The Viability of Consociational Democracy in Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: A Focus on

Turkish Cypriot Perspectives

By

Fuat Can Moralıoğlu

Submitted to

Central European University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Supervisor: Prof. Daniel Bochsler

Vienna, Austria

2024

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Acknowledgment

To begin, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Daniel Bochsler. His intellectual support and mentorship proved invaluable in helping me overcome the obstacles I faced throughout this endeavor.

Furthermore, I am also indebted to my friends. Their companionship throughout this process made the journey more enjoyable. I am incredibly fortunate to have them in my life.

Last, but certainly not least, I want to extend my special gratitude to my mother and the memory of my late father, whom I lost shortly before starting my master's degree. His constant encouragement to strive for improvement continues to inspire me every day. This work is dedicated to him, and I know he would be immensely proud of this.

Abstract

How to govern ethnically divided societies? This thesis investigates the viability of consociational democracy as a framework for resolving the Cyprus conflict, focusing on Turkish Cypriot perspectives. By exploring theoretical foundations, drawing comparative insights from similar cases such as Lebanon, and examining the historical context of Cyprus—including the failures of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus and the 2004 Annan Plan Referanda—I am to provide a comprehensive backdrop. My empirical work of 5 in-depth interviews with Turkish Cypriots and triangulated with public opinion surveys, reveals a strong preference for power-sharing arrangements rooted in recognizing the limitations of majoritarian democracy in ethnically divided societies. These findings align with the existing literature suggesting that minority inclusion fosters stable democracies. The Cyprus case demonstrates that without robust institutions guaranteeing minority rights and political equality, tensions and dysfunction increase, as evidenced by past failures. The political and economic challenges since the partition in 1974 further fuel dissatisfaction among Turkish Cypriots, which highlights the need for a more inclusive governance model for the island. Therefore, I suggest that policymakers must prioritize political equality and community cohabitation through power-sharing in Cyprus. Future research should explore the practical implementation of consociational models and the role of external actors in facilitating peace, which will provide essential support for meaningful negotiations and the successful implementation of power-sharing mechanisms in Cypriot political life.

Keywords: *Annan Plan Referendums, consociational democracy, Cyprus conflict, ethnically divided societies, majoritarian democracy, power-sharing, Turkish Cypriots.*

The Viability of Consociational Democracy in Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: A Focus on Turkish Cypriot Perspectives

I.   Introduction

How to govern ethnically divided societies? Democratic models have been further developed to accommodate communities with diverse cultural backgrounds, so as to offer alternatives for state mechanisms to reassess their legitimate foundations. States that have disparate political, social, economic, and cultural backgrounds cannot, however, attain the same degree of stability using these democratic models. States with disparate political, social, economic, and cultural backgrounds often struggle to achieve the same level of stability through conventional democratic models. To address this challenge, consociational democracy, whose theoretical framework for managing multicultural political structures was established by Arend Lijphart (1974) in the latter half of the 20th century, emerges as a potential solution. While it may falter in certain nations, this model has demonstrated its viability in others. The Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter RoC), founded in 1960 and lasted only 3 years based on consociational democratic principles, stands as a prominent example of such failure. Another attempt to establish power-sharing mechanisms with two constituent states, including the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (hereinafter TRNC), under a federation, was rejected during the Cypriot Annan Plan referendums in 2004. However, I will argue that it is still seen as a viable option for Turkish Cypriots (hereinafter T/C) for certain reasons, which is the subject of the empirical aspect of my thesis.

The foundation of the TRNC is deeply rooted in civil society movements. "Local and regional defense organizations such as Volkan, Karaçete, and the 9th of September Front merged to form The Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) in response to the Greek Cypriot (hereinafter

G/C) EOKA", (Yüksel, 2018) a nationalist guerilla organization aiming to unify with Greece, with both groups receiving support from their respective kin-states. Rauf Denktaş, the founder of TRNC, noted that the first weapons for TMT were received by boat from Türkiye, while EOKA already had access to weapons on the island (Denktaş, 1999). These grassroots organizations, supported by their kin-states[1], underscore the importance of civil society in the ongoing conflict. This unique context motivated me to focus on contemporary public opinion, as people's perspectives remain central to both the conflict and its resolution.

The primary aim of this study is to seek an answer to my research question: "What sort of governance model do T/C people support, and why does the consociational democracy model receive mass support?"

The research is structured into five main chapters, each of which focuses on a distinct aspect that becomes pertinent in addressing the research question. The theoretical underpinnings of consociational democracy are examined in the first section as a framework for facilitating the coexistence of various ethnic groups. [2] In order to provide a comparative viewpoint and further

---

[1] The conflict in Cyprus is not only between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It also involves the roles of Greece and Türkiye, which support their respective communities on the island. This creates a more complex situation with 4 main players instead of 2. Additionally, the United Kingdom, as a guarantor country, makes it 5. I argue that understanding the conflict requires considering both the internal relationships within Cyprus and the external support and opposition from Greece and Türkiye, as well as the historically hostile relationship between these two countries.

[2] In my thesis, I adopt Brubaker's perspective on ethnicity, which posits that ethnicity is not a rigid, tangible entity but rather a socially constructed concept. Brubaker criticizes the prevalent tendency, even in scholarly discourse, to perceive ethnic groups as distinct, uniform, and isolated entities. Instead, he proposes "a cognitive approach that views ethnicity as a lens through which individuals interpret and make sense of their social surroundings. This perspective highlights the processes of categorization, classification, and identification that influence how people perceive and engage with society" (Brubaker, 2004, p.51-53). Cyprus serves as a pertinent case study in this context, as the identities of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are shaped by social and cognitive dynamics rather than fixed ethnic categories. "Historically, Greek and Turkish nationalisms have evolved differently within Cyprus. Following the events of 1974, there has been a concerted effort to promote a sense of "Cypriotness" as a unifying identity for both communities. This concept seeks to transcend the divisive labels of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, which is more of a shared geography and cultural traditions to foster a supra-national unity" (Toprak, p.3).

improve comprehension, this section also looks at how the consociational democratic model has been implemented in political systems such as Lebanon's.

Following this, a retrospective analysis of the Cyprus issue is provided, delving into historical disputes and contrasting perspectives of T/Cs and G/Cs. Subsequently, the power-sharing mechanisms outlined in the 2004 Annan Plan are examined. Despite its ultimate failure, this plan, developed 44 years after the establishment of the Republic, aimed to incorporate elements of consociational democracy, making it the focal point of my thesis.

The later section presents an analysis of five in-depth interviews conducted online with T/Cs by using the convenience sampling method. These interviews aim to evaluate their perspectives on the Cyprus problem and assess their views on viable resolutions for the island. The interviews focused on four key questions:

1. Whether they are satisfied with the current status quo of a divided island and the non-recognized TRNC.
2. Their opinions on the possibility of annexation to Türkiye.
3. Their views on a two-state solution versus a single state under the Republic of Cyprus.
4. Their stance on a bi-regional, bi-communal federation based on political equality.
   4a. A follow-up question regarding their likely voting direction if a bi-regional, bi-communal solution with power-sharing elements in the constitution, agreed upon by T/C and G/C leaders and approved by the three guarantor countries, were put to a referendum.

Additionally, this study draws inspiration from a public opinion survey conducted four years ago by Sertaç Sonan (2020), funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Cyprus Office. Chapter 7 of their report posed similar questions to participants. By integrating certain questions from this survey into the five in-depth interviews, the study aims to create a qualitative analysis that builds upon Sonan's quantitative findings. This approach not only tests the initial hypothesis but also provides a richer understanding of public opinion.

Ultimately, the study seeks to contribute to making the long-standing Cyprus issue more visible in academic and policy discussions. By combining theoretical analysis, historical context, and contemporary perspectives, it offers a nuanced exploration of potential pathways to a resolution.

II. Hypothesis

I hypothesize that in ethnically divided societies the consociational model with power-sharing elements emerges as a favored democratic framework over other types of resolution efforts – within the scope of my thesis, for Turkish Cypriots. This hypothesis stems from a critical analysis of existing democratic models applied in multi-ethnic contexts, including Belgium, Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon. What sets the case of Cyprus apart from other examples is that both T/Cs and G/Cs had grassroots organizations, whether armed or not, and they had already attempted to live under a Republic from 1960 to 1963 with power-sharing elements incorporated into their constitution. After another attempt with the Annan Plan proposal in 2004, T/Cs showed their support for this model. Therefore, I posit that since both sides are familiar with a similar power-sharing practice in the past, despite its lack of success, T/Cs who are the minority on the island, "still support resolution efforts due to their clear dissatisfaction with the status quo" (Sonan, 2020, p.32).

For example, Miriam Hänni (2017) suggests that ethnic minorities tend to be more supportive of democracy when they are actively included in the political process. "When minority groups have representation in parliament through minority MPs or parties, they perceive their voices as being heard and their interests as being represented" (Hänni, 2017, p.103). This inclusion fosters a sense of political efficacy and engagement among ethnic minorities, which will lead to greater support for democratization. Furthermore, when minority MPs are able to effectively advocate for policies that address the needs and concerns of their communities, it reinforces the perception that democracy is responsive and inclusive. This positive experience with democratic governance enhances minority groups' confidence in the political system and strengthens their commitment to democratic principles (Hänni, 2017, p.121-122). Therefore, I believe Turkish Cypriots, if given the opportunity, would prefer to exercise their political rights under a power-sharing democratic model with G/Cs because they recognize that such a system would ensure their interests are protected and they would terminate the ongoing dispute regarding the recognition of their *de-facto* state.

Another reason why I argue that power-sharing mechanisms are more attractive in Cyprus is the inherent limitations of majoritarian democracy in navigating the complexities of ethnic diversity. Majoritarian democracy, where decisions are made based on majority rule, can be problematic in ethnically divided societies for several reasons. It often leads to the domination of the majority group, resulting in the political, social, and economic marginalization of minority groups. This system can result in the tyranny of the majority, where the interests and preferences of the majority consistently override those of minority groups. For example, as Carter (2013) argues, "If there is a super-majority group, they may try to dominate the minority group through majoritarian rule" Krienbuehl (2010). Carter further explains that "Pakistan's undemocratic institutions may result from a lack of motivation for the Muslim population to

include any other religious faction in the decision-making process, which may, in turn, result in the country's lack of power-sharing. After partition, Pakistan's Muslim population further divided into six different subgroups rooted in linguistic and regional differences among them" (Chakrabarti 2012, p.16; as also cited in Carter, 2013, p.79). "Therefore, power-sharing between segmented populations is vital for democracy but has not yet been achieved due to ethnic and linguistic differences." (Carter, 2013, p.79).

