Tvrtko Srdoc

FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN WILL IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND HENRY OF GHENT

MA Thesis in Comparative History, with a specialization
in Late Antique, Medieval, and Renaissance Studies.

Central European University Private University

Vienna

May 2024

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by

Tvrtko Srdoc

(Croatia)

Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies,

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Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU.

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Examiner

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Author's Declaration

I, the undersigned, **Tvrtko Srdoc**, candidate for the MA degree in Comparative History, with a specialization in Late Antique, Medieval, and Renaissance Studies, with a specialization in Interdisciplinary Medieval Studies declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes and compares the faculty psychology and action theory of two 13th-century philosophers, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and Henry of Ghent (1240-1293). Historically depicted as adversaries, this study aims to offer a refined perspective on their positions within the intellectual milieu of the 13th-century. To understand their commonalities and differences, three themes were chosen for analysis and comparison. They are: 1) The relationship between the intellect and the will in these authors' works, 2) Their theories about the primacy of either intellect or will in the soul, and 3) Their understanding of human free decision (*liberum arbitrium*). The analysis and comparison revealed several key insights. Firstly, Thomas' approach to the relationship between faculties was found to be in line with what the author called the "intermingling" of the acts of intellect and will, while Henry's approach was termed 'voluntaristic'. Secondly, Henry was shown by the author to be more adamant about the primacy of the will within the soul, while Thomas' approach to this question was proved by the analysis and comparison to be more balanced. Thirdly, Thomas' idea of reason's indeterminacy and Henry's theory of the will's self-actualization were taken by the author as the main differences and dividing points within the debate on free decision. Finally, the author suggested this thesis to be a first step toward a further understanding of how the 'voluntarist' theories deal with the problem of randomness of choice.

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Table of contents

List of Abbreviations

1) Thomas' and Henry's Works

In sent. - Scriptum super libros Sententiarum

QDV - Quaestiones disputatae de veritate

ST - Summa theologiae

QDM - Quaestiones disputatae de malo

Qdl. – Quaestiones quodlibetales

2) Abbreviations for References Within the Works

d. distinctio

q. quaestio

a. articulus

arg. in opp. argumentum in oppositum

s.c. sed contra

c. corpus articuli

ad pr., sec., ter. ad primum, secundum, tertium, etc.

e.t. expositio textus

1. Introduction

This M.A. thesis will analyze and compare aspects of faculty psychology[1] in the works of two thinkers of the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas (1225/1226 – 1274) and Henry of Ghent (1240 – 1293). Firstly, a short historical and historiographical background to the 13th century debates will be given. Then the main reasons behind the choice of the two authors, research questions, explanation of some important terms, and my method of comparison, will be briefly laid out. Finally, the reader will be briefly introduced to the two authors and their works, which will form the subsequent analyses and comparison.

1.1. Short Historical and Historiographical Overview

In this chapter, a short historical and historiographical background to the 13th century debate will be given. The historical overview will include the three most important philosophical influences on the action theories[2] of the 13th century. Firstly, the most important Latin medieval precursors to the 13th century debate. Namely, a sketch of Anselm of Canterbury's, Bernard of Clairvaux's and Peter of Lombard's action theories will be given.[3] Secondly, an overview of

[1] In this thesis, 'faculty psychology' will be used as an umbrella-term for scholastic theories of the soul. This is because, through Avicenna's interpretation of Aristotle, most of the scholastic thinkers accepted that the soul was distinguishable into faculties, such as those of 'intellect' and 'will'. Cf. Dag Nikolaus Hasse, "The Soul's Faculties," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy,* ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 305-320.

[2] In this thesis, 'action theory' will be used as that part of faculty psychology which deals directly with the way humans decide, i.e. with free decision and everything that is involved in it, such as deliberation or choice.

[3] I will mostly use Tobias Hoffmann's latest historical contextualization, cf. Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), esp. 13-35. Another good historical overview is found in Pasquale Porro, "Trasformazioni medievali della liberta I: Alla ricerca di una definizione del libero arbitrio," in *Libero Arbitrio: Storia Di Una Controversia Filosofica*, ed. Mario De Caro, Maurizio Mori, Emidio Spinelli (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2014), 171-188, esp. 178-186, and *ibid*., "Trasformazioni medievali della liberta II: Libertà e determinismo nei dibattiti scolastici," in *Libero Arbitrio: Storia Di Una Controversia Filosofica*, ed. Mario De Caro, Maurizio Mori, Emidio Spinelli (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2014), 191-217. An older, but still helpful and detailed historical overview of the 13th century debates on freedom are found in Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), esp. 94-149. For the overview of the way in which the terms 'voluntas' and 'intellectus' have changed throughout the history of philosophy, cf. Thomas Williams, "Will and Intellect," in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), esp. 238-243.

the reception of Aristotle's action theory in the Latin philosophical tradition will be provided. Thirdly, a historical sketch of the early 13th-century thinkers who grappled with Aristotle and subsequently brought about the beginning phase of the psychological turn will be supplied.

I follow Tobias Hoffmann in positing a psychological turn in Latin medieval action theory after the transmission and assimilation of the newly translated works of Aristotle (from the 1220-s onward).[4] The psychological turn signifies a reconceptualization of free decision outside its direct relatedness to theological issues. It does not entirely eliminate the theological questions that may arise, such as the relationship between God's omniscience and the existence of human free will, the issue of divine predestination or the effects of original sin on freedom and free decision. However, it grounds freedom and free decision within the scope of faculty psychology. That is, it seeks to establish an explanation of human free agency within the Aristotelian faculty-based conception of the soul. It is a shift from the discourse about Adam's sin, and God's relation to mankind as creator and judge more generally to an understanding of freedom and free decision within faculty psychology.[5]

Unlike the philosopher-theologians before the psychological turn, who wrote about the will primarily asking theological questions (and seeking theologically-relevant answers), philosopher-theologians from the 13th century onwards wanted to understand and ground freedom (*libertas*) and free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) immanently, i.e. within the faculties of intellect and will. The 13th century authors still wanted to know 'What kind of faculty is free decision?', but they no longer approach this question by asking 'Why did God give man free decision?' The study of free decision is slowly becoming a part of the study of the soul, and questions of freedom are treated as questions about human nature.[6]

[4] Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and Rebel Angels*, esp. 1-9.
[5] Jamie Anne Spiering, "An Innovative Approach to Liberum Arbitrium in the Thirteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), esp. 20-85.
[6] Jamie Anne Spiering, "An Innovative Approach", 44.

However, with Aristotle's emergence and subsequent settling as "the Philosopher," the Scholastics had to reconcile his views with the Catholic teaching. Namely, for Aristotle, choice (προαίρεσις,) necessarily follows our practical judgments. This implies that what the Christians believe to be free decision is nothing more than necessary assent to the intellect's counsels, which are conclusions of a syllogism brought about after deliberation has finished. This is obviously a problem if one wants to hold to the idea of God-given freedom in humans. However, because of the importance and stature of the Stagirite, most scholastic thinkers did not want to reject reason's role absolutely but wanted to hold a place for reason (or intellect) in free decision and in freedom more generally. This is why the usual definition of the faculty of will in the thirteenth century is that of rational appetite. Another important reason against a wholehearted rejection of Aristotle's theory because of its incompatibility with the Christian teaching is that Aristotle's account of human cognition and action was by far the most thought-out and comprehensive one that was available to the schoolmen of the 13th century.

Anselm of Canterbury (1033/1034 - 1109) defined free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) as "the ability to maintain the rectitude of the will for the sake of rectitude."[7] For Anselm, the ability to sin is "neither freedom, nor part of freedom" – a quotation that will be very common among the later scholastics.[8] Rather, rectitude of the will, as a necessary condition for free decision, implies that the will does what it is meant to do. When this rectitude is safeguarded by right choices, then we can say one has free decision. In the cases of choosing evil, the rectitude of the will is not preserved, and neither is free decision (*liberum arbitrium*).[9] Anselm distinguishes between three senses in which one can speak of the will (*voluntas*). Firstly, as an instrument (*instrumentum*), secondly as a proneness (*aptitudo*), and thirdly as exercise or use (*usus*).

[7] Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and Rebel Angels,* 14.
[8] For instance, in Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibeta* we find: "Denique nec libertas, nec pars libertatis est peccandi potestas." (*Quodlibet* III, q. 17, *fo*. LXXIX, *verso*).
[9] Pasquale Porro, "Trasformazioni Medievali", 178.

Anselm's *dictum* about the will being a self-moving instrument will be used by later scholastics who advocated the self-movement of the will within the soul.[10]

Bernard of Clairvaux (1090 – 1153) introduces three types of freedom, with each having a negative counterpart. The positive aspect is when one possesses such a freedom, the negative is the state in which one lacks such freedom. Firstly, free decision (*libertas arbitrii*) and freedom from necessity, freedom of counsel (*libertas consilii*) and freedom from sin, and freedom of delight (*libertas complaciti*) and freedom from misery.[11] Bernard's account of the will makes it the most important factor in free decision. Differing from the later 'intellectualist' accounts, the will can choose against the reason's better judgment. What is more, the will can choose without a prior input from reason, something that is unimaginable even for the 'voluntarist' thinkers of later scholasticism.

Peter of Lombard (1100-1160) discusses freedom and free decision within the second part of his *Sentences*. More specifically, the issues related to freedom are closely linked to the theory of original sin. He defines free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) as a faculty of reason and will with which one chooses good with the help of grace or evil when grace is lacking.[12] Both the context in which the will is mentioned, and the definition which includes the divine gift of grace, signify that Lombard's discussion of freedom and free decision is primarily theological. Furthermore, he inherits the four states of free decision from Bernard. That is, before the original sin, after the original sin and before reparation, after reparation and before confirmation, and after confirmation in Heaven or Hell.[13] Contrary to Anselm, Lombard thinks that free decision is not diminished by sin, but that it is the precise reason behind the possibility of sin.[14] Although sin is a part of free decision, Lombard accepts that in choosing evil, men lose freedom from sin

[10] Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and Rebel Angels*, 18.
[11] *Ibid.* 19.
[12] *Ibid.* 20.
[13] *Ibid.* 184.
[14] Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and Rebel Angels*, 21.

temporarily, which happens because grace is rejected, and freedom from misery indefinitely, i.e., until the beatific vision.[15]

Aristotle was the biggest philosophical authority in late scholastic philosophy. This meant that authors writing after Aristotle's moral and metaphysical works had been translated to Latin, had to account for his theories and make their own compatible with the Philosopher's. Although Aristotle does not have a concept of free will (*libera voluntas*), nor of free decision (*liberum arbitrium*), in the translations of Aristotle to Latin the scholastics found both *voluntas* (will) and *voluntarium* (voluntary).

There are two main stages in the reception of Aristotle's action theory.

The first phase in the reception of Aristotle's action theory was through *De fide orthodoxa*. It is a work written by John Damascene in the first half of the eighth century. It was translated by Burgundio of Pisa in 1153-54 and subsequently redacted by Robert Grosseteste between 1235-1240. It is an exposition of human action based on the theories of Nemesius of Emesa and Maximus Confessor, which they loosely adopted from Aristotle. Among others, a contradistinction between will as rational appetite and irrational appetite is introduced in the text. This is a novel idea that does not exist in Augustine, and thus neither in Anselm nor the later Latin tradition. What follows from the idea that the will is a rational appetite is that free decision implies rationality. Whereas animals are acted upon (*aguntur*), humans act (*agit*) and can choose whether to renounce or follow a desire. Because of this, humans are praised or blamed. Thence, the root of moral responsibility is in free decision. John Damascene separates judgment (*iudicium*) and decision (*electio*), which for Aristotle were the same thing. Namely, for Aristotle, that which is chosen coincides with the judgment that the reason gives.

[15] Pasquale Porro, "Transformazioni medievali", 174.

Furthermore, Damascene adds another step between judgment and decision that is translated as *sententia* in Latin.[16]

The second phase of the reception of Aristotle's faculty psychology and action theory started with the translation of the whole Nichomachean ethics in 1246/47 by Robert Grosseteste. He was able to almost fully invent an understandable lexicon of latinized Aristotelian terms which would, more or less, be in use for all of the scholastic period. Thus, the later scholastics found Aristotle's "decision" to mean the same as choice (*electio*), although for Aristotle a decision does not need to involve multiple possible alternatives. If only one means to an end is available, there can still be free decision. On the other hand, choice (*electio*) as the proper act of free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) requires multiple options to choose from.[17] Furthermore, for the authors before the 13th century, such as Anselm, Bernard and Peter Lombard, choice means an appetitive function of the will. On the other hand, Aristotle's "decision" is a culmination of deliberation, with the starting points of deliberation not chosen. Aristotle holds that the will cannot decide contrary to one's better judgment, because one's decision coincides with one's better judgment. This is different from how earlier medieval thinkers saw the will as able to go against reason, as mentioned in the case of Bernard of Clairvaux.[18]

Another issue was that in Aristotle' action theory an object understood as good moves the will to desire it. This idea caused a lot of the later scholastics to think of Aristotle's action theory as deterministic.[19] As we will see with Henry of Ghent, Aristotle's rejection of self-actualization and the Aristotelian *dictum* that everything moved has to be moved by another, was highly controversial in the scholastic period.

[16] *Ibid.* 24.
[17] *Ibid.* 25.
[18] *Ibid.* 26.
[19] *Ibid.* 29.

Aristotle's chief influences on later medieval faculty theories are his account of decision-making, his theory of the relation between cognitive deficiencies and moral failures, his theory of the causal influence of the desirable object on the will, his account of active and passive powers, and his imposition of limits on the way in which something can be sad to move itself.[20]

The psychological turn began with Phillip the Chancellor (1160-1236) and was significantly advanced by the *Summa Halensis* (1236-1245), Albert the Great (1200-1280), and Bonaventure (1221-1274).[21]

For Phillip the Chancellor, freedom (*libertas*) is to do what one wills. Free decision and the subsequent choice are primarily an act of the will and secondarily of the intellect. The acts of the will and of the intellect can equally be said to be free.[22] Philip explains the *ratio libertatis* of free decision as emerging from the immateriality of the intellect and the will, which makes it so that they are not bound by matter and can thus choose among opposites. Reason and will are only conceptually distinct, because of their acts and their objects, the true and the good. However, the will is a freer faculty than reason because the true coerces (*agit*) the reason to assent, but the good does not coerce the will.

The importance of the work called *Summa Halensis*, written in part by Alexander of Hales, is that it elaborates on Philip the Chancellor's claim that free decision is rooted in immateriality. It adds to this an argument for why materiality in animals prevents control over which alternative possibility is actualized.[23]

In his *De Homine*, Albert the Great adds to the argument of the *Summa Halensis* by advocating that free decision requires not only that the cognizing power transcend the bounds of the

[20] *Ibid*. 30.
[21] *Ibid.* 31.
[22] Pasquale Porro, "Transformazioni medievali", 184.
[23] Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and Rebel Angels*, 37.

material, but also that the appetitive power transcend the domain of the pleasant.[24] Bonaventure sees a larger unity between the will and the intellect in free decision than Albert the Great, who thought of free decision as a separate faculty of the soul, distinct from the faculties of will and reason.

Bonaventure construes the will as a formal, and the reason as the material cause of free decision in humans. He can safely be said to be the father of later 'voluntarist' thinkers, since he consistently ascribes the primacy of the will in the soul, and in free decision. For Bonaventure, in order for there to be free decision, there need to be two conditions fulfilled. Firstly, a lack of external coercion. Secondly, the will of the agent needs to move itself to a particular choice. The Franciscan master does not go into detail as to how this self-movement is metaphysically possible. However, as we will see in the analysis of Henry of Ghent's theory of the will's self-actualization, Bonaventure's later followers will supply a metaphysical grounding for this teaching.

This brief overview clearly shows the beginning phases of the psychological turn. This is seen in the way in which these authors approach freedom and free decision. Namely, they understand the existence of freedom and free decision as emerging from the faculty make-up of human beings. While some understand free decision as a separate faculty, and others as primarily in the will or in reason, they all have in common the immanent nature of the grounding of freedom and free decision. In other words, later scholastic thinkers immanentized the ability of humans to order themselves, and to choose according to that ordering. That being said, they largely differ in the precise way in which they understand the immanent human powers to bring about the existence of human freedom and human free decision.

[24] *Ibid.* 21.

A sketch of the main questions and debates in historiography will now be given. This overview will touch briefly upon certain historiographical issues. A comprehensive list and explanation of secondary literature would require more space, and since the main goal of this M.A. thesis is my analysis and interpretation of primary sources, it will not be included here.

