

A Theory of Value-Based Cleavages Across-Religions

Values, Ideology, and Behavior

by

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
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2024

Declaration

I, the undersigned Ameni Mehrez, candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Central European University Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations, declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that parts of this dissertation have already been published in *Political Behavior* journal. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of work of others, and no part the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Vienna, June 19, 2024

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ameni Mehrez', written over a horizontal line.

Signature

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Abstract

Why are values associated with left-wing (liberal) political ideology in some contexts while being associated with right-wing (conservative) political ideology in others? In this dissertation, I examine the link between values and political ideology and voting across religions with a focus on the Arab-Muslim world. I demonstrate that this link is not solely shaped by religious factors but also political ones. Using a variety of datasets (cross-national surveys, an original face-to-face survey, and political speeches) and methods (statistical analysis, text analysis, and thematic analysis), I show that the link between values and political ideology vary across religions. Through the cross-religious analysis, I demonstrate that, in Muslim societies, people who endorse justice tend to align with right-wing political ideology whereas in Christian societies, they are more inclined towards leftist views. I also show that this link is conditioned by the level of political oppression exercised against opposition parties. In Arab-Muslim countries, where Islamist parties are denied access to politics, the link between endorsing justice and being to the right is stronger. Through an original survey conducted in Tunisia in 2019, I provide a fine-grained analysis of values and show that people who endorse justice are more likely to vote for right-wing Islamist parties whereas those who endorse authority and nationalism are more likely to vote for leftist and secularist parties. Finally, through quantitative and qualitative text analysis of politicians' speeches from Tunisia, I show that the same patterns also hold in the political elite.

Acknowledgments

When I was much younger, my teachers in primary and middle school often warned me about the danger of discussing politics in public or in class. I remember, one of my teachers threatened to kick me out of the classroom if I did not stop bringing political questions into the class discussion. I was just 9 or 10 years old. Obviously, things were much different under Ben Ali's dictatorship. Everyone was afraid until the revolution happened in 2011. The protest became widespread all over the country from south to north. That was a turning moment in my life. I was in high school, third grade, just a year before my baccalaureate. My parents were very worried about the situation. I was sharing all the protest videos and events on Facebook. My uncle, who used to work in the Ministry of Interior, called my dad to warn him about me after seeing my posts. I remember him saying: "tell your daughter to stop, I will not be able to help her if she gets in trouble." My parents did not allow me to go out and protest, they were too worried I would get shot like many other young people in my city and other cities. But my drive to join this revolutionary moment was bigger and higher than anything. On January 14th, 2011, when my parents went out to check on my grandparents, I left our flat with a big banner written on it "Ben Ali Degage." I was not scared because I believed it was the right thing to do. It was out of the question I would miss such an opportunity to join this momentum. I went to the main avenue in my hometown and stood with the protesters. The protest was not as big as the one in Tunis, in Avenue Habib Bourguiba, but still enough people were gathered. An hour later, I saw my mom running towards me, grabbing me from my clothes, and pushing me towards the car. She knew I would be there.

Since then, I chose to study political science, the topic I was forbidden to publicly talk about and critically debate. Despite all the ups and downs of the Tunisian democratic experience, there is nothing more valuable than the freedom of speech we gained following the fall of the dictatorship. To all the people who sacrificed their lives to make this world a better and freer place.

I wish to thank first and foremost my supervisor, Levente Littvay. Levi has been a champion of my work since the beginning of my time at CEU – actually, even before then. He believed in my research more than I did at times. Levi has guided me and accompanied me throughout my journey from reading my work, grant proposals' writing, dissertation research, to creating opportunities for me to present my work and network with other scholars. He has been providing valuable advice to navigate graduate school and academia. His devotion to all his students, including me, truly sets him apart. I have learned so many invaluable lessons by watching his tireless and selfless approach to research, teaching, and advising. He has given me innumerable opportunities, without which I would not be the scholar I am today. Levi

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List of Abbreviations

- AKP: Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
- ALC: A La Carte Embeddings
- CPR: Congress for the Republic Party
- DFM: Document Feature Matrix
- EA: Enumeration Areas
- ERU: Emotional Response to Unfairness
- EU: European Union
- FJP: Freedom and Justice Party
- GALTAN: Green, Alternative, Libertarian and Traditionalism, Authoritarianism, and Nationalism
- MB: Muslim Brotherhood
- MENA: Middle East and North Africa
- MFD: Moral Foundations Dictionary
- MFT: Moral Foundations Theory
- MTI: Movement of Islamic Tendency
- PJD: Justice and Development Party (Morocco)
- PSD: Socialist Destourian Party
- PSU: Primary Sampling Units
- OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
- US: United States
- WEIRD: Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries
- WVS: World Value Survey

List of Arabic Terms

- *Adl* : justice
- *Alif* : the first letter of the Arabic alphabet
- *Caliphate* : the office of the religious and political leader in the Muslim community
- *Din* : religion
- *Fiqh* : Islamic jurisprudence
- *Hadith* : teachings of the Prophet Mohammad
- *Imam* : Islamic leadership position and the person leading the prayer at the Mosque
- *Jihad* : striving, struggling
- *Khalifa* : Successor of the Prophet Mohammad
- *Khutba* : the sermon delivered by the Imam during the Friday prayer
- *Quran* : the holy book in Islam
- *Risala* : Prophethood
- *Sharia* : religious and moral law in Islam
- *Sunna* : the sayings, practices, and traditions of the Prophet Mohammad
- *Tawhid* : the belief in the Oneness of God
- *Ulama* : class of Muslim legal scholars
- *Umma* : Muslim community

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1 A Theory of Value-Based Cleavages

“Justice is the criterion by which God will evaluate mankind, and the sovereign is charged with the responsibility of actualizing justice.” (Ibn Khaldun)

1.1 Introduction

In his January 2002, State of the Union Address George W. Bush said: “States like these [talking about Iran, Iraq, and North Korea] and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil [...] Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good. And we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.” In a CNN interview, Donald Trump stated that “I think Islam hates us.” Their framing is one of a value-war or value clash between two worlds: the Western vs. the Muslim world. This framing resonates with some academic perspectives. A decade before President Bush’s speech and the invasion of Iraq, [Huntington \(1996\)](#) made an argument in his famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, where he argues that conflicts will emerge along cultural divides, “particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims.” In his *Foreign Affairs* piece, he stated that “Islam has bloody borders” ([Huntington, 1993](#)). The term “Clash of Civilization” is not unique to Huntington but was used by others before him ([Lewis, 1990](#); [Mathews, 1926](#)). The terrible attacks of 9/11 have intensified the debate about the “Clash of Civilization.” It amplified once again this division between Islam and the West. Several scholars questioned the compatibility of Islam with democratic and liberal

values (Diamond et al., 2003; Huntington, 1996; G. Kramer, 1993; M. Kramer, 1996; Wright, 1992; Kepel, 2006; Roy, 2007) Many of these accounts have opposed Islam and the “West,” particularly when it comes to liberal and democratic values. Fukuyama (1992) for instance, noted that Islam is “very hard to reconcile with liberalism and the recognition of universal rights.” Titles of books such as *Secularism confronts Islam* (Roy, 2007), *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Kepel, 2006), and *Islam and the West* (Lewis, 1993) all depict the idea of a “confrontation” between the two worlds.

This influential scholarship tradition suggest that Arabs and Muslims are not supportive of freedom, liberty, and democracy, deeply cherished in the West. But, to what extent is there an actual clash between Western and Muslim values? Existing records and scholarly work demonstrate the opposite. Muslims do endorse “Western” values such as freedom and democracy. Scholars in recent years have provided a tremendous amount of evidence documenting Islam’s compatibility with democracy and Muslims’ commitment to democratic values and freedom (Brown, 2016; Ciftci, 2013; Hofmann, 2004; Kedourie, 1992; March, 2011; Tessler, 2002; Jamal, 2006; Esposito & Voll, 2001). What is more striking is that this support is particularly prominent among pious Muslims (Ciftci, 2013; Davis & Robinson, 2006; Hoffman & Jamal, 2014) and people who support and vote for Islamist¹ parties and movements (Mehrez, 2023). Prominent contemporary Islamic scholars and thinkers such as Rached Ghannouchi, Umar al Razi, Al Tahir bin Ashur, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, Muhammad Iqbal, among many others, have extensively studied the concepts of freedom and liberty in Islam and embraced them. In the words of Ghannouchi (2020), “The theory of freedom in Islam stipulates individual freedom on all things, as long as it does not clash with the right or benefit of the wider community. If it clashes, then it must be adjusted to and limited by the common good.” (p. 55) For Ghannouchi, freedom is “the first and most important human right guaranteed by Islam” (Tamimi, 2001, p. 76). Sayyid Qutb, regarded by some as the

¹Throughout this dissertation, I use the term "Islamist" to describe political parties or groups with a religious background and that advocate for the implementation of Islamic principles and laws in governance and societal affairs.

“father of modern jihad” has written several influential books endorsing justice and freedom in Muslim societies (Qutb, 2005). He noted, “This Din (faith) is a universal declaration of the freedom of man from slavery to other men and his desires, which is also a form of human servitude.” (Ibid, p.47) These are just a few examples of the rich repository of work that testifies to the importance of these values among Islamic thinkers and leaders. The puzzle that remains unsolved is: Why depict values in Islam and the West as conflicting when both endorse and cherish the same values? Several Islamist parties throughout the region use the words “justice” and “freedom” on their party labels: to give a few examples, the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and Turkey, and the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia. Why do Islamists embrace these values? And what role do these values play in shaping public opinion in the Arab-Muslim world? Most importantly, such values are often associated with left-wing, liberal political ideology in the West among scholars, journalists, and analysts. Yet, in the Arab-Muslim world, these values are primarily supported and emphasized by right-wing Islamist political actors and parties. Why are values associated with left-wing (liberal) political ideology in some contexts while being associated with right-wing (conservative) political ideology in others? All these questions are important to understand variation in value endorsement among different populations and the role they play in shaping political decisions and actors. This project is an attempt to uncover the unrecognized commonalities between Islam and the so-called “West.” I examine the role of values in shaping ordinary people’s political preferences and voting from a comparative perspective and with a focus on the Arab-Muslim world. In doing so, I aim to provide a novel theory of value-based cleavages across religions. Through this project, I hope to make two main contributions: an academic contribution to the literature on comparative politics and political behavior and a policy contribution to US foreign policy in the Arab-Muslim world.

1.2 Existing Literature on Cleavage Theory

One of the most common explanations of why people hold different political ideologies is the political-cleavage approach (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini, 2000; Lijphart, 1979, 1981). Lipset & Rokkan (1967)’s book, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, is considered the starting point of any discussion on cleavage theory. They suggested four key cleavages: center-periphery, state-church, city-rural, and capital-workforce. The four cleavages became known as the traditional cleavage thesis.

1.2.1 What Defines a Cleavage

Before elaborating on existing accounts of cleavage theories,² it is important to consider the meaning of the term “cleavage.” This concept denotes a particular type of political divide or conflict that has deep rooted societal structural transformations. Over the course of this scholarship, scholars have defined and redefined the composition of cleavages (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Deegan-Krause, 2006; Rae & Taylor, 1970; Zuckerman, 1975). Bartolini & Mair (1990) list three main characteristics that are necessary to constitute a cleavage: (1) a social structure (such as class and religion) that distinguishes one group from another, (2) the existence of an established collective identity and collective interests for each social group, and (3) an organization representing that social group. These organizations could be parties, church, trade union, or political movements. Kriesi (1998) proposed a similar but more refined composition by arguing that cleavages are composed of two main elements: structural basis and organizational basis. On the one hand, the social group involved “must be conscious of their collective identity – as workers, employers, Catholics or Protestants – and be willing to act on that basis.” On the other, these divisions must be expressed in organizational terms such as political actors, which will give “coherence and organized political expression to what

²This project is a paper-based dissertation. A comprehensive theoretical framework is explored in detail in this chapter. However, given the nature of the dissertation, some of the theories introduced here might appear again in subsequent chapters.

otherwise are incoherent and fragmentary beliefs, values, and experiences among members of some social group.” (Ibid, p. 167) In later work, [Mair \(2006\)](#) noted that a cleavage only forms “when a particular social divide becomes associated with a particular set of values or identities [which are] made politically relevant by means of an organized party or group.” (p. 373)

The traditional cleavage initially proposed by [Lipset & Rokkan \(1967\)](#)’s major work is theorized to stem from two major historical events: the rise of the National and Industrial Revolutions (in Europe first then spreading to the US). These historical events produced long-term structural divisions (such as class or religion) that are expressed through the party systems ([Brooks et al., 2006](#)). They provide a “frozen” basis for political divides through voting behavior³ ([Lipset & Rokkan, 1967](#); [Bartolini & Mair, 1990](#); [Brooks et al., 2006](#)). Over time, these socio-structural elements started to decline, giving way to new lines of conflicts – namely the value-based cleavages .

1.3 The Value-Based Cleavages – “New Politics” Thesis

Processes of modernization, globalization, and secularization have engendered a rapid change in society which led several scholars to revisit Lipset and Rokkan’s political cleavage model and argue that these cleavages are in decline or even “dead” ([Dalton et al., 1984](#); [Deegan-Krause, 2007](#); [Franklin, 1992](#); [Kriesi, 2010](#)). Several studies suggest that the predictive power of structural divisions (mainly class and religion) for voting has weakened ([Bartolini, 2000](#); [Flanagan & Dalton, 1984](#); [Mair, 1997](#)) and they are being replaced by new dividing lines called “value-based cleavage” or “cleavage-like divide.” ([J. D. Hunter, 1991](#); [Kriesi et al., 2008](#); [Layman, 2001](#); [Toka, 1998](#); [Inglehart & Welzel, 2010](#); [Welzel & Inglehart, 2005](#)) According to [Enyedi \(2008\)](#), individuals are better defined by cultural and value divides than by socio-structural elements. He argues that “values and attitudes should be considered not

³Scholars interested in explaining patterns of vote, typically take social structural variables such as urban-rural residence, social class, and religion, and assess their ability to explain voting behavior over time.

simply as integral elements of cleavages but also as their potential base. The value system of Western democracies has become more fragmented during the last decades, allowing for the development of idiosyncratic and transient value clusters, and in this regard cleavage politics has lost momentum. But the politically most salient values and attitudes are still ordered along few, well identifiable dimensions.” (Ibid, p.293) Values are defined as the guiding principles that help individuals organize and make sense of the complex political world around them. In the words of Tetlock et al. (2000), “underlying all political belief systems are ultimate or terminal values that specify the end-states of public policy. These values [...] function as the back stops of belief systems” (p.247). People support the candidates and policies that best represent their values and advocate for them.

“New politics” became the expression used to refer to the new value-based cleavage. Others called it the “transformation theory,” where the traditional structural divide turned into a value-based divide (Inglehart, 1984). Below, I provide an overview of the main value models that have been developed and their predictive power over political ideology.

1.3.1 Value-Based Models

Numerous models of value-based divides have been developed. One of the most renowned is Inglehart (1997)’s materialist vs. post-materialist value orientations. According to Inglehart (1971), a “transformation in the political cultures of advanced industrial societies, [which] seems to be altering the basic value priorities of given generations, as a result of changing conditions influencing their basic socialization.” (p. 991). Kitschelt (1994) called the new value-divide the “authoritarian-libertarian” dimension, where authoritarian values predict right-wing voting, while libertarian values predict left-wing voting. Others have come up with what became known as the GALTAN dimension, where GAL stands for Green, Alternative, Libertarian, whereas TAN stands for Traditionalism, Authoritarianism, and Nationalism (Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2006). The GAL-TAN has been associated with the economic left-right voting and positioning of political parties (Dassonneville et al., 2024;

Häusermann & Kriesi, 2015; Jolly et al., 2022). Another prominent contribution to the study of values was led by social psychologists (Feldman, 1988; Graham et al., 2011; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Jost et al., 2003). For example, Graham and colleagues (Graham et al., 2009, 2011) developed the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). Building upon the previous works of psychologists (Kohlberg, 1971; Turiel, 1983) and anthropologists (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Shweder et al., 1997), they found five major values or “foundations” upon which cultures construct their moralities: (1) Harm/Care: This foundation derives from mammals’ evolved ability to feel compassion for others and to care about the suffering of others. (2) Fairness/Cheating: This foundation is concerned with how fairly you treat others. It includes concerns about rights, equality, justice, and proportionality. (3) Loyalty/Betrayal: This foundation is related to the ingroup. It includes concerns about patriotism and loyalty to the group. (4) Authority/Subversion: This foundation is related to the social and hierarchical order within a community, group, or society. It includes concerns about leadership, fellowship, respect, obedience, and proper role fulfilment. (5) Sanctity/ Degradation:⁴ This foundation includes concerns about purity, sanctity, and chastity.⁵ The first two Foundations, Care and Fairness, have been called the “Individualizing Foundations” as they relate to individual concerns, whereas the last three (Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) have been labelled “Binding Foundations” as they are related to the interest of the group. The central prediction of the MFT is that Care and Fairness are associated with left-wing (or liberal) political ideology whereas the Binding Foundations are associated with a right-wing (or conservative) ideology (Graham et al., 2009). The MFT findings have been replicated both in WEIRD (Bbbio et al., 2011; Davies et al., 2014; Franks & Scherr, 2015; Kim et al., 2012; Kivikangas et al., 2021; Métayer & Pahlavan, 2014) and non-WEIRD cultural populations (Berniūnas et al., 2016; Doğruyol et al., 2019; Yilmaz et al., 2016; Zhang & Li, 2015). Some failures to replicate

⁴In an earlier version of the MFT, the fifth foundation was labeled “Purity” Foundation, the terminology might be found in earlier works and/or figures.

⁵A sixth Foundation has been added by the authors to the MFT framework called Liberty/ Oppression. This foundation is related to resentment toward oppression and liberty. It includes concerns about freedom, liberty, and dominance. This Foundation has been mainly correlated with libertarian political views in the US (see Iyer et al. (2012)).

it though have been found in Iran ([Atari et al., 2020](#)) and Tunisia.⁶ Other works in social psychology find similar results with regard to the link between values and political ideology ([Feldman, 2013](#); [Lupton et al., 2015](#); [Nelson & Garst, 2005](#)).

Values are defined as the guiding principles that help one decide whether an action is acceptable or not, right, or wrong. The core values that are important for this dissertation are justice and authority. While there is no consensus among scholars on how many values are important for the study of political behavior, these two values are often taken to be central in the way people think about and engage with politics ([Arzheimer et al., 2016](#); [Feldman, 1988](#); [Hare et al., 2018](#); [Gainous & Radunovich, 2005](#)). I take the justice value to be about concerns for equal treatment, cheating and violations of fairness, and equity and proportionality. The authority value is about concerns for traditional morality, social hierarchy, and security. Justice and authority are both multilayered values. Therefore, throughout the dissertation, I try to capture and account for that multidimensionality using different measurements. Detailed conceptualizations and operationalizations are found in Chapters 2 and 3 .

1.3.2 WEIRD Value-Based Theories

While there is extensive scholarship from political science and psychology on value-based cleavages and their role in shaping political ideology and voting, very little empirical evidence is available on how value-based cleavages evolved and developed across different contexts, particularly across religions. Existing value-based cleavages accounts have mainly focused on institutional factors specific to Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) contexts. As a result, this literature heavily relied on political (political party competition in old and new democracies) and historical⁷ (National and Industrial revolutions, Europeanization, secularization) factors that are specific to some contexts. Most importantly, the literature on value-based cleavages has predominantly focused on one religion, Christianity.

⁶I have tested the MFT framework in Tunisia and found no results for its factor structure nor its predictive validity. Results are in a draft manuscript but not published yet.

⁷For a detailed account of cleavages and cleavage formation see [Enyedi & Bétoa \(2023\)](#).

While Christians make up the world's largest religious population with 31% (87% of them live in Christian majority countries),⁸ Muslims are the second largest religious group and makeup 25% of the world population (73% of them live in Muslim-majority countries), yet they are rarely represented in the cleavage literature. The literature's tendency to focus on Christian countries has hindered the development of a broader theory of the relationship between values and political preferences. This project takes a first step to address this gap and expand the value-based cleavage scholarship beyond the majority Christian countries. Since the focus of this study is on the multilevel nature of values, I now present in detail the levels of analysis for cleavage formation.

1.4 Cleavage Formation: Levels of Analysis

An ongoing debate among cleavage scholars is whether micro-level factors or macro-level factors shape political cleavages. One strand of literature argues that individual-level factors matter for explaining variation in political behavior. For structural cleavages, these variables include socio-demographic characteristics or political attitudes (Knutsen & Scarbrough, 1998; Lane & Ersson, 1998; Rae & Taylor, 1970). The religious cleavage, for example, is typically studied by examining whether denominational affiliations or the level of religiosity explain political behavior (Bean, 1999; Dalton et al., 1984; Knutsen, 2004; Lane & Ersson, 1998; Wald et al., 1988). In his seminal work, *The American Voter*, Campbell et al. (1960) shows that people who belong to the same religious denomination share the same political attitudes and vote in a similar fashion.⁹ Similarly, the class cleavage has been examined using the social class variable measured by the person's type of occupation or income level (Alford, 1962, 1963; Lazarsfeld & Durant, 1942).

The second strand of literature has rather argued that organizational and macro-level factors are more important. Scholars have focused on the organizational or institutional

⁸Countries are differentiated by the adherents of the religious group whether they are a majority or a minority.

⁹See also Conway (2000); Wald et al. (1988)

component of cleavages (Enyedi, 2005; Przeworski & Sprague, 1977). Rather than focusing on individual-level religiosity, they used religious at the aggregate level as their exploratory variable. For this approach, cultural, religious, and societal institutions shape political behavior and help sustain those cleavages. This tradition goes back to Durkheim (1912) and Geertz (1973) and still persists in contemporary scholarship (Arikan & Bloom, 2019; Ruiter & van Tubergen, 2009; Wald & Shye, 1995; Bolzendahl et al., 2019). Some scholars have come up with new cleavages such as the education cleavage, showing that a new dividing line along education levels (aggregate level) can be detected in Western European countries (Bovens & Wille, 2017). Others have identified a new structural cleavage of “winners and losers” within European countries¹⁰ as a result of the Europeanization process (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008).

My theory aims to reconcile these two approaches and integrate both micro- and macro-level factors into the study of value-based cleavages. I provide an alternative framework for studying and understanding values, one that primarily examines values and the context in which they become salient and relevant. I will be referring to value-based divides as “value-based cleavage”, as I believe, I am offering a theory that satisfies and combines all the proposed key elements of a cleavage (critical social structure, collective identity, and political organization representing those identities). For the purpose of this project, I focus on two main contextual factors as the main drivers of value endorsement and value change: religion and political parties. I chose these two macro-level factors because of their varying temporality – the extent to which they can have long vs. short-term impacts. Religion is treated as a long-term factor whereas political parties are treated as a short-term factor. This is not to say that individual characteristics do not matter – on the contrary, several individual-level factors shape political preferences. Rather, this theory claims that holding the other factors constant, values will influence political preferences – and by a similar logic,

¹⁰This cleavage is mainly characterized by a divide between member states of the European Union (EU) that support European integration and immigration and those who oppose it.

voting behavior – differently across different religious and institutional contexts. ¹¹

The basic intuition of my theory is as follows: across religious contexts, values are emphasized and reinforced to different degrees. People living in different religious societies will receive different religious education and socialization about core values which in turn will impact their political preferences. However, the tendency to endorse certain values is not only shaped by religious settings but also by institutional factors, specifically political parties.

1.5 Religion and Parties as Contextual Factors at Different Temporalities

Religion has served as the cornerstone of society since the dawn of humanity. In the words of [Harari \(2015\)](#), “religion has been the third great unifier of humankind, alongside money and empires.” (p.59) It has been studied both as an individual-level phenomenon as well as a contextual-level factor. Scholars studying the former have focused on individual religious practices such as Mosque/Church attendance, praying, and religious group attendance, whereas scholars studying the latter have focused on religion as a macro-level factor shaping societal structures (aggregate religion or religiosity). Since the focus of this project is on variation across contexts, I will focus on contextual religion as a key factor in my value-based cleavage theory. I will treat religion as a contextual factor to capture the majority religion in a particular society (e.g., Muslim vs. Christian societies). This is not to say that religiosity at the individual level (individual piety or practice) does not matter. Instead, I will argue and show that the link between values and political preferences depends in part on the religious context in which those values occur and are defined.

The second important and key factor identified by the cleavage literature are political parties. Cleavage theory scholars have attributed a great deal of agency to political parties

¹¹Institutional factors are used interchangeably with political factors to refer to factors related to political institutions such as the state, political parties, and political systems. In this dissertation, the focus is on political parties as political contextual factors.

and leaders in their ability to transform, shift, and maintain political cleavages (Berelson et al., 1954; Enyedi, 2005; Horowitz, 1984; Sartori, 1969). Torcal & Chhibber (1997) argue that the “emergence of social class as salient political conflict resulted from strategic choices made by [party] elites.” (p. 50) Along similar lines, Enyedi (2005) notes that “the unification of larger segments succeeds when a political actor is able to identify the common ideological denominator and establish an organizational structure that allows for the aggregation of interests.” (p. 701) Therefore, parties have the power to mobilize, shape, and combine people’s aggregate values and interests, what Enyedi (Ibid) calls “Parties as Combiners.” Along the same lines, Sartori (1969)’s work insists on the role of parties as “essential agencies of mobilization in political conflict.” Scholars of cleavage theory note that a cleavage cannot exist or become salient unless there is a party explicitly drawing on people’s values and interests (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Manza & Brooks, 1999). When new political conflicts emerge, it does not automatically mean that new political actors will emerge to represent those new divides. Rather, scholars have argued and showed that existing parties have the adaptive capacity to reposition themselves with respect to those new divides – what is referred to as “cleavage realignment.” (Knutsen, 1986; Mair, 1993; Laver, 1989) As expressed by Kriesi et al. (2006), these parties “take up the new preferences, identities, values, and interests, and interpret and articulate them in their own specific ways.” (p. 925) Based on this, one might argue that values are not just the product of the religious context in which they occur but also the product of parties using values to mobilize voters.

These two factors influence values and their relation to political preferences according to different timeframes. Religion has impacted political preferences over the course of centuries. Religion is remarkably persistent and can resonate with the public across centuries (Durkheim, 1912; Norenzayan, 2013; Rappaport, 1999; Weber, 1905). It penetrates all aspects of society (values, beliefs, identities, institutions). Political parties, by contrast, have a shorter-term impact, which often lasts only a few decades. Parties have to change their policies, strategies, and incentives depending on the context in which they operate. Parties are not static actors;

they shift and change strategies depending on the constraints they face in their political environment (Cox, 1997; Davenport et al., 2005; Neto & Cox, 1997; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Haggard & Kaufman, 2016).

