

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A PEACEMAKER: A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT MEDIATION

By
Oscar Ivan Mendoza Hernandez

Submitted to Central European University - Private University
Department of Public Policy

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Public Policy

Supervisor: Professor Thilo Bodenstein

Vienna, Austria
2024

Copyright Notice

I, the undersigned Oscar Ivan Mendoza Hernandez hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

Date: June 3rd, 2024

Name: Oscar Ivan Mendoza Hernandez

Signature: *Oscar Mendoza Hdez*

Abstract

This thesis investigates why the European Union failed to mediate some conflicts but succeeded in others, aiming to identify conditions for successful EU mediation worldwide. The research employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a method that identifies necessary and sufficient conditions by analyzing various combinations of factors leading to specific outcomes. Findings reveal that success rests on member-state unity, internal coordination, legitimacy, and strategic use of incentives and threats. Direct mediation is crucial for conflicts near EU borders, while external interference and lack of legitimacy undermine efforts. Unsuccessful mediations often lack coordination among EU actors and perceived legitimacy. This study uncovers patterns and conditions influencing mediation outcomes by systematically analyzing diverse cases. The research offers insights that can enhance EU mediation strategies, contributing to the broader field of international conflict resolution. The findings provide a framework for evaluating and improving EU mediation practices and supporting global peacebuilding efforts by emphasizing internal cohesion and tailored strategies. This thesis stresses the importance of internal unity, coordination, and legitimacy, suggesting that the EU can be a more effective global mediator by strategically using its diverse toolbox in conflict resolution.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1
LITERATURE REVIEW	5
THE EU MEDIATION TOOLBOX	7
THE EU'S DEFINITIONS OF PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS	10
WHAT IS SUCCESS?	12
WHY IS THE EU A (UN)SUCCESSFUL MEDIATOR?	14
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	17
CONFLICT MEDIATION	17
SUCCESS	19
CONDITIONS LEADING TO EU'S SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION	20
<i>EU member states' unity</i>	21
<i>Coordination among EU actors</i>	21
<i>Legitimacy</i>	22
<i>Use of sticks and carrots</i>	22
<i>Role of External Actors</i>	22
<i>Prospect of EU membership</i>	23
METHODOLOGY	24
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS	27
CASE SELECTION	27
DATA COLLECTION	28
QCA ANALYSIS	30
<i>Calibration</i>	30
<i>Sufficient Conditions Leading to a Successful EU Mediation</i>	32
<i>Testing Robustness with Cluster Diagnostics</i>	36
<i>Necessary conditions leading to a successful EU mediation</i>	39
<i>Sufficient conditions leading to an unsuccessful EU mediation</i>	41
<i>Necessary conditions leading to an unsuccessful EU mediation</i>	44
CONCLUSION	46
APPENDIX	48
BIBLIOGRAPHY	64

List of Figures

FIGURE 1: SUFFICIENCY PLOT	34
FIGURE 2: NECESSITY PLOT	41
FIGURE 3: SUFFICIENCY PLOT	43

List of Tables

TABLE 1: CALIBRATION TABLE	31
---	----

Introduction

Why did the European Union (EU) fail to mediate the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict but was successful in its mediating of the conflict in North Macedonia? Are there any recipes that allow the EU to mediate any conflict in the world successfully? The EU's conflict mediation efforts are diverse and multifaceted, reflecting the complex nature of international diplomacy and conflict resolution. Despite its robust framework and extensive experience, the EU's success in conflict mediation is not guaranteed. The Armenian-Azerbaijan and North Macedonian conflicts offer two starkly different outcomes, prompting an exploration into the conditions necessary and sufficient for the success or failure of EU mediation efforts.

That is why this thesis seeks to answer the research question: What (combinations of) conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the success or failure of EU conflict mediation efforts? By examining various cases of EU mediation, this research aims to uncover patterns and conditions determining the effectiveness of the EU's conflict resolution strategies. This thesis aims to contribute to a broader understanding of international conflict mediation by systematically analyzing the conditions that influence the success or failure of EU mediation efforts. The findings offer insights into the complex interplay of factors determining mediation outcomes, providing a framework for evaluating and improving EU mediation strategies. This research enhances theoretical knowledge that could be used by policymakers and practitioners involved in conflict resolution.

Given the ongoing global conflict, examining the EU's mediation efforts is timely and relevant. As conflicts continue to arise and evolve, the need for effective mediation strategies becomes

increasingly urgent. The EU, with its unique position as a supranational entity with significant economic and political influence, has the potential to play a crucial role in promoting peace and stability. However, its success depends on a deep understanding of the conditions that facilitate or hinder its mediation efforts. This thesis addresses this need by thoroughly analyzing the EU's mediation strategies and outcomes. This research aims to support the EU in enhancing its role as a global mediator through a combination of theoretical exploration, empirical analysis, and practical recommendations. By identifying the key factors contributing to successful mediation, this thesis offers a roadmap for the EU to navigate the complexities of international diplomacy and conflict resolution more effectively.

The structure of this thesis is designed to systematically address the research question and provide a comprehensive understanding of the EU's mediation efforts. The Literature Review delves into the EU's role and approach in international conflict mediation. This section reviews the key strategies and principles that guide EU mediation efforts, emphasizing the EU's dual approach of direct and indirect mediation. It examines specific case studies and their varying outcomes, offering insights into the EU's complexities and challenges in its mediation roles. The literature review also highlights the EU's significant influence in global peace talks and its commitment to promoting stability and resolving conflicts worldwide. Following the literature review, the Theoretical Framework section defines and conceptualizes key terms such as "success" and "mediation." This section is crucial for setting the foundation of the research, as it clarifies the operational definitions used in the analysis. The framework explains the conditions considered in the study, including EU member states' unity, coordination among EU actors, legitimacy, the use of incentives and threats, the role of external actors, and the prospect of EU membership. By

establishing these definitions and conditions, the theoretical framework ensures a clear and consistent approach to evaluating the EU's mediation efforts.

The Methodology section outlines the research design and methods to answer the research question. This thesis employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a robust tool well-suited for identifying necessary and sufficient conditions in complex scenarios. QCA allows for the analysis of various combinations of conditions that lead to specific outcomes, making it ideal for this study's goal of understanding what makes EU mediation efforts succeed or fail. This section also describes integrating qualitative content analysis and document analysis for data collection. Document analysis provides in-depth context and background, while qualitative content analysis helps to categorize and interpret data systematically. The calibration process for transforming qualitative data into set memberships for QCA is detailed, ensuring transparency and replicability in the research process. The Empirical Analysis section examines various EU mediation cases to identify patterns of success and failure. This section applies the QCA methodology to real-world cases, analyzing the sufficient and necessary conditions for successful and unsuccessful mediation efforts. By comparing different cases, the empirical analysis highlights common factors and unique circumstances that influence the outcomes of EU mediation. This comparative approach provides a nuanced understanding of the EU's strengths and weaknesses in conflict mediation and offers practical insights into how the EU can improve its strategies. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the key findings and their contributions to understanding EU conflict mediation.

In short, this thesis seeks to answer the critical question of what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the success or failure of EU conflict mediation efforts and aims to contribute to the

broader field of international conflict resolution. By offering a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the EU's mediation efforts, this research provides valuable insights and practical recommendations that can help improve the effectiveness of EU mediation and support global peacebuilding efforts.

Literature Review

The European Union (EU) has established a strong track record in international conflict mediation, participating in peace talks, and supporting peace initiatives worldwide. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU has expanded its mediation efforts beyond the civil wars in former Yugoslavia to include other countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Egypt, Yemen, and Myanmar. The EU, acting as a leading mediator, co-mediator, or support mediator, has encouraged discussions between opposing parties and aided other international actors' mediation efforts. The EU's mediation approach falls into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct mediation is when EU representatives (co)lead mediate negotiations. Indirect mediation, on the other hand, is when activities like funding, diplomatic support, and building up people's skills help third-party mediation efforts (Bergmann et al. 2018, 162-163; Müller and Bergmann 2020, 151–152). In general, mediators can act as facilitators, formulators, or manipulators, each with a unique role in affecting negotiation dynamics and outcomes (Davis 2008, 180–192). Facilitation implies opening communication channels without making substantive ideas; formulation entails framing conversations and recommending compromises; and manipulation entails using authority and resources to affect results (Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 962).

The EU uses mediation across all conflict phases, incorporating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and Community instruments (Bergmann et al. 2018, 159). Conflict mediation is a key component of the EU's diplomacy, intending to prevent disputes from growing into violent conflicts, avoiding further escalation of current hostilities, and resolving conflicts whenever possible. The Lisbon Treaty establishes

conflict prevention and peacebuilding as primary goals of the EU's foreign policy. Article 21(2)(c) requires the Union to design and pursue policies to "preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security" while situating these efforts within the broader settings of the CFSP and CSDP (Pavlov 2023, 282). Furthermore, the "European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy," adopted in June 2016, stresses mediation as a crucial tool for preventing and resolving violent conflicts, recognizing its role in tackling worldwide fragility (Bergmann et al. 2018, 159). This strategy is consistent with the EU's broader goal of promoting international peace and security, a major component of its mission and a crucial foreign policy goal (General Secretariat of the Council 2020, 4).

The literature on EU mediation is still in its early stages, with two major branches. The first examines the principles, concepts, and policies that underpin EU mediation (Davis 2014; Girke 2015). The second section focuses on specific examples of the EU's influence and efficacy in peace talks (Brandenburg 2017; Forsberg and Seppo 2011; Girke 2015). These tactics highlight the EU's adaptable and diversified approach to conflict resolution, which aims to turn conflicts into stable and nonviolent environments (Kirca 2020, 1). The European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003 emphasizes the EU's desire to share global security obligations and contribute to a better world.

In the same way, article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) underlines the EU's basic mandates of maintaining peace, preventing conflict, and improving international security. The EU Initially focused on conflict prevention through development policy, progressively adding political and diplomatic measures through the CFSP, as seen by the foundation of the CSDP and supported by the Lisbon Treaty's creation of the EEAS (Shepherd 2012, 62–63; Kirca 2020, 22–23). The

EU's mediation policy reflects its internal dynamics of peace formation and integration by utilizing technical and financial aid to address regional issues while promoting stability and integration (Visoka and Doyle 2016, 863–866). This holistic approach addresses structural conflict drivers, confirming the EU's commitment to global peace and security despite inherent challenges (De Man, Müller, and Tyushka 2023, 4).

The EU mediation toolbox

The EU's peace mediation operations include promoting community-level conversations, mediating between warring party leaders, and assisting local ceasefire negotiations (European Union External Action 2021, 1). According to Zajączkowski (2020), the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) enhances the EU's foreign engagement by executing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) rather than providing a joint defense structure. The EU's approach to mediation is adaptable, allowing it to take on complementary tasks when other parties are better suited to lead mediation efforts. This adaptation includes improving coordination across various mediation actors to ensure strategic coherence and complementarity (European External Action Service, 2023, 9). The EU frequently integrates multiple mediation tracks, promoting more cohesive and inclusive processes through Track 2 diplomacy with NGOs and Track 3 efforts with community and grassroots actors¹ (European External Action Service 2023, 14). In armed conflicts where parties prioritize military options, the EU fosters confidence-building measures by promoting reciprocal steps that can lead to ceasefires and broader political processes (European External Action Service 2023, 34). Moreover, the EU supports ceasefire accords in various ways, ranging from minor responsibilities as witnesses or observers to more significant roles as

¹ Track 1 is when the EU engage with the leaders of the parties in conflict

guarantors who provide security assurances through the deployment of military or civilian troops (European External Action Service 2023, 35).

