National and Foreign Policy Implications of the Discourses Connected to Nationalism and Religion in the Security Council's Counterterrorism Practice in the post-9/11 Era

By **Jana Stanković**

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Supervisor: Professor András László Pap

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Abstract

This research aimed to explore the discourses around the counter-terrorism practice of the United Nations Security Council, from September 11, 2001 to 31 December 2022. This thesis examined the main discourses produced at the meetings of the Security Council by the representatives of the permanent and non-permanent members that connect nationalism and religion to terrorism and violent extremism, and the ways these discourses are used as argumentation strategies for advocating and consolidating foreign policy interests, distribution of power among the members of the Security Council, and justifying actions against perceived security challenges, risks and threats. I used the discourse-historical approach of critical discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis, while quantitative content analysis was used as a supplementary method. The findings indicate that the discourses clearly correlate to national interests and foreign policies of states and they are generally adapted to the changed geopolitical circumstances, while nationalism and religion are used to indicate to specific national issues or concrete ethnic and religious groups. Furthermore, while there is a consensus among members of the Security Council that terrorism presents a global threat that affects all societies and that there is a need to tackle this challenge, there is not clear and coherent way to understand the concept, analyze its consequences and reach consensus on necessary political actions. This pattern creates challenging societal, national, regional and international consequences.

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1. INTRODUCTION

As an enthusiastic researcher from the Western Balkans, I have been always intrigued by the ways political discourses, dyed in the screaming colors of nationalism, are covertly consolidating national and foreign policy interests of states in the international arena. The Organization of the United Nations, as a general forum for deliberation of currently 193 member states is an important international forum where all important questions related to international peace and security are regularly scrutinized. However, besides international law, standards and good comparative practices in resolving various issues on the one side, individual members states have always had their priorities, which wanted to directly or indirectly highlight in front of an international audience.

This thesis examines main discourses produced at the meetings of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by the representatives of the permanent and non-permanent members that connect nationalism and religion to terrorism and violent extremism, and the ways these discourses are used as argumentation strategies for advocating and consolidating national and foreign policy interests, and distribution of power primarily among the permanent members of the UNSC. Approach of the critical discourse analysis, and qualitative and quantitative content analysis were used for the analysis of data: select proceedings of the Security Council's meetings and accompanying resolutions in the period from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2021. While the United Nations as an international organization has a mandate in maintaining international peace and security, one must keep in mind that member states have with various and often contradicting political, ideological, and national interests in different regional and international contexts.

Terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are taken as a starting point for the data selection, not only because of international geopolitical consequences, but also because the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers has showed how individual actions could influence whole national, transnational, and/or religious groups. Since then, anti-Muslim prejudice has been, according to Ernst and Bornstein,[1] increasingly present in various instances, including media reporting, different governmental policies, but also hate crimes.[2] In March 2021, the United Nations Human Rights Council stated that "institutional suspicion and fear of Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim has escalated to epidemic proportions."[3]

The primary expectations of the results of the data analysis were expected to show that discourses about religion contributing to terrorism or violent extremism are more present. Although this premise was confirmed, the research has showed that the results are much more nuanced than expected. In analyzed cases, by using different argumentation strategies, it was noted that member states often referred to either specific ethno-religious groups or particular events where these ethic groups had a significant role at that certain point in time.

Additionally, this research examined how and which obligations the Security Council has imposed on both non-state actors and the United Nations member states in the field of counterterrorism and scrutinized their potential correlation to the discourses under the analysis

[1] Donald Erns and Brian H. Bornstein, "Prejudice against Muslims: Association with personality traits and political attitudes," in *Islamophobia in the West,* ed. Marc Helbling (London: Routledge, 2012), 21-37.
[2] Donald Erns and Brian H. Bornstein, "Prejudice against Muslims: Association with personality traits and political attitudes," in *Islamophobia in the West,* ed. Marc Helbling (London: Routledge, 2012), 21-37.
[3] "Anti-Muslim hatred has reached 'epidemic proportions' says UN rights expert, urging actions by States," United Nations, UN News, last modified March 4 2021 https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086452

1.1. From the Peace of Westphalia to the modern United Nations

In the next subchapters, I will briefly introduce the main concepts in international relations and contextual facts that are important for understanding the position, status, and role of the main actors in international relations, in conjunction with the reason why their historical and political evolution is vital for examining the correlation between detected discourses and policy orientations of the countries who produced them.

