950 Ehrenburg (2004, 357) was working on a novel about the early Cold War in Europe and, thus, asked Stalin personally to go abroad for work. Stalin, who favored Ehrenburg despite his Jewish origins, approved the request. Over 1951-1952 the book was published under the title of *The Ninth Wave*. Again, it included the criticism of foreign incoming tourism. This is rather surprising, given that generally this book is considered the most servile of all his work and Ehrenburg (1990, 181) later had remorse about having written it. In *The Ninth Wave* a French journalist says that he spent 11 days in the Soviet Union and was not able to speak to anyone except few tourist bureucrats. His more seasoned colleague from the US reacted by saying that he was in Moscow for 1.5 years and could name barely a few locals who agreed to talk to him. "Maybe this is hypocritical?" More than once have I seen the admiration with which passers-by looked at my car", – he goes on saying and thus points at the evident ontological crisis Soviet identity was going through at the time of writing (Ehrenburg 1953, 2008).

The book was published before Stalin's death, this passage included. Why did censure let it through? Perhaps no one made it that far as page two hundred something? One way or another, Ehrenburg is clearly practicing reflexive monitoring to make self-interrogation possible (Steele

2008, 150). Was this narrative communicated to the state agents? It is not known whether this publication was read and discussed in the Central Committee but it is clear that at that time Ehrenburg was in communication with the ideological department of the CC (Afiani 2001, 15-16, 452) and foreign minister (Ehrenburg 2004, 348, 380, 397).

But Ehrenburg was not the only agent who was producing counter-narrative in order to "incite a targeted state to reflect upon its sense of Self in light of its actions" (Steele 2008, 158). Stalin's death was a traumatic event which allowed to contest the "meaning of the linear narrative itself". At the same time, these meanings were intertwined with turf wars, fought around literature. Already in May 1953, few months after Stalin's death, a reformist group of authors started preparations for a coup within the all-powerful Writer's Union of the Soviet state (Afiani 2001, 102).

3.2 Polevoy's Proposals

In October 1953 they succeeded and one of the group, Boris Polevoy, took command of the Union's International Commission (Afiani 2001, 162-163). Polevoy, similarly, as Honchar, also went abroad during the war and even oversaw one of the meetings between Soviet and American soldiers on Elbe. As Polevoy (1978, 199) recalled, during that meeting "mutual annoyances and suspicions were forgotten" while "[t]he hearts of the soldiers of the allied armies instinctively found a way to each other". Furthermore, in 1950 he was among two Soviet delegates to the World Peace Congress in Scottland. In other words, in 1953 he already knew that legitimate foreignness is possible.

By November 1953 Polevoy instructed the staff of the International Commission that their effectiveness will be measured based on the intensity of the contact established with their support between foreign authors and Soviet writers (Buynova 2022, 412). At the time Polevoy was assigned the responsibility for the foreign component of the Writers' Congress. This

Congress was to be held in late 1954 for the first time since 1934 to signify the democratization in the literary process. As a result, Polevoy and his commission spent most of 1954 preparing for the event. These efforts were rather successful, given that they hoped to have 75-80 foreigners attending (Romanova 2020, 235), managed to get 72 which was still almost two times more than in 1934 (Na Vtorom[…] 1955, 231). Furthermore, the event constituted a step towards the creation of legitimate/illegitimate foreignness dichotomy. On one hand the guest lists did not only include typical foreign Stalinists but also rather independent thinkers, thus the legitimate was broadened. For instance, Sartre was invited (Buynov 2022, 419) after having been smeared in 1947 by the Soviet press as affinal to Nazism (Zaslavskiy 1947, 4). On the other hand, the illegitimate foreignness was highlighted via speeches during the congress which bashed American comics, Hemingway, personalism etc (Bazhan 1956, 34, 87, 298). Furthermore, this border was again drawn and redrawn over 1955 on the pages of *Foreign Literature* magazine, founded at the congress. For instance, Ehrenburg was purged out of the magazine's editorial office for promoting Hemingway (Afiani 2001, 467).

