

**Russia, Austria, and Old Believers: The Entanglements of Religious and
Foreign Policies in 1846-1856**

By Aleksandr Orlov

Submitted to Central European University - Private University
Department of History

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Jan Hennings
Second Reader: Vlad Naumescu

Vienna, Austria
2024

Statement of Copyright

Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either in full or part, may be made only in accordance with the instructions given by the Author and lodged in the Central European Library. Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page must form a part of any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author.

Abstract

This thesis aims to explore the institution-building of the Russian Old Believers (the branch of Eastern Orthodoxy split from the official Church) in the mid-19th century and its entanglements with interstate relations between the Russian and Austrian empires. Under the increasing pressure of the Russian authorities, the Old Believers resorted to the establishment of their Church with an organizational center outside the Russian empire – in Austrian Bukovina. In response, the Russian imperial administration launched a full-scale campaign to dissolve the “Schism,” particularly the new “Austrian Church.”

I argue that this process belonged not only to the religious sphere but also to the political one, and the dynamics of interstate relations deeply influenced the state course towards religious dissenters in the Russian empire. I show that the European Revolution of 1848-1849 and the Crimean War proved to be decisive factors for the decline and increase of the Russian state’s attention to the Old Believer Church.

At the same time, this study reveals the incongruity of Russian policy towards the Old Believers, as government agents from different structures, such as diplomats and officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, acted according to idiosyncratic logics. Finally, the emergence of the “Austrian Church” turned out to be a problematic knot in which a wide range of challenges were intertwined: the fragility of a confessional principle of imperial management, the vulnerability of imperial sovereignty, and the economy’s dependency on capitalists-dissenters.

Ultimately, I draw attention to the limits of imperial power. The Russian authorities were unable to cope with the ramified networks of the Old Believers and the endurance of the new ecclesiastical institution and were forced to resort to more flexible ways of state management.

Acknowledgements

The creation of this thesis has happened thanks to the assistance of many people whose contributions were critical to me during my journey through the one-year MA program in Comparative History at Central European University and before.

Firstly, I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Jan Hennings, whose comments and questions guided me to focus my research and appropriately frame my composite material. From the day he interviewed me for admission to CEU to this moment, his support, confidence, and responsiveness have facilitated my passing this way. I was also happy to work with my second reader, Vlad Naumescu, whose suggestions helps me to restructure my thesis.

I would also like to thank my colleagues at the CEU Department of History, from whom I learned a lot during our discussions at Master Thesis Seminars chaired by Brett Wilson and Karsten Wilke; Balázs Trencsényi for a class, provided me with an immersion in the theoretical debates devoted to comparative, transnational, and global history, and thought-provoking remarks, deepened my understanding of historical problems; Alexander Semyonov for the reintroduction of methodological reflections on imperial studies integral to my work; Günhan Börekçi, who brought my attention to a complicated intersection of imperial and environmental problems; and Michael Miller for the discovery me of a huge body of issues and literature dedicated to diaspora. Last but not least, I am obliged to mention Aniko Mlonar, who coordinated countless emerging issues at the department and has always been open to all student demands and questions.

In addition, I am thankful to the organizers of the 18th Annual Graduate Conference in European History “Sensational Events – Narrative, Material and Visual Expressions” for letting me present some preliminary observations at the conference and overview the current trends in my field.

I am especially grateful to my previous supervisors, Vladimir Khasin from Saratov State University and Alexei Miller from European University at Saint Petersburg, whose support fostered my skills of unconventional broad vision of the past and clear historical writing.

My friends at CEU and outside it, particularly Pavel and Vasilisa, shared my difficulties and joys and were helping me cope with excessive self-criticism and avoid monomania without losing single-mindedness.

Finally, I am exceedingly indebted to my family. My deceased father awakened my unquenchable interest in the comprehension of the past and its connections with the contemporary world and always encouraged a critical view of the reality; my mother invariably supported my endeavors, including nonconformist ones.

Table of contents

<i>Chapter I. Introduction</i>	1
I. How Belief Became Politics	1
II. The Historical Context	2
III. The Literature Review	5
IV. Methodology and Sources	9
V. Structure	12
<i>Chapter II: The Creation of Old Believers' Church in the Habsburg Empire and Its Influence on the Russian Religious Policy in 1846-1852</i>	14
I. The Establishment of an Episcopal See in Bukovina in 1846: Its Reasons and Ramifications	14
II. Diplomacy and Repressions: Two Ways of the Russian Authorities	21
<i>Chapter III: War and Schism</i>	33
I. The Crimean War. The Tensions between Empires and Their Impact on Religious Policy	33
II. The Apogee of the Struggle with Religious Dissent in Russia: Research and Repressions	41
<i>CONCLUSION</i>	51
<i>Bibliography</i>	57
Archival Documents	57
Published Primary Documents	58
Secondary Literature	60

Chapter I. Introduction

I. How Belief Became Politics

Religious issues never were a private matter in the Russian empire. Some scholars have suggested that the Russian empire was essentially a confessional state: the imperial order was maintained through the management of confessional communities and religious identities¹. The mid-19th century, it can be argued, witnessed an ever-increasing politicization of religion. Imperial officials themselves recognized that spiritual questions were deeply political. The establishment of the Old Believers' Church – the so-called “Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy” – is a case in point. Belaya Krinitsa, a village in Austrian Bukovina, became both a center of a novel ecclesiastical institution and place where historic imperial entanglements between the Russian and Austrian empires manifested themselves.

This thesis presents a case study, focusing on the emergence of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy and elucidating broad imperial complexities. Studying the first institutional structures of the Old Believers at this historic junction shows the limits of imperial management, the problematic character of the confessional principle of difference, and the entanglements of imperial politics and foreign relations.

The dynamics of inter-imperial relations largely determined the trajectory of Russian policies towards religious dissenters in the mid-19th century, given that “the Austrian Church” (a widespread definition of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy among the Russian officials) was the most significant factor in this field, provoking concerns about the boundaries of imperial sovereignty and the mediated Austrian intervention in Russian internal processes.

¹ Robert Crews, “Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia.” *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (2003), 50–83; Paul H. Werth, *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Therefore, this thesis aims to contextualize the relationship between the Russian imperial state and the Old Believers in the mid-nineteenth century by demonstrating that this issue cannot be reduced to the domain of Church history. The “de-exoticization” of Russian religious dissent², which is presented as a part of a complex dynamic of imperial trajectories and interstate relations, is one of the implications of this study.

II. The Historical Context

Russian Orthodoxy, often seen as central to Russian culture and life, was far from homogeneous for the most of its history. The first notable sects, the Strigolniki and the Judaizers, date from the 14th and the 15th centuries, but the decisive split occurred in the 17th century and became known as “the Schism” (Raskol). Short of a developed theology, the only language for the religious discussion was the language of ritual, and the opponents of the Church reforms were given the name of “Old Ritualists”, although they preferred the term “Old Believers,” which is also more common in the English historiography.

Soon after their emergence, the Old Believers split into numerous branches, but most important was the division between the priestly and the priestless Old Believers. The priestly Old Believers recruited personnel from official Orthodoxy but harbored a dream about their ecclesiastical institution since their only bishop, Pavel of Kolomna, was killed at the beginning of the Schism³. This murder was solely one link in a long chain of severe repressions against the Schismatics, which is why the Old Believers of all branches were the most widespread of all sects in the regions that were characterized by weak government control – northern Russia, the Urals, Siberia, and the Cossack lands⁴.

² Igor Kuziner. "Millenaristy, kapitalisty, kooperatory: pozdneimperskij i rannesovetskij opyt staroobradcev-strannikov" [The Millenarists, Capitalists, and Cooperators: The Late Imperial and Early Soviet Experience of Wanderers], *Ab Imperio* 2021, no. 2 (2021), 26.

³ Pierre Pascal. *Avvakum et les Débuts du Raskol. [Avvakum and the Beginnings of Raskol]* (Paris: Mouton 1963), 294.

⁴ Michael Cherniavsky, “The Old Believers and the New Religion.” *Slavic Review* 25, no. 1 (1966), 4.

While many Old Believers migrated from central Russia to these remote regions, some preferred migration abroad to escape repressions in the Russian Empire. The first communities emerged already in the 17th century and went to the Baltic lands, the Prussian kingdom, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Ottoman Empire after the exodus of the Cossacks-Nekrasovites at the beginning of the 18th century⁵. Even though after the annexation of the Baltic lands and the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the tangible part of these communities was now part of the Russian Empire, diaspora became a significant factor for the Old Believers due to the relative toleration of the “host” authorities.

At the same time, the body of Russian religious dissent grew with new denominations – the Khlysts, the Skoptsy, the Dukhobors, the Molokans, and the Judaizers. Although they had a little dogmatic and ritual resemblance to the Old Believers, for the Russian authorities, all Russians who did not belong to the State Orthodox Church were schismatics or sectarians. Meanwhile, the second half of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th century proved to be a period of unprecedented loyalty on the part of the Russian government to all these groups⁶.

This period ended with the reign of Nicholas I. The combination of “the well-ordered police state” with the idea that Russianness was integrally linked to the Orthodox Church, according to Count S. Uvarov famed “triad:” Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality, was fraught with negative consequences for non-state Orthodox Christians. “It made the goal of integration of the Great Russian population itself – of the Old Believers and sectarians – extremely acute⁷.” From 1833-1834, the Russian authorities increased restrictions and

⁵ Sergei A. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe Staroobriadchestvo [The Russian Old Belief]* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970), 356-359.

⁶ Elena A. Vishlenkova, *Zabotjas' o dushah poddannyh: religioznaja politika v Rossii pervoj chetverti XIX veka [Caring for the souls of the subjects: Religious Policy in Russia in the First Quarter of the Nineteenth Century]* (Saratov: Izd-vo Sarat. un-ta, 2002), 274-275.

⁷ Alexei Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research*. (Budapest, Central European University Press 2008), 56.

repressions against the Old Believers, which motivated them to find the new ways of survival and resistance.

One of these opportunities was provided by the Austrian Empire. In the second half of the 18th century, the Habsburgs annexed an Ottoman province, Bukovina, with a small but sustained communities of the priestly Old Believers known as the Lipovans (this term with unclear origins was also applied to the Old Believers from the all Northeastern Balkans). From the perspective of the Habsburg officials, Bukovina was a culturally backward and economically underdeveloped region⁸, and the “industrious” Lipovans were seen as throne pillar and reliable subjects. In these conditions, it was not a highly difficult task for the Old Believers to obtain permission for institutional building in Lemberg and Vienna.

In addition, Bukovina was an area of extreme cultural and religious diversity, even in the context of the Habsburg Empire. Apart from the Lipovans, this region was inhabited by Romanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Jews, Armenians, Roma, and Magyars, none of whom constituted a majority of the population. The religious landscape was represented by Eastern Orthodoxy, Old Believers, Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Evangelicals, Armenian Orthodox, and Armenian Catholics⁹. The local authorities had to show a certain degree of tolerance and meet the well-grounded demands of the subordinate communities in order to manage successfully such a diverse territory.

In parallel, the religious factor gained traction in international relations. Emperor Nicholas I saw Orthodoxy as a significant component of foreign policy; Russia increased its presence in the Holy Land (Palestine), strengthened its control over the Danubian principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia), and cast seductive glances on the Balkan Orthodox people (Serbs,

⁸ Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016), 72-74.

⁹ Fred Stambrook, “National and Other Identities in Bukovina, in Late Austrian Times.” *Austrian History Yearbook* 35 (2004), 186.

Bulgarians, Montenegrins)¹⁰. The Old Believers posed a dual menace in this context: their communities could tactically counter Russian influence in the Danubian region, and their ramified networks could strategically serve Austrian or even Ottoman and Polish interest in the Russian Empire.

Apart from the foreign state interests, Nicholas I and his subordinates were extremely worried about the spread of European revolutionary ideas, particularly after the “springtime of nations” in 1848-1849¹¹. Although the Old Believers for the most part were not perceived as being in contact with European revolutionaries, the general context of “securitization” in the Russian Empire and the suggestions about growing links between “the Schism and European civilization” facilitated the oppression of this religious community.

In conclusion, in the mid-nineteenth century, “the Old Believer question” stood at the intersection of several contexts of fundamental importance: imperial nation-building, the involvement of religion in international relations, and the imperial sovereignty. It was a period of unprecedented political attention to this religious group in the Russian Empire, comparable only with the first decades of the Schism in the 17th century. This study attempts to shed light on the reasons and mechanisms of this focus by combining the approaches of the religious turn and new imperial history.

III. The Literature Review

The most influential general works on Russian history do not provide a focused perspective on the problem of religious dissent in mid-nineteenth century Russia and the encounters of the Russian authorities with this conglomerate of religious communities. This

¹⁰ Orlando Figes, *Crimea. The Last Crusade*. (London: Allen Lane Publishers, 2010), 60-76.

¹¹ David Saunders, *Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881* (London: Longman, 1992), 191-192.

view addresses the interactions of the Russian state with the Old Belief and sectarianism, including the “Austrian persuasion,” solely in the sphere of the Church policy¹².

The existing literature immediately relevant to my topic can be divided into two separate categories: the books and articles devoted to the Old Believers or, more broadly, Russian religious dissent and studies focusing on the foreign policy of the Russian Empire and inter-imperial relations in the 19th century. The first works about the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy were written in the second half of the 19th century by Russian professor of theology Nikolai Subbotin. Even though highly biased against the Old Believers, these studies contain valuable information about the development of processes and crucial actors¹³. At the same time, several Austrian authors published books devoted to “Lippowaner,” although rather more ethnographical than historical ones¹⁴. In 1921, the theologian Frederick C. Conybeare released the first English book in the field – “*The Russian Dissenters*.”¹⁵ The breakthrough in the studies came in the mid-twentieth century, when Michael Cherniavsky, Sergei Zenkovsky, and Robert Crummey published their works on the various aspects of the social and political history of the Old Believers¹⁶. Nowadays, this field consists of numerous books and articles in English and Russian, although they frequently overly focus on narrow regional issues¹⁷.

¹² Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 1997, 237-238; Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History* (New York: Longman, 2001), 142; Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*. (New York: Scribner, 1974), 236-238.

¹³ Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyvaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinitskago Sviashchenstva 2v* [The History of the So-called Austrian or Belaya Krinitsa Clergy] (Moskva: Tipografija J. Lissnera i A. Geshelja, 1895, 1899); Nikolai Subbotin, *Raskol kak orudie vrazhdebnykh rossii partii* [The Schism as a Tool of Parties Hostile to Russia] (Moskva: Katkov i K^o), 1867.

¹⁴ Raimund F. Kaindl, *Das Entstehen und die Entwicklung der Lippowaner-Colonien in der Bukowina* [The Emergence and Development of the Lipovan Colonies in Bukovina] (Wien: Carl Gerold's Sohn), 1896; Johann Polek, *Die Lippowaner in der Bukowina, 1-2* [The Lipovans in Bukovina] (Czernowitz: Czopp, 1896-1898).

¹⁵ Frederick C. Conybeare, *Russian Dissenters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1921.

¹⁶ Michael Cherniavsky, *The Old Believers and the New Religion*, 1–39; Sergei A. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe Staroobriadchestvo*; Robert O. Crummey, *The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist: the Vyg Community and the Russian State, 1694 – 1855* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

¹⁷ Robert O. Crummey, “Old Belief as Popular Religion: New Approaches.” *Slavic Review* 52, no. 4 (1993): 700–712; Roy R. Robson, *Old Believers in Modern Russia*. (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995); Irina Paert, *Old Believers, Religious Dissent, and Gender in Russia, 1760–1850*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Robert O. Crummey, *Old Believers in a Changing World* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011); Douglas Rogers, *The Old Faith and the Russian Land: A Historical Ethnography of Ethics in the Urals* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

The most notable recent contributions belong to Thomas Marsden and Peter T. DeSimone. Marsden's book *"The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855"* elucidates the gradually exacerbating policy of the Russian imperial state towards the Old Believers by addressing the argument that the emerging international context, nation-building, and the rise of the modern state in Russia determined the new system for the Old Believers. However, Marsden concentrates on the figure of the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, Dmitry Bibikov, and invites further explorations into the numerous nuances of the complex triangular relationship between the Belaya Krinitza Old Believers and the Russian and Austrian imperial administrations by making sufficiently trivial and inaccurate suggestions: "as within the Soviet Union, the regime showed a genuine desire, not just to control the people, but to win over their hearts and minds."¹⁸

In turn, DeSimone's work, *"The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism, and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow,"* is devoted to the dynamics of the relationship between the Moscow Old Believers' community and the imperial state. This community is of great importance to my research since the Moscow Old Believers forged intensive contacts with their Bukovinian counterparts and made a tangible contribution to the establishment of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy. While DeSimone's book remains most instructive on the Old Believers in the Russian empire, the international and transnational dimensions of the subject have yet to be explored¹⁹.

