Evaluation of the Measures Adopted between 2015 and 2019 by the European Union in the Areas of Migration and Terrorism

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Author's Declaration

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Abstract

Since 2015, migration and terrorism have been simultaneously securitized within the European Union (EU). The refugee wave of 2015 fundamentally shook the EU's refugee policy. European leaders began to securitize migration due to the massive influx of arrivals, and besides this there was an increased sense of threat from terrorism as result of the events of 2015 and 2016, that also became part of the security discourse from 2015 onwards. However, European terrorism is not caused by migration. Numerous measures were taken to address the crises at both national and EU levels, although not all of them brought the expected results. As a matter of fact, decision-makers faced further problems in several cases. There are various solutions for managing both the migration crisis and the threat of terrorism. This thesis sheds light on these possibilities one by one and examines how successful the measures taken were and what consequences they had.

The subchapters on migration are going to discuss potential solutions such as consolidating legal concepts, managing the root causes through financial support, externalizing migration through agreements between the European Union and Turkey, and different border control methods. There are also numerous solutions for managing the threat of terrorism, including immediate response, European Union agencies and systems dedicated to counterterrorism, preparation and defense strategies through information sharing, and cooperation with third countries as a prevention strategy. Overall, each decision needs to be examined individually, and in many cases, the problems that arises are greater than the solutions provided by the measures taken.

Effective actions are hindered by disagreements and differing political interests among member states, the neglect of humanitarian considerations, and the need to handle potential human rights abuses cautiously. Furthermore, this thesis also offers some solutions in the conclusion in order to make measures and procedures more effective and safer for individuals.

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I am also profoundly grateful to my maternal grandparents who are constantly holding my hands, guiding me through life's challenges and joys. Your enduring influence has been a beacon of light, and I dedicate this achievement to your cherished memory.

Tartalomjegyzék

Introduction

The refugee wave of 2015 significantly shook the European Union's migration mechanisms, plunging the organization into a policy crisis from which it still has not fully recovered, nor has managed to establish adequate internal framework, structure in order to address a similar crisis situation.

Regarding the migration policy of the European Union, the jurisdiction is divided. In certain cases, member states are the decision-maker, such as in the adjudication of refugee applications, visa issuance, and granting citizenship, while other procedures have been harmonized within the community, such as border protection. Another type of problem that received significantly more attention during the refugee wave is terrorism, the fear and sense of threat it evokes, and the association between the two issues in the minds of many due to media and political discourse.

A public opinion survey conducted by the European Commission's Eurobarometer in response to the question, "In your opinion, what are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?", showed that in 2014, 24% mentioned migration, and 11% mentioned terrorism as one of the two main issues. Migration ranked 4th, and terrorism 5th on the list, behind elements such as economic situation, unemployment, and the fiscal situation of member states (European Commission, 2014). In contrast, by the fall of 2015, immigration ranked first with 58%, and terrorism ranked second with 25% (European Commission, 2015). By the fall of 2017, the same survey showed a decreasing trend in migration perception, with 39% mentioning it as one of the most important issues. Regarding the perception of terrorism, fluctuations were observed over the years, maintaining levels above 30% since the spring of 2016. In the fall of 2017, it stood at 38%, just behind immigration (European Commission, 2017).

Based on these data, it is evident that for at least two years, immigration and terrorism were consistently perceived as the most significant threats to the European Union by surveyed EU citizens. This is partly a consequence of security measures undertaken by both member states and the European Union through rhetoric and policy measures. The events of 2015 and 2016 often blurred the lines between migration and terrorism, a phenomenon exacerbated by the security discourse occurring in society, the media, and political circles.

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From the European Union's perspective, immigration has been part of the discourse since the 1950s, and security measures began around the same time in the European Communities. Terrorism became a serious threat to the Western world in the 2000s, and during the crisis-filled period of 2015, the intention to enhance security in this area also increased. Therefore, between 2015 and 2019, security measures for both migration and terrorism were operating simultaneously (Andreeva, 2021). In my thesis, I base the mention of these two topics on this context. However, since no correlation can be demonstrated between the two phenomena, I intent to examine the measures taken independently from each other.

In my thesis, my aim is to analyze the measures taken by the European Union, and in some cases by the member states, in the areas of migration and terrorism between 2015 and 2019. I intend to examine how effective and appropriate certain decisions were in terms of mitigating the issues, or whether they were merely the result of political solution-seeking. My assumption regarding the topic is that in response to crises, the European Union initially made decisions that were not effective, but rather resulted in further problems instead of providing real solutions or alleviation. By alleviating the problem, I mean to what extent the measures reduced migration pressure and how successful they were in resolving the crisis situation without causing further major issues.

According to the structure of the thesis, the next chapter will focus on the theoretical framework. It will elaborate on the concepts of securitization and collective securitization, providing insight into the existing literature on migration and terrorism from the perspective of collective securitization. Following that, in the third and fourth chapters, I am going to examine the measures taken in the cases of migration and terrorism based on the framework of possible solutions. The subchapters of both parts are divided according to possible solution methods, outlining various approaches to managing refugee flows and terrorism. Concerning the migration chapter, the first subchapter will discuss legal basic concepts and the importance of harmonizing procedures and legal approaches. The second subchapter will focus on root causes, addressing the handling of root causes through financial resources and missions. In the third, the admission and integration of immigrants will be the main topic, with an interesting example being the German open-door policy. The fourth subchapter will review the externalization of migration, including an evaluation of the agreement between the European Union and Turkey,

while the final segment will discuss the introduction of temporary border controls within the Schengen area for the controlled and limited admission of immigrants.

Determining the effectiveness of decisions made in the area of terrorism is quite challenging. Firstly, adequate data is not available, and secondly, there is no precise definition of what it means for a measure to be effective. Similarly, I am going to seek answer whether the measures taken raise further problems and restrictions for EU citizens. The framework here is similar to the previous one, proceeding according to categories of possible solutions. First, I will discuss the introduction of border controls as a response to terrorism, using the example of France. Then I will delve into counter-terrorism efforts, highlighting the significant role played by Eurojust and Europol. Subsequently, I will address data collection as part of the defense strategy, and finally, I will explore the preventative strategy, examining cooperation with third countries.

For my research, I am going to utilize sources such as official Eurostat data, programs and reports issued by European Union institutions, as well as secondary sources such as relevant articles and studies on the topic.

1. Theoretical Framework

1.1 Securitization

Securitization is theory of security development on constructivist principles by the Copenhagen School, with key contributors including Waever and his colleagues (Buzan et al., 1998). The essence of the theory is that society perceives a given phenomenon as a threat and expects the government to provide the appropriate solution to mitigate the problem. By taking special measures, the government elevates the issue to the level of political agenda. According to the theory of security, the term is an intersubjective, socially constructed concept, there is no issue that is inherently a security matter. Instead, it is associated with people's perceptions of reality and their sense of security. An issue starts as a non-political technical matter, then if handled in the political sphere, it becomes politicized, and eventually through securitization, it becomes a security issue. It is important to note in relation to securitization that society does not necessarily judge the level of threat objectively, as people are prone to misinterpret how an event truly affects their lives. The securitization process involves three important elements: speech acts, acceptance by the receiving audience, and the introduction of extraordinary measures.