But it is not only the magazine which resulted from the congress. In January 1955, a few weeks after the congress, Polevoy submitted a memo to the Central Committee on "stays of Soviet writers abroad and foreign writers in the USSR" (Buynova 2022, nn 22). This memo sent waves in the literary circles, given that two days after submission the news made it to Korney Chukovskiy, a doyen of Soviet children. Polevoy believed that foreigners should be allowed in homes of Soviet writers and not only brought along rigid travel routes. Polevoy tries to incite shame in the state agents by calling the current travel regulations a "vicious overprotecting practice" (Buynova 2022, 416). Furthermore, foreigners should be allowed to speak with them about "the shortcomings of our everyday life" and not only about the great Soviet victories (Chukovskiy 2013, 184). In this way, Polevoy closely follows the criticism of Soviet treatment of foreigners made few years earlier by Ehrenburg. By presenting this memo, the writer reveals

how policy outcomes are inconsistent with the state's dominant self-narrative (Steele 2008, 152), according to which close communication between different cultures was essential to their development (Bazhan 1956, 78).

It appears that these attempts to make state agent more reflexive were successful, given that over the first half of 1955 a policy change emerged. An increasing number of artefacts were allowed into the legitimate foreignness. In February the most prestigious literary journal *Novyi Mir* silently launched a new section which introduced Soviet readers to similar journals abroad, starting off with Sartre's *Les Temps modernes* (Razgovorov 1955). In April one of the biggest Soviet newspapers ran a panegyric of Hans Christian Andersen, with whom the Soviet Union had on and off relation[7], saying that "we only start to truly love and understand unknown nations when captivated and affected by its art" (Marshak 1955, 3).

3.3 Responses to the Reform

Similar tendencies unfolded also around embodied foreignness. Take, for instance, Eddie Rosner. A Polish Jewish jazz musician, he was unlucky to end up in the Soviet Union after the occupation of Poland in 1939 and then served time in Soviet labor camps. After being rehabilitated in 1954 he was then inscribed into legitimate foreignness by employment at Moscow cultural facilities. He created a jazz band there and went on tour with it in the early 1955. The party cadre in one of the East Ukrainian towns did not believe that a policy change has occurred. They thought that Rosner who spoke with a foreign accent (Dragilev 2011, 8) and his jazz performance could not be legitimate and thus blamed the Ministry of Culture for "mistake or negligence". How could it be that instead of performing "beautiful Russian and Ukrainian folk songs" the band committed "redundant movements" on the stage (Afiani 2001,

[7] Not a single title of Andersen in Russian was published during the Early Stalinism of 1931-1934. In 1945 alone, when the party control over foreignness was still not reestablished, 8 titles in Russian were published.

386-387)? In other words, as Steele (2008, 151) argues, some citizens may be interested "in resisting self-interrogation as they internalize one version of their country's self-identity and emotionalize it in the form of patriotism". Although the highest authorities were informed of this resistance, the complaint was handled without much interest and ultimately archived (Afiani 2001, 391). Rosner went on to perform and starred in a very popular film next year. This implies internalization of the new approach to foreignness by the state agents.

This gap between the reformed Soviet policy and a conception of Soviet patriotism limited to some concerns of the society demonstrates how Steele (2008, 17) is right in countering Mitzen's to assign the state a coherent identity. The ontological insecurity was by no means universal in the Soviet society after the Second World War. It is just that the Soviet intellectuals, who knew that legitimate foreignness was possible due to their past travel, were the most predisposed to organize and raise the reflexivity of state agents. Even in this milieu this state of identity was not common to all. For example, Alexander Fadeev, the Stalinist leader of the Writer's Union was purged out of power in 1954. Fadeev was trying to accept the reformed Soviet identity, rewriting throughout 1955 a draft of his novel on black metallurgy which was originally designed to attack foreignness. Now "technical learning from the West" was thinkable and this change brought the whole draft in flux (Fadeev 1971, 503). At that time, Fadeev (1971, 521-522) was forced to go abroad extensively due to various offices he held but was so disinterested that "barely saw anything there", nothing caught attention, an evident sign of magical defense against engulfment. Finally, being not able to accept the new policy, he blamed the state agents for "ruining art" and argued that the new party leadership was even worse than Stalin. In 1956, while tourism as embodied foreignness was already gathering steam, Fadeev took his life (Mikhailov 1990). It appears that his sense of self was so encamped by impingements that "the ultimate and most paradoxically absurd possible defence" was employed – "the denial of being, as a means of preserving being" (Laing 1969, 149-150).