1.6 Stability or Change?

How long shall we expect value-based cleavages to persist? Value endorsement among people and parties can shift with changing political and social circumstances. For example, in the post-French Revolution of 1848, liberal nationalism was a new form of left-wing political ideology which characterized the Republican Left. They defended on the one hand liberal ideas, and on the other, nation-states and sovereignty (Pflanze, 1966). With the rising influence of Marxist ideas and revolutionary movements, the French Left moved from hard Republican nationalist to socialist internationalist. Jean Jaurès,¹² the father of socialism in France, was himself one of those who endorsed liberal nationalism and later switched to leftist internationalism, endorsing the working-class identity, and rejecting other radical forms of nationalist forces. With the rise of ethnic nationalism in Europe¹³ by the 1880s and 1890s, nationalist values became mainly right-wing issues. Liberal nationalism¹⁴ also characterized some of the political leaders in Italy. Garibaldi who established a unified Kingdom of Italy, was both a liberal and a nationalist long influenced by the ideas of Mazzini and “Young Italy.”¹⁵ Another example of value change can be seen from the US context with the shift of African American voting behavior. Prior to the New Deal, most African Americans (those eligible to vote) were voting Republican, the “Party of the Emancipator.” However, following the Great Depression and the New Deal, President Roosevelt managed to align the African

¹²One of Jaurès famous saying that was picked up both by the left and the right in France is “A celui qui n’a plus rien, La Patrie est son seul bien” (To those who have nothing left, their homeland is their only good).

¹³The rise of ethnic nationalism, antisemitism, and other major events such as Dreyfus Affair, have led several liberal leftists to abandon nationalist ideas resulting in value realignment among the left.

¹⁴For a differentiation between the 19th century classical liberalism and later versions of nationalism (mainly the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century), see Hobsbawm (1992).

¹⁵It is important to point out that the political changes that occurred in the second half of the 19th century in Europe did not happen at the same timeframe in all countries. The history of the rise of nationalism is more complicated and more diverse than the examples mentioned above.

American voters to his side by supporting civil rights and providing access to relief. This shift led to a new alignment among African Americans who voted for the Democratic Party (Gordon, 1969; Sklaroff, 2009). It is important to acknowledge the shifting preferences along value dimensions, as I proceed further in this chapter. I do not argue that value-based cleavages are fixed and stable, rather they shift and change with changing social and political circumstances. For this reason, it is crucial to study values in their social settings to get a comprehensive understanding of their formation and evolution over time.

1.6.1 Value-Based Cleavage Theory: Remaining Ambiguities

The principal goal of this project is to address the following question: Why do values sometimes predict left-leaning preferences and voting and sometimes predict just the opposite political views? The existing literature on the topic has clearly failed to explain the wide variation in values' influence on political preferences and voting. It remains scattered and limited to certain social contexts, particularly, WEIRD and Christian populations. The study of cleavages, in particular, has been attached to Western countries. In the words of Van Biezen & Caramani (2007) "the concept of cleavage is the product of a very specific transformation that took place in Western Europe exclusively" (p.7) Some scholarly works have explored structural and value-based cleavages in Central Eastern Europe (Deegan-Krause, 2006; Enyedi & Bértoa, 2023; Tóka, 2004; Van Biezen & Caramani, 2007), Latin America (Dix, 1989; Roberts, 2002), and to some extent some Asian countries (Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016). However, comparative cleavage scholarship remains almost exclusively focused on Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, particularly Christian-majority countries (Gainous & Radunovich, 2005).

Most importantly, what is missing from the existing literature about value-based cleavages is the multilevel understanding of values – combining micro- and macro-level factors and exploring how the interaction across these levels helps shed light on the heterogeneity of value endorsement. Following Huckfeldt & Sprague (1995) framework of contextual analysis,

I emphasize the importance of distinguishing micro and macro levels of analysis for studying value-based cleavages.

1.7 Unfolding the Story

To test my theory of value-based cleavages, I apply a multilevel approach to studying values across religions. Religion has always occupied a significant place in the study of politics (Bellin, 2008; Haidt, 2012; Layman, 2001). However, comparative political behavior research across religions remains limited (Hofmann, 2004; Jelen & Wilcox, 2002). Most studies have either focused on single case studies or variation within the same religious denomination.¹⁶ Others have examined variation within Christian denominations (Kellstedt et al., 1994; Rozell et al., 1998; Green, 2007). But cross-denominational comparisons remain limited, particularly comparisons involving Muslim contexts. Given this lacuna in the literature, I explore my theory across religions with a focus on Muslim societies, where very little empirical work has been done in terms of value-based research.

1.7.1 Understanding the Gap

The lack of cleavage research in the Arab-Muslim world can be attributed to two main factors: (1) the lack of empirical data from Muslim countries as compared to the vast amount of data from other countries and (2) the marginalization of the region from mainstream social science research – also referred as the “exceptionalism thesis.” (Diamond, 2010; Bellin, 2004) The latter has gained so much importance, particularly at the end of the 20th century. Following the third wave of democratization, many Eastern European and Latin American countries have either democratized or initiated a transition towards democracy. Yet, most of the Arab-Muslim region appeared immune from global trends of democratization and modernization.

¹⁶In several of the cleavage studies, scholars analyze survey responses from participants who identify with a Christian (and sometimes Jewish) denomination and tend to exclude Muslims and "others" from their study. See example Gainous & Radunovich (2005)

Some called this process “authoritarian robustness” or “authoritarian durability” (Bellin, 2004). Some have taken an essentialist approach and argued that Islam is not compatible with democratic values, therefore, we are witnessing an “Islamic exceptionalism.” (Huntington, 1984; Hamid, 2016) Others have linked it to Arab cultures and argued that there is something specific to Arab societies that make their systems immune to democratization – what became known as “Arab exceptionalism.” (Stepan & Robertson, 2004) The obsession of scholars with this “exceptionalism” thesis has led to a failure to study and understand the region as any other part of the world, which engendered a research bias. Believing that the case of the Arab-Muslim region stands out from the rest of the world, created what Tessler (2015) called “the missing dimension in political science research.” Scholars were so focused on explaining why the region did not democratize that they missed important factors from their analysis such as political behavior and value preferences.

1.7.2 Typology of Cleavages in Arab-Muslim Societies

What type of political divides have been identified in Arab-Muslim politics? When it comes to the study of Arab-Muslim countries, two major strands have dominated the literature on political cleavages: (1) clientelism, and (2) the secular-Islamist divide. According to the first, patronage relations play a crucial role in shaping citizens’ voting behavior and political participation. Unlike in the developed world where policy programs link politicians to voters, client-patron relations link parties to their constituents in much of the developing world (Corstange, 2012). Such linkages are heavily scrutinized in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) literature. Along the same line, Lust (2009) shows that elections in the Arab world are “primarily an arena of patronage distribution” where parties offer material or other types of rewards in exchange for political support. Scholars have argued that Arab citizens rely on *wasta* – the use of personal connections to obtain goods, services, and rewards – rather than on policy programs or ideologies to choose their political candidates or parties. The same has been argued for the political elites. Blaydes (2008) shows that elites and parties rely

on “competitive clientelism” by distributing state resources among their supporters in Arab countries. Instead of focusing on political agendas and programs, parties invest in clientelist linkages to gain the support of the voters (Blaydes, 2011). This phenomenon has been given several labels such as “vote buying,” “wasta voting,” “vote trafficking,” or “the price of the vote” (Blaydes, 2011; Corstange, 2012, 2016; Lust, 2009).

The second dominant debate in the literature is the secular-Islamist cleavage. Existing research by specialists on the region examine ideological divisions by primarily focusing on the religious-secular divide (Aydogan, 2020; Ciftci, 2012; Eyadat, 2015; Mecham & Hwang, 2014; Waldner & Lust, 2016). They argue that the historically rooted secular-religious divide is shaping most of Arab societal and political issues today (S. Hunter, 1995; Roy, 1994). In the words of Blaydes & Linzer (2012) when talking about the Islamic world: “the substance of political debate surrounds a secular-religious issue cleavage akin to the left-right ideological dimension that describes policy preferences in most Western democracies.” (p.228-229) Others have studied the values rooted in the secular-Islamist cleavage and how they shape political and social preferences (Ciftci, 2012). Even after the massive waves of protests that swept the Arab world in 2011, scholars still discussed the tensions between secularists and Islamists in various countries (Bradley, 2012). Using data collected right after the Egyptian elections in 2012, Ozen (2018) shows that the secular-religious cleavage was the most dominant political division among Egyptian citizens.

Although these studies are important contributions to the field, they might not be the only explanations at play. In a recent study, Wegner & Cavatorta (2019) provide one of the first empirical evidence that ideological congruence¹⁷ exists but it is mainly limited to the secular-religious cleavage. Their findings stand in contrast to MENA specialists’ claim that Arab-Muslim citizens have little to no ideological attachment and are only motivated by patronage politics. Others have demonstrated that Arab voters are not motivated solely by patronage, but rather also care about government performance (de Miguel et al., 2015). One

¹⁷Ideological congruence refers to the distance between the parties and their supporters, and is often used to measure the quality of political representation.

of the purposes of this project is to go beyond patronage and secular-Islamist cleavage and investigate the role of values in shaping political preferences and voting. While there is a lot of research on structural and religious cleavages, very little has been done to investigate value cleavages.

1.7.3 Political Ideology and Voting Behavior in the Arab-Muslim World

Traditionally, political ideology and voting behavior have received little attention among scholars studying the region. Studies have been primarily preoccupied with other political outcomes such as regime preferences, whether a person is more favorable to authoritarian or democratic regimes (Jamal, 2006; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Ciftci, 2010). In many scholarly works, ideology is often operationalized in terms of support for Sharia or for democratic systems (Ciftci, 2012; Tessler et al., 2012). I take a broader definition of ideology, which is not limited to regime preference. Conceptualizations of ideology are diverse in the political science and political psychology literature,¹⁸ but I follow Erikson & Tedin (2019) who define ideology as “a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved.” (p. 68)

Voting behavior is another major political outcome that is widely studied in other regions, particularly with regard to political cleavages but that has not yet been much examined in the Arab-Muslim world, with the exception of countries like Turkey (Bilecen, 2015; Çarkoglu, 2012), and to some extent Indonesia (Higashikata & Kawamura, 2015; Liddle & Mujani, 2007) and Malaysia (Dettman & Pepinsky, 2024). Voting behavior studies and particularly comparative election studies (Mehrez, 2023) are also very limited in the Arab world (for recent works, see Blackman & Jackson (2021); Mehrez et al. (2023); Ozen (2018, 2020)). One reason for this is the lack of electoral data from these countries. The lack of competitive

¹⁸For a detailed account of ideology, its structure, and dimensions see chapter 1 from Jost (2021)’s book, *Left and Right: The Psychological Significance of a Political Distinction*.

and consecutive elections in many of those countries might have discouraged scholars from engaging with this scholarship.

1.8 Cleavage Formation in the Arab-Muslim World

To provide a comprehensive understanding of cleavages in Arab-Muslim countries, one needs to revisit the major historical events that triggered large-scale changes and thus created new dividing lines in these societies. Two major historical events are key in the creation of value-based cleavages in the region: state-building processes and political party formation. Following the independence and establishment of nation-states, two diverging political forces emerged within the Arab-Muslim world: the secular-nationalists and the Islamists. The latter sought to preserve Islamic institutions and values, while the former sought to apply secular liberal ideas in the newly established nation-states (post-independence from European powers). The Arab nationalists copied from the European model of nation-state nationalism of the 19th century and broke with the religious tradition. The Islamists or Islamic revivalists rejected Western models for state governance and called for a return to Islamic law and values that according to them better preserve justice in society. These events have created the value-based cleavages we still observe in much of the Arab-Muslim world.

1.8.1 Changing Institutions, Changing Values

The major historical events that shaped the Arab-Muslim world have not only created structural and religious cleavages (secular vs. Islamist) but also value-based cleavages. When the decadence and disintegration of Islamic empires became apparent, Muslims underwent a “moral crisis” (Khadduri, 1970, p. 55). Islamic institutions, Islamic law (Sharia), and Islamic values were being replaced by Western institutions and secular law and values. Muslims not only witnessed these changes but also lived through the invasion of Islamic lands by European powers. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the *Caliphate* was abolished, and Western

institutions started replacing Islamic ones. Colonialism has brought several Western ideas such as civic institutions and law, the separation between state and religion, and challenging religious traditions. As [Lewis \(2002\)](#) noted: “While Western material culture transformed the structure and aspect of Islamic society, often for the worse, ideas from the West were affecting the very basis of group cohesion, creating new patterns of identity and loyalty and providing both the objectives and the formulation of new aspirations” (p. 54). This period was also marked by the rise of nationalism. New political leaders influenced by ideas of nationalism¹⁹ and liberalism developed in Europe emerged and rose to power. They led the fight for independence in their respective countries and governed the “newly liberated state in a distinctly secular spirit” ([Fuller, 2003](#), p. 119). Several leaders from the region such as Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, Gamel Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Reza Shah in Iran, Sukarno in Indonesia, Mohammed Ali Jinnah in Pakistan, and Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria adopted secular nationalism as their main ideology. The impact of these changes on Arab-Muslim societies is eloquently articulated by [Manzoor \(1995\)](#), who notes, “The triumph of secularism, or the encroachment upon the Muslim order by Western powers, has disturbed seriously the traditional equilibrium between state and clergy. The modern state, which had become too secular and had emancipated itself from the *ulama*’s influence, is under siege today.” (p. 554)

After several years of fighting colonial powers, most Muslim countries gained independence. The momentum of secular nationalism brought new visions to the leaders and the people who viewed nationalism as a model of development, progress, and prosperity. However this enthusiasm soon faded into deception following the failure of the Arab nationalist experiment, the failure of the Arab League, and the catastrophic defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War. It constituted a turning point for those nationalist regimes. It led to growing discontent among Arab Muslims with their respective regimes who became disappointed by the failure of the secular-nationalist experiment to deliver social and economic programs. Islamist parties and movements filled this void and called for a better model – one that goes back to Islamic

¹⁹It is important to note that "nationalism" is used with a reference to the rise of 19th century European nationalism.

institutions and Islamic values. In the words of [Gardner \(2011\)](#), “the long-term winners could prove to be the Islamic revivalists who stepped into this vacuum, picking up the fallen banners of nationalism and portraying their own amorphous as a liberation theology.” (p. 24) The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt used the slogan “Islam is the solution” as a reference to all the problems that Egypt was facing under Arab nationalist leaders (Nasser and Sadat).

These cultural, social, and political changes have created deep societal divisions with newly divergent identities, along which political parties and movements have aligned themselves. As a result of these shifts, a value-based cleavage has emerged in most of the Arab-Muslim world. This divide is deeply rooted in those social identities and concerns. This new divide can be described as a battle between those who adopted a secular-nationalist stance towards the state vs. those who wanted to return to a more religious-based society and political institutions. The former wanted to break with Islamic institutions and construct a new identity based on nationality and not religion. They emphasized national identity as well as law and order as the most important features of nation-state building. The latter opposed the abolition of the “Islamic Caliphate” and defended the idea of the united Islamic *umma*. They defended the Islamist system as the ideal type of political authority able to pursue justice and promote freedom. These value priorities have become deeply politicized and they created the value-based divide observed in most of the Arab-Muslim world today. Islamist parties and movements are still calling for a return to the justice system better maintained under a religious political authority, while the nationalists are defending law, order, and authority.

1.9 Plan of the Project

I bring empirical evidence from a variety of sources to assess the theory described above. I follow a multilevel understanding of values, focusing on micro- and macro-level factors as well as the interaction between these factors. By triangulating different datasets (cross-national surveys, original face-to-face survey in Tunisia, and political speeches), methods (statistical

analysis and text analysis), and analytical approaches (quantitative text analysis and thematic content analysis), I aim to provide a comprehensive and rich body of evidence and analysis to support my main arguments.

Chapter 2 examines the link between values and political ideology across Muslim and Christian societies. Using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), I examine the link between values and political ideology across religions where I show that the link between values and political ideology varies across religions as well as across political contexts. Moreover, I assess the predictive power of my theory for voting behavior. Using four different countries from the Arab-Muslim world, I show that the theory still holds when examining voting patterns.

Chapter 3 complements the comparative nature of the multilevel study by applying my theory to one detailed case study: Tunisia. This specific case study serves as a check on the cross-national statistical comparison from the previous chapter. Unlike the WVS questions which test attitudinal measures of fairness and justice, this survey relies on multidimensional measures of justice and authority values. These measures were designed to capture several facets of justice (equity, equality, fairness) and authority (hierarchy, nationalism, traditional morality). Moreover, Tunisia makes an excellent case study for value-based cleavages: it had three competitive free and fair elections since the 2011 mass uprisings. Its system combines a variety of parties that are diverse in terms of their political views. Arguably, Tunisian society is also one of the most progressive compared to other Arab countries. Therefore, if values matter in politics, they should hold particular importance in the Tunisian case. The chapter further elaborates on the significance of the Tunisian case and explores the link between values and voting during the 2019 Tunisian elections. I provide new evidence in support of my value-based theory: people who endorse justice and freedom are more likely to vote for Islamist parties rather than left-wing ones, and those who endorse authority-nationalist values are more likely to vote for secular and left-wing parties.

Chapter 4 examines the supply side of value-based cleavages in the case study of Tunisia.

This chapter aims to examine how political elites use moral language to mobilize people and whether the same value-based divides observed among ordinary citizens in the Arab-Muslim world is also found among politicians. Using a mixed-methods approach, I analyze the political speeches of two main parties in Tunisia, the Islamist Ennahda Party and the secular Nidaa Tounes Party. The quantitative analysis yields similar results to the previous chapters: values of justice and fairness are more likely to be evoked in the speeches of Ennahda, while values of authority and nationalism are more likely to be used by Nidaa Tounes Party. To complement the quantitative analysis, I do a thematic analysis to explore in which context Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes Parties mention those values. I show that the language of Ennahda regarding justice and authority values are semantically different from that of Nidaa Tounes. For Ennahda, justice means Islamic values, Sharia, and freedom from oppression. For Nidaa Tounes, justice is mainly understood as law enforcement. When it comes to authority, this value means respect and fear from the state in the case of Nidaa Tounes, and government from below in the case of Ennahda.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the main arguments of the project and situating these findings into the context of cleavage theory and political behavior more broadly. Several policy implications are also highlighted in the conclusion.

2 Do Values Predict Political Ideology? A Cross-Religious Analysis Using Multilevel Modeling

“I decided my mind can change on issues from time to time because sometimes I’m wrong. I’m not the smartest guy in the room, so I listen to other people, and I can be persuaded that I’m wrong. But my values, I don’t vary from those.” (Mitt Romney, Harvard Dialogues series, January 23, 2024)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter applies my theory of value-based cleavages across religions. I argue that while the tendency to endorse certain values is in part shaped by the content of religious teachings, it is also influenced by the inclusion/exclusion of religious parties in politics. I test my theory in more than 50 countries from the World Value Survey (WVS) by focusing on Abrahamic faith traditions and specifically Islam. Results show that justice value is positively associated with right-wing ideology in Muslim countries. I also find evidence of both the religious explanation and the political oppression explanation, as the theory predicts. The link between endorsing justice and being to the right is positive and significant in Muslim countries where there is higher support for religious political authority and where religious parties have been repressed.

To go beyond political ideology, I test the predictive power of my theory of value-based cleavages on voting behavior. Looking at four different cases from the Arab-Muslim world, I show that people who endorse justice are more likely to vote for Islamist parties in Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey, but not Morocco. The findings from this chapter reveal new insights from Muslim societies and highlight the importance of studying across-religion variation and incorporating contextual factors into the analysis.

2.2 Values and Political Ideology

Political scientists have long argued that people lack a comprehensive ideological structure that allows them to evaluate parties and politicians (Campbell et al., 1960; Kinder, 1983; Conover & Feldman, 1984; Converse, 1964). In light of this, scholars have proposed another approach to better understand political ideology: the value-based approach. Values are the guiding principles that help individuals organize and make sense of the complex political world around them. In the words of Tetlock et al. (2000), “underlying all political belief systems are ultimate or terminal values that specify the end-states of public policy. These values [...] function as the back stops of belief systems” (p.247). People support the candidates and policies that best represent their values and advocate for them.

Values are a crucial part of human life. They are defined as the guiding principles that help one decide whether an action is acceptable or not, right or wrong, good or bad. In political science, there has been a renaissance of value-based research. Scholars have investigated the role of values in shaping people’s political views (Graham et al., 2009), attitudes (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001), and behavior (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). A large body of literature suggests that values are stable and extend beyond particular situations (Evans & Neundorff, 2020; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Zaller, 1991). In politics, people rely on their core values to make their political decisions and evaluate politicians (Feldman, 2013; Nelson & Garst, 2005). This link has been documented in political science (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Inglehart,

2000), sociology (Smith, 2003), and psychology (Franks & Scherr, 2015; Schwartz, 2012; Greene, 2013).

Several studies have documented the link between values and political ideology. Rokeach (1973) shows that supporters of liberal candidates in the US are more supportive of equality than supporters of Republican candidates and the former are more likely to place egalitarian values at the top of their value priorities. Similarly, Feldman (1988) finds that justice values are associated with support for Democratic presidents. Graham et al. (2009, 2011) demonstrated similar results with their five-value model – also called “the Moral Foundations Theory” (MFT). According to MFT, people who endorse care and fairness values are more likely to identify as liberals, while those who endorse all five foundations and particularly authority, loyalty, and sanctity values are more likely to identify as conservatives. Voelkel & Feinberg (2018) show that liberals are more persuaded by fairness-related moral framing whereas conservatives are more persuaded by messages related to loyalty to the group. In a recent study, Bizer (2020) examines how responses to unfair treatments differ across individuals using the Emotional Response to Unfairness (ERU) scale. He shows that people high on ERU were more likely to vote for Hillary Clinton whereas those low on ERU were more likely to vote for Donald Trump during the 2016 election. Using the Schwartz 10 basic values, conformity, security, and tradition were also found to be associated with right-wing political ideology, whereas universalism and benevolence were associated with left-wing political ideology (Piurko et al., 2011; Caprara et al., 2006).

While numerous studies examine the link between values and political ideology, very little has been done to incorporate Muslim countries into cross-cultural research, whether in political science, psychology, or sociology. Most of the comparative work has predominantly focused on Christian countries (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Finke & Adamczyk, 2008), or just one or two Muslim countries (Caprara et al., 2017) in their cross-national surveys, or exclusively on Muslim countries with no comparison with other religions (Ciftci, 2019, 2022; Davis & Robinson, 2006). Caprara et al. (2017) cross-cultural study of 16 countries, for instance,

included only one Muslim-majority country – Turkey. [Schwartz \(1992\)](#) relied initially on 20 countries to test the universality of his 10 basic values model, but none of them were from the Muslim world. Such designs hinder the study of values and political ideology from a comparative perspective. Most importantly, existing research has been theorizing about values and value structures using predominantly Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) cultural populations ([Caprara et al., 2006](#); [Conover & Feldman, 1984](#); [McClosky & Zaller, 2013](#); [Rokeach, 1973](#)). This chapter investigates theoretically and empirically the link between values and political ideology across religions using a variety of countries. Specifically, it focuses on Muslim countries,¹ where there is little empirical evidence about the link between values and political ideology. Using a multilevel modeling approach, I show that contrary to what has been predicted by existing research ([Graham et al., 2009](#); [Flanagan & Lee, 2003](#); [Evans et al., 1996](#); [Kitschelt, 2004](#)), people who endorse justice and fairness values are more likely to be right-wing oriented in Muslim countries only. Turning to the mechanisms driving this relationship, I test two potential factors: the role of religious settings and the inclusion/exclusion of religious political parties. Results of cross-country comparisons yield evidence that these two factors spur much of the observed variation.

2.3 Values in the Muslim World: Religious Context

A defining feature of the study of values in the Muslim world is the emphasis placed on justice and fairness values in the Quran and Sunna.² Justice occupies a supreme place in Islam and the Quran is very specific about the obligation of every Muslim to act "justly." Justice (*‘al-adl’*) in Islam means placing things in their rightful place. According to [K. B. Ismail \(2010\)](#), “Islamic justice is something higher than the formal justice of Roman law or any other human law. It is even more penetrative than the subtler justice in the speculation of the Greek philosophers.” (p.2) According to [Fish \(2011\)](#), “justice occupies pride of place in

¹Throughout the paper, I will use ‘Muslim countries’ and ‘Muslim societies’ interchangeably to designate countries that have a predominantly Muslim population.

²*Sunna* refers to the sayings (*hadith*) of the Prophet Mohammed.

Muslim moral thinking. In broadest general terms, it is the essence of the Muslim ideal and message, much as the essence of the Christian ideal and message is love.” (p. 222) Moreover, one of the fundamental beliefs in Islam is the idea that man is the vicegerent of God on earth – also known as "*Khalifa*." Therefore, as a representative of God, it is man's responsibility to make the world a just place and promote God's moral laws (Ciftci, 2022; Abou El Fadl, 2004). Kamali (2002) highlights this idea by arguing that justice “stands next in order of priority to belief in the Oneness of God (*tawhid*) and the Prophethood (*risala*).” (p.107) According to this, justice is more than just something synonymous with law, fairness, and equality. It is a supreme goal that all Muslims should seek to achieve and promote (Kamali, 2008).

2.3.1 Sources of Religious Teachings

Religious teachings about justice and fairness can emanate from three primary sources: education, clerics, and Islamist parties. First, Islamic education is mandatory in most Muslim countries. This type of education is offered in both Quranic and public schools as part of the mandatory curricula. It involves reciting the Quran, learning about the Prophet's hadith, and studying Islamic values. Second, Muslims can also get religious teachings through the Imams. Friday sermons ("*Khutba*") are weekly speeches delivered before the Friday prayers by Imams and are mandatory for all male Muslims to attend. The sermons aim to inform, guide, and educate Muslims about fundamental rules and values in Islam. Finally, values can also emanate from political parties and movements. According to Feldman (1988), values are “evident in the political rhetoric and politics of the society. In fact, they may be so pervasive that their presence in everyday politics often goes unnoticed.” (p. 418) The stronger the emphasis on values by the political elite, the more persistent they are in society (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Decades of research demonstrate that people evaluate parties and policies based on how the parties connect to their core values (Druckman, 2001; Druckman et al., 2013; Goren, 2012; Petersen et al., 2010; Stubager, 2013; Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). Islamist parties like other political actors often signal their core values, particularly Islamic values, in

their political discourses. As noted by [Livny \(2020\)](#) “what defines all these organizations as ‘Islamic-based’ is more about means than ends. They couch their appeals to supporters in Islamic terms, making regular and explicit use of religious language and symbols” (p.1). It is worth mentioning that scholars often draw distinctions among Islamist parties based on a number of dimensions such as the type of political activities they engage in, their ideology, and their organizational style ([Nazar, 2016](#); [Wittes, 2008](#)). However, for the purpose of this project, I use a rather broad definition that captures the core normative and cultural elements of these parties across regions (Middle East, Africa, and Asia) and a large variation in political systems. Islamist parties’ shared characteristics consist of belief in the Islamic community and endorsement of Islamic values. As [Mecham & Hwang \(2014\)](#) write: “Islamist parties speak a common language of shared references about what is right and wrong, share a mythical history of the glory days of the original Islamic community (*umma*).” (p.17)

Despite the salience of Islamic values especially justice and fairness in Islam and in Islamist parties’ discourses, little empirical work has been done to investigate their predictive power over political outcomes. [Davis & Robinson \(2006\)](#) analyze seven Muslim countries and find that orthodox Muslims are more likely to possess egalitarian preferences than modernists. Moreover, [Ciftci \(2019, 2022\)](#) explains why religious Muslims are more supportive of democratic systems than non-religious Muslims. He argues that since Islam emphasizes social justice as a core value, Muslims should support a political system that minimizes injustices and inequality and that democracy is seen as more likely to fulfill those goals. Using survey data from 19 Muslim countries, he shows that religious Muslims have a higher preference for democratic systems, an effect that is mediated by social justice and benevolence values. Single case studies provide some evidence that justice values are positively correlated with right-wing political preferences. Using representative survey data from Tunisia, [Mehrez \(2023\)](#) shows that people who endorse justice values were significantly more likely to vote for Islamist parties than for left-wing ones. Drawing from this contradictory evidence, on the one hand from Muslim countries and the other from non-Muslim ones, this project sheds

some light on the potential variation in value endorsement across religious settings.