The EU's substantial economic strength allows it to impose sanctions on conflict parties to pressure them to adhere to peace treaties or human rights guarantees. It uses development funding and trade agreements as conditional tools for conflict resolution (Cooley 2018, 15). In its neighborhood, the EU uses the potential of association or full integration as a dispute resolution tool, deploying both positive conditionality (promising advantages for meeting particular conditions) and negative conditionality (imposing consequences for violating responsibilities) (Cooley 2018, 15–16). This conditionality can shift policymakers' cost-benefit calculus in conflict situations, prompting them to cooperate with mediation attempts (Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 959). Furthermore, the EU's influence goes beyond traditional power dynamics since it uses its normative authority to shape international norms (Manners 2002, 239). If competing parties agree on the EU's view of conflict resolution, the EU can successfully contribute to conflict settlement (Cooley 2018, 15). However, Ker-Lindsay (2012, 88) contends that the mere promise of EU entry is insufficient without the ongoing management of political incentives to promote full participation by all parties. For example, during the Euromaidan crisis, the EU's material leverage proved unsuccessful, showing the limitations of manipulative techniques without the promise of membership (Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann 2018, 324). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, conditionality with the potential of admission proved unhelpful in state-building challenges, demonstrating that such policies are not always effective (Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann 2018, 324).

On the other hand, given Serbia's specific accession ambitions, the EU's participation in the Kosovo-Serbia war was considerably more effective (Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann 2018, 324). The EU is frequently motivated to act as a mediator because it can facilitate peaceful settlements and influence the terms of the agreement to its advantage. These motivations are boosted by humanitarian concerns and larger security, economic, and reputational considerations (Bergmann et al. 2018, 167–168). These factors influence the EU's strategic mediation, focusing on regions with strong geopolitical and economic linkages to the EU, such as its eastern neighborhood and the Balkans (Scalera and Wiegand 2018, 434). Economic and normative biases support this geographical prejudice, guiding the EU's mediation efforts through trading relationships and opportunities to exert normative influence (Scalera and Wiegand 2018, 435).

Despite its comprehensive approach, the EU has a significant bias toward mediating conflicts in neighboring countries, influenced by geographical proximity and economic interests. The EU's limited involvement in remote countries like Asia and Africa, where economic affinity and strategic interests are less apparent, demonstrates this inclination (Scalera and Wiegand 2018, 448–449). However, the EU's normative orientation may eventually lead to expanding its mediation scope, motivated by broader humanitarian and normative concerns. Besides, the Ethno-political disputes in the European neighborhood, whether violent or frozen, pose substantial dangers to the EU's stability and security due to their closeness and potential spillovers. As a result, EU member states and institutions have taken an active role in addressing these problems, aiming to contribute to their settlement and gradual resolution (Tocci 2004, 1).

The EU's definitions of peacebuilding efforts

The literature is split when evaluating the EU's conceptualization of conflict resolution. Some scholars think that European integration can resolve identity disputes. In contrast, others believe the EU's function is to allow institutional accommodation of competing identities through mechanisms such as consociational power-sharing agreements (Cooley 2018, 53). This argument focuses on the complexity and diversity of the EU's mediation efforts and the numerous theoretical approaches to interpreting their impact on conflict transformation. Defining peacebuilding in the EU context is a difficult and sensitive issue. Take the example of Duke and Courtier (in Pavlov 2023, 283), who emphasize the fluid character of peacebuilding, which makes it difficult to distinguish from similar ideas such as conflict prevention, mediation, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilization. The lack of a widely accepted politico-legal definition also exacerbates this difficulty, forcing EU institutions to adopt their own interpretations. This ambiguity extends to lower-level peace notions inside the EU's policy framework, hampering efforts to reach a common view and approach. For instance, "conflict management," often synonymously with "peacebuilding," encompasses diverse behaviors and strategies for handling conflict situations. According to Bercovitch (2011, 93–94), conflict management tactics range from military action to negotiation and mediation, focusing on nonviolent strategies to reduce harmful conflict features and increase positive outcomes. Mediation, a subcategory of dispute resolution, involves an outside person assisting in discussions to change attitudes or actions without using force or legal authority. This process, known as 'aided negotiation,' consists of four key components: the opposing parties, the mediator, the mediation procedure, and the mediation context.

Consequently, Ramsbotham et al. (in Shepherd 2012, 65) define conflict management as "the settlement and containment of violent conflict," emphasizing the CSDP's utility in "conflict containment," which includes peacekeeping and war limitation within the broader scope of conflict resolution. The EU's approach to civilian crisis management is similarly built, with ambiguous language. According to Zajączkowski (2020, 10), non-military missions aim to prevent crisis escalation and contribute to resolution. In terms of mediation, the EU's Peace Mediation Guidelines put the EU Peace Mediation Concept into practice, guiding a wide range of EU mediators, including those from the EEAS and non-governmental organizations. These principles cover mediation, facilitation, dialogue, and mediation support, demonstrating the EU's comprehensive understanding of peace mediation (European External Action Service 2023, 5). The EU's Integrated Approach to Conflict Mediation is multidimensional, multi-phase, multi-level, and multilateral. This comprehensive strategy entails implementing all relevant policies and instruments for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. An EU mediator must coordinate these efforts with the EU's broader political, economic, and security interests while recognizing the complex interplay between local, national, regional, and global levels (European External Action Service 2023, 7-8). This method also emphasizes multilateral engagement, creating collaboration with international entities such as the United Nations, OSCE, AU, and NATO to strengthen mediation efforts. As a result, a thorough examination of the literature reveals a broad consensus on many crucial mediation criteria: third-party engagement, voluntary and nonviolent processes, and nonbinding outcomes. Mediation is most commonly defined as a method in which disputants seek aid from an outsider to resolve problems without using force or legal authority (Bergmann et al. 2018, 161–162).

This framework relies heavily on the EU's Mediation Support Team (MST) at Brussels's European External Action Service (EEAS) headquarters. Established in 2011, the MST provides mentoring and training to EU workers and supports mediation efforts by forming networks with international actors, such as the United Nations Mediation Support Unit (Bergmann et al. 2018, 165). According to recent data, most of the EU's mediation actions focus on helping third-party projects. Between 2014 and 2019, the EU supported over 60 mediation initiatives through its Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP), as well as 33 efforts by African regional organizations through the African Peace Facility's Early Response Mechanism (ERM) between 2012 and 2016 (Müller and Bergmann 2020, 150). These events show the EU's strategic use of mediation support as a tool for promoting global peace efforts.

What is success?

Understanding what constitutes success or failure in mediation and dispute resolution is a difficult and complex undertaking. Despite substantial research into the causes, evolution, and management of disagreements, the concept of success still needs to be more precise and consistent. Without a comprehensive framework, people frequently define success on a case-by-case basis, resulting in various, sometimes ineffective, explanations. This inconsistency requires a more in-depth discussion to establish a clear and consistent understanding of what success in mediation entails. A range of factors, such as expectations, outcome, process, and efficiency, can measure mediation success, but those criteria have some serious downsides. For instance, a successful process may empower parties and address their issues respectfully, even if it does not result in a physical agreement. However, a mediation procedure with procedural difficulties may still result in a suspension of violence or a formal agreement (Bercovitch 2011, 95). Evaluating mediation success versus pre-mediation goals is simple, but it offers challenges due to varying expectations and goals

(Bercovitch 2011, 99–100). Consequently, efficiency in mediation's procedural and temporal dimensions is critical, but it comes second to achieving substantive outcomes (Bercovitch 2011, 96).

Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank (1987) provide other criteria such as fairness, participant satisfaction, wisdom, and stability, yet these abstract concepts make measuring success difficult (in Bercovitch 2011, 95). For example, participant satisfaction can be a critical predictor of success because satisfied parties are more likely to commit to mediation results, increasing stability (Bercovitch 2011, 96). However, satisfaction is subjective and varies greatly depending on individual goals and perspectives. Effectiveness, as judged by tangible outcomes such as behavioral changes, agreements, or ceasefires, is a more concrete measure of success that is less susceptible to perceptual conflicts (Bercovitch 2011, 96). Other authors claim that we should evaluate mediation performance not only in terms of immediate results but also in terms of long-term stability and conflict impact. As a global conflict manager, the EU must assess whether its interventions have resulted in long-term peace and positive change on the ground (Whitman and Stefan 2012, 31–32). Thus, success in conflict resolution encompasses a wide range of criteria, such as negotiating speedy ceasefires, resolving the root causes of conflict, and promoting long-term stability (De Man, Müller, and Tyushka 2023, 12–13).

Focusing on the EU context, some scholars argue that we should assess mediation success from an EU-specific and conflict-specific standpoint. The internal EU perspective on mediator success assesses whether the EU has successfully met its objectives as a mediator in a given conflict. This perspective may also include punctuality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness (Radt 2012, 243–245).

The external conflict viewpoint examines whether the EU mediation effort positively impacted the conflict and its resolution, such as lower violence and greater stability (Rodt 2012, 244–25). As a result, this dimension reveals a significant change in the disputants' behavior during and after the mediation process (In Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 960–961). Then, we should examine the effectiveness of EU mediation in terms of the EU's overall peacekeeping and mediation activities. This comprehensive evaluation entails expanding support for peace processes, improving process design, and strengthening dialogue infrastructure. Furthermore, advising and training mediators, empowering insider mediators, improving gender equality and women's empowerment, and encouraging the inclusion of marginalized groups are all necessary components of a comprehensive evaluation of EU mediation success (General Secretariat of the Council 2020, 4). A comprehensive approach ensures a thorough knowledge of the EU's role in the larger peace process and dialogue ecosystem, including long-term consequences and structural changes (General Secretariat of the Council 2020, 11).

Why is the EU a (un)successful mediator?

The EU's effectiveness as a mediator is influenced by several factors, such as its institutional framework and the interests of its member states. The EU's foreign and security policy decision-making process requires unanimity, which can lead to suboptimal outcomes based on the lowest common denominator. This limitation affects the effectiveness of the EU's initiatives in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). (Zajączkowski 2020, 19). Prioritizing sovereign rights over collective action complicates European decision-making (Zajączkowski 2020, 19; Froitzheim and Söderbaum 2013, 5). Operational constraints such as a lack of political will, an insufficient mission budget, and coordination issues between civil and military personnel all impede the EU's crisis management

efficacy (Froitzheim and Söderbaum 2013, 5). According to Zajączkowski (2020, 26), Siniver (2012, 134), and Froitzheim and Söderbaum (2013, 8), policy deadlocks and poor issue solutions arise from the complex relationships and competing objectives among EU mission participants, including non-EU actors.