The Old Believers' communities outside Russia are less thoroughly explored, and this is particularly relevant for the mid-nineteenth century. The relationship of the Bukovinian Lipovans with the Habsburg authorities almost constitutes a "blind spot" in historiography since two exceptions are the articles by Michael Kramer and Melchior Jakubowski, *"Osnovanie*

¹⁸ Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

¹⁹ Peter T. DeSimone, *The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2018).

staroobryadcheskoj mitropolii v Beloj Krinice na Bukovine i prebyvanie sv. mitropolita Amvrosija v Avstrii” [The Establishment of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy on Bukovina and the Presence of Saint Metropolitan Ambrose in Austria] and “Facing the Old Believers. The Experience of Austrian and Prussian Officials in Bukovina and Neuostpreussen.”²⁰”

Kramer’s article presents valuable facts about the Old Believers in Bukovina. In turn, Jakubowski builds a convincing argument about the relationships between the emigrant Old Believers and the Austrian and Prussian authorities. These relations were paradoxical due to the combination of the Old Believers’ economic productivity and their avoidance of state regulations, such as oath-taking, military service, metrical registration, or inns’ building.

The concentration of the literature devoted to the Old Believers’ communities and their individual relationship with both states, that is, the concentration on processes within state borders overlooking inter-imperial dynamics, makes the historiography of foreign policy between the Austrian and Russian empires even more relevant. The interest in the history of Russian foreign policy gained momentum during the Cold War; the first notable book to elucidate the 19th century was “*A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914*” by Barbara Jelavich. Later, the fundamental works in this field were written by Alfred Rieber, John P. LeDonne, and William C. Fuller²¹.

Simultaneously, it is important to understand the Austrian perspective on Russian-Austrian relations, where the book by Aaron Wess Mitchell, “*The Grand Strategy of the*

²⁰ Michael Kramer, “Osnovanie staroobryadcheskoj mitropolii v Beloj Krinice na Bukovine i prebyvanie sv. mitropolita Amvrosija v Avstrii.” [The Establishment of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy on Bukovina and the Presence of Saint Metropolitan Ambrose in Austria] In *Duhovnye otvety*, 9 (Moskva, Tverskaja Nikol'skaja staroobryadcheskaja obshhina hrama vo imja svjatitelja Nikoly chudotvorca 1998), 81-129; Michael Jakubowski, “Facing the Old Believers. The Experience of Austrian and Prussian Officials in Bukovina and Neuostpreussen,” *Acta Poloniae Historica* 122 (2020): 247-275.

²¹ Barbara Jelavich, *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914*. (Philadelphia, PA & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964); Alfred J. Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay.” In *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 315-59; John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

Habsburg Empire,” serves as the main guide²². Mitchell argues that Russia was a highly controversial partner for Austria as an ally in “western issues” and an adversary in “south-eastern” ones. As a result, these contradictions tangibly affected the position of the Old Believers in both empires. In addition, there are studies elucidating the issue of how the Russian Empire dealt with religious diversity within its realm, albeit not the Old Believers: the books by Paul Werth, Elena Campbell, and Mikhail Dolbilov provide the valuable insights in this sphere²³.

Finally, studies of particular cases help to maintain a narrative balance between general trends and detailed case studies. Thus, Ethel Dunn and Leonte Ivanov analyze the expedition of the Russian official and the Slavophile, Ivan Aksakov, in Bessarabia; Eugene Clay shows the fate of the Old Believer monastery on the Low Volga; and Victor Taki depicts the career of one of the crucial interrogators of the Old Belief, Ivan Liprandi²⁴.

IV. Methodology and Sources

The analysis of the mutual influence of discourses and practices within Russian and Austrian imperial administrations constitutes the methodological core of the research. This study is methodologically placed within the new imperial history. I rely on the theoretical approaches to empire, systematized by Ronald Grigor Suny toward Russian and East European

²² Aaron W. Mitchell, *The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

²³ Paul H. Werth, *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia*; Elena I. Campbell, *The Muslim Question and Russian Imperial Governance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015); Mikhail Dolbilov, *Russkii kraj, chuzhaia vera: Etnoreligioznaia politika v Litve i Belorusii pri Aleksandre II [The Russian Land, the Foreign Faith: Ethnoreligious Policy of the Empire in Lithuania and Belarus under Alexander II]* (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2010).

²⁴ Ethel Dunn, “A Slavophile Looks at the Raskol and the Sects.” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 44, no. 102 (1966), 167-179; Leonte Ivanov, “Ivan Aksakov's Letters from Bessarabia.” *Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations*. Vol. VI, no. 1 (2009), 65-76; Eugene Clay, “An Old Believer Monastery on the Volga: The Cheremshan Monastic Complex, 1820-1925,” *Slavonica* 7, no. 2 (2001), 9-27; Victor Taki, “From partisan war to the ethnography of European Turkey: The Balkan career of Ivan Liprandi, 1790–1880.” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 58 no. 3 (2016), 257-285.

history²⁵ and reintroduced by the editorial team of *Ab Imperio* Journal in the article “In Search of a New Imperial History,” and other conceptual texts, primarily, “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire²⁶.” The central argument in this conceptual program lies in the vision of empire as a semantic category and a dynamic situation instead of a narrowing conceptualization merely as a political entity.

Proposed in the piece “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire,” the concept of *strategical relativism* allows me to reinterpret both the Russian imperial administration and the communities of the Old Believers. The concept refers to “the discourse and stance that relativizes the bounded and internally homogeneous nature of the constituent elements of the sociopolitical space and governance²⁷”.

While the concept of strategical relativism problematizes *intra*-imperial structures, strategical relativism, it may also contribute to a better understanding of *inter*- or *trans*-imperial relations. Consequently, an “entangled” approach helps me to discuss imperial competition, cooperation, and connectivity as profoundly interconnected processes²⁸. Through these perspectives, I can look at the triangle of two imperial governments and one community of religious dissenters as the complex focal point, consisting of numerous actors with various short-term and long-term goals and interests.

I seek to examine primary sources produced by all involved actors (the Russian and Austrian imperial administrations, the priestly Old Believers, the Polish emigration), although

²⁵ Ronald G. Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire.” In *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23-66.

²⁶ Ilya Gerasimov, Sergey Glebov, Alexander Kaplunovsky, Marina Mogilner, and Alexander Semyonov, “In Search of a New Imperial History.” *Ab Imperio*, 2005, no. 1 (2005), 33–56; Ilya Gerasimov, Sergey Glebov, Jan Kusber, Marina Mogilner, Alexander Semyonov, “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire.” In *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire* (Leiden, Brill, 2009), 3-32.

²⁷ Ilya Gerasimov, Sergey Glebov, Jan Kusber, Marina Mogilner, Alexander Semyonov, “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire:” 20.

²⁸ Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Heé, “Transimperial History – Connectivity, Cooperation and Competition.” *Journal of Modern European History* 16, no. 4 (2018), 430.

my possibility to work with unpublished archival materials created by the Old Believers is restricted, and I have to lean on published texts from various volumes. Apart from this, my research experience and the time constraints of a 1-year MA program allow me to primarily focus on Russian-language sources, including those that reveal the processes in the Habsburg Empire.

The thesis engages with a complex set of published and unpublished sources. The most commonly presented genre of sources in my study is bureaucratic notes (*zapiski*) that were written by various Russian officials for their seniors and were devoted to the different aspects of Old Believers' agency. Apart from this, the correspondence of Russian bureaucrats, including professional and personal, can shed light on the complex peculiarities of state policy towards religious dissenters and the influence of the trans-imperial context on it. Austrian diplomatic correspondence directed at the problem of Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy is not less important, as it illustrates the scale of this issue for interstate relations, attitudes of the Austrian diplomats to this challenge, and the range of possible consequences.

In turn, the correspondence of the Old Believers allows me to look at the reverse side of the process and to demonstrate "a dual perspective" in the study. Although the list of the Old Believers' materials dedicated not spiritual but political issues is not abundant, the memoir depicting the journey from Moscow to Bukovina provides valuable evidence of the permeability of the Russian-Austrian border, while the volume "The Materials for the History of the so-called Austrian or Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy" shows the details of the relationship between the Bukovinian Old Believers and the Habsburg imperial administration.

Surely, the collections of sources gathered and introduced by authors opposed to the Old Believers (the theologian and historian, Nikolai Subbotin) provoke the question of authenticity and reliability. However, the persons from the Belaya Krinitza persuasion never accused these publications of misrepresentations and defamation, even though in 1905-1917,

the Old Believers enjoyed the highest level of toleration in the Russian Empire, and some priestly Old Believers were members of the Russian State Duma (imperial parliament). Nevertheless, I approach these sources with a certain degree of caution and look at them with special critical reflection.

Several memoir texts by retired officials complement this array of sources by elucidating significant details and nuances that illuminate, for instance, the investigation of one of the “co-founders” of the Hierarchy, archimandrite Gerontti, and the expeditions targeting the Schism. In addition, the memoire “notes” by the Polish emigrant, Michal Czajkowski, who played a significant role in the establishment of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy and tried to mobilize the Ottoman Old Believers during the Crimean War, expound the goals and performance of the fourth side in this complicated process – the Polish emigration.

The published volumes of decrees produced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Holy Synod and devoted to the various aspects of their struggle against the Schism present a diachronical outline of the state policy and, at the same time, shed light on some particular measures. Last but not least, the meeting minutes of the Secret Committee for the Affairs of Schismatics (Raskol’niki) provide valuable information about the crucial decisions, fears, and attitudes of state actors.

V. Structure

The thesis consists of four parts: one introductory chapter, two research chapters, and the conclusion. The first research chapter depicts the reasons for the establishment of the Old Believer Church, the stages of this process, and the efforts of the Russian imperial administration in dealing with this challenge. I argue that the emergence of the “Austrian Church” proved to be a pivotal watershed in the Russian policy toward religious dissent in the mid-nineteenth century and the temporary rapprochement of Russian and Austria after the

European revolution of 1848-1849 moderates this policy for several years. This piece embraces a multicomponent process spanning the village of Belaya Krinitza in Bukovina, Vienna, Istanbul, Moscow, and St. Petersburg and involving the Old Believer monks, the Russian bureaucrats and diplomats, the Austrian high officials, and the Polish emigrants. The first chapter is divided on two sections: the first fragment focuses on a complicated “pre-history” of the Belaya Krinitza Church: the negotiations between numerous actors and the attempts of Russian bureaucrats to investigate and prevent this process: the second paragraph concentrates on the Russian-Austrian diplomatic tensions after the establishment of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy and Russian police measures of counteracting this challenge.

The second chapter is devoted to the various attempts of the Russian authorities to dissolve the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy, its reasons and contexts. I claim that the “destroyed alliance” of Russia and Austria, the politicization of Orthodoxy and the “securitization” of internal policies under the circumstances of the Crimean War determined the unprecedented state campaign directed at the Schism and particularly the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy. The incrementally unfolding project of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of research and eradication of the Schism coincides with the onset of the Crimean War, which entailed sharp focusing on Orthodoxy and state security. I structure this chapter on two paragraphs: the first piece elucidates the discourses, conflating the Old Belief and the “Austrian menace” and, widely, external risks, which circulated during and after the Crimean War. The second paragraph depicts bureaucratic practices directed at the Russian religious dissent and, specifically, the priestly Old Believers in the mid-1850s. These practices consisted of the gathering of information on the Schism, targeted arrests, and the attack on the community of the Belaya Krinitza Old Believers in Moscow.

Chapter II: The Creation of Old Believers' Church in the Habsburg Empire and Its Influence on the Russian Religious Policy in 1846-1852.

I. The Establishment of an Episcopal See in Bukovina in 1846: Its Reasons and Ramifications

On October 24, 1846, the emigrant Russian Old Believers solemnly hosted an Ottoman subject in the monastery on the eastern peripheries of the Austrian Empire²⁹. This Ottoman person was a retired Greek Orthodox bishop, Ambrose. This episode became watershed moment in the history of Russian religious dissenters and their relationship with the Russian state. It was a long journey for the Old Believers, from the first dreams devoted to their own ecclesiastical institution to a festive rite occurring in the Bukovinian monastery of Belaya Krinitsa.

Rumors about the existence of genuine bishops “somewhere in the East” circulated among the Old Believers during the 18th century, but their search failed, while communities were able to function due to the conversion of priests from the official Orthodoxy³⁰. However, the second quarter of the 19th century was marked by tangible changes in the lives of the priestly Old Believers and Russian religious dissenters as a whole³¹. The Russian official and writer, Pavel Mel'nikov, in his seminal work “*Ocherki Popovschiny*” [Essays on the Priestly Old

²⁹ Zhurnaly zasedaniy za 1845-1849 gody [The Meeting Minutes for 1845-1849], RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. l. 310; Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyyaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinitskago Sviashchenstva. Vol. 1*, 431.

³⁰ Sergei A. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe Staroobriadchestvo*: 455; Maureen Perrie, "In Search of an Apostolic Succession: Russian Old Believers and the Legend of Belovod'e." *Slavonic and East European Review* 98, no. 2, 2020, 276-277.

³¹ Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841-1855*, 1-30; Laura Engelstein, *Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale* (Ithaca, Cornell University 1999), 49-56; Maureen Perrie, "The Castrates, the Specter of Pugachev, and Religious Policy under Nicholas I." *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 24, no. 2 (2023), 299-301; David W. Edwards, "The System of Nicholas I in Church-State Relations." In *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*. (Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 1978), 154-169.

Believers], mentions the entire complex of measures taken by the Russian authorities in 1827-1837 to prevent the conversion of Orthodox priests to the Old Belief³².

In this context, the Old Believer community in Bukovina, where dissenters could exist without severe restrictions under the auspices of post-Josephinian Habsburg toleration³³, gained the upper hand. The consequences were not long in coming: in July 1839, two monks, Gerontii (Kolpakov) and Pavel (Velikodvorski), crossed the border between Russian Bessarabia and Austrian Bukovina and arrived at the monastery of Belaya Krinitsa³⁴.

Gerontii and Pavel became the genuine founding fathers of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy. Even highly biased against the Old Belief, the Russian official and intellectual Nikolai Nadezhdin acknowledged their outstanding personal qualities: the eloquence and the intelligence of Pavel and the dexterity and managerial skills of Gerontii³⁵. A little bit later, in May 1840, Alimpii (Miloradov) joined them, and these three monks formed the core of a team that contributed to the creation of the new Church.

At this point, the Old Believers faced a twofold task: to obtain permission from the Habsburg authorities to establish an institution and to find a bishop. In both respects, the interactions with the allied foreigners proved to be extremely productive. In the Viennese direction, the attorney and Slavic activist Jan Dvoracek became a crucial legal advisor to the Old Believers, while the search for a bishop brought emigrant monks together with one of the brightest members of the Polish diaspora – Michal Czajkowski³⁶.

³² Pavel I. Mel'nikov, "Ocherki popovschiny," [Essays on the Priestly Old Believers] In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii P.I. Mel'nikova [Andreia Pecherskago]*, Vol. 13. (Sankt-Peterburg: Tovarishhestvo M. O.Vol'f, 1897), 287-291.

³³ Melchior Jakubowski, "Facing the Old Believers. The Experience of Austrian and Prussian Officials in Bukovina and Neuostpreussen," 260-265.

³⁴ Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyyvaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinitskago Sviashchenstva. Vol. 1*: 160.

³⁵ Nikolai Nadezhdin, "O zagranichnyh raskol'nikah" [On the Foreign Schismatics], In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlenyj V. Kel'sievym*. Vol. 1. (London: Trubner, 1860),

³⁶ Ivan P. Liprandi, "Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol'nicheskij arhimandrit" [Gerontii Levonov, the Belaya Krinitsa Schismatic Archimandrite], In *ChOIDR. Vol. 4*. (Moskva: Universitetskaja tipografija na Strastnom bul'vare, 1871): 159-160; Michal Puna, *Zemští poslanci zvolení na Moravě r. 1848 a 1861, K otázce formování politické kultury a její kontinuity* [Regional Deputies Elected in Moravia in 1848 and 1861: On the Question of the Formation of Political Culture and Its Continuity] [online]. muni.cz [cit. 2024-03-02]; Michal Chajkovskij,

Czajkowski, who emigrated after the defeat of the Polish Uprising of 1830-1831, lived in Istanbul in the 1840s, and was known as Sadyk Pasha, was fascinated by the Old Believers and the opportunity to build a coalition against the Russian Empire. He instructed a Franciscan monk from Hercegovina, Philipp Pashalych, to draw up a list of retired Greek Orthodox bishops, who could be converted to the Old Belief³⁷.

In turn, thanks to the efforts of Dvoracek, Pavel and Alimpii were able to secure meetings with the Interior Minister of the Austrian Empire, Count Franz Anton von Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky and the Emperor Ferdinand in 1843³⁸. Apart from this, a special commission sent by local authorities positively evaluated the resources of the monastery for the establishment of a bishop see³⁹. Thus, negotiations with the Austrian officials of various levels were successful, and, finally, on September 18, 1844 Ferdinand signed a decree, allowing the Old Believers to establish a diocese in Bukovina, confirming the legal status of a monastery in Belaya Krinitsa⁴⁰.