2.4 Hypotheses

This chapter investigates the link between values and political ideology across religions. Countries with a predominant religion are treated as the context in which values and political ideology are shaped and reinforced. [Wald et al. \(1988\)](#) argue that a contextual effect requires at least "(1) the communication of political messages and (2) opportunities for members to observe the reactions of fellow members to these messages and to bring their own behavior into conformity with them." (p. 532) By comparing predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim countries, this study sheds light on the environment in which values are shaped and politicized.

First, similarities and differences can be found between Abrahamic faith traditions when it comes to value emphasis. Islam shares some key values and concerns with other religions such as Christianity and Judaism. Christians, like Muslims, care about the conservation of traditional morality (such as family and marriage norms) and preserving order and social hierarchy. They all have deep concerns about how secularization processes are changing and challenging their religious beliefs. Such beliefs can be found among social conservatives in the US ([Graham et al., 2009](#); [Lakoff, 2016](#)), Israel ([Barnea & Schwartz, 1998](#)), Latin America ([Boas, 2019](#)), or in Europe ([Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016](#); [Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000](#)). Given their salience in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies, it is reasonable to assume that values related to authority and tradition will not vary across religions and will be associated with right-wing political ideology.

Hypothesis 1: Values related to authority and tradition are positively associated with right-wing political ideology in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies.

In contrast, the impact of justice values will vary depending on the religion in which they feature. In Islam, unlike in Judaism and Christianity, justice is a core value that occupies a central stage both in Islamic teachings as well as in right-wing Islamist parties' discourses.

Accordingly, I expect this value to be positively associated with right-wing political ideology in predominantly Muslim countries only.

Hypothesis 2: Justice value is positively associated with right-wing political ideology in Muslim societies only.

As previously argued, religious teachings are important in shaping people's values. It is worth asking whether religion has an impact as an individual-level factor – in terms of religious teachings and communal practice – or as a contextual factor. If religion operates at the individual level, we should expect to observe a positive link between justice value and right-wing political ideology among all individuals belonging to a Muslim denomination. If religion operates on an aggregate level, we should observe variation in this relationship among Muslims residing in predominantly Muslim settings. To test for this, I differentiate between Muslims socialized in predominantly Muslim countries and those socialized in non-Muslim countries. The former group has received both Islamic teaching education and has been exposed to religious parties' political discourses, while the latter has been exposed to a different political setting where justice and fairness values do not necessarily emanate from Islamist political parties. Consequently, I posit that the positive link between justice values and right-wing political ideology will be more pronounced among Muslims living in predominantly Muslim societies compared to Muslims living in non-Muslim societies.

Hypothesis 3: The positive link between justice value and right-wing political ideology is significantly stronger among Muslims living in predominantly Muslim societies than Muslims living in non-Muslim societies.

2.4.1 Exploring the Mechanisms

To explain why justice value is positively associated with right-wing political ideology in the Muslim world, I test two potential mechanisms: political oppression and the belief in Islamist political authority (political Islam) as an ideal form of government. The first mechanism relates to the political oppression employed by ruling regimes in several Muslim countries.

Except for a handful of cases,³ Islamist parties and movements in most Muslim countries are either in opposition or banned (temporarily or permanently) from politics (Kurzman & Naqvi, 2010; Robbins, 2012; Ghafar & Hess, 2018). They have been regarded as a threat to the stability and legitimacy of the ruling elites, particularly with the rise of Islamist movements in the 1970s. Hence, they were banned from the political scene, jailed, and repressed. These parties condemned the oppression exercised against them and called for a rule of justice. Except for very few countries,⁴ Islamist parties in most of the Muslim world face repression and legal restrictions (Hamid, 2010). Therefore, one might expect that mounting repression and exclusion may be driving the positive association between justice values and right-wing political ideology in the Muslim world.

Hypothesis 4: In Muslim countries where opposition parties are banned and weak, the link between embracing justice and being on the right is stronger than in countries with more political pluralism.

The second potential mechanism is the belief in Islamist political authority as the ideal type of governance. In many Muslim countries, people support and favor a religious-led authority rather than a non-religious one. Two main factors have been proposed to explain this: the reputation of good governance and the organizational advantage of Islamists. The first strand of literature has shown that Islamist parties appeal to the masses by signaling their dedication to pure and fair policies. Many Muslims believe that an Islamist political authority represents the ideal type of political order where justice prevails, and individuals' rights are protected. This reputation of good and just governance goes back to the emergence of Islam in the 7th century which was understood as a quest to pursue justice and fight oppression. The Prophet Mohammad was sent to establish justice as the Quran illustrates: "We sent Our Messengers with clear signs and sent down with them the Book and the Measure in order

³Exceptions where Islamist parties take an active role in government are Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Morocco.

⁴It is important to note that oppression has not been the only strategy used by the regimes in the Muslim world to deal with Islamist parties. Other strategies such as co-optation, moderation, and partial integration have also been employed. See Sallam (2022).

to establish justice among the people” (57:25). A recent study by [Isani \(2019\)](#) confirms the idea of good reputation and shows that the word ”*Caliphate*” is associated among Muslims with the idea of an efficient dispensation of justice. Therefore, by emphasizing justice value, contemporary Islamist figures and parties are not only appealing to those who believe in the “good governance” of religious political authority but also fostering a reputation of being trustworthy and just in contrast to the alternatives ([Cammett & Luong, 2014](#)).

The second strand of literature has focused on the organizational advantage of Islamists. Because Islamist parties have access to an extensive network of social welfare provisions, they are more successful than non-religious parties in mobilizing voters ([Bayat, 2002](#); [Brooke, 2019](#); [Davis & Robinson, 2012](#); [Wiktorowicz, 2004](#)). [Masoud \(2014\)](#) shows that Egyptians rated the Justice and Freedom Party (Muslim Brotherhood) as more distributive and welfare statist than left-wing parties mainly because of their “embeddedness in Islamic social networks.” Others have highlighted the role of Mosques in facilitating and maintaining those networks ([Clark, 2004](#); [Wickham, 2002](#)). Whether through their reputation for good governance or through their social Islamic networks, Islamist political actors seem to be more favored than non-Islamist ones. Building off of this literature, I hypothesize that the positive link between justice value and being to the right will be more prominent in countries where support for religious political authority is high.

Hypothesis 5: The link between justice and right-wing political ideology is stronger in those countries that are more likely to favor Islamist political authority.

2.5 Data and Method

To test these hypotheses, this paper uses data from the 6th wave⁵ of the World Value Survey (WVS)⁶, which was conducted between 2010 and 2014. The dataset consists of 60 countries

⁵I use the 6th wave of the WVS data instead of the 7th more recent wave because some questions of interest were only asked in the older waves.

⁶The WVS is used in this paper for the following reasons. First, it provides data from all over the world covering five broad regions which makes it more suitable than other regionally focused surveys (such as

and a sample size of around 89,500 respondents. Multilevel regression analysis is used to simultaneously examine the link between values and political ideology across individuals and countries. To measure values (level 1 predictors), I use a two-dimensional-value⁷ model – authority value dimension and justice value dimension. The authority value dimension is measured using five items from the WVS related to conformity, family, respect for authority, security, and tradition. The justice value dimension⁸ is measured using four items⁹ that are related to claiming government benefits, cheating on taxes, avoiding a fare, and giving a bribe (see Appendix A for full item descriptions). Value dimensions yielded alpha reliability scores of 0.61 and 0.79 respectively. A mean score was computed across items to create an average value score for each dimension and for each respondent in the dataset with larger scores indicating greater endorsement of the value.

One key question often asked in cross-cultural research is: how do participants from different societies interpret the survey questions? To address this, I do a measurement invariance analysis using Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis with Maximum Likelihood Estimation to assess whether the measurement properties of the used scales are consistent across the different religions. As Table 2.1 shows, Muslims and non-Muslims interpret the authority and justice value scales in a nearly similar way. Model fit indices for configural, metric and scalar invariance are all above the recommended threshold for invariance testing (Chen, 2008). This indicates that there is no significant difference between the scale means

Arab Barometer, European Social Survey, and American Barometer) to do a comparative analysis. Another important characteristic of the WVS is that it highly focuses on values and contains a variety of questions that can be used in cross-national analysis.

⁷While there is no consensus about the structure and definition of values, two main values are consistently considered in value-based studies: justice-related values (fairness, equality, and equity concerns) and authority values (concerns related to tradition, security, hierarchy, and respect for authority). For more details see Flanagan & Lee (2003); Kitschelt (1994). Although all these authors use the label "authoritarian" values to mean endorsing social hierarchy and respect for tradition, I employ "authority" instead to denote this set of values. The distinction is done to avoid confusing authoritarian values with preferences for authoritarian regimes.

⁸Items used from the WVS are chosen to reflect attitudes towards unfair behavior. Although using different item wordings, this operationalization has already been applied in previous studies (Graham et al., 2011; Bizer, 2020).

⁹Some items from both dimensions are reverse coded so that higher values indicate higher endorsement of the value.

across groups, implying that a valid and meaningful comparison can be drawn across the groups.

| | χ^2 | df | RMSEA | SRMR | TLI | CFI | AIC | BIC |
|------------|-------------|----|-------|------|------|------|-----------|-----------|
| Configural | 4851.788468 | 26 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 1785349.3 | 1785600.3 |
| Metric | 6568.90952 | 59 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.94 | 0.95 | 2131481.3 | 2131929.4 |
| Scalar | 10257.31224 | 66 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.91 | 0.92 | 2135155.7 | 2135539.8 |

Table 2.1: **Results of Measurement Invariance Models**

The dependent variable is political ideology measured by the respondents' self-positioning on a 10-point scale where 1 means left-wing and 10 means right-wing. While several researchers argue that a uni-dimensional scale has several disadvantages compared to multi-dimensional scales (Ashton et al., 2005; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Yeung & Quek, 2024; Caughey et al., 2019), I argue in this paper that the left-right can be convenient for the following reasons. First, the left-right distinction proves to be a useful measure of ideology because it helps differentiate between ideas and people who hold opposing views (Huber, 1989). The left-right also serve as heuristics or shortcuts to make sense of the political world and orient people in their political choices (Kerlinger, 1984; Sniderman et al., 1993). Besides its practical utility, the left-right is maybe one of the most widely used measures that existed for the last three centuries and continues to be used in politics today. While multi-dimensional measures capture more variation of the ideological spectrum, they come with disadvantages. Social and economic issue positions, for example, are rarely applicable in comparative analysis as they vary tremendously across countries and sometimes even within a single country. They also vary across time as one issue might be salient now but not a few years or months later. Based on this, I conclude that the left-right ideological dimension better suits the empirical goal of this paper and its comparative purpose.¹⁰

The control variables included the level of education, gender (0 = female and 1 = male),

¹⁰For a measurement validity of the dependent variable, I regress the left-right self-placement on some social and economic issues from the WVS survey (see Appendix A, Figure A.3 for full results). The results are consistent with the expected patterns observed in other studies, showing no significant discrepancies.

age (measured in years), and religiosity (frequency of prayers). I include a dummy variable for predominantly Muslim countries¹¹ (0 if non-Muslim and 1 if Muslim) to estimate the effect of values on political ideology across religions. Moreover, to differentiate the individual-level impact of religion from its contextual one, I run an OLS regression¹² where I only look at the sample of Muslim respondents living in non-Muslim majority countries and another one with only Muslim respondents living in predominantly Muslim countries.

Finally, to test the two hypothesized mechanisms of political repression and religious political authority, I include two contextual variables: political oppression and support for religious authorities in politics respectively. Given that the focus of this paper is on contextual factors, I rely on country-level variables to measure the hypothesized mechanisms. The measure of political oppression is taken from the V-Dem Dataset and specifically targets oppression towards opposition parties. I compute the average score of the variable called "party ban" from 1990 to 2010 for all countries (Coppedge et al., 2021). The religious political authority variable, (taken from the WVS), measures support for religious authorities in politics averaged across participants for each country. A total of 53 countries¹³ and 61,918 individuals remained after excluding the ones that did not have information on key variables (see Table A.1 in Appendix A for descriptive statistics).

Multilevel Model Equations

To simultaneously test the micro and macro-level influence of values on political ideology, I use a multilevel regression analysis (Hox et al., 2017). All level 1 continuous predictors in the model are group mean centered, whereas all level 2 continuous predictors are grand mean centered. All random slopes of each of my predictors are included (Heisig & Schaffer,

¹¹Countries with at least 60% of the country's population Muslim is categorized as a Muslim society.

¹²For these OLS models, I subset from the WVS participants who identified with a Muslim denomination before categorizing them into those who live in predominantly Muslim countries and those who live in non-Muslim countries.

¹³Out of 60 countries from the WVS, 6 countries did not include the dependent variable question (Jordan, Kuwait, Germany, Qatar, Republic of China, and Singapore) and 1 country did not include at least one of the independent variables (Egypt). In total, 15 were Muslim-majority countries and 38 were non-Muslim countries. See Appendix A for the categorization of all countries.

2019). The multilevel model is run in seven separate steps. In the first step, I estimate the baseline model and compute the Intra-Class Correlation (ICC).¹⁴ The ICC indicates that the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is across countries is around 8%. In step 2, I estimate Model 2 and include all the predictors and control variables. In Models 3 and 4, I include the interaction of authority and justice values respectively with Muslim majority dummy in separate models to avoid the potential collinearity problem. In Model 5, I include both interactions together to test whether the results change. Finally, in Models 6 and 7, I test the mechanisms at play and include the three-way interactions¹⁵ between the justice value dimension, Muslim majority dummy, and party ban on the one hand and religious political authority on the other.

2.6 Results

Model 2 shows the main individual-level results (Table 2.2). Both authority and justice values are significant predictors of political ideology. In line with existing research, people who embrace traditional morality are more likely to self-identify as right-wing, whereas those who embrace justice values are more likely to self-identify as left-wing. All control variables are also significant in the expected direction. Older males with lower education and higher religiosity are more likely to be on the right than on the left side of the political spectrum. Being in a Muslim-majority country seems to have a positive effect on political ideology: individuals from Muslim societies are more likely to position themselves on the right rather than on the left. This is in line with previous findings (Aydoğan, 2021).

Because the primary interest of the chapter is the impact of each value dimension on political ideology conditional on the religious context, I examine the interaction of both value dimensions with the Muslim majority dummy (see Models 3 and 4). As expected, the link between values and political ideology varies across religions depending on the type of value.

¹⁴ICC is the ratio of the between country variance to the total variance.

¹⁵The three-way interactions exclusively involve the justice value variable, not the authority variable. This choice is based on the hypothesized mechanisms.

The interaction between authority and the Muslim majority is positive but not significant, which means there are no detectable differences between Muslim and non-Muslim societies. Figure 2.1 illustrates the positive trends across contexts. As hypothesized, the interaction between justice value and the Muslim majority dummy is positive and significant (Model 4 & Figure 2.1). In other words, people who endorse justice are significantly more likely to self-identify with the right in Muslim societies only. In Model 5, I run both interactions in the same model to check whether the coefficients are altered. The results remain robust and consistent with the previous findings.

While these results clearly show different trends across religions, they do not tell whether this link differs across countries with different religions or across people from different religious denominations. One might argue that the perceived association between justice value and right-wing political ideology is not specific to Muslim societies but can be linked to Muslims more broadly. If this is the case, one should find the same association among Muslims who do not live in predominantly Muslim countries. To test this, I run two OLS regressions where I include Muslims who do not live in predominantly Muslim countries and Muslims living in predominantly Muslim countries respectively (Figure 2.2). The results show that the link between justice and political ideology differs between the two groups. Although not significant, there is a negative relationship between endorsing justice and being right-wing among Muslims living in non-Muslim contexts. Looking at the sub-sample of Muslims living in Muslim-majority countries, there is a significant positive relationship between endorsing justice values and right-wing political ideology. These results confirm that religion at the individual level of analysis is not enough to explain how values are linked to political ideology.

Finally, Table 2.3 shows the results of the hypothesized mechanisms: political oppression and religious political authority. As hypothesized, the positive association between justice and right-wing political ideology seems to be conditional on the level of political oppression (as measured by party ban). Countries with more oppressed parties significantly differ from those countries where opposition parties have relatively more freedom and room to compete

Table 2.2: Multilevel regression models. Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors are in parentheses.

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Left-right (self-placement) | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Authority | | 0.234*** (0.014) | 0.244*** (0.047) | 0.230*** (0.014) | 0.246*** (0.042) |
| Justice | | -0.038*** (0.006) | -0.038*** (0.006) | -0.033 (0.020) | -0.032 (0.017) |
| Religiosity | | 0.067*** (0.004) | 0.063*** (0.004) | 0.065*** (0.004) | 0.062*** (0.004) |
| Education | | -0.036*** (0.004) | -0.034*** (0.004) | -0.036*** (0.004) | -0.035*** (0.004) |
| Gender | | 0.103*** (0.018) | 0.099*** (0.018) | 0.101*** (0.018) | 0.098*** (0.018) |
| Age | | 0.027*** (0.006) | 0.027*** (0.006) | 0.027*** (0.006) | 0.027*** (0.006) |
| Muslim majority | | 0.747*** (0.179) | 0.739*** (0.180) | 0.750*** (0.179) | 0.741*** (0.180) |
| Authority*Muslim majority | | | 0.071 (0.091) | | 0.029 (0.082) |
| Justice*Muslim majority | | | | 0.089* (0.037) | 0.074* (0.033) |
| Constant | 5.674*** (0.093) | 5.423*** (0.096) | 5.427*** (0.096) | 5.423*** (0.095) | 5.427*** (0.096) |
| Random effects: | | | | | |
| Country variance | 0.448 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.34 |
| Residual variance | 5.10 | 5.04 | 5.01 | 5.01 | 5.0 |
| Random slope justice | | | | 0.01 | 0.008 |
| Random slope authority | | | 0.07 | | 0.05 |
| N | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 |
| Observations | 61,918 | 61,918 | 61,918 | 61,918 | 61,918 |
| Log Likelihood | -138,424.200 | -138,064.500 | -137,935.200 | -137,950.000 | -137,852.500 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 276,854.400 | 276,151.000 | 275,896.300 | 275,926.100 | 275,740.900 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 276,881.500 | 276,250.400 | 276,013.800 | 276,043.500 | 275,903.500 |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure 2.1: Interaction between authority values and Muslim-majority countries and justice values and Muslim-majority countries




Figure 2.2: The link between justice values and political ideology





Figure 2.3: Interaction between the justice value dimension, Muslim countries, and party ban/ religious political authority.



and participate in politics (see Figure 2.3, upper row). The second mechanism of religious political authority is also supported. The results¹⁶ of the three-way interaction show that in Muslim societies where support for religious political authority is high, the link between endorsing justice and being to the right politically is stronger (see Figure 2.3, lower row). This result is only observed in Muslim societies but not non-Muslim ones. This finding confirms the argument that justice and fairness thrive under Islamist political authority, an idea that continues to resonate strongly among Muslims.

¹⁶For a sensitivity analysis, I replicate the analysis by focusing solely on Muslim and Christian countries, rather than comparing Muslims to non-Muslims. The overall findings remain consistent except for two results where the significance changes to 0.1 which is understandable in multilevel regressions given that the number of countries decreases. However, these changes are not substantive and do not change the interpretation of the results. Full results can be found in Appendix A, Tables A.3 and A.4.

Table 2.3: Multilevel regression models. Entries are regression coefficients, and their standard errors are in parentheses. Model 6 tests the political oppression mechanism, whereas Model 7 tests the religious political authority mechanism

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|---|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| | Left-right (self-placement) (6) | (7) |
| Authority | 0.230*** (0.014) | 0.229*** (0.014) |
| Justice | -0.045* (0.021) | -0.045* (0.018) |
| Religiosity | 0.065*** (0.004) | 0.065*** (0.004) |
| Education | -0.036*** (0.004) | -0.036*** (0.004) |
| Gender | 0.101*** (0.018) | 0.101*** (0.018) |
| Age | 0.027*** (0.006) | 0.027*** (0.006) |
| Party ban | -0.066 (0.142) | |
| Religious authority | | 0.144 (0.096) |
| Muslim Majority | 0.804*** (0.223) | 0.566* (0.237) |
| Justice*Party ban | -0.035 (0.027) | |
| Justice*Religious authority | | -0.032 (0.017) |
| Justice*Muslim Majority | 0.045 (0.045) | 0.003 (0.042) |
| Party ban*Muslim Majority | 0.032 (0.189) | |
| Justice*Party ban*Muslim Majority | 0.092* (0.037) | |
| Religious authority*Muslim Majority | | -0.026 (0.171) |
| Justice*Religious authority*Muslim Majority | | 0.130*** (0.031) |
| Constant | 5.399*** (0.110) | 5.485*** (0.103) |
| Random effects: | | |
| Country variance | 0.35 | 0.33 |
| Residual variance | 5.01 | 5.01 |
| Random slope justice | 0.05 | 0.01 |
| N | 53 | 53 |
| Observations | 61,918 | 61,918 |
| Log Likelihood | -137,954.200 | -137,949.500 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 275,942.400 | 275,933.100 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 276,095.900 | 276,086.700 |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

2.7 Robustness Checks

One might argue that other types of contextual factors such as social and economic factors, can also explain the positive association between justice value and right-wing political ideology in Muslim countries. To test for potential confounders, I check whether other important economic factors might affect this link. I include contextual predictors such as GDP per capita, inequality coefficient (Gini), and Corruption Perception Index (see Table 2.4). Results show that GDP and Gini coefficients for the three-way interaction are not statistically significant, indicating that GDP and inequality do not condition the relationship between endorsing justice and being to the right. However, the corruption perception coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that the link between justice and right-wing political ideology is stronger in contexts with higher corruption perception. This finding could be due to the high levels of corruption in Muslim countries.

2.8 Implications for Political Behavior: Case Studies of Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco

Until now, I have only shown variation in the link between values and political ideology. It may be the case however that the endorsement of these values does not automatically translate into political behavior. In other words, are people high in justice value also likely to vote for right-wing Islamist parties? Existing research shows mixed evidence about the link between political ideology and voting preferences. Some studies find some evidence in support of this link ([Holm & Robinson, 1978](#); [Levitin & Miller, 1979](#); [Sears et al., 2014](#)), while others find weak correlations ([Jacoby, 2009](#)).

To address this, I examine the link between values and voting behavior by zooming in on four countries from the WVS: Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco. The differences between these countries make them excellent case studies for several reasons. While all four countries

Table 2.4: Multilevel regression models. Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors are in parentheses. GDP = GDP per capita; Gini = Inequality Index; Corruption = Corruption Perception Index

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | |
|--|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Left-right (self-placement) | | |
| | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Authority | 0.229*** (0.014) | 0.229*** (0.014) | 0.229*** (0.014) |
| Justice | -0.038* (0.019) | -0.028 (0.020) | -0.043* (0.019) |
| Religiosity | 0.065*** (0.004) | 0.065*** (0.004) | 0.065*** (0.004) |
| Education | -0.036*** (0.004) | -0.036*** (0.004) | -0.036*** (0.004) |
| Gender | 0.101*** (0.018) | 0.101*** (0.018) | 0.101*** (0.018) |
| Age | 0.027*** (0.006) | 0.027*** (0.006) | 0.027*** (0.006) |
| GDP per capita | -0.001 (0.005) | | |
| Gini | | 0.009 (0.009) | |
| Corruption | | | -0.0002 (0.005) |
| Muslim Majority | 0.439 (0.420) | 0.733*** (0.190) | 0.548 (0.324) |
| Justice*Muslim Majority | -0.022 (0.081) | 0.086* (0.039) | -0.002 (0.065) |
| Justice*GDP per capita | 0.002 (0.001) | | |
| GDP per capita*Muslim Majority | -0.032 (0.041) | | |
| Justice*GDP per capita*Muslim Majority | -0.014 (0.008) | | |
| Justice*Gini | | -0.003 (0.002) | |
| Gini*Muslim Majority | | -0.019 (0.023) | |
| Justice*Gini*Muslim Majority | | 0.003 (0.005) | |
| Justice*Corruption | | | 0.002* (0.001) |
| Corruption*Muslim Majority | | | -0.013 (0.018) |
| Justice*Corruption*Muslim Majority | | | -0.009* (0.004) |
| Constant | 5.427*** (0.099) | 5.414*** (0.097) | 5.425*** (0.101) |
| Random effects: | | | |
| Country variance | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.35 |
| Residual variance | 5.01 | 4.95 | 5.01 |
| Random slope justice | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| N | 53 | 53 | 53 |
| Observations | 61,918 | 61,918 | 61,918 |
| Log Likelihood | -137,963.700 | -137,964.900 | -137,964.200 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 275,961.400 | 275,963.800 | 275,962.400 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 276,114.900 | 276,117.400 | 276,116.000 |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

have Islamist parties that are or were in power and took part in national elections, they vary on two key aspects: the degree of freedom they enjoyed (whether in parliament or incumbent government) and the type of political system in which they performed.¹⁷ In Tunisia, the survey was collected just two years after the change of the authoritarian regime. Under former President Ben Ali, Ennahda was banned and had almost no presence in political life. Many of its leading members, such as Rached Ghannouchi, were in exile or jail. After the uprisings, Ennahda Party was leading the transition government and preparing to run again for the 2014 elections. Similarly in Egypt, the survey was conducted one year after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak and one year before the military coup by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Unlike Ennahda in Tunisia, Egypt's Islamist party, the Muslim Brotherhood later called the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – has had a more complicated relationship with the Egyptian government. They were repressed by the Egyptian governments while also allowed to run in elections as independents (Abed-Kotob, 1995; Langohr, 2001; Sallam, 2022). When it comes to Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is quite different from both Tunisia and Egypt. Unlike many other countries in the region, Turkey has the longest-running Islamist party in government since 2002 (Dagi, 2008; Tepe, 2005). Although in power for a long period of time, elections in Turkey have always been competitive and the divide between Islamists and secularists remains salient.¹⁸ Finally, Morocco's Islamist party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), has also been slowly allowed to run in parliamentary elections. However, unlike the AKP in Turkey, their influence remains constrained and limited since the King of Morocco has the ultimate monopoly over the political and religious domains (Daadaoui, 2017).

It is worth mentioning that compared to the other three cases, the nature of the religious political authority is different in Morocco. While in Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey, religious political authority is mainly represented by Islamist parties competing for power, in Morocco,

¹⁷Characteristics of the four countries are summarized in Table A.5 in Appendix A.