CONCLUSIONS

Instead of repeating myself and summing up what has already been summed up numerous times, I would like to use this opportunity to focus on what are the contributions made by this thesis. I see three items. First, I propose an new explanation of 1955 decision which is alternative to mainstream ones, stemming from currency-seeking, propaganda-enabling or personality of the leader. Second, ontological insecurity literature on IR has usually been focused on the democratic states. I argue that similar dynamics also play out in non-democratic societies. Third, I do so by looking at the ontological insecurity as experienced by individuals in the society and then transported into the state agents via non-state co-actors. This approach is different from intrasubjective and intersubjective schools of ontological security in IR. This approach highlights the individual agency and, thus, responsibility which play out even in the most authoritarian states, such as late Stalinist Soviet Union.

A reader may rightfully ask: how is all this of any use? Not to deny that this project was a hobby used to divert my mind from other things, I do see a clear policy implication. Way too often Russia has been imagined as radically different from societies on the European continent. Even a special term was created to explain how Russian colonialism is substantively different from European one (Etkind 2011, 252). I do not want to homogenize the Russian society over time and space, there is no question that "[e]very generation makes its own choice within the window of opportunities that it receives from the past" (Etkind 2011, 249). At the same time, it is clear that since 1945 legitimate and illegitimate foreignness of mostly Western origin became entangled in the Soviet lives. It is evident from my study that many representatives from the World War veterans and World War children generations did hold a preference for consumption of foreign. Currently, even the most cursory reading of contemporary Russian pop culture and consumerism reveals how much it remains integrated into the global Europe-

centered market of goods and ideas. In September 2023 the first iPhone 15 Pro Max was demonstrated in Russia, one day before sales of it started globally (Sidorov 2023). Food delivery reviews thrive in the Russian segment of YouTube, with typical video receiving hundreds of thousands views and including such dishes as pizza, strip loin steak with rosemary, loligo squids, tartare, *vitello tonnato* and *salade niçoise* (oblomoff, 2024). These are consequence of generations-long developments and tourism as embodied foreignness played a pivotal role in them. The current Russian regime understands how important these patterns of consumption are and thus bases its power partly on providing uninterrupted access to legitimate foreignness even in times of high-intensity warfare. Said simply, it may as well be that blue jeans neared the collapse of the Berlin Wall (Nye 2023, 13, 66) but currently it is the blue jeans which make destruction of Ukraine tolerable to millions of Russians.

Recognition of this is important to adopt adequate countermeasures. For instance, it has been argued that Western policymakers should ensure YouTube's operations in Russia (Dietrich 2024). I believe just the opposite: the Russian society must be made ontologically insecure. I argue this not out of vengefulness. Russians' access to what is considered legitimate foreignness provides regime stability. Circumstances must be created for the Russian state agents to reformulate Russian identity in an isolationist way. It is, then, the presence of illegitimate foreignness in the Russian society which will generate ontological insecurity, as was the case between 1945 and 1953. Of course, it goes against the democratic principles of the Western societies, as well as against commitment to provide Russians with "information and expression that contradicts the regime's discourse" (Dietrich 2024). But why does anyone think that information regarding the wealth of the Kremlin elite would persuade Russians to rebel against its government, if hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by the governmental policy failed to do so? If the Transatlantic alliance wants to "[k]eep on rockin' in the free world" (quoted in Lee 2024) radically new approaches are necessary. The current, neoliberal

policymaking not only enabled Russia to finance its military buildup over the past 20 years, but also did not stop the authoritarian transformation in Russia, despite having spent at minimum 20 billion USD on various "democracy promotion" measures between 2000 and 2014[8].

[8] Own calculations based on ForeignAssistance.gov 2024.

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