According to Buzan and his colleagues (1998), security is about survival. When a problem is identified as more important than anything else and priority is lost, it can be treated as an existential threat, justifying the introduction of special measures. The securitizer permits the use of special measures by influencing the receiving audience in the appropriate direction through speech acts. Furthermore, the authors emphasize the importance of speech acts, noting that an even does not become a security issue on its own, but rather due to the fact that it is perceived as an existential threat and begins to be treated as such in discourse by both decision-makers and the public. The actor performing securitization highlights the problem by associating it with intersubjective concepts of security, thus identifying it as a security threat and removing it from the realm of normally handled politics. Therefore, securitization is an indicator that politics shapes the situation through the application and special, emergency measures, explained through speech acts (Buzan et al., 1998: 21-25).

In order for the problem to truly become the subject of secularization, it is necessary for society to also acknowledge the seriousness of the situation, interpreting it as a threat based on a common agreement. Through speech acts, the actor or political actor designates the problem causing the threat, and the receiving audience accepts and recognizes the seriousness of the

situation, thereby legitimizing the implementation of special measures with their consent. The threat is not necessarily objectively dangerous, it often relies more on subjective perception. The authors also note that security and securitization are negative concepts, it is not true that "the greater the security, the better", as security and threats can be used to silence opposition and legitimize restrictive measures. Securitization is always a political decision with political and social consequences (Buzan et al., 1998: 25-29).

When society perceives a threat, they generally turn to the government with increased trust and confidence in handling the situation. Tálas (2016) emphasized that the average citizen often acquires information not from their own experience but mostly from the media and political discourse. Therefore, using these channels, outlets, it is not overly difficult to securitize a topic and influence, shape the audience's perception of threat and security (Tálas, 2016:41).

1.2. Collective Securitization

The concept of collective securitization, partially rooted in the theoretical framework proposed by Buzan et al., entails the European Union's potential as an autonomous actor on the realm of security. Sperling and Webber (2019) assert that the European Union possesses the capacity to function as an independent securitizing entity, given its operational distinctiveness from individual member states (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 239). Moreover, they contend that during times of crisis, the European Union can effectively assume the role of a collective securitizing actor, facilitated by an increased demand for communal interventions and expedited decision-making processes to ensure swift responses. The analytical framework applied by the authors examines four essential components of securitization: security, the referent object, the securitizing actor, and the enactment of special measures.

Sperling and Weber (2019) challenge the Copenhagen School's assertion that threats are socially constructed, arguing instead that external factors must exist for a threat to be securitized. In such cases, a triggering event disrupts the established order, ultimately posing a threat to the survival of the audience. The state serves simultaneously as the securitizing actor, capable of taking action once it has ensured the acceptance and support of society, and as the referent object, as its survival is also part of the objective. Collective securitization is an extension of this concept (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 240), where for instance, both individual

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member states of the European Union and the EU itself fulfills these dual roles. They act as decision-makers to address threats they face and may become the referent object of the threat.

The organization, consisting of a community of states, receives authorization from the member states to take security measures. Its political power and authorization come from the delegated representatives of the states, who received them as elected representatives from the people (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 241). During security assurance, the actor and the audience influence each other, depending on each other. However, in the case of international organisations there are several audiences. According to Sperling and Webber (2019), the most important audience is the representatives of the states, who support, strengten, or even initiate security assurance at the level of international organisations (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 242). They are important as they are not only present as recipients but also play a political role. They convey their own security-related concerns to the international community and the members of the organization, thus shaping security issues. International organizations have greater and more comprehensive expertise and can initiate security assurance from a distinguished role. Regarding the measures, Sperling and Webber emphasize justification. The organization decides on the special situation within its operation in a customary manner, not through speech acts but through policy formulation (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 243-245).

In the study, the researchers outlined the six-step model of collective securitization. The first step is the starting point, the status quo in the security discourse, followed by an event or series of events that induce change. Due to its seriousness, the perceived risk of deterioration in the security situation arises in people's minds. In response, the actors performing security assurance, such as politicians, presidents, or prime ministers, designate the problem through speech acts, and the audience reacts in some way. According to the authors of the study, these latter two steps are practically inseparable, interconnected, and reinforce each other. As the fifth step, measures are taken in order to address the problem, and finally, a new status quo is established. This new status quo includes speech act methods related to security assurance and the measures taken (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 246-247).

The creation and maintenance of security were previously the responsibility of nation states. However, the management of the new types of transnational threats requires coordination among states, which can be achieved through common-level security governance. This is mainly facilitated through intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN),

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 233). The advantages of collective securitization at the EU level include low transaction costs and the benefits of collective action. The areas covered by EU collective securitization include terrorism, cyberspace, migration, energy, health care, and climate change (Sperling and Webber, 2019: 230-232). In the following chapter, I am going to discuss literature on collective securitization regarding migration and terrorism.

1.3. Migration and Terrorism in Security Studies Literature
1.3.1. Migration

Migration in the European Union, previously the European Communities, has gradually become entwined within the discourse on security. During the 1950s, the predominant form of migration was economic, with immigrants primarily viewed as labor resources that contributed to the strengthening of Western European labor markets. However, the introduction of restrictive policies began in the 1960s and 1970s as labor flows dwindled. Despite these measures, the continued rise in the number of immigrants was fueled by opportunities for family reunification. Nevertheless, within the political discourse, migration increasingly came to be characterized as destabilizing, posing a threat to the unity and cultural fabric of the state (Huysmans, 2000: 753-754). Scholarly literatures have demonstrated that the securitization of migration has been successfully accomplished in European nation states and the European Union. According to Huysmans, three main thematic lines guided the securitization of migration before the 2000s, international security, cultural security, and the crisis of the welfare state (Huysmans, 2000: 758). Initially, migration was primarily driven by economic motives, followed by family reunification immigration. However, more recently, particularly in contemporary times, individuals have been fleeing war zones, conflict areas, and regions affected by environmental changes.

Ceccorulli (2019) discusses the securitization of the Schengen zone, which has ensured freedom of movement since 1985 by abolishing internal borders and implementing common external border controls. However, regarding the Schengen area, the participating parties have also agreed that, in exceptional circumstances, member states may reintroduce border controls, provided that the duration of such controls would be limited, and other Schengen countries, the

European Parliament, and the Commission would be notified in advance (Ceccorulli, 2019: 304).

During the migration wave, the European Union faced a complex challenge in managing both its external and internal distribution of refugees. This influx of refugees placed immense strain on the EU's institutional framework, particularly the Schengen system, and exacerbated tensions among member states. Consequently, the issue of collective securitization emerged as a response to these challenges, with a significant emphasis placed on reinstating national border controls (Ceccorully, 2019: 310-311). Although, it is crucial to note that despite the reassertion of national sovereignty in border management, the securitization process remained within the legal framework provided by EU directives and regulations (Ceccorulli, 2019: 314).