In contemporary anglophone historiography, there are four main groups of writings regarding Thomas' and Henry's faculty psychologies.[25]

Firstly, there are a series of articles written about two main questions: 1) Whether Thomas Aquinas was a voluntarist or an intellectualist.[26] A voluntarist is someone who thinks that the will is the main faculty of the soul and that the action of the will is not determined by reason. An intellectualist is someone who thinks that the intellect is the main faculty of the soul and that the action of the will is determined by reason. In my view, this question boils down to the second one which is, 2) Whether Thomas Aquinas was a compatibilist (determinist) or incompatibilist (libertarian) as regards free decision.[27] That is, whether Thomas thought it (in)compatible that free decision exists alongside any type of determination, in this case, intellectual. Some contemporary authors who think Thomas Aquinas was a voluntarist (indeterminist) thinker are Tobias Hoffmann[28], Eleonore Stump[29], Scott MacDonald[30], David

[25] This grouping is an impression based on the limited amount of secondary literature I have been able to read so far.
[26] For the various meanings historiography has given to these terms, cf. Tobias Hoffmann, "Intellectualism and Voluntarism," in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 414.
[27] I think Thomas' teaching on the primacy of the intellect over the will makes the first debate redundant, as the analysis in 2.1. will show.
[28] Cf. the most recent contribution to this topic, Tobias Hoffmann and Cyrille Michon, "Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism," *Philosophers' Imprint* 17 (2017): 1-36. The authors advocate a libertarian conception of Thomas' thought, based on three main ideas: 1) Thomas' answers to other deterministic threats (celestial bodies and God) were incompatibilist, 2) Thomas' rejection of conditional free decision analysis, and 3) Thomas' own idea of free decision as rooted in practical reasoning avoids intellectual determinism.
[29] Eleonore Stump has written a few papers defending Thomas as a libertarian. For the most comprehensive work, cf. Eleonore Stump, "Aquinas's Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will," *The Monist* 80 (1997): 576-597. Here, Stump gives a general account of the relationship between the intellect and the will for Thomas, while also advocating a view of Thomas as a libertarian that rejects PAP (the principle of alternative possibilities).
[30] Cf. Scott Macdonald, "Aquinas's Libertarian Account of Free Choice," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 52 (1998). The reason's ability to form meta-judgments is termed as the basis of the indeterminacy of reason.

M. Gallagher[31], and Steven Jensen.[32] On the other hand, the most important recent defender of Thomas as a compatibilist is Thomas Williams.[33] Besides Williams, Loughran[34], Pasnau[35], and Hause[36] (tentatively), have advocated that Thomas needs to be understood as a compatibilist. There are some contemporary authors who think Thomas is neither a libertarian nor a compatibilist.[37]

The second type of historiographical writing is general historical overviews of these authors' views on freedom, free decision, the relationship between the intellect and the will, and other similar topics. These contributions generally give a broad overview of their thought.[38]

Subsequently, it is this act of reason because of which MacDonald thinks of Thomas as a libertarian. I give my short critique of MacDonald's argument in footnote 118.

[31] Gallagher has written extensively on Thomas' faculty psychology. His two most important articles defending the view that Thomas is a libertarian are: David M. Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as a Rational Appetite," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29 (1991): 559–84. and *ibid.*, "Free Choice and Free Judgment in Thomas Aquinas," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 76 (1994): 247–77.

[32] Cf. Steven J. Jensen, "Libertarian Free Decision: A Thomistic Account," *The Thomist* 81 (2017): 315-343.

[33] Williams advocates his view of Thomas as a compatibilist in many of his contributions. For instance, in his article from 2011, Williams affirms that Thomas "fails to give us any reason to think they [freedom and determinism] are incompatible, cf. Thomas Williams, "Human Freedom and Agency," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 199-208. In a 2018 article, Williams asserts Thomas' compatibilism from his interpretation of *ST* I-II q. 77, a.1, according to which the will cannot act against the particular judgment of reason. That is, the only way that there can be freedom and free decision in Thomas' thought, according to Williams, is if one understands freedom in a compatibilist sense (not including different possibilities being open to the will, but only that it acts according to its own principle). Cf. Thomas Williams, "Will and Intellect," in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 238–256.

[34] Thomas J. Loughran, "Aquinas, Compatibilist," in *Human and Divine Agency: Anglican, Catholic, and Lutheran Perspectives*, ed. F. Michael McLain and W. Mark Richardson (Lanham, New York and Oxford: University Press of America, 1999), 1-39.

[35] Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 73-89* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[36] Hause argues against Thomas as a voluntarist but does not give his clear opinion on the more pertinent issue which is whether Thomas is a compatibilist or not. Cf. Jeffrey Hause, "Thomas Aquinas and the Voluntarists," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1997): 167–182.

[37] This critique is primarily based on the idea that every free act according to voluntarists must absolutely have its origin in the agent doing the act. This is, however, contrary to Thomas' theory which poses God as the First Mover of every act of the will. Shanley also criticizes the compatibilist interpretations of Thomas, but he does not go into more detail and thus that part is left lacking. Shanley criticizes the predications of Thomas as libertarian or compatibilist. Shanley's critique of such terms is not based on their historical anachronism (as, for instance, mine would be), but on the way in which they neglect the theological presuppositions of Thomas' thought. Cf. Brian J. Shanley, "Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism," in *Freedom and the Human Person* (Washington D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 70-89.

[38] For instance, Louise Mitchell offers no real contributions to the understanding of Thomas' thought. However, she compares him with Servais Pinckaers, which would warrant me putting this article in the comparative section as well. Cf. Louise A. Mitchell, "Free to Be Human: Thomas Aquinas's Discussion of Liberum Arbitrium," *New Blackfriars* 96 (2015): 22–42. Donagan tries to sketch Thomas' theory in opposition to Aristotle, but he is not consistent in this method. I would say that this paper is mostly a sketch of the main topics in Thomas, but with some vague and not sufficiently explained sentences, e.g.: "In Aquinas' theory, voluntary human acts are identical

The third type are topic-specific articles and studies that are directly linked to a certain aspect of Thomas' or Henry's faculty psychology. This third type of historiography is usually a close-reading contribution, and it is neither directly interested in the (in)compatibilist debate, nor intends to give a general outline of these thinkers' thoughts.[39]

The fourth type is comparisons between one of these authors and another (medieval or not) thinker.[40]

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with human acts involving choice". This sentence is not very clear, and in fact Thomas explicitly states that those in Heaven are free, which would be against this Donagan's sentence. Cf. Alan Donagan, "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 642–654. Similarly, Teske gives a general overview of Henry's faculty psychology. He focuses on two main issues. Firstly, how does the will in God function for Henry of Ghent. Secondly, how the primacy of the will is situated in Henry's *Quodlibeta*. This contribution does not add more than just a reading of the texts where Henry's mentions the will. Cf. Roland Teske, "Henry of Ghent on Freedom of the Human Will," in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 315-335. Marco Forlivesi gives a general account of the relationship between the intellect and the will in Thomas. Cf. Marco Forlivesi, "Rapporti tra Intelletto e Volontà nell'Opera di Tommaso d'Aquino," *Divus Thomas* 99 (1996): 222-258.

[39] For the *akrasia* (weakness of will or incontinence) literature, cf. Tobias Hoffmann, "Weakness of Will in Henry of Ghent," in *Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present*, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 115–37. Hoffmann analyzes Henry of Ghent's 'voluntarist' theory of akrasia by focusing on three factors. Firstly, on the necessity of the will being able to choose contrary to the reason's better judgment. Secondly, by explaining the relation between ignorance, passion, and moral evil. Thirdly, by discussing the strength of will, virtues, and moral perfection. At the end of the paper, Hoffmann gives a critique of Henry' account. It has to do with the inability of Henry's theory to explain why one should want to dismiss the practical judgment of what deliberation has proved to be the best choice. As Hoffmann says, "[Henry] simply posits the possibility of the second-best choice (i.e. to choose according to the simple cognition) as a brute fact." For an account of *akrasia* in Thomas, cf. Bonnie Kent, "Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27 (1989): 199–223. On the indeterminacy of reason's judgments in Thomas, cf. Stephen Wang, "The Indetermination of Reason and the Role of the Will in Aquinas's Account of Human Freedom," *New Blackfriars* 90 (2009): 108–129. On Thomas' appropriation of the Aristotelian principle "the free is the cause of itself", Jamie Anne Spiering, "Liber Est Causa Sui: Thomas Aquinas and the Maxim 'The Free is the Cause of Itself'," *The Review of Metaphysics* 65 (2011): 351-376. On Henry of Ghent's rejection of the Aristotelian principle *omne quod movetur ab alio movetur*, cf. Roland Teske, "Henry of Ghent's rejection of the principle 'Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur'," in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700Th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 279-305. For a negative (and I believe, rightfully so) response as to whether Thomas' changed his mind about the will, cf. Daniel Westberg, "Did Aquinas Change his Mind about the Will?" *The Thomist* 58 (1994): 41-60. For a positive response, cf. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, eds., *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

[40] For a comprehensive and detailed comparison between Thomas and Henry on the relationship between Divine and human willing, cf. John F. Wippel, "Divine Knowledge, Divine Power, and Human Freedom in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent," in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Springer: Synthese Historical Library, 1985), 213-241. For a comparison between Phillip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas on *liberum arbitrium*, cf. Jamie Anne Spiering, "An Innovative Approach to Liberum Arbitrium in the Thirteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America Press, 2010). For a comparison of the metaphysics of Pseudo-Dionysius and Henry of Ghent, where Henry is seen as the last scholastic representative of a metaphysical tradition in direct dialogue and acceptance to Pseudo Dionysius, cf. Pasquale Porro, "Pseudo-Dionysius and Henry of Ghent," in *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter*, ed. T. Toiadjiev, G. Kapriev and A. Speer (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 395-427. For a comparison between Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and Henry of Ghent on the way in which the object of the beatific vision (God)

1.2. Research Questions, Method, and Terminology

The main reason behind the choice of the two authors is the way that both the traditional and contemporary historiography has pitted them against each other. This is seen from the views of the oft-cited historians of medieval philosophy from the 20th century, such as Etienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro, with the latter calling Henry of Ghent "[il] principale avversario di san Tommaso", and even, "il corifeo dell'antitomismo medievale."[41] Although this direct opposition has been somewhat toned down, the main contemporary historian of philosophy working on these issues has also grouped them on opposing sides – Thomas as an intellectualist, and Henry as a voluntarist.[42]

The goal of this M.A. thesis is to be a contribution to the positioning of these two authors within 13th-century theories of faculty psychology and action theory. This will be done through the analysis of their own theories, and their subsequent comparison. In addition, this M.A. thesis hopes to be an analysis of two specific ways in which the introduction of Aristotle's texts to medieval Latin philosophy caused new and exciting changes in the formulation of faculty psychology and action theory in the 13th-century.

My method is to analyze and compare these two authors, based on three chosen themes. The themes are: 1) The relationship between the intellect and the will in the soul, 2) The debate over the primacy of one or the other, and 3) Their theories on free decision (*liberum arbitrium*).

influences the will, cf. Thomas M. Osborne Jr., "Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on Whether to See God Is to Love Him," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 80 (2013): 57–76. For a similar study but comparing three other scholastic thinkers on the object of the first evil choice, cf. Pini, Giorgio. "What Lucifer Wanted: Anselm, Aquinas, and Scotus on the Object of the First Evil Choice." *Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy* 1 (2013): 61–82.

[41] "The principal adversary of Saint Thomas", and "Coryphean of medieval antithomism", respectively. Quoted from Pasquale Porro, "Metaphysics and Theology in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century: Henry of Ghent Reconsidered," *Miscellanea Medievalia* 27 (2000): 266.

[42] Cf. Tobias Hoffmann, *Free Will and Rebel Angels,* 40-54, and 63-84.

The choice of these three themes is contingent. However, as I hope the analyses and the comparison will prove, these topics are indeed shared by both authors. That being said, my choice of three themes is by no means exhaustive, and could have included some other topics, which were equally part of the same discussion.[43]

Three research questions follow the themes, and they are: 1) What are Thomas' and Henry's views on the primacy of the will or intellect in the soul? 2) How do Thomas and Henry explain the relationship between the will and the intellect within the soul? and 3) How and where do Thomas and Henry ground free decision and choice?

There are some terminological notes that I wish to address here. Firstly, I translate *voluntas* and *velle*, as 'will' and 'willing', *intellectus* and *ratio* as 'intellect' and 'reason', *liberum arbitrium* as 'free decision', *libertas*, *libertas pura* or *libera voluntas* as 'freedom' or 'freedom simply'. It seems that the only contentious of these is the translation of *liberum arbitrium*. I chose "free decision" since it seemed most neutral as to the source of freedom in it. This is because if one translates it as 'free-will' or 'free judgment', one *a priori* presupposes that the root cause of this power is in the will or in reason. Secondly, after consulting the primary and secondary sources, I believe that "freedom of the human will" (which is the title of this thesis) is not the most helpful way to understand these debates. This is because "of the human will" implies that freedom is found primarily in the faculty of the will. This is something that must first be proven by analyzing the sources. If I were able to change the title of this thesis, I would propose "Freedom and Free Decision in Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent". However, it was too late to change the title after it had been defended in the form of a prospectus.

[43] An example of such a topic is the incontinence or weakness of the will, which will be touched upon only at a glance in this M.A. thesis.

1.3. Biographies and the Sources Used

In this chapter, short biographies of the two authors that will be analyzed will be given. An overview of the sources that will be consulted in the analysis will also be given. Although there is not enough space to go into too much detail about the author's lives, nor the particular context behind each of their works, some preliminary notes about their lives and their works are necessary for historical contextualization.

1.3.1. Thomas Aquinas (*Super Libros Sententiarum*, *Quaestiones Disputate de Veritate*, *Summa Theologiae*, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*)

Thomas Aquinas was born in Roccasecca, near Naples, around 1226. He was educated at an early age in Monte Cassino by the Benedictines and studied philosophy at the Faculty of Arts in the newly established University of Naples. He entered the Dominican Order in 1244 and spent three years at the Dominican Priory in Paris (1245-48) studying theology. From 1248 to 1251 or 1252 he studied under Albert the Great in Cologne. In 1252 he was sent to Paris again as a Bachelor in Theology. There were three stages a Bachelor had to pass to become a Master in Theology. Firstly, lecturing and commentating on the Scriptures. Secondly, commentating on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, and thirdly, assisting on formal university disputations. In 1256 he completed all three conditions and was granted the title of Master of Theology. From 1256 to 1259 he held the Dominican chair at the University of Paris. In 1260 or 1261 he was named priory lector at Orvieto, where he was in close contact with Pope Urban IV. In 1265 he was called to establish a Dominican house of studies (*studium generale*) in Rome, for which purpose he started writing the *Summa theologiae*. His second regency in Paris was from 1268 to 1272.

In 1272 he founded a *studium generale* at Naples. Thomas Aquinas died on March the 7th 1274 at the Cistercian abbey of Fossanova, on his way to the 2nd Council of Lyon (1274).[44]

Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum[45]

After Alexander of Hales subdivided Peter Lombard's Sentences into distinctions and articles in the early 13th century, it became a general theology textbook throughout the medieval period (and up until the 16th century). This meant that everybody who wanted to become a Master in Theology had to write a commentary on this work. This is Thomas' earliest great work, written in the early 1250s. In it, Thomas offers more than a simple commentary. It is the only one of his works comparable to the *Summa theologiae* in size and scope, and it includes topics that Thomas never treated in the *Summa* or anywhere else in his opus. Moreover, the Commentary on the Sentences often contains detailed and in-depth accounts of arguments or positions that Thomas refers to only implicitly or as a subtext in his later works.[46]

Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate[47]

The form of the Disputed Questions was part of the curricula of medieval universities. It consisted of objections, responses, and a magisterial determination. It was usually a work

[44] Main dates from the life of Thomas Aquinas are taken from Dominic Legge, "Thomas Aquinas: A Life Pursuing Wisdom," in *The New Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Thomas Joseph White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 7-28. For further details on Thomas' life and works, cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his work* (Washington D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

[45] I used Mandonnet's edition of the Commentary of the Sentences in this thesis. Cf. Pierre Mandonnet, ed., *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929).

[46] The main information about the *Scriptum super Sententiarum*, the *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* and the *Quaestiones disputatae de malo* are taken from Torell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 39-45, 59-69, 101-111, and 201-207.

[47] I used the Leonine edition of the Disputed questions on truth. Cf. *Opera omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, Tomus XXII, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, qq. 21-29 (Rome: Editio Leonina, 1973).

gathered from numerous scholastic years, in the case of the Disputed Questions on Truth, three academic years (1256-59). *De veritate* is an assembly of 253 articles grouped into twenty-nine questions. The first question has given its name to the entire series (*De veritate*), but the other questions are more or less distant from that subject. We can see quite well that the whole is subdivided into two large parts. Firstly, on truth and knowledge (qq. 1–20) and secondly, on the good and the appetite for the good (qq. 21–29).

Summa theologiae[48]

The *Summary of Theology* is the most influential work of St. Thomas Aquinas. It was never finished, and the writing of the work began in 1265 in Rome, for the needs of the newly established *studium generale* in Rome. It is divided into three parts - the first deals with God's existence and nature (questions 1-43), God's creation (q.44-49), angels (q.50-64), days of creation (q.50-64), human nature (q.75-102) and Divine authority (q.103-119). The second part deals with morality in general and is divided into two parts. The first part of the second part (*Prima Secundae*) deals with human happiness (q. 1-5), human actions (q. 6-17), the good and bad character of human actions (q. 18-21), passions (q. 22- 48) and sources of human actions - intrinsic (q. 49-89) and extrinsic (q. 90-114). The second part of the second part (*Secunda Secundae*) deals with the three theological virtues and their corresponding vices (q. 1-46), the three cardinal virtues and their corresponding vices (q. 47-170) and life goals with reference to the religious life (q. 171-189). The third part deals with the Incarnation, i.e., the embodiment (q. 1-59) and the sacraments (q. 60-90). Each part is further divided into questions and articles. The *Summa* was written as a tool for the further study of novitiates within the Dominican order. That explains the synthesizing tendency of the work. It should also be said that the *Summa*, in

[48] I used the Leonine edition of the *Summa theologiae.* Cf. *Opera omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, *Summa Theologiae*, Tomus Quintus, Pars Prima (Rome: Editio Leonina, 1889), and *Opera omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, *Summa Theologiae*, Tomus Sextus, Prima Secundae (Rome: Editio Leonina, 1891).

addition to being a capital work in the history of philosophy and theology, is also important in the study of the history of education, given its prevalence in curricula inside and outside the Catholic Church since the 13th century.[49]

Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo[50]

The Disputed Questions on Evil were written in two phases: around 1270 for Questions 1–15; and in 1272 for Question 16. The first question has given its name to the whole (On Evil), but it is the only one that speaks explicitly of the problem of evil. Therefore, we must read it in connection with Thomas's other explanations to have his full thought on the subject. Two questions then follow on sin and its causes (Questions 2 and 3), and two others on original sin and the punishment that followed it (Questions 4 and 5). Question 6, *De electione humana*, is the most important for this thesis. This is because it is the most exhaustive treatment of choice (*electio*) in Thomas' whole opus. The seventh question is on venial sin, followed by the seven deadly sins (Question 8), presented in this order: vainglory, envy, sloth, anger, avarice, gluttony, and luxury (Questions 9–15). Finally, Question 16 offers the reader an exposition of demonology, complete in twelve articles.