The search for a bishop required more persistent efforts, as the Eastern Orthodox hierarches were reluctant to join a “schismatic” community and to settle in a remote Bukovinian monastery. The Russian official Nikolai Nadezhdin acidly noted on one of the candidates, Venedict Cralevich, “the old man, having escaped from Dalmatia and been given a generous pension by the Austrian government, is now living happily and, of course, has no advantage in exchanging the splendid, brilliant Venice for some Belo-Krinitsa slum⁴¹.”

However, the collaboration with Michal Czajkowski and his agents bore fruit. A retired bishop of the Constantinople Patriarchate, Ambrose (Papageorgopulos), who had previously

“Zapiski” [The Notes], *Russkaja starina*, 94 (1898) 691-692. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987): 172-186.

³⁷ Michal Czajkovskij, “Zapiski,” *Russkaja starina*, 95 (1898); 691-692.

³⁸ “Prilozhenija k Zapiske Nadezhdina” [The Appendixes to A Note of Nadezhdin] In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym. Vol. 1* (London: Trubner, 1860): 156.

³⁹ *Materialy dlja istorii tak nazyvaemoj avstrijskoj ili belokrinickoj ierarhii* [The Materials for the History of the So-called Austrian or Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy]. Izd. N. Subbotin (Moskva: tip. Je. Lissnera i A. Geshelja, 1899): 106-114.

⁴⁰ Michael Kramer, “Osnovanie staroobradcheskoj mitropolii v Beloj Krinice na Bukovine i prebyvanie sv. mitropolita Amvrosija v Avstrii.” 97.

⁴¹ Nikolai Nadezhdin, “O zagranichnyh raskol'nikah:” 108.

headed the Bosnian diocese, agreed to open negotiations with the Old Believers⁴². On April 16, 1846, these negotiations were successfully concluded, and Ambrose confirmed his readiness to join the “Russian schismatics” and signed a necessary document to that effect. This agreement was beneficial for the Old Believers: even the Russian theologian and historian Nikolai Subbotin, entirely hostile to the dissenters and particularly to the Belaya Krinitsa Church, characterized Ambrose positively⁴³.

These activities did not go unnoticed by the Russian authorities. Nikolai Nadezhdin, who was one of the crucial Russian officials in the work with religious dissent and the most consistent Russian nationalist in the bureaucracy⁴⁴, was sent in 1845 the expedition that covered the Prussian kingdom and the Austrian and Ottoman empires. Nadezhdin visited the Belaya Krinitsa monastery and paid attention to the preparation for the reception of a bishop, “the schismatics of Bukovina, who, according to the general opinion of the natives, were the main heroes of the celebration, have been extremely animated and moved ever since. When I visited them, I saw that their thoughts and speeches were only about the future bishop.⁴⁵”

Apart from this, Nadezhdin clearly noted an international and even “great power politics” context of the forthcoming event, “Now, all of a sudden, a well-organized, powerful State such as Austria solemnly grants them, by all forms of civil law, a secure episcopal chair – and, consequently, the schism, which had hitherto groveled as a dark, rejected sect, is elevated to the status of an officially recognized Church!⁴⁶”

⁴² *Perpiska raskol'nicheskikh dejatelej* [The Correspondence of the Schismatic Actors]. Vol. 1 (Moskva: Tipografija J. Lissnera i J. Romana, 1887): 67-68.

⁴³ Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyyaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinitskago Sviashchenstva. Vol. 1*: 364-367.

⁴⁴ Nathaniel Knight, “Ethnicity, Nationality and the Masses: Narodnost' and Modernity in Imperial Russia,” In *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, ed. Daniel Hoffman and Yanni Kotsonis (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000): 41-64; “Science, empire, and nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845–1855.” In *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, ed. Jane Burbank and Daniel L. Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998): 108-131.

⁴⁵ Nikolai Nadezhdin, “O zagranichnyh raskol'nikah:” 106.

⁴⁶ Nikolai Nadezhdin, “O zagranichnyh raskol'nikah:” 106.

After this expedition, he wrote a report for the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs Lev Perovskii, which turned out to be so significant that Perovskii presented it to Emperor Nicholas I and his successor Alexander⁴⁷. At the same time, on 12 July 1845, another government expert on the Schism, Ivan Liprandi, informed the Minister Perovskii of the efforts of the Old Believers to organize their Church and mentioned Venedict Cralevich as a possible candidate⁴⁸. Even though Liprandi admitted that he could not find out the contact points of the dissenters, the level of awareness of the state investigator was palpable.

However, this awareness did not help to prevent the establishment of the Belaya Krinita Hierarchy. On 28 June, 1846, Metropolitan Ambrose and accompanying him the Old Believers arrived in Vienna and on 11 July, were granted an audience from Emperor Ferdinand, where Ambrose presented the petition for Austrian subjecthood⁴⁹. Meanwhile, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Count Medem, completely overlooked this episode as well as the consequent three-months stay of Ambrose and his confidants in the city and their meetings with high-ranking Austrian officials.

As a result, the Russian authorities did not learn of the creation of the Belaya Krinita Hierarchy until February 1847 (the report of the Ruthenian Denis Zubrytsky)⁵⁰, when this institution had already taken root and become resistant to state pressure. This indifference of Ambassador Medem can be explained by the peculiarities of the “anti-schism governance” in the Russian Empire. The bureaucrats designed and implemented policies towards the dissenters in the secret committees; as the historian Pia Pera portrays the establishment of the main secret committee in Saint Petersburg, “Alexander gave his approval on condition that the activities of

⁴⁷ “Vsepoddannejšhaja” zapiska L. A. Perovskogo s objavljenijami k zapiske st. sov. Nadezhdina o russkih raskol'nikah, zhivushhiih za granicej [The Most Subordinate Note of L. A. Perovskii with Explanations to a Note of the State Counsellor Nadezhdin about the Russian Schismatics Who Live Abroad], RGIA. F. 1021. Op. 2. No. 10.

⁴⁸ Ivan P. Liprandi, “Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol'niceskij arhimandrit,” 104-105.

⁴⁹ *Perepiska raskol'niceskikh dejatelej. Vol. 1.*: 83-84.

⁵⁰ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. l. 303, 448.

the committee and its very existence should remain a well-guarded secret, perhaps because he did not want to alarm the Old Believers, and also because he did not wish to taint his reputation as an enlightened monarch⁵¹.”

This tendency continued throughout the reign of Nicholas I, and there was no communication between the officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who were working with the schism, and the diplomats on this issue. Due to this gap, the abilities of Alimpii and Pavel, and the general favor of the Habsburg authorities, Ambrose received guarantees from the Viennese officials and left for the Belaya Krinitsa Monastery at the beginning of October, 1846⁵². The decree of the Habsburg Court Chancellery, confirming the rights of Ambrose, was sent to the Galician-Lodomerian provincial administration in Lemberg on 3 November, 1846 and was soon forwarded to the Bukovinian administration⁵³.

In turn, “Pavel and Alimpii returned triumphantly to Belaia Krinitsa; they brought with them not just a bishop but a Metropolitan, a still higher rank⁵⁴” The accession of Ambrose to the Old Believer community provoked some discussions on ritual details but was successfully completed on 24 October 1846 in the presence of delegates from the Ottoman Empire, Moldavia and Bukovina⁵⁵. The Old Orthodox (*drevlepravoslavnaia*) Christian Church came to exist.

It is noteworthy that its position was soon strengthened with the consecration of a new bishop, which was organized as a solemn event with the invitation of the Bukovinian nobility. In his correspondence with the Moscow co-religionists, the monk Pavel (Velikodvorski) mentioned “the regional head” (apparently, the governor Gheorghe Isăcescu) and more than 50

⁵¹ Pia Pera, “The Secret Committee on the Old Believers: Moving away from Catherine II's Policy of Religious Toleration.” In *Russia in the Age of the Enlightenment*, ed. Roger B. Bartlett and Janet M. Hartley (London: St. Martin's Press, 1990): 229.

⁵² Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyvaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinit'skago Sviashchenstva. Vol. 1*: 426.

⁵³ Michael Kramer, *Osnovanie staroobryadcheskoj mitropolii v Beloj Krinice na Bukovine i prebyvanie sv. mitropolita Amvrosija v Avstrii*: 99.

⁵⁴ Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*: 37.

⁵⁵ Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyvaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinit'skago Sviashchenstva. Vol. 1*: 296.

landowners, who visited this ceremony⁵⁶. The governor even ordered artillery salvoes to be fired at the event and called in a military team, which illustrates a high level of respect to the new Church on the part of the local elite.

After that, the monk Pavel wrote to the one of his Moscow correspondents, “Now it remains for us “...” to pray to God all the days of our lives for our great sovereign King Ferdinand and for the whole world⁵⁷.” Even though this appeal did not challenge the very idea of monarchy, it was highly dangerous for the Russian imperial sovereignty since a significant part of the Russian population might prefer the loyalty to the rival great power.

The number of the Old Believers in the Russian Empire is debatable and fluctuated within a range from 750 000 (the official figure) to 10 million (the estimate of the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Internal Affairs after expeditions)⁵⁸. Although not all of them accepted the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy, the Popovtsy were the largest and best organized community, and their potential allegiance to “the great sovereign King Ferdinand” could not be ignored by the Russian authorities.

In addition to their numbers, the priestly Old Believers could boast economic opportunities. They were overrepresented among the urban estates: merchants and townspeople (*meshchane*), and particularly among the wealthiest merchants and entrepreneurs of Moscow and the Volga region. Moreover, the big merchant Moscow families, such as the Riabushinskiys and the Sirotkins, made an indispensably financial contribution to the formation of the “Belokrinitskii persuasion⁵⁹.”

At the same time, the Russian-Austrian relationship experienced tensions in the 1840s, which included tactical issues such as the failed marriage between the Russian Grand Princess

⁵⁶ *Perepiska raskol'nicheskikh dejatelej. Vol. 1: 88-91.*

⁵⁷ *Perepiska raskol'nicheskikh dejatelej. Vol. 1: 92.*

⁵⁸ Irina Paert, ““Two or Twenty Million?” The Languages of Official Statistics and Religious Dissent in Imperial Russia.” *Ab Imperio* 2006, no. 3 (2006): 85.

⁵⁹ Alfred J. Rieber, *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press), 1982: 142.

Olga and the Austrian Archduke Stefan, as well as strategic contradictions connected with the control of the Balkan Slavic population and the protection of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire⁶⁰. Even though formally allied, the Habsburg Monarchy could not be a totally reliable partner for Nicholas I and his subordinates.

Due to the combination of these factors, the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy presented a fundamentally new phenomenon. Although the Russian government had a rich experience of working with foreign faiths, occupying a prominent place in the religious landscape of the empire⁶¹, this status had never been accorded to the schismatics of the crucial “internal” faith – Orthodoxy. The unique exception was the Greek Catholics, emerging after the Union with Rome in 1596 in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and subjected to Russia as a result of its partitions. However, in 1839, Greek Catholic religious structures were banned in the Russian Empire, and they were forcibly incorporated into Orthodoxy⁶².

In conclusion, the Russian authorities faced an unprecedented level of self-organization and negotiating skills on the part of the members of the community, usually associated with backwardness and ignorance. The *Old Believers* or *Ritualists* proved capable of creating a *new* institution, covering three empires. In these conditions, the Russian officials had only two ways “to solve the question:” diplomacy and repressions.

II. Diplomacy and Repressions: Two Ways of the Russian Authorities

The existence of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy remained a secret to the Russian authorities for almost four months until, in February 1847, the Ruthenian intellectual Denys

⁶⁰ Michael Kramer, “Osnovanie staroobriadcheskoj mitropolii v Beloj Krinice na Bukovine i prebyvanie sv. mitropolita Amvrosija v Avstrii.” 105; Aaron W. Mitchell, *The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire*: 265-266.

⁶¹ Paul H. Werth, *The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 3.

⁶² Mikhail Dolbilov, *Russkii krai, chuzhaia vera: Etnoreligioznaia politika v Litve i Belorusii pri Aleksandre II*: 80.

Zubrytsky informed the Archaeographic Commission in Saint Petersburg of this event⁶³. The Galician historian who wrote a three-volume work on the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia, Zubrytsky, was the main proponent of Russophile views among the intellectuals of the region⁶⁴ and a firm adherent of Orthodoxy, which explains his hostility to the Old Believers.

On February 19, 1847, the Secret Committee on the Affairs of the Schismatics gathered for a particular meeting devoted to this news. The Minister of Internal Affairs Perovskii made a speech at this session in which he pointed out the two crucial risks for the imperial government: the new bishop would provide priests for the Popovtsy, and this event would increase the migration of the Old Believers abroad⁶⁵.

Apart from this, the participants of the meeting paid attention to financial issues: the “schismatics” received money for the functioning of this Church almost exclusively from Russia⁶⁶. This aspect confirmed that the establishment of this institution was not merely a local initiative of the Bukovinian Lipovans or even the Old Believer communities of the Eastern Balkans. On the contrary, it was the result of long-term efforts involving the religious dissenters from the “core” of the Russian Empire and relevant for them.

On the whole, this news challenged the essential part of the Nicholas I’ government system: ubiquitous control through exact knowledge⁶⁷. However, reality demonstrated that knowledge of the Old Believers’ activities was fragmentary, and even Nadezhdin’s expedition had elucidated only a part of the processes and, more importantly, had not helped to prevent the threat.

⁶³ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. l. 310; O zagranichnyh raskol'nikah [On the Foreign Schismatics], RGIA. F. 797. Op. 17. No. 39309. l. 1.

⁶⁴ John P. Himka, “The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus’: Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions.” In *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001): 127.

⁶⁵ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. l. 312.

⁶⁶ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. l. 311.

⁶⁷ Catherine Evtuhov, *Portrait of a Russian Province: Economy, Society, and Civilization in Nineteenth-Century Nizhnii Novgorod* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburg University Press, 2011): 11.

The Minister Perovskii outlined the two ways of countering in this configuration: to contact the Constantinople Patriarch for the interdict of Ambrose and to support the Orthodox people of Bukovina⁶⁸. The Moscow Metropolitan Filaret wrote an appeal to the Patriarch Anhimos (Anthimos), which was forwarded from the Holy Synod, asking him “to force the disobedient bishop to repent” or, otherwise, “to condemn him with the self-condemned ones, and if he dared to ordain disgracefully, you would abolish them by the power of ecclesiastical rules⁶⁹.”

However, this Church diplomacy proved not to be utterly successful. Although the Patriarch Anthimos responded with a lengthy letter on the taken measures, which was forwarded to the Minister Nesselrode⁷⁰, in reality, he limited his actions to a reprimand for Ambrose for the voluntary departure from his jurisdiction and the consecration of persons with unclear piety⁷¹. It is noteworthy that the Constantinople Church experienced a crisis period at that time: it was forced to accept the autonomy of the Serbian Church in the 1830s, the loss of control over the Jerusalem Patriarchate in 1843, the independence of the Greek Orthodox Church in 1850, and the sprawling Romanization of Orthodoxy in the Danubian region in the 1850s⁷².

In 1847, Anthimos attempted to counteract the reforms of the Ottoman government that planned to restrict the power of the Patriarchate over the Orthodox community in the empire. Moreover, “the Porte would gradually purge the upper clergy of abusive and Russophile elements while placing temporal affairs in the hands of lay notables who depended upon the Ottoman government for their wealth and position⁷³.” In these conditions, the outright conflict

⁶⁸ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. l. 312.

⁶⁹ “Iz vlechenie iz del Sv. Sinoda 10 marta 1847 goda” [An Extract from the Affairs of the Holy Synod, March 10, 1847], In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennykh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym. Vol. 1* (London: Trubner, 1860): 297; RGIA. F. 797. Op. 17. No. 39309. l. 71-77.

⁷⁰ RGIA. F. 797. Op. 17. No. 39309. l.

⁷¹ “Letopis' proishodjashchih v raskole sobytij” [A Chronicle of the Events Taking Place in the Schism], *Bratskoe slovo*. 1876. Vol. II: 209-210.

⁷² Richard Clogg, “The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire.” In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition*, ed. Benjamin Braude (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014): 117.

⁷³ Jack Fairey, *The Great Powers and Orthodox Christendom: The Crisis over the Eastern Church in the Era of the Crimean War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 106.

with the Old Believers, who had demonstrated their skill in political negotiations, was not in the interests of Anthimos.

Apart from this, the Russian high officials resorted to the “channel” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which bore more promising fruit. On the one hand, Emperor Nicholas I prepared a note with his personal addition, “If I am not soon satisfied with my just demand, I shall be compelled to resort to other extremely regrettable measures⁷⁴.” His demand was for the immediate dissolution of “the false monastery” and the exile of “the bishop-impostor⁷⁵.”