1.3.2. Terrorism, Internal and External Safety

The threat of terrorism has become a prominent issue in security discourse since the emergence of modern terrorism. Modern or global terrorism can be tracked back to the 1970s, coinciding with the increased accessibility of air travel and the amplifying effect of television and later the internet on terrorist activities. These developments facilitated greater impact, recruitment and the spread of extremist ideologies. The Eruopean Union's collective response to terrorism first gained prominence after the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and was further underscored by terrorist incidents in Europe during the 2000s. The terrorist attacks in France in 2015, concurrent with the migration crisis, made it evident that terrorism was a problem requiring common regulations, prompting increased discussions within the EU institutions (Andreeca, 2021: 755).

Kaunert and Leonard (2019) analyzed terrorism through the lens of the collective securitization model, suggesting that it is an area where the EU can provide added value alongside national measures of the member states (Kaunert and Leonard, 2019: 273). They identify the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as the event that triggered securitization, highlighting the use of war rhetoric in order to justify military responses to terrorism (Kaunert and Leonard, 2019: 266). The referent object in this event was the „civilized world", leading to the development of counter-terrorism cooperation between the EU and the United States. Regarding terrorism following the 2015 European refugee crisis, Shephard's study (2021) provides an effective basis

for research on collective securitization, arguing that the EU's securitization of terrorism has framed the issue within a new context, a transnational threat requiring comprehensive, multidimensional, and transnational responses. (Shepherd, 2021: 736). Suggesting that addressing this threat solely at the national level is no longer sufficient. Shepherd (2021) contends that the European terrorist attacks and responses between 2015 and 2020 reinforced the new discourse that terrorism is a transboundary threat (Shepherd, 2021: 736).

The study also highlights the interconnectedness of external and internal security. Terrorism encompasses various stages that can simultaneously pose both external and internal threats territorially, including recruitment, counseling, financing, and training, which transcend borders in online or in-person forms (Shepherd, 2021: 737). EU institutions and organizations have advocated for the integration of internal and external security by promoting cooperation between internal affairs, law enforcement, and counter-terrorism agencies with external security bodies, through joint security and defense policies, EU delegations, information exchange, and the deployment of counter-terrorism experts to third countries. The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) agreements and missions, neighborhood policy, and cooperation with other international organizations aimed to reduce the terrorism threat in third countries while strengthening internal security of the EU, with particular focus on certain African regions (Shepherd, 2021: 737-738).

In the following part, I am going to continue with evaluating the measures taken by the European Union since 2015 regarding the migration crisis and countering terrorism, examining how effective these decisions have been in alleviating the problems.

2. Migration

By the present day, the European Union has evolved into an economically strong region, consisting mostly of developed countries, thus transitioning from an area characterized by emigration to largely an immigration destination. Certain events and changes amplify migration processes and quickly compel masses to leave their homes, and in serious cases, their state or region of residence. These events can be war, armed conflict, internal violence within a state, or changes in environmental conditions due to climate change. The inability to sustain their previous way of life and the lack of security lead to forced migration, where people feel they have no choice but to seek refuge in hopes of a better life. In 2015, the refugee crisis was triggered by the Syrian civil war, but refugees also arrived from Afghanistan, Eritrea, and to a lesser extent, other African and Middle Eastern countries. At that time, the European Union's asylum system, according to the Dublin III Regulation of 2013, proved inadequate for managing the refugee influx, prompting several attempts at finding solutions during the course of events.

Among the subchapters, the initial focus is going to be on outlining, defining the legal fundamentals, whereby I shall expound upon the 2015 legal circumstances and their deficiencies as the starting point. Subsequently, I will outline the various approaches to managing a refugee influx, clarifying both the collective endeavors of the European Union and the methodologies employed by individual member states in grappling with mass migration. Methodologies to be expounded upon will encompass addressing root causes, the admission and integration of migrants, externalization of migration, as well as the implementation of border controls within the Schengen Area and among the member states.

2.1. Legal Fundamentals

The adequate legal framework and concepts assist in managing migration by providing a framework for identifying who qualifies as a refugee and on what basis. Typically, this system varies from state to state, but the migration crisis of 2015 prompted changes and improvements in the community procedural system, as the existing system was unprepared for the large influx of arrivals. The legal regulations include the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the Dublin III Regulation, as well as the legal categories of refugee law within the community.

In 1951, when the Geneva Convention was signed, the refugee concept was formulated with the focus on port-war migration as follows:

"A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality and is unable to avail themselves of the protection of that country […]."

Furthermore, the Convention and its supplementary protocol contain another crucial provision for individuals fleeing armed conflict, known as the principle of non-refoulement. According to this principle, it is prohibited to return a refugee to a state where they would face persecution.

The legal category includes both refugees and, based on the directive renewed in 2004 and 2011, subsidiary protection status. Refugees have the right to have their application objectively and impartially examined through individual procedures (EASO, 2018). Although, member states may also apply different legal categories to immigrants. Such as, In Hungary, protected status and admitted status are such categories. It would be advisable to harmonize these categories at the EU level, as using common legal categories in the European Union's migration policy would simplify and make the system of receiving refuges easier to interpret. Furthermore, significant differences exist among member states regarding the acceptance of asylum application. The following figure examines data on the positive adjudication of asylum applications based on available Eurostat data in the EU after the exist of the United Kingdom, and in certain member states between 2015 and 2019.

Figure 1: The total number of asylum applications submitted in the given state and the ratio of applications
approved positively at the first instance
(Source: Own edit made based on Eurostat data)

Figure 1 illustrates the percentage of asylum applications granted positive decisions by the authorities of various states and within the EU 27 territory for the examined years. Significant differences can be observed among the states. In 2015, Hungary had the lowest rate of positive decisions, with only 0.24% of asylum applications being approved, while Italy had the highest rate at 35.45%. Two states stand out in this graph. Sweden in 2016 and Germany in 2017, where the percentage of positive decisions exceeded the total number of asylum applications received in those years. Looking at the EU27 data, over half of the applications received positive decisions in 2016 and 2017. Overall, the number of applications received was exceptionally high in 2015 and 2016, with 1.2 million applications in each year. In 2015, there were only six thousand more applications than in the following year. Among other factors, the disparity in the approval rates of asylum applications led to the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in 2020. However, due to the scope of my research, this period is not covered.

As a result of the second renegotiation of the Dublin Agreement, the Dublin III Regulation was established and put into effect in 2015, although it failed to operate properly and efficiently in practice. According to the 2013 Regulation, asylum applications must be submitted in the state where the asylum seeker arrived, and the procedure must be conducted in that state as well. Thus, in cases of mass migration, such as the event in 2015, such a system overwhelmed the frontline states. Consequently, the Dublin III procedure collapsed rapidly, as many asylum

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seekers attempted to travel to other states where their applications were more likely to be accepted. In contrast, a solution could involve a system where asylum applications could also be submitted to embassies or consulates abroad.

The application of humanitarian visas was first raised in the European Parliament in 2016. In 2018, the European Parliament requested the Commission to submit a legislative proposal for the application of humanitarian visas in the European Union. With the use of humanitarian visas, asylum applications can be submitted at consulates and embassies, providing much safer means for applications to access refugee status through legal channels. Nevertheless, according to the European Parliament, the issuance of humanitarian visas would remain within the exclusive competence of the member states, similar to the standard visa process (European Parliament, 2018). Member states would have the discretion to decide whether to implement humanitarian visas and to what extent.