¹⁸While analysts and scholars still describe the Turkish election as competitive and free, some acknowledge that they are "unfair" because of the biased media coverage by the incumbent. Read more on <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/12/turkey-election-free-fair-vote-erdogan/>

religious authority mainly emanates from the King. King Mohammed VI is called the “Commander of the Faithful,” and is a direct descendent of the Prophet Mohammad. What makes the Moroccan case special is the unique position the king holds as both the religious and the political figure (Boukhars, 2010; Khamlichi, 2014; Maghraoui, 2001; Wainscott, 2017). A 2017 survey experiment conducted by *YouGov* shows that Moroccan respondents overwhelmingly mention the King as the most trusted figure (70%) and as the highest religious authority in the country, with the highest approval rate (48%).¹⁹ The Prime Minister, Saadeddine Othmani who is a member of the PJD, has only 8% approval rate and is ranked as the least trusted figure. This distinction is important for making inferences about the sources of religious-political legitimacy and how such figures can shape value-based cleavages.

To test the link in these four different cases, I use the question from the WVS, which asks respondents about their vote intention if an election is to be held tomorrow.²⁰ The dependent variable is vote choice computed as a binary measure where 1 means voting for Islamists and 0 means voting for left-wing secular parties. Even though the focus is on justice, I include both value dimensions in the model (justice and authority values). Finally, I include age, education, gender, and religiosity²¹ as control variables.


Results in Figure 2.4 show that in three out of the four countries, people who are high on justice value are significantly more likely to vote for Islamists than other left-wing parties. In countries where Islamist parties were oppressed and banned, Tunisia and Egypt, the link between justice and voting for Islamists is positive and significant. Despite being the incumbent government and not in opposition, the link also holds in Turkey. This result might be due to the high political competition and the salience of the divide between Islamists and secularists. Elections in Turkey remain highly contested and uncertain, which might explain why justice is highly predictive of Islamist vote choice. Furthermore, neither justice

¹⁹Full survey report can be found here: <https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/public-opinion-religious-authority-moroccan-king>, accessed 12.03.2023

²⁰Full details about parties’ categorizations can be found in Table A.6 in Appendix A.

²¹The measure of religiosity (frequency of prayer) was not asked in the case of Egypt.

Figure 2.4: Binary logistic regression results of each country's model (Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco).



nor religiosity predicted voting for Islamists in the case of Morocco. This indicates the central importance of the King's position as the representative of the religious political authority. Finally, when comparing the predictive power of justice value to other socio-demographic variables, the former seems to be more important and more consistent in predicting voting behavior than variables such as education, age, or gender. These findings further illustrate the importance of considering values as determinants of vote choice and political attitudes in the Arab-Muslim world.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to examine the link between values and political ideology across religions. Using a multilevel regression analysis, I show that values, as measured by authority and justice

endorsement, shape political ideology. People who endorse traditional morality, conformity, and social hierarchy are more likely to be to the right, whereas people who endorse fairness and justice values are more likely to be to the left. These results are in line with existing research from political science and psychology (Caprara et al., 2017; Feldman, 1988; Graham et al., 2009). When testing for variation across religions, two main patterns are observed. The first is similar to what has already been found: People who embrace authority and traditional morality are more likely to be to the right everywhere (regardless of the religious context). However, when it comes to the justice value, new patterns are observed. Interestingly and as hypothesized, there is a positive association between endorsing justice value and right-wing political ideology in Muslim societies only. This finding comes in contrast to what has been found in other non-Muslim countries (mainly Christian countries), where the left is more likely to be associated with fairness and justice values than the right.

The question that arises then is whether this link is true for all Muslims more broadly or whether it is specific to Muslim societies only? Findings lend empirical support to the latter. Only Muslims living in Muslim societies are more likely to endorse justice value and be right-wing-oriented. People who identify as Muslims and live in non-Muslim countries are more likely to be to the left rather than the right (though the result is not statistically significant). Being able to look at the two subsamples of Muslims reveals an important consequence for the study of values: values are not only shaped by individuals' religious beliefs, but they are also a product of the social and political environment in which they are structured and employed. This result corroborates existing studies documenting that people are more likely to endorse the values around them and these values are socially constructed and reinforced (Connors, 2020; Lupton et al., 2015).

There are many possible explanations for the association between embracing justice and right-wing orientation among people living in Muslim societies. While it is impossible to test with certainty the causal process at work given the available data, it is useful to consider a few important mechanisms relevant to the literature on religion and politics in the region.

The first possible mechanism that was supported by the results in this chapter, emphasizes the role of political oppression in shaping people's values. In several Muslim countries, opposition groups, and more specifically Islamist opposition parties, are censured and banned from politics. Political oppression directed towards opposition parties conditions the link between endorsing justice and being to the right in Muslim societies. A second potential mechanism also supported by the results, is a belief in Islamist political authority as a type of government capable of achieving justice in Muslim societies. In his famous work "Making Democracy Work," [Putnam et al. \(1994\)](#) makes a similar argument about medieval Italian cities, and notes that people were more concerned with the "city of God" than with the "city of man." In Muslim countries, Islam plays an important role by providing answers and guiding rules on how to achieve justice in society, how to organize society more fairly, and how to avoid injustices. Therefore, by emphasizing justice values, contemporary Islamist parties are appealing to people who believe in the role of Islamist political authority in pursuing fairness and establishing a just order. These findings are consistent with prior evidence documenting that Islamist parties and movements tend to be more favorable than the alternatives because of their reputation for good governance and pursuit of justice ([Cammett & Luong, 2014](#); [Isani, 2019](#)). Most importantly, this chapter goes beyond political ideology and studies the link between values and voting behavior. Results show that justice is not only associated with right-wing ideology but also with voting for Islamist parties in Muslim countries. The findings further show that political oppression is not the only explanation. In countries where the religious political authority is contested (King vs. religious parties), it is harder to establish this link.

In short, this chapter carries several important implications for the comparative study of value-based cleavages. First, the link between values and political ideology can shift by changing the religious and political context. Values are emphasized differently in different religions based on their salience and importance for various religious groups. They are also used differently by different political actors. In the Muslim world, cues about justice

and fairness emanate from oppressed Islamist parties and movements, whereas in Christian countries, they are more likely to emanate from liberal and left-wing parties and candidates. This finding further lends support to a large body of work on the power of moral cues in political language (Bos & Minihold, 2022; Frimer, 2019; Simonsen & Widmann, 2023; Sterling & Jost, 2018). Furthermore, the findings from this chapter shed some light on the study of Muslim societies – a group either overlooked or “essentialized” in comparative politics and cross-cultural research. Only recently, public opinion firms started incorporating other non-WEIRD countries into their repository of data (Mehrez et al., 2023; Henrich, 2020). As a result, little comparative work is done on Muslim societies, particularly studies with a comparative cross-national focus. For example, the 5th wave of the WVS included only a handful of Muslim countries which renders the cross-national comparison very limited.

Finally, and most importantly, the findings have real policy implications when it comes to understanding public opinion towards Islamist parties and groups. In most of the Arab-Muslim world, Islamists have won national elections at times when scholars least predicted it. For instance, scholars were surprised by the popularity of Islamist parties both in Tunisia and Egypt in the elections that followed the 2011 mass uprisings (Knickmeyer, 2011). This study highlights the importance of values and shows that values matter not only for people but also for parties who use them as a mobilization tool to shape public opinion.

3 When Right is Left: Values and Voting

Behavior in Tunisia

خلقت طليقا كطيف النسيم، و حرا كنور الضحى في سماه.

You were created free like a breeze, unchained like the light of the morning in the sky. (Abou-El-Kacem Chebbi, 1933)

3.1 Introduction

Having demonstrated the variation of value endorsement across religions and the importance of contextual factors, a more detailed assessment of individual cases is required to check on the cross-national comparison. This chapter applies my value-based theory to an important case from the Arab-Muslim world, that of Tunisia. I argue that the adoption of state secularism following independence which in turn led to the rise of Islamist opposition movements, has solidified the value-based cleavage. Using an original representative face-to-face survey collected right after the 2019 Tunisian elections, I test whether values determine citizens' voting behavior in both parliamentary and presidential elections. In line with the theory and

previous findings, the evidence suggests that people who endorse justice-liberty values are more likely to vote for right-wing Islamist parties. This chapter illuminates new findings that were not revealed in the preceding chapter. It shows that people who endorse authority-nationalist values are more likely to vote for left-wing secular parties.

The 2011 uprisings that swept several countries in the Arab world challenged decades of works on “Arab exceptionalism” or the “Arab anomaly” (Diamond, 2010; Stepan & Robertson, 2003, 2004). These unprecedented protests led to a renewal of the literature on the MENA region, with a focus on public opinion surveys that study protest behavior, youth political engagement, and voting behavior (Blackman & Jackson, 2021; Hoffman & Jamal, 2014, 2012; Mansouri, 2022). Despite the unexpected and interesting results of some elections that took place in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, very little research has been conducted on partisanship and voting behavior in the Arab world (Ozen, 2020, 2018). This chapter begins filling this gap by examining what explains voting behavior in Tunisia, the only country that held several free and fair elections in the post-Arab Spring period (Masoud, 2018).

In seeking to explain differences in voting behavior in Western democracies, scholars have often appealed to the value-based cleavage, that is, to the idea that values are good predictors of voting behavior. People who endorse authoritarian values tend to lean towards right-wing parties or candidates, whereas people who endorse justice, equality, and freedom values tend to lean towards left-wing parties or candidates. Evidence for value-based-voting has been found in the UK (Kaufman, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2021), Europe (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000), the US (Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Crawford et al., 2013; Franks & Scherr, 2015), and even Latin-America (Cohen & Smith, 2016). However, studies on party politics in the MENA region have provided some evidence that the relationship between values and political preferences might not hold. Leftist politicians’ discourses tend to emphasize values such as nationalism and authoritarianism - typically associated with the right in Western democracies - whereas traditional right-wing

politicians tend to emphasize the values of freedom and justice – often associated with left-wingers in the West (Gold, 2012; Aydogan & Slapin, 2015).

This chapter assesses whether the relation between values and voting for the left and the right that is observed in the West also holds in Tunisia. The contribution of this article is threefold: First and most importantly, this study allows researchers to examine value-based voting differences beyond WEIRD societies (Henrich, 2020). Studies have been increasingly challenging the generalizability of mainstream political and psychological trends to non-Western societies (Aydogan & Slapin, 2015; Dinas & Northmore-Ball, 2020; Tavits & Letki, 2009; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2020). For example, Pop-Eleches & Tucker (2020) show that exposure to communism is associated with left-authoritarian attitudes in post-communist countries. Similarly, this paper shows that value-based voting in the Arab world differs from what is observed in advanced democracies. Second, it helps better understand the political dynamics in the Arab world and develop more robust predictions about future elections in Tunisia and beyond. Finally, given the limited access to quantitative data in the Arab world, previous works studying political cleavages have been mainly limited to political parties' discourses or experts' surveys as their data sources. To the best of my knowledge, this article is the first to explore the link between values and voting behavior using post-election survey data from a representative sample of ordinary Arab citizens collected by a professional polling agency in a face-to-face context. It is also original in studying an Arab country and not just a Muslim-majority country such as Turkey.

The chapter begins by analyzing the role of value-based cleavages in influencing voting behavior. Based on the literature on Arab politics, I test several hypotheses regarding value-based voting during the 2019 Tunisian parliamentary and presidential elections. Then, I briefly present some background information on the case study of Tunisia and outline the data and methods used. Results from the value-based cleavages show that the relationship between values and voting does not hold in Tunisia: people who endorse liberty and justice are more likely to vote for traditional right-wing than for leftist parties, while those who

endorse authority and nationalist values are more likely to vote for left-wing rather than for right-wing parties. Finally, I discuss the results and examine the significance of the findings for the literature on Arab politics and the broader political science literature.

3.2 The Literature on Structural Cleavages and Value-Based Cleavages

Before examining structural and value-based cleavages, it is important to explain what I take to define the left and the right. While the literature often calls “left-wing” those who support economic redistribution and “right-wing” those who oppose it, in this paper I focus on another important dimension of the contrast between the left and the right, viz., the tension between tradition and progress (Lakoff, 2016; Bobbio, 1997; Jost et al., 2008; Muller, 2020). The right has been often associated with emphasizing traditional views, supporting the status quo, and looking back to the past. These ideas can be found for instance in the classical works of Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, and Jean Laponce. For conservatives, radical change is seen as dangerous and a return to traditional social and moral norms is preferred. The left has often been associated with supporting social change, embracing progressive views, and challenging the supremacy of religious groups and institutions. These ideas can be found among classical Enlightenment thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Paine, and John Jacques Rousseau. The current divide between the left and the right remains rooted in the tension between progress and tradition (Jost, 2021; Levin, 2020).

To understand who votes left and who votes right, scholars have relied on the structural and value-based cleavage literature. The structural cleavage literature shows that people from lower social economic status appear more likely to vote for left-wing parties, while people from upper and middle classes are more likely to vote for right-wing parties (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Grumm, 1958). Religious individuals also appear more likely to vote for a right-wing party, whereas less religious ones appear more likely to support left-wing candidates or policies

(Nieuwbeerta, 1996; Lijphart, 1979). Others have argued that individual values are important to understand electoral behavior – also known as “the value-based cleavage” (Feldman, 2003; Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt, 1994; Jost et al., 2009; Stubager, 2008, 2010; Enyedi, 2008).

It is common in this literature to distinguish several clusters of values taken to be relevant for voting behavior (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt, 1994). A first cluster, often labeled “post-materialism/libertarianism,” includes personal and political freedom, equality, tolerance, environmental protection, and respect and tolerance for minorities. A second cluster, often labeled “authoritarianism” encompasses concerns about security, order, law, as well as respect for authority, discipline, and customs. Freedom and hierarchy have been considered as central to the first and second cluster of values respectively (Flanagan & Lee, 2003; Kitschelt, 2004). People with libertarian¹ values tend to endorse individual freedom, tolerance of others, equal treatment, and self-determination in social, economic, and political decisions. They show strong opposition to social and moral norms that are forced on others (Tetlock et al., 2000; Iyer et al., 2012). By contrast, people with authoritarian² views tend to endorse social hierarchy and respect for authority. They also place high importance on respect for authority, be it familial authority (parents, older people), social authority (community, group memberships), or national authority (military, political authority).

Evidence suggests these clusters of values influence voting behavior. People who endorse authoritarian values are more likely to vote for right-wing parties, whereas those who endorse libertarian values are more likely to support left-wing parties (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987). The moral values of the Moral Foundations Theory framework (Graham et al., 2009), have been linked to voting intentions (Iyer et al., 2012; Harper & Hogue, 2019; Sychev et al., 2020).

¹The term “libertarian” here does not refer to the political values associated with the political groups and the party that call themselves “libertarian” in the US. Rather, this paper follows Inglehart & Flanagan (1987) definition of libertarian values: being pro-equality, freedom, and justice.

²In the political-science literature, the word “authoritarianism” is conceptualized as individuals’ support for regime type (authoritarian regimes vs. democracy), whereas in political psychology the term is often synonymous with the “authoritarian personality” and denotes the tendency to endorse values such as authority, hierarchy, and social norms. This paper uses the latter definition.

In the US context, endorsing authoritarian values significantly predicted electoral decisions among American voters (Franks & Scherr, 2015; Cizmar et al., 2014). Another study from five Western European countries finds that individuals who score high on authoritarianism and nationalism are more likely to support right-wing populist parties (Dunn, 2015). Although these studies have been extremely important in understanding differences in political attitudes, they do not show the full picture.

3.3 Value-Based Cleavages in the Arab World

When it comes to the Arab region, empirical research on value-based cleavages is limited and often focuses on politicians' discourses rather than on the electorates. The existing studies from the MENA region suggest a different pattern from the one found in Western democracies. In their comparative analysis of Islamist parties in North Africa, Ghafar and Hess (2018) provide evidence that members of Islamist parties endorse values such as social justice and equality similar to those endorsed by Western leftist parties. In a content analysis of Turkish political discourses, Aydogan & Slapin (2015) show that leftist parties in Turkey emphasized words such as sovereignty, nationalism, and the military – which are often associated with the right in the West. Interestingly, right-wing parties in Turkey such as the Justice and Development Party used more words related to justice and freedom – topics often associated with the left in the West.

Linking secularists with authoritarianism on the one hand and Islamists with egalitarian and social justice values on the other is not new or uncommon among Middle Eastern scholars (Hussain, 1984; Wickham, 2002; Atiyeh, 1975; Dalacoura, 2016). Scholarly works have often associated the post-colonial Arab era with the rise of nationalist movements (such as the National Liberation Front in Algeria, the Destour Party in Tunisia, and the Istiqlal Party in Morocco) led by nationalist Arab leaders. What these leaders have in common is fighting colonialism and building their post-independence states by stressing anti-imperialist

discourses and strengthening national identities. Using this rhetoric, they have also managed to reinforce authoritarian tendencies and political legitimacy. Such tendencies have received various labels, such as “secular nationalism” or “secular authoritarianism.” (Wickham, 2002).

When it comes to Islamists, their endorsement of freedom and justice values can be explained through two mechanisms. The first focuses on the role of authoritarian legacies in shaping Arabs’ political attitudes. Scholars argue that Islamist movements emerged to counter secular-nationalist forces and oppose the oppression by Arab nationalist leaders such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba (Jankowski & Gershoni, 1997; Salame, 1987). In his book *Making the Arab World*, Gerges (2018) argues that the history of the Arab world since the 1920s has been shaped by two competing ideologies, Arab nationalism and Islamism. The latter has emerged as a reaction to secular Arab nationalism and authoritarian tendencies against opposition movements. Islamists have condemned the injustices that were practiced against them and fought for more justice and equal treatment in political, social, and economic matters.

The second mechanism focuses on the role of Islamic teachings³ in shaping values. Some scholars have argued that Islamists do not endorse freedom and justice just because of past oppression, but also because of the place of those values in Islamic teachings. It is not an accident that the leader of Ennahda Party, Rached Ghannouchi, wrote a book titled “Public Freedoms in the Islamic State” where he refers to freedom as the greatest value in Islam. Hoffman & Jamal (2014) also show that given the numerous references to social justice value in Islam, Qur’an readers are more sensitive to injustices by their authoritarian regimes, therefore, they are more motivated to engage in protest behavior. Ciftci (2019, 2022) argues that justice is “the most significant value in Islam’s ethicopolitical system. Therefore, the conception of justice will play a significant role in shaping Muslim political attitudes, whether authoritarian or democratic.” (p.3) Similarly, Abou El Fadl (2004) argues that human beings

³Islamic teachings can emanate from two main sources: the religious clerics (religious education, Friday sermons) and Islamist movements. Both the clerics and the Islamist groups can be considered as sources of Islamic values.

are the vicegerents of God on earth and are therefore responsible for making the world a just place. God is referred to as the “Just” and acts according to what is right. When creating the universe, God has assigned men to be the vicegerents of God on earth. As the representative of God on earth, man must fulfil a mission and a responsibility granted to him, that is maintaining a just world and prohibiting inequality. Freedom is also a core principle in Islam and is understood as the divinely appointed responsibility of men to make the right choices. Man in this sense is free, to fulfil God’s mission and behave justly. In the words of [Reda \(2019\)](#), “neither freedom nor justice is meaningful in the absence of the other.” (p. 902)

Herein lies the paradox of Arabs’ value endorsement. Colonialism has contributed to the emergence of a new ideology: nationalism mainly endorsed by Arab secular leaders who, post-independence, took control of their states. In turn, the rule of nationalist authoritarian leaders contributed to the emergence of Islamist opposition groups. These groups have condemned the oppression exercised by nationalist forces and called for a return to Islamic values. Without considering these contextual factors, one cannot fully understand the differences in value endorsement between Arab and Western voters.

I explore the link between values and voting behavior in Tunisia. Two major reasons make Tunisia an ideal case study to examine this link. First, three free and fair elections have been held since 2011. The existence of multiple election cycles makes it possible to test how individuals make their vote choice in light of the existing parties. Finally, its competitive party system makes the comparison to Western democracies more accurate and meaningful.

3.4 Brief Overview of Tunisian Politics

The battle between Islamists and secular-nationalist forces has been shaping Tunisian politics since the mid-20th century. Habib Bourguiba was the first President of post-independence Tunisia. Like several other Arab leaders, he endorsed nationalism and secularism. He was a French-educated leader, who was influenced by the left in France and believed in

modernization and secularization as the best paths for post-Tunisia independence. His politics and style became known as “Bourguibism.” For example, he abolished Islamic courts and replaced them with civic ones. He initiated a series of social reforms such as giving women the right to divorce and outlawing polygamy and forced marriage (Khedher, 1956). Because of his progressive policies, he was challenged and opposed by Islamists. Rached Ghannouchi rejected the endorsement of secular values and created an opposition Islamist movement in 1981 called “the Islamic Tendency Movement” (later known as “Ennahda movement”). Ghannouchi perceived secularization as a “colonizing project” and a “process of gradually removing religious influences from public life (Tamimi, 2001). The movement showed strong opposition through protests, riots, and violent acts during both Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s regimes. However, the movement was suppressed and banned from political life for several decades (Boulby, 1988). Post the 2011 uprisings, the once-banned Ennahda became a legal political party. During the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, newly formed secular-nationalist parties such as Nidaa Tounes, Tahya Tounes, and Congress for the Republic were competing against the Islamist Ennahda party, particularly during the 2011 and 2014 elections. The secular-Islamist cleavage has been central to explaining voting behavior in Tunisia (Anderson, 2014; Ozen, 2020).

3.5 Hypotheses

In this article, I examine the determinants of voting behavior among Arab citizens by focusing on the structural and value-based cleavage literature. Specifically, I test whether, with regard to their values, right-wing Islamists resemble more left-wing Western voters, and leftists resemble more right-wing Western voters. Based on the widely used core definition of left and right (tradition vs. progress), I call the Islamists right-wing and the secularists left-wing. This classification is used by the parties who refer to themselves by those labels, by journalists

in local and foreign media, as well as scholarly works (POMED report 2019).⁴

Structural cleavages have received a lot of attention among scholars working on the region. With regard to class voting, a large and influential body of literature argues that Islamist parties' political advantage in elections is due to their welfare programs and economic assistance to poor segments of the population. Poor citizens appear more likely to support right-wing Islamist parties because of welfare provisions provided through Islamist networks and NGOs (Bayat, 2002; S. Ismail, 2001; Hamzeh, 2001; Alterman, 2000). Masoud (2014) shows that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt managed to attract people from lower socio-economic status using service provisions such as health care, education, and financial aid. Islamic social welfare provisions have not been limited to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but are a common feature of Islamist parties and movements across the region such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Refah in Turkey (Bayat, 2002). However, other studies suggest that the size of the charity network affects the type of voters the Islamist movements attract. In countries with limited Islamist charities such as the Maghreb countries, Islamist voters have higher educational attainment and are less likely to be unemployed than other voters (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015).

With regards to religion, more religious individuals appear more attracted to right-wing Islamist parties in some studies. In the 2014 Tunisian elections, individuals who read the Quran and prayed more were more likely to vote for the Islamist Ennahda party than for secular left-wing parties such as Nidaa Tounes, Popular Front, and Afek Tounes (Berman & Nugent, 2015). However, in a study of the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections in Egypt, personal religiosity did not influence voting behavior in contrast to attitudes towards the role of religion in politics (Ozen, 2018). Support for secularization, and not weaker personal religiosity, decreased the likelihood of voting for the Islamist Freedom and Justice party instead of secular forces such as the Egyptian Bloc or Al-Wafd.

⁴POMED offers a classification of Tunisian parties that participated in the 2019 parliamentary elections based on parties' programs and leaders. The document was designed with the help of experts working extensively on Tunisian politics. Retrieved from: https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Tunisia_2019_Parliamentary_Election_Guide.pdf, accessed 08.10.2022

Based on this literature, I test five main hypotheses. First, I do not expect poor segments of the population to vote for Islamists in countries where Islamists' charity networks are limited such as Tunisia (Pellicer & Wegner, 2015). Instead, I hypothesize that lower socio-economic status is positively correlated with voting for left-wing parties and left-wing candidates (H1). We have seen that religiosity appears to play an important role in shaping voting behavior. On this basis, I predict that greater religiosity is positively correlated with a greater probability of voting for right-wingers (H2). Because religiosity does not necessarily mean a higher probability to vote for Islamists, as Ozen's study shows, in this article, I also test for the secular-Islamist cleavage⁵ as a potential factor shaping voting behavior. To disentangle the concept of secular-Islamist cleavage on the one hand and values on the other, I define the latter as the set of broad beliefs that direct people in everyday issues and the former as the set of attitudes about the role of Islam in politics.

In general terms, I hypothesize that we will see evidence of value-based voting among Tunisians (H3). Although MENA countries are often described as conservative patriarchal societies, Tunisia has been considered the exception or, using Masri's expression, "an Arab anomaly" (Masri, 2017). Tunisia has often been portrayed as a progressive and liberal country with regard to women's rights, individual freedom, and civil liberties compared to its neighbors (Tessler et al., 1978a,b). Given the level of modernization and emancipation the country has reached since its independence, I expect to find evidence of value-based voting among Tunisians. Finally, I predict that the relationship observed in the West between authoritarian vs. liberty/justice orientations and voting behavior will be reversed in Tunisia (Aydogan & Slapin, 2015; Dalacoura, 2016; Wickham, 2002; Gerges, 2018). In accordance with the literature on the historical legacies of political parties and state-building in the Arab world, Arab voters are expected to differ from Western voters in terms of value endorsement and voting behavior. Given that in Tunisia leftist parties have always emphasized the values of authority, nation, and sovereignty, I expect voters for the left to also endorse these values.

⁵I estimate the value and secular-Islamist cleavage factors in separate models to show the independent effect of each (see Tables B.7-10 Appendix B).

Similarly, Islamists have always emphasized equality, freedom, and social justice in their political agendas, and I expect voters who endorse these values to be more likely to support Islamist parties or candidates. Unlike in the West, espousing authority values should be positively correlated with voting for leftist parties or candidates (H4), whereas espousing freedom, equality, and social justice should be positively correlated with voting for right-wing parties (H5).

3.6 Data and Methods

This paper relies on a nationally representative dataset⁶ collected in December 2019 via face-to-face Tablet Assisted Interviews by One to One for Research and Polling. Participants (N = 1000) were Tunisian citizens aged 18 and above. Tunisia is divided into 24 governorates. The sampling frame was created on the basis of the last (2014) census in Tunisia conducted by the National Institute of Statistics. In order to obtain a representative sample of the population, a stratified multi-stage sample was used. First, Tunisia was divided into 46 primary sampling units (PSUs), an urban and rural area of all governorates. A total of 46 PSU were selected using the proportional to size method (Tunis and Monastir are 100% urban yielding 46 total instead of 48). Within those 46 PSUs, 125 Enumeration Areas (EAs) were selected also using the same method. In each of the EAs, 8 households were systematically drawn following a skip interval of households. Then, respondents were selected using random selection with the Kish table. From one house to another, the interviewer alternated between male and female. Participants were 50% women and 50% men. Since the focus of this study is on voters,⁷ the analysis only included people who went to vote during the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections (See Table B.1 for additional descriptive statistics, Appendix B).