1.3.1. Henry of Ghent (*Quaestiones Quodlibetales*)

Henry of Ghent was born around 1240. At the University of Paris, he became a master at the Faculty of Arts in 1267, and a Master of Theology in 1276. After becoming a master, he started his long career at the Faculty of Theology in Paris, a position he kept until his death on the 23rd of June 1293. Works which can be attributed to Henry with certainty are his *Quodlibeta,*

[49] The main information about the *Summa theologiae* is taken from Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (London: Routledge, 2003), 9-10 and Brian Davies, *Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 6-8.
[50] I used the Leonine edition of the Disputed questions on evil. Cf. *Opera omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII edita cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, Tomus XXIII, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo* (Rome: Editio Leonina, 1982).

Quaestiones Ordinariae (or *Summa*), the *Tractatus super facto praelatorum et fratrum*, and various sermons. Henry was involved in the Condemnation of 1277 as part of the theological commission that drafted the 219 condemned propositions. Henry's intellectual prowess at the University of Paris earned him the honorific title *Doctor Solemnis*.[51]

Quaestiones Quodlibetales (*Quodlibeta*)

The quodlibetal questions are a product of a disputation between students and a master. They would meet twice a year, once before Christmas, and once before Easter. The students could ask the master any question (*quod* = what, *libet* = pleases). The master would record all the questions. Then, a few days later, he would answer them briefly in oral fashion. Finally, the whole series of these *quaestio* alongside the master's detailed determinations would be written and subsequently distributed some time after the meeting.[52] We know that Henry conducted and published fifteen quodlibetal disputations from 1276 through 1292.[53] Henry also started writing a monumental *Summa* (*Quaestiones Ordinariae*), but he never finished the work. Although the part that was finished (the treatise on God) has some interesting things to say about the free decision and topics related to it, because of the scope of this thesis, I decided not to consult it.

[51] For the main information about Henry's biography and his writings, cf. Raymond Macken. "La vie d'Henri de Gand", "Les ecrits d'Henri" in *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia: Quodlibet I.*, ed. R. Macken (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1979), V-XXIV., Guido Alliney. "Introduzione", in *Il nodo nel giunco: le questioni sulla libertà di Enrico di Gand*. (Bari: Edizioni di Pagina, 2009), 7-18., Roland Teske. "Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will ". *Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation* 32 (Marquette: Marquette University Press, 1993), 1-6., Gordon A. Wilson. "Henry of Ghent's Written Legacy", in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*. (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011), 3-23., Pasquale Porro. "An Historical Image of Henry of Ghent" in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of his Death (1293)*, ed. W. Vanhamel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 373-403., Pasquale Porro. *Enrico di Gand. La via delle proposizioni universali* (Bari: Levante, 1990), 143-174. For Henry's involvement in the 1277 Condemnation, cf. Robert Wielockx. "Henry of Ghent and the Events of 1277", in *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*. (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011), 25-61.

[52] This is the most common form of a mediaeval *quaestio*:

1) *Quaestio*: The issue at hand (e.g. *Utrum homo sit liberi arbitrii*),
2) *Obiecta*: Objections to the position that the *magister* will defend,
3) *Sed contra*: a short passage from the Scripture, the Church Fathers, or a philosopher-theologian defending the *magister*'s own view,
4) *Corpus articuli* (also *Responsio* or *Solutio*): the *magister*'s detailed determination of the issue, and
5) *Ad obiecta*: the *magister*'s reply to objections posed in 2).

[53] For a study of the quodlibetal genre in general and Henry's *quodlibeta* in particular, cf. Pasquale Porro. "Doing Theology (and Philosophy) in the First Person: Henry of Ghent's Quodlibeta." In *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006), 171–231.

The modern critical edition (the *Opera omnia*) of Henry's works started in 1979 at the De Wulf-Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at the Katholieke Universiteit (KU) Leuven. I used this modern edition as my primary source. For those quodlibetal questions that are not yet part of the *Opera omnia*, I used the 1518 Badius edition made in Paris (reprinted in 1961 in Leuven). There are twenty-nine quodlibetal questions where Henry discusses (directly or indirectly) the primacy of the will over the intellect, the relationship between the will and the intellect, and free decision (*liberum arbitrium*).[54]

[54] These are: Quodlibet I Quaestio 14 (ed. R. Macken, 1979): *Utrum voluntas sit potentia superior intellectu vel e converso*, Quodlibet I Quaestio 15 (ed. R. Macken, 1979): *Utrum actus voluntatis praecedat actum intellectus vel e converso*, Quodlibet I Quaestio 16 (ed. R. Macken, 1979) *Utrum propositis ab intellectu maiori bono et minori possit voluntas eligere minus bonum*, Quodlibet I Quaestio 17 (ed. R. Macken, 1979) *Utrum deordinatio voluntatis causetur a deordinatione rationis vel e converso*, Quodlibet I Quaestio 20 (ed. R. Macken, 1979) *Utrum magis sit eligendum non esse omnino quam in miseria esse*, Quodlibet III Quaestio 17 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]) *Utrum homo sit liberi arbitrii*, Quodlibet V Quaestio 27 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]) *Utrum voluntas per operationem suam sit alicubi, ubi corpus non sit animatum, cuius est illa voluntas*, Quodlibet VI Quaestio 32 (ed. G. Wilson, 1987) *Utrum primi motus sint peccata*, Quodlibet VIII Quaestio 10 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]) *Utrum homo, vel Angelus in statu innocentiae potuerit habere primum actum malum*, Quodlibet VIII Quaestio 11 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]) *Utrum damnati possint reverti ad bonum*, Quodlibet VIII Quaestio 15 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]), *Utrum appetitus rationalis distinguatur, vel possit distingui in irrascibilem et concupiscibilem*, Quodlibet IX Quaestio 5 (ed. R. Macken, 1983) *Utrum voluntas moveat se ipsam*, Quodlibet IX Quaestio 6 (ed. R. Macken, 1983) *Utrum imperare sit actus voluntatis, an rationis sive intellectus*, Quodlibet X Quaestio 9 (ed. R. Macken, 1987) *Utrum subiectum per se possit esse causa sufficiens sui accidentis*, Quodlibet X Quaestio 10 (ed. R. Macken, 1987) *Utrum appetitus sensitivus potest movere voluntatem ad consentiendum alicui, nulla de hoc existente notitia in intellectu*, Quodlibet X Quaestio 11 (ed. R. Macken, 1987) *Utrum possibile sit homini ut assentiat propositioni cuius contrarium apparet sibi per rationem*, Quodlibet X Quaestio 13 (ed. R. Macken, 1987) *Utrum, ratione dictante aliquid faciendium, voluntas pro aliqua hora possit illud non velle*, Quodlibet X Quaestio 14 (ed. R. Macken, 1987) *Utrum operatio voluntatis sit finaliter propter operationem intellectus vel e converso*, Quodlibet X Quaestio 15 (ed. R. Macken, 1987) *Utrum magis uniatur voluntas volito an intellectus intellecto*, Quodlibet XII Quaestio 26 (ed. J. Decorte, 1987) *Utrum voluntas possit actuari sive reduci in actum, et tamen non determinari ab illo a quo actuatur*, Quodlibet XI Quaestio 6 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]) *Utrum aliquid potest reducere seipsum de potentia ad actum*, Quodlibet XI Quaestio 7 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]) *Utrum in substantia intellectuali creata possit esse virtus una activa, quae possit in contraria*, Quodlibet XII Quaestio 3 (ed. J. Decorte, 1987) *Utrum non habens rationem cogentem ad aliquam partem contradictionis possit illi assentire sine formidine*, Quodlibet XII Quaestio 5 (ed. J. Decorte, 1987) *Utrum Deus posset facere quod intellectus possit videre ipsum, et quod tamen voluntas eum non diligat*, Quodlibet XII Quaestio 27 (ed. J. Decorte, 1987) *Utrum sufficiat ad libertatem arbitrii quod potuit impediri ne actuaretur ab alio de necessita*, Quodlibet XIII Quaestio 9 (ed. J. Decorte, 1985), *Utrum primum et per se obiectum voluntatis sit bonum sub ratione boni simpliciter an sub ratione convenientis*, Quodlibet XIII Quaestio 10 (ed. J. Decorte, 1985) *Utrum actus volitionis moralis speciem moris sortiatur ab objecto an a voluntate*, Quodlibet XIII Quaestio 11 (ed. J. Decorte, 1985) *Utrum ad eliciendum actum volitionis sufficiat sola obiecti ostensio an cum hoc requiratur aliqua influentia vel affectio*, Quodlibet XIV Quaestio 5 (ed. Badius, 1518 [1961]) *Utrum intellectus et voluntas sint aeque liberi supponendo quod ambo sint liberi*.

2. Thomas Aquinas on the Freedom of the Human Will[55]

This chapter is divided into three subchapters. Each of them will deal with one aspect of Thomas' faculty psychology. Before going into each separate theme, a short introduction to some presently relevant concepts Thomas Aquinas uses is needed.

Both the will and the intellect are faculties of the soul. A faculty is a power that is in the command (*nutum*) of the subject, just as possessions are said to be in command of the possessor.[56] The will is a faculty of the soul, although it is sometimes understood by its proper act, which is to will (*velle*).[57] The definition of the will is that it is an intellectual or rational appetite. That it is an appetite means it is oriented towards a good perceived as an end or a means to an end. When the good is willed as an end, then the act of the will is called intention (*intentio*). When the good is willed as a means to an end, then the act of the will is called choice (*electio*). That the will is rational means it requires the intellect to supply a concept of the good so that it can intend to it or will it simply (the end) or choose it (the means).[58] That means that a necessary condition for any act of the will is that the good is 'shown' (*ostendatur*) to the will by the cognizing or apprehensive power, which is reason or intellect.[59]

Every act of the will is ordered under the aspect of the good (*sub ratione boni*), because the good is the will's primary object. This means that the will can only will what the intellect perceives as a good. However, this perception of the good does not have to reflect the nature of

[55] The editions of Thomas' works are cited according to the placement in the text (cf. list of abbreviations at the beginning), and the page number in the edition. All translations are my own.
[56] "… facultas secundum communem usum loquendi significat potestatem qua aliquid habetur ad nutum, unde et possessiones facultates dicuntur, quia in dominio sunt possidentis (…)" (*In sent.* II, d. 24. q.1, a.1, *ad sec*., 591.).
[57] "Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas quandoque dicitur ipsa potentia qua volumus; quandoque autem ipse voluntatis actus." (*ST* I-II, q. 8, a. 2, *c*., 70.).
[58] "Appetitus autem rationalis est qui consequitur apprehensionem rationis; et hic dicitur motus rationis, qui est actus voluntatis." (*In sent*. II, d.24, q.3, a.1, *c*., 617.). Also, *ST* I, q. 82, a.5, c., 305.
[59] "Unde ad hoc quod velit bonum, non requiritur nisi quod ostendatur sibi per vim cognitivam." (*QDV*, q.24, a.4, *ad non*., 692.).

the thing itself. Just because the will wills something as good, does not mean that it is truly good for the person, but only that it is perceived as such. This is why all people seek happiness, but not all people seek it where it should be sought.[60] Intellect and reason are used interchangeably by Thomas. This is because they signify the same faculty (the cognizing or apprehensive faculty) whose principal act is to think or cognize.[61] The conceptual difference between reason and intellect is that the intellect signifies a non-discursive process of the cognizing (or apprehensive) faculty and includes a sudden apprehension of a thing. On the other hand, reason signifies a discursive process of the same faculty, moving from one thing to another, for instance, inferring the conclusion from the premises.[62] Because there is no real distinction between them (they signify different aspects of the same faculty), Thomas often uses the two terms interchangeably.[63]

There is also a difference between speculative and practical intellect. The speculative intellect is the intellect insofar as it is ordered only to the truth of a thing. The practical intellect is the intellect insofar as it is also ordered to a certain work. That is to say, it also includes what ought to be done.[64] Free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) is a faculty of will and reason.[65] Choice (*electio*) is the proper act of *liberum arbitrium*, which combines both an appetitive (*desiderium*) and rational (*discretionem*) element.[66] For choice to exist, it is necessary that there exist different

[60] "… quamvis omnis voluntas bonum appetat, non tamen appetit semper quod est vere sibi bonum, sed id quod est apparens bonum; et quamvis omnis homo beatitudinem appetat, non tamen quaerit eam in eo ubi est vera beatitudo, sed ubi non est. (…)" (*In sent.* II, d.38, q.1, a.5, *c*., 979.). Also, *In sent.* II, d.40, q.1, a.5, *ad qui*., 1027., and *ST* Ia q.82, a.2, *ad pr*., 296.
[61] "… ipsum actum intellectus qui est intelligere. "(*ST* I, q.79, a.10, *c*., 277.).
[62] "… intellectus non est idem quod ratio. Ratio enim importat quemdam discursum unius in aliud; intellectus autem importat subitam apprehensionem alicujus rei." (*In sent.* II, d.24, q.3, a.3, *ad sec*., 624.).
[63] "Ratio ergo et intellectus et mens sunt una potentia." (*ST* I, q.79, a. 8, *s.c*., 274.).
[64] "Nam intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem: practicus vero intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus." (*ST* I, q.79, a.11, *c*., 278.).
[65] "Facultas autem liberi arbitrii duo presupponit, scilicet naturam et vim cognitivam." (*QDV*, q.24, a.3, *c*., 688.). In *Quaestiones Disputate de Malo*, instead of *liberum arbitrium*, Thomas uses *liberum electionem*, but with the same meaning.
[66] "Eligere enim, quod actus ejus [liberum arbitrium] ponitur, importat discretionem et desiderium; unde eligere est alterum alteri praeoptare. Haec autem duo sine virtute voluntatis et rationis perfici non possunt. Unde patet

options to choose from.[67] Reason's counsel (conclusion of practical or operative syllogism) precedes every act of choice.[68] If there were no free decision (and, subsequently, choice), there would not be any reason for merit or demerit, nor for just punishments or rewards.[69] According to Thomas, free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) is not a faculty distinct from will and reason. Rather, it is principally the power of the faculty of will in which there is also a rational or intellective component.[70] In this way, free decision, as part of the appetitive faculty, is analogous to reason as part of the cognizing or apprehensive faculty. Just as the discursive act of the cognizing faculty (i.e. the act of reason) follows the non-discursive act of the cognizing of principles (i.e. the act of the intellect), so too does the choice of means (i.e. the act of free decision) follow from the intending or willing of an end (i.e. the act of the will simply).[71]

There are different types of freedom that Thomas inherits from the earlier philosophical tradition, principally from Bernard of Clairvaux. *Libertas a peccato* (freedom from sin) comes about because the habits are well-formed, and the bad natural dispositions are avoided. *Libertas a miseria* (freedom from misery) is a freedom from shortcomings of the body. This is, for instance, the freedom to see for those that have eyes. *Libertas a necessitate* (freedom from necessity) or freedom from coercion (*coactione*) is a freedom from being necessitated into

quod liberum arbitrium virtutem voluntatis et rationis colligit, propter quod facultas utriusque dicitur." (*In sent.* II, d.24, q.1, a.2, *c.*, 593.).

[67] "Liberum autem arbitrium ad electionis actum se habet ut quo talis actus efficitur quandoque bene, quandoque quidem male et indifferenter; unde non videtur habitum aliquem designare, si habitus proprie accipiatur; sed illam potentiam cujus proprie actus est eligere; quia liberum arbitrium est quo eligitur bonum vel malum, ut Augustinus dicit." (*In sent.* II, d. 24, q.1, a.1, c., 591.).

[68] "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, electio consequitur sententiam vel iudicium, quod est sicut conclusio syllogismi operativi." (*ST* I-II, q.13, a.3, *c.*, 101.).

[69] "… absque omni dubitatione hominem arbitrio liberum ponere oportet. Ad hoc enim fides astringit, cum sine libero arbitrio non possit esse meritum vel demeritum, iusta poena vel praemium." (*QDV*, q.24, a.1, *c.*, 680.).

[70] "… quia philosophi qui potentias animae subtiliter scrutati sunt, nullam potentiam in intellectiva parte praeter voluntatem et rationem, sive intellectum posuerunt. (...) Dicit enim Philosophus, quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus: et hoc magis videntur sua verba sonare, quod electio sit actus appetitus voluntatis, secundum tamen quod manet in ea virtus rationis et intellectus. (…)" (*In sent.* II, d.24, q.1, a.3, *c.*, 597.).