The note itself presented the Belaya Krinitsa Monastery as “a shelter for tramps” and the Metropolitan Ambrose as “a fleeing tramp.” On the whole, the argumentation against the new hierarchy was threefold: the existence of such institutions was declared incompatible with the legal rules of “the well-ordered state,” the Schism was defined as the fruit of “the rude ignorance of previous centuries, weakened by the enlightenment,” and this factor was destructive for friendly relations between the Powers⁷⁶.

On the other hand, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Karl Nesselrode, and the head of the Third Section (secret police), Count Alexei Orlov, contacted the Austrian ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Count Franz Colloredo, and warned him that the emergence of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy was a “*sujet disagreeable*⁷⁷,” which threatened the breakdown of interstate relations between two empires.

Meanwhile, the reaction of the Russian imperial administration was not limited to foreign policy efforts. On May 3, 1847, the Secret Committee on the Affairs of the Schismatics met for the second particular session devoted to the Old Believer Church, which resulted in a

⁷⁴ *Obzor meroprijatij Ministerstva Vnutrennih Del po raskolu s 1802 po 1881 god* [The Overview of the Measures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the Schism from 1802 to 1881] (Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1903): 87.

⁷⁵ *Obzor meroprijatij Ministerstva Vnutrennih Del po raskolu s 1802 po 1881 god*: 87.

⁷⁶ “Nota, sostavlennaja dlja peredachi Ministru inostrannyh del, dlja dal'nejshego napravlenija” [A Note for the Transfer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Further Direction], In Ivan P. Liprandi, “*Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol'nicheskij arhimandrit*.” 173-177.

⁷⁷ HHSTA, 134 Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1847, 59v.

statement on “the establishment of a barrier for all kinds of schismatic contacts⁷⁸.” This statement was transformed into “The Supreme Decree” of May 13, 1847, in which Emperor Nicholas I ordered that measures be taken to stop affairs between the Russian and Bukovinian “schismatics” and that the Old Believers arriving abroad be immediately arrested⁷⁹.

This decree confirms one of the crucial features of Russian foreign policy, pointed out by Alfred Rieber: the permeability of state borders⁸⁰. Belaya Krinitsa, with Bessarabia annexed only in 1812, was such a frontier zone, creating – from the point of view of the imperial government – problems of internal security and facilitating flight by malcontents. However, due to the initial lack of caution on the part of the Old Believers, the first key emissary of the new Church, the archimandrite Gerontii (Levonov), was arrested on May 28, 1847, near Moscow⁸¹.

An experienced secret service officer, Ivan Liprandi, who had organized the Russian espionage in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829⁸² and later investigated the case of the Petrashevsky Circle, including Fyodor Dostoevsky, led an inquiry over Gerontii and his associates (the Austrian merchant Johann Miller, the Kievian merchant Konon Bulyshkin and his son Timofei, the monk Abram (Ushakov), and two peasant women Anna and Stepanida). The Minister of Internal Affairs Perovskii and the head of the Third Section Orlov supervised this process, and Emperor Nicholas I “asked more than once about the Austrian archimandrite⁸³.”

After two months of interrogation, Gerontii confessed and wrote a letter for Nicholas I with a detailed description of his biography and the circumstances surrounding the emergence

⁷⁸ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. l. 455.

⁷⁹ *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola* [The Collection of Decrees about the Schism] (Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1858): 484.

⁸⁰ Alfred J. Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay.” In *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 329-335.

⁸¹ Sergei A. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe Staroobriadchestvo*: 472.

⁸² Victor Taki, “From partisan war to the ethnography of European Turkey: the Balkan career of Ivan Liprandi, 1790–1880:” 264.

⁸³ Ivan P. Liprandi, “Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol'nicheskij arhimandrit:” 115.

of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy⁸⁴. Under these conditions, Liprandi proposed to refrain from the arrests of the wealthy Moscow entrepreneurs linked to this institution, suggesting that it could provoke rumors about extortion, while the imprisonment of Gerontii would be a sufficiently tangible strike for the Old Believers without extreme measures⁸⁵.

Nikolai Nadezhdin endorsed this approach. He was convinced that “the detention of Gerontii Leonov deals a heavy blow to the foreign Schism, and if it does not stop, it will considerably weaken its further development and, at the same time, its malign influence on Russia⁸⁶.” Nadezhdin defined Gerontii as “one of the main drivers of the foreign Schism, the head and the genuine ruler of the nest of schismatic intrigues⁸⁷.” As a result, the archimandrite was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment in the Alexeevsky Ravelin and the Shlisselburg Fortress.

At the same time, diplomatic pressure on the Austrian government began to bear fruit. Thus, Ambassador Colloredo informed Counsellor Metternich that Nicholas I would withdraw his Russian counterpart Pavel Medem from Vienne pending a “satisfying response” to the case of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy⁸⁸. Under these circumstances, on December 1, 1847, the Governor of Galicia, Count Franz Stadion, summoned the Metropolitan Ambrose in Lemberg for immediate explanations, and, after that, the head of the Hierarchy arrived in Vienne for a meeting with the Court Chancellor, Count Karl von Inzaghi⁸⁹.

This meeting took place on January 26, 1848, and Ambrose presented his justifications (the duty to come for “a rescue sheep in need of a shepherd”). However, Inzaghi pointed out that it was a diplomatic affaire and forwarded the Metropolitan to Counsellor Metternich, who

⁸⁴ Ivan P. Liprandi, “Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol'nicheskij arhimandrit:” 146-149.

⁸⁵ Ivan P. Liprandi, “Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol'nicheskij arhimandrit:” 122.

⁸⁶ “Zapiska o Raskole” [A Note on the Schism], RGALI. F. 1387. Op. 1. No. 1. l. 4.

⁸⁷ RGALI. F. 1387. Op. 1. No. 1. l. 11.

⁸⁸ HHSTA, 134 Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1847, 60v.

⁸⁹ *Perepiska raskol'nicheskih dejatelej. Vol. 1: 178.*

granted an audience for the Old Believers on January 31⁹⁰. Apart from Metternich, Ambrose and Alimp'ii held a conversation with archduke Ludwig (Louis), who was favorable to the Old Believers from the onset of their "Church affair." Nevertheless, these meetings could not change the decision of the Austrian government – on February 10, 1848, Emperor Ferdinand signed a decree dissolving the Belay Krinitsa Monastery, while Ambrose was exiled to Cilli in Styria⁹¹.

The monk Alimp'ii tried to reverse this negative trend by asking the Interior Minister, von Kolowrat, for help and insisting that Ambrose had responded satisfactorily on the request of the Patriarch Anthimos, had acted in Bukovina in accordance with the imperial decree of September 18, 1844, and had not committed any crime⁹². However, this attempt was in vain; even though von Kolowrat was known for his favor to the Lipovans, in this case, his hands were tied.

In the context of the pressure exerted by Russian diplomacy and the growing political unrest across Europe, the Austrian imperial administration could not risk a rupture with St Petersburg through a religious institution from the remote eastern periphery. Meanwhile, these measures were in many respects only formal; Alimp'ii wrote to Moscow on March 16: "The commission was quite favorable to us as nothing illegal had been discovered⁹³." Even though the monastery was sealed, the monks moved into the houses of the village of Belaya Krinitsa and the adjacent small town of Klimoutz, and the new Metropolitan Kirill continued to reside in this place.

⁹⁰ *Perepiska raskol'nicheskikh dejatelej. Vol. 1:* 117-118.

⁹¹ Pamjatnik proishodjashchih del Belokrinickogo starovercheskogo monastyrja [A Memorial on the Ongoing Affairs of the Belaya Krinitsa Old Believer Monastery], In Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyvaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinitskago Sviashchenstva. Vol. 1:* 120; Nikolai Subbotin, *Raskol kak orudie vrazhdebnykh rossii partii:* 25.

⁹² *Materialy dlja istorii tak nazyvaemoj avstrijskoj ili belokrinickoj ierarhii:* 242-247.

⁹³ *Perepiska raskol'nicheskikh dejatelej. Vol. 1:* 123.

Moreover, the Old Believers from Bukovina even retained contacts with the exiled Metropolitan Ambrose by sending the monk Ieronim to Cilli as the confessor of the hierarch⁹⁴.

Nevertheless, the Russian high officials, particularly diplomats, were entirely convinced of the defeat of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy. Thus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nesselrode informed the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod Protasov that “the promises have been fulfilled, and the Austrian Government does not lose sight of their exact compliance⁹⁵.” Even Nicholas I was satisfied with these superficial measures⁹⁶; a unique exception was the Minister of Internal Affairs, Perovskii, who supervised the work with religious dissent within the Empire.

Perovskii sent a young official from the respected Moscow family, Ivan Aksakov, to an expedition in the borderland of Bessarabia in October 1848⁹⁷. An alumnus of the Imperial School of Jurisprudence, a Slavophile, and a poet, Aksakov was highly prejudiced against the Old Believers and particularly “the Austrian Church” since he considered Orthodoxy as an integral component of Russianness and the “Western influence” as a predominantly destructive factor for Russia⁹⁸.

In his personal correspondence with relatives, he claims that he would not oppress a Russian “fleeing priest” (*beglyi pop*), unlike the Bukovinian emissaries, “Oh, these gentlemen are not mere sectarians: they are Austrian subjects, Germanized schismatics! I still cannot bear the abandonment of native land, for I do not believe in the strict sincerity of their convictions⁹⁹.” He added that “the influence of foreign priests is not purely religious; it has already a lot of political in it¹⁰⁰.”

⁹⁴ *Materialy dlja istorii tak nazyvaemoj avstrijskoj ili belokrinickoj ierarhii*: 271-272.

⁹⁵ RGIA. F. 797. Op. 17. No. 39309. l. 130.

⁹⁶ HHSTA, 134 Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1847, 268v.

⁹⁷ Ivan S. Aksakov, *Pis'ma k rodnym. 1844-1849* [The Letters to Relatives] (Moskva: Nauka, 1988): 394; Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*: 49-50.

⁹⁸ Ethel Dunn, “A Slavophile Looks at the Raskol and the Sects:” 168-170.

⁹⁹ Ivan S. Aksakov, *Pis'ma k rodnym. 1844-1849*: 436.

¹⁰⁰ Ivan S. Aksakov, *Pis'ma k rodnym. 1844-1849*: 436.

In turn, in an official “Note on the Bessarabian Schismatics,” Aksakov primarily overviewed the transborder contacts of the Old Believers and concluded that to stop these contacts was unattainable. He proposed to send a particular government agent to observe these contacts instead of taking futile prohibitive measures and to ask Slavic bishops in the Austrian and Ottoman empires to preach purposefully among the Old Believers¹⁰¹. The first conclusion, based on the “field work” in Bessarabia, contradicted a point from “A Note” of the Chief of Gendarmes (Orlov) and the Minister of Internal Affairs (Perovskii) that the suppression of contacts between “this malicious nest” (Belaya Krinitsa) and the Russian Old Believers would bring maximal success¹⁰².

Moreover, these contacts embraced not only local the Bessarabian Lipovans but also the prominent members of the Moscow Popovtsy community. Thus, in 1847, the delegation from Moscow, consisting of the young and vigorous *nachetchik* (religious teacher) Vasilii Borisov and a member of the cemetery team Fyodor Zhigarev, visited the Belaya Krinitsa Monastery, having crossed the border near the town of Khotin¹⁰³.

Nevertheless, the “political character” of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy was no less significant for Russian imperial officials than illegal transborder contacts. Aksakov insisted on this in his “Note,” pointing out that the new Church allegedly brought “the new pernicious opinions” to social groups that had not known them before¹⁰⁴. Aksakov reiterated this view in his correspondence the following year, “The Schism that in its own way consorts with European civilization, while remaining the Schism, is the most vicious and dangerous phenomenon...¹⁰⁵” However, his efforts proved to be not highly groundbreaking, as the Slavophile himself

¹⁰¹ Ivan S. Aksakov, “O Bessarabskikh raskol’nikakh [On the Bessarabian Schismatics],” *Russkii Arkhiv*, 11 (1888), 450-451.

¹⁰² Ivan P. Liprandi, “Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol’nicheskij arhimandrit:” 168.

¹⁰³ “Poezdka v Belokrinickij monastyr’. Kak my ezdili za mirom v Beluju Krinicu” [The Journey to the Belaya Krinitsa Monastery. How we did travel to Belaya Krinitsa for Myrrh], Predisl. N.I. Subbotina. *Russkij vestnik*, 50 (1864). 52-58.

¹⁰⁴ Ivan S. Aksakov, “O Bessarabskikh raskol’nikakh:” 450.

¹⁰⁵ Ivan S. Aksakov, *Pis'ma k rodnym. 1849-1856* (Moskva: Nauka, 1994): 20.

admitted, “My report on the Bessarabian schismatics, although praised, is lying quietly at Nadezhdin's place and does not germinate any seed! It's all very sad¹⁰⁶.”

It is highly likely that the international context conditioned the decline of Russian state interest in the “Austrian Church.” From March 1848, the Habsburg Empire witnessed full-blown political unrest, embedded in the pan-European “Spring of nations.” Although almost all regions of the Empire were affected by political upheavals, the most dangerous process for the Habsburg imperial administration was the Hungarian Revolution¹⁰⁷. In these circumstances, on January 25, 1849, the Austrian Ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Buol, confirmed that the Austrian Government had accepted the offer by Nicholas I about the Russian military intervention¹⁰⁸.

The long negotiations turned into an irrevocable decision on May 21, 1849, when the young Austrian Emperor Franz Josef arrived in Warsaw, met personally Nicholas I, and asked for “his assistance in preserving ‘modern society from certain ruin’ and supporting the ‘holy struggle of the social order against anarchy’.¹⁰⁹” Subsequently, the coalition of Russian, Austrian, and Croatian troops defeated the Hungarian Revolution, and on August 13, 1849, the Hungarians surrendered to the Russians in Világos (now Şiria in Romania).

In this context, Austria seemed to be an absolutely reliable and dependent ally, and the “Austrian Church” – the danger that had been overcome. After the formal dissolution of the Belaya Krinitsa Monastery, the exile of Ambrose, and the imprisonment of Gerontii, the new ecclesiastical institution appeared to be defeated, as the Russian authorities obviously underestimated the endurance of “grassroot” religious networks.

¹⁰⁶ Ivan S. Aksakov, *Pis'ma k rodnym. 1844-1849*: 482.

¹⁰⁷ Istvan Deak, *Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979): 159-157.

¹⁰⁸ Eugene Horváth, “Russia and the Hungarian Revolution (1848-9).” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 12, no. 36 (1934): 637.

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Clark, *Revolutionary Spring: Fighting for a New World 1848–1849* (New York: Allen Lane, 2023): 454.

Furthermore, the Russian military commanders overlooked the opportunity to arrest Metropolitan Kirill, Pavel (Velikodvorskii), and other significant persons from the new ecclesiastical institution, although the Russian army passed throughout Bukovina for the struggle with the Hungarian revolutionaries¹¹⁰ and acted not so far from Belaya Krinitsa. This illustrates a gap not only between the officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and diplomats but also between them and army officers. It would be mistakenly to present the Russian imperial administration as a unified, consistently functioning machine.

However, this did not mean total indifference on the part of the Russian government to religious dissent; rather, at the turn of the 1840-1850s, it shifted its focus to other groups from the Belaya Krinitsa persuasion. Thus, the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a particular commission to the Yaroslavl' province on the Upper Volga, which included abovementioned Ivan Aksakov and was devoted to the highly radical community of the Beguny (Wanderers), who rejected all forms of governmental control (money, property, and documents)¹¹¹.

In conclusion, the combination of diplomatic pressure, which resulted in the formal dissolution of the Belaya Krinitsa Monastery and the exile of Metropolitan Ambrose, and a targeted repressive measure (the arrest of Archimandrite Gerontii (Levonov) and his companions) appeared to reduce the threat of the Old Believer Church in principle. However, the imperial officials underestimated the ability of religious dissenters to withstand state oppression, particularly in its formal dimensions, and overestimated Russian influence on the Habsburg Empire. The definition of "the Austrian Church" blurred the fact that it was primarily the Church of the Old Believers who had a rich experience of survival under unfavorable conditions.

¹¹⁰ Ian W. Roberts, *Nicholas I and the Russian intervention in Hungary* (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 1991: 143-165.

¹¹¹ Alexander Etkind, *Internal Colonization. Russia's Imperial Experience* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011): 159; Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841-1855*: 83-108.

As Irina Paert points out, “in the mid-1840s, the state watched with suspicion the establishment of an Old Believer hierarchy within the Austrian Empire¹¹².” However, the ability of the state to see was highly limited, and it was particularly relevant for frontier regions, such as Bessarabia, and foreign borderlands. The emergence of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy demonstrated that, in many respects, Romanov political authority was “work in progress” across imperial territories. Government agents were not able to unconditionally impose their will but acted in the legally complex space: neither entirely lawless nor completely accountable¹¹³.