The control of majority groups in government agencies often results in minority groups lacking political representation, which can cause ongoing dissatisfaction and even lead to radicalization. For instance, "in the 1960s, Northern Irish Catholics launched a civil rights movement to demand their rights as citizens and to protest against the political dominance of Protestants. While the British government was open to considering reforms, the Protestant-led Northern Irish government banned civil rights marches and denied that Catholics had any legitimate grievances" (Klein, 2006, p.97). Therefore, the exclusion of minorities in government and local decision-making mechanisms may lead to conflict, as disenfranchised minority groups may resort to protests, civil disobedience, or even armed resistance.

Given these challenges, alternative democratic models like consociational democracy are often proposed for ethnically divided societies. Sartori (2014) stresses the importance of "political engineering"[3] to ensure equal participation and representation for all segments of society. Consociational democracy, with its focus on power-sharing and minority rights, emerges as a viable alternative to majority rule in ethnically divided societies (Sartori, 2014, p.258).

---

[3] Political engineering refers to designing political structures to ensure fair and equal participation for all segments of society.

Overall, my hypothesis suggests that power-sharing models like consociational democracy offer a more effective and inclusive framework for governing multi-ethnic societies by providing a system that requires cooperation, mitigating conflict, and promoting long-term stability. By examining theoretical frameworks and analyzing in-depth interviews with Turkish Cypriots, triangulated with Sonan's (2020) public opinion survey, I will test this hypothesis. This approach will provide insights into the most suitable democratic model for addressing the governance challenges posed by ethnic diversity in modern societies.

III.   Methodology

In this study, I employed a qualitative research design, focusing on in-depth interviews to explore the perspectives of T/Cs regarding the Cyprus problem and potential resolutions. Specifically, I examined their views on living under a consociational democratic framework compared to other possible resolutions for the island. Leveraging my personal connections— since part of my family was born and lives in the cities of Kyrenia and Larnaca in Cyprus—I used nonprobability sampling to select participants. From an initial list of 10 potential interviewees recommended by my acquaintances, I chose 5 participants to ensure diversity from the most populated areas in the TRNC.

A. Participant Selection

To ensure a wide range of views, I asked my relatives to longlist 10 individuals aged between 18 and 60 from Kyrenia and Larnaca. Then, I selected 5 participants to represent a mix of genders, ages, and occupations, aiming to maximize the representation of diverse socio-economic statuses of T/Cs. The participants were:

Participants	Gender	Age	Occupation	Education Level	City
1. K.A.	Male	18	University Student	Highschool graduate	Larnaca
2. M.F.G.	Male	36	Kiosk Owner	Highschool graduate	Larnaca
3. B.H.	Male	53	Biology Teacher	Bachelor's graduate	Kyrenia
4. E.Ç.	Female	19	University Student	Highschool graduate	Larnaca
5. A.B.	Female	40	Cosmetician	Vocational high school graduate	Kyrenia

Table 1: Interview participants

B. Interview Process

I conducted the interviews with them in Turkish language between May 2 and 19 May 2024, using Zoom and FaceTime to ensure convenience for participants. Each interview lasted approximately 20-30 minutes. The interview questions were semi-structured so it allowed me to combine open-ended questions with follow-up questions to thoroughly explore participants' views.

As mentioned in my introduction chapter, the focus of the interviews was to understand participants' satisfaction with the current status quo of a divided island and the continuation of the non-recognition of TRNC, their opinions on the possibility of annexation to Türkiye, their views on a two-state solution versus a single state under the Republic of Cyprus, their stance on a bi-regional, bi-communal federation based on political equality, and their likely voting direction if a bi-regional, bi-communal solution with power-sharing elements in the constitution, agreed upon by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders and approved by the three guarantor countries, were put to a referendum. This approach will provide a comprehensive understanding of their perspectives on the possible governance models in Cyprus.

IV.   Limitations

The limitations of this study include several factors related to the research design and sampling methods. First is the lack of in-depth interviews with G/Cs. This absence restricts the ability to make a comparative analysis with the Southern Cypriots and limits the study's scope to the perspectives of only one side. Despite this limitation, the insights derived from T/Cs who were foundational in establishing their *de-facto* state, will be valuable for understanding one critical dimension of the Cyprus issue.

Second, the convenience sampling method, where participants were referred to me by acquaintances in Cyprus, could introduce bias. Since these participants interact with my acquaintances in their daily lives, they might have politically filtered themselves while answering my questions. However, to enhance diversity, I ensured that participants came from different generations, occupations, and cities within the TRNC. This approach aimed to maximize the representation of various viewpoints within the T/C community. Additionally, the geographic focus on Kyrenia and Larnaca, while providing insights from two of the most populated areas in the TRNC, may not capture the perspectives of T/Cs living in other regions.

Despite these limitations, the findings from these interviews, combined with insights from existing public opinion surveys, offer a more developed view of the current sentiments and future aspirations of the Turkish Cypriot community. This approach not only enriches the academic discourse on ethnically divided societies but also provides practical implications for policymakers seeking to address the Cyprus problem.

V.   Review of the Literature

As mentioned earlier, I will triangulate my interview findings with the main reference for my research question, a study conducted by Sertaç Sonan, Ebru Küçükşener, and Enis Porat (2020). This study examined the attitudes of Turkish Cypriots through a public opinion survey, which included questions about the continuation of the island's division and attitudes towards having a Greek Cypriot neighbor post-settlement. Their findings revealed that a significant majority of T/Cs express discomfort with the ongoing division of the island (Sonan, 2020, p. 30-31), validating my point in the introduction chapter. However, opinions diverge on how to end this division.

When presented with five possible scenarios for resolving the Cyprus problem—continuation of the status quo, annexation by Türkiye, a two-state solution, a unitary state under the Republic of Cyprus, and a federal solution based on political equality—responses varied significantly. "46.3% of Turkish Cypriots show clear dissatisfaction with the status quo" (Sonan, 2020, p.31). Additionally, while a federal solution under the RoC is viewed favorably by a majority of T/Cs, a significant portion also finds reunification under power-sharing elements to be a satisfactory option, which goes against the general political discourse. The study further shows the preference among T/Cs for a federal solution based on political equality, a model previously supported by 65% of Turkish Cypriots in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum. Moreover, the survey indicates that T/Cs are more inclined towards having a G/C neighbor post-settlement, with nearly half expressing a positive view.

Another significant study conducted by Psaltis, Loizides, and Cakal in 2020 offers insights into the prevailing attitudes towards reunification among both communities (Psaltis et al., 2022). Their survey reveals a desire for a federal Cyprus among a substantial majority of respondents

from both T/Cs and G/Cs. Their findings are consistent with Hänni's work (2017), which stresses the desires of minorities -in this case, Turkish Cypriots. Psaltis (2022) also found that T/Cs are particularly keen on enjoying a more inclusive political life. Additionally, the study emphasizes the importance of power-sharing elements in a potential federal solution, which resonates strongly with Turkish Cypriots.

Constantinou (2012) examines the current stagnant situation on the island, describing it as one of "comfortable conflict" or "cold peace." This period, marked by the absence of violence, creates a sense of security and routine for those who benefit from it (Constantinou, 2012, p.5). Interestingly, "this peace, although illiberal in nature, is perceived as liberal by those whose identities and way of life are safeguarded by the status quo" (Constantinou, 2012, p.10). A key point in his work is the claim that deeply ingrained social and political routines maintain this sense of security, which actually leads to resistance against changes that could disrupt the existing order (Constantinou, 2012, p.10). However, the idea that political comfort from routine and collective acceptance could be a topic of further research.

Ladisch (2005) also contributes to this topic through interviews conducted with T/Cs and G/Cs. The author finds that both sides share similar definitions of reconciliation, emphasizing understanding, dialogue, and acknowledgment of past wrongs, thereby underscoring its role as a social and political process (Ladisch, 2005, p.118). However, Ladisch also identifies differences in opinions regarding how to end the current status quo, which corresponds to my hypothesis. In his research, interviewees recommended various tools to promote reconciliation, including official apologies, educational reforms, media campaigns, and economic cooperation (Ladisch, 2005, p.120-127). Among these, education, particularly history education, emerged as a powerful tool for fostering reconciliation by addressing historical narratives (Ladisch,

2005, p.127). Views on the sequencing of reconciliation initiatives varied, with some participants advocating for reconciliation to follow a settlement, while others argued for immediate action (Ladisch, 2005, p.116). Despite these differences, there was a consensus that reconciliation efforts should extend beyond select individuals and become more public, especially with open borders facilitating broader engagement (Ladisch, 2005, p.124).

However, despite these valuable contributions, there remains a gap in the literature regarding the effectiveness of consociational democracy among other solutions in Cyprus. My research aims to address this gap by conducting in-depth interviews with Turkish Cypriots and triangulating the results with Sonan's public opinion survey (2020) while also examining the applicability of Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy. Through this, I seek to contribute to a deeper understanding of the prospects for reconciliation and sustainable peace in Cyprus.

VI.   Theoretical Framework

In ethnically divided societies, the quest for democracy holds significance, particularly in the aftermath of conflict. This chapter aims to lay the groundwork for understanding the pivotal role of democracy in fostering harmony among diverse ethnic groups, often following periods of war. Cyprus, for instance, has a history of armed conflict involving grassroots armed organizations such as TMT and EOKA, as well as a Turkish military intervention in 1974. In this context, Leipziger's (2023) study provides valuable insights into the relationship between democracy and ethnic inequality in such societies. His research underscores how democratization emerges as a catalyst for inclusivity, offering avenues to address longstanding grievances among ethnically diverse populations. Notably, Leipziger theorizes that "the

positive effects of democratization unfold gradually, with tangible reductions in ethnic inequality becoming observable over 15-20 years post-war" (Leipziger, 2023, p. 15).