Participants were first asked the value preferences questions, then their vote choice during

⁶The data and replication files are available at: <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/4XJAOA>

⁷Full analysis including voters and non-voters is available in Tables B.3-4 Appendix B. The results remain the same.

the 2019 elections, and finally the socio-demographic questions. All questions were in Tunisian Arabic. The questionnaire was translated and then back-translated. Previous works have focused on developing an occupational schema to measure class (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). Since such a measure is not available in the dataset, I used the net household income as a proxy for social class. Individuals were asked to choose one of eight options about net income⁸ (Less than 500 dt, up to 5000 dt). To measure participants' level of religiosity, respondents were asked how often they pray on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = never and 5 = every day). Participants were also asked to self-identify on a 7-point secular-Islamist scale (1= extremely secular, 7 = extremely Islamist). They were also asked about their age, their milieu (0=rural, 1=urban), and their gender (0=female and 1=male).

To measure values, I used two sets of items⁹ for two main dimensions:¹⁰ authority-nationalist¹¹ value orientation and liberty-justice value orientation (see Online Appendix A). For the authority value orientation, participants were asked how much they agree or disagree (1= strongly disagree, 6= strongly agree) with statements related to obedience to orders (“If I were a soldier and disagree with my commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty”), teaching authority to children (“Respect for authority is something all children need to learn”), and being proud of one’s country’s history (“I am proud of my country’s history”). For the liberty-justice value orientation, participants were asked how relevant to them (1=not at all relevant, 6= extremely relevant) respect for private property is (“whether or not private property was respected”), individual liberty (“whether or not everyone was free to do as they wanted”), equal treatment (“whether or not some people

⁸1 USD equals approximately 3.04 Tunisian Dinars. The minimum wage in Tunisia is around 365,732 TND per month (USD 112.5). Retrieved from: <http://www.social.tn/index.php?id=48>, accessed on 06.10.2022

⁹These items were designed in a way to solely measure value endorsement and avoid any confusion with issue positions or political views.

¹⁰Items are taken from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire of Graham et al. (2011) and are factor analyzed to ensure internal validity of the measurements (See Table B.2 Appendix B for full exploratory factor analysis). Weak items and cross-loadings were removed from the model. Out of 14 items, eight are kept with acceptable model fit (CFI = 0.98; TLI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.026).

¹¹To avoid confusing “authoritarianism” with regime type, I use the label “authority-nationalist” to refer to values.

were treated differently from others”), denial of rights (“whether or not someone was denied his or her rights”), and acting unfairly (“whether or not someone acted unfairly”). A mean score was created from each set of variables to create an authority-nationalism value score and a liberty-justice one for each participant.

Finally, one of the most problematic issues in electoral studies concerns the issue of overreporting. When asked about vote choice, respondents who did not vote tend to claim that they did vote because of several factors well studied in the election-study literature, such as the social desirability bias (Presser, 1990) and memory failure (Tanur, 1992). This paper followed the approach of Belli et al. (1999), which uses statements that make participants aware that they might misremember their voting choices and scrutinize their memories for information associated with voting to reduce overreporting.¹² (See Appendix B)

3.6.1 Dependent variables

In order to produce a suitable classification of parties, I classified the Tunisian parties into five main party families (See Table 3.1). The five party categories¹³ are as follows: the first category consists of right-wing Islamist parties that either have an Islamist background or clearly make reference to Islam in their discourses. The second category contains Qalb Tounes Party, which labeled itself as a center-left party during the 2019 electoral campaign. This party had the second highest share of votes in the elections and is classified as a distinct category. The party is also known to be the “party of the poor” because of the charitable work that the leader of the party, Nabil Karoui, was able to do through his popular Nessma TV channel. The third category consists of secular-nationalist parties that identify with Bourguibism. The fourth category are the social democrats, who differ from secular nationalists for being

¹²The sample of voters for the parliamentary and presidential elections is 423 and 485 respectively (including those who answered refuse to answer, and I don’t know). Survey data matches the turnout results of the official elections held in 2019. The real turnout rate in the parliamentary elections was 41.7% while in the survey it is 42.3%. The turnout rate in the actual presidential elections (round 1) was 48.9% while in the survey it reached 48.5%. Retrieved from: <https://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/217/>, accessed on 05.02.2022

¹³Center-left, secular-nationalist, and social democrat are treated as left-wing parties and referred to as such in the paper.

more leftist on economic issues. The fifth and last category are the parties/lists that ran as independents.

Table 3.1: Party Families and Political Parties

| Party label | Party family | Parties | Count (in the survey) |
|-------------|----------------------|--|-----------------------|
| 1 | Islamist parties | Ennahda, Dignity Coalition, Errahma, Tayar Al Mahaba | 111 |
| 2 | Center left | Kalb Tounes | 94 |
| 3 | Secular nationalists | Free Constitutional Party, AMAL party, Nidaa Tounes, Machrou Tounes, and Tahya Tounes. | 36 |
| 4 | Social democrats | Popular Front, People's Movement, Social Democratic Path, Democratic Current | 46 |
| 5 | Independent lists | Independent lists, Nahnou laha (list of safi said), List tomorrow is better, One hand list, Another Tunisia is possible list, Hope and Work independent list, Successful Sidi bouzid list. | 23 |

The presidential election candidates were also classified into five categories (Table 3.2): the first group includes the right-wing candidates. The second category is center-left and includes the center-left candidate Nabil Karoui. The third category consists of secular-nationalist candidates. The fourth category includes the social democrats, and the fifth category consists of independent candidates.

Table 3.2: Presidential Candidates Categories

| Candidate label | Candidate categories | Candidates | Count (in the survey) |
|-----------------|----------------------|---|-----------------------|
| 1 | Right wing | Seifeddine Makhoulouf, Abdelfattah Mourou, Lotfi Mrayhi, Hechmi Hamdi, Hamadi Jebali, Mehdi Jomaa | 30 |
| 2 | Center left | Nabil Karoui | 99 |
| 3 | Secular nationalists | Moncef Marzouki, Youssef Chahed, Abir Mousi, Said Aydi | 58 |
| 4 | Social democrats | Mohammed Abbou, Hamma Hammami | 19 |
| 5 | Independent | Kais Said, Safi Said, Abdelkarim Zbidi | 209 |

3.6.2 Multinomial regression

To test whether value-based cleavages influence voting behavior, data were analyzed by means of a multinomial logit analysis. Multinomial regression requires the dependent variable to be a nominal variable (e.g., vote choice). The dependent variable is the log of the odds of choosing

a specific party/candidate over the reference party/candidate. Two separate models were built: one for the parliamentary and another for the presidential election. For the parliamentary elections, Islamist parties were chosen to be the reference category because they are the only right-wing parties in the classification of Tunisian parties. For the 2019 presidential elections, right-wing candidates were chosen to be the reference category. Independence of Irrelevant Alternative Assumption (IIA)¹⁴ was tested in both models using the Hausman-McFadden Test and shown to be non-violated (Dow & Endersby, 2004).

3.7 Results


3.7.1 Parliamentary Elections Vote Choice

Results of the model for the parliamentary election are reported in Table 3.3. Since multinomial logit models are non-linear, only significance and the sign of the coefficients can be interpreted. Therefore, odds ratios, marginal effects, and predicted probabilities are used to interpret the results. Consistent with the third hypothesis, Table 3.3 shows that both structural and value-based cleavages are significant predictors. Prayer and income are significant predictors of voting behavior. Consistent with the first hypothesis, income is a significant predictor of voting for the center-left party Qalb Tounes, but not the other left-wing categories. A unit increase in income decreases the odds of voting for the center-left party compared to Islamists by 41%. In other words, voters of Qalb Tounes have lower income levels than voters of Islamist parties. Moreover, consistent with the second hypothesis, a unit increase in the level of religiosity decreases the odds of voting for the center-left party, versus voting for Islamists by 43%. Likewise, as religiosity increases, the odds of voting for secular-nationalist parties versus voting for Islamists decreases by 28%.

To obtain a more intuitive understanding of these results, the predicted probabilities for

¹⁴IIA test checks whether an individual's choice depends on the characteristics of the other alternative choices.

Figure 3.1: Predicted probabilities of parliamentary vote choice across the range of Prayer



the Islamist and center-left outcome categories across the range of the prayer variable are presented in Figure 3.1. As we move from never praying to praying every day, the predicted probability of voting for an Islamist party increases by almost 30%. The opposite trend is observed for the Center-left party: the predicted probability of voting for this party decreases by 41% as religiosity decreases. Control variables such as age, gender, and the secular-Islamist self-identification measure are also significant. A unit increase in age increases the odds of voting for center-left vs. voting for Islamists by 59%. Women are more likely to vote for the center-left party than for Islamists and men are more likely to vote for Islamists than for center-left. People who self-identify as secularists are more likely to vote for secular-nationalist parties or social democrats vs. Islamist parties. When it comes to the value-based cleavage, both the authority-nationalist values and liberty-justice values are significantly predictive. A unit increase in authority values increases the odds of voting for the center-left party compared to Islamist parties by 74%. Endorsing liberty-justice values decreases the odds of voting for the center-left and social democrats compared to voting for the Islamists by 41% and 37% respectively. To determine the effect of liberty-justice values on each of the vote choice categories, I plot its average marginal effect. Figure 3.2 shows the predicted

change in observing Islamist and center-left vote choice categories for a given change in the liberty-justice-value-orientation. Consistent with the fifth hypothesis, as people endorse more liberty-justice values, the probability of voting for the Islamists increases by 40% and decreases for the center-left by 33%. The difference can also be seen when comparing Islamists to social democrats (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.2: Average marginal effect with 95% confidence intervals of liberty-justice values on each of the Islamist and center-left vote choices




Figure 3.3: Average marginal effect with 95% Confidence intervals of liberty-justice values on each of the Islamist and social democrat vote choices




Table 3.3: Multinomial Logit Model (Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, reference category = Islamists, Log Likelihood = -348.7, Pseudo $R^2(McFadden) = 0.13$)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|--|--------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) | 5 (Independent) |
| Secular-Islamist | -0.045 (0.111) | -0.334*** (0.120) | -0.254** (0.111) | 0.032 (0.176) |
| Income | -0.518*** (0.168) | -0.270 (0.182) | -0.053 (0.154) | 0.076 (0.183) |
| Age | 0.468*** (0.150) | 0.170 (0.179) | 0.061 (0.162) | -0.421* (0.245) |
| Milieu | 0.761** (0.356) | 0.388 (0.448) | -0.155 (0.432) | 0.509 (0.525) |
| Prayer | -0.573*** (0.122) | -0.325** (0.143) | -0.106 (0.145) | -0.146 (0.170) |
| Gender | -0.941** (0.368) | 0.037 (0.462) | -0.461 (0.411) | 0.304 (0.583) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.559** (0.238) | 0.478 (0.298) | -0.070 (0.221) | -0.065 (0.272) |
| Liberty-justice values | -0.519*** (0.181) | -0.041 (0.234) | -0.459** (0.212) | -0.417 (0.272) |
| Constant | 0.488 (1.730) | -0.977 (2.154) | 3.582** (1.725) | 0.821 (2.221) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 769.482 | 769.482 | 769.482 | 769.482 |
| <i>Note:</i> | | | * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ | |

3.7.2 Presidential Elections Vote Choice

Structural and value-based cleavages are again significant predictors of voting behavior for the presidential election (Table 3.4). A unit increase in religiosity corresponds to a decrease in the odds of a center-left vote versus a right-wing vote by about 37%. Figure 3.4 shows the predicted probabilities of voting for right-wing and center-left candidates across the range of Prayer. Unlike in the previous model, the predicted probability of voting for right-wing candidates during the presidential elections barely increases as religiosity increases. However, the predicted probability of voting for the center-left candidate Nabil Karoui increases by 30% as religiosity decreases. There is also a 20% increase in the probability of voting for an independent candidate as religiosity increases, though this result is not significant (Figure 3.5). When it comes to income, having a lower income increases the odds of voting for center-left than for right-wing candidates by 50%.


Age and secular-Islamist self-identification are the only control variables predictive of voting for presidential candidates. Younger people were significantly more likely to vote for the independent candidate, Kais Saied, compared to right-wing candidates. Furthermore, people who self-identify as secularists were more likely to vote for secular-nationalists or social democrats compared to right-wingers (37% and 44% respectively). Among values, only authority-nationalism values are significant. In line with the fourth hypothesis, people who endorse authority-nationalism values are more than twice as likely to vote for secular-nationalist candidates than for right-wingers.

Because this article is only interested in voters, the previous analysis did not include those who did not vote or who refuse to answer. However, to make sure that the results did not depend on this restriction, an analysis including both voters and non-voters was conducted (Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B). No change in the results was observed. As a robustness check, I fit binomial logit models for each category separately against all other

Table 3.4: Multinomial Logit Model comparing leftist (2) and Independents (3) to right-wing candidates in the presidential election


| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) | 5 (Independent) |
| Secular-Islamist | -0.183 (0.153) | -0.420*** (0.155) | -0.568*** (0.182) | -0.196 (0.142) |
| Income | -0.678*** (0.201) | -0.203 (0.182) | 0.119 (0.224) | -0.311** (0.158) |
| Age | 0.352* (0.190) | -0.118 (0.198) | -0.111 (0.254) | -0.337** (0.168) |
| Milieu | 0.290 (0.465) | 0.292 (0.499) | -0.445 (0.727) | 0.201 (0.427) |
| Prayer | -0.450** (0.178) | -0.204 (0.182) | 0.016 (0.240) | -0.122 (0.163) |
| Gender | -0.758 (0.467) | 0.695 (0.496) | 0.451 (0.651) | 0.405 (0.416) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.462* (0.263) | 0.821*** (0.315) | -0.066 (0.333) | 0.434* (0.222) |
| Liberty-justice values | -0.201 (0.222) | 0.101 (0.244) | -0.175 (0.323) | 0.054 (0.209) |
| Constant | 2.384 (2.072) | -1.267 (2.316) | 3.539 (2.623) | 1.951 (1.861) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 931.867 | 931.867 | 931.867 | 931.867 |
| <i>Note:</i> | | | * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ | |

Figure 3.4: Predicted probabilities of presidential vote choice across the range of Prayer



categories (Tables B.5 and B.6 Appendix B). Despite slight differences, results are consistent with findings from the multinomial logit models. Lastly, when conducting other tests such as grouping all left-wing parties together and excluding the independent category, the results remain the same (Tables B.11-14, Appendix B).

Figure 3.5: Predicted probabilities of presidential vote choice across the range of Prayer



3.8 Discussion

The present article sought to study the determinants of voting behavior during the 2019¹⁵ parliamentary and presidential elections in Tunisia. I examine one main question: whether the relation between values and voting for the left and right that is observed in Western democracies also holds in Tunisia. First, using original post-election survey data, I examined the determinants of voting behavior using structural variables and value-based variables. As predicted, the value-based cleavage is an important predictor of voting during both elections (H3). People who endorse authority-nationalist values are more likely to vote for leftist parties and candidates (H4), whereas people who endorse liberty-justice values are more likely to vote for right-wing parties than leftists (H5). These results are robust even when including non-voters in both models, as well as when controlling for other covariates, such as gender, age, and milieu. It is important to note that the mechanism at play is not just the authoritarian legacies of past secular-nationalist regimes. While both Islamists and leftists were previously oppressed, only Islamist voters endorse the values of liberty and justice. I argue that endorsing justice and liberty is not associated with Islamists just because they were oppressed but also because of the importance of those values in Islamic teachings. Islam puts a great emphasis on these values, which have become important slogans in Islamist parties' discourses and have later been endorsed by Islamist voters.

In line with the literature on the traditional political cleavages, people from lower social classes are more likely to vote for the center-left party Qalb Tounes than for Islamist parties. Despite its importance, it is unclear whether this result shows that there is class-based voting in Tunisia. Income is not predictive of voting for any of the other left-wing parties such as

¹⁵The 2019 election differed in many ways from the two previous ones in 2011 and 2014. One of the changes that marked the pre-2019 period was the announcement by Ennahda Party that they were no longer advocating for political Islam. This decision comes after two political assassinations and mounting political turmoil. Ennahda also lost voters to a newly established Islamist party, "Dignity Coalition." However, the peculiarities of the 2019 elections do not undermine this paper's findings. In fact, the 2019 elections should be the most challenging test of my hypotheses. If despite all those changes we can still see a strong link between religiosity and voting for Islamists on the one hand and identifying as Islamist and voting for Islamists on the other, we can be more certain about the validity of the research design and about the results in this paper.

secular-nationalists and social democrats. Since Qalb Tounes Party has been known as the “party of the poor,” distributing resources and financial aid to people in marginalized parts of the country, the mechanism at play might not be class-based voting but rather patronage or vote-buying. Thus, hypothesis 1 cannot be further tested without data examining the exact mechanism. Moreover, results are consistent with the second hypothesis: More religious individuals are significantly more likely to vote for Islamist parties than for leftist parties. While previous studies do not find an effect of personal piety on voting behavior (Ozen, 2018), in this study both individual religiosity and secular-Islamist self-identification are significant predictors of voting behavior. This result suggests that in addition to the secular-Islamist ideological divide, individual-level religiosity plays a role in organizing people’s choices in elections. Most importantly, the findings suggest that personal religiosity is particularly distinctive of the vote for Islamists, whereas the secular-Islamist cleavage is more relevant to leftist parties. In other words, people who vote for secular-nationalist parties might be making their choice because they are anti-Islamists. This is particularly true in Tunisian politics, where parties such as Nidaa Tounes in 2014 and the Free Destourian Party in 2019 have explicitly pursued an anti-Islamist agenda during their electoral campaigns.

3.9 Conclusion

The article thus provides two important contributions to the literature on Arab politics and comparative politics. First, the observed evidence for value-based voting shows that Arab citizens do not only rely on class or religion to choose their political representatives. Values also matter when making political choices and values-related differences are indeed found between the different left- and right-wing parties. It also indicates that the discussion of political behavior in Arab countries should move beyond the secular-Islamist divide and examine other dimensions that shape citizens’ electoral choices such as personal beliefs and values. Furthermore, the historical legacies of political parties in the Arab world and the

values emphasized in Islamic teachings help us explain why leftists endorse authority and nationalist values, whereas Islamists endorse justice and freedom values. This result also indicates that like psychologists, political scientists should be careful when generalizing findings from WEIRD societies.

Finally, while these results were found in the context of Tunisia, the link between values and voting behavior is generalizable to other Arab contexts. In countries with Islamist parties, Islamist voters should be more likely to endorse justice and freedom values than other non-Islamist voters because of what those values represent in the Qur'an and other religious books. We should also expect to see a stronger effect in countries where the state has been repressing religious groups because Islamist supporters are not only motivated by Islamic teachings but also react to repressive authoritarian tendencies. For instance, Islamist voters should be more likely to endorse these values in countries such as Algeria and Egypt than in countries like Morocco or Jordan where their Islamist parties have been, to some extent, enjoying political autonomy from the King and taking part in the general elections (García-Rivero & Kotzé, 2007; Wegner & Pellicer, 2009). Leftist voters should be more likely to endorse authority-nationalist values in countries where the secular-nationalist discourse is salient. Similarly, findings about the structural cleavage can also be generalized. Islamist parties should attract poor segments of the population in countries where they have large charity networks, whereas the link should be weaker in countries where the Islamist charity network is limited.

3.10 Future Research

As mentioned above, this study stresses the existence of value-based voting in Tunisia's post-2011 uprisings. The range of values examined is limited, and more work is necessary to explore a wider set of values and understand how these structure and shape political attitudes. Moreover, while the findings from this paper indicate that the value dimension is flipped in

the Arab world when compared with Europe and other Western countries, other dimensions of left and right were not tested for. Since the focus of this paper is on value-based voting, I did not examine how people vary with respect to other key dimensions distinguishing the left and the right such as economic issue preferences. Future research should study whether these other dimensions align with existing trends from the West. Last but not least, another important consideration for future research is the exogeneity of values: In other words, do values structure political preferences or do political preferences shape values? The best approach to answer the causal link between political behavior and values is with panel data or experiments.

4 Value-based Cleavages Among Tunisian Politicians: A Quantitative and Qualitative Text Analysis

“Everyone cares about fairness, but there are two major kinds. On the left, fairness implies equality, but on the right, it means proportionality.” (Jonathan Haidt – The Righteous Mind, 2012, p. 324)

4.1 Introduction

Previous chapters have demonstrated that values discriminate between ideologically different people. However, it is less clear whether value-based cleavages that characterize people also apply to the political elites. This chapter goes beyond mass public opinion and assesses my theory about value-based cleavages among the elites. I argue that value-based divides are also central in political communication and differences in moral language can be found among ideologically different politicians. Using a corpus of Tunisian politicians’ speeches collected between 2011 and 2014, I investigate whether politicians engage in moralized discourse. I conduct a quantitative and qualitative content analysis to gauge value appeals among two main leading parties: Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. For each of these parties, I look at the extent to which they moralize their political rhetoric by comparing them to each other.

In addition, I examine the context to which moral framing occurs for each of the parties. Consistent with my value-based theory, I show that speeches emanating from Ennahda Party are more likely to emphasize the discourse of justice, freedom, and equality, whereas speeches emanating from Nidaa Tounes Party are more likely to emphasize the discourse of authority, nation, and sovereignty.

4.2 Morality in Politics

Moral language has always been used to persuade, shape, and motivate the masses. Existing studies provide strong evidence of the role moralized political rhetoric plays in influencing public opinion (Lakoff, 2016; Mucciaroni, 2011; Shogan, 2007). Moral language, in particular, has received special attention given its strong ability to resonate with the public (Clifford & Simas, 2024; Voelkel & Feinberg, 2018; Graham et al., 2012). Scholars found that the moralization of political rhetoric via elite cueing and issue framing shapes a wide range of political attitudes, political behavior, elite preferences, and political polarization (Bos & Minihold, 2022; Garrett & Bankert, 2020; Hackenburg et al., 2023; Kraft, 2018; Wang & Inbar, 2021; Clifford, 2014).

Moral reasoning is shown to be instrumental in understanding a wide range of socio-political issues. In examining the moral underpinnings of ideology, Kraft (2018) investigates how people evoke moral language when they discuss everyday politics. Using open-ended questions, participants tended to use moral language even when not asked to explicitly do so. Nicoletti & Delehanty (2017) show that moralized issue policies, particularly those reflecting core values, are a powerful tool to predict people's political attitudes compared to non-moralized issue framing. In a study trying to understand not just whether morality matters in politics but also how it matters, Ryan (2014) shows that morally convicted individuals are more likely to hold antagonistic views about politics and express emotions of anger. In another study, he also shows that moralized attitudes induce opposition to compromise (Ryan,

2017).

4.3 Moral Language and Appeals

Given this extensive research about the role of morality in shaping attitudes and behaviors, scholars have shifted their focus to investigate the role of morality in political communication. In recent years, studies from political science and social psychology have significantly focused on politicians' use of moral language (Enke, 2020; Hackenburg et al., 2023; Kraft & Klemmensen, 2024; Mayer et al., 2019; Simonsen & Widmann, 2023). It is important to distinguish between "normative"¹ and "moral" claims. While moral values are concerns about what is morally right or wrong, normative claims refer to the standards that one ought and should follow. For instance, "you should not lie" is an example of a moral claim, whereas, "you should drive on the right side of the road" is an example of a normative claim. I define moral language² as a type of rhetoric in which questions about what is morally right and wrong are contested. This line of research suggests that political elites purposely engage in moralized discourse. They frame their policies to questions of "right" and "wrong" to persuade the public and try to change their attitudes. In the words of Nelson & Garst (2005): "Political leaders and policymakers who wish to persuade regularly draw on the power of value-based language. In the United States, supporters of affirmative action, for example, often appeal to egalitarian values by suggesting that society has an obligation to correct the effects of past discrimination, whereas opponents appeal to individualistic values by suggesting that every person should be judged without regard to race." (p. 489) Existing studies show that politicians' statements justified by moral language are more powerful and more likely to be perceived as sincere than pragmatic or extreme language (Clifford & Simas, 2024). In another work, Simonsen & Widmann (2023) investigate why parties tend to rely on moralized

¹Normative claims are often divided into several types: moral, conventional (you should say thank you when someone helps you), and prudential (you should wear appropriate clothes for work), among several other categories. This chapter is only concerned with the moral type of normative claims.

²Throughout this dissertation, I use "moral language," "moral discourse" and "moral rhetoric" interchangeably.

discourses. Looking at eight Western democracies, they show that political polarization is associated with an increase in moralized language among politicians. Most importantly, they show that all parties (whether centrist, extremist, government, or opposition) are equally likely to engage in moral discourse. Others find that the existence of moral rhetoric is at its highest during legislative periods (Clifford & Jerit, 2013).

One of the most influential frameworks for studying morality (whether moral values or moral language) has been the Moral Foundations Theory – MFT (Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 2009). The MFT has been extensively used to gauge ideological differences. It posits that there are five moral domains or “Foundations” that constitute human morality and moral judgment. The five foundations are as follows: Care/Harm, Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation.³ Given its popularity and relatively wide external validity, the MFT has been used to gauge elite moral appeals, particularly in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) countries (Clifford, 2014; Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Kraft, 2018; Kraft & Klemmensen, 2024; Neiman et al., 2016; Clifford et al., 2015).

A dictionary called the Moral Foundations Dictionary (MFD)⁴ has been developed from the MFT framework to specifically, gauge the five moral foundations present in language and speeches (Graham et al., 2009). Scholars have used it to study moral language among political elites (Dehghani et al., 2014). For instance, Clifford & Jerit (2013) analyzed op-eds related to stem-cell research from the New York Times and found that liberal authors were more likely to rely on the Harm Foundation than conservative authors. By contrast, conservatives relied on a purity discourse when discussing stem-cell research. Similarly, Hackenburg et al. (2023) studied moral rhetoric among US presidential candidates (2016-2020) and showed that Democratic candidates used more moral language related to care and fairness while Republicans used words related to loyalty, authority, and sanctity language. In another study

³Detailed description of the MFT and each of the foundations can be found in chapter 1.

⁴For the original MFD 1.0 version see Graham et al. (2009). For the enriched version MFD 2.0 see Frimer et al. (2017).

using 36 years of US congressional Records, [Wang & Inbar \(2021\)](#) found that Democrats used significantly more words related to the Care and Fairness Foundations than Republicans. Moreover, the MFD has gone through several refinements, resulting in newer versions in English and adaptations for analyzing non-English language corpora ([Carvalho et al., 2020](#); [Cheng & Zhang, 2023](#); [Garten et al., 2016](#); [Hopp et al., 2021](#); [Matsuo et al., 2019](#)). Scholars have not only focused on who emphasizes which moral value, but also the context in which these moral values are evoked. For instance, [Hackenburg et al. \(2023\)](#) show that parties in the US and the UK attach different meanings to the values they evoke in their discourses. Particularly, they show that, in the US, Democrats and Republicans significantly diverge in their use of words related to the Loyalty Foundation whereas in the UK semantic divergence is especially apparent in the Fairness Foundation.