When the disputing parties view the EU as legitimate, EU unity, consistent rhetoric and actions, and a flexible mediation strategy enable EU mediation to perform better (Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann 2018, 325). However, additional mediators and crises can jeopardize these attempts (Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann 2018, 325). Whitman and Stefan (2012) underline the importance of member states' political will and the nature of the conflict in determining the EU's role as mediators and crisis managers. Effective interventions require horizontal and vertical coherence within the EU, which includes internal coordination and alignment of member state policies with EU central institutions (Froitzheim and Söderbaum 2013, 8). To effectively mediate, the EU must demonstrate internal coherence and leverage by adopting a consistent mediation approach (Müller and Bergmann 2020, 155). Gillespie (2010, 86) argues that the EU's lack of state-like traits restricts its participation in global conflict settlement. The CFSP faces a particularly difficult challenge from competing member state interests in this environment. Furthermore, Tocci (2004, 13) proposes that conditionality may indirectly impact conflict resolution by influencing policy areas relevant to the conflict resolution agenda.

The research shows that the EU's unanimity requirement, plurality of parties, and normative power impact its mediation effectiveness. Enhancing EU coherence, effectively leveraging its normative

impact, and maintaining ongoing political participation are critical to boosting its mediation and dispute-resolution capabilities.

Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann (2018, 327) propose that a future study should examine the unique dispute characteristics that shape the domestic reception of EU mediation. Understanding these qualities can help mediation efforts be more effective and widely accepted in conflict zones. Moreover, Brandenburg (2017, 3) highlights a need for more current research, primarily concentrating on situations where the EU acts as the primary mediator. This emphasis ignores the various important roles that the EU may play, such as co-mediator, facilitator, or supporter of third-party mediation initiatives. By addressing these shortcomings, we can gain further insight into adjusting and enhancing EU mediation for different conflict circumstances. This gap is exactly what this thesis aims to fill. By considering these factors, scholars and practitioners can develop more sophisticated tactics that use the EU's capabilities in various mediation roles. This broader knowledge will help support peacebuilding efforts and strengthen conflict mediation processes.

Theoretical Framework

As highlighted in the literature review, the primary concepts of this thesis, success and mediation, lack consensus definitions and are studied from various perspectives. This thesis aims to answer the following research question: What conditions (combinations) are necessary and/or sufficient for the success or failure of EU conflict mediation efforts? The research's key concepts must be properly defined to answer this question. Specifically, defining success in the context of EU mediation not only reveals what constitutes a failure but is also critical for operationalizing these notions in the empirical sections of this research. The method used is dependent on specific definitions to enable correct data analysis, interpretation, and calibration of outcomes.

Furthermore, a clear definition of mediation will help narrow the cases that can be included in the empirical section of the study, which is fundamental for keeping the study focused. By defining these concepts, this thesis will provide greater clarity and transparency, allowing readers to better understand the research pathway and the framework within which the findings are interpreted.

Conflict mediation

Even though certain authors' conceptualizations of mediation may differ slightly, Bercovitch et al. (1991, 8) provide the most comprehensive definition as "a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law." This definition emphasizes mediation's voluntary and nonviolent aspect, which is critical for understanding EU mediation practices (Bergmann et al. 2018, 161-162).

Defining conflict mediation in the EU also demands an awareness of the various mediation approaches and actors involved. As previously stated, the EU uses a specific typology of mediation roles, such as leading, funding, and accompanying mediation (General Secretariat of the Council 2020, 10-11). The essence of these roles can be divided into two categories: direct and indirect mediation. This thesis suggests that this simplified categorization will be the foundation for further empirical study. Direct mediation entails the EU negotiating directly with the opposing parties, independently or in collaboration with other international actors such as the United Nations. In contrast, indirect mediation refers to the EU's financial, technical, or expert help to other mediators, greatly increasing the scope and impact of its mediation activities (Bergmann et al. 2018, 162).

Significantly, the EU's mediators do not have a formal, unique role. This flexibility enables a wide range of EU representatives, including the High Representative, EU Special Representatives, and even the Council Presidency, to participate in mediation roles, reflecting the decentralized nature of EU foreign policy in conflict resolution (Bergmann et al. 2018, 162; Girke 2015, 513; Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 959). Hence, this thesis contends that any attempt by these parties to mediate, whether by manipulation, facilitation, or formulation, should be considered an act of EU mediation if officially acknowledged by the European Union. The EU Council often provides this official legitimacy, and indirectly, the member states legitimize mediation activities. Furthermore, the overall purpose of EU mediation is to facilitate conversations between conflict parties and to resolve issues with the assistance of an accepted third party. The specific goals and methods of mediation may differ depending on the nature of the dispute and the parties' expectations. This approach is backed by the General Secretariat of the Council's comprehensive definition of

mediation support, which includes facilitation, dialogue, and advising elements (General Secretariat of the Council 2020, 3).

This conceptual framework stresses that EU mediation can take many forms and include numerous parties. Such a framework not only covers the entirety of the EU's mediation activities but also aligns with the EU's broader foreign policy goals of conflict prevention and crisis management. This perspective holds that any recognized mediation effort by an EU player becomes an official act of EU mediation, regardless of its form or type of involvement (Davis 2008, 180).

Success

Determining success in EU mediation remains a difficulty. According to Bercovitch (2011, 93-102), success is frequently assumed rather than systematically defined, and many studies use various, at times inconsistent, indicators. To solve this issue, success will be assessed from an internal EU and an external conflict perspective. This dual approach ensures that the evaluation is based on EU objectives and real improvements in the conflict context (Rodt 2012, 243-245). As a result, the criteria for determining whether or not an EU mediation case is successful will be based on the EU's internal and external goals. The EU's internal criterion explores whether the mediation achieved the EU's specific objectives. In fact, The EU defines *success* as achieving these aims, representing the Union's operational capabilities (Whitman and Stefan 2012, 31). External Goal Attainment assesses if the mediation contributed to reducing violence or avoided further escalation and aggravation of the conflict. From this perspective, mediation success is determined by observable changes in conflict behavior during and after the mediation (Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 960-961).

The criteria of internal and external goal attainment were chosen because they give actual, visible evidence that can be found in policy documents, EU reports, and changes in conflict intensity. These indicators are less prone to subjective interpretation, providing a strong framework for evaluating mediation efforts (Rodt 2012, 243-245; Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 960-961). In addition, while other criteria, such as satisfaction, fairness, and overall effectiveness, are important, they are significantly influenced by personal perceptions and biases, making them less accurate for consistent evaluation (Bercovitch 2011, 95-97). Furthermore, criteria on the stability and wisdom of the mediation process add complexity that is difficult to measure clearly. These criteria cover broad, abstract concepts that are difficult to quantify and evaluate in an academic study.

Finally, by focusing on internal and external goal attainment, this research takes a pragmatic approach, selecting frequently documented and analyzable criteria. This method enables a methodical and reliable evaluation of EU mediation efforts while reducing subjectivity and the practical challenges associated with less tangible success measures. This approach guarantees that the evaluation of mediation success is based on observable outcomes and matches the EU's operational goals, resulting in a clear and practical framework for analysis.

Conditions leading to EU's successful mediation

In the literature review, I already examined the conditions that make the EU a (un)successful mediator. However, it is critical to conceptualize these conditions and explain the theoretical rationale for selecting the conditions that will be used in the empirical study.

EU member states' unity

Based on the literature, effective mediation requires political consensus and structural coherence within the EU. EU internal divides can undermine credibility and confidence among conflict parties, thereby affecting EU mediation efforts (Zajączkowski 2020, 19; Froitzheim and Söderbaum 2013, 8; Müller and Bergmann 2020, 155; Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 962-963, 969). Furthermore, EU unity indicates sufficient political will, resulting in the presence of strong commitment, which is an essential requirement for the Union's dedication to effective conflict resolution (Whitman and Stefan 2012, 36; Davis 2008, 184-185; Whitman and Wolff 2012, 11; Gillespie 2010, 86). Mediation efforts could backfire if EU member states do not work together. This impasse is typically caused by differences in EU member states' interests or values, resulting in conflicting messages and methods, reducing the overall efficacy and coherence of the EU's mediation activities.

Coordination among EU actors

Several scholars point out the importance of effective coordination among EU bodies, aligning Member States' policies with EU institutions' mediation activities (European External Action Service 2023, 8; Froitzheim and Söderbaum 2013, 8-9; Müller and Bergmann 2020, 155; Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 962-963, 968). The risk of lacking coordination includes lower mediation effectiveness since divergent efforts might result in opposite strategies that confuse or alienate conflict parties. This lack of coordination may undermine the EU's reputation as a trustworthy mediator, making it harder to maintain stakeholder trust and possibly prolonging or accelerating conflicts.

Legitimacy

The EU's legitimacy is vital; if the parties do not regard the EU as a legitimate mediator, they are unlikely to participate in and accept the EU's mediation efforts. This legitimacy can be strengthened through a consistent strategy that includes clear and credible policies and specifications (Cooley 2018, 15; Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann 2018, 325; Tocci 2005, 142, 145; Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 960). Lack of legitimacy reduces the EU's influence and authority in mediation processes, limiting its ability to support negotiations and implement long-term peace solutions successfully.

Use of sticks and carrots

Managing political incentives and strategically using EU resources to encourage compromises are key. This includes the nuanced role of conditionality in influencing policy fields related to conflict resolution, peace efforts, and the bargaining positions of involved states or entities (Ker-Lindsay 2012, 88; Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann 2018, 324; Tocci 2005, 145; Müller and Bergmann 2020, 155; Tocci 2004, 13). Ineffective management or misalignment of these incentives can result in protracted negotiations because parties may not be properly motivated to compromise or may doubt the EU's commitment and competence to follow through on promises and threats.

Role of External Actors

Zajączkowski (2020, 26) explores the complicated relationships and opposing agendas between EU mission participants, including non-EU actors. Furthermore, the involvement of global powers such as Russia, China, and the United States could hinder EU mediation attempts. According to Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann (2018, 325), the involvement of additional mediators may

damage EU mediation efforts. This dynamic introduces competing interests and strategies, which might decrease the EU's impact and effectiveness in conflict mediation scenarios.

Prospect of EU membership

The prospect of EU membership is a critical tool in EU mediation efforts. This condition addresses the strategic use of the membership promise as a motivator for warring parties to cooperate with EU-mediated negotiations. Ker-Lindsay (2012, 88) emphasizes the importance of actively controlling political incentives related to admission to engage all stakeholders properly. Meanwhile, Niemann, Haastrup, and Bergmann (2018, 324) highlight the strategy's variable efficacy, noting that in some settings, such as Ukraine, the EU's leverage was constrained because membership was not an option. In contrast, in discussions such as the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, EU leverage was stronger due to the concrete prospect of accession (Bergmann and Niemann 2015, 962-969). This condition emphasizes the importance of the EU's capacity to present credible membership possibilities, which can substantially impact the outcomes of its mediation efforts.

In conclusion, this thesis establishes a solid theoretical framework for exploring the nature of EU mediation efforts. Defining key terms such as success and mediation to establish a clear research trajectory. By clearly defining these concepts, the research improves the precision of its empirical analysis and offers a systematic lens through which to evaluate the conditions required for effective EU mediation. The thesis seeks to contribute to a deeper knowledge of the conditions at play in EU conflict mediation by examining how different conditions impact EU mediation outcomes. This approach thus serves as the foundation for exploring the potential for success or failure of the EU's mediation efforts, addressing the core research question with theoretical rigor and practical significance.