1.1.1. Actors of International Relations

Actors of international relations are defined by Public International Law. This legal system consists of a "whole set of formal rules and customary practices that together define the legal rights and obligations, and govern the interactions, of international legal subjects,"[4] while the formal sources of the Public International Law are defined in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and they include international conventions, international customs, the general principles of laws, as well as juridical decisions and teachings as subsidiary sources.[5]

Brownlie defines that "a subject of international law is an entity possessing international rights and obligations and having the capacity to (1) to maintain its rights by bringing international claims, and (2) to be responsible for its breaches of obligation by being subjected to such claims."[6]

[4] John H. Currie, *Public International Law* (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008), 1.
[5] International Court of Justice, *Statute of the International Court of Justice*, 1945, Article 38, n.d. https://www.icj-cij.org/statute
[6] James R. Crawford, *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 105.

Traditionally, states are considered primary legal subjects,[7] and should be understood, according to Currie,[8] in the sense of the Article 1 of the Montevideo convention,[9]which states:

"The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:

a. a permanent population;
b. a defined territory;
c. government; and
d. capacity to enter into relations with the other states."[10]

Over time, international organizations have been widely accepted as subjects of international law, [11] while their definitions may vary on the basis of their goals and mandates. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations[12] from 1986 defines the relations between treaties, states, and international organizations more closely. In this convention, international organizations are defined as intergovernmental organizations, [13] where states "consent to be bound by a treaty."[14]

Similarly, the discussion on non-state actors as international legal subjects has been developed, where some examples include: individuals, corporations, non-governmental organizations.[15] Followingly, the attempts to define non-state actors as a legal category in scholarship have been

[7] John H. Currie, *Public International Law* (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008), 23.
[8] John H. Currie, *Public International Law* (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008), 23.
[9] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf
[10] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, Article 1, https://www.ilsa.org/Jessup/Jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf
[11] James R. Crawford, *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 156.
[12] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, 1986 https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf
[13] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, 1986, Article 2 https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf
[14] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, 1986, Article 2 https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf
[15] John H. Currie, *Public International Law* (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008), 73-78.

numerous. For the needs of this thesis, I accept the following definition proposed by Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert:

"the term non-state actors (…) includes such wide range of identifiable organizations as non-governmental organizations, multinational enterprises, national liberation armies, and intergovernmental organizations, as well as more amorphous groupings such as armed NSAs, indigenous groups, criminal and terrorist organizations and social movements."[16]

1.1.2. The Peace of Westphalia and The Balance of Power

The modern system of nation-states is based on the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.[17] The guiding principle that is at the heart of the Westphalian international system is the concept of sovereignty, which introduced "the privileged status of the states without any higher authority standing above them."[18] This state-centric system was also based on the principles of sovereign independence and equality, non-intervention in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity, and equal rights and obligations of the nation-states.[19]

The Westphalian international system until the World War I is usually understood in terms of Kenneth Waltz's realist theory of the balance of power.[20] According to Waltz, the international system is anarchical, without any higher authority, so the states, as the main actors in the international system, have to increase their chance of survival, by focusing on either the internal

[16] Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, "Introduction: Non-State Actors: International Law's Problematic Case," *Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law. From Law-Takers to Law-Makers*¸ ed. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (London: Routledge, 2016), 1.
[17] European peace settlements of 1648 in Münster and Osnabrück, which brought to an end the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch and the German phase of the Thirty Years' War.
[18] Ebru Oğurly, "Understanding the Distinguishing Features of Post-Westphalian Diplomacy," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 24, no. 2-3 (2019): 177.
[19] Miloš Hrnjaz, *International Court of Justice and the Use of Force* (Belgrade: Andrejević Endowment, 2012), 13
[20] See more: Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979)

strengthening or external allegiances to secure their survival and prevent other states from gaining enough military power to conquer others.[21] The disturbance of this balance between the great powers is often problematized as one of the potential factors that led to World War I.[22]

1.1.3. From the League of Nations to the United Nations

World War I showed all the shortcomings of the international system based on the balance of power without any higher authority. However, an exciting idea of a permanent international organization founded on the ideas of collective security and the non-use of force eventually broke through and was accomplished with the 1919 Versailles peace agreements and arose in the form of the League of Nations.[23] The League of Nations was an organization founded by the efforts of Woodrow Wilson, "in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligation not to resort to war."[24] Although the League of Nations did not fulfill the high expectations that were made upon its establishment, the organization has made essential contributions to the foundations of what will later be known as the Organization of the United Nations and the international system we know today.