Building on this, I will utilize Söderberg's (2003) theorization, which suggests that democratization in the aftermath of conflict often follows a tumultuous path, influenced by various internal and external factors. Following the partition of the island after the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the immediate democratization of the TRNC did not occur, as governmental agencies were heavily influenced politically and institutionally by their kin-state, Türkiye. However, as the TRNC strengthened its governmental agencies and held regular local elections, their reliance on Türkiye for democratization gradually decreased, though it remained significant. Furthermore, his theory challenges the notion that "democratizing states are more susceptible to conflict compared to stable democracies or autocracies" (Söderberg, 2003, p.7), emphasizing that this susceptibility is particularly pronounced in "semi-democracies," where neither full autocratic control nor complete democratic stability is achieved, resulting in a higher propensity for conflict (Söderberg, 2003, p.6-8).

These findings and theories are particularly relevant to Cyprus, where the experiences with armed organizations like TMT and EOKA, alongside the Turkish intervention, exemplify the challenges and potential of democratization in post-conflict settings. To further understand the evolution of Cyprus from 1974 to 1994, it is essential to analyze three main perspectives: internal democratic transition, ethnic conflict, and gradual integration into the European Community. Before discussing the escalation in 1974 as a starting point, we must examine the internal conditions in Cyprus during the 1960s. During this period, both internal and international factors converged to influence Cyprus's democratic process. The island was

granted independence in 1960, establishing a consociational democratic government. However, the end of British colonial rule revealed significant constraints on this newfound independence. Disagreements over the constitution emphasized the bi-communal nature of the state, leading to expressions of ethnic nationalism and, eventually, inter-communal violence, as I mentioned starting from street fights to more organized armed organizations, for instance, TMT against EOKA.

"Despite the unstable internal situation, political representatives from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities persistently advocated for full sovereignty and political transition. This period coincided with democratic transitions in other Southern European countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain. There were two main phases to Cyprus's democratic efforts: the first was characterized by decolonization, and the second by ethnic nationalism. However, because of the two communities' divergent democratic visions, neither phase was totally successful. The opposing ideals of Enosis (union with Greece) and Taksim (partition), supported by Greek and Turkish Cypriots, respectively, deepened the political divide, exacerbated by the lack of reconciliation between these perspectives" (Alessandrini, 2022).

John Nagle's research is also pertinent within this theoretical framework. He contends that "consociationalism emphasizes incorporating ethnic identities into political structures to manage ethnonational divisions" (Nagle, 2011, p.17). Other scholars have also praised consociational arrangements for their efficacy in regulating conflicts and facilitating power-sharing among competing ethnic factions (Lijphart, 1977). However, critics argue that consociationalism "may perpetuate ethnic divisions and hinder the cultivation of a shared identity" (Nagle, 2011, p.8). This perspective advocates for grassroots approaches to address division and promote intergroup reconciliation (Ruane and Todd, 1996, as cited in Nagle, 2011,

p.20). "While transformationist strategies offer potential solutions for overcoming ethnonational barriers, they face significant implementation challenges, especially in deeply divided contexts like Northern Ireland" (Nagle, 2011, p.21-22).

In conclusion, drawing on Leipziger's idea that "the positive effects of democratization in ethnically divided societies become observable after approximately two decades," I contend that the aftermath of the 1974 conflict in Cyprus presents a compelling case. Despite the unsuccessful attempt to democratize the entire island through the institutionalization of agencies in the 2004 Annan Plan, there remains a persistent inclination towards power-sharing among the T/Cs. This inclination suggests that, given the historical support for democratic frameworks that promote inclusivity and address ethnic inequalities, the T/Cs will continue to advocate for and support power-sharing arrangements as a means to achieve long-term stability and democratic governance on the island.

VII.   Elements of Consociational Democracy versus Majoritarian Systems

In this chapter, I will analyze the theory of consociational democracy, focusing on its constituent elements as developed by Arend Lijphart, and discussing its advantages and risks. This analysis will provide the details of consociational democracy to ethnically diverse societies. In the second half of this chapter, I will compare consociational democracy with the majoritarian approach, which the Greek Cypriots advocated for, particularly in the context of the power-sharing elements included in the 2004 Annan Plan. This comparison will indicate the differing perspectives on governance and the implications for democratic stability in Cyprus.

In ethnically divided societies, the establishment and maintenance of democracy can be a significant struggle. Managing ethnic diversity and the conflicts it brings is a critical challenge for decision-makers and political scientists, especially in countries where democratic norms are not yet fully entrenched. Ethnic identities – shaped by national, religious, racial, and cultural values –form complex social affiliations that can drive conflict. When diverse ethnic groups coexist within a single society without a balance of power among them, the risk of conflict is ever-present. To address this, multi-ethnic societies often require a new constitutional and institutional framework.

Consociational democracy, therefore, offers a solution by promoting cooperation and compromise among political actors through institutions designed to increase inclusivity and representation. This system enables different ethnic groups to coexist peacefully within a unified nation-state. The theory of consociational democracy, developed by Arend Lijphart, outlines an approach for societies hosting multiple ethnic or social groups to share power, establish a stable political order, and live together without conflict. According to Lijphart, there are four key qualities that constitute the essence of consociational democracy. *Table 2* below illustrates the principles of consociational democracy, the modes of implementation, and the potential problems that these practices may entail.

Table 2: Consocionalist model of democracy

Principles	Practices	Potential Problems
Ethnic political parties within broad coalitions	Grand coalition governments	Political elites may fuel conflict to strengthen their power at the center
Decision-making regarding groups, based on the importance of decisions, being subject to either common or minority veto	The recognition of the rights of prominent ethnic, religious, and cultural groups, as well as individuals of different races, through the constitution	Strengthening ethnic divisions undermines mutual tolerance and understanding in society
Proportionality	The utilization of a proportional representation electoral system and the proportional distribution of employment opportunities, expenditures, and participation among ethnic group leaders	While accurately reflecting societal divisions, it fails to incentivize the establishment of bridges between different groups
Segmental Autonomy	Federalism involves regional/administrative or institutional seperation	It does not encourage conflicting groups to live together peacefully

(Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, p.45)

A. Grand Coalition

Consociational democracies, by their nature, are models that allow for the coexistence of different religious, sectarian, or ethnic groups. Achieving this relies on each group being able to express itself in the parliament. "Therefore, systems implementing the consociational democracy model must rely on a broad-based coalition government. In coalition governments, a common government is formed by parties with the most support within cultural groups" (Dalar, 2015, p.352). This coalition government expresses its own views in decision-making. The beneficial aspect of broad-based coalition governments is the establishment of a democratic compromise base by involving different opinions in governance. However, the detrimental aspect stems from their reliance on fragile majorities, which can lead to potential instability.

As also Dalar (2015) argues, in grand coalition governments formed with leaders from significant groups in society, the support of all cabinet members is required for a decision to be made. Although this may slow down some decision-making processes, it is a method that necessitates a culture of compromise, as other groups will also need support on different issues (Dalar, 2015, p.352-353). This prevailing culture of compromise among leaders will also help develop among the represented cultural groups.

B. Proportionality

With this dynamic of consociational democracy, proportional representation of all cultural groups in the parliament is aimed for. In fact, in more liberal versions of consociational democracy, it is argued that the principle of proportionality should be reflected in all public spheres. However, Lijphart suggests that the principle of proportionality should be limited to political representation, as designing all public spheres according to the sizes of cultural groups would increase fragmentation (Lijphart, 2014, p.36-38). According to him, the implementation of proportional representation in the decision-making processes of the government and parliament at the central, regional, or local levels is crucial for the functionality of consociational democracy. This proportionality extends across a wide range, from representation in parliament to the distribution of resources.

C. Minority Veto

The veto right is implemented in various ways across many democratic models. For instance, amending the constitution often requires approval by a qualified majority, meaning that a minority of a certain size holds veto power. This method ensures that significant changes cannot occur without substantial consensus.

In the consociational model, the veto right is a more effective tool for protecting minorities. While laws typically require a majority vote to pass in parliament, any minority cultural group has the right to block legislation. As Lijphart explains, "If the majority cannot convince the minority, they cannot pass a law" (Lijphart, 1996, p.162). This aims to establish a platform for mutual agreement among all parties involved in the legislative process.

D. Segmental Autonomy

"Each segmental group must be allowed to run its own internal affairs." (Miard, 2006, p.11) As Miard further argues, "This means that segmental autonomy increases the plural nature of an already plural society. This is in the nature of consociationalism, at least initially: to make plural societies more thoroughly plural. Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy" (Lijphart, 1977, p.41-42). As the saying goes, "Good fences make good neighbors" (O'Leary, 2005, p.11; as cited in Miard, 2006, p.12).

E. The Problem of the Majority Democracy Model in Cyprus

I began this chapter by recalling Gleditsch's research (2003), in which he emphasizes the significance of uneven transitions in democratization processes, noting their potential to destabilize regions and exacerbate existing conflicts. The case of Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriot community's shift towards democracy occurred amidst broader geopolitical tensions, exemplifies this phenomenon.

Gleditsch's research is crucial for understanding the political developments in the region. Notably, the absence of parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus until 1985 and the

establishment of regular elections thereafter pinpoint the initial hurdles in the democratization process. However, the legitimacy of these elections also has been contentious. Allegations of interference from Türkiye, such as those made by Democratic People's Party chairman İsmet Kotak through the *Kıbrıs Postası Newspaper*, underscore these concerns. "Kotak claimed that Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal provided the National Unity Party (NUP) with 315 million Turkish Lira as an "election bonus" and that the arrival of the Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Cyprus the day before the election served as support for the NUP" (Akay, 1985). These allegations demonstrate ongoing external influences on the domestic democratization efforts of Turkish Cypriots, with political elites from Türkiye continuously facing similar accusations of meddling in Northern Cyprus' internal affairs. While the democratization process in the TRNC is a compelling topic for study, this chapter will specifically focus on the problems of the majoritarian model. This focus directly correlates with my interview questions regarding the experience of living under the RoC, which will provide a narrower yet more detailed examination of the resolutions.

Expanding on this discourse, Dahl (1982) underscores the importance of secure group rights and collective safety for a well-functioning electoral system. He argues, "If ordinary political conflicts can be settled more or less fairly by the democratic process. . . then ordinary jurisdictional conflicts can be. If a procedure like majority rule ordinarily leads to reasonably satisfactory outcomes, while fundamental rights are preserved, then will it not lead to satisfactory outcomes in decisions about jurisdiction? But what if the freedom of a minority is threatened by democratic processes?" (Dahl, 1982, p.93-94).