The MFT is not the only framework that has been used to measure and gauge moral differences across the ideological spectrum. For instance, some scholars have relied on a socio-cultural dimension that became known as the Green-Alternative-Libertarian/ Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (GAL/TAN) cleavage ([Bos & Minihold, 2022](#); [Budde et al., 2018](#); [Hooghe et al., 2002](#); [Kriesi, 2010](#); [Polk et al., 2017](#)). While some studies do not yield fully consistent results with the MFT (for exceptions see, [Frimer \(2020\)](#); [Sterling & Jost \(2018\)](#)), the majority of moral-value frameworks yield consistent findings: ideological differences between liberals (left-wing oriented) and conservatives (right-wing oriented) are largely apparent in moral language where the former are more likely to emphasize care and fairness while the latter are more likely to highlight loyalty, authority, and sanctity values.

Together, these studies present an important contribution to the literature on moral rhetoric in political science, however, they are limited to WEIRD cultural contexts. Studies investigating moral appeals among politicians in non-WEIRD countries are limited ([Atari et al., 2020](#); [Cheng & Zhang, 2023](#)). While [Atari et al. \(2020\)](#) find no consistent results of the MFT framework among ordinary Iranians, they have not tested the moral underpinnings of ideology among the elites. This chapter aims to fill this gap, by addressing some of the

external validity issues related to the MFT framework and applying it to political speeches, particularly in an Arabic-language context: Tunisia. To the best of my knowledge, no systematic empirical analysis has been yet applied to Arabic corpora from the Arab world.

4.4 Tunisia During the Transition

To test my theory of value-based divides among politicians, I rely on politicians' speeches from Tunisia. Specifically, I focus on the political discourses of two leading parties during the 2011 and 2014 transitional period in Tunisia: Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. Before presenting the data and methods used for the analysis, it is important to understand the background of these political parties in Tunisia before and after the Arab Spring.

In the wake of the 2011 mass uprisings that swept the whole region, Tunisia entered a transitional phase marked by major political, economic, and security challenges. Despite these challenges, it managed to successfully transition towards democracy. Before the uprisings, Tunisia was ruled by two successive authoritarian dictators, Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, for around 55 years. Their regimes exercised severe state control over the people, political institutions, and opposition actors in order to remain in power. Under Habib Bourguiba, the state monopolized all sectors within the country (Sadiki, 2002). The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI)⁵, now known as Ennahda (Renaissance), emerged during the 1970s and was officially founded in 1981. It was one of the main opposition movements. The movement mounted a strong challenge to Bourguiba and his Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) as well as to Ben Ali's regime. The movement's activities were massively restricted; its members were no longer allowed to mobilize in mosques and their call to be a legally recognized entity was denied (Boulby, 1988). Ennahda ceased to exist under the repression of the Ben Ali regime, who executed several of its members and jailed many others. Rached Ghannouchi, the leader and founding member of Ennahda, fled the country and went into

⁵The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) later changed its label into "Ennahda Movement" – a label that does not contain any Islamic identification. For more information, see also <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8d40.html>, accessed on 10.01.2022.

exile. His return to Tunisia was only possible after the 2011 revolution.

Several parties celebrated the political opening and took part in the transitional phase. The leaders of the Islamist movement and many of its members came back from exile and established Ennahda as a legal political party. On October 23, 2011, a parliamentary election took place to elect the members of the National Constituent Assembly, in which Ennahda won over 40% of the popular vote (Murphy, 2013). Another 40% was won by some secular parties such as the Congress for the Republic (CPR), Progressive Democratic Party, People's Movement, and Ettakatol (also known as the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties). A Troika government, comprising the Islamist Ennahda and two secular parties (Ettakatol and CPR), was formed. However, this government was unable to agree on common grounds. Amid escalating tensions between secularists and Islamists, increasing unrest, and two political assassinations, the parties agreed on a government of national unity brokered by the National Dialogue Quartet in 2013.⁶ The once-banned Ennahda Party sought the political opening and transition as an opportunity to govern democratically, and never return to the “era of tyranny.”⁷ In their party platforms and slogans, they emphasized the need for transitional justice and called for freedom for all Tunisians who finally got emancipated from their authoritarian regimes.

As a reaction to the rise of the Islamist Ennahda Party both in parliament and in government, a new secular party was established by Beji Caid Essebsi in 2012: Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia). Essebsi was considered a politician from the ancient regime. He served as minister of interior (1965-1969) and foreign affairs (1981-1986) under Bourguiba and he was the president of the national assembly (1990-1991) under Ben Ali. Nonetheless, Essebsi was regarded as a Destourian⁸ technocrat and someone who opposed Ben Ali's corrupt regime.

⁶Four civil society organizations (the Tunisian General Labor Union, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts/ The Tunisian Human Rights League, and the Tunisian Orders for Lawyers) proposed a national dialogue as a solution to the political polarization and crisis. These organizations later won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.

⁷Rached Ghannouchi often used the expressions *زمن الاستبداد* (era of oppression) or *زمن الطاغية* (era of a tyrant) to denote the period under which Tunisia was under authoritarian rule.

⁸Destourian as reference to the PSD from Bourguiba's regime.

His party was believed to achieve secular reforms and bring back order and stability. Most importantly, Beji Caid Essebsi was often associated with Tunisia's founding father, Habib Bourguiba. Bourguiba not only brought independence to Tunisia but espoused liberal values: He established the first republic, emancipated women, giving them unique freedom in the Arab world and protecting their rights, and provided free and mandatory education to all Tunisians, among many other reforms. Nidaa Tounes leaders and members embraced this tradition, often calling themselves "Bourguibists." Nidaa Tounes emphasized its vision to bring back national unity, order, and respect for state sovereignty following the chaos that spread post-2011. Most importantly, Nidaa Tounes primarily campaigned on an anti-Islamist platform targeting the Ennahda party and its followers (Grewal & Hamid, 2020).

4.5 Hypotheses

To determine how politicians use moral appeals in their political communication, I focus on the discourses of the Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes parties during the transition phase (2011-2014). The selection of these two parties over this period was based on the following reasoning. First, the period spanning from 2011 to 2014 holds significant importance: it proceeded the country's first free and fair parliamentary elections. Moreover, Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes were the main leading parties with two opposite ideological views. The polarization along secular-Islamist lines was quite significant during the transition period, making it the focus of the election campaign. Second, despite being a relatively newer party compared to Ennahda, Nidaa Tounes emerged largely to counterbalance Ennahda's Islamist political agenda. Finally, as the main contenders, these parties spearheaded the electoral campaigns through their mobilization resources and platforms. Therefore, their speeches were more available and widespread on online platforms compared to other parties.

Based on the above strands of literature and the agenda of both parties, one shall expect

Tunisian parties to place different weights on the moral values they use in their political speeches. Specifically, Ennahda's moral values will significantly vary from Nidaa Tounes's. First given the centrality of justice and freedom in Islamist parties' discourses, one shall expect Ennahda Party to emphasize these values more than the left-wing Nidaa Tounes.

Hypothesis 1: Ennahda Party will rely more on words related to justice and fairness than the left-wing politicians.

Nidaa Tounes was a new party that emerged only in 2012 and embraced a "Bourguibist" ideology. Their party platform was dominated by security, order, and national sovereignty discourses. This party can also be compared to secular-nationalist parties from the Arab world.

Hypothesis 2: The secular Nidaa Tounes Party will rely more on words related to authority and sovereignty than the Islamist Ennahda.

When it comes to unpacking the mechanisms and explaining why justice is associated with Islamist parties rather than left-wing as is the case in Western countries, I test two main mechanisms: political oppression and the role of political Islam. On one hand, and given Ennahda's experience with oppression, imprisonment, and exclusion under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, one might expect the party to emphasize the discourse of justice, freedom, and equality. On the other, Islamist parties in general tend to use a justice discourse not just because of past oppression but also because of the significance of this value in Islamic teachings and the Sunna. Hence, one might expect justice words to be evoked in the contexts of oppression and religious discourse.

Hypothesis 3: Justice will be evoked together with the freedom and religion discourse among Ennahda speeches only.

When it comes to explaining the link between left-wing secular parties and nationalism, I argue that the legacy of secular nationalist parties will be also manifested in the discourses of

these parties. I shall expect Nidaa Tounes to heavily evoke the state and sovereignty words in line with its ideology about respect for authority.

Hypothesis 4: Authority will be linked to the nationalism discourse among Nidaa Tounes speeches only.

4.6 Data and Methods

Drawing upon the MFT, I explore the moral language politicians use in Tunisia. The MFT provides a good framework to test these questions for several reasons. First, the MFT has been tested and used by several scholars, in different contexts, using various methods (surveys, vignettes, dictionary) but has never been applied to an Arabic corpus yet. Moreover, the broad characterization of the five moral foundations allows us to explore several dimensions of morality.

4.6.1 Data

To test these hypotheses, I rely on the political speeches delivered by Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes between 2011 and 2014. The speeches were selected from online sources such as parties' websites, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels ($N = 198$). Because none of the available Tunisian archives or datasets contain speech transcripts of post-revolution leaders, Tunisian native speakers were assigned the task of listening to the videos and transcribing the speeches.⁹ To look at various forms of political discourses, this study examines four types of speeches: discourses delivered during the electoral campaign, discourses delivered for an international audience, press conferences, and finally declarations.¹⁰ The 198 speeches contain around 150,000 words, divided roughly equally between the two parties.

⁹This transcription was possible thanks to the generous funding from the Team Populism Project at CEU.

¹⁰Declarations are speeches delivered by the politician at his or her home/office, which are either streamed live or uploaded to social media channels.

4.6.2 Preparing the Corpus

Using R, the speeches were first cleaned and pre-processed using the *arabicStemR* package. This package allows the handling of alifs, removing Arabic stop words, Latin characters, and Arabic numbers (Nielsen, 2012). Once the speeches are pre-processed; they are turned into a corpus.¹¹ Table 4.1 shows the 10 most frequent words for each party.

Table 4.1: Top 10 most frequent words per party

| Ennahda | Nidaa Tounes |
|------------|--------------|
| Ennahda | God |
| People | State |
| Revolution | Government |
| Islam | Elections |
| Party | Assembly |
| Government | People |
| Democracy | President |
| Freedom | Revolution |
| Truth | Truth |
| Elections | Ennahda |

4.6.3 Methods

To gauge moral appeals in the political discourses of Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, I apply a mixed-method approach where I combine both quantitative and qualitative content analyses. The quantitative techniques include the use of dictionary-based approaches and word embeddings while the qualitative method employs in-depth thematic coding. The quantitative methods seek to address the following questions: how do moral appeals vary between the two parties? And what meaning do they attach to these moral values? The qualitative analysis aims to complement the quantitative analysis by providing an in-depth understanding of the context in which the moral language is evoked. Below, I explain each method in detail.

¹¹All speeches were used in the original language, Tunisian Arabic. The process of cleaning and analyzing the speeches was done using R.

Dictionary Approach

To determine the list of moral words that politicians use and their occurrence frequencies, a dictionary-based approach is used (Young & Soroka, 2012). The dictionary involves a pre-defined list of moral language words. Drawing on the original MFD,¹² a customized dictionary was created with some modifications to make it fit the Tunisian political context (See Table C.1 Appendix C). Using off-the-shelf dictionaries (pre-defined dictionaries) does not require checking the validity of the dictionary. However, when a new dictionary is developed, a validation of the dictionary is an important step before applying it (Krippendorff, 2004). To do so, two native speakers of Tunisian Arabic examined the list and were asked to decide whether the chosen words belonged to each foundation. If the two raters answered ‘yes,’ that word was included in the dictionary. If both rejected it, it was not included. If one answered, ‘yes’ and the other answered ‘no,’ a third rater was required to decide whether that word remained or not. The customized dictionary was then applied to the corpora of Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. Using the *Quanteda* package (Benoit et al., 2018), I do a simple word frequency using the customized dictionary where the number of words about each of the five foundations is counted, then converted to percentages to give the total number of words in each corpus.

Word Embeddings

Although the dictionary is highly valuable in systematically determining the frequencies of words, it has disadvantages. One of the most cited of these is the issue of semantic ambiguity (Hackenburg et al., 2023). While two actors can use the same word with equal frequency, they might attach to it diverging meanings. To go beyond the dictionary and examine the semantics of moral values, I use word embeddings. This technique conceives of meaning as emerging from the distribution of words that surround a term in a text (Pennington et al.,

¹²The moral Foundations Dictionary is available here: <https://moralfoundations.org/other-materials/>, accessed 02.03.2024.

2014; Rodríguez, 2023; Rodriguez & Spirling, 2022). By representing each word as a vector of real numbers in a lower dimensional space and examining the relationships between vectors for the vocabulary of a corpus, scholars can uncover new facts about language and the people that produce it (Caliskan et al., 2017). The basic logic of this technique is as follows: a token of interest (e.g., 'justice') is represented as a dense vector of numbers. The length of this vector corresponds to the nature and complexity of the multidimensional space in which we are seeking to represent the word. Distances between the vectors represent meaningful semantic similarities of the words they embed.

In this chapter, I use *A La Carte* (ALC) embeddings first produced by Khodak et al. (2018) and then further developed by Rodríguez (2023). I rely on the *ConText* package in R which provides a variety of tools to explore word embeddings. ALC embeddings allow me to assess whether there is a significant difference in the context in which "a la carte" moral words are used by Ennahda vs. Nidaa Tounes. Such an approach relies on a document feature matrix (DFM created from tokenized corpus), a set of pre-trained embeddings, and a transformation matrix. The embedding process is realized through multiple steps. First, each feature count of the document is multiplied by its corresponding pre-trained embeddings. Then, the resulting vectors are column averaged. Finally, these averaged vectors are multiplied by the provided transformation matrix. According to Rodriguez & Spirling (2022), this "transforms a sparse V-dimensional vector (a vector of feature counts, with V = number of features in the corpus) into a dense D-dimensional vector (a D-dimensional embedding, with D = dimensions of the pre-trained embeddings)." Each row in this matrix represents an ALC embedding of a single instance of the word of interest (for example 'justice'). Existing works that use such tools have relied on pre-existing embeddings (called pre-trained GloVe models) that can be accessed online and applied directly to the DFM. Since such a pre-trained model in Tunisian Arabic is not available to download, I build my pre-trained embedding model and my transformation matrix. To do so, I first estimate GloVe embeddings on my full

corpus.¹³ For consistent results, I choose a layer with vector dimensions of length 300¹⁴ and a window size of 6 (context). Then given my corpus and its corresponding GloVe embeddings, I compute a corresponding transformation matrix using 50 iterations. Once this is done, exploring the embedded documents using several available features becomes possible. To check whether Ennahda attaches different meanings to moral language than Nidaa Tounes, I focus on the nearest neighbor cosine similarity ratio function which allows us to directly gauge how discriminant nearest neighbors are for each party. This feature computes first the similarity between a given feature and the party embeddings, then gives the ratio of the two cosine similarities.¹⁵ Values closer to 1 indicate no difference between the two groups. Values higher than 1 mean more distinctive for the group in the numerator (in this case for Ennahda). Values lower than 1 mean the word is more distinctive of the group in the denominator (Nidaa Tounes).

4.7 Results


Results from the dictionary approach are presented in Figure 4.1. Except for two dimensions that conform with the MFT expectations, three foundations do not. Ennahda party used words related to Loyalty and Sanctity Foundations more than Nidaa Tounes did. However, Ennahda Party used more words pertaining to Care and Fairness dimensions than Nidaa Tounes – a deviation from existing studies using MFT framework (Clifford & Jerit, 2013; Graham et al., 2009). Most importantly, while the difference is small, Nidaa Tounes used more words pertaining to the Authority Foundation than Ennahda. This result is also not consistent with previous works. However, it appears in line with my value-based cleavage theory - people who endorsed authority-nationalism values were more likely to be left-wing

¹³Training my own GloVe embeddings is done using the *Quanteda* and *word2vec* packages in R. GloVe embedding models will perform better on the whole corpus in case of small corpus size which is the case in this analysis.

¹⁴For more details on choosing vector dimensions and windows, see Rodriguez & Spirling (2022)

¹⁵Example of nearest neighbor cosine similarity ratio: let's suppose for Ennahda the word 'people' has a value of 0.84 and for Nidaa Tounes 0.67, the ratio would be 1.26 with Ennahda value chosen in the numerator.

Figure 4.1: Percentage frequency of each foundation from the total corpus



oriented and vote for left-leaning parties in Tunisia.

To explore the mechanisms behind these divergent results, I focus on two main dimensions in the following analysis: Fairness and Authority Foundations. For the Fairness dimension, I set the following feature words: justice in its two Arabic forms (عدالة، عدل)¹⁶ and equality (مساواة). The rationale behind choosing these features is to capture several facets of justice value that different parties might evoke differently. While justice might weigh more in the discourses of Islamists, secularists might use “equality” to refer to justice. By including multiple features, this analysis minimizes discrimination against one type of feature over the other. For the Authority dimension, I use the following features: authority

¹⁶In Arabic there exist two words for the word ‘justice.’ One is in the male format (عدل) and the other in the female format (عدالة). In Figure 2, the former is referred to as ‘justice 1’ while the latter is referred to as ‘justice 2.’ Semantically, there are slight differences between the two.

(سلطة), sovereignty (سيادة), and respect for the state (دولة). The full analysis was conducted using the Tunisian Arabic corpora, but results were translated into English and used for plotting (For original Arabic results see Figure C.1 in Appendix C).

Figure 4.2 shows the ratios of cosine similarities between group embeddings and the justice features (only the top 20 words are plotted).¹⁷ Words such as God, revolution, Islam, equality, freedom, and democracy are more distinctive of Ennahda discourse than of Nidaa Tounes discourse and their ratios are above 1.¹⁸ Words such as transitional, independent, government, and fear are more discriminant of Nidaa Tounes than of Ennahda (below 1). As hypothesized (H3), Ennahda Party is more prone to use a religious and freedom discourse when they talk about “justice.” Nidaa Tounes seems to have a different understanding of “justice.” For them, this word feature is primarily linked to an authority discourse. Interestingly, only one form of the Arabic word of justice (عدل) is distinctive of Ennahda, and this particular form is the one that appears in the Quran.

Figure 4.2: Cosine Similarity Ratio (Ennahda/Nidaa) for the Justice Dimension





Figure 4.3 shows the ratio of cosine similarities between group embeddings and the authority

¹⁷If a linking word or action verb ranks among the top 20 words, it is disregarded from the plot.

¹⁸If Nidaa Tounes is chosen to be in the numerator in the ratio, we would get the same words but in opposite sides. Distinctive words for Nidaa Tounes will be above 1 (right side of the plot) whereas distinctive words of Ennahda will be below 1 (left side of the plot).

features. Words such as judiciary, opposition, and deliberation are more distinctive of Ennahda discourse than Nidaa Tounes (above 1) whereas words such as sovereignty, independent, and constitution are most distinctive of Nidaa Tounes discourse (below 1). In line with the hypothesis (H4), Nidaa Tounes is more prone to attaching the meaning of state sovereignty, constitution, and independence with the word “authority.” In other words, they consider state sovereignty, its constitution, and independence as inherently tied to authority. Conversely, Ennahda attaches other meanings to this term, linking it to words like opposition, revolution, and judiciary. This suggests that for Ennahda, ‘authority’ is almost synonymous with the judiciary, affirming the previous findings that justice occupies a central place in the discourses of Islamist parties.

Figure 4.3: Cosine Similarity Ratio (Ennahda/Nidaa) for the Authority Dimension



These findings confirm that parties attach diverging meanings to the words they use. This is observed not only among Tunisian politicians but also among other politicians from other countries (Hackenburg et al., 2023; Rheault & Cochrane, 2020; Rudkowsky et al., 2018). As noted by Kraft & Klemmensen (2024), “the politics of morality is not about the promotion of specific moral values per se but, rather, a competition over their respective meaning.” (p.201) The results are also in line with the stated hypotheses of this chapter: for Ennahda Party

which was banned and persecuted for decades, justice means freedom from oppression and equal treatment. It also conveys a more religious understanding where justice means applying Islamic justice as God and the Prophet commanded. For secularists, justice is not about past grievances or religion. It reflects instead a nationalist ideology that aligns closely with the idea of maintaining a strong authority (هيئة الدولة) and preserving state institutions.

4.8 Qualitative Analysis

After quantitatively gauging the context in which key values of interest occur, I conduct a qualitative thematic analysis. The qualitative analysis aims to address two primary concerns. First, while the embeddings serve as a valuable systematic tool to extract vector representation of texts, the model used in this analysis has never been fully developed on a larger corpus in Tunisian Arabic. To the best of my knowledge, embeddings for standard Arabic have been accessible (see [Soliman et al. \(2017\)](#)) but not in Tunisian Arabic which is the language most politicians use in Tunisia. For example, in this study, I followed the common practice of setting the window size to 6 ([Rodriguez & Spirling, 2022](#)) but it might be that this window length should be narrower or larger with Arabic text. Most importantly, the extracted meaning with the embedding approach was done with pre-defined feature words. Therefore, the qualitative analysis might reveal other themes that the embedding model could not identify. Given this, an in-depth analysis of the speeches will allow us to provide more concrete and fine-grained insights from the text.

To do so, I take a sample of 100 speeches (50 per party) and conduct an inductive thematic coding. I develop a list of themes (coding list and coding examples are available in Tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C) to identify the uses of moral appeals.¹⁹ Specifically, I focus on the use of “justice” and “authority” related words. Table 4.2 summarizes the main themes and their occurrence in the speeches.

When zooming on the speeches, the two parties ascribe different meanings to the word

¹⁹The coding was done on NVivo version 14.

Table 4.2: Thematic analysis: themes and main occurrences

| Value | Themes/coding list | Ennahda | Nidaa Tounes |
|--------------------------|--|---------|--------------|
| Authority related themes | 1. Authority as respect of the state | 1 | 34 |
| | 2. Authority as security and order | 8 | 29 |
| | 3. Authority for the people, by the people | 31 | 10 |
| Justice related themes | 4. Justice as Islam and Sharia | 56 | 4 |
| | 5. Justice as freedom from oppression | 61 | 8 |
| | 6. Justice as law enforcement | 5 | 22 |

‘authority.’ For Nidaa Tounes, authority is mainly expressed through two main themes: (1) respect for the state and its institutions and (2) maintaining order and security in the country. Respect for the state is a core value for the secularist Nidaa Tounes. It is something that all people should endorse. This is clear in the multiple references²⁰ made by the leader of the party, Beji Caid Essebsi, in his speeches about respecting the state:

I have the concept of ‘state,’ wherever I go I defend Tunisia no matter who is in power because Tunisia is before all governments. Governments are removable, men come and go, but the state remains. We are among those who have this notion of ‘state’ and we defend it. (Beji Caid Essebsi, 2012)

In another speech, Essebsi linked the chaos that the country is experiencing with the lack of respect for the state:

I got disappointed when we headed this way, and for this reason, I came back. I have a responsibility to bring back the train on the rails because this train has stopped in my opinion. There is no respect for the state authority anymore, why did we reach this? Well, there are people who for the last two years have not been believing in the state [...] they do not respect anything anymore. They have no respect for the policy, for the president, no respect for those in the government, they believe whatever they hear on Facebook. For me this is painful. In my opinion, as long as someone is responsible in government, we must respect him,

²⁰All references were translated from Tunisian Arabic into English. For original statements see Appendix C.

and hence respect the state. There is no respect for the state today and this is the problem. Of course, if the state was feared, they would not do that because they knew that the state would follow them and punish them, but unfortunately, they destroyed and killed others [...] (Beji Caid Essebsi, 2012)

When compared to Ennahda, this understanding of ‘authority’ as respect for the state does not exist. For the leader of Ennahda, Rached Ghannouchi, the state could become an instrument of tyranny. For this reason, the authority should always emanate from the people and by the people. This is clearly illustrated in the passage below:

We can say that this constitution was not issued by a person or a committee of experts but rather by the people. The revolution led by young people offered freedom to all of us and the whole umma. Now, authority has transformed into a bottom-up process, and this is what distinguishes a democratic system. You are now the principal base of democracy because civil society is the base of democracy. The more authority goes down the more democracy we get, the more authority goes up, the closer we are to dictatorship [...] (Rached Ghannouchi, 2013)

According to Ghannouchi, authority should be built bottom-up based on people’s voices and civil society, as expressed in one of his speeches:

We are now building an infrastructure based on the people, that’s why now we say that the local authorities, municipalities and governorates, should be the real authorities. Civil society is the real authority, and for this reason, we are building it bottom up. Your voice has a say because you are the real authority, and if anything is taken from it, we lose trust it falls and drops as the fall’s leaves. (Rached Ghannouchi, 2013)

It is worth mentioning a difference between the results from the word embeddings and the in-depth reading of the speeches. For Ennahda, the word ‘opposition’ occurs as an important

word when evoking authority. However, the qualitative analysis reveals that ‘opposition’ is not used in the sense of challenging the state and the authorities. Instead, Rached Ghannouchi refers to the ‘opposition’ to express his belief in consensus and cooperation between government and opposition. Given that the speeches were delivered during the transition period, Ghannouchi was very keen on emphasizing the need for all actors whether in government or opposition to unite and lead the transition to democracy. In one of his speeches, he stated:

At the core of our program is compromise. Compromise is the key to our program given that the country is still in a transitional period, we cannot rule in the name of one party. 51% is enough to rule in a stable democracy but in a nascent democracy aged 3 years old, 51% is not enough, that’s why we need compromise and consensus [...] This country is faced with big changes, big decisions, and difficult economic decisions and we cannot succeed with the logic of 51% government and 49% opposition, this will paralyze the movement, and that’s what happened last year. The whole system was on the verge of collapse because of this duality. The duality of government and opposition is not suitable for transitional phases but suitable for stable democracies. (Rached Ghannouchi, 2014)

Ghannouchi has extensively highlighted this in his speeches. He made it clear that “there is no more opposition movement and government because the next government is a government of national consensus.” When it comes to justice concerns, similarly, the speeches reveal diverging meanings. For Nidaa Tounes, justice is merely viewed as retributive justice. Essebsi does not evoke justice as redistribution or justice as equality but rather has a very narrow meaning – one linked to law enforcement and retribution. This is clearly illustrated in the following statement:

Men are humans and like any human, they have rights and duties. If they do something wrong, they will be referred to justice, and in individual cases. We do

not have collective punishment; we are not in the 8th century. We are now a state and we want a future, a prosperous future, we want to join the developed nations and not go backwards. (Beji Caid Essebsi, 2013)

By contrast, Ghannouchi views justice as (1) an Islamic value and principle and (2) as freedom from oppression. His understanding of justice is more redistributive and procedural rather than a retributive one like Essebsi. Focusing on the speeches of Ghannouchi, one cannot refrain from noticing the extensive linkages between justice and Islam. For Ghannouchi “Justice is Islam and Islam is justice.” He repeatedly uses verses from the Quran that emphasize this value in Islam and among the guided *"Khalifs"*. For example, he stated:

We do not call people for revenge. We call people for justice. We call for justice to take its course. By truth, the heavens and the earth were established, and by justice, societies were established. Even in Infidel countries, if they are fair among their citizens, God Almighty does not deprive them of good fruits. (Rached Ghannouchi, 2013)

In another context, justice is synonymous with freedom. On several occasions, Ghannouchi talks about the necessity of having both freedom and justice as inseparable. For instance, he stated:

If you want to be followers of the prophets, peace and blessings be upon them, and an extension of the Islamic trend movement founded by young people, you must constantly remain renewed in your thinking, fighting for justice and freedom, for a great future for Islam, a future for Tunisia, and the future of the region. And you have an opportunity now. Tunisia has a historic opportunity today. It is like the first day on which the spark of freedom was lit, illuminating the world, and on which the flag of Tunisia was raised in every street shouting freedom from Tunisia. (Rached Ghannouchi, 2013)

Most importantly, justice for Ghannouchi is not just a type of political system or Islamic value, it is also freedom from oppression and tyranny. He extensively talks about transitional justice in post-revolution Tunisia and calls for the need to create and pursue justice for all the victims of past regimes. The following passage perfectly illustrates it:

The Tunisian revolution, thank God, did something great in the world. The Tunisian revolution opened a new page in the history of this world, in the history of the Arabs and the history of Muslims. The Tunisian revolution gave a beautiful message about Islam, Islam is freedom, Islam is revolution, and Islam is justice, equality, brotherhood, peace, and knowledge. And it progressed, and therefore, just as the French Revolution opened a new page for Europe, a Europe that had been mired in backwardness, mired in injustice, free-riding kings, and demented churches, the Tunisian Revolution opened Europe to democracy, science, and progress. Some kings fled, and some kings knew their destiny. They handed over power to the people and Europe was able to progress. We, in the Arab world, are a shadow of suffocation, suffocation of dictatorship with regimes of corruption and injustice, and elections that either do not exist, or the 99.99% elections, which are fake, a 'wooden' media, and an oppressed civil society. The Tunisian revolution gave a message to the Arabs too, that Muslims deserve freedom and democracy as well. The Tunisian revolution sent a message to the Arabs: you are stronger than your rulers, do not be afraid of your tyrants, they are cowards. (Rached Ghannouchi, 2013)

In light of this, we can clearly state that 'justice' and 'authority' values vary tremendously across the two parties. The qualitative analysis suggests that careful reading of the speeches can reveal new meanings attached to the values and help us better understand the motives and behavior of these parties.