[71] "Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una." (*ST* I, q.83, a.4, *c.*, 311).

action by another. It is a necessary condition for the existence of any other type of freedom.[72] There is a difference between the conditions for the existence of freedom simply and for the existence of free decision. For freedom simply, only the lack of coercion is needed. For *liberum arbitrium*, alongside the lack of coercion, multiple options to choose from are needed. This is why animals are also said to have voluntary motions, that is, freedom simply, but not free decision. In Thomas' words:

> Hence since the violent is that whose principle lies without, the voluntary will be that whose principle lies within. And so it is that animals that move themselves are said to have voluntary motions, though they do not have choice or will, as the Philosopher shows in the same place. Hence neither do they have free decision.[73]

After giving a brief overview of some main concepts and ideas that Thomas Aquinas uses in his faculty psychology, three themes that have to do with Thomas' theory on freedom and free decision will now be explored. Firstly, Thomas' opinion on the general relationship between the faculties of intellect and the will are to be analyzed. Secondly, an elaboration on Thomas' intricate view of the primacy of the faculty of intellect over the will within the soul, will be given. Lastly, a sketch of Thomas' action theory proper, his opinion on how free decision and the subsequent act of choice in humans appears, will be explained.

2.1. The Relationship Between the Will and the Intellect

In this subchapter, the relationship between the will and the intellect in Thomas' thought will be analyzed. Firstly, how Thomas explains the will's act on the intellect and vice versa. Secondly, what I will call the intermingling of the acts of the will and the intellect, which have

[72] "Respondeo dicendum, quod libertas in sui ratione negationem coactionis includit." (*In sent.* II, d.25, q.1, a.5, *c*., 656.).
[73] "… unde cum violentum sit cujus principium est extra, voluntarium erit cujus principium est intra; et inde est quod animalia quae moventur ex seipsis, motus voluntarios habere dicuntur, nec tamen electionem habent aut voluntatem, sicut Philosophus ibidem ostendit; unde nec liberum arbitrium." (*In sent.* II, d.25, q.1, a.1, *ad sex*., 647.).

their root in the teaching on the convertibility of the transcendentals, will be touched upon. Thirdly, the exercise-specification distinction that Thomas uses will be explained. More specifically, it is the special way in which the will and the intellect interact in the act of choice. Although the free decision and the act of choice itself are dealt with in the next subchapter (2.3.), this distinction will be touched upon here since it shows the intricate relationship between the two faculties.

Both reason (or intellect) acts on the will and the will on reason. The will moves reason by commanding its act, and reason moves the will by proposing to it its object. More precisely, the good as perceived by the intellect moves the will to its act.[74] Thus, each power can be said to be informed to some extent by the other. The will moves the intellect, and all the other faculties as an efficient cause, while the intellect moves the will as a final cause.[75] That is why, the object having been proposed or shown to the will, does not necessitate the act of the will. The will itself retains its autonomy in desiring the end or exercising the means, as it is proposed by the reason. That is why Thomas states that "each power can be informed by the other in some way."[76] Alongside this act of showing the object to the will as an end, the intellect also deliberates and then acts on the will by giving counsels.

Thus, the intellect moves the will in two ways. Firstly, generally, regarding the formal principles of universal being and truth which presuppose every kind of appetite. This means presenting the object to the will. Secondly, specifically regarding counsel which necessarily precedes every

[74] "Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem." (*ST* I, q.82, a.3, *c*., 299.).
[75] "... actus voluntatis est quaedam inclinatio in aliquid, non autem actus intellectus. Inclinatio autem est dispositio moventis secundum quod efficiens movet. Unde patet quod voluntas habet movere per modum causae agentis, et non intellectus." (*QDV*, q.22, a.12, *c*., 642.).
[76] "... voluntas quodammodo movet rationem imperando actum eius, et ratio movet voluntatem proponendo ei obiectum suum, quod est finis, et inde est quod utraque potentia potest aliqualiter per aliam informari." (*QDV*. q.24, a.6, *ad qui*., 696).

act of choice.[77] Thomas states that reason, although a cognizing faculty, directs the will. He gives a theological example to prove the temporal priority of the intellect to the will. Namely, every sin needs to first be in reason to subsequently be in the will.[78] The reason's directing or ordering of the will is parallel to the two kinds of acts that the will does – willing the ends or intending (*intentio*) and willing the means or choosing (*electio*). The reason shows the object as an end and deliberates about means to achieve that end. This is how Thomas elaborates on these two acts of the intellect towards the will:

> But reason can order the act of the will in two ways: either insofar as the will concerns the end, and then the act of the will in its relationship to reason is intention, or else insofar as it concerns what is directed to the end, and in this case the act of the will in its relation to reason is choice.[79]

Thomas gives two reasons why the intellect's moving the will does not necessitate it. Firstly, the will is not necessitated by the intellect's conception of an object as an end because, for something to be moved by another, the power of the mover needs to be more universal than the power of the moved. This is not the case with the will whose final object is the universal good or beatitude.[80] Secondly, what the intellect does to the will is not violent because it does not infringe on the "sourcehood" of the will, and it is not contrary to the nature of the will, which is itself rational.[81] While the intellect directs the will, the will moves all the other powers of the soul.[82] This also includes the intellect whereby the will moves the intellect to start deliberating.

[77] "Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est obiectum intellectus. Et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum." (*ST* I-II, q. 9, a.1, *c*., 74.)
[78] "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio quamvis sit cognitiva potentia, tamen est directiva voluntatis; unde non potest esse peccatum in voluntate nisi sit aliquo modo in ratione, praecipue cum voluntas non sit nisi boni, vel apparentis boni; unde malam voluntatem aliquo modo praecedit falsa aestimatio." (*In sent.* II, d.24, q.3, a.3, *ad pr*., 624).
[79] "Sed ratio potest ordinare actum voluntatis dupliciter: vel secundum quod voluntas est de fine, et sic actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem est intentio: vel secundum quod est de his quae sunt ad finem; et sic actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem est electio." (*In sent.* II, d.38, q.1, a.3, *ad qui*., 975.).
[80] "... voluntas ex necessitate inhaeret ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo." (*ST* I, q.82, a.1, *c*., 293.).
[n]sic idem vellet et non vellet." (*ST* I-II, q.9, a.5, *ad sec*., 79.).
[82] "Unde manifestum est quod uti primo et principaliter est voluntatis, tanquam primi moventis; rationis autem tanquam dirigentis." (*ST* I-II, q.16, a.1, *c.,* 114).

However, since the will cannot act without some prior rational input, there needs to be a deliberation ending in a counsel preceding this act of the will. That deliberation and counsel, in turn, also presuppose an act of the will as a beginning point of the process. This chain of actions cannot go *ad infinitum* but needs God who is the First Mover of the actions in the soul.[83] How exactly God does this without infringing on freedom and free decision, is beyond the scope of this thesis.[84] In any case, Henry of Ghent solves this possible infinite regress by making the will a self-mover, rather than by invoking God as the Primary Mover. Other than acting on other powers, the will also acts on itself. It does this by moving itself from willing an end (e.g., health) to willing a means (e.g. to take medicine) by choosing among different proposed counsels that the intellect gives.[85] Thomas parallels this self-movement of the will with the self-movement of reason, which moves from understanding premises to understanding the conclusion. This account of the self-movement of the will is different from the one given by Henry of Ghent.[86]

There seems to be an interesting intermingling between the act(s) of the will and the act(s) of the intellect in Thomas. This makes, in a way, every act of the intellect a voluntary act, and every act of the will an intellectual act. Thomas puts it thusly:

> Hence even good itself, inasmuch as it is an apprehensible form, is contained under the truth as a particular truth, and truth itself, inasmuch as it is the end of the intellectual operation, is contained under the good as a particular good.[87]

[83] "Sed cum voluntas non semper voluerit consiliari, necesse est quod ab aliquo moveatur ad hoc quod velit consiliari; et si quidem a se ipsa, necesse est iterum quod motum voluntatis precedat consilium et consilium precedat actus voluntati; et cum hoc in infinitum procedere non possit, necesse est ponere quod quantum ad primum motum voluntatis moveatur voluntas (...) Relinquitur ergo, sicut concludit Aristoteles in capitulo De bona fortuna, quod id quod primo movet voluntatem et intellectum sit aliquid supra voluntatem et intellectum, scilicet Deus." (*QDM*, q.6, *c*., 149.).

[84] For a solution that involves God's eternity, cf. Tobias Hoffmann and Cyrille Michon, "Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism," *Philosophers' Imprint* 17 (2017): 1-36, esp. 18-20.

[85] "... ita per hoc quod homo aliquid vult in actu, movet se ad volendum aliquid aliud in actu; sicut per hoc quod vult sanitatem, movet se ad volendum sumere potionem; ex hoc quod vult sanitatem, incipit consiliari de his quae conferunt ad sanitatem; et tandem determinato consilio vult accipere potionem." (*QDM*, q.6, *c*., 149),

[86] The one given by Henry is analyzed and criticized in 3.3.

[87] "Unde et ipsum bonum, in quantum est quaedam forma apprehensibilis, continetur sub vero quasi quoddam verum; et ipsum verum, in quantum est finis intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum." (*QDM* q.6, *c*., 149).

My guess is that this idea of Thomas has to do with the idea that the transcendantals are convertible. In other words, the teaching that whenever there is one of the transcendentals present, there are all of them present. This also includes truth and goodness, which is why every good thing is true, and vice versa.[88]

There is another way in which the will and the intellect interact for Thomas, and that is in the proper act of free decision, which is the act of choice. In the act of choice, which is principally an act of the will, both the will acts on the intellect and the intellect on the will.[89] The acting of the will on the intellect is called exercise (*exercitium*) of the act, while the acting of the intellect on the will is called specification (*specificatio*) or determination (*determinatio*) of the act.[90] Both of these acts are necessary for the act of choice to exist. On the one hand, exercise signifies the will's moving toward one option that the intellect suggests. On the other hand, specification signifies the intellect's proposing the possible options to choose from. On the part of the determination or specification made by the intellect, the will is moved of necessity only regarding that which is good in all aspects (happiness in this life and God in the next). It is also, in most cases, moved from habits which are innate to human nature, such as to be, to live, and to know. I would call these necessitations connatural, but not necessary, since people do not always will to live, such as those in great pains, etc.[91] The will's exercise is only necessitated by happiness itself (God) and not by other goods because all other goods lack complete goodness, and so reason can propose the will different conceptions of them. That is, it can

[88] "... verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile." (*ST* I, q.79, a.11, *ad sec*., 279).
[89] "... voluntas movet intellectum quantum ad exercitium actus (...) Sed quantum ad determinationem actus, quae est ex parte obiecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, quia et ipsum bonum apprehenditur secundum quandam specialem rationem comprehensam sub universali ratione veri." (...) (ST I II q. 9 a.1, *ad ter,* 75).
[90] "Et prima quidem immutatio pertinet ad ipsum exercitium actus, ut scilicet agatur vel non agatur; secunda vero immutatio pertinet ad specificationem actus (...)" (*QDM* q.6, *c*., 148.).
[91] "Si igitur apprehendatur aliquid ut bonum conveniens secundum omnia particularia que considerari possunt, ex necessitate movebit voluntatem, et propter hoc homo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem (...)" (*QDM*, q.6, *c*., 149/150.).

propose one good as more desirable than another.[92] This is akin to the intellect being of necessity moved only by that which is true necessarily, and not by probable truths.[93] The first principle of the act of choice can be considered both the will insofar as it exercises the motion and the intellect insofar as it specifies (or determines) it.

I think that the relationship between the will and the intellect in the act of choice illustrates succinctly and clearly the intermingling of the will and the intellect that was mentioned earlier. Furthermore, I think that this mixed relationship between the will and the intellect could have as its root the theory of convertibility of the transcendentals. Because every of the will's acts is, in a way, intellectual – and every of the intellect's act is volitional, it is no surprise to see that their acts do indeed overlap. What's more, the balanced approach to the the problematic of their primacy, as well as their relationship (both general and in the act of choice) reflects the convertibility of the transcendentals.

2.2. Is the Will or the Intellect a Higher Faculty of the Soul?

At first glance, Thomas Aquinas seems to have changed his mind as regards the primacy of the faculty of intellect or will in the soul. In his earlier work (written in the early 1250-s), the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, he seems to be leaning toward the opinion that the will is the higher faculty than the intellect since the whole of freedom is found within the will. However, he balances this by saying that the intellect is higher by reason of order, since every

[92] "Et quia defectus cuiuscumque boni habet rationem non boni, ideo illud solum bonum quod est perfectum et cui nihil deficit, est tale bonum quod voluntas non potest non velle, quod est beatitudo. Alia autem quaelibet particularia bona, inquantum deficiunt ab aliquo bono, possunt accipi ut non bona, et secundum hanc considerationem, possunt repudiari vel approbari a voluntate, quae potest in idem ferri secundum diversas considerationes." (*ST* I-II, q.10, a.2, *c.*, 86.).

[93] "... intellectus ex necessitate movetur a tali obiecto quod est semper et ex necessitate verum, non autem ab eo quod potest esse verum et falsum, scilicet a contingenti, sicut et de bono dictum est." (*ST* I-II, q.10, a.2, *ad sec.*, 86).

act of the will presupposes an act of the reason or intellect. That is, every act of the will presupposes either the cognition of first principles or deliberation ending with counsel. The will, on the other hand, can be said to be higher because it has command over all the soul's powers, including those of the intellect. Because of this efficient preeminence and the fact that it acts on all other faculties of the soul, the fullness of freedom (*summum libertatis*) is said to be found in the will.[94] Three articles later, in article number five of the same work, Thomas reiterates his view by calling the will the end of all freedom.[95] What is interesting to note is that in this work Thomas uses an argument that we will see Henry of Ghent use to defend the will's primacy in the soul. Namely, he states the principle according to which the will wills things as they are in themselves, while the intellect cognizes them only as they are conceptualized in the soul. Unlike Henry, he does not directly conclude from this that the will is a higher power *simpliciter*. However, it seems to be stated as a positive factor on the part of the faculty of the will, as opposed to the intellect.[96]

Be that as it may, I do not think that these sparse citations from the *Sentences* show that Thomas has changed his mind on the primacy of the will or the intellect in the course of his writing. At most, they can prove that he has changed his focus or altered his terminology. In fact, I think the following analysis will show his theory of the primacy of intellect to have stayed the same, only more elaborated and specified in his later works. In his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, written only a couple of years after the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, Thomas explains the principle in more detail, affirming the view that the intellect is a higher faculty than the will.

[94] "... quamvis intellectus sit superior virtus quam voluntas ratione ordinis, quia prior est et a voluntate praesupponitur; tamen voluntas etiam quodammodo superior est, secundum quod imperium habet super omnes animae vires, propter hoc quod ejus objectum est finis; unde convenientissime in ipsa summum libertatis invenitur. (...)" (*In sent.* II, d.25, q.1, a.2, *ad qua.*, 650.).

[95] "... voluntas, ut prius dictum est, totius libertatis finis est." (*In sent.* II, d.25, q.1, a.5, *e.t*., 658.).

[96] "... sed voluntas, ut dictum est, fertur in suum objectum, secundum quod est in re: et ideo non oportet ut aliquam operationem habeat in rem ad hoc quod fiat sibi proportionata, vel expoliando eam a materia, vel aliquid hujusmodi, sicut intellectus facit; sed directe in rem apprehensam, secundum quod est, fertur (...)." (*In sent.* II, d.39, q.1, a.2, *c.*, 988/989.).

Here he gives a comparison of the perfection and dignity of the intellect and the will by their respective objects. Although the intellect's object is perceived by the intellect as a concept, the intellect's perfection and dignity consist in the form of the understood thing being in the intellect itself. That is to say, the concept of the object is drawn to the soul as a concept of the intellect. On the other hand, the will's act is said to be inferior since the will is ordered to another thing according to the being of that thing. Since it is better to possess the dignity of another thing rather than to be ordered to another thing existing outside oneself, "the will and intellect, if they are considered absolutely, not comparing them to this or that thing, have an order such that the intellect is simply more eminent than the will."[97] In the same work, Thomas says that the root of freedom is in reason. More precisely, since the *ratio libertatis* depends on cognition, the whole root of freedom is said to be in the cognizing power.[98] This is in fact the conclusion Thomas arrives at in the *Summa theologiae,* where the intellect is once again said to be the greater faculty *simpliciter*.[99]

However, before arriving at this conclusion, Thomas gives the most elaborate account of the primacy of the intellect over the will. He says that the superiority of one power in the soul to another can be considered in two ways – either simply (*simpliciter*) or accordingly (*secundum quid*). Thomas elaborates that being greater simply means having a simpler and more abstract object. The object of the will is the good as conceptualized by the intellect. This object of the good or any other such concept that the will has, first must be conceived by the intellect in order to be a proper object of any other faculty. Therefore, the object of the intellect is simpler and

[97] "Perfectio autem et dignitas intellectus in hoc consistit quod species rei intellectae in ipso intellectu consistit; cum secundum hoc intelligat actu, in quo eius dignitas tota consideratur. Nobilitas autem voluntatis et actus eius consistit ex hoc quod anima ordinatur ad rem aliquam nobilem, secundum esse quod res illa habet in seipsa. Perfectius autem est, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, habere in se nobilitatem alterius rei, quam ad rem nobilem comparari extra se existentem. Unde voluntas et intellectus, si absolute considerentur, non comparando ad hanc vel illam rem, hunc ordinem habent, quod intellectus simpliciter eminentior est voluntate." (*QDV*, q.22, a.11, *c*., 639.)