Dahl's argument further suggests that if ordinary political conflicts can be fairly settled by democratic means and majority rule usually results in satisfactory outcomes while protecting

fundamental rights, then similar approaches should work for jurisdictional conflicts. However, he raises a critical concern about situations where democratic processes threaten the freedom of a minority. Granting autonomy to a minority might protect its rights and welfare, but it could also harm the rights and welfare of others, potentially the majority. The central question he grapples with is how to resolve such conflicts: should every jurisdictional conflict be settled by democratic procedures involving the largest number of citizens?

While democracy and majority rule are effective in many cases, there are circumstances where these principles might not adequately protect minority rights or could even lead to harm for the majority. This issue becomes particularly pertinent in polyethnic societies where elections take place. Minority groups often experience concerns not only about losing political influence but also about their safety and cultural identity. In the absence of robust institutions that unconditionally ensure the security and rights of all groups, regardless of electoral outcomes, an election defeat can trigger existential anxieties. These anxieties may drive groups to prioritize self-preservation, potentially resulting in the formation of unauthorized armed militias. This scenario can destabilize the societal structure and initiate a harmful cycle of violence.

That is why, I argue that losing an election in a majoritarian democracy, where the majority dominates governmental agencies and other state apparatuses by excluding and/or suppressing the political presence of minorities, might be interpreted not as a temporary political setback but as an existential threat. In these contexts, simple majority rule not only fails to deliver genuinely democratic outcomes, where all groups feel invested in the system, but also exacerbates the risk of conflict and societal fragmentation.

Population Sizes of Ethnic Groups

Voting Power Distribution

Table 3: Visualization of Horowitz's work (1985)

For example, inspired by Horowitz's work (1985, p. 83-85) I visualized his ethnic politics theory using three major ethnicities, A, B, and C, as shown in *Table 3*. If ethnicity is the primary driver of political affiliation, as in the case of Cyprus, Group A, with the largest population, consistently wins half of the seats, securing control over the government. Groups B and C, regardless of their combined numbers, remain perpetually excluded from power. This reinforces their minority status and potentially leads to long-term political instability. Regarding this, one of the questions I posed to my interviewees concerned living under the RoC. The responses from T/Cs were not surprising as they drew attention to the unfairness of majoritarian democracy for minority groups in ethnically divided societies.

VIII.   Power-sharing in Lebanon

A. Historical Context

This chapter is written to provide a comparative perspective on Cyprus by examining lessons learned from Lebanon, which has successfully applied power-sharing mechanisms in a multicultural society. I believe comparing Lebanon, with 18 different religious sects coexisting, to Cyprus is instructive due to its similar experience in governance. Lebanon's diversity has, at certain points, facilitated a semblance of democracy, which is often rare in the region. It appears

paradoxical that a society as diverse as Lebanon's could achieve a degree of peace, while seemingly more homogenous nations struggle with internal discord. Therefore, studying Lebanon's power-sharing dynamics provides valuable insights into why ethnically divided societies may or may not experience conflict, shedding light on the influence of both external factors and internal dynamics. This comparative analysis aims to understand better the complexities of democratization and power-sharing in divided societies and to draw lessons that could be applicable to Cyprus.

Examining periods of peace and conflict throughout Lebanese history reveals a crucial pattern in this sense. "When a foreign power acts as a "guarantor state," enforcing power-sharing agreements, Lebanon tends to experience relative stability. Conversely, the absence of such intervention increases the likelihood of inter-group competition escalating into violence. For instance, the outbreak of conflict following the weakening of Ottoman control and Germany's occupation of France during World War I highlights this vulnerability" (Ekinci, 1998, p.23). However, the involvement of foreign states presents a double-edged sword. While no single power has ever garnered universal support across all Lebanese sects, their mere presence can act as a deterrent to conflict. This is because foreign states often perceive instability in Lebanon as a threat to their own interests, as evidenced by past clashes between France and the Ottoman Empire.

Ironically, power-sharing regimes implemented after the Ottoman withdrawal aimed to create a democratic Lebanon free from sectarian divisions. These efforts, however, have largely backfired. Not only has Lebanon failed to progress towards a truly secular democracy, but sectarianism has arguably deepened. The foreign-backed elites, in an attempt to solidify their own power, have exploited these sectarian divisions, further widening the social and political

chasm. These misguided external policies have significantly altered Lebanese internal politics, most notably by hindering the development of a truly democratic system based on shared values.

B. Analysis of Power-sharing Mechanisms in Lebanon

In this chapter, I will examine Lebanon's power-sharing mechanisms, which are particularly pertinent for Cyprus due to its similarity in ethnic cleavages. This analysis is essential for providing readers with a comparative perspective on the 2004 Annan Plan, especially regarding the allocation of parliamentary seats based on ethnic proportions in Cyprus, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. As Fulya Atacan notes, "The political phenomenon in Lebanon differs significantly from that in other countries. The most prominent manifestation of this difference is the National Pact signed in 1943. This pact should be understood as a formula for inter-sectarian consensus and political power-sharing" (Atacan, 2004, p.285).

The National Pact has been instrumental in shaping Lebanon's contemporary political structure. Unlike systems that derive political legitimacy and power from national elections, this pact bases them on the demographic distribution of Lebanon's various religious communities. It reflects the collective desire among Lebanon's minority groups to establish an independent state governed by a consociational framework within federalism (Köprülü, 2013, p.5).

Köprülü (2013) further argues that one of the most nop principles of the National Pact is that significant decisions cannot be made by a single ethnic, sectarian, or racial group. This principle is protected by the veto right enshrined in their constitution. According to the pact, power-sharing is implemented in key governmental positions: "The President is to be a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, the Speaker of Parliament a Shia, and the Deputy Prime

Minister a Greek Orthodox. This arrangement is designed to maintain a balance of power within the country" (Köprülü, 2013, p.5).

The distribution of parliamentary seats follows Lijphart's proportionality principle, as illustrated in *Table 4*:

Allocation of Parliamentary Seats in Lebanon

Table 4: Allocation of parliamentary seats in Lebanon

This distribution aims to reflect the demographic realities and relative sizes of these groups within Lebanon. By doing so, it attempts to prevent any single group from dominating the political landscape. In light of these, it is evident that the National Pact aligns with Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy model, which emphasizes broad coalitions, proportionality, and mutual veto principles to ensure the consent of all parties.

When comparing the power-sharing mechanisms in Lebanon and Cyprus, it becomes clear that both countries have implemented strategies to manage their ethnically and religiously diverse populations. For instance, the Taif Agreement of 1989 was crucial in reshaping Lebanon's

political system. The agreement established a Council of Ministers that included representatives from all major sectarian groups, requiring a two-thirds majority for decisions to prevent any single group from dominating the executive branch. Furthermore, it restructured the Lebanese Parliament to ensure equal representation between Christians and Muslims by dividing the 128 parliamentary seats equally between the two groups, with additional subdivisions among various sectarian groups to reflect Lebanon's diverse demographics (Bahout, 2016, p.10). Similarly, the House of Representatives in Cyprus, elected proportionally every five years, mirrors the island's demographics by including members from the Greek Cypriot community and observers for Armenian, Latin, and Maronite minorities. However, a significant portion of the House remains vacant since 1964[4] due to the lack of agreement on representation mechanisms, and the ongoing division of the island.

Furthermore, Lebanon's confessionalist system relies heavily on proportional representation, which aims to address deep sectarian divisions while maintaining political stability. In contrast, the Annan Plan advocates for a federation of two states under one federal government. Another significant disparity between the two approaches lies in the role of external actors. Lebanon's stability has often been maintained by the absence of external powers interfering in its domestic politics. In contrast, the Annan Plan sought to create an internally driven solution for Cyprus while also taking into account the strategic interests of external guarantors like Greece, Türkiye, and the UK.

---

[4] 24 of the 80 parliamentary seats are reserved for Turkish Cypriots.

IX.   Historical Context of Cyprus Issue and Grassroots Organizations

In this chapter, I will provide an informative background of Cyprus to better understand the circumstances surrounding the antebellum and postbellum periods. A comprehensive understanding of the Cyprus issue is crucial for my thesis since it will offer critical insights into the historical, ethnic, and geopolitical dynamics that have shaped the island's contemporary conflicts and political landscape. By examining the deep-rooted causes and significant events that have led to the current division, I aim to provide the underlying factors that continue to influence the island's stability and the ongoing challenges to peace and reunification efforts.

The Cyprus issue has its roots in the island's strategic and geopolitical significance, alongside its diverse ethnic population. "The Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus in 1571, maintaining control until the late 19th century when the island attracted the attention of Western powers, particularly Britain. Following the Ottoman defeat in the 1878 Russo-Turkish War, Britain assumed administrative control over Cyprus under a defense alliance, consolidating its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean" (Çiçek, 2002, p. 374).

British administration continued until the mid-20th century, during which time ethnic tensions between the Greek Cypriots, who sought unification with Greece, and Turkish Cypriots, who resisted this move, intensified. "By the 1950s, these tensions had escalated into violent clashes, leading to the establishment of the EOKA by Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) by Turkish Cypriots" (Yılmaz, 2017, p.380). Therefore, these organizations, which also received support from their respective kin-states, motivated me to explore people's opinions on the current situation on the island, because I consider that people are at the center of both the conflict and its resolution.

In response to escalating violence and the failure of diplomatic efforts, the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements established the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, with power-sharing arrangements between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Despite initial hopes, the agreements did not bring lasting peace. By 1963, President Makarios proposed 13 constitutional changes to the Turkish side, which were rejected and led to further conflict and the division of Nicosia by an UN-patrolled Green Line. The situation worsened in 1974 when a Greek-backed coup aimed at Enosis prompted Türkiye to intervene militarily, which Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit cited as their right as a guarantor power. This intervention resulted in the *de-facto* partition of the island, with the northern part becoming predominantly Turkish Cypriot and the southern part Greek Cypriot (Islattı, 2019).

Today, Cyprus' capital Larnaca is shared by G/C and T/C, however, TRNC is recognized only by Türkiye. Despite other UN-sponsored negotiations and peace initiatives, including the 2004 Annan Plan which was rejected by the Greek Cypriots in the referendum, a lasting resolution remains elusive. The island's division continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, and energy exploration rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. "In recent years, there have been renewed efforts to restart peace talks, but mutual distrust, property disputes, and security concerns persist as significant barriers to reunification. The Cyprus issue, thus, remains a complex and enduring conflict at the intersection of historical grievances, ethnic nationalism, and international diplomacy" (Islattı, 2019).