Finally, this story revealed the high degree of misalignment between Russian state institutions. Even though the Belaya Krinitsa investigation continued for several years in the 1840s, and Russian embassies operated in Vienne and Istanbul, the government was belatedly informed of this fateful event only by the pro-Russian Lemberg cultural activist. In the following years, the Russian authorities would try to overcome this discord, although the ultimate goal of eradicating the Schism proved futile.

¹¹² Irina Paert, *Old Believers, Religious Dissent, and Gender in Russia, 1760–1850* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003): 225.

¹¹³ Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 37-38.

Chapter III: War and Schism

I. The Crimean War. The Tensions between Empires and Their Impact on Religious Policy

In the first half of the 1850s, the Russian imperial administration faced two challenges, addressing (directly or indirectly) religious dissent: the “Austrian Church” proved to be sufficiently resilient, and the alliance with the Austrian Empire begun to fray. Firstly, the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy continued to function in Austria; thus, on October 17, 1849, the Ministry of Cultus and Instruction confirmed the legal status of a new bishop, Onufrii, and the following year, the Austrian government recognized the dignity of the “Metropolitan of All Old Orthodox Christians” for Kirill¹¹⁴.

Furthermore, in December of 1852, Emperor Franz Josef granted an audience in Czernowitz to Metropolitan Kirill, where the head of the Old Believer Church was present in bishop’s vestments, received a warm welcome from Franz Josef, and confirmed that he prayed for the Emperor, according the source from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs¹¹⁵.

Secondly, in 1851, the Ottoman government legalized the Old Believer Church on its territory, which had already existed *de facto* as the archdiocese composed of four dioceses: Slava and Brăila in the Danubian Principalities, Tucea in Rumelia, and Mainos in Western Anatolia¹¹⁶. Thirdly, despite all border restrictions, the Old Believers from Belaya Krinitsa were able to dispatch two bishops in Russia: Sofronii (Zhirov) in 1849 and Antonii (Shutov) in 1853¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁴ Nikolai Subbotin, *Istoriia tak nazyvaemogo Avstriiskago ili Belokrinitskago Sviashchenstva. Vol. 2* (Moskva: Tipografija J. Lissnera i A. Geshelja, 1899): 195.

¹¹⁵ “Iz vlechenie iz del ministerstva vnutrennih del ob uchrezhdenii Belokrinickoj mitropolii [An Extract from the Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs about the Establishment of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy],” In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym. Vol. 1* (London: Trubner, 1860): 163-164.

¹¹⁶ *Materialy dlja istorii tak nazyvaemoj avstrijskoj ili belokrinickoj ierarhii*: 314-315.

¹¹⁷ Sergei A. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe Staroobriadchestvo*: 480-481.

At the same time, the relationship between two conservative empires (Romanov and Habsburg) started to cool down due to contradictions exactly in the Balkan region. As the historian Paul W. Schroeder points out: “The more other countries Russian included, considered Austria dependent on Russia, the more Schwarzenberg (the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Austrian Empire) and Francis Josef were determined to prove the contrary¹¹⁸.” The Balkans became the theatre of these contradictions; the Russian high officials and particularly Nicholas I saw themselves as the protectors of the Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans, while the Austrian authorities were interested in maintaining the “status quo” in the region¹¹⁹.

These tensions escalated on the eve of the Crimean War when the Austrian government claimed that Austria would be neutral in the coming Russo-Turkish War only if Russia “would not fight a revolutionary war” – that is, if it would abandon any plan of annexing Ottoman territories, encouraging the Balkan Christians to revolt, and maintaining the indefinite occupation of the Danubian Principalities¹²⁰. Nicholas I rejected this ultimatum, and even though the “hot war” between these empires did not flare up, the alliance ceased to exist.

The historian Dominic Lieven defines this policy as “catastrophic stupidity” that made Russia an “unremitted enemy” of Austria for two decades and led to several failed wars without allies for Vienna¹²¹. In any case, under these circumstances, the abrupt increase of the Russian state’s attention to the “Austrian Church” was inevitable. Meanwhile, the Russian officials, working specifically with religious dissent, were already assessing the endurance of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy in 1852.

¹¹⁸ Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972): 13.

¹¹⁹ Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 31.

¹²⁰ Paul W. Schroeder, “A Turning Point in Austrian Policy in the Crimean War: The Conference of March, 1854.” *Austrian History Yearbook* 4, (1968): 160.

¹²¹ Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals* (London: John Murray, 2000): 168.

Thus, in November 1852, a bureaucrat from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Yuli Arseniev, presenting “A Note on the Schisms in the Russian Church,” pointed out that, despite the dissolution of the Belaya Krinitza Monastery and the exile of the Metropolitan, the Old Believers had established a new spiritual center in Slava; i.e., the initial measures had proved to be insufficient¹²². Even though Arseniev’s account of the history of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy was flawed (hence, he dated the founding of the monastery to 1842)¹²³, his focus on the priestly Old Believers is unquestionable.

Arseniev claimed that the perception of the Popovtsy as a “less harmful” sect was incorrect. From his perspective, on the contrary, these schismatics were the most harmful and dangerous since “this sect” was the most numerous in the Empire; it was the most ramified, and its members had constant contacts, including contacts with “foreign sectarians;” the religious fanaticism among the Popovtsy was stronger than among other sects; and many merchants with huge funds participated in this branch of dissent¹²⁴.

Apart from this, Arseniev emphasized that the government should take into account not only religious but also political and civil benefits in “actions towards schismatics” and that if the number of “heretics” equaled the Orthodox people, they “would primarily seek to shake the order that had been strengthened over the centuries and had raised Russia on the extent of glory and power¹²⁵.”

In turn, Pavel Mel’nikov, who wrote several materials on the Schism after the outright crisis in Russian-Austrian relations, stressed “the danger from the Austrian side¹²⁶.” Mel’nikov argued that the proximity of Belaya Krinitza influenced Bessarabia, Poland, and Podolia, that is, the frontier regions, the loyalty of which was questionable, and that Russia could not rely on

¹²² Kratkaja zapiska o raskole st. sov. Arsen’eva [A Short Note on the Schism by the State Counsellor Arsen’ev], RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 77. l. 43.

¹²³ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 77. l. 42.

¹²⁴ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 77. l. 44.

¹²⁵ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 77. l. 14-16.

¹²⁶ Zapiska o russkom raskole [A Note on the Russian Schism], OR RNB. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 24. l. 3.

the friendship and goodwill of Austria, “as the events of recent years have shown¹²⁷.” Moreover, as he noted, under the conditions of the interstate crisis, the protection of the Austrian authorities over the Old Believer Church increased; for example, the Austrian Archduke accompanied the religious procession of the Metropolitan Kirill in 1855¹²⁸.

Mel’nikov insisted that the Schism was “a powerful instrument of foreign states against us” and drew attention to a detail that the Old Believers revered the Austrian Emperor, while Nicholas I was compared with the Roman persecutors of Christians, Nero and Diocletian in one of their texts, “The Tale of the Belaya Krinitza Metropolis¹²⁹.” In such a political system as Imperial Russia, the attitude towards the figure of the emperor was a highly significant mark of loyalty or disloyalty, and the people from the Belaya Krinitza persuasion appeared to be even more threatening than the most radical religious dissenters, who defined the Russian Emperor as the Antichrist but had no inclination to the rulers of foreign great powers.

However, the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy seems to be particularly dangerous in another text by Mel’nikov, “The Historical Essays on the Priestly Old Belief.” Contrary to its title, it was a political program rather than a scholarly study. Mel’nikov claimed that “if we do not calm the minds of the schismatics at the present time, if we do not destroy their sympathy for the Austrian government, and if we do not restore in them trust and loyalty to the domestic government, it means bringing upon the state the possibility of civil war¹³⁰.”

The risk of civil war was the most tangible threat ever associated with the Old Belief. One can assume that this danger arose in 1857 due to the combination of factors: the sense of insecurity within the imperial administration following the failure of Crimean War, the attitude to the Russian-Austrian discord as a “betrayal,” which encouraged to see “Austrian conspiracy”

¹²⁷ OR RNB. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 24. I. 1.

¹²⁸ OR RNB. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 24. I. 1.

¹²⁹ OR RNB. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 24. I. 4.

¹³⁰ Istoricheskie ocherki popovshiny [The Historical Essays on the Priestly Old Believers], F. 478. Op. 1. No. 29. I. 5.

in religious matters, and the endeavor to maintain state's focus on this issue, as the new monarch, Alexander II, was much more indifferent to religious dissent than his father¹³¹.

Mel'nikov listed two ways "to smash the Belaya Krinitsa Metropolis." The first was trivial and sufficiently vague: "to solidify respect for the dignity of the Government in the eyes of the people¹³²," but the second one deserves attention. The bureaucrat from the Ministry of Internal Affairs proposed to provide bishops for "the schismatics" from the Orthodox clergy as "the only way out of this predicament¹³³."

It was a virtually revolutionary suggestion, which should have "stopped the further branching of the Schism and the emergence of new sects, which would follow with any other measure, and, most importantly in the terms of the state, completely destroyed the malign influence of Austria and definitively killed Belaya Krinitsa¹³⁴." Although high-ranking Orthodox bishops from the Secret Committee on the Affairs of the Schismatics categorically rejected this measure¹³⁵, its appearance demonstrated the highly serious concerns of some officials about the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy and their willingness to resort to non-standard approaches to counter it.

Even though the state's interest in the Schism began to grow before the Crimean War, this conflict revealed several problematic knots in the relationship between the imperial administration and religious dissenters, particularly the priestly Old Believers. Firstly, this war was associated with the sudden rise of attention to religious issues in interstate relations. Having attached the piety to imperial ideology¹³⁶, to the end of his reign, Nicholas I attempted to deliver for import this model of political-religious confluence but with limited success.

¹³¹ Zhurnaly zasedanij za 1858 g. [The Meeting Minutes, 1858], RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 38. l. 15.

¹³² OR RNB. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 29. l. 6.

¹³³ OR RNB. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 29. l. 7.

¹³⁴ OR RNB. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 29. l. 7.

¹³⁵ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 38. l. 4.

¹³⁶ Laura Engelstein, "Holy Russia in Modern Times: An Essay on Orthodoxy and Cultural Change." *Past & Present*, no. 173 (2001): 141.

As is well known, the ultimatum demand of the Russian Emperor to provide him guarantees of the Protector of the Orthodox Christians in the “Holy Lands” (Ottoman Palestine) and, moreover, throughout the Ottoman Empire, became the *casus belli* in this context. The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count von Buol even defined the Russian diplomatic attack in 1853 as “a crusade in favor of the Anatolian Church¹³⁷.”

Arguably, long-cherished religious passions fueled this war¹³⁸, but this war also fostered demonstrative adherence to Orthodoxy among the Russian elites. The Russian patriotic authors, such as Mikhail Pogodin and Sergei Shevyrev, forged a narrative conflating the War of 1812 and crusades for the Christian Holy Land¹³⁹. Under these circumstances, the eradication of the noticeable communities of non-Orthodox Russians transformed into a particularly relevant task.

Secondly, the war inevitably exacerbated the problem of state security. It affected in the full extent the Muslim population of the Russian Empire: thus, some Russian officials had tangible suspicions of the Crimean Tatars (the Crimean khanate had been a vassal state to the Ottoman empire until the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca which ended the Russian-Ottoman war in 1784)¹⁴⁰, and the Russian Muslims at whole experienced some degree of alienation in that period. The Old Believers stood in a similar position; they had coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire – the Cossaks-Nekrasovites, who were loyal to the Sublime Porte and served in the Ottoman troops.

These concerns were not entirely groundless. The oppression aggravated the negative attitudes of the Old Believers toward the Russian state, particularly among the young members of the community. Thus, the Russian journalist and political emigrant Vasilii Kel’siev, who

¹³⁷ Jack Fairey, *The Great Powers and Orthodox Christendom: The Crisis over the Eastern Church in the Era of the Crimean War*: 7.

¹³⁸ Orlando Figes, *Crimea. The Last Crusade*: 38.

¹³⁹ Olga Maiorova, "Searching for a New Language of Collective Self: The Symbolism of Russian National Belonging During and After the Crimean War." *Ab Imperio* 2006, no. 4 (2006): 191.

¹⁴⁰ Elena I. Campbell, *The Muslim Question and Russian Imperial Governance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015): 25-27.

published a rich collection of materials on the Schism, recalled in his “Confession” that some Old Believers insisted: “we would all without exception have rebelled then (in 1848),” if the revolution had reached Russia¹⁴¹. Even though the representativity of this opinion is unclear, its existence confirmed the rising pushback among Russian religious dissenters.

Thirdly, the Lipovans-Popovtsy had a strong presence in the theater of operations – the Northeastern Balkans, including the Danubian Principalities, and, in the conditions of the war, it could not remain unnoticeable. Hence, two bishops of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy, Archbishop Arkadii of the Slava and Bishop Alimpii of Tulcea, were arrested by the Russian General Alexander Ushakov in March, 1854, what was more that Nicholas I personally sanctioned to commit this arrest¹⁴².

Even though the Old Believer clergy attempted to demonstrated external loyalty, it did not rescue them from the persecutions on the part of the Russian military forces¹⁴³. The local intercommunal conflicts fueled the imperial repressions; for instance, the local Orthodox people complained to the Russian army commanders that the Lipovans incited Turks against Christians¹⁴⁴.

As Alfred Rieber pointed out, “Russia’s statesmen had witnessed with growing concern the erosion of its once dominant position within the borderlands along the Danubian frontier. The gradual effects of the French and Industrial revolutions were undermining Russian influence¹⁴⁵”. The Lipovans from the Belaya Krinitza persuasion with their transborder networks extended from Bukovina to Western Anatolia, contacts with the Polish emigration,

¹⁴¹ Vasili I. Kel'siev, *Ispoved' (A Confession)*, Podg. k pečati E. Kingisepp (Moskva: Literaturnoe nasledstvo, 1941). Vol. 41-42: 318.

¹⁴² Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*: 177.

¹⁴³ *Perepiska raskol'nicheskikh dejatelej. Vol. 2* (Moskva: Tipografija J. Lissnera i J. Romana), 1889: 27.

¹⁴⁴ Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*: 177.

¹⁴⁵ Alfred J. Rieber, *The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 338.

and coreligionist in the Ottoman troops emigration virtually epitomized these Balkan fears of the Russian officials and military commanders.

The additional direction of fears was the possible links of the Old Believers with the Poles and the Roman Catholic Church. After the Uprising of 1830-1831, “the Polish question” seemed to be the most perturbing challenge for the Russian imperial equilibrium¹⁴⁶, and the stable coalition between “the enemies of Russia” was the genuine nightmare for high officials. The existence of Michal Czajkowski, whose role in the establishment of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy was well known for the Russian bureaucrats in the 1850s, encouraged these fears.

During the Crimean War, Chazkowski led “the Slavic legion” in the Ottoman troops, consisting of the Old Believers-Cossaks Nekrasovites and the Zaporozhian Cossacks Beyond the Danube; the officers were the Polish veterans of 1831. “Czajkowski’s plan was to enter Ukraine at the head of his force, and he expected that this would provoke an anti-Russian revolt¹⁴⁷.” Although these plans did not materialize, and this regiment did not even engage in open hostilities with Russian troops (ironically, due to Austrian pressure on the Sublime Porte), this factor reinforced the perception of the Old Belief as an immense risk to the Russian imperial order.

The historian and theologian Nikolai Subbotin, who published a book with an eloquent title, “The Schism as a Tool of Parties Hostile to Russia,” even insisted that the leader of the Polish emigration, Prince Adam Czartoryski, was personally interested in the support of the Old Belief and dispatched “one of his most talented agents,” Michal Czajkowski to accomplish it¹⁴⁸. Subbotin emphasized that the Old Believers “were obliged to give due credit to Polonism and Turkish veiled Catholicism¹⁴⁹.”

¹⁴⁶ Leonid E. Gorizontov, *Paradoksy imperskoj politiki: Poljaki v Rossii i russkie v Pol'she* [The Paradoxes of Imperial Politics: Poles in Russia and Russians in Poland] (Moskva: Indrik, 1999): 100.

¹⁴⁷ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*: 181.

¹⁴⁸ Nikolai Subbotin, *Raskol kak orudie vrazhdebnykh rossii partii*: 8.

¹⁴⁹ Nikolai Subbotin, *Raskol kak orudie vrazhdebnykh rossii partii*: 16.

In turn, Pavel Mel'nikov quoted a text by Nadezhdin, who had claimed that the Galician Greek Catholic Metropolitan had given the first spark in the creation of the Belaya Krinitsa Church. Mel'nikov himself added a rumor, gleaned from the Old Believers, that the Pope of Rome had blessed to the Austrian Government to establish this Hierarchy as revenge for the extermination of the Greek Catholic communities in Russia¹⁵⁰. Although the Russian government was not directly anti-Catholic¹⁵¹, this religious issue was deeply intertwined with the “Polish question,” and the possible Polish and Catholic contacts of the Old Believers ultimately brought political significance to the problem of religious dissent in Russia, particularly in the conditions of the Crimean War.