[98] "... tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet. Appetitus enim cognitionem sequitur, cum appetitus non

[99] "Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas." (*ST* I, q.82, a.3, *c*., 299.).

more abstract than that of the will. The primacy of a faculty is here directly linked to the idea that the object of the intellect encompasses in itself the object of the will. This also makes the intellect itself a more noble faculty than the will. On the other hand, the will is higher than the intellect when the object of the will is of a higher perfection than the soul itself. That is why, when presented with any good that is not God, to know that good is better than to will it or love it. On the other hand, only when the object is God, to love Him is better than to simply know Him. The intellect is still the higher faculty simply, and higher accordingly in all cases, except the one exception just mentioned.[100] Although the intellect is higher *simpliciter*, in one way the will is said to be higher than the intellect. This is if one considers the true, which is the object of the intellect, as a certain good itself. Precisely because the true is a good, the will can move the intellect to deliberate about it.[101]

In the second part of the first part of *ST* (the *Prima Secundae*), Thomas states that a human act is one proceeding from a deliberating will. This equally includes both the reason and the will's role.[102] Although free decision and the the act of choice is dealt with in subchapter 2.3, it seems important to mention them briefly here. This is because I believe that Thomas also carefully shows reason's preeminence in his analysis of the act of choice (*electio*), which is principally an act of free decision (*liberum arbitrium*).

This is how Thomas spells out this argument:

> In the actions of the soul, it is important to note that an act, which fundamentally belongs to one faculty or habit, takes the form and species from a higher faculty or habit, in accordance with how the lower is directed by the higher (...) Moreover, it is evident that reason, in a way, precedes the will and guides its

[100] "Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio: e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas." (*ST* I, q.82, a.2, *c.*, 299.).

[101] "Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere." (*ST* 1 Q82 A4, *ad pr.* 303).

[102] "Dictum est autem supra quod actus dicuntur humani, inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata." (*ST* I-II, q.1, a.3, *c.*, 10). Reiterated somewhat differently, but with the same meaning, *ST* I-II, q.6, a.3, *ad ter.*, 59.

> actions, insofar as the will tends towards its object according to the order of reason, given that the apprehensive faculty presents its object to the appetitive faculty.[103]

In the act of choice, the intellect is the formal cause of the will's act, while the will is the material cause. The will acquires the form (the 'whatness') of its choice from the intellect. Because that which receives a form or species is inferior to that from which it is received, and because the will receives this form from the intellect, Thomas says that the intellect is a higher faculty than the will.

Although this view is not spelt out as straightforwardly as I portrayed it, it affirms Thomas' advocacy of the primacy of the intellect over the will in the soul. Thomas does this by using an argument that pertains to the act of choice. Thomas saw the primacy of the intellect over the will, both in themselves and in their respective relations to their objects, as shown in the first part of this subchapter, and in the act of choice (*electio*), as shown in the second part.

In this chapter, I tried to summarize Thomas' views on the primacy of the intellect over the will. There are two general impressions that this short analysis has given. Namely, (1) Thomas focuses on different aspects of this question, from the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* to the *Summa theologiae*. In the first work, he wants to show the importance of the will in the soul, without highlighting its absolute superiority. In the others, now using a more nuanced philosophical vocabulary – as seen in the way he calls the will the material, and the intellect the formal cause of freedom, which is lacking from the *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* – he elaborates on how the intellect is a greater faculty *simpliciter*. From this, it seems to me that, it

[103] "Est autem considerandum in actibus animae, quod actus qui est essentialiter unius potentiae vel habitus, recipit formam et speciem a superiori potentia vel habitu, secundum quod ordinatur inferius a superiori (...). Manifestum est autem quod ratio quodammodo voluntatem praecedit, et ordinat actum eius, inquantum scilicet voluntas in suum obiectum tendit secundum ordinem rationis, eo quod vis apprehensiva appetitivae suum obiectum repraesentat." (*ST* I-II, q.13, a.1, *c*., 98).

does not follow that he changed his mind on the subject. This is also because, (2) even at the more mature phase of his thought, he does not single out the intellect as greater, without also considering the importance of the will, and the way in which the will can be said to be a higher faculty in a certain way (*secundum quid*). This is also seen from the comparison of the primacy of these two faculties as regards the beatific vision or the way in which the will can move the intellect, when the object of the intellect is considered a certain good.

2.3. Free Decision

This subchapter will deal with the theory of free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) in Thomas Aquinas. More precisely, it will deal with choice (*electio*) as the proper act of the power of free decision (*liberum arbitrium*). In the last subchapter, the will's exercise and the intellect's specification of the act were explained. There are also other parts of the larger mechanism of decision, which are not important for us presently (such as use, enjoyment, consent, etc.).[104] In this subchapter, another issue will be discussed.

Namely, Thomas' view on the intellectual basis of free decision. In other words, his idea that, although both the intellect and the will are necessary conditions for the existence of free decision, the intellect is the more important of the two. More precisely, the so-called indeterminacy of reason's counsels is what makes reason the root of *liberum arbitrium*. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, *liberum arbitrium* is a power of the will insofar as it chooses.[105] This makes the faculty of the will a material cause for the act of choice. While

[104] Although Donagan wrongly identifies use (*usus*) with choice (*electio*), his scheme of the human act according to Thomas is visually helpful. Cf. Alan Donagan, "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 653.

[105] "Unde liberum arbitrium est ipsa voluntas; nominat autem eam non absolute sed in ordine ad aliquem actum eius qui est eligere." (*QDV*, q.24, a.6, *c.*, *ad pr.*, 695.).

Thomas calls the will the material cause, he calls the intellect the formal cause of choice (*electio*).[106] As was said, necessary and sufficient conditions of choice are both reason's counsel and will's pursuing of that counsel. However, although the act of the will is a necessary condition of free decision (and its act of choice), the role of the will is passive on Thomas' account. Namely, it accepts what has previously been judged (*diiudicatur*) by the intellect as better, while the intellect actively proposes counsels to the will.[107] This opens up questions as to the extent to which the will can choose against the best possible option given by reason's counsels.[108] Since this is a large issue and would warrant more space, I decided not to deal with it in this thesis.

In any case, for choice to exist, it is necessary that there exist different options to choose from.[109] And this is made available by the various proposed counsels that reason gives. In fact, the intellect's ability to propose different counsels to the will is what separates free human action exemplified in choice, from necessitated actions of other animals. The root of free decision and the choice which follows is, therefore, reason's judgment and its ability to propose different counsels. This is unlike animals which act on natural instincts. Because the very essence of *liberum arbitrium* is to be able to go different ways, and because reason's judgments are the ones that enable it, reason is the root of *liberum arbitrium*:

> Reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now, particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow

[106] "... materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis." (*ST* I-II, q.13, a.1, *c*., 98.).
[107] "Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur" (*ST* I, q.83, a.3, *c*., 310). For the will's consent ot reason's judgment, cf. also S*T* I-II, q.15, a.3, *c*., 111.
[108] According to some authors, on the basis of this problem, Thomas advocates freedom as the lack of outside coercion, but not excluding intellectual determination. Cf. Thomas Williams, "Human Freedom and Agency," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. 206., and Thomas Williams, "Will and Intellect," in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Ethics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), esp. 249.
[109] "... cum electio sit praeacceptio unius respectu alterius, necesse est quod electio sit respectu plurium quae eligi possunt. Et ideo in his quae sunt penitus determinata ad unum, electio locum non habet." (*ST* I-II, q.13, a.2, *c*., 99)

> opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And therefore, it is necessary that man has free decision, from the very fact that he is rational.[110]

A comparison of human action with actions of inanimate objects and actions of other animals serves Thomas to more clearly elucidate the crucial role of reason in the act of choice. Some medieval authors likened human free decision to the "self-movement" of a heavy object by its own form of heaviness or the self-movement of animals toward an object of sensation. However, Thomas does not accept this understanding of human free decision.

He says that heavy things do not properly have self-movement, since they only move "in themselves," but not "by themselves." In other words, the action that they do is not from themselves, but from another, e.g., from a human pushing a heavy thing or removing an impediment so that it can move downwards. When it comes to animals, they do have the source of their action within themselves. However, they do not have free decision (and choice) since they cannot propose to themselves different paths of action to take and therefore do not have different options to choose from. In other words, animals necessarily move by external impulses, following the rational judgment implanted in them not by themselves, but by another - God. That is, they necessarily follow their sensual nature that was given to them by God. That is why, for instance, birds cannot choose not to make nests, nor the sheep not to flee the wolf once it is near.[111] On the other hand, humans can be said to be self-moving agents.[112] Thomas thinks that both the will and the intellect are necessary conditions for free decision. On the one hand, the will is necessary as a subject of action (that which wills), while on the other reason is

[110] "Ratio enim circa contingentia habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est." (*ST* I, q.83, a.1, *c*., 307).

[111] "Sicut gravia et levia non movent se ipsa ut per hoc sint causa sui motus, ita nec bruta iudicant de suo iudicio sed sequuntur iudicium sibi ad alio iuditum; et sic non sunt causa sui arbitrii nec liberi arbitrii habent." (*QDV*, q.24, a.1, *c*., 680.).

[112] Spiering gives a twofold analysis of self-movement in Thomas. Namely, that humans move both "of themselves" and "by themselves". In other words, human acts can properly be said to be both efficient and final, corresponding to the faculties of the will and of reason. Cf. Jamie Anne Spiering, "'Liber Est Causa Sui': Thomas Aquinas and the Maxim 'The Free is the Cause of Itself.'," *The Review of Metaphysics* 65 (2011): esp. 364-365.

most properly the cause of such action since it allows the will to choose among different proposed goods. Such a carefully crafted distinction deserves another quotation from the Angelic Doctor:

> The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define free decision as a free judgment arising from reason, implying that reason is the cause of liberty.[113]

It is not clear what the precise difference between 'root' and 'cause' is from this citation. If 'root' is taken to be the same as 'cause,' then this passage is easily explainable. Namely, both the will and the intellect are the causes of free decision, but differently. Where the will is the subject of choice (i.e., that which exercises choice), reason is the proper explanation of why there is choice at all (i.e., because of its specification).

As the basis of free decision and choice, Thomas invokes the principle of reason's indeterminacy. This principle makes it clear that the role of reason is more important for the existence of free decisions than the role of the will. In the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo,* Thomas uses the analogy of a builder building a house to illustrate how the indeterminacy of reason works in the human act of choice. The builder, before building a particular house, has a form of house in mind. The builder can act on this form, which is in his mind, to build a particular house. The reason why the builder can build a house in different shapes, with different colors, for different purposes, etc., is that there is no determination on the particular form of a house from the form of the house *qua* house in his mind.[114] In other words, the builder can act

[113] "... radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subiectum, sed sicut causa, est ratio. Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium quod est liberum de ratione iudicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis." (*ST* I-II, q.17, a.1, *c*., 118.).

[114] MacDonald thinks that the root source of rational indeterminacy is meta-judgment. There are two problems with his analysis. Firstly, the term is a term of contemporary analytic philosophy, and thus not present in Thomas' thought. Secondly, the idea that reason is able to be reflexive upon its own acts does not explain the fact that reasons is indeterminate. In other words, it is not clear how the meta-judgments of reason leads to the ability of the will to choose otherwise. Cf. Scott Macdonald, "Aquinas's Libertarian Account of Free Choice," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 52 (1998): esp. 328.

on the form of 'house' in his mind in different ways because of the indeterminacy of the reason's conception. Reason can, in fact, always propose a different conception of the universal concept 'house,' to build. This is because of the universal nature of the intellect's conception.[115] Such a concept in the mind does not bound him to make the house square or circular, white, or yellow, etc.[116] The way that the builder functions is analogous to the way humans in general function. Namely, no limited good can fulfill the potentially infinite number of conceptions and counsels reason can give. Reason can supply a potentially infinite number of counsels in two ways. By adding, removing, or modifying the major premise, i.e.,

1. from Major P_1 'All pleasure is to be pursued' to Major P_2 'All pleasure is not to be pursued.'

by adding, removing, or modifying the minor premise, i.e.,

2. from Minor P_1 'This house ought to be yellow' to Minor P_2 'This house ought to be blue',

reason make the will choose a different course of action. There are, of course, infinitely many possibilities in which reason can do this. One can imagine a scenario in which a new minor premise is added, which changes the conclusion and thus the counsel. For example, if we first accept the reason's counsel to take up the hobby of art collecting, but on account of its expense, we give it up. That is, since another minor premise was added (e.g., 'Art collecting is too

[115] Precisely this universality of the intellect's form is elaborated on in-detail by Stephen Wang. Cf. Stephen Wang, "The Indetermination of Reason and the Role of the Will in Aquinas's Account of Human Freedom," *New Blackfriars* 90 (2009): esp. 119.

[116] "... forma intellecta est universalis sub qua multa possunt comprehendi; unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adaequet potentiam universalis, remanet inclinatio voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa: sicut si artifex concipiat formam domus in universali sub qua comprehenduntur diversae figurae domus, potest voluntas eius inclinari ad hoc quod faciat domum quadratam vel rotundam, vel alterius figurae." (*QDM*, q.6, *c*., 148).

expensive to keep up.'), the conclusion of a practical judgment changes (e.g., from Major P_1 'I should take up art collecting' to Major P_2 'I should give up art collecting', etc.).

To conclude: for there to be free decision for Thomas Aquinas, there need to be different proposed goods to choose from. This requirement is fulfilled by the role of reason which can propose many different conceptions of the good because of its indeterminacy. Thus, short of that which is good in all aspects (God), reason's judgments are always infinitely indeterminate. This allows for there to exist human free agency and human free decision, as Thomas points out in the *Secunda Secundae*: "Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side or another."[117]

[117] "... homo est dominus suorum actuum, et volendi et non volendi, propter deliberationem rationis, quae potest flecti ad unam partem vel ad aliam." (*ST* I-II, q.109, a.2, *ad pr*., 291.).

3. Henry of Ghent on the Freedom of the Human Will

This chapter is divided into three subchapters. They each indicate an important theme in Henry's views on the will as expounded in his *quodlibeta*. The categorization itself is my choice, which will help me compare the two authors in the next chapter. As with Thomas, the presently relevant terms Henry uses in the *quodlibeta* will first have to be defined.

Both the intellect and the will are faculties (or powers) of the soul. A faculty is a capacity or ability to act and be acted upon.[118] *Ratio* and *intellectus* are interchangeably used in Henry's writings, and they signify a faculty by which a person thinks. However, the *ratio* can also be used as a broader concept that includes the will. However, the *ratio* is usually used signifying the same thing as the intellect, which is the cognizing faculty.[119] There are two characteristic acts of the intellect. The simple or general cognition and deliberation. Simple cognition is a non-discursive act of the intellect whereby an object is subsumed under a definition.[120] Deliberation is a discursive act of the intellect whereby one, through premises of a practical judgment, arrives at a conclusion, which is the counsel of a practical judgment. The will (*voluntas*) is synonymous with the rational appetite.[121] It is rational since it can only will under

[118] "… quidem facultas secundum se nihil aliud est, quam habilitas quaedam indifferenter se habens ad patiendum et ad agendum." (*Quodlibet* XIIII, q. 5, *fo*. CCCCCLXIIII, *recto*).
The modern edition is cited according to the placement in the text (cf. list of abbreviations at the beginning) and the page, while the 1518 Badius edition according to the *folium* and its side (*verso* or *recto*). The editor and the year are not mentioned in the footnotes, since they are easily searchable in the Introducion, cf. *supra*, footnote 4. The primary source is cited in its original language. All translations are my own.
[119] "Dico, quod ratio est nomen potentiae spiritualis distinctae contra substantias corporales comiter in se comitens potentiam appetitivam quae est voluntas et potentiam cognitivam quae est intellectus, licet secundum nominis usum ratio approprietur intellectui." (*Quodlibet* XIIII, q. 5, *fo*. CCCCCLXVI, *verso*).
[120] Non-discursive and discursive are here synonymous with 'immediate' and 'inferring'. More precisely, I understand "simple cognition" in Henry as the immediate concept-forming ability, while deliberation is an ability which involves inferring from premises to a conclusion.
[121] "… secundum appetitum rationalem qui dicitur voluntas." (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 5, *c*., 101); "… uno modo accipitur ut includit in se actum rationis." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 95).

some aspect of the good, as conceptualized by the intellect.[122] It shares its appetiteveness with the appetites of animals, which means it is a faculty oriented toward something, i.e. a good as perceived by the intellect. The characteristic act of the will is willing or loving.[123] However, there is a distinction between willing the good simply (*simpliciter*) and willing one good over another, i.e., choosing (*eligere*). Willing simply concerns the ends which the intellect proposes (e.g. willing to be healthy).[124] On the other hand, choosing concerns means to achieve that end (e.g. choosing to eat this apple rather than this chocolate bar, to achieve health).[125] The requirement for freedom simply (*libertas*, *libertas sola, libertas pura*) is the lack of any outside coercion on the act of the will. That is, the necessary and sufficient condition of *libertas* is that the source of the action is in the will itself. Some authors in contemporary historiography call this condition the "sourcehood" condition of freedom.[126] Alongside the lack of coercion, free decision, and its act of choice (*liberum arbitrium, libertas arbitrii, libero arbitrio voluntatis, electio*)[127] require the existence of different goods to choose from. Henry illustrates the distinction succinctly:

> Freedom and free decision are different. Freedom is wherever there is no coercion, although there may not be free decision toward opposites. Free

[122] "… quia nihil aliorum appetitur nisi sub ratione boni, quae non est nisi aliqua effigies veri et puri boni quod est in Deo." (*Quodlibet* XIII, q. 9, *c.,* 60); "Sed malum in quantum huiusmodi, nullo modo est eligibile, quia nihil eligitur nisi in ratione boni, quae nulla est in non esse." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 20, *s.c.*, 158).

[123] "Et patet assumptum quoniam proprius habitus voluntatis quo fertur in bonum actu veri amoris, est habitus caritatis, quo secundum Augustinum per se diligimus Deum et proximum in Deo et propter Deum." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 14, *c*., 84/85.).