2.2 Addressing Root Causes

One solution that may arise to mitigate crisis situations in the management of root causes, often referred to as „root causes". An effective method to prevent mass migration could be to address the issue at their source, in the sending countries, by providing air or deploying apparatus to assist developing countries in achieving a standard of living that would encourage residents to stay. In 2015, a proposal for an emergency fund aimed at African development was announced with the goal of reducing the number of refugees arriving in the Union's territory after economic development.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was intended to address the root causes of irregular migration, including poverty, poor governance, and lack of public security. However, some researchers criticize it for overlooking other issues present in sending countries, such as environmental degradation and political instability, and prioritizing the management of economic causes and problems (Coggio, 2021).

It is worth examining to what extent aid influences migration. After the launch of the Emergency Trust Fund, the rate of emigration decreased, but it is questionable whether this is truly attributable to the fund. According to Coggio (2021), it seems more likely that leaders of African sending countries have strengthened surveillance and control systems and sometimes

mistreat refugees. Keeping people in their countries of origin can be achieved not only through economic means but also through social measures aimed at addressing governance issues and the lack of social services. Coggio (2021) concludes that financial aid alone is insufficient and unsustainable for stopping migration, as it does not create the expected security and opportunities that drive people towards the Western world. Similarly, a regional fund was established to address the Syrian crisis, starting in 2014, providing aid to neighboring host countries as well.

European measures targeting root causes must take into account the humanitarian and human rights aspects of the issue. During the migration wave, human trafficking increased significantly, with networks illegally transporting poor people to Europe for exorbitant guards facilitated the work of human traffickers. One tragic incident that underscored the urgency for European Union action in protecting was the 2013 sinking of a boat carrying several hundred people near the island of Lampedusa resulting in hundreds of deaths. Between 2015 and 2016, mainly adult men and unaccompanied children arrived, primarily from Libya, but the composition of those arriving with the migration wave changed continuously between 2015 and 2017. EU cooperation with third countries also extended to Libya, although human treatment in Libya was inadequate, with refugees being held in detention centers under inhumane conditions and often subjected to violence. This raises the question of why the EU allowed refugees to be held in such dire conditions, suggesting that it may not have been politically advantageous for the EU to alleviate the Libyan refugee crisis (Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck, 2019).

The operation against human trafficking in Libya, known as Operation Sophia, was initiated in 2015. This mission initially started as reconnaissance and rescue missions in international waters and airspace, and later expanded to include the inspection of ships. From 2016 onwards, it also entailed the training the Libyan coastguard and enforcing the UN arms embargo. Despite the multifaceted tasks of Operation Sophia, it was initially perceived as a failure, ineffective, as evidenced by the continued rise in the number of refugees arriving in Italy through the Mediterranean route in 2016, accompanied by a surge of fatalities. Subsequently, even as a modest decline was observed in the summer of 2017, this was largely attributed to the forceful actions of the coastguard (Baldwin-Edwards and Lutterbeck, 2019).

The EU's policies aimed at addressing root causes cannot be considered particularly effective. Neither financial assistance to states not the Operation Sophia has proven to be sufficient deterrent for migrants. This is evidently due to Europe's lack of political will to effect real change in conflict-ridden regions and established a safe environment for refugees. From a humanitarian perspective, the handling of the crisis can thus be deemed unsuccessful.

2.3. Reception and Integration

The mass reception and integration of asylum seekers represent potential solutions for managing a migration crisis. In 2015, the European Union received a collective total of 1.3 million asylum application, constituting approximately 1.3% of the EU's population (BBC, 2016). Theoretically, a territory of this magnitude should possess the capacity to accommodate such a volume of refugees.

During the events of 2015, Germany initially pursued an open-door policy, admitting all asylum seekers who primarily arrived via the Western Balkan route, crossing through Hungary and Austria. However, it is noteworthy that Germany eventually implemented temporary border controls in September 2015, leading to considerable criticism of Chancellor Angela Merkel's policies. Nevertheless, Merkel reiterated in her statements in 2017 that she did not regret admitting asylum seekers and would act similarly again (Politico, 2017). Subsequently, in the quest for solutions, the Commission tabled proposals for a compulsory relocation framework founded on principles of solidarity, epitomized by the quota proposal. This initiative advocated for the proportional distribution of asylum procedures among EU member states, thus equitably distributing the responsibility of hosting asylum seekers. Member states unwilling to partake in this scheme would be obligated to provide financial contributions. Initially, such a relocation scheme was endorsed for the transfer of asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU nations. However, the Visegrád Group (V4) nations (Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary) advocated for rendering this mechanism voluntary rather than obligatory, citing their reluctance to admit refugees. They communicated this stance unfavorable to their populace. Against the backdrop of this divisive political milieu, efforts to find solutions to the migration crisis persisted throughout 2016 (Duszczyk et al., 2019).

In this context, integration and the reception of asylum seekers could have represented fundamental solutions, as the influx was not of such magnitude as to surpass the capacity of the European Union, which comprised 28 member states at the time. Nevertheless, the primarily impediment appeared to stem from the populist leadership in select Union member states. Utilizing media platforms and employing rhetoric geared toward security, these leaders elicited resistance against the proposal, thereby influencing societal opposition at the grassroots level. Their objective to retain power necessitated the articulation of this position to the EU leadership as well.

Immigrants can serve as a potential source of new labor for the host country's workforce, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of demographic aging. Although, the reception of immigrants and their integration into the hist society face significant challenges, particularly in the context of rising racism and xenophobia across Europe. These challenges are exacerbated by discourses propagated in both media and political spheres, which tend to reinforce negative sentiments within society. An illustrative case of this phenomenon is evident in Hungary, where a discourse of securitization unfolded primarily through speech acts.

Society's antipathy towards immigrations can be attributed to two fundamental factors, realistic threats, encompassing economic and employment concerns, and symbolic threats, relating to the preservation of cultural identity and values (Barna and Koital, 2018: 6). In the spring of 2015, Hungary's political landscape witnessed the initiation of a poster campaign centered on immigration, highlighting its purported economic and cultural drawbacks. Concurrently, the National Consultation, launched during the same period, addressed issues of migration, organized violence, and terrorism (Bird-Nagy, 2018). Despite the posters being in Hungary, ostensibly aimed at immigrants, they predominantly resonated with the Hungarian populace. It becomes apparent that these posters, coupled with political discourse and media representation featuring crowds, exerted a substantial influence and continuing to do so on many Hungarian citizens. Notably, immigration was mentioned as one of the most pressing issues by only 13% of respondents in spring 2015, a figure that surged to 65% by autumn of the same year (European Commission, 2015a, 2015b).

2.4. The Externalization of Migration: the EU-Turkey Agreement

In order to alleviate the migration crisis, EU leaders considered the option of keeping refugees on neighboring transit countries in exchange for financial assistance. At the end of 2015, negotiations began between Turkish officials led by President Erdogan and representatives of EU member states regarding a potential solution, the externalization of migration and border control. The agreement reached between the EU and Turkey stands as an example of collective securitization by the European Union. The objective of this cooperation was to mitigate the migration pressure on the EU frontline states by readmitting irregular refugees arriving from Turkey into Greece back to Turkey, and in return, Turkey accepts a recognized refugee already present in its territory. Additionally, the EU pledged a total of 6 billion euros in financial assistance to Turkey as per the agreement (European Council, 2016).