Methodology

The main objective of this thesis is to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for either the success or failure of EU conflict mediation efforts. Given EU mediation's complex and diverse nature, evaluating the various outcomes requires an empirical framework that can handle the complex combination of multiple factors. This is precisely where Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is most useful. It is known that QCA is the most advanced tool in set-theoretic methods. It effectively provides causal interpretation of complex data, showing how different combinations of conditions lead to different outcomes (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 1; 2010 398–401). QCA's distinctive feature is its use of truth tables, which allow for examining causal complexity such as equifinality, where several paths can lead to the same end, and conjunctural causation, which highlights how different conditions combine to produce an event. These capacities are crucial for analyzing EU mediation, as various factors may interact to influence the mediation's success or failure (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 399–400). Furthermore, QCA employs logical minimization principles, allowing for a data description that is both concise and complete. Logical minimization simplifies information by finding similarities and differences in cases with the same result, making the explanation shorter but equally logical. This process distinguishes between essential and incidental conditions, allowing for the identification of the most important ones. To extract major causal patterns from dense and often laborious data sets, QCA uses logical minimization to obtain clearer, more streamlined insights from complicated scenarios.

Similarly, the increased use of QCA goes beyond its role as a simple data analysis technique. It is primarily a comprehensive research methodology that incorporates and strongly relies on

additional qualitative approaches to understand the cases and conditions under examination better. The breadth and quality of case knowledge heavily influence the strength and clarity of QCA outcomes, making this integration crucial (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 398–400). To ensure complete coverage and the correct calibration of conditions, this research extensively employs document analysis and qualitative content analysis. These methods are core tools for obtaining accurate, context-rich information for case definition and condition determination. Document analysis is useful in research because it helps understand and develop knowledge on any issue. It also reveals the context of the situations studied (such as changes, progress, and new events). Additionally, it provides supplementary data that may be useful and can corroborate and verify findings (Bowen 2009, 27–30). I chose the data sources because they provide details on the execution of EU missions and their characteristics and frequently assess the EU's performance. Thus, the information in these documents enables the calibration of conditions for the QCA analysis. Using various sources, such as scholarly articles and policy evaluations, helps offset any biases and provides a more balanced perspective on EU mediation efforts.

To do qualitative content analysis, I will follow Halperin and Heath's four-step process (2020, 377–384). I will begin the analysis by identifying the material to be analyzed and verifying its accessibility. I will collect data from various sources, such as EU publications, newspapers, academic research articles, and policy evaluations. I will then define the categories I aim to search for the material. These categories will include the conditions specified in the literature review and theoretical framework. Next, I will select the recording unit, consisting of sentences from the papers under analysis. The final stage is to create a protocol for selecting and assigning units of interest to previously created categories. After finishing the four-step process, I will start coding

and gathering the data required to calibrate the existence or absence of a condition. Descriptive coding will summarize the main theme of each examined excerpt (Saldaña 2013, 4). As a result, after calibrating the conditions and outcomes, I will be able to run the analysis in R (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021).

Regarding potential biases, it is accepted that there may be differences between the EU's internal assessment of mediation success and external scholarly reviews. I will rely on the EU's internal and external objective attainment criteria to solve this. This approach allows for the identification of various arguments and the assignment of results. In cases of disagreement, I will highlight them during the calibration process and explain the chosen value, sometimes relying on a majority viewpoint if no consensus occurs. Furthermore, employing a mix of sources rather than only EU reports helps to mitigate the EU's potential bias in presenting itself as an effective mediator. As a result, QCA emerges as the best technique for this research, offering the tools needed to systematically investigate and determine the conditions that lead to the success or failure of EU mediation attempts. This technique encourages a comprehensive analysis of complex causation. It is consistent with this study's case-oriented, comparative aspect, allowing for significant conclusions that are both theoretically sound and practically useful.

Empirical analysis

Case selection

I selected the cases based on multiple instances recognized by the European Union as successful mediations, including those in Mali, Yemen, and the Serbia-Kosovo conflict (EU External Action 2021). Acknowledging that the EU may only highlight its accomplishments, I broadened my search to include other mediation cases discussed in books and journals. For instance, Julian Bergmann's "The European Union as International Mediator: Brokering Stability and Peace in the Neighbourhood" (2020) was particularly insightful.

Some cases were dismissed due to a need for more information in English, Spanish, or Russian, the languages I can read. For example, despite the EU's classification of the Central African Republic as a mediation case (European Union External Action 2021), I could not obtain complete details, probably due to the case's recent nature. Additionally, situations like Moldova and Transnistria, a separatist territory, were omitted due to their military aspect. I also excluded all cases before establishing the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 1999 through the Treaty of Amsterdam. Furthermore, examples in which the EU was exclusively involved in the implementation phase of an agreement were omitted, as my primary focus is on mediation.

It is important to note that the selected cases were the product of a thorough back-and-forth process in which I reviewed the available material to determine whether a case could be included in the final QCA analysis. This demonstrates why conducting a robust qualitative study in QCA is

important. Appendix 1 details all selected cases, the years the EU mediation efforts took place, and the abbreviations for further QCA analysis.

Data collection

As I mentioned before, I used document analysis and qualitative content analysis to collect the data for the cases to be studied. In QCA, the focus is on the analysis itself (the evaluation of necessary and sufficient conditions). Due to limitations in the word count, I will not be able to show how I collected the information in every case. However, for the sake of transparency and for informative purposes, I will demonstrate the coding process for one case, namely the case of North Macedonia.

Following Halperin and Heath's four-step process (2020, 377–384), I began the analysis by identifying the material and verifying its accessibility. As mentioned, I relied on EU documents, academic articles, news pieces, evaluation reports, etc. However, I prioritized academic articles due to their usual impartiality and research focus. I also favored articles with the highest citation counts, indicating their influence and foundational nature for other researches. I found two academic articles after searching for information in journal databases and other search engines such as Google and Google Scholar². I discarded other articles due to repetitive information and used these two to collect the necessary data for the North Macedonia case.

² The articles are: Kirca, Asiye Bilge. 2020. “The Role of The European Union In Conflict Resolution: The Cases Of Northern Ireland And North Macedonia.” Istanbul: Turkish-German University. <https://openaccess.tau.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/20.500.12846/493>; Cooley, Laurence. 2018. The European Union’s

The second step is to define the theme and the categories we seek. In this case, the theme is EU mediation, and the categories are based on the conditions found in the literature review and mentioned in the theoretical framework. The categories are in Appendix 2 and their abbreviations for further QCA analysis. As it is visible, there are two additional conditions: whether mediation is considered successful or not in the articles and the type of EU mediation (direct or indirect). In the next step, I selected the recording unit, which consisted of sentences from the papers under analysis that provided information about the presence or absence of the specified conditions. The final stage involved creating a protocol for selecting and assigning units of interest to the appropriate categories. For the protocol, I chose the sentences I considered suitable for the categories and aggregated them to gather as much information as possible for the calibration stage in the QCA analysis. The following is an example of the coding process:

Unit: "When the illegal Albanian organization occupied an area in the west of Skopje, the US and the EU engaged their mediators to end the conflict... the process for the Ohrid Framework Agreement was kicked off by the help of the international mediators (Kirca 2020, 60)."

Unit: "Macedonia provides a particularly interesting case since... the EU played a far greater role in negotiating an end to the violence and in the design of the peace agreement that resulted" (Cooley 2018, 66).

Approach to Conflict Resolution: Transformation or Regulation in the Western Balkans? London: Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351043489>.

These units were coded under the code "direct mediation," which belongs to the category "EU type of mediation." I applied the same logic for all cases and all categories. Moreover, as mentioned before, some cases were dropped due to the lack of information or the absence of mediation activities by the EU. At the end of the coding process, I effectively collected information and gained deep knowledge on 18 cases. This information was later used to calibrate the presence or absence of the conditions and the outcome studied.

QCA analysis

Calibration

Calibration is the process of transforming the data on the cases to reflect the membership in the sets we are interested in (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 11). This is done to understand to what extent certain cases belong to a specific condition. For instance, considering the example used in the data collection part, the set created from the category "EU type of mediation" is EU direct mediation. If the EU mediated directly in a certain case, this case will belong to this set, thus receiving a value of 1 (full membership). If the EU mediated indirectly, the case will not belong to this set, thus receiving a value of 0 (no membership). Therefore, considering the code in the previous example, the North Macedonian case has full membership in this set. The belonging to this set is binary, known as a crisp set.

However, a set may have membership degrees, making it a fuzzy set. This set type will have values ranging from 0 to 1 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 3). For this paper, I will use fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), meaning that there will be degrees of membership in the studied conditions. However, some conditions will be calibrated using binary (crisp) logic. The advantage of fsQCA is that it

allows for both crisp and fuzzy sets, whereas in crisp-set QCA, only crisp sets can be used. Table 1 provides detailed information on the indicators used to measure the seven explanatory conditions included in the theoretical framework, plus success. Appendix 3 consists of the calibrated data for every case and condition and the sources used for data collection in each case.

Table 1: Calibration Table

Condition	Calibration Rationale
EU type of mediation (EU_Direct)	1.0 where the EU engaged in direct mediation, whether as a sole mediator or co-mediator; 0.0 where the EU engaged in indirect mediation, whether supporting through expertise, funding, etc.
EU member states' unity (EU_Unity)	1.0 full consensus among member states about the mediation strategies and interests; 0.66 consensus among the majority of the member states about the mediation strategies and interests, with some states disagreeing on minor issues; 0.33 minoritarian consensus among member states about the mediation strategies and interests; 0.0 no consensus among member states about the mediation strategies and interests
Coordination among EU actors (EU_LackCoo)	1.0 There is a fully lack of cooperation among EU actors and institutions with each other while mediating; 0.66 there is lack of cooperation with some communication among EU actor and institutions while mediating; 0.33 there is some lack of cooperation among EU actors and institutions with each other while mediating; 0.0 There is no lack of cooperation among EU actors and institutions with each other while mediating
Legitimacy (Legit)	1.0 The EU is seen as a fully legitimate mediator by all actors in the conflict; 0.66 The EU is seen as a legitimate mediator with some trust issues; 0.33 The EU is seen as legitimate only by one or the minority of the actors in the conflict; 0.0 The EU is not seen as a legitimate mediator
Use of sticks and carrots (S_C)	1.0 The EU used incentives and/or threats in the mediation process; 0.0 The EU did not use incentives and/or threats in the mediation process
Role of external actor (Ext_Actor)	1.0 there is an external state undermining EU mediation efforts; 0.0 there is no external state undermining EU mediation efforts

Condition	Calibration Rationale
Prospect of EU membership (EU_Member)	1.0 The EU used the membership to the union as an incentive or threat in the mediation process; 0.0 The EU did not use the membership to the union as an incentive or threat in the mediation process
Success (SUCC)	1.0 The EU achieved its objectives in the mediation process and there was an improvement in the conditions of the conflict; 0.66 The EU mostly achieved its objectives in the mediation process and there was some improvement in the conditions of the conflict; 0.33 The EU partly achieved its objectives in the mediation process and/or there was little improvement in the conditions of the conflict. 0.0 The EU did not achieve its objectives in the mediation process and there was no improvement in the conditions of the conflict.

Sufficient Conditions Leading to a Successful EU Mediation

After calibrating the data, it is possible to carry out the analysis for necessity and sufficiency, meaning that the necessary and sufficient condition(s) will be studied. I will start with the sufficiency analysis. A condition can be considered sufficient if, whenever it is present across cases, the outcome is also present in these cases. In other words, there should not be a single case that shows the condition but not the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 57). The sufficiency analysis involves the so-called truth table, which displays all logically possible configurations of conditions, assigns all empirical cases to the respective configuration, and highlights combinations without empirical cases. Additionally, it shows the strength of the set relationship. Configurations that show a strong set relationship are then further simplified by identifying conditions that make a difference across cases and removing redundant ones. All analyses use the R packages 'QCA' and 'SetMethods'.