[124] For the importance of the will in Henry's general theory of cognition, cf. Riccardo Fedriga, "Psicologia Teologica e Psicologia Filosofica. La teoria della conoscenza di Enrico di Gand alla luce delle critiche di Duns Scoto," *Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia* 61 (2006): 165–180, esp. 173.

[125] These examples are mine. They serve to illustrate more vividly the meaning behind the philosophical terminology.

[126] Cf. Tobias Hoffmann and Cyrille Michon, "Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism," *Philosophers' Imprint* 17 (2017): 1-36, esp. 3-5.

[127] From *Quodlibet* X onwards, Henry uses *libertas arbitrii voluntatis* alongside *liberum arbitrium*. Both terms have the same meaning, as is seen from a passage in *Quodlibet* XII where he uses both interchangeably: "… et sic ipsa voluntas ex se vere indeterminata est ad velle persistere vel non persistere in illis, et quia in hoc non potest determinari ab obiecto quod non est finis sub omni ratione boni, oportet ergo quod voluntas in hoc se ipsam determinet suo libero arbitrio. Et hanc determinationem aliqui consueverunt appellare exercitium actus. Solummodo talem determinationem sive exercitium actus dicunt esse in libero arbitrio voluntatis, non autem ipsam actuationem, quae necessario praecedit istam determinationem. Et sic dicunt actuationem voluntatis esse ab obiecto naturali necessitate, et nullo modo a libertate arbitrii in voluntate. Determinationem autem sive exercitium actus dicunt esse a libero arbitrio voluntatis, et respectu illius solummodo voluntatem esse liberi arbitrii." (*Quodlibet* XII, q. 26, *c*., 141).

> decision, however, exists only where there is choice between opposites. Both, namely, freedom as well as free decision, require that the one who moves is not moved by another through coercion.[128]

Henry often uses the example of the blessed in Heaven or the damned in Hell to illustrate the distinction between freedom and free decision. Once God is seen, the will cannot will anything else. This is because the final object of the will, i.e., the good in all aspects, is seen and necessarily willed (loved). Similarly, the damned also have freedom, since there is no coercion from the outside and their rejection of God stems from themselves as roots (*libertas sit ibi ut in radice*).[129] However, neither the blessed nor the damned have free decision proper, since they are permanently bound by their affection to evil or to good. Upon seeing God, according to Henry, not even He can make those in Heaven not love Him.[130] Furthermore, if the free decision, i.e. the subsequent act of choice, were a real possibility for those in the afterlife, then they would be able to reject the blessed vision of God in Heaven or escape the eternal punishments of Hell.[131] After giving a general overview of some main concepts and ideas Henry uses in his faculty psychology, we will now move toward the three main themes of his theory.

3.1. The relationship Between the Will and the Intellect

In this subchapter, the two most important views of Henry that pertain to the general relationship between the will and the intellect will be analyzed. The first is that the will acts and is not acted

[128] "…differunt libertas et libertas arbitrii. Libertas enim est ubicumque nulla occurrit coactio, licet non sit libera electio valens ad opposita. Liberum arbitrium autem non est nisi ubi est contrariorum libera electio." […] "… utrumque, scilicet, tam libertas quam liberum arbitrium, requirit quod motum non movetur ab alio per coactionem." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 9, *ad qui.*, 235).

[129] "Ad argumentum in oppositum quod in eis est liberum arbitrium: dicendum quod verum est: sed affectione sua in malum ligatum: ut licet libertas sit ibi ut in radice: in effectum tamen prosilire non potest." (*Quodlibet* VIII, q. 11, *fo*. CCCXXIII, *recto*.).

[130] This is against the 'intellectualist' conception of Thomas Aquinas, followed by Godfrey of Fontaines. According to that opinion, God is the efficient cause of the beatific vision. For Godfrey of Fontaines' critique of Henry's view, cf. Thomas M. Osborne Jr., "Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on Whether to See God Is to Love Him," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 80 (2013): 57–76, esp. 70.

[131] "Solum enim finale bonum cognitum per intellectum aperta visione tantum habet ponderis inclinantis, alliciendo, non violentando voluntatem, ut libere velit illud, quod tamen quadam immutabili necessitate non potest non velle illud. Libere, dico, sed tamen non libero arbitrio, quod non proprie cadit circa finem, sed libertas solum, immo circa ea quae sunt ad finem. "(*Quodlibet* IX, q. 5, *c.*, 134.).

upon and the second is that reason (or intellect) serves only as a *causa sine qua non* of the will's act.[132] The second theory is the logical consequence of the first, broader theory. This will be elaborated later in this subchapter.

Henry quotes the opinion that the will is a power which acts and is not acted upon from John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*.[133] Furthermore, he says that any influence from the intellect on the will that would make the will be acted upon, rather than acting, would necessarily make the will not free. Henry gives two reasons for this. The first is that the intellect cannot choose not to be moved by what it understands. That is, the intellect cannot choose not to form concepts of objects from simple cognition. Concepts formed from simple cognition are the basis for the intellect's deliberation and subsequent judgments. If the will is acted upon by these judgments, it would become equally necessary and without freedom. The main reason why this is unacceptable is that the will is linked directly to free decision. However, without free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) there are no merit or demerit, persuasion, deliberation, counsel, all of which are necessary for virtue.[134] To illustrate this point, Henry uses an analogy with the sheep fleeing in the presence of a wolf. He says that there is a *quasi*-rational judgment in animals, which he calls *iudicio aestimationis* (Eng. judgment of estimation). An example of this input is the sheep "knowing" to flee from the wolf when the wolf is sensed. The act of their sensitive appetite is the subsequent fleeing. Firstly, the presence of the object of sensation, which is the sight or the smell of a wolf, acts on the *iudicio aestimationis* which acts on the sensitive appetite. All these three movements are necessary since the sheep does not have free decision. By analogy, since the intellect in humans acts on the rational appetite (the will) similarly to the *iudicio aestimationis* on the sensitive appetite in animals, the will in humans would be equally

[132] Henry uses *intellectus* and *ratio* interchangeably, cf. *supra*, p. 37.
[133] "…magis naturam agis quod agatur." (*Quodlibet* III, q. 17: *fo*. LXXIX, *recto*).
[134] "Et sic periret liberum arbitrium, et per consequens omnis ratio meriti et demeriti et suasionis ac deliberationis et consiliationis et ceterorum huiusmodi, quae necessaria sunt ad virtutes." (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 5, *c*., 121).

necessitated.[135] The second reason is that if the will is acted on directly by the conclusion of a practical judgment, it automatically becomes necessitated by it. Namely, just as the intellect cannot refuse to assent to the conclusion (the counsel) from accepted premises, in the same way the will's action would necessarily follow the conclusion, once the practical judgment is over and the counsel is given - that is - once deliberation finishes.[136] To illustrate, let me give a popular example.

If the intellect assents to the truthfulness of two premises:

1. *Socrates is a human*, and
2. *All humans are mortal*,

it cannot but consent to the truthfulness of the conclusion:

3. *Socrates is mortal*.

As I said in the beginning of this subchapter, I believe that this theory of Henry logically leads to the second one. Namely - because Henry thinks that any act of the intellect by which it makes the will be acted upon, rather than acting makes the will lose its freedom - the intellect cannot be more than a *causa sine qua non* of the will's act. What does this mean?

Every act of the will requires a prior act by the intellect. Here Henry follows St. Augustine's words: "We can love what is unseen, but not what is unknown. "[137] However, for Henry, this act of cognition cannot infringe on the will's free activity. Therefore, although the input from the intellect is necessary, it cannot be more than a "revealing" of the concept (in the act of simple cognition) or a non-coercive proposition in the form of counsel (in the act of

[135] "Ut in tali puncto actus voluntatis sit inclinatio quaedam naturalis sequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio quaedam naturalis consequens formam naturalem et appetitus brutalis est inclinatio quaedam consequens formam delectabilis apprehensam a sensu." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 99.).

[136] "Unde et circa illa circa quae non potest ratio variare iudicium, non est electio libera ut possit ad utrumlibet." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 100).

[137] "Dicendum ad hoc quod si loquamur de cognitione quacumque indifferenter, planum est quod sine aliqua cognitione praecedenti voluntatem impossibile est velle aliquid, propter quod dicit Augustinus: Diligere invisa possumus, incognita nequaquam" […] "…et ita semper qualiscumque cognitio debet praecedere voluntatem. Quae bene potest praecedere ulteriorem cognitionem …" (*Quodlibet* I, q. 15, *c*., 91).

deliberation). In both cases the intellect does not act on the will but is still a necessary cause for the possibility of the will's act. This kind of cause Henry calls "cause without which not" (*causa sine qua non*).[138] He distinguishes this kind of cause from the "cause because of which thus" (*causa propter quam sic*).[139] I would suggest this kind of cause to be the same as an efficient cause, which is inappropriate for Henry, since it would coerce the will and make it lose its freedom. In my interpretation of Henry's theory, the role of the intellect in the act of the will is both minimal and necessary. It is minimal since it cannot infringe on the will's free action. It is necessary since the will cannot will without some input from the intellect. To illustrate this kind of rational input, Henry uses the example taken from language. Namely, in the act of deliberation, the intellect does not act in the way of a verb in imperative form, but a verb in the indicative form. This means that its input is non-coercing. Henry puts thus this interesting distinction:

> But the master of movement is the one whose role is primarily to command and direct, and thus the intellect does not say, 'Do this!' in the proper sense, unless by way of advice, nor is its role primarily that of ordering, but only that of giving advice.[140]

In this subchapter two themes in Henry's ideas on the relationship between the will and the intellect were analyzed. Firstly, the idea that – to remain free – the will must act, and not be acted upon. This distinction Henry takes from John Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa*. Henry uses an analogy with the *iudicio aestimationis* of animals to illustrate this first theory. The second theory is that the role of reason in the act of the will must be a specific kind of cause, something that Henry calls the *causa sine qua non* or the cause without which not. This idea

[138] "Et sic ratio sua determinatione non est respectu actus volendi nisi dicto modo, aut non nisi sicut causa sine qua non." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 9, *ad pr.*, 238).
[139] "Et quod arg'uitur «quod sic, quia voluntas per praesentiam intellectus secundum actum fit in actu et per absentiam non fit», dicendum secundum praedicta quod verum est sicut causa sine qua non, non autem sicut causa propter quam sic." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 14, *ad sec*., 297.).
[140] "Dominus autem motus est ille cuius est principaliter iubere atque praecipere, et sic intellectus non proprie dicit: 'Fac hoc', nisi per modum consilii, nec est ipsius ordinare principaliter nisi consulendo." (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 6, *c*., 143).

of reason as a minimal and yet necessary condition of the act of will is linked to the first theory which sees any infringement on the will as resulting in necessitation and ceasing of the will's freedom and subsequently of free decision.

3.2. Is the Will or the Intellect a Higher Faculty of the Soul?

Throughout his *quodlibeta*, Henry uses three main arguments to establish the will as the main faculty of the soul. The first is that the will's act, which is willing or loving, is more perfect than the intellect's act, which is understanding or cognizing.[141] Every act, which is specific for a certain kind of thing, is for the perfection of its own particular being.[142] Hence, the specific acts of heavy, non-sentient objects is to fall downwards. This is because their perfection is to be close to the ground. The specific acts of non-human animals, according to their sensitive souls, is sensual pleasure - by which they acquire perfection. Similarly, the specific act of humans is to will, since their perfection is fulfilled in the loving of God.[143] Therefore, the primacy of the will's act is connected to the eschatological promise of a man's beatitude. This beatitude, which is the vision of God in Heaven, consists primarily in the loving, rather than in the understanding of God.[144] The second argument is that the union of the will with the object willed is greater than the union of the intellect with the object cognized. This is because the object is thought to know and to be perfected by the concept of the object, while the object is willed in order to love and be perfected by the object itself. In Henry's own words:

> The union of the will with the thing willed is real, whereas the union of the intellect with the thing understood is only according to reason. Proof: Because

[141] It seems that "perfection" here is equalized to beatitude of seeing God, as the analysis will show.
[142] Here I use 'specific' as something that pertains primarily to a species.
[143] "Et consimiliter omnino est in rationabilibus: appetitus enim habendi sive tenendi summum bonum per fruitionem in amando non est nisi propter salutem suam qua perficitur in illo, ut propter perfectionem rei appetentis secundum aliquid superius quam sit ipsa operatio appetendi qua perficitur ut superiore simpliciter, appetitus vero videndi illud non est propter huiusmodi videre, nisi ut propter perfectionem sine qua media non: potest appetens illud bonum perfecte attingere neque eius fruitionem, et per hoc suam in illo consummationem." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 14, *ad pr*., 296.).
[144] "…perfecta beatitudo, cum sit optimum omnium bonorum, non consistit nisi in actu perfectiore et meliore, qui non est videre sed amare. Melius enim esset Deum amare non videndo quam videre non amando, quare amare simpliciter melius est quam videre." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 14, *c*., 294).

> the object of the will has the nature of the good, which is real, while the object of the intellect has the nature of the true, which is only according to reason.[145]

Here is how I would portray the underlying maxim: To be perfected by the object of an act is higher than to be perfected by the concept of the object of an act. Whereas the intellect by its act draws the understood thing into itself, the will by its act transfers itself into the thing willed for its own sake.[146] The third argument that Henry uses to stress the will's primacy within the soul, rests on the will's authority to direct all other powers of the soul. Henry distinguishes between two types of directing, by authority and by service. The first way is the way of the will towards the intellect, and the second the intellect towards the will. While in the first way, the intellect cannot choose not to be directed by the will, in the second, the will can choose not to be directed by the intellect. The first type of direction is like that of the master toward his servant. Henry likens the second type of direction to a servant guiding the master in the dark. In directing by service, the master can always make the servant stop guiding him, which seems to be akin to the will rejecting the counsel of reason.[147] Directing by authority makes the will able to command all the other powers (including reason) as an efficient cause, and to make them obey and follow.[148] In short, the third argument for the supremacy of the will amounts to this *dictum* of the Solemn Doctor: "The will is the first mover of itself and other things in the whole kingdom of the soul, and as such is superior [to the intellect] and is the first mover of all the other [powers] to their ends."[149]

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[145] "…unio voluntatis cum volito realis est, unio vero intellecti cum intellectu est secundum rationem tantum. Probatio: quia obiectum voluntatis habet rationem boni quae realis est, obiectum autem intellectus habet rationem veri quae non nisi secundum rationem est solum." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 15, *s.c.,* 301).

[146] "... voluntas actione sua inclinatur in ipsam rem, actione autem intellectus perficitur ipse intellectus ipsa re intellecta ut habet esse in intellectu, quia intellectus actione sua trahit in se ipsam rem intellectam, voluntas autem actione sua transfert se in ipsum volitum propter se ut eo fruatur." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 14, *c*., 86.).

[147] "Ad quintum, quod dirigens superius est directo, dicendum quod est dirigens auctoritate, sicut dominus servum: ille est superior: sic voluntas dirigit intellectum; vel ministerialiter sicut servus dominum, praeferendo lucernam de nocte ne dominus offendat: tale dirigens est inferius et sic intellectus dirigit voluntatem, unde a dirigendo et intelligendo potest ipsum voluntas retrahere quando vult, sicut dominus servum." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 14, *ad qui*., 90.).

[148] "In exsequendo autem et imperando solius voluntatis est ordinare, sed intellectus subordinare. (...)" (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 6, *c*., 143.).

[149] "Voluntas autem est universalis et primus motor in toto regno animae, et superior, et primus movens omnia alia ad finem suum. (...)" (*Quodlibet* I, q. 14, *c*., 85).

In this subchapter, I analyzed three main arguments that Henry uses to prove the will's supremacy in the soul over the intellect. The first is that the act of the will is higher than the act of the intellect since the perfection of a human being lies in the loving of God, which is an act done by the will. Secondly, the will is perfected by the object of its act, while the intellect is perfected by the concept of the object of its act, which makes the intellect an inferior faculty. Thirdly, directing by authority, which is likened to the way the will can direct the intellect, is higher than directing by service, which is likened to the way the intellect can direct the will.