From a legal standpoint, the EU-Turkey agreement raises several concerns. Primarily, it deviated from the formal procedures of treaty-making, thus lacking full recognition under international law. Additionally, the absence of involvement by the European Parliament in the decision-making process represents a notable deficiency in terms of both the rule of law and democratic principles. Furthermore, Turkey does not qualify as a safe third country for refugees, as it only extends refugee status to migrants arriving from Europe, while the conditions for refugees are deemed inadequate, thereby infringing upon their rights to individual assessment (Ziegler, 2019).

This solution represents the externalization of migration, whereby Turkey agreed to host migrants in exchange for financial assistance and curbed illegal immigration, thereby aiding in controlling the influx of masses towards the EU. Essentially, Turkey functioned as a border control state. As observes earlier in the Theoretical Framework section, subsection 2.1, securitization is typically a consequence of political decisions. In this case, the agreement had numerous political motives and proved beneficial from a political standpoint for both the European Union and Turkey. However, from a humanitarian perspective concerning the conditions of refugees, it may not have been ideal.

With this agreement, Turkey was able to draw closer to the European Union, as further chapters were opened in the accession process according to the agreement (European Council, 2016). Additionally, the EU drafted a roadmap that paved the way for visa liberalization for Turkish citizens. Financial assistance was also provided, and support was offered in establishing the necessary technological infrastructure for border protection. Furthermore, the EU requested the

lifting of geographical restrictions on refugee admissions, but the Turkish stance on this matter remained hesitant. Regarding the visa regime, it is paradoxical that the EU expected Turkey to align its list of safe and unsafe countries with that of the Union, despite Turkey itself being considered among the unsafe third countries by the European Union (Çetin, 2020: 546-547). In terms of border protection, Frontex border guards were deployed in order to reinforce the Turkish system, and troops were directed to the Turkish-Greek border as well. For the migrant, predominantly Syrians, the agreement posed challenges as they had to live under unfavorable conditions in Turkey. The procedures were time-consuming, accessing the labor market was difficult, and public services were not easily accessible. Additionally, they faced deficiencies in terms of their social rights (Çetin, 2020: 453).

The agreement posed significant challenges for migrants, predominantly Syrians, as they had to live under unfavorable conditions in Turkey. The procedures were time-consuming, making it difficult for migrants to enter the labor market, and public services were not easily accessible. Additionally, migrants faced significant deficiencies regarding their social rights (Çetin, 2020, 453). Paradoxically, Turkey acted as the EU's de facto border guard to mitigate the crisis. However, as a potential EU member state with candidate status, Turkey would have become a frontline EU state upon accession. This paradoxical situation was further complicated by the EU initially maintaining its discriminatory and restrictive visa policy towards Turkey (Çetin, 2020: 554).

Concerning the EU-Turkey agreement, it was crucial to adhere to legal requirements to establish a legitimate agreement, as well as to meet the humanitarian expectations from the EU's perspective. Although the agreement had political benefits, it needed to be legally sound in order to ensure that migrants' interests were not compromised. Since Turkey is not considered a safe country for migrants, they remained in poor conditions there. This failure to improve their circumstances did not reduce the appeal of illegal and dangerous journeys with human traffickers from the migrants' perspective.

2.5. Controlling Immigration: Border Controls

The flow of incoming migrants primarily followed two routes, the Mediterranean and the Western Balkan pathways. Under the Schengen Agreement, temporary national border controls

may be instituted, provided that the member state notifies the European Commission regarding the specifics of the area, duration, and rationale for the tightening measures. The migration surge exerted substantial pressure on EU member states, leading seven member states to introduce temporary border controls by the end of 2015. Member states situated on the external borders of the Schengen Area are more vulnerable to the influx of migrants and are therefore more likely to implement temporary border controls compared to those predominantly surrounded by internal borders. A significant turning point in the 2015 migration crisis occurred when Germany, despite having operated under an open-door policy, imposed such restrictions. The cross-border movement of migrants can trigger a chain reaction, impacting internal states as well (Gulzau, 2021). Furthermore, some member states began constructing fences to regulate the number of incoming migrants.

The introduction of temporary border controls poses a crisis within the Schengen Area, as it demonstrates that member states opted for individual rather than collective solutions. The concept of collective securitization is illustrated when the European Commission and Council members addressed the member states as a community, initiating a dialogue for a consensus-based solution. EU institutions spearheaded the collective securitization of the Schengen Area, with the European Commission issuing the "Back to Schengen" roadmap (Ceccorulli, 2019).

Reinstating border controls gives the impression that the state is taking measures to protect itself. However, as these controls are typically limited to short segments of the border, their practical effectiveness is not comprehensive. Ensuring the security of the Schengen Area remains more effectively achieved through rigorous monitoring by frontline states. The construction of border fences often compels migrants to resort to illegal methods, posing significant humanitarian concerns. A collective solution to border control is represented by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, whose enhanced operations commenced in 2016. Frontex played a crucial role in the securitization of the 2015 migration crisis, focusing on three main areas, coordinating joint operations, participating in "hotspots', and conducting risk analysis. The joint operations, such as Poseidon and Triton, took place in the frontline states of Italy and Greece, involving border surveillance, search, and rescue missions, and contributing to Europol by providing intelligence on human trafficking networks. Frontex also cooperated with NATO, enhancing its operation scope. In the hotspot, Frontex was instrumental in managing the arrival of migrants by performing tasks such as identification, registration, and fingerprinting (Léonard and Kaunert, 2020). This integrated approach

underscored the agency's pivotal role in addressing migration challenges and enhancing border security within the EU framework.

3. Counter-Terrorism Measures

In the 20th century, nationalist and separatist terrorism was predominant, whereas from the 2000s onward, radical Islamist terrorism became the dominant threat. Islamist terrorism was not unfamiliar to the European Union even before 2015, with notable incidents such as the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings. In 2015, Paris experienced two major terrorist attacks, in January at the offices of the weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo, and in November when multiple coordinated bombings occurred across the city. In March 2016, Belgium suffered a double bombing, followed by another attack in France in July when a truck was driven into a crowd gathered for the national holiday in Nice. Later that year, Germany faced a terrorist attack at the Berlin Christmas market.

In the early stages, following the 9/11 attacks, the European Union's role in the fight against terrorism was primarily coordinative. The EU focused on harmonizing various national legal frameworks and providing support to the member states' authorities (Argomanitz et al., 2015: 196).

Determining the effectiveness of decisions made in the field of counter-terrorism is significantly more challenging. Firstly, adequate data is not available, and there is no precise definition of what it means for a measure to be effective, as counter-terrorism measures evolve and change on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, analyzing effectiveness is difficult as it is unclear what exact tools and methods the European Union would employ. Despite this, measures that increase the security level in a country can be problematic from a civil liberties or human rights perspective. Therefore, it is more worthwhile to consider presence rather than effectiveness (Argomanitz et a., 2015).