In conclusion, the interstate tensions on the eve of the Crimean War and its ideological framing facilitated a new turn of the Russian imperial administration to the “Austrian Church.” Political motivations evidently outweighed dogmatic ones here since the priestly Old Believers were the most moderate group in spiritual issues but could boast the numbers of adherents, transborder connections, and financial resources. Due to the combination of this “external” factor and consistently growing state attention to Russian religious dissent, the Crimean War period proved to be the apogee of inquiries and repressions against the Old Believers.

II. The Apogee of the Struggle with Religious Dissent in Russia: Research and Repressions

Spurred on by external and internal factors, the Russian imperial administration organized the most consistent attack on the communities of the Old Believers in the mid-1850s. This policy included not only direct repressions but also the program of the full-scaled study of

¹⁵⁰ Pavel I. Mel'nikov, “Zapiska o russkom raskole” [A Note on the Russian Schism] In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennykh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym. Vol. 1.* (London: Trubner, 1860): 191.

¹⁵¹ *Zapadnye okrainy Rossijskoj imperii* [The Western Borderlands of the Russian Empire], ed. Mikhail Dolbilov, Alexei Miller (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2006): 110, 120.

the Schism, the core of which became the series of expeditions under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs¹⁵². Apart from this, in 1853, two new secret institutions, the Special Secret Committee for the Revision of the Laws towards the Schismatics and the Special Temporary Government for the Execution of Affairs of the Schismatics, were established in the system of governance¹⁵³.

The expeditions were defined as statistical, took place in 1853-1854, and covered eight provinces of the imperial core: Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Nizhniy Novgorod, Simbirsk, and Saratov¹⁵⁴. The program of expeditions aimed at the ascertainment of the numbers of the “schismatics,” their estate affiliation, the logic of their connections, and so on¹⁵⁵. One of the points, “the rumor about the emergence of false bishops,” was directly devoted to the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy, as only the members of this institution were these bishops.

Alexander Artemiev, who revised the Saratov province in 1854, noted that the establishment of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy tangibly facilitated the Old Belief in the region: “Numerous descriptions of the event that took place in Belaya Krinitsa, particularly copies of the “Cathedral Report on the Acceptance of the Greek Metropolitan Ambrose,” were immediately spread among the people and served as a tool to persuade and attract those who hesitated¹⁵⁶.” In addition, he emphasized that the adherents of this branch were known as “Austriaks” or “Austrians,” even though they self-identified as *Staroveriy* (the Old Believers) or *Popovtshchina* (the priestly persuasion)¹⁵⁷.

¹⁵² Pavel I. Mel'nikov, “Schislenie raskol'nikov” [The Accounting of Schismatics], *Russkij vestnik*. 1868. Vol. 2: 425-431.

¹⁵³ Mikhail N. Vasil'evskii, *Gosudarstvennaia sistema otnoshenii k staroobriadcheskomu raskolu v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia I* (Kazan: Centr. tip, 1914): 29-31.

¹⁵⁴ Pavel I. Mel'nikov, “Schislenie raskol'nikov:” 430-431.

¹⁵⁵ Otchet d. stat. sov. Arsen'eva o sostojanii raskola v Novgorodskoj gub. i v Novoladozhskom u. Peterburgskoj gub. [The Report of the State Counsellor Arsen'ev on the Conditions of the Schism in the Novgorod and Sankt-Peterburg Provinces], RGIA. F. 1284. op. 208. d. 480 (b). l. 2-3.

¹⁵⁶ Kratkaja zapiska o sovremennom polozhenii raskola v Saratovskoj gubernii [A Short Note on the Contemporary Conditions of the Schism in the Saratov Province], OR RNB. F. 37. Op. 1. No. 273. l. 31.

¹⁵⁷ OR RNB. F. 37. Op. 1. No. 273. l. 32.

However, Artemiev saw severe risks in connection with the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy not only from its “Austrian” character but also from its influence among the merchants. He insisted that after the restoration of the Metropolis, some merchants began to dream of the restoration of the ancient form of rule in Russia, even hoping for a coalition with the aristocracy¹⁵⁸. According to Artemiev’s report, the Old Believers allegedly could offer disgruntled nobles the Tsardom of Kazan and the Novgorod lands; here the author stressed an argument that was widespread among the Russian officials and central to the “anti-Schism” policy, namely that “religious freethinking always leads to criminal political designs¹⁵⁹.”

In turn, Pavel Mel’nikov, who worked in the Nizhniy Novgorod province, pointed out that the Old Believers were forging “*status in stato*” in the Empire, where some people, “false bishops,” priests, monks, and mentors, had the spiritual power, while the so-called “*konovody*” (as a rule, this term meant the influential merchants) – the secular power¹⁶⁰. Apart from this, he mentioned that after the emergence of “false bishops,” the correspondence between the Russian “schismatics” and their Austrian and Turkish coreligionists noticeably increased¹⁶¹. Furthermore, Mel’nikov openly placed this problem in the international context: “It may become more dangerous for the political life of Russia than all militias of the West and its Islamic allies¹⁶²”

Thus, “schismatic” institution-building seemed to be the most threatening factor for the imperial officials. The development of alternative “hierarchies” had an undermining potential since it challenged the very imperial principle as a set of hierarchical, unequitable relations,¹⁶³

¹⁵⁸ OR RNB. F. 37. Op. 1. No. 273. I. 40.

¹⁵⁹ OR RNB. F. 37. Op. 1. No. 273. I. 40.

¹⁶⁰ Pavel I. Mel’nikov, “Otchet o sovremennom sostojanii raskola” [A Report about the Contemporary State of the Schism] In *Sbornik v pamiat’ P.I. Mel’nikova Deistviia Nizhegorodskoi Gubernskoi Uchenoi Arkhivnoi Komissii*, ix, 2v. (Nizhniy Novgorod: Tipo-Lit. I. I. Mashistova, 1910): 249-250.

¹⁶¹ Pavel I. Mel’nikov, *Otchet o sovremennom sostojanii raskola*: 99.

¹⁶² Pavel I. Mel’nikov, *Otchet o sovremennom sostojanii raskola*: 228.

¹⁶³ Ronald G. Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire:” 25.

unlike the dogmatically more radical but dispersed communities of the Bespopovtsy (priestless Old Believers) and “new” sectarians (Molokans, Dukhobors, Khlysts).

In the Kostroma expedition, the officials found out, among other things, that some Old Believers did not approve of the Crimean War, claiming: “For what is the Tsar waging the war for the faith of the Greeks? Men and money will be spent in vain¹⁶⁴.” Accordingly, the Crimean war was present in the policy towards the Old Believers not only as a general framework but also as a source of immediate suspicion.

In 1855, Mel’nikov obtained a task to continue his expedition activities in the Kazan region. The program of his new investigation contained several additional points: “Special attention should be paid to the affairs of the Kazan schismatics in matters concerning the Bukovina False Hierarchy, and also to where the false bishops are now and who they are;” “The discovery and detention of false bishops, not confining to the limits of the Kazan province¹⁶⁵.” It is highly likely that the Crimean War and the direct (even though not military) conflict with the Austrian Empire prompted the Russian authorities to include these topical tasks in a wider program of knowledge collection about the Schism.

Apart from this, in the first half of 1855, Mel’nikov visited in the monastery of Suzdal in the Vladimir province the archbishop Arkadii (Dorofeev), who was arrested in Dobrudga by General Ushakov and transported to Russia¹⁶⁶. On the instructions of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dmitrii Bibikov, Mel’nikov, as an experienced expert on the Schism, interrogated the bishop, although without tangible results concerning the relevant structure of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶⁴ Sbornik o raskol'nikah. Zapiski, otchety i pr. raznyh lic [A Volume on the Schismatics. The Notes, Reports, and Rest of Various Persons], OR RNB. F. 37. Op. 1. No. 39. l. 23.

¹⁶⁵ Perepiska s Ministerstvom vnutrennih del [The Correspondence with the Ministry of Internal Affairs], RO IRLI. F. 95. Op. 1. No. 66. l. 38.

¹⁶⁶ “Pis'ma P. I. Mel'nikova k V. M. Lazarevskomu” [The Letters of P. I. Mel’nikov to V. M. Lazarevsky] In *Sbornik v pamiat' P.I. Mel'nikova, Deistviia Nizhegorodskoi Gubernskoi Uchenoi Arkhivnoi Komissii, ix, 2v* (Nizhnii Novgorod: Tipo-Lit. I. I. Mashistova, 1910): 187.

¹⁶⁷ Pis'ma P. I. Mel'nikova k V. M. Lazarevskomu: 188.

Nevertheless, the lengthy interrogations of Archbishop Arkadii and Bishop Alimprii yielded some fruits; thus, the officials discovered that the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy in Russia consisted of two dioceses with formal centers in Vladimir and Simbirsk and conclude that the cross-border contacts of the Old Believers touched on not only spiritual matters but also on “the hostile attitudes to us concerning the military actions¹⁶⁸.” However, under these circumstances of a lack of knowledge, the Russian authorities did not have many ways to cope with this challenge.

Outside of these nine provinces, the local governors received orders to gather information about the schismatics and to submit reports on this topic. Certainly, their reports were much more concise and superficial, but the point “the visits of the schismatics from adjacent provinces and Bessarabia to Austria and Turkey as a reason for the strengthening of the Schism” was also present in them¹⁶⁹.

Meanwhile, the intensification of the state’s interest in religious dissent was not limited to the production of knowledge. After the outbreak of the Crimean War, the issue of loyalty in the army became particularly relevant, and on September, 1, 1854, Nicholas I personally added the point on “the punishment of the schismatics for the military disobedience” to the report from the Chancellery of the Military Office¹⁷⁰.

However, the most severe measures against the Old Believers were direct repressions. In the Nizhniy Novgorod province, after his inquiry, Mel’nikov proposed “to destroy the sketes (the Old Believer hermitages) completely, never again allowing any building on their site¹⁷¹.” In the Saratov province, the local authorities struck the remarkable Cheremshan community by

¹⁶⁸ Nikolai V. Varadinov *Istoriya Ministerstva vnutrennih del. Kniga 8. Dopolnitel'naja. Istoriya rasporjazhenij po raskolu* [The History of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Book 8. The History of Decrees on the Schism] (Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1863): 650.

¹⁶⁹ Nikolai V. Varadinov *Istoriya Ministerstva vnutrennih del. Kniga 8. Dopolnitel'naja. Istoriya rasporjazhenij po raskolu*: 631.

¹⁷⁰ *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola*. (Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1875): 494-495.

¹⁷¹ Catherine Evtuhov, *Portrait of a Russian Province: Economy, Society, and Civilization in Nineteenth-Century Nizhnii Novgorod*: 144.

confiscating pre-Nikon icons and other church items and arresting several nuns, but the most tangible blow was the detention of a vigorous Belaya Krinitsa missionary, Afonii (Kochuev)¹⁷². Contrary to a rumor, Kochuev was not a “false bishop;” he had only the status of a monk, even not a priest, but he had been a significant figure in the networks of the Popovtsy for decades, an arduous adherent of the new Hierarchy, and a highly educated person; similar to the bishops from the Danubian principalities, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in a monastery¹⁷³.

However, the decisive attack took place in Moscow. It targeted the Rogozhskoe community, which had sprung up in the “ancient capital” in 1771, after the powerful contribution of the Old Believers in combating bubonic plague¹⁷⁴. Formed around the Rogozhskoe cemetery, this community became a vital organizational center for the priestly Old Believers at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries and maintained its position despite the restrictions during the reign of Nicholas I¹⁷⁵.

The role of “Moscow money” in the establishment of the Belaya Krinitsa Hierarchy aroused serious suspicions among imperial officials already in 1847, but then they decided to refrain from the dissolution of this “religious hub.” However, in the conditions of the Crimean War and the endurance of the Old Believer Church, the fate of the community was resolved; later, Pavel Mel’nikov insisted in his “The Essays on the Priestly Old Believers” that “Moscow created Belaya Krinitsa¹⁷⁶.” One can argue that it was a general opinion among bureaucrats, who specifically addressed this issue.

Accordingly, in 1854, the Russian authorities forcibly transformed the Rogozhskoe cemetery into the community of *Edinoverie*. This religious model emerged at the turn of the

¹⁷² Eugene Clay, *An Old Believer Monastery on the Volga: The Cheremshan Monastic Complex, 1820-1925*: 12.

¹⁷³ Nikolai Popov, *Sbornik dlia istorii Staroobriadchestva* [A Volume for the History of the Old Belief]. Vol. 2 (Moskva: Univ. tip., 1866): 240-250.

¹⁷⁴ Peter T. De Simone, *The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow*: 44-45.

¹⁷⁵ *Obzor meroprijatij Ministerstva Vnutrennih Del po raskolu s 1802 po 1881 god.:* 94.

¹⁷⁶ Pavel I. Mel’nikov, “Ocherki popovschiny:” 324.

18th and 19th centuries, thanks to the efforts of the Moscow Metropolitan Plato, and implied dogmatic unity (*Edinoverie* meant unity in faith) and ecclesiastical subordination to the “Orthodox Greek-Russian Church” with the preservation of old rites¹⁷⁷.

The immediate cause of this attack was a petition from a Moscow merchant, Vladimir Sapelkin, who asked to be converted to *Edinoverie*. Metropolitan Filaret, who was an ardent and consistent opponent of the Old Belief¹⁷⁸, seized the opportunity and transferred this appeal to St. Petersburg¹⁷⁹. Simultaneously, Minister Bibikov submitted a report to the Emperor about the transborder contacts between the Moscow Old Believers and their foreign coreligionists, covering Kyiv and Izmail¹⁸⁰. These activities took root, and on August, 9, 1854, Nicholas I signed a decree “On the Strengthening of the Supervision of the Schismatics from the Rogozhskoe Cemetery in Moscow¹⁸¹.”

The “contacts of the schismatics from the Rogozhskoe Cemetery with the foreign schismatics” were defined as one of the two reasons for this decree, along with the role of the trustees of this cemetery in the spread of the Schism¹⁸². As Thomas Marsden argues, “Certainly, the onset of war meant that the popovtsy’s activities acquired a new political significance, beyond the theoretical and unconvincing notion that they constituted a secret society with revolutionary potential¹⁸³”.

The abovementioned decree contained several points: to designate a special official from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to supervise the Rogozhskoe cemetery, to instruct an

¹⁷⁷ James White, *Unity in Faith?: Edinoverie, Russian Orthodoxy, and Old Belief, 1800–1918*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020): 23–46.

¹⁷⁸ Gregory L. Freeze, “Pastyr' i cerkovnyj dejatel': svjatitel' Filaret Moskovskij i staroobrjadcheskij raskol 1825–1855 gg” [A Shepherd and Church Actor: The Saint Filaret from Moscow and the Old Believer Schism, 1825–1855], *Filaretovskij al'manah*. 2008. Vol. 4: 122–146.

¹⁷⁹ Peter T. De Simone, *The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow*: 89.

¹⁸⁰ Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*: 182–183.

¹⁸¹ *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola*: 493–494.

¹⁸² *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola*: 493–494.

¹⁸³ Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*: 177.

additional official to live permanently at this community, and to pass on one of the prayer houses to Orthodoxy or Edinoverie¹⁸⁴. This special official became an experienced bureaucrat, Nikita Moszhakov, who showed extreme hostility towards religious dissenters and left a bad memory among them¹⁸⁵.

After a month and a half, at the end of September of 1854, the Metropolitan Filaret blessed the first *Edinoverie* church in the Rogozhskoe cemetery, but the genuine impact of this event was modest enough, as only 100 people out of approximately 2,000 registered in the Rogozskoe congregation agreed to be converted¹⁸⁶. Under these circumstances, the government launched the next attack on the Moscow congregation; on December, 15, 1854, Nicholas I signed a new decree on the Rogozhskoe cemetery, which provided for the removal from the community “people living at this cemetery and unjustly supported by charity, with the establishment of the strictest surveillance over them” and for the initiation of affairs with the Moscow military governor for the search of “false clerics¹⁸⁷.”

These measures targeted two spheres: the charity of the Old Believers, which was the inseparable social glue of their communities, and the new network of priests set up by the archbishop of Vladimir and all Russia Antonii (Shutov), who moved between the towns and villages of the Moscow and Vladimir provinces. Despite their best efforts, the Russian policemen could not arrest Antonii due to his skill in disguise and his ability to outmaneuver his opponents¹⁸⁸.

At the turn of 1854 and 1855, the Moscow authorities attempted to confiscate all the communal buildings of the Rogozhskoe Cemetery and transfer them to *Edinovertsy* (the

¹⁸⁴ *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola*: 494.