3.3. Free Decision

This subchapter will explain how Henry positions himself as a staunch defender of the primacy of the will in free decision and choice. For him, the will is the *ratio libertatis* of choice. The reason for the free decision (the *liberum* in *liberum arbitrium*, so to speak) is the will itself. More precisely, it is the will's ability for self-actualization and subsequent choice. Although input from the intellect is necessary, the will chooses according to its own power to choose and without direct influence from any other faculty.[150]

This conception of *ratio libertatis* is contrary to the conception Henry attacks in many places.[151] That conception, which roughly corresponds to Thomas', posits free decision coming from the intellect's possibility to propose to the will different conceptions of the good.[152] According to Henry's interpretation of that view, the will can indeed make the intellect start deliberating

[150] "Ita quod ad volendum simpliciter nihil faciat ratio nisi quod proponat volibilia, licet ad volendum per electionem necesse est praecedere rationis sententiam, quia aliter voluntatis appetitus non esset electivus nec aliter proprie est rationalis nec proprie voluntas." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 106).
[151] "Alii vero dicunt quod voluntas movetur a bono cognito sicut a suo proprio obiecto proprium passibile, quemadmodum a vero cognoscibili movetur intellectus, sed naturaliter, non violenter. (...) Quod non potest stare (...)" (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 5, *c*., 121.).
[152] "Alii autem liberum arbitrium negant: licet indirecte, ponentes omnia fieri a voluntate necessitate rationis determinantis, libertatem solum ponunt ex parte rationis in determinando." (*Quodlibet* III, q. 17, *fo*. LXXVIII., *recto*).

about different things. However, once the deliberation ends and practical judgment is formed by the intellect, the act of the will has to follow necessarily.[153] There are two big issues for Henry with this 'intellectualist' position. Firstly, intellect's various conceptions of the good would be the basis of freedom, even if the will can make the intellect start thinking about these conceptions. Secondly, when the deliberation ends, and the intellect proposes a practical judgment to the will, the action immediately follows. That is, the will cannot choose contrary to the intellect's practical judgment. This is how Henry sees this option:

> So that the entire power of free decision lies within reason, and nothing on the part of the will except insofar as the will depends on reason, so that it cannot will anything unless known by reason and in the way in which it is judged by reason, as has been said.[154]

For Henry, the root of free decision cannot be the intellect since the intellect's activity (and hence practical reasoning) is deterministic. As Tobias Hoffmann rightfully points out, "Henry's entire moral psychology and ethics are premised on this view."[155] Because of this, Henry thinks that free decision is primarily rooted in the will and choice is properly an act of the will, although intellect is involved because the will cannot act without some prior knowledge. However, the main idea of Henry is that the will can choose against the judgment of the intellect.[156] It does this by making the intellect start deliberating again and give another counsel.[157] Furthermore, even if only one good is proposed, there is still free decision and

[153] "Unde et circa illa circa quae non potest ratio variare iudicium, non est electio libera ut possit ad utrumlibet." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 100).
[154] "Ut sic sit tota vis liberi arbitrii penes rationem et nihil ex parte voluntatis nisi quatenus voluntas a ratione dependet, ut non possit velle nisi cognitum et modo quo est a ratione iudicatum, ut dictum est." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 100).
[155] Cf. Tobias Hoffmann, "Henry of Ghent's Voluntarist Account of Weakness of Will," in *Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present*, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), esp. 136.
[156] This is known as *akrasia* or the weakness of the will. For literature on this issue, cf. footnote 39.
[157] "…poterit eam compellere ad credendum contrarium, si tamen ratio non sit determinata medio vere demonstrativo et evidenti, sed tamen non sine aliquali ratione ad illud credendum compellitur. Vel potest dici, secundum quod alibi determinavimus: etsi tale pondus non inesset voluntati a determinatione rationis, citra ultimum ex se posset se movere ad quodcumque vellet." (*Quodlibet* IX, q. 5, *c*., 137).

choice, since the will can either choose that good or not.[158] Also, if two goods presented by the intellect are equally appealing, the will can choose simply because it wants to experience one of them.[159] The will is, thus, the main cause of free decision. It uses the intellect's inputs, as well as the inputs from the passions or the soul's habit, but it is in no way necessitated by any of them.[160]

The basis of the will's ability to choose, regardless of the reason's input, is the teaching of the self-actualization of the will. Henry situates the will as a self-mover within other kinds of things that move themselves.[161] There are six levels of self-causing movement according to Henry: 1) The divine will in willing, 2) The created will in willing, 3) The created intellect in thinking, 4) The light or heavy object in moving itself, 5) The animal in moving itself with progressive motion, and 6) The generating cause as moving something besides itself to a certain generation. By its own natural power, the will can move when it wishes.[162] It can do this because it is immaterial and possesses a power to be conversive on itself (*super se est conversiva*).[163] God

[158] "Si vero primo modo cognitum est unum solum, per se sine altero cognitum et sic propositum voluntati, tunc, cum voluntas non potest velle vel nolle nisi cognitum, etsi istud cognitum possit liberum arbitrium velle vel nolle indifferenter, ut sic omnino maneat liberum arbitrium quoad actus exercitium, nullo modo tamen potest velle aut nolle aliud ab hoc, immo si aliquid velit aut nolit, oportet quod sit istud et non aliud, ut sic non omnino maneat liberum arbitrium quoad actus determinationem sive specificationem." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 9: 241).

[159] "Ita etiam quod si omnis conditio et ratio boni quam invenit in isto, inveniretur in alio, posset libere hoc illi sibi praeeligere sola libidine experiendi." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *ad pr*., 114.).

[160] "In praeeligendo ergo inter aequalia bona alterum, vel minus bonum magis bono, vel bonum ut nunc bono simpliciter, sola voluntas sibi in hoc causa est, etsi aliquando sumit occasionem a sententia rationis vel ex tractu passionis vel ex habitus inclinatione (...)" (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 112.).

[161] For an in-detail analysis of Henry situating the will within this scheme, cf. Roland Teske, "Henry of Ghent's rejection of the principle 'Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur'," in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700Th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 284-285.

[162] "Et hoc convenit ei ex naturali proprietate voluntatis, ut cum vult, ex se per se sic moveatur, sicut lapidi quod semper deorsum nitatur. Sed differt in hoc quod lapis non potest de se aliter moveri, voluntas autem potest." (*Quodlibet* I, q. 16, *c*., 127).

"…habentes potentiam perfectam non impeditam liberam ad actum, potest statim in actum illum ad quem est cum aliquid potest per illam potentiam, natura intellectualis in voluntate sua habet huiusmodi potentiam: quae etiam est expeditior in malum quod in bonum." (*Quodlibet* VIII, q. 10, *fo*. CCCXX, *verso*).

[163] "Et convenit ei talis vis activa in se ipsam, quia eo quod est separata a materia, super se est conversiva ad agendum in se, sicut et intellectus ad patiendum a se. "(*Quodlibet* IX, q. 5: 137.).

endowed it with this power by creating it as immaterial.[164] Why does Henry posit the will as a self-mover? Every deliberation presupposes an act of the will. That is because the will makes the intellect think, reason, and deliberate about things when it wishes. However, the will makes the intellect deliberate, which presupposes a deliberation that the will ought to do so. Therefore, every such act of the will presupposes another one by the intellect *ad infinitum*. We have on our hands an infinite regress.[165] Henry tries to avoid this danger by positing the will as a self-mover.[166] He also manages to avoid contradicting the basic principle of Aristotelian metaphysics. That is, everything made actual, from being potential, such as the act of the will, must be made actual by something else, which was actual beforehand. He says that the will can move by itself since it is virtually, but not formally active to all non-contradictory possibilities.[167] This virtual activity can make any potential act also formally active.

How is the will only virtually, and not formally active to all acts of the will? What prevents the will from being formally actual to any act is the impediment by the lack of knowledge. When this impediment is removed by the intellect proposing an object, acting as a *causa sine qua non*, then the will can make itself formally actual from being virtually actual.[168] More concretely, when a person gains knowledge of the will's object, only then can the will move itself to that object. Henry compares this impediment by the lack of knowledge to an impediment that

[164] "Ideo dicendum sicut prius: quod actus primus voluntatis non potest esse malus quia naturalis est: et a Deo inditus naturae intellectuali: non per impetum quaedam ut dicit predicta opinio: sed per hoc quod ei indidit naturalae voluntatem: qua ex se et per se per hoc iam habet naturaliter, potest in actum primum voluntatis." (*Quodlibet* VIII, q. 10, *fo*. CCCXXI, *verso*).

[165] Since they share the same philosophical framework, Thomas Aquinas similarly saw a danger of infinite regression in every act of deliberation. However, he solved the issue not by making the will a self-mover, but by invoking God as the Primary Mover in every act of the will.

[166] Another possibility is that Henry posits the self-actualization in the will rather than in God's primary causality, to avoid the threat of necessitation by divine predestination.

[167] "…voluntas faciens se de potentia volente actu volentem, prius erat volens virtualiter, scilicet habendo unde potuit se facere in actum volendi, licet non formaliter, qualem se facit illa virtute." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 9, *ad sec*., 230).

[168] The object presented removes the "impediment" from the virtually active will to the formally active will: "Sed sicut removens prohibens privative, quia non potest aliquid velle, nisi in notitia intellectus praesens sit sibi obiectum, quod non cognitum erat absens." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 9, *ad qui*., 238).

prevents a heavy thing from falling downward.[169] Once the impediment is removed (e.g., once the heavy thing is pushed from the table), the heavy thing falls by itself, i.e., by its own form of heaviness. Henry likens the distinction between virtual activity and formal activity in the will to the sun, which makes other things hot, although it itself is not formally hot.[170] I believe this example does not work, since the sun itself is formally hot. Also, since its rays are always actually hot, and not only virtually. This is because there is no impediment to the rays being actually hot, akin to the lack of knowledge that prevents the will from always being formally actual. Nevertheless, granting Henry this somewhat spurious example, is his view intelligible? What does it mean for something to be virtually actual? From the sources, it seems that the definition of virtual activity differs only linguistically from that of potentiality. In other words, there is no difference between virtual activity and potentiality. If 'virtually actual' is equivalent in meaning to 'potential,' Henry's theory of the will's self-movement is lacking.

Henry's 'virtual actuality' is a concept that tries to make the will a self-mover. It does this by making the will already actual, avoiding contradicting Aristotelian metaphysics. Thus, it also avoids the will being made actual from something else. However, if there is no meaningful difference between 'virtually actual' and 'potential,' then Henry still needs to explain what makes the will formally actual from being only virtually actual. There have been, however, authors that have tried to explain this. Teske explains that the power (*virtus*) to move itself is given to the will by God just as it is given to heavy and light things to move after their impediment is removed. However, Teske does not explain how it is metaphysically possible that the will can decide whether to act after the impediment is removed, since this is not the

[169] "…voluntas est actus sive in actu primo, qui est esse secundum vim quae sibi naturaliter est indita ad se movendum a creante, quemadmodum grave quiescens sursum per impedimentum, est actu ens secundum formam gravitatis." (*Quodlibet* XII, q. 12, *c*., 154).
[170] "Dico autem, existente in actu tale, saltem virtute, etsi non in forma, quemadmodum sol qui, calidus in potentia, facit calidum in actu virtute, etsi non formaliter calidus est." (*Quodlibet* X, q. 9, *c*., 221).

case with other examples Henry uses. For example, a heavy object does not choose whether it will fall after the table on which it is situated is removed. Neither does Teske explain why and how 'virtual activity' is semantically different from 'potentiality.'[171]

In this chapter, the main terms Henry uses in his faculty psychology were explained. Then, Henry's three main arguments to support the will being a higher faculty than the intellect were highlighted. Henry's view on the relationship between the intellect and the will was explained. Henry uses the idea that the will acts and is not acted upon, and that the intellect is only a *causa sine qua non* of the will's act, to explain their interrelationship. Henry's opinion on the freedom in free decision (*liberum arbitrium*) as emerging principally out of the will's self-actualization was also touched upon. Within this last part, I explained the idea of self-actualization of the will and gave my critique of it, based on the redundancy of Henry's concept of 'virtual activity.'

[171] Roland Teske, "Henry of Ghent's rejection of the principle 'Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur'," in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700Th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 305.

4. Comparison of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent

Based on the two analytical chapters of this thesis, I will now give my opinion on the similarities and differences between Thomas' and Henry's faculty psychologies. Following the ordering of the threefold analysis already given, my own opinion on their comparison will be outlined. This is based on three questions: 1) How is the Relationship Between the Faculties Explained? 2) How is their the primacy explained?, and 3) How is free decision explained? Before delving into these topics, a brief comparison of the terminology that these authors use in their works, will be touched upon. In the subchapters, my opinion on the sameness or difference in these authors' understanding of these terms, and how they employ them in their theories, will be given.

From the short introductions to both analytic chapters, it is clear that Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent both understand the meaning of the will (*voluntas*) as rational appetite. They also both understand that the will is always orientated toward a certain good. That is to say, that the will always acts under the aspect of the good (*sub ratione boni*). Following from this, of course, the input from reason is taken as necessary for the will's acts. However, I would say that the two authors put emphasis on different aspects of this orientation of the will. While Thomas writes quite often on the difference between *intentio* and *electio*, I did not find this distinction to be important in Henry. That being said, Henry does accept the distinction between choosing and willing simply, as signifying the distinction between willing means to an end and willing an end. When it comes to reason or intellect, here again we have a consonance in terminology. It seems, however, that Henry stresses more than Thomas the two different acts of the intellect – the simple cognition (*simplex cognitio*) and deliberation (*deliberatio*). On the other hand, Thomas' distinction between reason being discursive, and intellect being non-discursive does not get as much attention from the Solemn Doctor. Henry more frequently

mentions the fact that reason is a larger category than the intellect, and that the will and the intellect can both be said to be part of reason taken broadly. When it comes to free decision, they both understand it as including both the will and reason. Furthermore, they both use *electio* as the proper act of free decision. The distinction between freedom and free decision is more frequent in Henry's writing, but it is also present in Thomas.' This short overview can be reassuring for a historian of philosophy, since, from the fact that these two authors use largely the same terminology, one's comparison can – at least *prima facie* – be considered reasonable.

4.1. How is the Relationship Between the Faculties Explained?

The question of the relationship between the will and the intellect is an important issue for the understanding of Thomas' and Henry's theories on the whole. One must keep in mind that these authors, like any philosophers, wanted to stay consistent within their own theories. Which means that, if they understood a certain faculty to be more important than another, than the relationship between that faculty and another is expected to be consistent with that view.

What were Thomas and Henry concerned with when explaining the relationship between the two faculties? My impression is that their main concern was necessitation. In other words, they wanted to avoid at all costs the necessitation of human action, and the subsequent negation of human free agency and moral responsibility. Following this understanding of mine, in this subchapter, these two authors will be compared based on how they understood the relationship of the intellect toward the will and of the will toward the intellect. This will, hopefully, make it clearer as to how each of them "escape" the treat of necessitation and the ceasing of moral responsibility.

How do our authors explain the movement of the intellect toward the will?

For Thomas, there is a very important movement from the intellect to the will. As was seen from the analysis, the intellect not only proposes goods, but moves and directs the will. The intellect moves the will by proposing first principles (what Henry would call simple cognition) or directing proper, which is deliberating and giving counsels about what is to be done. This movement from the intellect also has a temporal precedence, as is seen in the case of sin, which first needs to be in reason to be in the will. For Thomas, the influence of the intellect toward the will is that of the final cause, directing and moving the will to its act.

For Henry, the causation of the intellect toward the will needs to be minimal. This is why Henry conceives the reason as only a *causa sine qua non* of the will's act. It seems to me that, applying Thomas' language to Henry, even the specification of the act is done by the will, i.e., by the will being able to change how the intellect portrays the various options that the will can orient itself toward. The movement of the intellect toward the will cannot be motion in precise terms. Since any kind of motion toward the will would necessitate the will's action (which includes God's act toward the will), the act of the intellect toward the will can only be that of showing the object or proposing the counsels.

How do our authors explain the movement of the will toward the intellect?

For Thomas, the will moves as an efficient cause, but the intellect is the final cause. Every act of the will presupposes a prior one by the intellect. Since he does not accept the will being an absolute first self-mover, this poses a problem. He solves this infringing on the intellect by the will by God being the first mover in every first act of the will and reason. Previously, I said 'absolute' self-mover, since Thomas does accept that the will moves itself to act, but not absolutely, i.e. from potency to act, as Henry thinks of it.[172] On the contrary, the will moves

[172] Cf. *supra*, 3.3.

itself from willing an end as it is proposed by the intellect to willing the means as they are proposed by the intellect, after deliberation has finished.

On the other hand, for Henry, the will moves all the faculties as an efficient and final cause. Furthermore, for Henry the will can move itself by its own power. This is how any act of the will does not warrant a prior one from the intellect *ad infinitum*. The will directs all other powers of the soul, which includes the intellect, which it can direct to start deliberating.

In comparison, as their views elaborated in 2.1., 3.1., reflect, Henry says many times that the will is the master of all the other faculties, it is the king in the kingdom of the soul. That is why its relationship with any other faculty must be of subordinance. On the other hand, Thomas' even-sided approach in the primacy debate is also seen in this question. For instance, in the parallelism of the will's and the intellect's acts. Namely, the will wills the end just as the reason shows the end as a good. Following from this, the will chooses the means to an end just as the intellect deliberates and gives counsels about the best possible means to choose. This is in line with what I call the intermingling of the acts of these faculties.

How do our authors "escape" the necessitation of human free agency?

Henry escapes it by making the intellect have the most minimal importance in its influence on the will. This minimal importance from the intellect is based on the idea that any other type of causality from the intellect is necessitating. Henry gives two reasons for this. Firstly, just as reason is necessitated in simple cognition by the outside object, the will would be by reason. This is because all the reason's judgments are based on simple cognition. Secondly, reason is necessitated by the truthfulness of a proposition. That is, it necessarily consents to the

conclusion from the premises. Subsequently, the will would be necessitated by the reason's motion on it. Therefore, Henry escapes intellectual necessitation by making the intellect a minimal (if still necessary) factor in the will's act. He also escapes it by making the will an absolute self-mover.

On the other hand, the intellect is non-coercive on the will for Thomas, for two reasons. Firstly, the object of the intellect, when proposing a counsel is a particular true thing. On the other hand, the object of the will is always the end as universal, even when choosing a particular good. This means that it cannot be necessitated by the intellect. The second reason for the non-necessitation (or non-coercion) of the will by the intellect is that the act of the intellect is not violent toward the will since it still allows for the will to act out its act from itself.

Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas present different answers to the threat of necessitation. Henry approaches it by minimizing the influence of the intellect on the will, which he deems necessary to avoid external coercion of the will. By reducing the intellect's causal role to a mere initiator of options, Henry aims to ensure that the will retains its absolute self-actualizing freedom in human agency. For Henry, preserving human freedom hinges on limiting the intellect's sway over the will, thus preventing any form of necessitation. On the other hand, Thomas' framework emphasizes the compatibility of intellect and will, wherein each faculty contributes to decision-making without overriding the other. By acknowledging the interdependence of intellect and will while safeguarding their autonomy, Aquinas offers a more even-sided theory of the relationship between the will and reason.