Regarding terrorism, another important aspect is that terrorist attacks reveal the shortcomings of the counter-terrorism program in the affected country or organization up to that point. After a terrorist attack, the number of measures taken increases, then stagnates until another incident prompts further developments by decision-makers (Kaunert and Léonard, 2019:271). Accepting that determining the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures is challenging, the following subsections are going to examine potential solutions to terrorism, primarily focusing

on major developments after 2015, the downsides of these measures, and the political and social context in which these measures were implemented.

The subsections of this part will also encompass potential strategies. First, I am going to examine the appearance of the terror threat in security discourse and how the extent of this threat has been assessed. The subsequent segment will focus on response reactions, particularly on temporary border controls, which will be illustrated through the circumstances in France as an example of national-level securitization. The third subsection will delve into the fight against terrorism, where the role of police forces, Europol, and the judicial body Eurojust will be emphasized, along with the identification systems that aid in identifying and tracking terrorists. The strategy for anti-terrorism protection will be the main focus of the fourth subsection, where information exchange and data collection will be highlighted as essential tools, especially during judicial and policy investigations. Lastly, the prevention strategy is going to be discussed, covering the role of the EU counter-terrorism coordinator and cooperation with third countries.

3.1. Assessment of the Terrorism Threat

Following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, significant changes were needed in EU anti-terrorism policy. Firstly, it was deemed important to strengthen border controls to some extent, although this raised concerns about restricting the freedom of movement for EU citizens. Secondly, the establishment of passenger screening systems was also considered, which eventually materialized in 2016.

In the discourse propagated by politics and the media, terrorism was frequently portrayed as a serious threat, thereby securitizing the issue. the data mentioned in the introduction confirms that this securitization was successful among the European audience, as Eurobarometer surveys listed it as one of the most important challenges facing the EU for years.

In contrast to the increasing sense of security and perception of threat due to anti-terrorism measures in Europe, the overall rise in terrorism in the European Union does not imply increased threat everywhere, rather it is more prevalent in certain areas while less so in others. This type of Islamist violence is typical in areas where Muslim minorities reside, such as

France, as the organization of extremist Islamist terrorism is more likely in regions with Muslim communities than in areas where such individuals are absent (Tálas, 2016). Furthermore, the development of technology can be attributed to the fact that radicalizing content can now be easily accessed in the online space with just a few clicks, thereby facilitating the radicalization of susceptible individuals.

The European Union's measures should be understood as added value to national efforts, with the primary responsibility for establishing fundamental law enforcement and criminal policy resting with member states. In the following sections, I am going to examine the elements of the counter-terrorism strategy based on Bartkó's (2011) framework. First, the response to terrorist acts, followed by the fight against terrorism, then the aspects of preparedness, protection, and detection, and finally, the strategy for prevention.

3.2. Response to Terrorist Acts: Temporary Border Controls

The response to terrorism in terms of immediate consequence management in 2015 involved the introduction of border control. Moreover, the response strategy includes mitigating the consequences and damages, compensating the survivors and the victims' families, and providing moral and financial support (Bartkó, 2011: 178-179).

During the migration crisis, the first terrorist attack occurred in France, prompting the country to be the first to react to the threat. Consequently, the terror threat became closely linked with border protection. This response is more characteristic of the period following a terrorist incident, serving as an immediate reaction to enhance the public's sense of security. Within the Schengen area, such measures are not feasible without a justifiable threat.

Following the November 2015 terrorist attacks, President François Hollande swiftly declared a state of emergency (état d'urgence). France recognized three forms of exceptional legal regimes, one of which is the state of emergency, initially set for 12 days. Parliament holds the authority to extend this period, which, through successive renewals, extended until 2017. Academic discourse frequently explores the human rights implications of the state of emergency. This regime significantly enhances the powers of both the national government and regional authorities. The Minister of the Interior is empowered to place individuals deemed to threat to

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public order and safety under house arrest. Moreover, the Minister can mandate such individuals to report to police or gendarmerie units up to three times daily and to surrender their identification documents (Stollsteiner, 2021: 326). Additionally, the Minister of the Interior and perfects can order the dispersal of assemblies and protests, temporarily close venues, and conduct house searches. Stollsteiner notes that legal frequently criticize the state of emergency and its associated practices. There was significant debate in 2015 regarding its incorporation into the constitution, a proposal that ultimately was not realized (Stollsteiner, 2021: 327).

In the aftermath of November 2015 attacks, France involved the state of emergency to implement temporary border controls. This application of national border controls in response to terrorism raises critical questions regarding the necessity and implications of such measures. This period saw several core European Union values being scrutinized, including the right to free movement, the right to protest, the protection of civil liberties, and the principle of using force only as a last resort (Cross, 2017: 614).

The terrorist attacks in France, followed by those in Belgium highlighted the necessity for European Union-level cooperation in detecting terrorism (Andreeva, 2021). The Schengen borders are monitored by the Frontex agency. In this context, collective securitization against migration and anti-terrorism efforts converges significantly due to their temporal proximity, making them difficult to separate. However, the collective border controls were primarily implemented due to migration concerns. Individual state border controls have not proven effective as counter-terrorism measure. Instead, monitoring at the external borders of the Schengen Area and utilizing information-gathering systems are more likely to aid in preventing terrorism.

3.3. Counter-Terrorism Efforts

The counter-terrorism strategy focuses on investigation and the monitoring of potential terrorist activities. Effective counter-terrorism requires agencies capable of cross-border operations and the collaboration of national police forces. In this regard, entities and systems such as Eurojust, Europol, the Visa Information System (VIS), and the Schengen Information System (SIS) are particularly valuable (Bartkó, 2011: 175-178).

Eurojust is the EU agency responsible for coordinating judicial cooperation in criminal matters and resolving jurisdictional issues. Both the SIS and Europol play significant roles in investigating terrorist activities, thereby enhancing their importance in counter-terrorism. Europol accelerates investigations through the verification of multiple data sources, utilizing tools that are more efficient and cost-effective when applied at the community level. Among its resources, Europol has access to the VIS data, enabling it to monitor visas issues by member states, which aids in terrorism investigations. The SIS also crucial in law enforcement, and its functionality was further enhanced by regulatory developments in 2018. These changes mandated member states to enter decisions regarding the return of refugees into the SIS and to notify the system and Europol of any terrorism-related findings and alerts. EU officials have also recognized that collaboration between intelligence services, police, and the judiciary significantly aids in identifying potential terrorists and investigating terrorist incidents (Andreeva, 2021). These systems create an effective "knowledge base" that bolsters counter-terrorism efforts (Bartkó, 2011: 175).

Both from political and judicial perspectives, Europol and Eurojust must be accountable to ensure they operate without corruption and under appropriate leadership. Primarily, the protection of fundamental rights must be prioritized, and these organizations should be held accountable for holding these standards. Additionally, the effective functioning of these agencies necessitates cooperation with their national counterparts, collaboration in sharing data with third countries, and the consent of the state involved. However, member states have the right to participate in regulations in varying degrees through differentiated integration. For instance, Denmark has opted out of participation in Europol and Eurojust, choosing instead to establish a separate agreement with Europol as if Denmark were a third country. This arrangement means that any potential criminal threats identified by Danish authorities may not be within Europol's purview (Briére, 2018). This differentiated participation can lead to gaps in information sharing and coordination, potentially affecting the overall efficacy of the EU's collective security measures.