X.   Factors Facilitating the Applicability of Consociational Democracy in Cyprus

The escalating unrest and insecurity in Cyprus prompted Turkish Cypriots to form various local and regional defense organizations. Initially, groups such as Kara Yılan, Volkan, and Kıbrıs Türk Mukavemet Birliği (KITEMB) emerged independently and without coordination to

protect the community against EOKA's terror activities (Balyemez, 2018, p. 40-41). However, dissatisfaction with their effectiveness led key figures like Rauf Denktaş, Burhan Nalbantoğlu, and Kemal Tanrısevdi to recognize the need for a more powerful and unified organization (Balyemez, 2018, p.42). This realization resulted in the formation of the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) in 1957, which consolidated the existing local defense groups under its structure (Balyemez, 2018, p.47).

The establishment of TMT underscores the Turkish Cypriot community's grassroots initiative, supported and legitimized by the elites of Northern Cyprus. Seeking external support, leaders like Denktaş and Küçük traveled to Türkiye to secure not only political but also material backing, which explicitly shows their kin-state's role in providing arms and expertise. This strategic alliance with Türkiye mirrored the operational support EOKA received from Greece. As documented, "The shipment of weapons from Türkiye to Cyprus was typically carried out using small, motorized boats. There were six instances of weapons shipments from Türkiye until November 9, 1958" (Balyemez, 2018, p.47). Through these efforts, the Turkish Cypriot grassroots organizations demonstrated a clear desire for self-determination. Their resistance efforts were not solely about immediate survival but also aimed at ensuring political recognition and a fair distribution of power within Cyprus.

A. Power Balance

In societies with diverse cultural and ethnic structures, it is necessary to establish a multiple power balance among these groups to prevent this diversity from turning into conflict. In an equation where multiple balance-control mechanisms exist, these groups can protect their interests and effectively turn their demands into politics. "A binary balance system where one group can establish hegemony or where groups are numerically imbalanced can result in

intergroup rivalry and conflict rather than cooperation." (Çiçek, 2017, p.27) Similarly, in a society with two equally sized groups, elites may tend to seek sole power by gaining slightly more votes rather than collaborating. This group in power can use its position to dominate or suppress the other group. However, this is not the case in Cyprus, since the size of T/C and G/C is asymmetrical.

Hans Daalder attributes the success of coalition democracy in the Netherlands to the fact that all groups remain in a minority position. Because no cultural group can independently form a majority, no single group poses a threat to the others. According to Daalder, the divisive potential of having multiple groups is mitigated by the inability of any one group to dominate. (Daalder, 1996, p. 219)

In a system striving for an optimal balance of power, Steiner (1974) identifies two crucial elements. The first is ensuring a distribution of power where no single segment dominates the others. This is balanced by the second element: the necessity of at least three distinct groups. Steiner argues that a bipolar system, with only two dominant powers, is inherently unstable and more prone to conflict (Steiner, 1974, p.259-268). He adds that in a dual system, the gain of one group is naturally perceived as the loss of the other. However, in a system with multiple actors, it is less clear which group is disadvantaged by the gain of another. In such a setup, the primary concern of each group is that its interests are not directly threatened. (Steiner, 1974, p. 268) Consequently, each group focuses on its own gains without worrying about the cost of decisions. Nevertheless, there is a risk inherent in this argument: "While the coalition democracy model is designed for multi-group societies, the decision-making capability of a multi-actor coalition is weaker compared to more homogeneous societies. To maintain the functionality of this model, the ideal number of groups should not exceed three or four. This is

because there is an inverse relationship between the number of groups and the ability to make quick and effective decisions" (Steiner, 1974, p. 269-270).

However, applying this model to Cyprus becomes intriguing. While consocionalist democracy aims to accommodate diverse societies, its decision-making capability weakens with too many actors, which is not an issue in Cyprus due to its bipartite structure. The lack of a third significant group exacerbates the zero-sum perception between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which would make swift and effective decision-making challenging. To sustain the functionality of a consocionalist democracy in Cyprus, it would be essential to establish mechanisms that promote mutual interests and minimize zero-sum perceptions between the two primary groups. This approach is crucial for mitigating conflict and fostering cooperation in a context where a third balancing group is absent.

B. Multi-Party System

In ethnically diverse societies, a multi-party political structure is another factor that facilitates the applicability of the consociational democracy model. In multi-group societies, subcultural groups express their demands and political preferences through parties. The crucial point here is the possibility for each group, regardless of its size, to be represented by a party that reflects its own views. As mentioned earlier, political parties emerge as a need and reflection of social groups. The deprivation of representation for a group can influence the power balance and increase the risk of intergroup conflict. Moreover, since parties consist of the political leaders and elites of the groups they represent, they also serve as a means to provide elites for the grand coalition to be established.

C. Relationship Between Country Size and Consocionalist Democracy

Successful examples of coalition democracy are often found in smaller countries. Val R. Lorwin (1971) notes that nations such as "Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria, which exhibit high or moderate pluralism, have effectively adopted coalition democracy. In contrast, larger nations like France, Italy, Germany, and the United States have not shown similar tendencies." (Lorwin, 1971, p.148)

According to Çiçek (2017), the smaller size of a country directly and indirectly impacts the success of consociationalist democracy. "Directly, it promotes consensus and cooperation among different groups. Indirectly, it reduces the burden on decision-making processes and simplifies governance. Several intrinsic and extrinsic factors in smaller countries drive these effects. Internally, the small size allows elites to develop personal relationships, fostering a culture of consensus and tolerance that enhances governability. Externally, the vulnerability of small states to external threats encourages internal solidarity and cooperation, as there is no overarching international authority to protect them" (Çiçek, 2017, p. 28-29). Considering these advantages of being a small-sized island, Cyprus – with a Greek Cypriot majority and a Turkish Cypriot minority – illustrates why consociationalist democracy appears to be a viable solution.

XI. Power-sharing Elements in the Annan Plan

After offering a comparison with Lebanon and elucidating the consociationalist principles, I feel prepared to explore the power-sharing mechanisms embedded within the Annan Plan—a reunification proposal for Cyprus put forth by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The findings and discussions presented in this chapter rely on my own analysis, and I hope to contribute to the existing literature on the plan's power-sharing elements.

The fifth and final Annan Plan aimed to establish a united Cyprus with a single international identity and sovereignty, consisting of two constituent states: the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. The plan required that amendments to the "United Cyprus Republic Constitution" be approved by both the federal parliament and the majority of voters in separate referendums held by each state, ensuring the core principles remained immutable and emphasizing the need for consensus in constitutional changes. This provision aimed to foster cooperation and balance power between the two communities.

Firstly, since I see that there is a gap in the examination of the proposed flag of the plan (Attachment 3), I aim to bring a new perspective to the design as seen in *Figure 1*, which still needs to be examined.

Figure 1: Flag proposal for Cyprus, 2004

An important step toward reunifying the island, which has been split between TRNC and the RoC, was the proposal of a new flag. "In early March 2004, a committee comprised of Greek and Turkish Cypriots chose this flag from hundreds of entries submitted to an international competition held by the UN in early 2003. The competition required a flag with a 2:3 proportion and a detailed description of the design. The proposed flag featured blue and red stripes to represent the Greek and Turkish communities, though the shades differed from those on the

respective national flags of Greece and Turkey. The orange-yellow central stripe symbolized copper, reflecting Cyprus's name, while the white fimbriation likely stood for harmony between the various communities. The current flag of the TRNC was to continue to be used for the Turkish Cypriot State, while no design was ever proposed for the Greek Cypriot State" (Thomas, 2004).

However, there were problems with the flag's layout. It was criticized for being excessively simple and dull, using blue for Greeks and red for Turks, thus emphasizing division over unification. While it might represent the real-life divisions between these populations, a flag intended to symbolize unity should evoke harmony rather than hostility. Moreover, in a reunification attempt, the arrangement might imply a hierarchy, placing one population above the other, which could be problematic.

As for the identification of power-sharing elements in the plan, I will start by citing certain articles to give a better understanding. The delineation of powers between the federal government and the constituent states was another critical aspect of the plan. The Annan Plan allocated specific areas of governance to the federal level, including the followings:

- Foreign Affairs (Article 5; Sub-Article 2)

- Central Bank (Annex I, Part IV, Article 14; Sub-article 1c)

- Federal Finances (Annex I, Part IV, Article 14; Sub-article 1d)

- EU Relations (Annex I, Part IV, Article 14; Sub-article 1b)

- Natural Resources (Annex I, Part IV, Article 14; Sub-article 1e)

- Transportation of Ships (Annex III, Attachment 10; Law 3)

- Citizenship (Article 3; Sub-article 1)

- General and Special Pardons (Attachment 5; Article 24)

- Intellectual Property Rights (Attachment 18)

This demarcation was intended to streamline governance and ensure effective operation within designated spheres. On the other hand, the constituent states were granted authority over various domains such as;

- Tourism (Article 16; Sub-article 3a)

- Judiciary at the constituent state level

- Sports and education (Article 16; Sub-article 3f)

- Industry and commerce (Article 16; Sub-article 3d)

- Fisheries and agriculture (Article 16; Sub-article 3c)

- Environmental protection (Article 16; Sub-article 3b)

- Social security and labor (Article 16; Sub-article 3h)

- Health (Article 16; Sub-article 3g)

- Urban and regional planning (Article 16; Sub-article 3e)

By explicitly stating that all powers not expressly given to the federal government would reside with the constituent states, the plan aimed to decentralize governance and empower local authorities. Additionally, the implementation of the Constitution would be overseen by the Supreme Court, to prevent unilateral changes; for example, the plan explicitly prohibited any unilateral amendments, secession, or union with another country to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the unified state (Annex V, Chapter D; Sub-article VI).

Property rights were another complex issue addressed by the Annan Plan. Given the historical context of displacement and property loss following conflicts, the plan proposed an

independent and impartial Property Court to adjudicate property claims based on criteria set out in the Foundation Agreement (Annex VII, Part IV, Article 22). This commission would determine how property rights could be exercised, considering the location of the affected property. Special arrangements were included to protect the rights and interests of current occupants, which aimed at a balanced and fair resolution to property disputes.