Appendix 4 includes the truth table for EU success in mediation. In this truth table, I only display configurations with empirical information. Additionally, the "incl" or sufficiency inclusion score in the truth table evaluates the consistency of specific conditions in predicting an outcome across different cases, hence measuring the reliability of these conditions. The "incl" score should be higher than 0.8 to consider a condition sufficient (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 92). Conversely, "PRI," or proportional reduction in inconsistency, measures how much the presence of specific conditions decreases uncertainty or inconsistency in achieving the outcome. A higher PRI score signifies that introducing these conditions improves the predictability and stability of the outcome. PRI should be higher than 0.5 for a condition to be considered sufficient (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 96). These metrics assess the sufficiency of specific conditions to produce a certain result.

As truth tables are complex to read and interpret, performing a minimization of the truth table is useful so that the sufficient conditions for EU successful mediation will be easier to understand. After minimizing the truth table, I obtained the following result. Appendix 5 shows the output from the truth table minimization. From this, several conclusions can be drawn. First, there is no single sufficient condition to explain the success of EU mediation. Second, the minimization shows two specific pathways (configurations) considered sufficient for achieving EU mediation success. It is important to clarify that M1 shows a "+," which means OR, indicating that when one of these conditions exists, the EU will successfully mediate.

The first pathway shows that direct mediation from the EU, with all members agreeing with the mediation efforts, the EU actors and institutions cooperating, the EU being seen as a legitimate

mediator, using incentives and/or threats to the actors in conflict, and no external actor undermining the EU mediation activities, are sufficient conditions to make the EU a successful mediator. Similarly, the second pathway demonstrates that with all EU members agreeing with the mediation efforts, the EU actors and institutions cooperating, being seen as legitimate, using incentives and/or threats to the actors in conflict, and no external actor undermining the EU mediation activities, the EU can be a successful mediator even without the incentive and threat of EU membership. Interestingly, both pathways show that the EU can achieve successful mediation even without the lure of membership. The second path shows that, with certain conditions, the EU's mediation appears to be insignificant. Figure 1 shows a plot with the solution formula (both pathways combined), demonstrating its sufficiency.

Figure 1: Sufficiency Plot



The previous minimization revealed the most complex sufficient condition solution, "the conservative solution." This solution still contains difficulties in interpretation due to its high number of conditions. To address this, it is possible to minimize the truth table further to find the most parsimonious solution, which is the simplest of all solutions. The most parsimonious solution utilizes logical remainders, known as simplifying assumptions, to determine necessary conditions. These remainders are chosen to facilitate the analysis and provide the simplest explanation of the observed data. The term "simplifying assumptions" indicates that no part of the sufficient conditions can be removed without losing essential information from the truth table. This solution eliminates redundancies, making it widely regarded as the most dependable for causal interpretation. This reliability stems from the empirical support for every part of the solution, demonstrating its impact on the outcome at a broader case level (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 123-125). Appendix 6 includes the most parsimonious solutions; however, not all solutions in the table pass the threshold of 0.8 to be considered sufficient. By examining the "incl" value, it is clear that only one solution can be considered sufficient. The solution is M07, which shows two pathways sufficient for success. It is important to clarify that M07 shows a "+," which means OR, indicating that when one of these sets of conditions exists, the EU will successfully mediate.

The first pathway shows that when the EU mediates directly (sole or co-mediator), does not have cooperation problems among its actors and institutions, and uses union membership as a mediation tool; it is sufficient for the EU to be successful. This makes sense because, for the EU to use membership as a tool credibly, it is more effective if it mediates directly and without cooperation problems. If there is a lack of coordination or the EU is not directly supporting, the use of membership would not be credible, thus undermining the EU's effectiveness. The cases of Serbia

and Montenegro and Serbia and Kosovo reflect this; Serbia was always eager to negotiate and comply because the EU was directly mediating and signaling through its different actors and institutions the same message, which made the membership prospect more credible and effective as a tool towards Serbia. The second pathway shows that EU member states' unity, being seen as legitimate by the actors in the conflict, and using sticks and carrots (which do not have to be EU membership leverage) are sufficient conditions for successful mediation. This is plausible because in cases where the EU does not leverage its membership, it is often clear that the actors will not be able to enter the EU (mostly due to geographical considerations). Thus, the EU offers other incentives or sanctions to encourage the actors to continue with the mediation. For instance, in the Russo-Georgian war, the EU applied pressure on Russia by freezing their relationship under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (Forsberg and Seppo 2011). Another case this solution covers is Colombia, where the EU offered to lift sanctions on FARC members if they continued negotiations that resulted in a peace agreement (Pérez De Armiño 2023). The non-use of EU membership also highlights some shortcomings of this EU strategy. In the Turkish case, this strategy is deemed ineffective due to the lack of credibility that some Turkish politicians attribute to the EU. They did not believe that the accession process would be swift and that Turkey would enjoy the benefits soon. Consequently, when Turkey began to roll back some improvements regarding the Kurds, they did not feel threatened by the EU membership tool. Turkish actors had already anticipated this, and with the EU's inability to use another tool, the EU could do nothing (Kurda 2022).

Testing Robustness with Cluster Diagnostics

I used cluster diagnostics to test the robustness of the conditions found to be sufficient. This tool helps to verify if the sufficiency (or necessity) patterns are consistent across various groups within

the dataset and to determine if combining the data for analysis is effective. This is particularly helpful for my thesis due to the differences that can exist between the locations of the countries where the EU is mediating and the types of conflict the EU is mediating. The tool provides two types of consistency (and coverage) measurements. Initially, it presents the pooled consistency, which evaluates the consistency of the overall solution formula and its components across the entire dataset. Following this, it assesses the between-consistency, which measures how consistent the solution is within each specific cluster.

To perform this analysis, I added information about the location of the conflict and the type of conflict to the calibrated data. For the location of the conflict, I created three clusters: Near, Medium, and Far. Near are those countries that share a border (maritime or land) with the EU. Medium refers to those countries that share a border with the Near countries, and Far refers to the rest of the countries. Regarding the type of conflict, I created five clusters: Civil, Eth_Nat, Revol, Secess, and Terri. Civil are conflicts with a civil war nature, Eth_Nat are conflicts related to ethnic conflict and nationalism, Revol are conflicts involving revolutions such as coups, Secess are conflicts where part of a country seeks independence, and Terri are conflicts where two states claim certain territory. I know some conflicts have various dimensions, but for the sake of the thesis, I organized the cases into these clusters. The clusters can be seen in Appendix 7.

Appendix 8 shows that the solution is consistent in all clusters, meaning that the solution explains the EU's successful mediation in different geographical locations. In coverage, both pathways explain at least one of the location clusters. For Near countries, the analysis shows that direct mediation from the EU, with all members agreeing with the mediation efforts, the EU actors and

institutions cooperating, the EU being seen as a legitimate mediator, using incentives and/or threats to the actors in conflict, and no external actor undermining the EU mediation activities, is a sufficient solution. Including direct mediation is interesting because it shows that the EU must directly mediate conflicts in its neighborhood. In the case of Far countries, the sufficient solution is all EU members agreeing with the mediation efforts, the EU actors and institutions cooperating, being seen as legitimate, using incentives and/or threats to the actors in conflict, with no external actor undermining the EU mediation activities, and no use of the incentive and threat of EU membership. As mentioned before, the EU would not invite a Far country to join, so the absence of that condition is understandable. Otherwise, the EU would undermine itself using such a tool with a Far country. It is also interesting that the type of mediation is not as important for Far countries as it is for Near countries. Due to its normative power, indirect mediation in the European neighborhood may be a bad idea for the EU. Medium countries are not covered because the three cases for Medium were all unsuccessful EU mediations (Arm_Az, Ge_AS, Is_Pa).

Regarding the type of conflict, consistency is also significant in all clusters, which means that this solution explains the success of the EU mediation effort in all kinds of conflicts. The results can be seen in Appendix 9. Direct mediation from the EU, with all members agreeing with the mediation efforts, the EU actors and institutions cooperating, the EU is seen as a legitimate mediator, using incentives and/or threats to the actors in conflict, and no external actor undermining the EU mediation activities explains all clusters except civil war and revolutions. However, EU success in these types of conflicts is explained by the solution of all EU members agreeing with the mediation efforts, the EU actors and institutions cooperating, being seen as legitimate, using incentives and/or threats to the actors in conflict, with no external actor

undermining the EU mediation activities, and no use of the incentive and threat of EU membership. Further research could investigate why direct EU mediation belongs to the sufficient solution in some conflicts and not in others.

Necessary conditions leading to a successful EU mediation


A necessary condition must be present for an outcome to occur; without it, the outcome cannot happen. A set of parameters is used to determine whether a condition is necessary. The consistency measure quantifies how closely empirical evidence matches a theoretical necessity relationship. This measure, ranging from 0 to 1, calculates the extent of deviations, with values closer to 1 indicating a more consistent necessity. Generally, a consistency threshold of at least 0.9 is recommended to consider a condition as necessarily related to an outcome (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 69). Two other important parameters are Coverage and Relevance of Necessity (RoN). Coverage measures the proportion of cases a condition or set of conditions explains within a dataset, indicating how substantial a condition is for explaining the outcome. RoN complements this by showing how critical a condition is to the outcome; a RoN value close to 0.5 suggests the condition may not be crucial. While the consistency threshold for necessity is often set at 0.9, there are no strict thresholds for coverage and RoN, making their interpretation more flexible and context-dependent.

In Appendix 10, the table with the necessity analysis results shows that three conditions are necessary for EU mediation success: EU member state unity, the EU being seen as a legitimate mediator, and no lack of coordination among EU actors and institutions. However, checking the other parameters shows that they are below the 0.5 threshold. An explanation for this is that the EU usually starts a mediation process because the member states are most likely united. Similarly,

if the EU decides to mediate a conflict, it is most likely because the actors consider it legitimate. Thirdly, the EU usually designates one actor to mediate, so it is plausible that, in most cases, a clear actor or institution is mediating.

After the necessity analysis, it is important to detect SUIN conditions. A "sufficient but unnecessary" condition in QCA is part of a condition that, though not essential by itself, becomes necessary when combined with similar conditions to produce an outcome. This reflects causal complexity where multiple pathways can lead to the same result. SUIN conditions are seen in necessary disjunctions, where the presence of any single condition from the OR combination (logical OR) is enough for the outcome, but none are indispensable alone. Identifying such conditions helps to understand different viable strategies or causal paths that could not be isolated as crucial on their own but are collectively critical in achieving an outcome. This insight is particularly useful in comprehensively mapping the causal terrain of complex social phenomena (Oana, Schneider, and Thomann 2021, 80). In the analysis, only one SUIN condition was found: EU member unity, with no lack of coordination among EU actors and institutions, and the EU being a legitimate actor. Thus, this SUIN condition is necessary for EU mediation success. The result can be seen in Appendix 11 and illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Necessity Plot




Sufficient conditions leading to an unsuccessful EU mediation

Examining the sufficiency and necessity conditions for the absence of successful outcomes in EU mediation is crucial to providing a more comprehensive analysis. This analysis can highlight areas where the EU needs improvement or identify conditions it should avoid to become a more effective mediator. The truth table for this analysis can be found in Appendix 12. However, I will proceed with its minimization due to the difficulties in interpreting the table. Given the complexity of the conservative solution minimization, I will not draw any conclusions directly from it. Instead, I will focus on the parsimonious solution, which simplifies the analysis by eliminating redundancies. Appendix 13 includes the conservative solution minimization of the truth table.