3.4. Preparedness and Protection Against Terrorist Attacks: Data Collection and Information Sharing

The protection strategy has two important branches. Firstly, the protection and safety of citizens, and secondly, the infrastructure that is typically targeted by terrorism, such as administrative buildings, roads, bridges, transportation, border protection, and even the online communication systems and websites of significant institutions. This strategy includes information sharing, infrastructure protection, and the supervision or armaments and firearms, with regulations to prevent access to materials used to make explosives. Protecting infrastructure is a national responsibility, and it is essential to define protective strategies affecting these areas, as well as the security of inter-European transportation (Bartkó, 2011: 170-175).

A terrorist act acts as catalyst for change, prompting states to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation. This is evidenced by the fact that the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016 marked a significant turning point in the practice of information exchange among European Union member states, leading to a substantial increase in cooperation.

The sudden increase in information exchange is evident in the rise of data sharing through the Europol system, where the number of entries in the Europol information system grew from six thousand to half a million between 2016 and 2018 (Andreeva, 202: 762). Previously, such extensive information exchange was uncommon due to mistrust, with terrorism being managed at the national level. However, the events of 2015 and 2016 made it clear that a common system is necessary to combat the transnational problem, as it was suspected that two perpetrators might have entered France with the migration wave. Additionally, several perpetrators of the Belgian incident had previously committed crimes in Germany and Italy, and also possesses false identification documents in multiple countries simultaneously (Andreeva, 2021: 765).

The effective functioning of information exchange is hindered by the absence of a community-level agency for intelligence services, similar to Europol for police forces. Another issue is the gap between political declarations and the operational reality of counter-terrorism measures, where they are publicly advocated by politicians do not align with the mechanisms that can be practically implemented (Andreeva, 2021).

The Passenger Name Record (PNR) is a database that contains personal information of air travelers provided during the booking process. The directive was adopted in the European Union in 2016, outlining specific rules for the handling and transmission of this data as needed.

The system was designed to support the effective cross-border work of law enforcement agencies. The data can be utilized for counter-terrorism efforts and other criminal activities, serving purposes such as risk assessment, establishing risk criteria for prevention, and supporting investigations and prosecutions (European Council, 2021).

Following the September 11 attacks, the United States requested the implementation of the PNR system for all inbound and outbound travelers to and from the US in order to enhance national security. This request sparked a significant discourse among European Union institutions and within its member states. Initially, the system faced considerable criticism in Europe, and the 2000s saw extensive debates surrounding the PNR, raising issues related to data protection, security, and legality. Concerns about data misuse emerged, with the PNR perceived as excessive surveillance of foreigners by the US. Furthermore, several political parties in the European Parliament viewed it is an infringement on the rights of EU citizenship (Huijboom and Bodea, 2015).

When implementing security measures, a common dilemma arises, do the new regulations genuinely enhance security, or do their negative impacts outweigh the benefits, thereby reducing people's rights and freedom of movement? In the United States, following the 2001 events, the phenomenon known as "security theater" became prevalent. This term refers to measures that ostensibly increase security but, in reality, merely provide a perception of increased safety without significantly affecting the actual security situation (Schneier, 2003). The PNR system can be critiqued for its logic as well. For instance, it may be argued that many terrorists do not enter a country by plane, which is particularly true within the European Union, where numerous other means of inter-state travel exist. Consequently, the PNR system would not capture their data. Overall, while this method might be effective in monitoring passengers on transatlantic flights and providing greater security for travelers, it is insufficient on its own for tracking potential perpetrators at a European level.

3.5. Prevention: Cooperation with Third Countries

The prevention strategy encompasses a variety of approaches such as prevention programs, deradicalization, weakening the factors that legitimize terrorism, addressing ideology, curbing radicalization, and identifying and mitigating the underlying causes to avert threats.

Furthermore, it is crucial to strengthen law enforcement agencies and collective crime-fighting efforts at the community level, promoting communication among them, which can enhance effectiveness when extended to agencies in third countries. Individuals susceptible to influence and inclined to use violence are often radicalized and recruited through extremist websites, therefor weakening or eliminating these online platforms should also be a significant focus of prevention strategies. According to the third pillar of this strategy, the Union should also aim to dismantle existing terrorist organizations from a security perspective by stopping their financing and preventing their access to weapons (Bartkó, 2011: 165-170)

In the context of terrorism, addressing the root causes also involves cooperation between Western states and developing countries that are primary sources of terrorism. The Islamist violence, which can be mitigated through cooperation, is characteristic of regions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In this analysis, I associate cooperation with third countries with the prevention strategy, as the goal of such cooperation is ideally to dismantle forums that encourage radicalism and to enhance the efficiency of law enforcement agencies. The position of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator was established in 2004 as a response to the Madrid bombings. This official is responsible for coordinating anti-terrorism efforts both within the EU and with non-EU countries. The goals of these efforts include preventing extremism and radicalization, stopping the financial support of terrorist organizations, facilitating mutual information sharing with third countries, and detecting and dismantling recruitment networks (European Council, 2022).

After the January 2015 Paris terrorist attack, the EU strategy included initiating anti-terrorist dialogues with the Arab League, Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon. The EU Counter-Terrorist Coordinator also prepares reports on these regions. However, even before the 2015 events, there was recognition that these areas needed political strengthening, particularly in terms of democracy and the rule of law. This strategy also encompassed efforts in order to prevent illegal migration, aiming to ensure that immigrants arrive in Europe in the safest and most controlled manner possible. Since 2015, the importance of these measures has increased significantly, as politically stronger African and Middle Eastern states would not only reduce the number of refugees but also prevent terrorists from infiltering among them (Durac, 2017).

The external collective securitization of terrorism has partly occurred and continues through the European External Action Service (EEAS) and through formal and informal diplomacy. The EU also works towards enhancing local capacities in third countries by providing financial support. In this context, the demand for a new Global Strategy increased in 2016, prompting EU leaders to expedite related negotiations. Anti-terrorist actions included preventing radicalization and recruitment in refugee camps. Although, there was a concern that a strong anti-terrorism stance at the EU level could spark nationalism, which would have been detrimental amidst the migration crisis and the simultaneous rise of right-wing parties across Europe. Therefore, it was essential for the European borders to project a democratic environment rather than a xenophobic, closed-off region (Cross, 2017).

Beyond information exchange, personnel exchange was also characteristic. EU internal security agency staff were deployed abroad, and security personnel from third countries were received. Similarly, counter-terrorism experts were sent overseas to assist in the development of local measures (Shepherd, 2021).

In contemporary times, terrorist organizations have increasingly leveraged modern technology, particularly the internet, as a primary platform for recruitment and the dissemination of ideologies. Consequently, counter-terrorism strategies must prioritize addressing online content and forums as critical areas of focus. The subject inherently raises a prevalent dilemma in counter-terrorism discourse, whether such measures predominantly curtail individual freedoms within the digital sphere or whether the emphasis should be placed on their potential to enhance security. Nonetheless, the implementation of these measures, alongside collective securitization efforts, can foster a perception of heightened safety among the public and society at large.