Security concerns were integral to the Annan Plan as well. It stipulated that Türkiye and Greece could each maintain a maximum of 6,000 troops on the island until Türkiye's accession to the European Union, after which all Greek and Turkish military forces would withdraw unless otherwise agreed (Annex IV, Article 3; Sub-article 2). This provision aimed to ensure the security of both communities while fostering conditions for long-term peace and stability. Furthermore, the Annan Plan outlined the representation of Cyprus within the European Union. It stated that Cyprus would be represented by the federal government in matters falling under its jurisdiction or significantly impacting its competences. However, if an issue pertained primarily or solely to the competencies of the constituent states, representation could be through a representative of either the federal government or the relevant constituent state, acting on behalf of the United Cyprus Republic. This arrangement was intended to ensure that both constituent states had a voice in EU matters relevant to their interests.

In terms of citizenship, the plan proposed a single Cypriot citizenship, complemented by internal constituent state citizenship. This dual citizenship model allowed for a unified national identity while preserving the distinct cultural and political identities of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Voting rights were tied to permanent residence, with Cypriots voting in federal elections based on their internal constituent state citizenship and in constituent state and local elections based on their permanent residence.

The Annan Plan also addressed the sensitive issue of population movement between the constituent states. It imposed temporary restrictions on the right to permanent residence in the other constituent state, with a moratorium on such movements for the first six years, gradually easing over the following years. These restrictions aimed to manage demographic changes and prevent potential tensions arising from large-scale relocations. Finally, the plan included provisions for the rights of Turkish and Greek nationals residing in Cyprus. It stipulated that Turkish and Greek citizens would receive equal treatment regarding entry and residence rights, in accordance with EU laws and agreements. However, their permanent residence rights would be limited to a certain percentage of the population in the respective constituent state, with priority given to those who had resided in Cyprus for longer periods. These restrictions would not apply to full-time students and temporary academic staff. Additionally, political rights for these nationals would only be granted upon acquiring Cypriot citizenship and the relevant internal constituent state citizenship.

The Annan Plan was a comprehensive attempt to resolve Cyprus's long-standing division by providing a formal framework for governance and power-sharing. It aimed to maintain the sovereignty and integrity of a united Cyprus while balancing the rights and interests of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities by establishing mechanisms for cooperation and coexistence. The comprehensive measures in the plan concerning citizenship, property rights, security, EU representation, governance, and population movement were formulated with the aim of establishing a durable and sustainable resolution to the Cyprus issue.

XII.   Factors Influencing Greek Cypriots' Rejection of the Annan Plan

In analyzing why Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, it is crucial to examine the outcomes of the April 24, 2004, referendum conducted in both Southern and Northern Cyprus. Since the reasons for rejection are still a disputed issue from a political perspective, in this chapter, I refer to 2 Turkish and 2 Greek academic works, 1 report of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and 1 letter from President Papadopoulos of RoC to Kofi Annan to maintain the ethical integrity of my thesis.

The referenda stated that the proposal would be void if it were rejected by either of the parties (Oran 2017, pp. 660–661). According to the election results, 75.8% of Greek Cypriots were against the Annan Plan, while 64.9% of Turkish Cypriots were in favor of it. That is to say, two-thirds of Turkish Cypriots supported the plan, while three-quarters of Greek Cypriots rejected it. The Greek Cypriots' belief that the Annan Plan was unjust and detrimental to their interests was highlighted by this notable difference (Chadjipadelis and Andreadis 2007, p. 5).

Voters	Yes	No
Greek Cypriots	24.17%	75.83%
Turkish Cypriots	64.90%	35.09%

Table 5: Results of the April 24, 2004 Referenda

As also Dinçer (2019) recalls, Baskın Oran (2017) attributes the primary reason for the Greek Cypriots' disapproval of the Annan Plan to their firm belief in the certainty of Cyprus's accession to the European Union as the Republic of Cyprus. The Accession Treaty, signed on April 16, 2003, ensured EU membership by May 1, 2004. Furthermore, following the development of the third version of the Annan Plan, the referendum question was altered to clarify that a "no" vote would not equate to rejecting EU membership. Previously, a "no" vote

implied rejecting both the Annan Plan and EU membership (Oran 2017, p. 662). This strategic context influenced President Tassos Papadopoulos of Southern Cyprus (2003-2008), who believed that once the RoC was a member of the EU, he could leverage this position to pressure Türkiye during its EU accession negotiations to obtain better terms for G/Cs. This strategy was based on the belief that Türkiye might have to agree to conditions less favorable than those in the Plan, which were seen as disadvantageous for T/Cs.

The complexity of G/C opposition to the Annan Plan is further elaborated in a report to the UN Security Council by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan following the referendums on April 24, 2004. The report indicated that G/Cs were unwilling to share economic benefits, political equality, and power with T/Cs under a federal state structure. Additionally, the property clauses in the Annan Plan caused significant dissatisfaction among G/Cs, which might be another reason for their decision to reject the plan (UNSC Report: S/2004/756; as also cited in Oran 2017, p.662).

In his letter to Kofi Annan on June 7, 2004, Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos detailed the motivations behind their rejection of the plan in the referendum. According to the arguments presented by Greek Cypriots, this rejection stems from several key concerns. Firstly, Papadopoulos expressed profound security concerns, particularly regarding the presence of Turkish mainland settlers and the potential establishment of a permanent Turkish military presence post-reunification. These elements were perceived as direct threats to the demographic composition and sovereignty of Cyprus (Papadopoulos, 2004, p.4). Additionally, a prevailing lack of trust in Türkiye's commitment to faithfully execute the plan's provisions further heightened their apprehensions (Papadopoulos, 2004, p.7-8).

Furthermore, Greek Cypriots expressed their concern that Türkiye was unfairly given an advantage in the plan by citing instances where Turkey was granted strategic economic benefits without Cyprus receiving corresponding gains. Additionally, the plan offered only relatively small territorial concessions and granted Türkiye significant veto power over actions taken by the Cypriot government (Papadopoulos, 2004, pp. 4-6). Papadopoulos questioned the plan's functionality even further, claiming that it did not satisfy the fundamental need for "functionality and workability" (Papadopoulos, 2004, p. 6). He highlighted the inherent ambiguities in the plan's implementation and voiced concerns about its compliance with EU regulations and the *acquis* (Papadopoulos, 2004, p. 17). Consequently, these collective concerns led to the 75.8% "No" vote from Greek Cypriots (Oran, 2017, p.663), which referred to the depth of their reservations and the perceived inadequacies of the Annan Plan.

According to Christophoros Christophorou (2005), conservative political rhetoric played a major role in setting the agenda for the "Oxi" (No) campaign. Christophorou also references Greek Cypriot nationalist discourse, their mistrust of Erdogan's government, and their mistrust of Turkish Cypriots. His findings are consistent with the arguments made by Papadopoulos in his letter. Additionally, the political elites of the Republic of Cyprus considered the Annan Plan a security risk, which escalated concerns about division and Turkish dominance over the island. Further undermining support for the plan was the Orthodox Church's argument that a "Yes" vote would have religious ramifications (Christophorou, 2005, pp. 94-95).

Considering all these, I contend that the reluctance of Greek Cypriots to accept the Annan Plan was driven by a combination of strategic, political, and social factors. According to Ahmet Sözen and Kudret Özersay (2007), "Greek Cypriots were unwilling to share political equality and the power that would come with EU membership with Turkish Cypriots, particularly as

they anticipated future concessions from Türkiye during its EU candidacy" (Sözen and Özersay 2007, p. 139).

XIII.   Interviews

In this chapter, I will present the results of five online interviews to test my hypothesis that in ethnically divided societies, the consociational model with power-sharing elements emerges as a favored democratic framework over other types of resolution efforts for Turkish Cypriots. Additionally, I aim to further understand their preferences in resolution proposals mentioned in the introduction chapter. To better categorize the responses for each question posed, I will start with the first question and its answers, discussing the most relevant responses in the most relevant context to maintain the compact structure and focus of my thesis. I have not included certain answers that were repetitive or unanimous in their positivity or negativity to ensure a more focused and informative analysis.

1.   Are you satisfied with the current status of the divided island, including the TRNC?

An 18-year-old university student, K.A., from Larnaca responded:

"Not really. The division is always there in the background, but it doesn't impact my day-to-day activities much. I go to university, hang out with friends, and live my life normally. Of course, if I go to the other side [Greek border], and the things my grandparents told me about things were like before when the Turkish army came here. I do not remember when. It feels more like a historical and political issue rather than something that affects me personally on a daily basis. I think it's because I grew up with the island already divided, so it's kind of our normal. But at the same time, I realize that just because it doesn't affect me directly every day doesn't mean it's not important. When my grandparents talk about their experiences, I realize there's a lot of pain and

history tied up in this issue. While I might not feel it every day, I understand the need

for correcting things."

K.A.'s response really brings to light the generational gap in how the division of Cyprus is perceived. While the older generations lived through the conflict and its direct impacts, younger people like K.A. see it more as a historical issue rather than a daily concern. This detachment from the immediate consequences of the division suggests that the younger generation may prioritize current social and economic issues over historical grievances. However, K.A still understands the importance of resolving the conflict.

A 36-year-old kiosk owner, M.F.G., from Larnaca responded:

"Look, I grew up in the 90s here in Cyprus, and things were worse than this. I remember
what my mother and father told me, so I get why the Turkish army came here. Of course,
they fought for us, and that's something we respect and appreciate. But look, I inherited
this kiosk from my late father. Imagine now if I had tourists as much as a man's kiosk
on the Greek side. I would earn so much money, and in Euros [currency], on top of
that. The politicians here, like everywhere, talk a lot but can't change anything. What
can they really do? They [Greek Cypriot Government] say federation or nothing. I do
not accept this either. This issue is bigger than just us. It needs to be solved by Türkiye,
Greece, and the EU, maybe [The United States of] America. I don't think we should
stay like this. It's not sustainable, and it's holding us back. It's time for a change;
Turkish Cypriots do not have one second to lose."