In the parsimonious solution (Appendix 14), two models reveal sufficient conditions leading to the EU's failure in mediation. These conditions are the EU's lack of coordination between actors and its lack of legitimacy as a mediator. The presence of these conditions is understandable. A lack of coordination would result in mixed messages and signals to the conflicting parties, undermining the EU's credibility and commitment as a mediator. In terms of legitimacy, if the parties do not view the EU as a legitimate actor, they are unlikely to comply with agreements or even participate in mediation. Additionally, conditions in parentheses indicate factors with explanatory power but are not as significant as the primary conditions mentioned. For example, if an external actor undermines the EU's efforts, the likelihood of mediation failure increases. It is also interesting to note that direct mediation without incentives and/or threats is a sufficient condition for the EU to fail. This may be because, without incentives and/or threats, the parties may perceive the EU as not being committed enough.

For example, in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU could not use the membership tool because there is no real prospect of either country joining the EU. Furthermore, the EU could not make any credible threats due to the lack of strong economic and geopolitical ties between the EU and both countries. The EU also refrained from offering other incentives to maintain its impartiality, and some member states, such as France, opposed offering incentives to Azerbaijan (Lorusso 2023; Rauf 2023; Lewis 2023; Shiraliyev 2023). These findings underscore the importance of coordination and legitimacy in successful EU mediation. Addressing these issues could significantly enhance the EU's effectiveness as a mediator.

Figure 3: Sufficiency Plot



Continuing with the cluster diagnostic, it is remarkable that it ignores the EU direct mediation condition. This may be because the inclusion score for this condition is below 0.8. Starting with the location of the conflicts, the identified conditions explain the EU's failure in mediation across all locations. This indicates that if there is a lack of communication, if the EU is not perceived as legitimate, or if an external actor is undermining the EU's mediation efforts, the mediation will likely fail. Regarding the type of conflict, the identified conditions also explain the EU's failure in mediation across all types of conflicts. However, the presence of external actors appears insignificant in explaining the EU's failure in secessionist conflicts. This suggests that while external actors can play a crucial role in many conflict types, their influence may be less critical in secessionist conflicts where internal dynamics are more dominant. The detailed results of this analysis can be found in Appendices 15 and 16.

Necessary conditions leading to an unsuccessful EU mediation

Turning to the necessary condition analysis, no single condition meets the threshold to be considered necessary. The closest condition to the 0.9 threshold is the presence of EU member unity. This is understandable because, as mentioned earlier, EU member states are usually united. Therefore, it is expected that even in unsuccessful mediations, this condition may still appear. Furthermore, applying the analysis for SUIN conditions, I found that no SUIN condition explains the EU's mediation failures. This indicates that no individual condition or combination of conditions guarantees the EU mediation efforts will always fail. This finding implies that the failure of EU mediation efforts is not due to a specific, predictable flaw but rather a complex interplay of factors that vary across different cases. It underscores the need for a flexible and context-specific approach to improve EU mediation strategies. The detailed results of this analysis are in Appendix 17.

The research findings suggest no universal formula for successful EU mediation, but they highlight two distinct pathways to success. Both pathways emphasize the need for member-state unity, internal cooperation, and EU legitimacy. Interestingly, it's noted that the promise of EU membership is not always a crucial factor for successful mediation. However, these elements alone are not sufficient. Factors such as internal disunity, a lack of EU legitimacy, and a direct approach without incentives or threats significantly raise the risk of failure. While the nature of the conflict does not impact the fundamental requirements for success, it may influence the specific strategies used. Notably, geography also appears to play a role, with direct mediation being more critical for conflicts closer to the EU. As a result, the findings suggest that the EU should prioritize maintaining internal unity and coordination, actively bolster its international mediation legitimacy,

and craft flexible strategies tailored to the specific details of each conflict, including the use of incentives beyond mere membership.

Conclusion

The EU has become a significant player in international conflict mediation. It leverages a diverse toolbox, employing both direct and indirect strategies with varying levels of engagement. The EU's commitment to peacebuilding is evident in its dedicated policies and substantial financial resources. However, limitations exist. Despite these challenges, the EU's dedication to peaceful conflict resolution offers a valuable contribution on the global stage. This thesis has established a framework to analyze the effectiveness of EU mediation efforts. Clearly defining key concepts like success and mediation allows for a focused investigation into the factors influencing outcomes. Through QCA, the research delves into the complex interplay of conditions necessary for successful EU mediation. This approach provides a robust and theoretically grounded lens to assess the EU's role in conflict resolution. The selected cases for analysis ensured the QCA's robustness, incorporating a wider range of sources beyond the EU's perspective mitigated potential bias. This comprehensive set of cases provided a strong foundation for the research.

The sufficiency analysis revealed two key pathways for successful EU mediation: The first one involves direct mediation with member state unity, cooperation among institutions, legitimacy, utilizing incentives/threats, and no external interference. The second pathway substitutes direct mediation with member state unity, legitimacy, incentives/threats, and no external interference. Interestingly, both pathways demonstrate the possibility of successful mediation without solely relying on the lure of EU membership. The research also identified the importance of geographical context. Direct mediation appears more crucial for conflicts close to the EU's borders. Additionally, the analysis of necessary conditions highlighted the importance of

member state unity, EU legitimacy, and internal coordination among EU actors, although none were individually decisive factors for success. The analysis of unsuccessful mediations identified a lack of coordination among EU actors and a lack of perceived legitimacy as key culprits. Interestingly, direct mediation without incentives or threats also emerged as a factor contributing to failure, suggesting that neutrality alone may not be sufficient.

In conclusion, this research underscores the importance of internal unity, coordination, and legitimacy for successful EU mediation. While the specific strategies may need to be tailored to the unique context of each conflict, the EU should prioritize these core elements to enhance its effectiveness as a mediator. Future research could explore the nuances of crafting effective incentives and the specific challenges faced by the EU in different conflict types. By addressing these limitations and strategically utilizing its multifaceted toolbox, the EU can continue to be a valuable player in promoting peace and stability on the global stage.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Cases Information

Case	Years	QCA Abbreviation	Source
Armenia Azerbaijan	- 2016- 2023	Arm_Az	(Lorusso 2023; Rauf 2023; Lewis 2023; Shiraliyev 2023)
Bosnia Herzegovina	and 2009	BIH	(Zenelaj, Beriker, and Hatipoglu 2012; Solveig 2018)
Colombia - FARC	2012- 2016	Col_F	(Di Filippo 2022; Pérez De Armiño 2023)
Cyprus	2002- 2004	Cyprus	(Ker-Lindsay 2012; Tocci 2007)
Democratic Republic of Congo	2006- 2009	DRC	Davis 2018; Davis 2015; Froitzheim, Söderbaum and Taylor 2011; Froitzheim and Söderbaum 2013; Vlassenroot and Arnould 2016)
Egypt	2011- 2013	Egypt	(Pinfari 2018)
Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia	2003- 2008	Ge_AS	(Tocci 2008; Tocci 2007; (Whitman and Wolff 2012b; Bergmann 2020)
Israel - Palestine	2003- 2012	Is_Pa	(Tocci 2007; Siniver 2012; Akgül-Açıkmeşe and Özel 2024)
Kosovo - Serbia	2011- 2020	Ko_Se	(Bergmann and Niemann 2015; Bergmann 2020; Visoka & Doyle 2016; Plänitz 2018)
Mali	2015	Mali	(Dudouet and Dressler, 2016; International Crisis Group 2020)
Myanmar	2012- 2015	Myanmar	(Brandenburg 2017)
North Macedonia	2001	NMac	(Kirca 2020; Cooley 2018)
Russia - Georgia	2008	Ru_Ge	(Valasek 2008; European Union External Action 2021; Forsberg and Seppo 2011; Nista 2020)
Serbia - Montenegro	2001- 2002	Se_Mon	(Bergmann 2020; Tocci 2007; Friis 2007)

Case	Years	QCA Abbreviation	Source
South Sudan	2014-2018	SSudan	(Bergmann 2021; Müller and Bergmann 2020)
Turkey	2001-2009	Turkey	(Tocci 2008; Kurda 2022)
Ukraine	2014-2019	Ukr	(Landwehr 2019; Chaban, Elgström, and Knodt 2019; Wittke and Rabinovych 2019)
Yemen	2011-2014	Yemen	(Girke 2015; Durac 2021; Eshaq and Al-Marani 2017)

Appendix 2: Coding Categories

Categories	Abbreviation for QCA
EU member States' unity	EU_Unity
Coordination among EU actors	EU_LackCoo
Legitimacy	Legit
Use of sticks and carrots	S_C
Role of external actors	Ext_Actor
Prospect of EU membership	EU_Member
Success	SUCC
EU type of mediation	Direct_EU

Appendix 3: Calibrated Data

Case	Direct _EU	EU_ Unity	EU _LackCoo	legit	S_C	Ext_ Actor	EU_ Member	SUCC
Arm_Az	1	0.66	0.33	0.33	0	1	0	0.00
BIH	1	1.00	0.66	1.00	1	0	1	0.00
Col_F	0	1.00	0.00	1.00	1	0	0	1.00
Cyprus	0	1.00	0.00	1.00	1	0	1	0.33
DRC	1	0.33	0.66	0.66	0	0	0	0.33
Egypt	1	0.33	0.66	0.66	1	1	0	0.00
Ge_AS	1	0.66	0.00	0.66	0	1	0	0.33
Is_Pa	1	0.33	0.66	0.33	1	1	0	0.33
Ko_Se	1	0.66	0.00	1.00	1	0	1	0.66
Mali	0	0.66	0.00	1.00	1	0	0	0.66
Myanmar	0	1.00	0.00	0.33	0	0	0	0.33
Nmac	1	1.00	0.00	1.00	1	0	1	1.00
Ru_Ge	1	0.66	0.00	1.00	1	0	0	0.66

Appendix 3: Calibrated Data

Case	Direct_EU	EU_Unity	EU_LackCoo	legit	S_C	Ext_Actor	EU_Member	SUCC
Se_Mon	1	0.66	0.33	1.00	1	0	1	0.66
SSudan	0	1.00	0.00	1.00	1	0	0	0.66
Turkey	0	1.00	0.00	1.00	1	0	1	0.33
Ukr	1	0.66	0.33	0.33	1	1	0	0.33
Yemen	0	1.00	0.00	1.00	0	0	0	0.33

Appendix 4: Truth Table for EU success in mediation

	Direct_EU	EU_unity	EU_LackCoo	Legit	S_C	Ext_Actor	EU_Member	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
109	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Ru_Ge
45	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	3	0.872	0.828	Col_F; Mal; SSudan
110	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	3	0.872	0.828	Ko_Se; Nmac; Se_Mon
89	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.500	0	DRC
95	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0.500	0	Egypt
103	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.500	0	Ukr
41	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.496	0	Yemen
87	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.496	0	Is_Pa
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.493	0	Myanmar

107	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.333	0	Ge_AS
126	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.333	0	BIH
46	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	0.330	0	Cyprus,Turkey
99	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.330	0	Arm_Az