4.9 Conclusion

This study has tested my value-based cleavage theory on elite discourses. Specifically, it examined the moral appeals in the political rhetoric of two main parties in Tunisia: Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes. The results from all three approaches (dictionary approach, word embeddings, and qualitative thematic analysis) point to the same results also observed in previous chapters: The Islamist Ennahda Party is more likely to use a justice-related discourse whereas the leftist Nidaa Tounes Party is more likely to use an authority discourse. These findings stand in contrast to existing studies from Western countries where justice is often attached to the discourses of Democrats or left-wing politicians while authority is expressed at higher levels among Republicans and right-wing parties (Enke, 2020; Frimer, 2020; Graham et al., 2009; Hackenburg et al., 2023). As I have argued previously, different historical trajectories have had different impact on the formation of the parties' ideologies in the Arab-Muslim world. For the Islamist Ennahda party, justice is at the core of its political discourse for two main reasons. First, justice is of central importance in Islam and Islamic leaders should always seek to pursue justice while in office. The second reason is related to the past oppression experienced under Bourguiba's and Ben Ali's regimes. Ennahda Party describes its path as a constant struggle for justice and freedom, aiming to take part in the political game instead of being persecuted and excluded. For them, being able to come back to Tunisia after the revolution and run for office under free and fair elections is a "big victory." When it comes to Nidaa Tounes, it belongs to the secular-nationalist party family. For this type of party, respect for authority and state sovereignty are at the core of their ideology. They believe that the state should be feared and respected because it is the best way to protect individuals' freedom and maintain order. This idea of authority and order comes from the legacy of secular-nationalist parties post-independence in the Arab-Muslim world who sought to strengthen the state to protect their newly established nation-states.

Going beyond the dictionary method and examining how Ennahda's moral language is

semantically similar/different from Nidaa Tounes yields two key discoveries. First, the secular Nidaa Tounes Party is more likely to resemble right-wingers by endorsing merit-based justice or retributive justice. This is again in contrast to findings from the US where Republicans are shown to endorse proportionality more than Democrats (Haidt, 2012; Simpson & Laham, 2015; Skurka et al., 2020). Similarly, the Islamists in Tunisia are more likely to resemble left-wing parties. They are more likely to endorse social justice – a moral concern mainly linked to the left in the US and elsewhere (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2016).

Taken together, I view these results as important contributions to scholars of ideology, morality, and political communication. First, they highlight the established link between values and political ideology among ordinary people and politicians. This prompts new questions about how partisan elite cues influence public opinion and attitudes. Moreover, this study addresses a highly salient topic in political science and psychology. Scholars are increasingly examining the role of moral appeals in political communication and their influence on public discourse (Clifford & Simas, 2024; Hackenburg et al., 2023; Kraft, 2018; Kraft & Klemmensen, 2024; Simonsen & Widmann, 2023). Therefore, this study provides an opportunity for more work on text as data methods using Arabic language.

5 Conclusion

Existing scholarship has provided several explanations for what makes a person left-wing or right-wing, conservative or liberal. Perhaps one of the most cited of these is the value-based cleavage approach - the idea that politics is structured along value divides. The chapters in this dissertation have expanded past research beyond WEIRD and Christian cultural populations by integrating Arab-Muslim countries. The central research question is: Why do values sometimes predict left-wing political ideology and sometimes just the opposite political ideology? To answer this question, this project makes two main arguments: First, values ought to be studied and viewed from a multilevel lens where both micro and macro-level factors are examined. I show that values are better understood within the context in which they are formed and reinforced. By zooming on different contextual factors, I provide evidence for my value-based theory across religions. Second and most importantly, this project also argues that the interaction between religious and political factors also plays a large role in explaining variation across contexts.

This dissertation has yielded much empirical evidence in support of the arguments presented above, by triangulating different datasets, methods, and analytical strategies. In Chapter 2, I show that values shape political ideology differently across religions particularly when comparing Muslim-majority contexts to non-Muslim ones. In the latter, justice is often associated with left-wing (liberal) political preferences, whereas in the former justice is primarily linked to right-wing political ideology, specifically right-wing Islamist views. The evidence suggests that this variation is not only explained by the religious context – whether

a person lives in a Muslim or non-Muslim society – but also by the political context. In Muslim countries where religious parties are denied access to political participation under authoritarian regimes, the link between endorsing justice and being to the right is stronger. Moreover, I also demonstrated that this link expands beyond political ideology and explains also voting behavior. Justice values are a significant predictor of voting for Islamist parties in some Arab-Muslim countries. Chapter 3 provides a detailed and more fine-grained analysis of value-based voting in Tunisia. Using a representative face-to-face survey conducted in the 2019 elections, I show that people who endorse justice and liberty values are more likely to vote for the Islamist Ennahda Party than any other left-wing party, whereas those who endorse authority and nationalist values are more likely to vote for leftist and secularist parties and candidates. Both findings stand in contrast to what has repeatedly been found in other countries. In Chapter 4, I examined the supply side of value-based cleavages in Tunisia by focusing on political speeches. The presented evidence suggests that Ennahda Party politicians are more likely to use a justice and freedom discourse whereas Nidaa Tounes politicians are more likely to evoke authority and nationalism in their political rhetoric. Taken together, these findings confirm the multilevel nature of values and the complex interplay of individual and aggregate factors shaping value-based cleavages.

5.1 Key Contributions

What key contributions can be gleaned from this research? Three main contributions emerge from the above findings. First, political attitudes and behaviors should be understood and studied from a multilevel perspective. People’s decisions are not solely the product of individual-level characteristics (beliefs, motives) but also the product of the social and political environment in which they are embedded. It is impossible to study individuals in isolation from their social settings. This research reinforces discussions of religion and politics and the complex interaction between the two. Most importantly, the patterns observed in the

different chapters can help scholars understand other contexts where similar factors might be at play, and hence contribute to the comparative study of political behavior and value-based cleavages.

Second, this research brings new insights into the study of a region – long perceived to be “exceptional” – the Arab-Muslim world. This exceptionalism thesis, often expressed by downplaying and dismissing the qualities of the out-group as compared to the ingroup, has led to the misrepresentation and marginalization of the region from mainstream political science research. I show that values are also important predictors of political preferences and voting patterns in the Arab-Muslim world. Instead of solely focusing on conventional explanations such as the religious-secular divide or clientelism, this research provides new avenues for research in the region. As I have shown, the Arab-Muslim world does not differ from other world regions: factors that matter elsewhere also matter in explaining political behavior in the region. Hence, this type of approach encourages a new understanding of people’s attitudes and choices – one that takes into consideration the diversity and heterogeneity of values in Arab-Muslim societies - rather than “locking them back into Arab exceptionalism.” (Gardner, 2009, p. 18)

Finally, the evidence presented suggests that values are more robust and more consistent than other socio-demographic variables such as education, age, and gender in predicting support for Islamist political parties across multiple countries (Tunisia, Turkey, and Egypt). While these results need to be tested in a broader set of Muslim countries, they might signal the highly predictive power of values as key determinants of political behavior, surpassing that of the more conventional explanatory variables.

5.2 Policy Implications

What key policy implications can be derived on the basis of the results of this dissertation? First, the framework presented here suggests that values endorsed in the West are also

important in the Muslim world. The “Clash of Civilization” or value gap between the two worlds should be avoided at all costs. Instead of using them to justify war and interventions, US policymakers would benefit from considering the shared values between Christians and Muslims as a source of reconciliation. Former US Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State, Edward Djerejian warned us more than 30 years ago at his famous Meridian House Speech in Washington (1992): “The U.S. Government does not view Islam as the next ‘ism’ confronting the West or threatening world peace. That is an overly simplistic response to a complex reality.” Understanding the framing of values and the visions of those groups can contribute to a more effective foreign policy in the region – one that promotes real peace and freedom and avoids confrontations and conflicts. As illustrated by [Gardner \(2011\)](#) in his book: “Until policy changes, we can expect at least one generation of conflict, more probably several between the Western and the Muslim worlds. A neo-medieval pall will descend upon Arab and Muslim countries and the shared values of Islam, and the West will wither into dust.” (p. 18)

Most importantly, this research suggests that people who endorse the value of justice and liberty are the ones more supportive of Islamist parties and movements. This finding can become a turning point in how the US perceives and treats Islamist actors. This was also mentioned by Ambassador Djerejian when he emphasized the need to recognize the “diversity” and “complexity” of the newly emerging Islamist groups ([Djerejian, 2009](#)). He affirmed that the appropriate course of action should be grounded in social, educational, and economic programs, which will result in significant improvements. Policymakers should make sharper distinctions between those who embrace radical violent extremism, and those who for so long yearned for freedom, justice, and dignity under their authoritarian states. While no one can deny the jihadist tendency of some Islamists, it is important to note that the majority of Islamists are not jihadists. Therefore, a new policy goal for the US and its allies should be to forge better relations and reconstruct trust with moderate Islamist actors based on their shared values and vision for freedom and pluralism. As of today, the percentage of people

who support some kind of government that is inspired by Islamic values is extremely high across the Arab-Muslim world. Islamist popularity, thus, is far from disappearing any time soon. As eloquently noted by [Gardner \(2011\)](#), “any liberalization or political opening in the Arab core of the Muslim world is bound to be heavily colored by Islamized politics.” (p. 15)

The general point here is that values are important and will remain one of the most potent drivers of political outcomes. It is our responsibility as scholars or policymakers to guide the debate towards using values as unifying reconciliatory tools rather than sources of division and polarization.

A Appendix

List of countries

- **Muslim countries:** Algeria, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
- **Non-Muslim countries:** Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, South Africa, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Zimbabwe, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Nigeria, South Korea, Trinidad and Tobago, Taiwan, Thailand.
- **Value Dimensions (all items were reverse coded):**
 - **Authority value dimension**
 - * Tradition is important to this person to follow the customs handed down by one's religion or family, 1 (very much like me), 6 (not at all like me)
 - * It is important to this person to behave properly to avoid doing anything people would say wrong, 1 (very much like me), 6 (not at all like me)
 - * Living in a secure surrounding is important to this person, to avoid anything that might be dangerous, 1 (very much like me), 6 (not at all like me)
 - * One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud, 1 (agree strongly), 4 (strongly disagree)
 - * Future changes: greater respect for authority, 1 (good thing), 3 (bad thing)
 - **Fairness value dimension**
 - * Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled 1(never justifiable), 10(always justifiable)
 - * Cheating on taxes if you have a chance, 1(never justifiable), 10(always justifiable)

- * Avoiding a fare on public transport, 1(never justifiable), 10(always justifiable)
- * Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties, 1(never justifiable), 10(always justifiable)

Figure A.1: Bivariate regression between justice value dimension and left-right self-placement in a sample of Muslim countries




Figure A.2: Bivariate regression between justice value dimension and left-right self-placement in a sample of Christian countries




Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables

| | n | mean | sd | median | min | max | range | skew | kurtosis |
|---------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|------|------|-------|-------|----------|
| Left-right | 66334 | 5.68 | 2.37 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 9 | -0.03 | -0.40 |
| Authority | 79427 | 3.88 | 0.75 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 5 | -0.58 | 0.10 |
| Justice | 76745 | 8.58 | 1.82 | 9.25 | 1 | 10 | 9 | -1.67 | 2.81 |
| Religiosity | 76419 | 5.42 | 2.64 | 6 | 1 | 8 | 7 | -0.64 | -1.14 |
| Education | 78954 | 5.63 | 2.42 | 6 | 1 | 9 | 8 | -0.24 | -0.96 |
| Age | 79599 | 41.86 | 16.62 | 40 | 16 | 102 | 86 | 0.50 | -0.64 |
| Political authority | 79684 | 4.24 | 1.25 | 4 | 1.99 | 7.47 | 5.48 | 0.36 | -0.18 |

Figure A.3: Bivariate regressions between political ideology (self-placement on left-right scale) and issue positions.




Table A.2: OLS results. Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors are in parentheses. Model 1 contains Muslim participants from non-Muslim majority countries whereas Model 2 contains Muslim participants living in Muslim-majority countries.

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Left-right (self-placement) | |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Authority | 0.120 (0.078) | 0.348*** (0.034) |
| Justice | −0.061* (0.033) | 0.044*** (0.014) |
| Religiosity | 0.029 (0.027) | 0.056*** (0.010) |
| Education | 0.021 (0.024) | −0.063*** (0.010) |
| Gender | 0.175* (0.105) | 0.048 (0.042) |
| Age | 0.004 (0.042) | 0.044*** (0.016) |
| Constant | 5.476*** (0.077) | 6.310*** (0.030) |
| Observations | 2,134 | 11,913 |
| R ² | 0.005 | 0.020 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.002 | 0.020 |
| Residual Std. Error | 2.387 (df = 2127) | 2.286 (df = 11906) |
| F Statistic | 1.883* (df = 6; 2127) | 41.244*** (df = 6; 11906) |
| <i>Note:</i> | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Table A.3: MLM results. Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors are in parentheses. All models compare Muslim (15 countries) to Christian-majority societies (30 countries).

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Left-right (self-placement) | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Authority | | 0.280*** (0.016) | 0.274*** (0.053) | 0.273*** (0.016) | 0.277*** (0.046) |
| Justice | | -0.035*** (0.006) | -0.035*** (0.006) | -0.026 (0.023) | -0.025 (0.020) |
| Religiosity | | 0.068*** (0.005) | 0.064*** (0.005) | 0.066*** (0.005) | 0.063*** (0.005) |
| Education | | -0.042*** (0.005) | -0.041*** (0.005) | -0.043*** (0.005) | -0.042*** (0.005) |
| Gender | | 0.104*** (0.021) | 0.096*** (0.020) | 0.102*** (0.020) | 0.096*** (0.020) |
| Age | | 0.012 (0.007) | 0.014* (0.007) | 0.013 (0.007) | 0.013 (0.007) |
| Muslim Majority | | 0.776*** (0.191) | 0.766*** (0.191) | 0.778*** (0.190) | 0.767*** (0.191) |
| Authority*Muslim Majority | | | 0.040 (0.094) | | -0.0005 (0.083) |
| Justice*Muslim Majority | | | | 0.080+ (0.041) | 0.067+ (0.036) |
| Constant | 5.692*** (0.104) | 5.396*** (0.110) | 5.403*** (0.110) | 5.397*** (0.110) | 5.402*** (0.110) |
| Random effects | | | | | |
| Country variance | 0.48 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 |
| Residual variance | 5.20 | 5.13 | 5.10 | 5.09 | 5.08 |
| Random slope justice | | | | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Random slope authority | | | 0.07 | | 0.05 |
| N | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| Observations | 50,206 | 50,206 | 50,206 | 50,206 | 50,206 |
| Log Likelihood | -112,736.900 | -112,405.800 | -112,309.500 | -112,294.700 | -112,225.500 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 225,479.800 | 224,831.500 | 224,645.100 | 224,615.400 | 224,485.000 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 225,506.300 | 224,919.700 | 224,759.800 | 224,730.100 | 224,635.000 |

Note:

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A.4: MLM results. Entries are regression coefficients and their standard errors are in parentheses. All models compare Muslim (15 countries) to Christian-majority societies (30 countries).

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Left-right (self-placement) | |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Authority | 0.272*** (0.016) | 0.274*** (0.016) |
| Justice | -0.040 (0.021) | -0.040 (0.026) |
| Religiosity | 0.066*** (0.005) | 0.066*** (0.005) |
| Education | -0.043*** (0.005) | -0.043*** (0.005) |
| Gender | 0.101*** (0.020) | 0.102*** (0.020) |
| Age | 0.012 (0.007) | 0.013 (0.007) |
| Religious authority | 0.152 (0.109) | |
| Party ban | | -0.070 (0.159) |
| Muslim Majority | 0.595* (0.248) | 0.836*** (0.237) |
| Justice*Religious authority | -0.039 (0.020) | |
| Justice*Party ban | | -0.035 (0.032) |
| Justice*Muslim Majority | -0.002 (0.046) | 0.037 (0.049) |
| Religious authority*Muslim Majority | -0.034 (0.182) | |
| Justice*Religious authority*Muslim Majority | 0.133*** (0.034) | |
| Party ban*Muslim Majority | | 0.036 (0.204) |
| Justice*Party ban*Muslim Majority | | 0.093* (0.041) |
| Constant | 5.457*** (0.117) | 5.369*** (0.129) |
| Random effects | | |
| Country variance | 0.35 | 0.37 |
| Residual variance | 5.09 | 5.09 |
| Random slope justice | 0.009 | 0.01 |
| N | 45 | 45 |
| Observations | 50,206 | 50,206 |
| Log Likelihood | -112,294.800 | -112,298.900 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 224,623.600 | 224,631.800 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 224,773.600 | 224,781.900 |
| <i>Note:</i> | 113 | *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 |

Table A.5: Comparison between the four countries based on key characteristics.

| Countries | Party Ban (in the last 20 years) | Religious political authority | Survey year (WVS) |
|-----------|--|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Tunisia | High | Islamist parties | 2013 |
| Egypt | High | Islamist parties | 2012 |
| Turkey | Low | Islamist parties | 2012 |
| Morocco | Moderate | The King | 2011 |

The question from the WVS data is as follows: Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow? (V228). Given that this analysis focuses on the contrast between voting Islamists vs. non-Islamists, I conduct a logistic regression analysis. Islamist vote choice is coded 1. If there is more than one Islamist party, they are grouped together, and both are coded as 1. Left leaning and secular parties (some are center left) are coded as 0. Independent vote options were coded as NA. People who did not answer or did not decide yet or refused to answer were coded NA.

Table A.6: Political parties' classifications for the four countries

| Categorization | Islamist parties | Left-wing/secular parties |
|----------------|---|--|
| Tunisia | Ennahda Party/ Current of Love | Nidaa Tounes/ Congress for the Republic/ Jabhaa Chaabiya/ Popular Front for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution/ Progressive Democratic Party |
| Egypt | Freedom and Justice Party / Al Nour Party | Center Party/ Free Egyptians Party/ Egypt Youth Party/ New Wafd Party/ Popular Socialist Alliance/ Revolutionis Tomorrow Party (full list can be accessed here) |
| Turkey | Justice and Development Party (AKP) | Republican people party/ Nationalist Action party |
| Morocco | Justice and Development Party (PJD) | Socialist union of popular forces/ Istiqlal Party/ National Rally of Independents/ The Popular Movement/ The Party of Progress and Socialism/ The Constitutional Union/ Authenticity and Modernity Party |

Table A.7: Logistic regression results for the four countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco. Islamist parties are coded as 1 and the rest are coded as 0 (reference category)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | Voting for Islamist parties | | | |
| | (Tunisia) | (Egypt) | (Turkey) | (Morocco) |
| Authority | −0.138 (0.174) | −0.007 (0.169) | 0.143 (0.113) | 0.397 (0.313) |
| Justice | 0.191** (0.076) | 0.225*** (0.076) | 0.182*** (0.059) | −0.095 (0.159) |
| Religiosity | 0.180*** (0.038) | | 0.202*** (0.036) | −0.105 (0.074) |
| Education | −0.011 (0.041) | 0.001 (0.041) | −0.240*** (0.030) | 0.066 (0.066) |
| Gender | 0.699*** (0.210) | 0.504** (0.203) | 0.282** (0.126) | 0.613 (0.380) |
| Age | −0.013* (0.008) | −0.002 (0.007) | −0.012** (0.005) | −0.009 (0.017) |
| Constant | −3.225*** (1.054) | −3.339*** (1.046) | −1.978** (0.777) | −1.220 (1.868) |
| Observations | 602 | 602 | 1,228 | 163 |
| Log Likelihood | −316.188 | −329.060 | −777.078 | −94.859 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 646.377 | 670.121 | 1,568.155 | 203.718 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B Appendix

Survey questions that involved 6 or more answer categories were shown to participants with a show-card to help them remember the options and decide.

- Liberty-justice values
 - Whether or not private property was respected
 - Whether or not everyone was free to do as they wanted
 - Whether or not some people were treated differently from others
 - Whether or not someone acted unfairly
 - Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights
- Authority-nationalist values
 - I am proud of my country's history
 - If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty
 - Respect for Authority is something all children need to learn

- Minimizing overreporting statement:

In a moment, I am going to ask you whether you voted on Sunday, October 6th which was [time] ago. Before you answer, think of a number of different things that will likely come to mind if you actually did vote this past election day; things like whether you walked, drove or were driven by another person to your polling place [pause], what the weather was like on the way, the time of the day that was [pause], and people you went with, saw, or met while there [pause]. After thinking about it, you may realize that you did not vote in this particular election [pause]. Now that you've thought about it, which of these statements best describes you? (1. I did not vote in October 6th parliamentary elections. 2. I thought about voting this time but didn't. 3. I usually vote but didn't this time. 4. I am sure I voted in October 6th, parliamentary elections).

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics of Socio-Demographic Variables (Voters' Sample)

| Parliamentary vote | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----|-------|-------|--------|-----|-----|-------|----------|
| | N | Mean | SD | Median | Min | Max | Skew | Kurtosis |
| Prayer | 303 | 3.94 | 1.68 | 5 | 1 | 5 | -1.03 | -0.81 |
| Age | 308 | 43.9 | 14.42 | 43 | 18 | 86 | 0.27 | -0.68 |
| Income | 296 | 2.14 | 1.26 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 1.80 | 4.27 |
| Secular-Islamist | 296 | 5.30 | 1.73 | 6 | 1 | 7 | -1.12 | 0.14 |
| Presidential Vote | | | | | | | | |
| | N | Mean | SD | Median | Min | Max | Skew | Kurtosis |
| Prayer | 404 | 4.00 | 1.62 | 5 | 1 | 5 | -1.12 | -0.61 |
| Age | 414 | 43.88 | 14.51 | 43 | 18 | 86 | 0.26 | -0.70 |
| Income | 395 | 2.09 | 1.18 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 1.69 | 3.90 |
| Secular-Islamist | 400 | 5.32 | 1.72 | 6 | 1 | 7 | -1.09 | 0.07 |

Table B.2: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) of 14 items (model fit: CFI= 0.95; TLI= 0.93; RMSEA= 0.026; rotation = Geomin; Estimator= Maximum Likelihood). In order to use all available observations in the dataset, the EFA was performed on MPlus (version 7.3) where the model is estimated using all datapoints using Maximum Likelihood estimation, unlike the functions ‘fa’ or ‘factanal’ in R that uses mean imputation or only performs EFA on complete observations. The results from both softwares are very similar and can be provided upon request.

| Items | Factor 1 | Factor 2 |
|--|---------------|---------------|
| Q11 Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country | 0.368 | 0.386 |
| Q12 Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority | 0.162 | 0.335 |
| Q18 Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society | 0.312 | 0.299 |
| Q29 I am proud of my country's history | 0.607* | -0.014 |
| Q30 Respect for authority is something all children need to learn | 0.435* | 0.031 |
| Q36 Men and women each have different roles to play in society | 0.096 | 0.181 |
| Q41 If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty | 0.400* | -0.01 |
| Q25 Whether or not private property was respected | 0.026 | 0.326* |
| Q26 Whether or not everyone was free to do as they wanted | -0.021 | 0.309* |
| Q10 Whether or not some people were treated differently from others | 0.002 | 0.734* |
| Q21 Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights | -0.081 | 0.373* |
| Q16 Whether or not someone acted unfairly | -0.041 | 0.556* |
| Q39 I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing | 0.101 | -0.119 |
| Q34 Justice is the most important requirement for a society | 0.116 | 0.082 |