Since he mentioned who could solve the problem, I posed a follow-up question about his views on the current President of TRNC, Ersin Tatar. He responded:

"Ersin Tatar, of course, did good things. When he was elected, he brought water from Türkiye to almost all the villages here, maybe all of them. But look, I have 36 years of life now, and I do not want Türkiye to look down on us. You know what they say? "Baby homeland" for Cyprus. What is this? If Turkish people in Türkiye want to support us too, they must not think they are superior to us. But Ersin Tatar is on this line, unfortunately."

M.F.G.'s comments illustrate the economic toll the division takes. His frustration about missing out on tourist revenue compared to the Greek side highlights the solid economic disadvantages Turkish Cypriots face. He is clearly skeptical about political solutions, and he expressed a belief that local politicians simply do not have the clout to bring about meaningful change. Instead, he insists that besides the respective kin-states of both societies, the EU, and the US need to get involved. This perspective underscores a sense of powerlessness and a reliance on external forces to solve local issues.

A 53-year-old biology teacher, B.H., from Kyrenia responded:

"Well, it's complicated, you know. I've seen a lot change over the years. Back when I was a kid, things were different. I remember when Ecevit launched the operation in 1974, but I was a baby. What I do remember is that our Greek neighbors were good people. There was a sense of community back then."

When I then followed up regarding Türkiye's involvement in the situation, he responded:

> *"Honestly, I think Türkiye's policies are just making things worse. It think they're causing more problems than they're solving. Don't misunderstand my words, I'm not saying these Greek Cypriots are blameless either, but Erdoğan needs to stop stirring the pot."*

B.H.'s perspective brings the historical context to the forefront. His memories of the past, particularly the sense of community that existed between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, paint a picture of a time when coexistence was the norm. This nostalgic recollection contrasts with his critique of Türkiye's current policies, which he believes are exacerbating the division rather than solving it. His longing for a return to peaceful coexistence is palpable, reflecting a deep-seated desire to revive the harmony that once existed.

Also, B.H. was not rigid in his views throughout the interview; his openness to different solutions, whether a federation or a two-state solution, shows a pragmatic approach that prioritizes peace over specific political structures. He seems more concerned with the end goal of peace and stability than with the particular form it takes. This pragmatism indicates a mature and realistic understanding of the complexities involved. B.H. recognizes that clinging to rigid political stances might not be as productive as being flexible and open to various pathways to peace. His perspective underscores the importance of considering historical grievances and current realities to find a solution that respects the needs and histories of all involved parties.

2. What do you think about the annexation of TRNC to Türkiye?

K.A. responded:

> *"Of course not. Because we want to stand on our own feet. Türkiye is different than here. Political issues may be the same, but daily life is different. We have our own*

identity, and it's important to maintain that. Joining Türkiye would mean losing a part

of who we are. We need to build our future independently, even if it's challenging. We

need to work on strengthening our own institutions and economy, not rely on another

country."

E.Ç. responded:

"I don't believe this will solve any problem and maybe Erdoğan might start a war

with Greece. So I don't want it at all. The last thing we need is more conflict. We want

peace from now, so why would I join Türkiye? Besides, Turkish Cypriots have a

unique culture and history that needs to be preserved. Being part of Türkiye would

overshadow that. We should focus on building bridges, not walls, and annexation

would just create more divisions."

M.F.G., A.B., and B.H. also expressed negative attitudes towards annexation to Türkiye. Their responses are consistent with Sonan's public opinion survey, which indicates that annexation by Türkiye is highly controversial among T/Cs, with a majority opposing it. Sonan highlights that this scenario is strongly opposed by 53.2% of Turkish Cypriots, although one-fifth of them fully support it (Sonan, 2020, p.31). Therefore, the interview responses align with and validate Sonan's findings, confirming that annexation by Türkiye remains one of the least favored resolutions.

3. What are your views on a two-state solution versus a single state under the Republic of Cyprus?

The responses were as expected. None of the participants favored relinquishing their rights under the TRNC and integrating into the Republic of Cyprus as a single state without any provisions for power-sharing. Instead, they contended that acknowledging the TRNC's

existence could contribute to resolving the issue. Similarly, another notable finding from Sonan's research aligns with my expectations. Only a small fraction of Turkish Cypriots view reunification under a unitary model within the Republic of Cyprus as a viable option or a plausible solution achievable through compromise. "This particular model is generally perceived as challenging to endorse by politicians, irrespective of their political affiliations." (Sonan, 2020, p.32)

4. What is your stance on a bi-regional, bi-communal federation based on political equality? (With the follow-up question 4a: What would you vote for in a potential referendum?)

Regarding their stance on a bi-regional, bi-communal federation based on political equality, respondents' answers again validated Sonan's findings. In his survey, he discovered that 65% of T/Cs favored such a federation in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum. Furthermore, he found that 42.5% of respondents fully supported the model, while another 26% viewed it as a potential solution with concessions. Only 22.8% entirely opposed a federal solution (Sonan, 2020, p. 32-33).

In my in-depth interviews, 4 out of 5 respondents argued that a bi-regional federation based on political equality is one of the most viable solutions. They expressed that if the federal government granted more political power to Turkish Cypriots than the existing Republic of Cyprus's parliament in areas like municipal governance and EU and Cyprus parliamentary seats, and provided more rights for Turkish Cypriots, they would support and vote for it.

The same respondents indicated their willingness to vote in favor of establishing power-sharing regulations in a potential referendum sanctioned by constitutional countries, their kin-states, and the United Kingdom. This corroborated my hypothesis that Turkish Cypriots support cohabitation under a framework with distinct power-sharing mechanisms. However, there was a single exception: A.B., who expressed hesitation. She informed me that, in the 2004 referendum, she had voted "Yes be annem!" [Yes, my dear!][5] and expressed her dissatisfaction with politics, and questioned whether anything would change even if she votes: "Yes be annem!" in a future referendum.

XIV.   Discussion of Interviews

A. Dissatisfaction with the Current Status

There are noticeable age disparities in responses regarding satisfaction with the current state of the divided island. Younger participants, such as K.A., an 18-year-old university student, tend to perceive the division more as a historical issue rather than a pressing contemporary concern. This shift in perspective indicates a transition from dwelling on past grievances to addressing present social and economic challenges. Conversely, older respondents like B.H., a 53-year-old biology teacher, contribute historical context by reminiscing about a period of community and coexistence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This generational gap highlights varying degrees of personal impact and historical awareness within the community.

B. Views on Annexation to Türkiye

The respondents strongly favor preserving the distinctive Turkish Cypriot identity, and they are overwhelmingly against the idea of being annexed by Ankara. These concerns voiced by

---

[5] The phrase "Yes be annem" ("Yes, my dear" or "Yes, dear") was a part of the propaganda campaign during the 2004 Annan Plan referendum in Cyprus. This campaign aimed to encourage Turkish Cypriots to vote in favor of the Annan Plan.

the respondents align with Sonan's public opinion study, which reveals strong resistance to annexation among Turkish Cypriots. K.A. and E.Ç. express a strong desire for independence and self-sufficiency, emphasizing the significance of maintaining a distinct Turkish Cypriot identity and the potential escalation of tensions with Greece. Similarly, M.F.G., A.B., and B.H. also voice opposition to annexation, asserting that it would be detrimental to Turkish Cypriots' distinct political and cultural identities. This consensus underscores the community's preference for autonomy over integration with Türkiye.

C. Preferences of Viable Resolutions

The respondents' opinions on a single state under the Republic of Cyprus versus a two-state solution further reveal their political preferences. There was a strong loyalty to the rights and recognition of the TRNC, as evidenced by the fact that none of the participants supported a unitary state without arrangements for power sharing. This is consistent with Sonan's research, which shows that Turkish Cypriots generally oppose reunion under a unitary framework (Sonan, 2020, p. 32). Instead, the interviewees supported a bi-regional, bi-communal federation founded on political equality. In the 2004 Annan Plan referenda, this model was supported by 65% of Turkish Cypriots as a workable alternative that could maintain power balance and protect Turkish Cypriot interests.

Strong support for a bi-regional, bi-communal federation over annexation suggests a desire for a consociational democratic solution that protects Turkish Cypriot identity and ensures political equality. These findings support my original theory and are consistent with Sonan's research, in which he found out the people's preference for autonomy and just power-sharing under a federal framework.

XV.   Conclusion

My hypothesis, which posited that Turkish Cypriots prefer consociational democracy over alternative types of governance, proved correct through the analysis of quantitative data from Sonan (2020) and qualitative data from my five in-depth interviews. In order to guarantee consistency and dependability, these various forms of data were cross-verified as part of the triangulation process. Turkish Cypriots continuously showed a high preference for power-sharing arrangements, as also supported by the survey data and interviews. This stems from a deep-seated dissatisfaction with the status quo and the inherent constraints of majoritarian democracy in ethnically divided societies. The division that persists and the scars from 1974 demonstrate the necessity of a governance framework that guarantees equal participation and representation for G/Cs and T/Cs.

These results are in line with the research of academics such as Miriam Hänni (2017), who contends that when marginalised groups participate in politics and feel that their interests are being represented, they become more supportive of democracy. According to Hänni's research, minority groups' participation in democratic processes promotes a sense of political participation and efficacy, both of which are essential for the stability and inclusiveness of democracies. In the case of Cyprus, a lack of strong institutions protecting political equality and minority rights has historically resulted in increased hostility and dysfunction within the democratic system. The unsuccessful attempts to put an end to the Cyprus conflict in 1960 and 2004 provide significant examples of the challenges in implementing consociationalist democracy. According to arguments of G/Cs, it gave Turkish Cypriots more political incentives than they had, and less to Greek Cypriots. Additionally, they would have to recognize the Turkish *de-facto* state, which led to the rejection of Kofi Annan's proposal for reunification.

Therefore, the case of Cyprus highlights how important it is to create democratic institutions that are capable of managing ethnic variety and advancing inclusive governance.

This study has significant implications for policy-makers involved in efforts to resolve the Cyprus dispute. The data points to the necessity of giving political equality for minorities and the coexistence of the two communities through a power-sharing structure top priority in any workable solution. The results of the existing surveys and my interviews show that Turkish Cypriots are highly dissatisfied with the TRNC's current de facto status. The political and economic difficulties that have remained since the island's division in 1974 are the source of this discontent. My interview findings further indicate that political instability and economic problems brought about by the TRNC's isolation and lack of international recognition have fueled Turkish Cypriots' yearning for a more inclusive and inclusive form of governance. It is necessary for policymakers to take these findings into account and work towards a resolution that considers the concerns and goals of both communities. Further studies should persist in examining the pragmatic application of consociational models and the influence of external entities, such as international organizations and neighboring countries, on the likelihood of peace in Cyprus. By getting involved, these outside parties can exert the pressure and support needed to encourage fruitful negotiations and guarantee the smooth execution of a power-sharing plan.