Appendix 5: Conservative Solution

M1: Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor +
EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member -> SUCC

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
<hr/>					
1	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	0.898	0.852	0.375	0.292
2	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	0.898	0.852	0.375	0.292
<hr/>					
	M1	0.886	0.841	0.668	
<hr/>					
cases					
<hr/>					
1	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	Ru_Ge; Ko_Se,Nmac,Se_Mon			
2	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	Col_F,Mali,SSudan; Ru_Ge			
<hr/>					

Appendix 6: Parsimonious Solution

M01: ~Direct_EU*S_C*~EU_Member + Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*~Ext_Actor -> SUCC
M02: ~Direct_EU*S_C*~EU_Member + Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C -> SUCC
M03: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*~Ext_Actor + S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member -> SUCC
M04: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*~Ext_Actor + EU_unity*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member -> SUCC
M05: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*~Ext_Actor + ~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member -> SUCC
M06: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*EU_Member + S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member -> SUCC
M07: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*EU_Member + EU_unity*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member -> SUCC
M08: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*EU_Member + ~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member -> SUCC
M09: S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member + Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C -> SUCC
M10: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C + EU_unity*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member -> SUCC
M11: Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C + ~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member -> SUCC

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)
1	~Direct_EU*S_C*~EU_Member	0.773	0.707	0.292	0.000	0.292	0.292	
2	Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*~Ext_Actor	0.761	0.653	0.417	0.042	0.417		0.334
3	Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*EU_Member	0.771	0.704	0.292	0.000			
4	S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	0.745	0.658	0.375	0.000			0.292
5	Direct_EU*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C	0.727	0.589	0.458	0.000		0.458	
6	EU_unity*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member	0.845	0.745	0.458	0.000			
7	~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~EU_Member	0.728	0.590	0.458	0.000			
	M1	0.766	0.677	0.709				
	M2	0.744	0.637	0.751				
	M3	0.766	0.677	0.709				
	M4	0.786	0.678	0.792				
	M5	0.753	0.636	0.792				
	M6	0.756	0.678	0.668				
	M7	0.814	0.726	0.751				
	M8	0.744	0.637	0.751				
	M9	0.744	0.637	0.751				
	M10	0.777	0.678	0.751				
	M11	0.744	0.637	0.751				

Appendix 7: New Data For Cluster Diagnostic

Case	Proximity EU	to Type Conflict	of
------	-----------------	---------------------	----

Arm_Az Medium Terri

Case	Proximity to EU	Type of Conflict
BIH	Near	Eth_Nat
Col	Far	Revol
Cyprus	Near	Eth_Nat
DRC	Far	Civil
Egypt	Near	Revol
Ge_AS	Medium	Secess
Is_Pa	Medium	Terri
Ko_Se	Near	Secess
Mali	Far	Civil
Myanmar	Far	Eth_Nat
Nmac	Near	Eth_Nat

Case	Proximity to EU	Type of Conflict
Ru_Ge	Near	Terri
Se_Mon	Near	Secess
SSudan	Far	Civil
Turkey	Near	Eth_Nat
Ukra	Near	Secess
Yemen	Far	Civil

Appendix 8: Cluster Diagnostic Result By Location

Consistencies:

	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	
Pooled		0.898
Between Far (6)		1.000
Between Medium (3)		1.000
Between Near (9)		0.898
	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	
Pooled		0.898
Between Far (6)		0.872
Between Medium (3)		1.000
Between Near (9)		1.000

Distances:

	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	
From Between to Pooled		0.029
	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	
From Between to Pooled		0.036

Coverages:

	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	
Pooled		0.375
Between Far (6)		0.000
Between Medium (3)		0.000
Between Near (9)		0.751
	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	
Pooled		0.375
Between Far (6)		0.701
Between Medium (3)		0.000
Between Near (9)		0.166

Appendix 9: Cluster Diagnostic Result By Type Of Conflict

Consistencies:

	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	
Pooled		0.898
Between Civil (4)		1.000
Between Eth_Nat (5)		0.746
Between Revol (2)		1.000
Between Secess (4)		1.000
Between Terri (3)		1.000
	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	
Pooled		0.898
Between Civil (4)		0.795
Between Eth_Nat (5)		1.000
Between Revol (2)		1.000
Between Secess (4)		1.000
Between Terri (3)		1.000

Distances:

	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	
From Between to Pooled		0.048
	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	
From Between to Pooled		0.038

Coverages:

	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor	
Pooled		0.375
Between Civil (4)		0.000
Between Eth_Nat (5)		0.503
Between Revol (2)		0.000
Between Secess (4)		0.667
Between Terri (3)		0.667
	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	
Pooled		0.375
Between Civil (4)		0.667
Between Eth_Nat (5)		0.000
Between Revol (2)		1.000
Between Secess (4)		0.000
Between Terri (3)		0.667

Appendix 10: Necessity Analysis Result

Condition	Consistency of Necessity	Coverage of Necessity	Relevance of Necessity
Direct_EU	0.542	0.391	0.511
EU_unity	1.000	0.583	0.436
EU_LackCoo	0.166	0.364	0.862
Legit	1.000	0.555	0.368
S_C	0.834	0.509	0.439
Ext_Actor	0.125	0.198	0.764
EU_Member	0.375	0.497	0.799
~Direct_EU	0.458	0.520	0.766
~EU_unity	0.338	0.610	0.888
~EU_LackCoo	1.000	0.553	0.361
~Legit	0.208	0.446	0.875
~S_C	0.166	0.264	0.779
~Ext_Actor	0.875	0.535	0.452
~EU_Member	0.625	0.413	0.460

Appendix 11: SUIN Condition

		inclN	RoN	covN
1	EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*Legit	1.000	0.634	0.683

Appendix 12: Truth Table For EU Non-Success Mediation

	Direct_EU	EU_unity	EU_LackCoo	Legit	S_C	Ext_Actor	EU_Member	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
33	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	Myanmar
87	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Is_Pa
89	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	DRC
95	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Egypt
99	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Arm_Az
103	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	Ukr
107	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Ge_AS
126	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	BIH
41	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.752	0.507	Yemen
46	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	0.670	0.507	Cyprus,Turkey
109	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0.515	0	Ru_Ge
110	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	3	0.383	0.172	Ko_Se,Nmac,Se_Mon
45	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0.256	0	Col_F,Mali,SSudan

Appendix 13: Conservative Solutions

M1: Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~Legit*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member +
 Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~S_C*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member +
 Direct_EU*~EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*S_C*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member +
 Direct_EU*~EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*Legit*~S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member +
 Direct_EU*EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*EU_Member +
 ~Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~Legit*~S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member -> ~SUCC

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU
1	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~Legit*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	1.000	1.000	0.231	0.033
2	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~S_C*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	1.000	1.000	0.131	0.032
3	Direct_EU*~EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*S_C*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	1.000	1.000	0.164	0.066
4	Direct_EU*~EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*Legit*~S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	1.000	1.000	0.066	0.066
5	Direct_EU*EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*EU_Member	1.000	1.000	0.098	0.098
6	~Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~Legit*~S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	1.000	1.000	0.067	0.067
M1		1.000	1.000	0.559	

		cases
1	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~Legit*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	Arm_Az; Ukr
2	Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~S_C*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	Arm_Az; Ge_AS
3	Direct_EU*~EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*S_C*Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	Is_Pa; Egypt
4	Direct_EU*~EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*Legit*~S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	DRC
5	Direct_EU*EU_unity*EU_LackCoo*Legit*S_C*~Ext_Actor*EU_Member	BIH
6	~Direct_EU*EU_unity*~EU_LackCoo*~Legit*~S_C*~Ext_Actor*~EU_Member	Myanmar

Appendix 14: Parsimonious Solutions

		inclS	PRI	covS	covU	(M1)	(M2)	cases
1	EU_LackCoo	1.000	1.000	0.361	0.098	0.130	0.130	Is_Pa; DRC; Egypt; BIH
2	~Legit	1.000	1.000	0.368	0.067	0.067	0.101	Myanmar; Is_Pa; Arm_Az; Ukr
3	Ext_Actor	0.802	0.753	0.399	0.034	0.099		Is_Pa; Egypt; Arm_Az; Ukr; Ge_AS
4	Direct_EU*~S_C	0.780	0.718	0.233	0.001		0.067	DRC; Arm_Az; Ge_AS
M1		0.865	0.815	0.629				
M2		0.901	0.859	0.596				

Appendix 15: Cluster Diagnostic Result By Location

Consistencies:

	EU_LackCoo	~Legit	Ext_Actor
Pooled	1	1	0.802
Between Far (6)	1	1	1.000
Between Medium (3)	1	1	0.780
Between Near (9)	1	1	0.835

Distances:

	EU_LackCoo	~Legit	Ext_Actor
From Between to Pooled	0	0	0.062

Coverages:

	EU_LackCoo	~Legit	Ext_Actor
Pooled	0.361	0.368	0.399
Between Far (6)	0.245	0.375	0.000
Between Medium (3)	0.423	0.718	1.000
Between Near (9)	0.394	0.201	0.332

Appendix 16: Cluster Diagnostic Result By Type Of Conflict

Consistencies:

	EU_LackCoo	~Legit	Ext_Actor
Pooled	1	1	0.802
Between Civil (4)	1	1	1.000
Between Eth_Nat (5)	1	1	1.000
Between Revol (2)	1	1	1.000
Between Secess (4)	1	1	0.670
Between Terri (3)	1	1	0.835

Distances:

	EU_LackCoo	~Legit	Ext_Actor
From Between to Pooled	0	0	0.066

Coverages:

	EU_LackCoo	~Legit	Ext_Actor
Pooled	0.361	0.368	0.399
Between Civil (4)	0.327	0.168	0.000
Between Eth_Nat (5)	0.219	0.223	0.000
Between Revol (2)	0.660	0.340	1.000
Between Secess (4)	0.327	0.500	0.663
Between Terri (3)	0.493	0.667	0.831

Appendix 17: Necessity Analysis

	Cons.Nec	Cov.Nec	RoN
Direct_EU	0.666	0.609	0.619
EU_unity	0.830	0.614	0.455
EU_LackCoo	0.361	1.000	1.000
Legit	0.796	0.560	0.370
S_C	0.634	0.491	0.430
Ext_Actor	0.399	0.802	0.929
EU_Member	0.300	0.503	0.801
~Direct_EU	0.334	0.480	0.751
~EU_unity	0.436	1.000	1.000
~EU_LackCoo	0.770	0.539	0.354
~Legit	0.368	1.000	1.000
~S_C	0.366	0.736	0.908
~Ext_Actor	0.601	0.465	0.418
~EU_Member	0.700	0.587	0.547