Despite the formal existence of the League of Nations until 1939, the ideas on the shaping of the post-war world were developed during World War II by the Allied forces. While the organization's name was first mentioned in the United Nations Declaration of 1942, the Allied forces laid the foundation of this new organization at their conferences, where the Dumbarton Oaks

[21] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979)
[22] Peter Gellman, "The Elusive Explanation: Balance of Power 'Theory' and the Origins of World War I," *Review of International Studies* 15, no. 2 (1989): 155–182.
[23] Vojin Dimitrijević, and Obrad Račić, *International Organizations* (Belgrade: Law Faculty of the Union University and Official Gazette, 2021), 21.
[24] The League of Nations, The Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, Preambule.

conference, from August 21 to October 7, 1944, was probably the most significant.[25] "The big four"[26] agreed on the fundamental principles of the future organization. The proposals made there were acknowledged and incorporated into the Charter itself. The United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco by 50 states on 26 June 1945, while it entered into force on October 24, 1945.[27] The structure of the UN consists of six main organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Trusteeship Council, and Secretariat.[28]

1.1.4. The International System after the End of the Cold War: Political and Social Consequences of the Paradigm Change

New risks, threats, and challenges for international peace and security have emerged and continued to develop after the end of the Cold war. The nature of conflict, together with global politics, has changed – 85% of armed conflicts of that period were non-international (internal) armed conflicts. [29] At the same time, ethnicity, nationality, and religion have been among the leading motivational and mobilizing powers in a negligible number of them.[30]

The practice of the Security Council after 1989 was characterized by an increased or re-established productivity and better cooperation among the members of the UNSC,[31] which could

[25] Vojin Dimitrijević, and Obrad Račić, *International Organizations* (Belgrade: Law Faculty of the Union University and Official Gazette, 2021), 210-213.
[26] USA, USSR, United Kingdom, and China – the four states that were responsible for achieving and maintaining international peace after WWII
[27] Vojin Dimitrijević, and Obrad Račić, *International Organizations* (Belgrade: Law Faculty of the Union University and Official Gazette, 2021), 213.
[28] "UN Structure," United Nations, n.d, accessed 9 April 2022https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/un-structure
[29] Joelle Hageboutros, "The Evolving Role of the Security Council in the Post-Cold War Period," *Swarthmore International Relations Journal* 1 (2016): 10.
[30] Joelle Hageboutros, "The Evolving Role of the Security Council in the Post-Cold War Period," *Swarthmore International Relations Journal* 1 (2016): 10-18.
[31] Joelle Hageboutros, "The Evolving Role of the Security Council in the Post-Cold War Period," *Swarthmore International Relations Journal* 1 (2016): 10.

be explained by multiple factors, including the relaxation of tensions between two former superpower blocks, decreasing use of the veto power in the UNSC, emergence of so-called accommodation of the Permanent Five (*P5*), and new outlooks on managing and resolving conflict.[32] The growing number of non-international armed conflicts demanded a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty and the understanding of *international threats to peace and security.* Together with the human rights discourse (focused on the protection of civilian victims and international human rights standards), the promotion of democracy and institutional developments in conflict and post-conflict situations were incorporated into the Security Council's decision-making.[33] It was clear that there was an overarching need for institutional, normative, and practical reform of the United Nations Security Council as the main political body responsible for international peace and security in the UN system,[34] in order to tackle the challenges and changes of the international reality, both in high politics and the field.

Moreover, after the events of 11 September 2001, the United States, the largest provider of the United Nations budget,[35] has declared "the war on terror",[36] the coalition of states led by the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001[37] and Iraq in 2003.[38] The Bush Doctrine[39], although essentially illegal and often instrumentalized, gained significant domestic popularity. At the same time,

[32] David M. Malone, "The Security Council: Adapting to Address Contemporary Conflicts," *Negotiation Journal* 19 no. 1 (2003): 69-83.
[33] David M. Malone, "The Security Council: Adapting to Address Contemporary Conflicts," *Negotiation Journal* 19 no. 1 (2003): 69-83.
[34] David M. Malone, "The Security Council: Adapting to Address Contemporary Conflict," *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 19, no.1 (2003): 69-83.
[35] "How are we funded," United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d, accessed 10 March 2022, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded,
[36] "Global War on Terror," George W. Bush Library, n.d, accessed 24 April 2024 https://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/research/topic-guides/global-war-terror,
[37] "Afghanistan war: How did 9/11 lead to a 20-year war?," Imperial Wars Museum, n.d, accessed 10 March 2022, https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/afghanistan-war-how-did-911-lead-to-a-20-year-war#:~:text=In%202001%20an%20international%20coalition,NATO%20troops%20on%20the%20ground
[38] "The Iraq War 2003-2011," Council on Foreign Relations, n.d, accessed 24 April 2024 https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war
[39] Walter LaFeber,. "The Bush Doctrine," *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 4 (2002): 543–558.