XVI.   Appendices

Appendix A

Katılımcı Onay Formu (in Turkish, English below)

Orta Avrupa Üniversitesi Milliyetçilik Çalışmaları Bölümü'nde yüksek lisans öğrencisi olan Can Moralıoğlu'nun yüksek lisans araştırma projesi için yapılacak mülakata kimlik bilgilerimin paylaşılmaması şartıyla katılmayı kabul ediyorum. Araştırma hakkında ayrıntılı açıklamalar araştırmacı tarafından sözlü olarak yapıldı. Görüşmenin video olarak kaydedilmesine ve araştırma bulgularının Orta Avrupa Üniversitesi ile paylaşılmasına onay veriyorum.

Bu araştırma projesi, Profesör Daniel Bochsler'ın danışmanlığında yürütülmektedir.

Araştırmacının iletişim bilgileri: moralioglu_fuat@student.ceu.edu

Katılımcının ismi   Tarih   İmza

Araştırmacının ismi   Tarih   İmza

Consent Form

I hereby accept to participate in the interview for the graduate research project of Can Moralıoğlu, a graduate student in the Nationalism Studies Program at Central European University, on the condition that my identity information will not be shared. Detailed explanations about the study were made orally by the researcher. I consent to the video recording of the interview and sharing the research findings with Central European University.

This research project is under the supervision of Professor Daniel Bochsler.

Contact information of the researcher: moralioglu_fuat@student.ceu.edu

Name of participant   Date   Signature

Name of researcher   Date   Signature

Appendix B

A. Participant Consent and Recording

I ensured that participants were fully informed about the purpose of the study, the nature of their involvement, and the confidentiality of their responses. Written consent was obtained from each participant. The interviews were video and audio-recorded, and subsequently transcribed verbatim to ensure accuracy in capturing participants' responses and to facilitate detailed analysis.

B. Ethical Considerations

I adhered to ethical guidelines for research involving human subjects. Participants were assured of their anonymity and the confidentiality of their responses. All data were stored securely, and interviewees were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time without any consequences. This commitment to ethical standards ensured the integrity of the research process and the protection of participants' rights and well-being.

XVII.   Bibliography

Adamides, C., Constantinou, C.M. (2012). Comfortable Conflict and (Il)liberal Peace in Cyprus. In: Richmond, O.P., Mitchell, A. (eds) Hybrid Forms of Peace. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. (https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230354234_13)

Alessandrini, F. (2022). Kıbrıs'ın Demokratikleşme Süreci. Yarının Kültürü, (yarininkulturu.org/2022/11/11/kibris/)

Akay, C. (1985). Seçim sonrası, KKTC kaynıyor. Milliyet, p. 5.

Andreadis, I. (2007). Analysis of the Cyprus referendum on the Annan plan. (https://gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2007-P4-Chadjipadelis1.pdf)

Bahout, J. (2016). The Unraveling Of Lebanon's Taif Agreement: Limits of Sect-Based Power Sharing.   Carnegie   Endowment   for   International   Peace. (http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13072)

Balyemez, M. (2018). TMT'nin Kuruluş Tarihi Hakkında Kktc'de Yanlış Oluşan Kamusal/Toplumsal Hafıza (İngiliz Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında). Journal of Turkish Studies. (http://dx.doi.org/10.7827/TurkishStudies.14136)

Brubaker, R., Loveman, M. & Stamatov, P. (2004). Ethnicity as cognition. Theory and Society 33, p.31–64 (https://doi.org/10.1023/B:RYSO.0000021405.18890.63)

Carter, A. (2013). Promoting Democracy in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Benefits of Combining Partition and Power-Sharing, Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research, Vol. 18. (https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1208&context=respublica)

Chakrabarti, S. (2012). Quarreling Siblings or Friendly Neighbours? Turbulent Nature of Indo-Pakistan Relationship Since 1947. UNISCI Discussion Paper 29: 9-33.

Çiçek, F. (2017). Power Sharing in Multi-Ethnic Societies, Manisa Celal Bayar University, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. Master's thesis. (https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/TezGoster?key=7lOJX8w_8PRQU1mSHU6-jpnkoDRV3oofqDOS-bXmd0wtlvm-lOXsNYx36yr60C07)

Daalder, H. (1996). The Netherlands: still a consociational democracy? (Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Institut für Höhere Studien, Abt. Politikwissenschaft, 33). Wien: Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien. (https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-266841)

Dahl, R.A. (1982). Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control.

Dinçer, M. (2019). Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Annan Planı. (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354812395_Kibrisli_Rumlar_ve_Annan_Plani)

Dean, T. (2004). Cyprus: The rejected 2004 flag proposal, (https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/cy!new.html)

Ekinci, B. (1998). Lübnan'ın Esas Teşkilat Tarihçesi. Amme İdaresi Dergisi, p.23.

Fulya, A. (2004). Değişen Toplumlar Değişmeyen Siyaset: Ortadoğu, Bağlam Yayınları, p. 285.

Germann, M. (2022). Pax populi? An analysis of the conflict resolution potential of referendums on self-determination. European Political Science Review, 14(3), 403 - 423. (https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773922000169)

Gleditsch, Kristian S., & Ward, D. (2000). War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization. International Studies Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 1, p. 1–29. (https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00146)

Horowitz, Donald L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press. (https://pestuge.iliauni.edu.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Horowitz-Donald-L.-Ethnic-Groups-in-Conflict.pdf)

Hänni, M. (2017). Presence, Representation, And Impact: How Minority Mps Affect Policy Outcomes. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, p. 97–130. (http://www.jstor.org/stable/45095050)

International Crisis Group. (2006). İhtilaflarla Dolu Bir Tarih. Kıbrıs Çıkmazı: Bundan Sonrası, International Crisis Group, p.3. (http://www.jstor .org/stable/resrep43713.4)

Islattı, Y. (2019) Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs Meselesi. Akademik Tarih, Akademik Tarih (TR) Aylık Blog Dergisi. (www.akademiktarihtr.com/kibrismeselesi/)

Klein, J. (2006). The Failure of Force: Policing Terrorism in Northern Ireland. In: McGoldrick, S.K., McArdle, A. (eds) Uniform Behavior. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983312_6

Krienbuehl, L. (2010). Peace with Power-Sharing: Under Which Conditions? Swiss Peace Foundation. (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SwissPeace_PeaceWithPowerSharing_UnderWhichConditions.pdf)

Ladisch, V. (2005). Toward the Reunification of Cyprus: Defining and Integrating Reconciliation into the Peace Process. (https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf1661/files/2006-6.pdf)

Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1996). The Framework Document on Northern Ireland and the Theory of Power-Sharing. Government and Opposition, p. 267-274.

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1996). Çağdaş Demokrasiler Yirmibir Ülkede Çoğunlukçu ve Oydaşmacı Yönetim Örüntüleri. Yetkin Yayınevi, Ankara.

Lijphart, A. (2014). Demokrasi Modelleri, Otuz Altı Ülke Yönetim Biçimleri ve Performansları. İthaki, İstanbul, 2014.

Miard, F. (2006). Solutions for a Better World? Consociational Democracy in Iraq. Research Seminar Research Paper, Universität Zürich, Summer Term 2006, Institut für Politikwissenschaft. (http://www.miard.ch/consociationiraq2006.pdf).

Nagle, J. (2011). Governing Ethnic Conflict: Consociation, Identity and the Price of Peace. Civil Wars, 13(4), 472–474. (https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2011.629881)

O'Leary, B (2005). Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments, in Sid Noel (ed.): From Power Sharing to Democracy. Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press. 3-43.

Papadopoulos, T. (2004). Annex to the Letter Dated 7 June 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General: A/58/835 S/2004/464, United Nations Archives, (search.archives.un.org/uploads/r/united-nations-archives/e/8/2/e828065fff3a3a744070d5d3dbe23907653e7a84dcc1c12598f145a2a7bf495c/S-1959-0108-0001-00008.pdf.)

Psaltis, Charis, et al. (2020). Youth and Politics in Protracted Conflicts: A Comparative Approach on Hope for a Settlement and Return of IDPs. London School of Economics and Political Science, (www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-Observatory/Research/Cyprus-Projects-2019-

2020/Youth-and-Politics-in-Protracted-Conflicts-a-comparative-approach-on-hope-for-a-settlement-and-return-of-IDPs)

Ruane, J., & Todd, J. (1996). The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511605598)

Sisk , Timothy D. (1996). Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Söderberg, M. & Ohlson, T. (2003). Democratisation and Armed Conflicts in Weak States, Sida Department for Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations and Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management (cdn.sida.se/publications/files/sida2533en-democratisation-and-armed-conflicts.pdf.)

Sözen, A, & Özersay, K. (2007). The Annan Plan: State Succession or Continuity. Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, p. 125–41. (http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284528)

Sonan, S, & Küçükşener, Ebru & Porat, E. (2020). Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta Siyaset ve Toplum: Bir Anket Çalışması. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, (https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/17603.pdf)

Steiner, J. (1974). Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Toprak, S. (n.d) Kıbrıslılık ve Yeni Kıbrıs Türk Milliyetçiliği. (https://www.academia.edu/28423385/Kıbrıslılık_ve_Yeni_Kıbrıs_Türk_Milliyetçiliği)

United Nations Security Council (2004). S/2004/756: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, (www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S6253.pdf)

United Nations. (2004). Annan Plan, (www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html)

Yağmur, E. (2018). Partnership Democracy and Search for Solutions in Cyprus. Master's thesis.
(https://acikerisim.gelisim.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11363/1184/529122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

Yüksel, Y. (2018). Incidents in Cyprus And Turkish Resistance Organization (1957-1964). Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı, Spring, (atamdergi.gov.tr/tam-metin/8/tur)

32. Gün Arşivi. "Kıbrıs'ın 50 Yılı Belgeseli", (2020). YouTube, (www.youtube.com/watch?v=V2XwO9KUznA&t=673s)