4. Conclusion

The migration crisis of 2015, alongside with the terrorist attacks that occurred in 2015 and 2016, catalyzed significant shifts in the European Union's migration and counter-terrorism policies. Socially, as well as in a political rhetoric and media, these two phenomena were often erroneously linked. In reality, no direct correlation exists between them, instead they represent two distinct crises that simultaneously led to securitization. Migration had been part of the security discourse for decades and became a subject of securitization during the crises in 2015. Consequently, terrorism also entered the realm of securitized issues due to the terrorist attacks. The migration crisis exposed the inadequacies of existing mechanisms to accommodate large number of asylum seekers. On the other hand, counter-terrorism measures typically evolve in response to specific terrorist incidents, which reveal the shortcomings of previous measures and prompt a surge in new counter-terrorism initiatives. A critical issue with securitizing measures is their actual effectiveness in guaranteeing security, as they may curtail the civil liberties of other citizens.

The objective of this thesis was to analyze the response to the migration wave and terrorist attacks, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of the measures implemented and the identification of related issues and shortcomings. In summary it is crucial to acknowledge that the overall success of these measures cannot be conclusively determined for the entire scope of the topic. Instead, it is more appropriate to evaluate the success of individual measures independently. This approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of their efficacy and the specific challenges they address.

Primarily, when considering the broader context, it is evident that the fundamental truth is that the implemented measures can be rendered ineffective by inadequate levels of interstate cooperation. The functioning of the European Union relies on the consensus among member states, and in some cases, unanimity is required in decision-making processes. However, when examining the measures individually, different types of problems and shortcomings become apparent.

The chapters dealing with the refugee wave highlighted potential solutions by examining the security-oriented measures that have emerged within these frameworks. The asylum policy

chapter underscored the necessity of harmonized definitions within the European Union in order to ensure that there are no significant discrepancies in the procedures among member states. It also emphasized the importance of the existence of a humanitarian visa for the safe and legal submission of asylum applications. Although, it remains problematic that this falls under national jurisdiction, allowing member states to determine the extent to which they implement this tool. The standardization of legal categories and procedural systems would be a beneficial and efficient approach to simplifying the reception of asylum seekers. However, this would entail further EU integration, which might not align with the interests of all European leaders and political factions.

The section dedicated to addressing the root causes initially focused on the financial aid provided by the EU to African regions, as well as to Syria and its neighboring areas. The aim of this aid is to improve economic conditions and living standards. Although, financial assistance alone has proven insufficient in keeping refugees within their countries or origin and has also failed from a humanitarian perspective, as asylum seekers continue to be victim of violence and remains unsafe due to poor treatment and conditions. Financial aid is effective only if it is allocated based on the specific needs of the state and directed towards the most critical areas for improvement. Given that most of the countries sending migrants in 2015 were not democratic, the EU must closely monitor the proper use of these funds, requiring detailed plans, development-focused data, and subsequent reporting for accountability. This criterion is equally important for national development plans, as these originate from the contributions of EU member states. Furthermore, maintaining the safety of individuals is crucial. It is also important to ensure the general respect for human rights and to monitor progress in this area, as improvements significantly contribute to people's willingness to remain in their home countries.

The examination of integration possibilities was based on Germany's open-door policy, which, in principle, could function at the level of an organization encompassing such a large area and so many states. The quota proposal, founded on principles of solidarity and aimed at proportionally distributing asylum seekers according to population, ultimately failed. This approach is unsustainable in Europe because, given the political interests at play, leaders cannot allow the influx of arrivals to disrupt the nation-state order. Additionally, xenophobia is on the rise, as evidenced by the increasing popularity and ascendancy of right-wing views and parties.

The externalization of migration and the outsourcing of asylum procedures are exemplified by the EU-Turkey agreement. Under this agreement, Turkey agreed to receive refugees arriving in the EU from Greece in exchange for financial compensation, while the EU would accept one refugee already recognized in Turkey. From the outset, this arrangement faced legal challenges, primarily because Turkey is not considered a safe third country, raising significant humanitarian concerns. Although the urgency of the situation required swift decisions, the agreements should have been made contingent upon Turkey's willingness to adhere to EU values and ensure appropriate treatment and opportunities for refugees within a properly supportive environment.

The final subsection of the migration chapter focused on controlling immigration. The analysis revealed that protecting the internal, intra-state borders of the Schengen area is not particularly effective in managing migration. Instead, more effective measures include rigorous checks at external borders and addressing the root causes of irregular migration.

In the fourth chapter of my thesis, I analyzed strategies related to terrorism. The reviewed literature indicates that assessing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures is challenging. Moreover, each terrorist attack prompts changes in procedures and the evolution of regulations. The strategies examined included reactions and responses to the immediate consequences of terrorism, counter-terrorism efforts, defense strategies, and prevention tactics.

The first section discusses the assessment of the terrorist threat, highlighting the discrepancy between perceptions and the actual level of threat. This discrepancy is largely generated by securitizing rhetoric, whereas empirical analyses suggest a lower and more sporadic threat, not uniformly affecting all areas. The second subsection focuses on the initial French response to terrorism, the implementation of a state of emergency and temporary border controls. These measures primarily influence security perceptions rather than effectively mitigating the actual threat, as they are not comprehensive and also restrict the right to free movement.

The third section examines the policing and judicial aspects of counter-terrorism efforts, focusing on the work of Europol and Eurojust. This strategy encompasses investigation and surveillance of individuals suspected of terrorism. It aims to cut off financial support for terrorism activities, track potential terrorists, and expedite judicial processes in collaboration with third countries. A critical issue for both Europol and Eurojust is the willingness of member states to participate, exemplified by Denmark's opt-out which necessitated a separate agreement

with these agencies. Maintaining cooperation between EU agencies and national authorities is essential, as is ensuring the accountable and lawful operation of Europol and Eurojust.

The third section addresses the policing and judicial dimensions of counter-terrorism efforts, specifically through the work of Europol and Eurojust. This strategy encompasses investigation and surveillance of individuals suspected of terrorism. Its objectives include the elimination of financial support for terrorism activities, monitoring of potential terrorists, and acceleration of judicial processes in cooperation with third countries. A critical issue for both Europol and Eurojust is the willingness of member states to participate. For instance, Denamrk's opt-out necessitated a separate agreement with these agencies. It is essential to maintain cooperation between EU agencies and national authorities, ensuring the accountable and lawful operation of Europol and Eurojust.

The subsection on cooperation with third countries is elaborated in the prevention strategy segment, alongside the role of the counter-terrorism coordinator. This cooperation includes the exchange of information and coordination of law enforcement efforts, as discussed in previous sections. The strategy aims to prevent terrorism at its source by halting radicalization, strengthening law enforcement agencies in third countries, and curbing the spread of extremist views on online forums. The effectiveness of this cooperation hinges on the willingness of third countries to engage in effective collaboration. Additionally, there is a persistent concern about the potential infringement on internet freedom in the pursuit of these goals.

My thesis serves to complement the existing literature on migration and terrorism. It confirms the well-known fact that decision-making is cumbersome due to various political interests, making it challenging to organize effective joint action, particularly in the areas of migration and terrorism. Furthermore, the thesis meticulously presents the shortcomings and problems of the measures taken between 2015 and 2019, possibly persisting to this day.

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