Table B.3: Multinomial Logit Model of voters and non-voters (Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, reference category = Islamists, Log Likelihood = -1082.9, Pseudo $R^2(McFadden)$ = 0.08)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) | 5 (Independent) | 6 (Did not vote) | 7 (DK/ refuse) |
| Secular-Islamist | -0.019 (0.099) | -0.295*** (0.113) | -0.254** (0.106) | 0.032 (0.168) | -0.033 (0.074) | -0.097 (0.091) |
| Income | -0.446*** (0.149) | -0.182 (0.159) | -0.052 (0.141) | 0.071 (0.162) | -0.291*** (0.091) | -0.358*** (0.130) |
| Age | 0.285** (0.128) | 0.171 (0.163) | -0.001 (0.149) | -0.416* (0.224) | -0.197** (0.091) | 0.245** (0.118) |
| Milieu | 0.662** (0.325) | 0.285 (0.432) | -0.212 (0.421) | 0.664 (0.507) | -0.256 (0.250) | -0.184 (0.326) |
| Prayer | -0.506*** (0.109) | -0.305** (0.139) | -0.114 (0.140) | -0.179 (0.162) | -0.317*** (0.087) | -0.235** (0.110) |
| Gender | -0.717** (0.328) | 0.071 (0.443) | -0.442 (0.396) | 0.205 (0.561) | -0.894*** (0.239) | -0.420 (0.308) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.447** (0.219) | 0.344 (0.282) | -0.110 (0.204) | -0.036 (0.242) | -0.076 (0.129) | 0.007 (0.173) |
| Liberty-justice values | -0.407*** (0.154) | -0.047 (0.215) | -0.409** (0.189) | -0.508** (0.243) | -0.493*** (0.121) | -0.329** (0.149) |
| Constant | 0.644 (1.646) | -0.590 (2.126) | 3.850** (1.709) | 1.027 (2.231) | 7.445*** (1.133) | 3.266** (1.432) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 2,273.858 | 2,273.858 | 2,273.858 | 2,273.858 | 2,273.858 | 2,273.858 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.4: Multinomial Logit Model of voters and non-voters (Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, reference category = Right-wing, Log Likelihood = -1127.3, Pseudo $R^2(McFadden)$ = 0.08)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) | 5 (Independent) | 6 (Did not vote) | 7 (DK/ refuse) |
| Secular-Islamist | -0.134 (0.144) | -0.337** (0.146) | -0.561*** (0.175) | -0.144 (0.135) | -0.112 (0.131) | -0.181 (0.150) |
| Income | -0.578*** (0.181) | -0.124 (0.162) | 0.116 (0.197) | -0.243* (0.140) | -0.339** (0.134) | -0.417** (0.185) |
| Age | 0.268 (0.172) | -0.037 (0.182) | -0.077 (0.234) | -0.280* (0.156) | -0.380** (0.150) | 0.184 (0.183) |
| Milieu | 0.333 (0.452) | 0.235 (0.486) | -0.454 (0.703) | 0.174 (0.418) | -0.292 (0.405) | -0.470 (0.510) |
| Prayer | -0.388** (0.168) | -0.202 (0.175) | -0.013 (0.231) | -0.128 (0.158) | -0.311** (0.152) | -0.244 (0.178) |
| Gender | -0.693 (0.444) | 0.602 (0.481) | 0.255 (0.638) | 0.264 (0.403) | -0.438 (0.388) | -0.101 (0.468) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.406 (0.247) | 0.636** (0.290) | -0.148 (0.292) | 0.326 (0.208) | 0.086 (0.194) | 0.263 (0.259) |
| Liberty-justice values | -0.184 (0.202) | 0.037 (0.224) | -0.166 (0.291) | -0.027 (0.191) | -0.194 (0.183) | -0.027 (0.218) |
| Constant | 2.065 (2.034) | -0.750 (2.278) | 4.044 (2.573) | 2.398 (1.830) | 7.204*** (1.745) | 2.214 (2.152) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 2,362.500 | 2,362.500 | 2,362.500 | 2,362.500 | 2,362.500 | 2,362.500 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.5: Binomial logit models for each outcome category of the parliamentary election (Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | Islamists | Center-Left | Secular-Nationalists | Social-Democrats | Independents |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Secular-Islamist | 0.170** (0.085) | 0.099 (0.094) | −0.259** (0.104) | −0.182* (0.096) | 0.148 (0.166) |
| Income | 0.240** (0.109) | −0.462*** (0.154) | −0.106 (0.165) | 0.113 (0.137) | 0.251 (0.167) |
| Age | −0.187* (0.112) | 0.448*** (0.135) | 0.023 (0.161) | −0.078 (0.145) | −0.578** (0.235) |
| Milieu | −0.444 (0.287) | 0.655** (0.313) | 0.090 (0.409) | −0.554 (0.396) | 0.246 (0.500) |
| Prayer | 0.352*** (0.098) | −0.453*** (0.102) | −0.065 (0.120) | 0.147 (0.124) | 0.073 (0.153) |
| Gender | 0.461 (0.286) | −0.861*** (0.330) | 0.430 (0.423) | −0.225 (0.374) | 0.610 (0.555) |
| Authority-nationalist values | −0.255 (0.166) | 0.498** (0.218) | 0.312 (0.276) | −0.285 (0.200) | −0.236 (0.256) |
| Liberty-justice values | 0.402*** (0.148) | −0.354** (0.153) | 0.274 (0.209) | −0.244 (0.186) | −0.190 (0.251) |
| Constant | −2.862** (1.312) | −1.826 (1.512) | −3.574* (1.967) | 1.949 (1.537) | −1.477 (2.060) |
| Observations | 276 | 276 | 276 | 276 | 276 |
| Log Likelihood | −164.350 | −135.648 | −95.658 | −108.064 | −63.319 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 346.699 | 289.295 | 209.315 | 234.128 | 144.638 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.6: Binomial logit models for each outcome category of the presidential election (Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Right-wing | Center-Left | Secular-Nationalist | Social-Democrats | Independents |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Secular-Islamist | 0.265* (0.137) | 0.073 (0.085) | −0.210** (0.086) | −0.354*** (0.130) | 0.079 (0.068) |
| Income | 0.325** (0.146) | −0.460*** (0.151) | 0.106 (0.124) | 0.429** (0.183) | −0.030 (0.099) |
| Age | 0.116 (0.156) | 0.581*** (0.126) | −0.012 (0.128) | 0.014 (0.205) | −0.451*** (0.096) |
| Milieu | −0.197 (0.411) | 0.121 (0.284) | 0.118 (0.326) | −0.654 (0.624) | −0.0001 (0.232) |
| Prayer | 0.198 (0.157) | −0.322*** (0.098) | −0.009 (0.101) | 0.193 (0.188) | 0.131* (0.076) |
| Gender | −0.181 (0.399) | −1.165*** (0.302) | 0.624* (0.335) | 0.226 (0.540) | 0.480** (0.235) |
| Authority-nationalist values | −0.442** (0.212) | 0.057 (0.190) | 0.472* (0.249) | −0.508* (0.275) | 0.045 (0.144) |
| Liberty-justice values | 0.026 (0.199) | −0.242* (0.132) | 0.131 (0.159) | −0.186 (0.267) | 0.117 (0.112) |
| Constant | −3.102* (1.789) | −0.138 (1.332) | −4.550*** (1.647) | 0.964 (2.061) | −0.629 (1.043) |
| Observations | 362 | 362 | 362 | 362 | 362 |
| Log Likelihood | −101.593 | −167.963 | −142.472 | −60.531 | −235.969 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 221.186 | 353.926 | 302.944 | 139.061 | 489.938 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.7: Multinomial Logit Model excluding value dimensions (Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, reference category = Islamists parties)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) | 5 (Independent) |
| Secular-Islamist | −0.024 (0.107) | −0.293** (0.116) | −0.255** (0.109) | 0.034 (0.174) |
| Income | −0.552*** (0.167) | −0.258 (0.175) | −0.097 (0.152) | 0.058 (0.175) |
| Age | 0.432*** (0.139) | 0.209 (0.167) | −0.043 (0.153) | −0.518** (0.236) |
| Milieu | 0.856** (0.343) | 0.346 (0.442) | −0.094 (0.426) | 0.564 (0.518) |
| Prayer | −0.519*** (0.116) | −0.273* (0.140) | −0.118 (0.139) | −0.158 (0.164) |
| Gender | −0.867** (0.357) | 0.021 (0.456) | −0.398 (0.404) | 0.347 (0.575) |
| Constant | 1.021 (1.066) | 0.959 (1.270) | 1.575 (1.187) | −1.066 (1.599) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 775.783 | 775.783 | 775.783 | 775.783 |
| <i>Note:</i> | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

Table B.8: Multinomial Logit Model excluding secular-Islamist self-identification
(Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, reference category = Islamists parties)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) | 5 (Independent) |
| Income | −0.567*** (0.169) | −0.130 (0.160) | 0.034 (0.143) | 0.109 (0.177) |
| Age | 0.401*** (0.141) | 0.174 (0.170) | 0.066 (0.153) | −0.285 (0.219) |
| Milieu | 0.754** (0.347) | 0.306 (0.436) | −0.067 (0.415) | 0.505 (0.509) |
| Prayer | −0.566*** (0.120) | −0.352** (0.142) | −0.131 (0.144) | −0.153 (0.170) |
| Gender | −0.753** (0.357) | 0.112 (0.448) | −0.431 (0.400) | 0.143 (0.555) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.628*** (0.226) | 0.523* (0.297) | −0.042 (0.210) | −0.087 (0.255) |
| Liberty-justice values | −0.475*** (0.178) | −0.007 (0.230) | −0.407** (0.207) | −0.454* (0.265) |
| Constant | −0.107 (1.541) | −3.233 (2.068) | 1.638 (1.585) | 1.054 (1.968) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 806.176 | 806.176 | 806.176 | 806.176 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.9: Multinomial Logit Model excluding value dimensions (Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, reference category = Right-wing candidates)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) | 5 (Independent) |
| Secular-Islamist | −0.142 (0.150) | −0.357** (0.150) | −0.576*** (0.180) | −0.160 (0.139) |
| Income | −0.687*** (0.199) | −0.190 (0.178) | 0.086 (0.216) | −0.296* (0.155) |
| Age | 0.401** (0.181) | 0.028 (0.187) | −0.151 (0.246) | −0.257 (0.161) |
| Milieu | 0.336 (0.459) | 0.242 (0.491) | −0.332 (0.708) | 0.157 (0.423) |
| Prayer | −0.408** (0.175) | −0.154 (0.179) | −0.032 (0.229) | −0.097 (0.161) |
| Gender | −0.757 (0.462) | 0.688 (0.490) | 0.429 (0.647) | 0.394 (0.412) |
| Constant | 3.457** (1.474) | 2.693* (1.518) | 2.779 (1.911) | 3.997*** (1.358) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 931.582 | 931.582 | 931.582 | 931.582 |
| <i>Note:</i> | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

Table B.10: Multinomial Logit Model excluding secular-Islamist self-identification
(Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses, reference
category = Right-wing candidates)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| | (Center-left) | (Secular-nationalist) | (Social-democrat) | (Independent) |
| Income | −0.669*** (0.197) | −0.101 (0.174) | 0.193 (0.206) | −0.252 (0.154) |
| Age | 0.344* (0.179) | −0.008 (0.187) | −0.028 (0.239) | −0.272* (0.159) |
| Milieu | 0.232 (0.460) | 0.156 (0.489) | −0.462 (0.697) | 0.130 (0.421) |
| Prayer | −0.466*** (0.177) | −0.260 (0.181) | −0.035 (0.238) | −0.153 (0.163) |
| Gender | −0.785* (0.461) | 0.525 (0.485) | 0.321 (0.637) | 0.289 (0.410) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.336 (0.247) | 0.663** (0.301) | −0.185 (0.304) | 0.313 (0.215) |
| Liberty-justice values | −0.216 (0.216) | 0.085 (0.236) | −0.166 (0.311) | 0.028 (0.204) |
| Constant | 2.303 (1.860) | −2.617 (2.157) | 1.205 (2.447) | 1.650 (1.674) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 976.832 | 976.832 | 976.832 | 976.832 |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.11: Multinomial Logit Model comparing leftist parties (2) and independent lists (3) to the reference category right-wing parties in the parliamentary election

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| | 2 (Left) | 3 (Independent) |
| Secular-Islamist | −0.199** (0.088) | 0.029 (0.176) |
| Income | −0.304** (0.118) | 0.084 (0.181) |
| Age | 0.273** (0.118) | −0.423* (0.243) |
| Milieu | 0.421 (0.297) | 0.508 (0.525) |
| Prayer | −0.384*** (0.101) | −0.147 (0.167) |
| Gender | −0.582** (0.297) | 0.316 (0.580) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.323* (0.175) | −0.070 (0.270) |
| Liberty-justice values | −0.394*** (0.153) | −0.418 (0.271) |
| Constant | 2.574* (1.359) | 0.857 (2.228) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 466.683 | 466.683 |
| <i>Note:</i> | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

Table B.12: Multinomial Logit Model comparing leftist (2) and Independents (3) to right-wing candidates in the presidential election

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| | 2 (Left) | 3 (Independent) |
| Secular-Islamist | −0.331** (0.142) | −0.198 (0.142) |
| Income | −0.349** (0.157) | −0.308** (0.155) |
| Age | 0.143 (0.168) | −0.330** (0.166) |
| Milieu | 0.222 (0.432) | 0.191 (0.426) |
| Prayer | −0.302* (0.164) | −0.124 (0.162) |
| Gender | −0.105 (0.423) | 0.398 (0.416) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.489** (0.232) | 0.425* (0.221) |
| Liberty-justice values | −0.094 (0.208) | 0.041 (0.208) |
| Constant | 2.496 (1.890) | 2.068 (1.858) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 662.382 | 662.382 |
| <i>Note:</i> | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

Table B.13: Multinomial Logit Model comparing (excluding independent category)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) |
| Secular-Islamist | −0.022 (0.112) | −0.342*** (0.121) | −0.234** (0.111) |
| Income | −0.490*** (0.170) | −0.274 (0.185) | −0.022 (0.155) |
| Age | 0.454*** (0.152) | 0.128 (0.183) | 0.065 (0.161) |
| Milieu | 0.778** (0.360) | 0.393 (0.450) | −0.169 (0.435) |
| Prayer | −0.577*** (0.124) | −0.312** (0.143) | −0.116 (0.144) |
| Gender | −0.998*** (0.381) | 0.101 (0.473) | −0.489 (0.421) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.569** (0.248) | 0.512* (0.308) | −0.063 (0.223) |
| Liberty-justice values | −0.545*** (0.186) | −0.004 (0.242) | −0.464** (0.216) |
| Constant | 0.424 (1.722) | −1.256 (2.147) | 3.452** (1.711) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 624.844 | 624.844 | 624.844 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.14: Multinomial Logit Model (excluding independent category)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| | 2 (Center-left) | 3 (Secular-nationalist) | 4 (Social-democrat) |
| Secular-Islamist | −0.141 (0.157) | −0.400** (0.158) | −0.608*** (0.190) |
| Income | −0.666*** (0.203) | −0.196 (0.179) | 0.055 (0.217) |
| Age | 0.431** (0.209) | −0.164 (0.217) | −0.189 (0.277) |
| Milieu | 0.219 (0.487) | 0.225 (0.527) | −0.783 (0.797) |
| Prayer | −0.415** (0.181) | −0.119 (0.182) | 0.135 (0.247) |
| Gender | −0.755 (0.479) | 0.821 (0.508) | 0.664 (0.681) |
| Authority-nationalist values | 0.424 (0.304) | 0.786** (0.340) | −0.165 (0.350) |
| Liberty-justice values | −0.248 (0.214) | 0.062 (0.235) | −0.165 (0.310) |
| Constant | 2.182 (2.270) | −1.246 (2.537) | 4.408 (2.856) |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 441.973 | 441.973 | 441.973 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Appendix

Table C.1: Full dictionary words in Arabic

| Harm Care | Fairness Cheating | Loyalty Betrayal | Authority Subversion | Sanctity Degradation |
|---|---|---|--|---|
| احسان، انسان، اهتمام، تازر، تسامح، تعاطف، تعاون، تعايش، حفظ، حماية، رفق، سلام، سلمي، شفقة، عطف، غفران، كرم، لطف ماوى، محبة، مساعد، وئام، وجدان، ود ،ودود، اصابة، اعتد، الم، تعسف، تعنيف، جرح، حرب، حقد، سجود، سجن، سحق، ضحية، ضحايا، ضرر، ضعيف، عذاب، عنف، عنيف، فقر، فقير، قتل، قمع، كراهية، مضر، مضرة، معاناة | امانة، امين، انصاف، تساو، توزيع، حق حقوق، شفاف، عادل، عدال، عدل، كرامة، متساو، متعادل، متكافى، متوازن، مساوا، مستقل، مظلوم، معتدل، منصف، ميزان، نزيه، ارتشا، استبداد، استبعاد، استغلال، اضطهاد، اضطهد، انتهاك، انتهاك، انحاز، انحياز، متعصب، تفضيل، تمييز، جائر، رشوة، سرقة، ظالم، يظلم، ظلم، غش، غير امين غير متكافى غير منصف فساد، لامساواة، نفاق، نهب، يستغل | ائتلاف، اتحاد، احترام، اخلاص، اسرة، امة، بلاد، بلد، تاريخ، تحالف، تراث، حليف، تضحية، تقاليد، تقليدي، ثقة، شهدا، شهيد، ضحي عائلة، عادات، عرب، فدى، مخلص، نضحي، هوية، وحدة، وطن، وفاء، وفاق، ولاء، انشقاق، انقلاب، انقلاب، تامر، خائن، خداع، خدع، خصوم، خصم، خلاف، خونة، خيانة، عارض، عدو، غدر، قلة احترام معارض، منقلب، نخون، يعارض | التزام، التزم، الزعيم، امن ارهاب تطبيق، جنود، جيش، حكم، حكومة، دافع، دستور، دفاع، رئيس، زعيم، سلطة، سيادة، شرطة شرطي شرعية طاعة، طبق، قوانين، قانون، دولة قوة، مناضل، ناضل، نضال، نظام، نفوذ، هيبة، احتجاج، ازمة، اضمحلال، اظطراب، انهيار، تخريب، تدمير، تدهور، تمرد، تهدم، حرق، حرب خربة، خطر، دكتات | اخلاق، اسلام، الرسول، القرآن، الله، ايمان، تقوى، جامع، حرمة، حلال، خاشع، خشوع، دين، روحاني، زكاة، سنة، الله شرع، شرف، شريعة، شريف، صالح، صفا، صلاة، عذرا، عفة، عقيدة، قداسة، قيم، متدين، مسلم، معتقد، مقدس، انحراف، تبذير، تفسخ حرام، ذنوب، ذنب، رغبات، رغبة، سلفي، شر شهوة، شهوات، شيطان، عيب، فاسق، فسق، كافر، مقزز، كفر، متعة، نجس |

Figure C.1: Cosine Similarity Ratio (Ennahda/Nidaa) for the Justice Dimension




Figure C.2: Cosine Similarity Ratio (Ennahda/Nidaa) for the Authority Dimension




Table C.2: Coding scheme - Part 1

| Use of moral appeals | Definition | Example | Occurrences |
|-----------------------|--|--|-------------|
| Authority | | | |
| Rule of law | Statements expressing the principle that all individuals and institutions, including governments, are subject to and accountable under the law. | The new constitution will restrict the authority. The previous one did not restrict the authority to the law, that's why we need a new one. (Ennahda) | 31 |
| Legitimacy | Statements expressing the recognition and acceptance of the state's authority by its citizens and other entities, based on adherence to established laws, norms, and principles of governance. | Our legitimacy is to do our duty and feel our duty, and that we will not leave the state empty and no doubt going in it, so we did this and we worked to communicate, but we are the quickest people and the best people to ensure that legitimacy takes over as soon as it exists. This is why we said we will hold elections. (Nidaa Tounes) | 12 |
| Independent judiciary | Statements expressing the need for a judiciary that can operate free from interference or influence from other branches of government or external parties. | We do not interfere in the judiciary; we do not touch it. They blamed us and they are right to do so, but I prefer that the judiciary remains independent. (Nidaa Tounes) | 9 |
| Respect for the state | Statements acknowledging and honoring the authority, sovereignty, and institutions of the government. | After the revolution, there are several expectations, several demands. The truth is, it is hard to respond to all of it at once, because no matter who that person is, he does not have a magic stick, and I am talking about our predecessors, as I respect the state. (Nidaa Tounes) | 24 |

Table C.3: Coding scheme - Part 2

| Use of moral appeals | Definition | Example | Occurrences |
|----------------------|---|---|-------------|
| Justice | | | |
| Islamic value | Statements about justice as an Islamic value prescribed by the Quran and Sunna. | We want Tunisians to reconcile with their religion. We want the Tunisian state to reconcile with its Arab Muslim identity and its cultural heritage. We want justice in the country. The Islamic system is a system of justice. We want justice to prevail in this country. (Ennahda) | 43 |
| Equality | Statements pertaining to the fair and impartial treatment of all individuals, regardless of their religion, background, ethnicity, or status. | This concession, which we gave in our book, approved the principle of absolute equality in assuming positions, including the presidency of the state, in the Tunisian constitution. (Ennahda) | 11 |
| Criminal | Statements expressing the need to administer justice through the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of individuals who violate the law. | But the truth is that the other brothers, who are not our enemies but competitors, ruled for almost three years in violation of the law because we elected them for a period of one year to enact the constitution, so they gave their souls the right to have legislative authority, and this is a clear violation of the law (Nidaa Tounes) | 23 |
| Transitional | Statements about the need to address past human rights abuses, atrocities, and injustices in the phase of a transition. | There are many experiences in reconciliation. Your brothers in Tunisia suffered great wounds, and when they set out for the future, it was necessary to liquidate the file of the wounds of the past, which is a heavy file. Transitional justice is still on the table, and some measures have been taken regarding it. (Ennahda) | 17 |

Reference 1: Beji Caid Essebsi, 2012

لاني انا عندي مفهوم الدولة وين نمشي ما ندافع الا على تونس و مهما يكون شكون هو الي في الحکم في تونس. لان تونس قبل الحکومات. الحکومات تزول و الرجال تمر و الي يبقى تبقى الدولة و نحننا من الناس الي عنا مفهوم الدولة و ندافعو على الدولة

Reference 2: Beji Caid Essebsi, 2012

بالنسبة لي صارت لي خيبة أمل لأنني شفت أننا لسنا نمشي في نفس الاتجاه و لهذا رجعت ، لأن أنا كآنت عندي مسؤولية في وضع القطار على السكة لكن القطار وقف حسب اعتقادي معاش فمة احترام لهيئة الدولة ألي نحب نقولو علاش وصلنا للحالة هذه أولا انا ما كنتش نحب نقولو فما ناس منذ عامين و هم ما كانوا يمنوا بالدولة معاش يحترموا حتى شيء معاش يحترموا بوليس معاش يحترموا الرئيس و معاش يحترموا الي في الحكومة اسمعو البوك و الفأيسبوك و الواحد كلو شيء مؤلم بالرغم الي بالنسبة لينا مادام انسان مسؤول في الدولة نحترموه خاطر نحترموا الدولة معاش فمة احترام الدولة هذه هي الاشكالية بالطبع لو كان الدولة مهابة ما يعملوش الحكاية هذي لأنو يفهمو لأن الدولة تلاحقهم و تكسرهم الله غالب مشاو ضربو قتلونا في رمضان

Reference 3: Rached Ghannouchi, 2013

ونحن نقول الدستور هذا ما يكون صنعوا إلا هالشخص بالضياف و إلا لجنة خبراء وانما صنعه شعب، نحننا الآن شعملتلنا نحننا الثورة هدا تلنا الحرية هادي بقيادة شبابها هداو للشعب كلو و للأمة كلها، هداو الحرية هادي، الآن السلطة هبطت من فوق لتحت و هذا إلي يميز الديمقراطية ولذلك أتم الآن في الحقيقة القاعدة الأساسية للديمقراطية لأن المجتمع مدني، هو أساس الديمقراطية بقدر ما نزل السلطة لتحت أديكا هي الديمقراطية بقدر ما تطلع السلطة الفوق هي الدكتاتورية؛

Reference 4: Rached Ghannouchi, 2013

نحننا الآن نبنو في بنية على أساس الشعب ولذلك نحننا الآن نقولوا السلطة المحلية، السلطة المحلية إلي هي البلديات ومراكز الولايات، المفروض تكون هادي هي السلطة الحقيقية، المجتمع المدني هو السلطة الحقيقية ولذلك نحننا الآن قاعدين نبنو البنية من تحت لفوق. وكلمتكم إلي عندها قيمة الآن لأنو أتم السلطة و أي سلطة تسحب منها ثقة أطيح كأوراق الخريف.

Reference 5: Rached Ghannouchi, 2014

فبرنامج النهضة في الحقيقة جوهره التوافق كلمة التوافق هي المفتاح الرئيسي لبرنامج النهضة بإعتبار أن البلاد لا تزال تمر بمرحلة إنتقالية لا يمكن أن تحكم بمنطق الحزب الواحد ٥١ % كافية للحكم في ديمقراطية مستقرة أما في ديمقراطية ناشئة عمرها ٣ سنوات في الرابع الآن ف ٥١ % غير كافية وإنما مطلوب حكم التوافق أو الإقتراب من الإجماع البلد يقدم على تحولات كبيرة وأمامه خيارات صعبة وخيارات إقتصادية صعبة لا يمكن أن ينجح مع منطق سلطة معارضة سلطة ب ٥١ % و سلطة معارضة ب ٤٩ % لأن هذا سيشل الحركة وهذا الذي حصل السنة الماضية كاد البناء ينهار السنة الماضية بسبب هذه الثنائية ، ثنائية سلطة و معارضة بما يدل على أن هذه الثنائية لا تصلح للأوضاع الإنتقالية وإنما تصلح للديمقراطيات المستقرة

Reference 6: Rached Ghannouchi, 2014

نحن لن نكون حركة معارضة لأن ماعتاش فما حركة معارضة و سلطة لأن الحكومة هذي الحكومة الحاجة هي حكومة وفاق وطن.

الرجال بشر كيف غيرهم من البشر عندهم حقوق و Reference 7: Beji Caid Essebsi, 2013 عندهم واجبات كل من شارك في عمل سيء فإنه يحال على لقضاء بالعدل و بأمور فردية مافيش هذي عقاب جماعي موجود كان في القرون الوسطى. نحن تو دولة نحبو المستقبل نحبو مستقبل زاهر و نحبو نلتحقوا بالأمم المتقدمة مانرجعوش إلى الوراء.

Reference 8: Rached Ghannouchi, 2013

نحن لا ندعوا الناس إلى الإنتقام لا ندعوا الناس إلى الثأر ندعوا الناس إلى العدالة ندعوا إلى أن تأخذ العدالة مجراها فبالحق قامت السموات و الأرض و بالعدل تقوم المجتمعات حتى الدول الكافرة إذا عدلت بين مواطنيها فإن الله سبحانه و تعالى لا يحرمها من الثمار الحيدة

Reference 9: Rached Ghannouchi, 2013

فإذا اردتم أن تكونوا اتباعا للأنبياء عليهم الصلاة والسلام وإمتداداً لحركة الاتجاه الإسلامي التي أسسها شباب، فينبغي أن تظلوا بإستمرار متجددين في فكركم مناضلين من أجل العدل ومن أجل الحرية من أجل مستقبل للإسلام عظيم ومستقبل لتونس ومستقبل منطقة وعندكم فرصة الآن تونس عندها فرصة تاريخية اليوم، أنها كما صنعت يوم أول انطلقت به شرارة الحرية أضاءت العالم وارتفعت به راية تونس في كل شارع يلهج بالحرية من تونس يوم

Reference 10: Rached Ghannouchi, 2013

الثورة التونسية و الحمد لله عملت شيء كبير في العالم الثورة التونسية فتحت صفحة جديدة في تاريخ هذه الدنيا في تاريخ العرب و في تاريخ المسلمين الثورة التونسية عطت رسالة جميلة عن الإسلام أن الإسلام حرية الإسلام ثورة و الإسلام عدل و مساواة و أخوة و سلم و علم و تقدم و لذلك مثل ما الثورة الفرنسية فتحت صفحة جديدة أمام أوروبا أوروبا التي كانت غارقة في التخلف و غارقة في الظلم و ملوك الإطلاق و الكنائس المخرفة الثورة التونسية ، فتحت أوروبا على الديمقراطية و على العلم و على التقدم هناك ملوك طاروا و هناك ملوك عرفوا قدرهم و سلموا السلطة للشعوب و تقدمت أوروبا نحن العالم العربي ظل مخنوق مخنوق الديكتاتورية بأنظمة الفساد و الظلم و الانتخابات إما غير موجودة و الانتخابات ٩٩،٩٩ % إنتخابات مزيفة و إعلام خشي و مجتمع مدني مقهور، الثورة التونسية عطت رسالة أن العرب هم أيضا أن المسلمين يستحقون الحرية و يستحقون الديمقراطية أيضا الثورة التونسية عطت رسالة للعرب أنكم أقوى من حكامكم و أن الطغاة و الجبارين متخافوش منهم راهم جناء.

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