Bibliography

1. Akgül-Açıkmeşe, Sinem, and Soli Özel. 2024. "EU Policy towards the Israel-Palestine Conflict: The Limitations of Mitigation Strategies." *The International Spectator* 59 (1): 59–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2024.2309664>.
2. Bercovitch, Jacob. 2011. "Mediation Success or Failure: The Search for the Elusive Criteria." In *Theory and Practice of International Mediation*. Routledge.
3. Bergmann, Julian. 2020. *The European Union as International Mediator: Brokering Stability and Peace in the Neighbourhood*. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25564-0>.
4. ———. 2021. "'Sisters in Peace': Analyzing the Cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in Peace Mediation." *International Negotiation*, September, 1–30. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-bja10041>.
5. Bergmann, Julian, Toni Hastrup, Arne Niemann, and Richard Whitman. 2018. "Introduction: The EU as International Mediator – Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives." *International Negotiation* 23 (2): 157–76. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-23021158>.
6. Bergmann, Julian, and Arne Niemann. 2015. "Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker?" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 53 (5): 957–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12254>.
7. Bowen, Glenn A. 2009. "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method." *Qualitative Research Journal* 9 (2): 27–40. <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>.
8. Brandenburg, Natalie C. 2017. "EU Mediation as an Assemblage of Practices: Introducing a New Approach to the Study of EU Conflict Resolution." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 55 (5): 993–1008. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12532>.
9. Chaban, Natalia, Ole Elgström, and Michèle Knodt. 2019. "Perceptions of EU Mediation and Mediation Effectiveness: Comparing Perspectives from Ukraine and the EU." *Cooperation and Conflict* 54 (4): 506–23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718823813>.
10. Cooley, Laurence. 2018. *The European Union's Approach to Conflict Resolution: Transformation or Regulation in the Western Balkans?* London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351043489>.
11. Davis, Laura. 2015. "Make Do, or Mend? EU Security Provision in Complex Conflicts: The Democratic Republic of Congo." *European Security* 24 (1): 101–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2014.888549>.
12. ———. 2018. "The EU as a Multi-Mediator: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo." *International Negotiation* 23 (2): 177–98. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-23021151>.
13. De Man, Philip, Gustavo Müller, and Andriy Tyushka. 2023. "The EU's Engagement in Conflict Resolution, Prevention and Mediation: A Framework." *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4324530>.
14. Di Filippo, Marcello. 2022. "The EU's Engagement with Latin America: The Case of Colombia." *IAI Papers* 22 (10). <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/eus-engagement-latin-america-case-colombia>.
15. Dudouet, Veronique, and Matteo Dressler. 2016. "From Power Mediation to Dialogue Facilitation: Assessing the European Union's Approach to Multi-Track Diplomacy."

- WOSCAP. <https://berghof-foundation.org/library/from-power-mediation-to-dialogue-facilitation-assessing-the-european-unions-approach-to-multi-track-diplomacy>.
16. Durac, Vincent. 2021. "The European Union and Yemen." In *Routledge Handbook of EU–Middle East Relations*. Routledge.
 17. Eshaq, Alia, and Suad Al-Marani. 2017. "Assessing the EU's Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Yemen." WOSCAP. <https://www.woscap.eu/documents/131298403/131299900/Yemen%2B-%2BPDF.pdf/Yemen%20-%20PDF/index.pdf>.
 18. European External Action Service. 2023. "Peace Mediation Guidelines." <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ed8fa9d2cf8322413ae6f1b/t/652f70c0c483a0372c80fbc9/1697607881071/EEAS+Peace+Mediation+Guidelines+2023.pdf>.
 19. European Union External Action. 2021. "EU Peace Mediation In a Nutshell." https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/isp2_mediation_factsheet_for_publication_20022021.pdf.
 20. Forsberg, Tuomas, and Antti Seppo. 2011. "The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation." In *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, edited by Roger E. Kanet, 121–37. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230293168_7.
 21. Friis, Karsten. 2007. "The Referendum in Montenegro: The EU'S ?Postmodern Diplomacy?" *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12 (Issue 1): 67–88. <https://doi.org/10.54648/EERR2007005>.
 22. Froitzheim, Meike, and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2013. "Building Peace from the Outside: The Case of the EU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." In *Globalization and Development Rethinking Interventions and Governance*. Routledge.
 23. Froitzheim, Meike, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Ian Taylor. 2011. "The Limits of the EU as a Peace and Security Actor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Africa Spectrum* 46 (3): 45–70. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971104600303>.
 24. General Secretariat of the Council. 2020. "Concept on EU Peace Mediation." <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/st13951.en20.pdf>.
 25. Gillespie, Richard. 2010. "European Union Responses to Conflict in the Western Mediterranean." *The Journal of North African Studies* 15 (1): 85–103. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380902920545>.
 26. Girke, Natalie C. 2015. "A Matter of Balance: The European Union as a Mediator in Yemen." *European Security* 24 (4): 509–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2015.1027766>.
 27. Halperin, Sandra, and Oliver Heath. 2020. *Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills*. Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 28. International Crisis Group. 2020. "Mali's Algiers Peace Agreement, Five Years On: An Uneasy Calm | Crisis Group." June 24, 2020. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-apres-un-calme-precaire-dont-il-ne-faut-pas-se-satisfaire>.
 29. Ker-Lindsay, James. 2012. "The Role of the EU as a Conflict Manager in Cyprus." In *The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager*. Routledge.
 30. Kirca, Asiye Bilge. 2020. "The Role of The European Union In Conflict Resolution: The Cases Of Northern Ireland And North Macedonia." Istanbul: Turkish-German University. <https://openaccess.tau.edu.tr/xmlui/handle/20.500.12846/493>.

31. Kurda, Zana A. 2022. "The European Union and the Kurds in Turkey." In *The European Union and the Kurdish Issue: The EU as a Rational and Normative Actor*, edited by Zana A. Kurda, 55–91. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05186-9_4.
32. Landwehr, Jakob. 2019. "No Way out? Opportunities for Mediation Efforts in the Donbas Region." *East European Politics* 35 (3): 291–310. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1647532>.
33. Lewis, David. 2023. "EUROPEAN UNION SUPPORT TO THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI PEACE PROCESS: NEW REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES." London: Conciliation Resources. <https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Conciliation Resources EU Armenia Azerbaijan Report.pdf>.
34. Lorusso, Marilisa. 2023. "EU Mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Prospects and Challenges." *Caucasus Watch*. December 24, 2023. <https://caucasuswatch.de/en/insights/eu-mediation-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-prospects-and-challenges.html>.
35. Müller, Patrick, and Julian Bergmann. 2020. "Orchestrating Peace in South Sudan: Exploring the Effectiveness of the European Union's Mediation Support." *European Security* 29 (2): 149–69. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1751616>.
36. Niemann, Arne, Toni Haastrup, and Julian Bergmann. 2018. "Motives, Roles, Effectiveness and the Future of the EU as an International Mediator." *International Negotiation* 23 (2): 319–30. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-23021162>.
37. Nista, Francesca Pia. 2020. "The European Union's Role as a Conflict Mediator: The Cases of the Russo- Georgian War and the Ukrainian Crisis." *Universita Ca'Foscari Venezia*. <http://hdl.handle.net/10579/17232>.
38. Oana, Ioana-Elena, Carsten Q. Schneider, and Eva Thomann. 2021. *Qualitative Comparative Analysis Using R: A Beginner's Guide*. Methods for Social Inquiry. Cambridge, United Kingdom New York, NY Port Melbourne, Australia New Delhi, India Singapore: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/978-1-009-00678-1>.
39. Pavlov, Nikolay. 2023. "Concepts in the European Union's Policy Area of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding." *Open Journal of Political Science* 13 (03): 282–301. <https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2023.133018>.
40. Pérez De Armiño, Karlos, ed. 2023. *European Union Support for Colombia's Peace Process: Civil Society, Human Rights and Territorial Peace*. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24797-2>.
41. Pinfari, Marco. 2018. "EU Mediation in Egypt: The Limits of Reactive Conflict Management." *International Negotiation* 23 (2): 199–217. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-23021157>.
42. Pläntz, Erik. 2018. "Towards a Comprehensive Framework of Mediation Success: EU Mediation in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue." *Journal of Regional Security* 13 (2): 65–95. <https://doi.org/10.5937/JRS1801065P>.
43. Rauf, Sarwat. 2023. "The Paradoxical Role of Mediators in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Prospects and Concerns." *Insight Turkey* 25 (4): 163–80.

44. Richter, Solveig. 2018. "Missing the Muscles? Mediation by Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Negotiation* 23 (2): 258–77. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-23021155>.
45. Rodt, Annemarie Peen. 2012. "EU Performance in Military Conflict Management." In *The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager*. Routledge.
46. Rubinson, Claude. 2019. "Presenting Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Notation, Tabular Layout, and Visualization." *Methodological Innovations* 12 (2): 205979911986211. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2059799119862110>.
47. Rutten, Roel, and Claude Rubinson. 2022. "A VOCABULARY FOR QCA." compasss.org.
48. Saldaña, Johnny. 2013. *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*. 2. ed. Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE Publ.
49. Scalera, Jamie E., and Krista E. Wiegand. 2018. "The Motivation of European Union Mediation in Civil Conflicts." *European Security* 27 (4): 434–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.1514388>.
50. Schneider, Carsten Q., and Claudius Wagemann. 2010. "Standards of Good Practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets." *Comparative Sociology* 9 (3): 397–418. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156913210X12493538729793>.
51. ———. 2012. *Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis*. Strategies for Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
52. Shepherd, Alistair J. K. 2012. "Transforming CSDP for Global Conflict Management." In *The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager*. Routledge.
53. Shiraliyev, Museyib. 2023. "THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CONFLICT RESOLUTION POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS." *Asya Araştırmaları Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, December. <https://doi.org/10.58640/asyar.1408255>.
54. Siniver, Asaf. 2012. "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." In *The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager*. Routledge.
55. Tocci, Natalie. 2008. "The EU and Conflict Resolution in Turkey and Georgia: Hindering EU Potential Through the Political Management of Contractual Relations." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 46 (4): 875–97. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.00806.x>.
56. Tocci, Nathalie. 2004. "Conflict Resolution in the European Neighbourhood: The Role of the EU as a Framework and as an Actor." *EUI Working Paper RSCAS*.
57. ———. 2005. "Articles: Conflict Resolution in the Neighbourhood: Comparing EU Involvement in Turkey's Kurdish Question and in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." *Mediterranean Politics* 10 (2): 125–46. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390500141568>.
58. ———. 2007. *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*. Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies Series 1. London; New York: Routledge.
59. Valasek, Tomas. 2008. "What Does the War in Georgia Mean for EU Foreign Policy?" *Centre for European Reform*, 2008. <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/briefing-note/2008/what-does-war-georgia-mean-eu-foreign-policy>.
60. Visoka, Gözim, and John Doyle. 2016. "Neo-Functional Peace: The European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (4): 862–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12342>.

61. Vlassenroot, Koen, and Valerie Arnould. 2016. "EU Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Try and Fail?" *Security in Transition*.
62. Whitman, Richard G., and Stefan Wolff. 2012a. "The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager: Capabilities and Context in an Interdependent World." In *The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager*. Routledge.
63. ———. 2012b. "The Limits of EU Conflict Management in the Case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia." In *The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager*. Routledge.
64. Wittke, Cindy, and Maryna Rabinovych. 2019. "Five Years after: The Role of International Actors in the 'Ukraine Crisis.'" *East European Politics* 35 (3): 259–63. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1645012>.
65. Zajączkowski, Kamil. 2020. "CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT - THEIR ESSENCE, ROLE AND DETERMINANTS." *On-Line Journal Modelling the New Europe*, no. 34 (December), 4–37. <https://doi.org/10.24193/OJMNE.2020.34.01>.
66. Zenelaj, Reina, Nimet Beriker, and M. Hatipoglu. 2012. "EU/US and Turkey as Mediators Bosnia: A Comparative Study." SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2086534>.