¹⁸⁵ Peter T. De Simone, *The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow*: 90.

¹⁸⁶ Thomas Marsden, *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*: 184. Peter T. De Simone, *The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow*: 89.

¹⁸⁷ *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola*: 496.

¹⁸⁸ Alexei P. Krakhmal'nikov, *Sochineniia staroverov belokrinitskogo soglasiia (1846-62 gg.)* [The Texts of the Old Believers from the Belaya Krinitza Persuasion] (Moskva: Indrik, 2012): 13-14.

adherents of Unity in Faith), but this process was prolonged by a complex status of property¹⁸⁹. It is noteworthy that even at the height of repressions, the Russian authorities could not act against the Old Believers in the regime of “a military operation,” and legalistic routine played a huge role in this struggle with the Schism.”

The last attack on the Rogozhskoe community, however, took place even after the death of Nicholas I (the chief persecutor of the “schismatics” died on March, 2, 1855), when in March of 1856, the Secret Committee on the Affairs of Schismatics ordered to forbid rituals in the chapels of the cemetery and sealed their altars¹⁹⁰. Nevertheless, this repressive measure broke out of the general trend. The statistical expeditions devoted to the Schism stopped already in 1855, and Pavel Mel’nikov even did not complete his work in the Kazan region; the most notable oppressors of religious dissent resigned from their positions at the onset of the new reign.

The Minister of Internal Affairs, Dmitrii Bibikov left his office on August 20, 1855 (although I do not agree with Thomas Marsden, who defines the policy towards the Old Believers as “the Bibikov’s system,” his personal investment in this policy is evident); his successor, Sergei Lanskoï, took a more liberal stance. Instead of the highly intolerant superintendent of the Rogozhskoe cemetery, Moszhakov, this post was provided to a more moderate official, Longinov, in August of 1855; the “ideologue” of the political course, Nikolai Nadezhdin, died in January of 1856¹⁹¹.

Even though the decisive factors framing state policy towards the Old Belief (the discorded alliance with the Habsburg Empire and the persistence of the Belaya Krinitisa Hierarchy) continued to exist, the state’s course changed. The religious fervor linked to the

¹⁸⁹ Elena Iukhimenko, *Starobriadcheskii tsentr za Rogozhskoi Zastavoiu* [The Old Believer Center Behind the Rogozhskaya Outpost] (Moskva: Jazyki slavjanskoj kul'tury, 2005): 56-58.

¹⁹⁰Elena Iukhimenko, *Starobriadcheskii tsentr za Rogozhskoi Zastavoiu*: 66.

¹⁹¹ Peter T. De Simone, *The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow*: 94;

Crimean War faded after the military defeats, while figures from the Russian imperial administration were forced to look at the structural flaws of the system of governance, social configuration, and economy. The “enlightened” officials, such as Yuli Arseniev, Alexander Artemiev, and Nikolai Milyutin, who had hitherto been conceptually focusing on the “work with the Schism,” became particularly engaged in reform-projecting¹⁹².

The Special Secret Committee for the Revision of the Laws towards the Schismatics and the Special Temporary Government for the Execution of the Affairs of the Schismatics were closed in 1855; the better-established Secret Committee on the Affairs of the Schismatics de facto ceased to function by the end of the 1850s¹⁹³. The Russian government had limited resources, and the simultaneous enforcement of a full-scale campaign against the Schism and the preparation of transformative reforms were beyond its capacity.

In conclusion, the apogee of the struggle against religious dissent in the Russian Empire did not lead to the intended results. The statistical expeditions showed the discrepancy between the number of registered and practicing schismatics, which implicitly means the defectiveness of the restricting policy enforced during the previous two decades. On the contrary, the state’s oppression fueled the negative attitudes of the Old Believers toward the imperial system and provoked their interest in cross-border contacts.

Nevertheless, the Russian officials found no evidence of the overt political plot or hypothetical rebellion even among the religious dissenters from the “Austrian persuasion,” which was a significant argument in favor of the Old Believers, particularly in the war and post-war conditions. This complex combination of endurance and “unfriendly loyalty” became a key to the survival of the Old Believer Church in the Russian Empire with the preservation of connections with its Austrian and even Ottoman parts.

¹⁹² William B. Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825–1861* (DeKalb: North Carolina University Press, 1982): 168-211.

¹⁹³ RGIA. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 38. l. 55-59.

CONCLUSION

The thesis explores an important angle of religious history of the Russian Empire by elucidating an episode from mid-nineteenth-century Eastern Europe: the establishment of the Old Believer Church with its center in Bukovina in the Austrian Monarchy. This study thus reconsiders the history of Russian religious dissent and Russian religious policy by highlighting its entanglements with foreign policy, the economic development, and ideological fluctuations, as this process was not restricted to an internal affair of the Russian empire, but also spanned the Austrian and Ottoman empires.

As Jurgen Osterhammel states: “only in Russia did the Orthodox Church and tsarism form a symbiotic relationship¹⁹⁴.” This is a reasonable suggestion but insufficient for the comprehension of Russian imperial policy towards the Old Believers where the political arguments openly outweighed spiritual ones. Any straightforward causation would be profoundly misleading in this matter; thus, after the Paris Treaty (the end of the Crimean War), the Russian imperial administration launched the aggressive policy against the Habsburg state in the Balkan region,¹⁹⁵ but this coincided with a decrease in repressions against the “Austrian Church” in Russia – the logic of internal processes proved to be more important.

Strategic relativism with its focus on imperial incongruency proposes a solution to this complicated picture¹⁹⁶. The Russian-Austrian relationship in many ways determined the policy toward the Old Belief in 1849-1856, but it was not a persistent factor; other variables entered this equation and transformed imperial designs. Apart from this, strategic relativism helps to conceive the organizational inconsistency of the Russian policy towards religious dissenters;

¹⁹⁴ Jurgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014): 884.

¹⁹⁵ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997): 261.

¹⁹⁶ Ilya Gerasimov, Sergey Glebov, Jan Kusber, Marina Mogilner, Alexander Semyonov, “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire:” 20-23.

the Russian imperial administration was not a “clockwork,” contrary to the dreams of its head, Nicholas I.

Persons from the diplomatic corps, the central bureaucracy (first and foremost, the Ministry of Internal Affairs), the Imperial Army, the Orthodox Church, and local institutions acted in accordance with various logics, and few of them had a coherent vision of the “problem of the Schism.” The Russian officials were forced to work opportunistically, and their efforts frequently made reverse effect; hence, the repressive measures of the 1830-1840s facilitated the establishment of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy. The behavior of their Austrian counterparts was even more situational due to a more pronounced lack of knowledge about the Old Believers. Accordingly, the perception of the Belaya Krinitza Hierarchy as a “Austrian conspiracy” or a “Austrian tool” does not stand up to scrutiny and must be relegated to contemporary propaganda.

This story rather emphasized the limits of the power available to the imperial state of the 19th century, whether Russian or Austrian. The state boundaries were permeable, and the state restrictions were escapable – the emergence of the “Austrian” bishops in Russia and the discrepancy between the official and genuine numbers of schismatics revealed by statistical expeditions in the 1850s convincingly confirmed both challenges.

One can argue about the inconsistency the Nicholas I’ grand strategy, where the avoidance of war was combined with its provocation, the antirevolutionary intervention – with the reluctance to do it, and the conviction about the sufficiency of Russian territories – with the Caucasian war and the slow expansion into Central Asia¹⁹⁷. This case confirms this ambiguity, as the famous “Gendarme of Europe” and his subordinates could not cope with the network of merchants, peasants, monks, and several “false” bishops.

¹⁹⁷ William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*: 219.

At the same time, this inquiry notes the confines of the concept of the “confessional state,” which has acquired a considerable weight in the studies of religion in the Russian Empire¹⁹⁸. Multiconfessional inclusiveness and manageable toleration had limits, and these limits were unstable, at times narrowing to a relatively restricted “corridor.” Apart from this, the argument of Paul Werth that “in the nineteenth century, it was above all by confessional criteria that the cultural diversity of Eurasian empires was ordered and institutionalized.¹⁹⁹” should be complemented by the clarification that these criteria did not exist as a given.

The confessional principle functioned in the interaction with other ones, and the most well-treated by scholars, “national” principle, was not unique. In the presented topic, the foreign policy factor and, to a lesser extent, the economical (the financial power of the Old Believers) and ideological (the mobilization of Orthodoxy at the onset of the Crimean War) dimensions deeply influenced confessional mapping.

In addition, I would caution against gauging this case through a binary opposition of “coercion/resistance.” Even though the Russian imperial administration sought to eradicate the Old Belief, particularly the “Austrian Church”, the repertoire of its repressive measures did not include full-scale violence. This reveals a complex constellation of “mental barriers” in the embodiment of imperial ambitions, where violence was directed at peripheral colonial ventures (the Caucasian War and the conquest of Central Asia) and against armed rebellions (the Polish Uprising and local peasant riots) but not bureaucratic tasks, such as dealing with the Schism.

The Old Believers, for their part, were not a revolutionary force. Although state’s oppression evidently aggravated their attitude to the Russian imperial rulership, even the so-called “*konovody* of the Schism” (influential and wealthy merchants with high authority in their

¹⁹⁸ Irina Paert, Catherine Gibson, & Liliya Berezhnaya, Confession, Loyalty, and National Indifference: Perspectives from Imperial and Postimperial Borderlands. *Ab Imperio* 2022, no. 2 (2022): 94-95.

¹⁹⁹ Paul Werth, “Imperiology and Religion. Some Thoughts on a Research Agenda.” In *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire*, ed. Kimitako Matsuzato (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007): 51.

communities) were not prone to political rebellion and, moreover, organizing riots, let alone their coreligionists from townsmen and peasants. Some Russian revolutionaries and left-wing emigrants had high hopes for religious dissenters (the Old Believers and sectarians)²⁰⁰, but these hopes turned out to be mostly in vain.

At the same time, the generally favorable attitude of the Old Believers towards the House of Habsburg also had relatively modest consequences. The fear of Pavel Mel'nikov: "What if, in the event of a rupture with Austria, Kirill, clothed in the ancient vestments of a bishop, were to march ahead of the Austrian troops? He will do a hundred times more harm to Russia with the blessing of his octagonal cross than the Austrian guns and cannons, for in the depths of Russia, five millions of people can stand up for him²⁰¹" – was extremely exaggerated.

The cultural distance between even the most educated and financially well-being Lipovans and the Austrian ruling elite was so significant that it excluded the opportunity a sustainable "pro-Vienna" project. Apart from this, even with the desire, the Austrian imperial administration had no mechanisms to exploit productively the loyalty of the priestly Old Believers.

However, this over-concentration on the "Austrian" problem in the multifaceted matter of the Schism reveals a significant feature of the Russian imperial order. The Russian "Synodal" Church proved to be the genuine "handmaiden²⁰²" in this case, even though some ecclesiastical actors, such as Metropolitan Filaret, demonstrated a certain degree of agency due to personal influence and charisma. Nevertheless, all crucial decisions were taken by secular bureaucrats, knowledge collecting occurred under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs but not the Holy Synod, pressure on the Austrian imperial administration was much more assertive than

²⁰⁰ Sergei A. Zenkovsky, *Russkoe Starobriadchestvo: 483-530*; Alexander Etkind, "Russian Sects Still Seem Obscure." *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2, no. 1 (2001): 167.

²⁰¹ Pavel I. Mel'nikov, *Zapiska o russkom raskole*: 193.

²⁰² Gregory L. Freeze, "Handmaiden of the State? The Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36, no. 1 (1985): 82–102.

on the Constantinople Patriarchate in 1847, and the very involved officials recognized that political reasons outweighed spiritual ones for them.

Consequently, as for this topic, the interest in the foreign policy factor, on the one hand, helps to avoid the narrow and misleading framing of the Old Believers solely as the opponents of the Orthodox Church, and, on the other hand, can enrich the studies of Russian foreign policy itself. The current works have left the linear geopolitical approach and analyzed, for instance, the diplomatic representations, ceremonies, and rituals²⁰³. However, the attention to interventions from religious policy to interstate relations can also shed light on the inconspicuous features of this process, unlike the methodologically conservative focus on the intertwining of economic or ideological and foreign policies, already explored in such accounts as “Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914” and “Crimea: The Last Crusade²⁰⁴.”

Last but not least, this study reconceptualizes the Old Believers themselves. The established narrative about this religious group presents the categories of fanaticism, ultratraditionalism, utopian dreams, apocalypticism, and the obsession on rites and sketches the spectacular images of bizarre appearance, hermitages in remote places, and religious suicides (self-immolation, self-starvation, and self-entombment). This picture is categorically incomplete. Some scholars, for instance, Robert O. Crummey, have undermined this narrative. While Crummey addresses the Old Believers in the pan-European framework of “popular religion²⁰⁵,” he examines mainly Russian source materials within Russian imperial contexts.

This thesis demonstrates that the Old Believers were also in the position to negotiate effectively with the Austrian officials at various levels, to create an unconventional coalition

²⁰³ Jan Hennings, *Russia and Courtly Europe: Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648–1725* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

²⁰⁴ Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Orlando Figes, *Crimea. The Last Crusade*.

²⁰⁵ Robert O. Crummey, “Old Belief as Popular Religion: New Approaches:” 700–712.

with the Polish emigrants in Istanbul, and to maneuver in the corridors of the Habsburg court. The thesis complicates the categories of “civilization” and “backwardness,” recursively directed at the Old Believers: some European authors depicted the Russian Empire as an uncivilized and backward entity, while the Russian imperial officials inflected these definitions on religious dissenters.

In addition, this work sheds light on the heterogeneity of the Old Believers. Even though their fragmentation into various branches is well known, this inquiry shows the whole repertoire of identifications: the Bukovinian and Bessarabian Lipovans, the Ottoman Nekrasovites, and their coreligionists from the Russian imperial core had to negotiate, collaborate, and support each other for the survival as a denomination.

This thesis concentrates on the dependency of the policy toward the Old Belief in Russia on the complex fluctuations of inter-imperial relations. I would like to continue my study and to examine the reverse trend – the influence of Old Believers’ cross-border institution-building on the imperial order. This approach will attempt to bridge two methodologically highly different turns in historical knowledge – imperial and transnational ones. This can add a new dimension in the scholarship of the imperial order, where the complicated relations of imperial and national manifestations continue to retain the focus of researchers, even in the mode of the studies of national indifference.

In conclusion, I seek to explore imperial entanglements and the maneuvers of the Old Believers’ network among them, that is, entanglements between foreign and religious policies of the Russian Empire, between processes taking place in different imperial formations (the Romanov and Habsburg empires), and entanglements between various levels of social and political hierarchies.

Bibliography

Archival Documents

Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Austria [HHSTA]

1. 134 Berichte, Weisungen, Varia 1847.

The Department of Manuscripts of the Institute of Russian Literature, St. Petersburg, Russia [RO IRLI]

1. F. 95. Op. 1. No. 66. (Perepiska s Ministerstvom vnutrennih del)

The Department of Manuscripts of the National Library of Russia, St. Petersburg, Russia (OR RNB)

1. F. 37. Op. 1. No. 39. (Sbornik o raskol'nikah." Zapiski, otchety i pr. raznyh lic)
2. F. 37. Op. 1. No. 273. (Kratkaja zapiska o sovremennom polozhenii raskola v Saratovskoj gubernii)
3. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 24. (Zapiska o russkom raskole)
4. F. 478. Op. 1. No. 29. (Istoricheskie ocherki popovshhiny)

The Russian State Archive of Literature and Art, Moscow, Russia (RGALI)

1. F. 1387. Op. 1. No. 1. ("Zapiska o Raskole")

The Russian State Historical Archive, St. Petersburg, Russia [RGIA]

1. F. 797. Op. 17. No. 39309. ("O zagranichnyh raskol'nikah")
2. F. 1021. Op. 2. No. 10. ("Vsepoddannejshaja" zapiska L. A. Perovskogo s objavljenijami k zapiske st. sov. Nadezhdina o russkih raskol'nikah, zhivushhijh za granicej)
3. F. 1284. op. 208. No. 480. (b) (Otchet d. stat. sov. Arsen'eva o sostojanii raskola v Novgorodskoj gub. i v Novoladozhskom u. Peterburgskoj gub.)
4. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 27. (Zhurnaly zasedanij za 1845-1849 gody)
5. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 38. (Zhurnaly zasedanij za 1858 g.)
6. F. 1473. Op. 1. No. 77. (Kratkaja zapiska o raskole st. sov. Arsen'eva)

Published Primary Documents

1. Aksakov, Ivan S. "O Bessarabskikh raskol'nikakh." *Russkii Arkhiv*. 1888. Vol. 11: 434–50.
2. Aksakov, Ivan S. *Pis'ma k rodnym*. 1844-1849. Moskva: Nauka, 1988.
3. Aksakov, Ivan S. *Pis'ma k rodnym*. 1849-1856. Moskva: Nauka, 1994.
4. Chajkovskij, Michal. "Zapiski." *Russkaja starina*. 1898. Vol. 94. June: 671-694.
5. "Iz vlechenie iz del ministerstva vnutrennih del ob uchrezhdenii Belokrinickoj mitropolii." In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym*. Vol. 1. London: Trübner, 1860: 155-165.
6. "Iz vlechenie iz del Sv. Sinoda 10 marta 1847 goda." In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym*. Vol. 2. London: Trübner, 1860: 293-298.
7. *Iz vlechenija iz rasporyazhenij po delam o raskol'nikah pri imperatorah Nikolae i Aleksandre II, popolnennye zapiskoj Mel'nikova*. Leipzig: Je. L. Kasprovich, 1882.
8. Kel'siev, Vasili I. "Ispoved." Podg. k pečati E. Kingisepp. Moskva: Literaturnoe nasledstvo: 1941. Vol. 41-42: 253-470.
9. "Letopis' proishodjashhij v raskole sobytij." *Bratskoe slovo*. 1876. Vol. II: 635-655.
10. Liprandi, Ivan P. "Kratkoe obozrenie sushhestvujushhij v Rossii raskolov, erešej i sekt kak v religioznom, tak i v politicheskom ih znachenii." In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym*. Vol. 2. London: Trübner, 1861: 91-170.
11. Liprandi, Ivan P. "Gerontij Levonov, belokrinickij raskol'nicheskij arhimandrit." In *ChOIDR*. Moskva: Universitetskaja tipografija na Strastnom bul'vare, 1871. Vol. 4: 104-140.