4.2. Which Faculty is Higher?

It seems quite clear that the question of the primacy of the will or the intellect in the soul is very important for both of the authors. This is because it sets the stage for their general action theory and faculty psychology. If one of the two is advanced to be a higher faculty, it is only natural to expect it to figure prominently in the decision-making process in general, and free decision in particular.

After giving commonalities of their approach, two general impressions that the analyses of their theories have brought forward will be given. Firstly, the even-sided nature of Thomas Aquinas' theory, as opposed to the more one-sided nature of Henry's. Secondly, the peculiar way in which these authors, using the same two ideas – 1. The will willing the object itself, and the intellect cognizing the concept of the object, and 2. Loving God is better than knowing God - arrive at diametrically opposed interpretations, i.e., one that favors the will's primacy, and the other the intellect's.

Both authors agree that being a higher faculty *simpliciter* means being a higher faculty in itself, regardless of particular situations. On the other hand, they take the *secundum quid* primacy as pertaining to these faculties in particular situations or in relation to certain objects.[173] Along with this, both authors agree on the method of testing whether one faculty is higher than another. Namely, there are two ways of doing this. Firstly, by comparing the acts of the faculties. Secondly, by comparing the way in which the object of their acts relates to and perfects the faculty itself. In addition to this, they each add another, different way of proving the primacy of one or the other faculty. For Thomas, the primacy of the intellect is seen from its role in the

[173] There is a small caveat to be said here, since Henry bases his *simpliciter* primacy by using one concrete example (the willing or loving of God), as will be explained shortly.

act of choice. On the other hand, Henry uses the distinction of directing, to explain that directing by authority, which is done by the will, is higher than directing by service, which is done by the intellect. This, in turn, constitutes an argument for the primacy of the will within the soul.

Other than these similarities, the main general impression that the analysis of 2.1. and 3.1. has shown is that Thomas Aquinas' view on the primacy of the intellect within the will is a more even-sided approach than Henry's theory on the primacy of the will. By 'even-sided' I mean that it gives more space to the contrary faculty and its role. This will be shown by stating again the three arguments Thomas gives, and the way he balances the primacy of the intellect with the role of the will in each of them.

The first argument for the primacy of the will of Thomas that I examined is that of the ordering of the will toward its object. More precisely, because the intellect orders its objects toward itself, and cognizes it according to the way that it is in the intellect, whereas the will is ordered (and passive) toward the object – the intellect is said to be the higher faculty. Right after spelling this argument out, Thomas is quick to point out that being ordered toward one's object is not always an inferior thing. Namely, in the case of God as an object, to love Him is better than to know Him, which makes the will a higher faculty *secundum quid*.

The second argument that was mentioned was about the way in which the object of the intellect is simpler and more abstract since it also encompasses the object of the will. In order to balance out this approach, Thomas follows this argument up by mentioning that even the object of the intellect can be considered *sub ratione boni*, which is why the will is able to move the intellect.

The third argument is implicit, and it draws from the relationship of the intellect to the will in the act of choice, which is a proper act of free decision. The intellect is shown to be a higher faculty since it specifies what the will chooses (i.e., the will's exercise). Since giving a form to the act always comes from a higher faculty, the intellect is shown to be higher. Here also Thomas shows his balanced outlook, since he is quick to point out that just as the intellect is the formal cause (albeit, more important), the will is the material cause of free decision. In other words, just as the intellect specifies, the will exercises the act of choice.

On the other hand, all three of Henry's arguments minimize the role of the intellect, or the way in which the intellect can be said to be higher *secundum quid*. Henry does not mention the intellect's importance when explaining that the will is higher in the act of loving God, in real union of the will with the object willed, nor in the will being able to direct by authority.

Both Thomas and Henry accept and use the same ideas that the union of the intellect with the thing cognized is not as real as the union of the will with the thing willed, and that the love of God is higher than the knowledge of God but arrive at different conclusions. As was shown in 2.1., Thomas thinks that the fact that the union of the will with the thing willed is "more real" makes the will inferior *simpliciter*, and higher *secundum quid*. The fact that the will wills the object as the object is in itself, means that the will subordinates itself to the object willed. Instead of becoming dignified, it lowers itself to the level of the object. This makes the will inferior *simpliciter*. On the other hand, the intellect absorbs into itself the concept of the object, without lowering itself to the level of the object. The lowering of itself to the object is good when the object of the will is God. However, for Thomas, this is the exception that proves the rule. Namely, it is because the intellect is the greater faculty that it can stay detached from its object

when it conceptualizes it. This, of course, is not preferable when the object is God, which is why Thomas accepts that to love God is better than to know Him.

Henry understands these two conceptions differently. For the first, he accepts that to know things lower than the soul is better than to love them. However, it seems to me that his argument is based on the reality of the union of the will and the object willed being a higher union than the reality of the intellect and concept of the object cognized. Because the union of the will with the object willed is real, it involves delving into the object itself, which is a higher act for Henry. As far as the second idea is concerned, Henry uses a theological argument in showing that, if to love (or to will) God is higher than to know Him, that means that the act and faculty by which God is loved, must also be higher than the act and the faculty by which God is thought *simpliciter*. This is because to love God is the perfection of the human nature itself. I called this argument theological since it bases the superiority of the will over the intellect on the particular act of loving God, which is seen as the perfection of human nature.

In the debate over the primacy of the will versus the intellect, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent analyze the faculties' roles in shaping human agency. While they concur on the criterion for evaluating primacy, their conclusions diverge significantly. Thomas offers an even-sided perspective by highlighting the crucial roles of both intellect and will. However, he finds the intellect a higher faculty *simpliciter*, and the will only *secundum quid*.

In contrast, Henry tends to favor the will, emphasizing its supremacy, particularly evident in the act of loving God – an act which is seen as the pinnacle of human perfection. Here, Henry minimizes the intellect's significance, elevating the will's primacy. This inclination toward the will's dominance shapes Henry's perspective, as is seen from the question of primacy as well.

4.3. How is Free Decision Explained?

Both Thomas and Henry accept that free decision is a power involving the intellect and the will. They also both accept that it is primarily an act of the will, insofar as it chooses. This, however, is not particularly exciting since the intellect is purely apprehensive. Therefore, it cannot possibly choose - which is the proper act of free decision. Because of this, both Thomas and Henry envisage the will as the material, and the intellect as the formal cause of free decision. They both also understand that *liberum arbitrium* includes different options to choose from. As was explained in the analyses and comparison, the crux of their interrelationship is whether reason necessitates the will or not. If reason is said to necessitate the will's choice, then we are not free agents and thus we cannot be praised or blamed. The most pertinent consequence of this problem for our authors is theological. How can God expect us to keep his commandments and to act in a just way if we are not truly free to follow him?

To specify the main points of disagreement on the issue of free decision, this subchapter will deal with three ideas that these authors share but interpret differently. Firstly, Thomas' exercise and specification distinction and Henry's critique of it. Secondly, their contrastive interpretations of the way animals act, which has a consequence on their theories of human free decision. Thirdly, their diverse interpretations of the thought experiment involving the builder and the house.

As was explained in the analysis, for Thomas Aquinas, both the act of the will on the intellect and the intellect on the will are necessary conditions for free decision.[174] The will acts on the

[174] Cf. *supra,* 15-16.

intellect because it exercises the choice of one of the specifications given by the intellect. Therefore, the intellect's role as the final cause of choice is seen from its specification of the act of choice. On the other hand, the will's role as the efficient cause of choice is seen from its exercise of the act. Reason's specification does not coerce the will into exercise, and subsequently destroy free decision, but the indeterminacy of its conceptions and judgments is the precise reason why there is free decision at all.

Henry gives two possible interpretations of the exercise-specification (determination) distinction.

The first one is acceptable to Henry. Namely, if the intellect only proposes (*ostensio sive oblatio*) that the will considers its counsels, then the innate freedom of the will's self-actualization is safeguarded. This is because, according to this interpretation, the intellect acts only as an accidental cause and a *causa sine qua non* of the will's act. The will remains free both to determine (or specify) its object and to exercise its act, although it is somewhat weighed down by the intellect's counsels, which make it harder to go against them.[175] However, Henry is well aware that his opponents do not have this first interpretation in mind when using the distinction. On the contrary, they think that the intellect does specify the will's exercise.

According to Henry, this second interpretation leads to coercion and necessitation. If the intellect - howsoever slightly, makes an impression on the will so as to specify its act - it necessitates its act completely. Therefore, it is impossible, according to Henry, to maintain that the intellect specifies (or determines) the act of choice, without also necessitating the exercise

[175] "Si primo modo, tunc non obstante illa impressione inclinante manet voluntas in sua plena libertate agendi et non agendi secundum illam impressionem, ac si non habuisset eam, licet non ita de facili possit velle contrarium eius. Et sic, si moveatur ad aliquid volendum, a se ipsa movetur, et hoc tam quoad determinationem actus et obiecti, quam quoad exercitium actus. "(*Quodlibet* IX, q.5, *c*., 123.).

of the same act.[176] The teaching behind this view is that whatever is once passive in relation to another, is always passive in relation to the same thing. Thus, if the will's act of exercise is passive to intellect's act of determination, it stays passive and loses its ability to self-determine its act. It seems correct to suppose that Damascene's 'acting vs. acted upon' distinction is the basis for his interpretation of the exercise-specification distinction.

There are only two options for Henry. Either the will is acted upon by the intellect, making the activity of the will and its choice entirely caused by a previous act of the intellect, or it is not acted upon at all and remains free to self-actualize. If the will is acted upon, it loses all its innate freedom. If it is not acted upon at all (but only weighed down), it retains its inner freedom. *Tertium non datur*. Applying Thomas' terminology to Henry's understanding, the will must both be free to determine its acts and to exercise them.[177]

Both Thomas and Henry compare human free decision to the way animals act. For Thomas, the extent to which something is said to have free decision is proportionate to the extent of rationality that thing has. This is why, one can see that animals also choose in a certain way, although imperfectly. As Thomas puts it:

> The entire root of freedom is constituted within reason. Thus, anything stands to free decision as it stands to reason. But reason is only perfectly and fully found within man; thus, in him alone free decision is found to exist completely.[178]

For Henry, although non-human animals have some sort of rational input, which he calls *iudicio aestimationis*, they do not fully possess free decision since they do not have the self-actualizing will. Animals seem to choose not because of their *iudicio aestimationis*, but despite of it. We

[176] "... et si non sit possibile ponere quod intellectus dicto modo moveat voluntatem quoad actus determinationem et non quoad exercitium." (*Quodlibet* IX, q.5, *c*., 123.).
[177] "Si ergo [voluntas] non est libera quoad actus determinationem, neque quoad exercitium." (*Quodlibet* X, q.9, *c*., 239.).
[178] "... totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium. Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine: unde in eo solum liberum arbitrium plenarie invenitur." (*QDV* q.24, a.2, 685).

can see that animals have a kind of choice, not because of their quasi-judgments (*iudicio aestimationis*), but because they have a certain type of self-movement, as is seen in their positioning on the six-tiered scale of things that move themselves.[179] Thus, although their quasi-judgments necessitate their subsequent actions, animals seem to choose in a certain way. This is because they can move of themselves, but not as perfectly as those that possess immateriality, such as God's will or human's will.

This short comparison of our authors' views on why animals do not possess free decision and the act of choice (or do possess it in a limited way) has shown that, depending on their view of the source of free decision in humans, our authors elaborate on the lack thereof in animals.

Thomas and Henry both use the already mentioned example of the builder and the house. Among other things, this example can show how the same thought experiment can have two different interpretations in medieval philosophy.

Thomas draws from this example the teaching on the indeterminacy of reason's judgments, which we elaborated in the analysis.[180] It corresponds to the ability of reason to look at the same limited good from different perspectives. If the good that is considered is not absolutely good, which means there is no way to comprehend that good differently (e.g., by adding, removing, or modifying a premise), then reason can always determine the will to act in a different way. The most succinct exposition of this thought experiment and its consequence for Thomas is elaborated in the sixth question of *QDM*:

> But if there should be such a good that is not found to be good according to all the particular things that can be considered, it will not necessarily move one to determination of action; for someone might desire its opposite, even while considering it, because perhaps it is good or suitable according to some other

[179] Cf. *supra,* 31.
[180] Cf. *supra,* 17-21.

> particular consideration, such as what is good for health is not good for pleasure, and so on.[181]

Henry uses the same thought experiment and puts a 'voluntarist' twist on it. He does this by focusing on the will's role in choice. That is, he focuses on the efficient cause of the indeterminacy rather than the material cause. Because the will is the one that is not determined by reason, but reason only proposes judgments to the will, the will is said to be the root of free decision:

> Just as under the form of universal art, many designs of houses are contained, so that none of them can contain the entire design according to which a house can be produced from the form of art, hence the will of the artist can freely incline to build a house of any design and is not determined to any specific one, neither by the determination of reason, because the will can act against it, as has been determined in another question.[182]

Although the will can act against the determination of reason, it seems that the very reason why it can do this is the multiplicity of options that the intellect proposes. Therefore, Henry's interpretation of the thought experiment does not seem to be particularly convincing. However, the important thing for our comparison is that they both use the same example and interpret it differently.

By comparing three concepts that both authors used, this subchapter continued the trend of the last two. Namely, the interesting distinctions between Thomas' and Henry's faculty psychologies have been sketched and outlined by comparing them. Also, by using a short case study of the analogy between the builder and the house, the way in which medieval

[181] "Si autem sit tale bonum quod non inveniatur esse bonum secundum omnia particularia quae considerari possunt, non ex necessitate movebit etiam quantum ad determinationem actus; poterit enim aliquis velle eius oppositum, etiam de eo cogitans, quia forte est bonum vel conveniens secundum aliquod aliud particulare consideratum, sicut quod est bonum sanitati, non est bonum delectationi, et sic de aliis." *QDM* q.6, *c*., 150.

[182] "Quemadmodum sub forma artis universali continetur multae figurae domorum: ita quod nulla earum potest continere omnem figurationem secundum quam ex forma artis potest domus produci propter quod voluntas artificis libere potest inclinari ad faciendum domum cuiuscumque figurationis et ad nullam determinatur: neque etiam ex determinatione rationis: quia contra eam potest agere voluntas: ut in alio quaestionem determinatum est." (Quodlibet III, q.17, fo. LXXIX., *recto*.)

philosophers, while using the same conceptual toolbox, arrived at diametrically opposed theories was analyzed.

5. Conclusion

This M.A. thesis was an analysis and comparison of certain aspects of Thomas Aquinas' and Henry of Ghent's faculty psychologies and action theories. More precisely, their views on three distinct, but overlapping topics was analyzed and compared. These three topics were: 1) The relationship between the will and the intellect in the soul, 2) The primacy of the will or the intellect in the soul, 2), and 3) Their explanation and grounding of free decision.

Instead of repeating all the specific conclusions that the analyses and the comparisons brought out, it seems more pertinent to briefly answer the research questions set out in 1.2., and to conclude with ideas for further research.

1) How do Thomas and Henry explain the relationship between the will and the intellect within the soul?

I termed Thomas' view on the interrelationship between the faculties the 'intermingling' of the will and the intellect. This intermingling shows quite clearly the careful and even-sided nature of his theory. On the other hand, because of his commitment to avoid necessitation by making the role of the intellect as minimal as possible the analyses and the comparison has warranted calling Henry's approach 'voluntaristic.'

2) What are Thomas' and Henry's views on the primacy of the will or intellect in the soul?

Here again, the previous impression can be reiterated. As the comparison showed, Thomas is always careful to strike a balance (whether he always does this convincingly is another matter) between the intellect's absolute primacy, and the will's according primacy. On the other hand,

again because of his whole theory, Henry is adamant about making the will the higher faculty in all scenarios. This, I believe, leads him to posit a questionable theory of the will's self-actualization.

3) How do Thomas and Henry ground free decision and choice?

Free decision for Thomas is based on reason's indeterminacy. This is also what separates human free decision from animal's acts. The problem with this approach, that Henry (as well as many other medieval, modern, and contemporary authors) saw is that it can be interpreted to lead to both intellectual and divine necessitation. Intellectual, because the intellect does not have the capacity to choose whether to be acted on by its objects. For instance, the intellect cannot avoid assenting to the conclusions from accepted premises. Divine, because, if one makes God the primary mover of every first act of intellect and will, how does one escape divine predestination? Thomas does mention that God works on contingent secondary causes without them losing their contingency, but whether this is enough to safeguard human free agency, is a contentious issue.

It seems to me that these two threats (the threat of intellectual and divine necessitation) were the main reasons why Henry posited his idea of the will as self-actualizing. Consequently, the will is the main cause of free decision. The will must be the king in the kingdom of the soul for there to be genuine free decision and choice. However, what Henry does not explain is why exactly the will chooses this proposed good rather than another. As Hoffmann also notes, Henry simply posits this as a brute fact.[183]

It is a big issue whether this can in fact be explained under the guise of the 'voluntarist' theories. If one assumes that the freedom in free choice derives from the will, can one explain the reason

[183] Tobias Hoffmann, "Weakness of Will in Henry of Ghent," in *Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present*, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 136.

behind the will choosing this particular good rather than another? Since there cannot be any determinate rational input that would explain the will choosing A instead of B, how do the 'voluntarists' explain the choice of A over the choice of B and avoid randomness of choice? This problem seems to me a necessary corollary to every 'voluntarist' theory of free decision. The very important future research pointer that this M.A. thesis has brought out is the analysis of this issue. I hope to work on this in the future, also looking at other medieval thinkers who posited the primacy of the will in the soul and in free decision and choice, such as John Peter Olivi, Walter of Bruges, and Duns Scotus.

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