12. *Materialy dlja istorii tak nazyvaemoj avstrijskoj ili belokrinickoj ierarhii*. Izd. N. Subbotin. Moskva: tip. Je. Lissnera i A. Geshelja, 1899.
13. Mel'nikov, Pavel. "Otchet o sovremennom sostojanii raskola." In *Sbornik v pamiat' P.I. Mel'nikova, Deistviia Nizhegorodskoi Gubernskoi Uchenoi Arkhivnoi Komissii*, ix. Nizhnii Novgorod: Tipo-Lit. I. I. Mashistova, 1910. Vol. II: 3-328.
14. Mel'nikov, Pavel. I. "Schislenie raskol'nikov." *Russkij vestnik*. 1868. Vol. 2: 403-442.
15. Mel'nikov, Pavel. I. "Zapiska o russkom raskole." In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym*. Vol. 1. London: Trübner, 1860: 167-198.
16. Nadezhdin, Nikolai I. "O zagranichnyh raskol'nikah." In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym*. Vol. 1. London: Trübner, 1860: 75-137.
17. "Nota, sostavlennaja dlja peredachi Ministru inostrannyh del, dlja dal'nejshego napravlenija." In *ChOIDR*. Moskva: Universitetskaja tipografija na Strastnom bul'vare, 1871. Vol. 4: 173-177.
18. *Obzor meroprijatij Ministerstva Vnutrennih Del po raskolu s 1802 po 1881 god*. Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1903.
19. "Pamjatnik proishodjashhij del Belokrinickogo starovercheskogo monastyrja." In *Istorija Belokrinickoj ierarhii. Prilozhenija*. Moskva: tip. T. Ris, 1874. Vol. 1: 109-144.
20. *Perepiska raskol'nicheskih dejatelej*. Vol. 1 Moskva: Tipografija J. Lissnera i J. Romana. 1887.
21. *Perepiska raskol'nicheskih dejatelej*. Vol. 2. Moskva: Tipografija J. Lissnera i J. Romana. 1889.
22. "Pis'ma P. I. Mel'nikova k V. M. Lazarevskomu." In *Sbornik v pamiat' P.I. Mel'nikova. Deistviia Nizhegorodskoi Gubernskoi Uchenoi Arkhivnoi Komissii*, ix. Vol. 1. Nizhnii Novgorod: Tipo-Lit. I. I. Mashistova, 1910: 180-195.

23. Popov, Nikolai. *Sbornik dlia istorii Staroobriadchestva*. Vol. 2. Moskva: Univ.tip, 1866.
24. "Prilozhenija k Zapiske Nadezhdina," In *Sbornik pravitel'stvennyh svedenij o raskol'nikah, costavlennyj V. Kel'sievym*. Vol. 1. London: Trübner, 1860: 139-153.
25. "Poezdka v Belokrinickij monastyr'. Kak my ezdili za mirom v Beluju Krnicu." Predisl. N.I. Subbotina. *Russkij vestnik*. 1864. Vol. 50: 42-78.
26. *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola*. Sankt-Peterburg.: Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1858.
27. *Sobranie postanovlenij po chasti raskola*. Sankt-Peterburg.: Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1875.
28. Varadinov Nikolai V. *Istorija Ministerstva vnutrennih del. Kniga 8. Dopolnitel'naja. Istorija rasporejzhenij po raskolu*. Sankt-Peterburg; Tipografija Ministerstva vnutrennih del, 1863.

Secondary Literature

1. Benton, Lauren. *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
2. Campbell, Elena I. *The Muslim Question and Russian Imperial Governance*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.
3. Clark, Christopher. *Revolutionary Spring: Fighting for a New World 1848–1849*. New York: Allen Lane, 2023.
4. Clay, Eugene. "An Old Believer Monastery on the Volga: The Cheremshan Monastic Complex, 1820-1925." *Slavonica* 7, no. 2. (2001): 9-27.
5. Clogg, Richard. "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire." In *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition*. Edited by Benjamin Braude. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014.

6. Conybeare Frederick C. *Russian Dissenters*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1921.
7. Cherniavsky, Michael. "The Old Believers and the New Religion." *Slavic Review* 25, no. 1 (1966): 1–39.
8. Crews, Robert. "Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia." *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 1 (2003): 50–83.
9. Crummey, Robert O. "Old Belief as Popular Religion: New Approaches." *Slavic Review* 52, no. 4 (1993): 700–712.
10. Crummey, Robert O. *The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist: the Vyg Community and the Russian State, 1694 – 1855*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.
11. Crummey, Robert O. *Old Believers in a Changing World*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011.
12. Deak, Istvan. *Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.
13. De Simone, Peter T. *The Old Believers in Imperial Russia: Oppression, Opportunism and Religious Identity in Tsarist Moscow*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2018.
14. Dolbilov, Mikhail. *Russkii krai, chuzhaia vera: Etnoreligioznaia politika v Litve i Belorusii pri Aleksandre II*. Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2010.
15. Dunn, Ethel. "A Slavophile Looks at the Raskol and the Sects." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 44, no. 102 (1966): 167–79.
16. Edwards, David W. "The System of Nicholas I in Church-State Relations." In *Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime*. Edited by Robert L. Nichols and Theofanis George Stavrou. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1978: 154-169.

17. Engelstein, Laura. *Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom: A Russian Folktale*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
18. Engelstein, Laura. "Holy Russia in Modern Times: An Essay on Orthodoxy and Cultural Change." *Past & Present*, no. 173 (2001): 129-156.
19. Etkind, Alexander. *Internal Colonization. Russia's Imperial Experience*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.
20. Etkind, Alexander. "Russian Sects Still Seem Obscure." *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2, no. 1 (2001): 165-181.
21. Evtuhov, Catherine. *Portrait of a Russian Province: Economy, Society, and Civilization in Nineteenth-Century Nizhnii Novgorod*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 2011.
22. Fairey, Jack. *The Great Powers and Orthodox Christendom: The Crisis over the Eastern Church in the Era of the Crimean War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
23. Figs, Orlando. *Crimea. The Last Crusade*. London: Allen Lane Publishers, 2010.
24. Freeze, Gregory L. "Handmaiden of the State? The Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 36, no. 1 (1985): 82–102.
25. Freeze, Gregory L. "Pastyr' i cerkovnyj dejatel': svjatitel' Filaret Moskovskij i staroobriadcheskij raskol 1825–1855 gg." In *Filaretovskij al'manah*. 2008. Vol. 4: 122–146.
26. Fuller, William C. *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
27. Gerasimov, Ilya, Glebov, Sergey, Kusber, Jan, Mogilner, Marina, Semyonov, Alexander. "New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire." In *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire*. Leiden: Brill, 2009: 3-32.

28. Gerasimov, Ilya, Glebov, Sergei, Kaplunovsky, Alexander, Mogilner, Marina, and Semyonov, Alexander. "In Search of a New Imperial History." *Ab Imperio*, 2005, no. 1 (2005): 33–56.
29. Geyer, Dietrich. *Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
30. Gorizontov, Leonid E. *Paradoksy imperskoj politiki: Poljaki v Rossii i russkie v Pol'she*. Moskva: Indrik, 1999.
31. Hedinger, Daniel, and Nadin Heé. "Transimperial History – Connectivity, Cooperation and Competition." *Journal of Modern European History* 16, no. 4 (2018): 429-452.
32. Hennings, Jan. *Russia and Courtly Europe: Ritual and the Culture of Diplomacy, 1648–1725*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
33. Himka, John P. "The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions." In *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*. Edited by Ronald Grigor Suny, Michael D. Kennedy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001: 109-164.
34. Horváth, Eugene. "Russia and the Hungarian Revolution (1848-9)." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 12, no. 36 (1934): 628-645.
35. Hosking, Geoffrey. *Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997.
36. Iukhimenko, Elena. *Staroobriadcheskii tsentr za Rogozhskoi Zastavoiu*. Moskva: Jazyki slavjanskoj kul'tury, 2005.
37. Ivanov, Leonte. "Ivan Aksakov's Letters from Bessarabia." *Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations*. Vol. VI, no. 1 (2009): 65-76.

38. Jakubowski, Michael. "Facing the Old Believers. The Experience of Austrian and Prussian Officials in Bukovina and Neustpreussen." *Acta Poloniae Historica* 122 (2020): 247-275.
39. Jelavich, Barbara. *A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914*. Philadelphia, PA & New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964.
40. Jelavich, Barbara. *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
41. Judson, Pieter. M. *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016.
42. Kaindl, Raimund F. *Das Entstehen und die Entwicklung der Lippowaner-Colonien in der Bukowina*. Wien: Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1896.
43. Kappeler, Andreas. *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*. Longman: Routledge, 2001.
44. Knight, Nathaniel. "Ethnicity, Nationality and the Masses: Narodnost' and Modernity in Imperial Russia." In *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices*. Edited by Daniel Hoffmann, Yanni Kotsonis. New York: St Martin's Press, 2000: 41-64.
45. Knight, Nathaniel. "Science, empire, and nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845–1855." In *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*. Edited by Jane Burbank and Daniel L. Ransel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998: 108-131.
46. Krakhmal'nikov, Alexei P. *Sochineniia staroverov belokrinitskogo soglasiia (1846-62 gg.)*. Moskva: Indrik, 2012.
47. Kramer, Michael. "Osnovanie staroobriadcheskoj mitropolii v Beloj Krinice na Bukovine i prebyvanie sv. mitropolita Amvrosija v Avstrii." In *Duhovnye otvety*. Vol.

9. Moskva: Tverskaja Nikol'skaja staroobriadcheskaja obshhina hrama vo imja svjatitelja Nikoly chudotvorca, 1998: 81-129.
48. Kuziner, Igor'. "Millenaristy, kapitalisty, kooperatory: pozdneimperskij i rannesovetskij opyt staroobriadcev-strannikov." *Ab Imperio* 2021, no. 2 (2021): 25-59.
49. LeDonne, John P. *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
50. Lieven, Dominic. *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals*. London: John Murray, 2000.
51. Lincoln, William B. *In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825–1861*. DeKalb.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982.
52. Maiorova, Olga. "Searching for a New Language of Collective Self: The Symbolism of Russian National Belonging During and After the Crimean War." *Ab Imperio* 2006, no. 4 (2006): 187-224.
53. Marsden, Thomas. *The Crisis of Religious Toleration in Imperial Russia: Bibikov's System for the Old Believers, 1841–1855*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
54. Marsden, Thomas. "Imperial Loyalty between Law, Religion, and Nation: Old Believers' Appeals to the Russian State, 1825–1894." *Ab Imperio* 2022, no. 2 (2022): 117-146.
55. Mel'nikov, Pavel I., "Ocherki popovschiny," In *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii P.I. Mel'nikova [Andreia Pecherskago]*, Vol. 13. Sankt-Peterburg: Tovarishhestvo M. O.Vol'f, 1897.
56. Miller, Alexei. *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008.
57. Mitchell, Aaron. W. *The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

58. Osterhammel, Jurgen. *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
59. Paert, Irina. *Old Believers, Religious Dissent, and Gender in Russia, 1760–1850*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.
60. Paert, Irina. ““Two or Twenty Million?” The Languages of Official Statistics and Religious Dissent in Imperial Russia.” *Ab Imperio* 2006, no. 3 (2006): 75-98.
61. Paert, Irina., Gibson, Catherine, & Berezhnaya, Liliya. “Confession, Loyalty, and National Indifference: Perspectives from Imperial and Postimperial Borderlands.” *Ab Imperio* 2022, no. 2 (2022): 91-116.
62. Pascal, Pierre. *Avvakum et les Débuts du Raskol*. Paris: Mouton, 1969.
63. Pera, Pia. “The Secret Committee on the Old Believers: Moving away from Catherine II's Policy of Religious Toleration.” In *Russia in the Age of the Enlightenment*. Edited by Roger P. Bartlett and Janet M. Hartley. London: St. Martin's Press, 1990: 222-241.
64. Perrie, Maureen. “In Search of an Apostolic Succession: Russian Old Believers and the Legend of Belovod'e.” *Slavonic and East European Review* 98, no. 2 (2020): 266-297.
65. Perrie, Maureen. “The Castrates, the Specter of Pugachev, and Religious Policy under Nicholas I.” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 24, no. 2 (2023): 299-320.
66. Pipes, Richard. *Russia under the Old Regime*. New York: Scribner, 1974.
67. Polek, Johann. *Die Lippowaner in der Bukowina*, 1-2. Czernowitz: Czopp, 1896-1898.
68. Puna, Michal. *Zemští poslanci zvolení na Moravě r. 1848 a 1861, K otázce formování politické kultury a její kontinuity* [online]. muni.cz [cit. 2024-03-02]
69. Rieber, Alfred J. *Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

70. Rieber, Alfred. J. "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay." In *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*. Edited by Hugh Ragsdale. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Woodrow Wilson Center, Cambridge University, 1993: 315-59.
71. Rieber, Alfred. J. *The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
72. Roberts, Ian W. *Nicholas I and the Russian intervention in Hungary*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991.
73. Robson, Roy R. *Old Believers in Modern Russia*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995.
74. Rogers, Douglas. *The Old Faith and the Russian Land: A Historical Ethnography of Ethics in the Urals*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009.
75. Rudnytsky, Ivan L. *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*. Edmonton, CIUS, University of Alberta, 1987.
76. Schroeder, Paul W. "A Turning Point in Austrian Policy in the Crimean War: The Conference of March, 1854." *Austrian History Yearbook* 4 (1968): 159–202.
77. Schroeder, Paul. W. *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972.
78. Saunders David. *Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881*. London: Longman, 1992.
79. Stambrook, Fred. "National and Other Identities in Bukovina, in Late Austrian Times." *Austrian History Yearbook* 35 (2004): 185-203.
80. Subbotin, Nikolai. *Istoriia tak nazывaemago Avstriiskago ili Belokrinitskago Sviashchenstva 2v*. Moskva: Tipografija J. Lissnera i A. Geshelja, 1895, 1899.

81. Subbotin, Nikolai. *Raskol kak orudie vrazhdebnykh rossii partii*. Moskva: Katkov i K°, 1867.
82. Suny, Ronald G. “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, and Theories of Empire.” In *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making the Age of Lenin and Stalin*. Edited by Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001: 23-66.
83. Taki, Victor. “From partisan war to the ethnography of European Turkey: The Balkan career of Ivan Liprandi, 1790–1880.” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 58, no. 3 (2016): 257-285.
84. Vasil’evskii, Mikhail N. *Gosudarstvennaia sistema otnoshenii k staroobriadcheskomu raskolu v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia I*. Kazan': Centr. tip., 1914.
85. Vishlenkova, Elena A. *Zabotjas' o dushah poddannyh: religioznaja politika v Rossii pervoj chetverti XIX veka*. Saratov: Izd-vo Sarat. un-ta, 2002.
86. Werth, Paul H. “Imperiology and Religion. Some Thoughts on a Research Agenda.” In *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire*. Edited by Kimitako Matsuzato. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007.
87. Werth, Paul H. *The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
88. White, James. *Unity in Faith?: Edinoverie, Russian Orthodoxy, and Old Belief, 1800–1918*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020.
89. *Zapadnye okrainy Rossijskoj imperii*. Edited by Mikhail Dolbilov, Alexei Miller. Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2006.
90. Zenkovsky, Sergei A. *Russkoe Staroobriadchestvo*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970.