Responsibility to Protect[40] was a new often-used concept in the foreign policy of the US and other Western states. After terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the paradigm about non-state actors drastically shifted in international relations and international law scholarship, practice, and reality, as it became more difficult to define them and their aims.[41] More than a decade later, this discussion became more complex with the global war on ISIL and thus far unheard emergence of foreign fighters, mainly from the European Union.[42] Simultaneously, Europe was faced with an massive flow of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Eritrea, consisting of over 1 million of migrants only in 2015, who fled to Europe due to conflicts and social-economic situations.[43] Although the mentioned events gained the most of the global-Western publicity, the list of similar affairs is not exhausted. Moreover, the timeframe of this research could also be understood as an examination of a full conflict cycle in relation to the war in Afghanistan, where the Taliban forces took over the country in August 2021, following a massive evacuation of international forces. Furthermore, the results will shed additional light to simultaneous ethnic and religious conflicts and tensions that exist(ed) around the world in the analyzed time period, which were perceived through the lenses of national interests of states.

Having in mind the previously described events and statistical data about discrimination mentioned in the Introduction, anti-migrant biases have been presenting an even greater challenge ever since. These prejudice take the form of negative prejudiced behaviors and negative

[40] See more: Alex J. Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009)
[41] Ragda Elbahy, "Deterring violent non-state actors: dilemmas and implications," *Journal of Humanities and Applied Social Sciences* 1 (2019): 43-54.
[42] See more: Bibi van Ginkel, Eva Entenmann (eds.) "The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats & Policies, "*The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) Evolutions in Counter-Terrorism*, Vol. 1 ((November 2020 [2016]): 11-18. https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-01/Special-Edition-1-2.pdf
[43] Linda Peters et al, "Explaining refugee flows. Understanding the 2015 European refugee crisis through a real options lens." *PloS One*, vol. 18(4), last modified 20 April 2023 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10118136/

stereotypes in the receiving countries to anti-migrant policies and institutional obstacles that re-enforce an increase in anti-Muslim prejudice, violence, and discrimination, which usually opens the door for right-wing extremism.[44] At the same time while the right-wing extremism is on the rise in European countries and the United States, Islamophobia is heavily instrumentalized by right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties.[45] On the other hand, with the existence and rise of the right-wing extremism, there is synchronous existence of the Islamic extremism. More so, these two kinds of extremism could be seen as mutually reinforcing in societies.[46]

1.2. Research aims and research questions

This thesis studies the power dynamics between the members of the UNSC in cases that were set on the agenda of the Council as the "*threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*" through critical discourse analysis of the speeches of the respective representatives in the period from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to the end of 2021, focusing on the ways different issues related to concepts of nationalism and religion are presented and connected to terrorism and violent extremism in these discourses.

This research aspired to achieve two goals.

First, I tried to overcome the discrepancy between the United Nations as an international organization and its member states. However, this organization consists of currently 193 member states that have their own – complementing or conflicting– national interests, regional alliances,

[44] Ulrich Wagner, Oliver Christ, and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, "Anti-Immigration Bias." In *The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination*, ed. John F. Dovidio, Miles Hewstone, Peter Click & Victoria M. Esses (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2010), 361.
[45] Farid Hafez, "Shifting borders: Islamophobia as common ground for building pan-European right-wing unity," *Patterns of Prejudice* 48, no. 5 (2014): 479.
[46] "Radicalization: Islamophobia and Islamism reinforce each other," Jena Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, last modified 29 June 2018 https://www.idz-jena.de/newsdet/radikalisierung-muslimfeindlichkeit-und-islamismus-verstaerken-sich-gegenseitig/

domestic and foreign policy aspirations, which they would like to promote, consolidate or defend at an international forum of this magnitude. By using critical discourse analysis for scrutinizing the Security Council's meeting records, this research aimed to identify how these discourses are used as argumentation strategies for advocating and consolidating national and foreign policy interests, distribution of power among the members of the Security Council, and justifying military and non-military activities against certain ethnic and religious groups within and outside the examined countries which perceive them as security challenges, risks and threats.

Second, since terrorist actors presented, at that time, an under-researched type of non-state actors, I examined how the Security Council has defined the role, status, and obligations related to counterterrorism in its resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. Additionally, I explored whether the evolution of imposed obligations correspond to the examined discourses.

Main research question**:**

How do the main discourses in the Security Council. which connect concepts of nationalism and religion to terrorism and violent extremism, and are detected during the meetings on "threats to international peace and security caused by the terrorist acts" in the period of 2001-2021, correlate to the national interests and foreign policy orientations of the members states of the Security Council?

An additional research questions has risen from the overarching research question:

How do these discourse influence relations between and within states?

Do the obligations found in the Security Council's resolutions and imposed on terrorist actors and member states in connection to counterterrorism correspond to the detected discourses?

***

Chapter 2 presents the main theoretical framework. Chronologically, this includes defining the main concepts in foreign policy analysis, functioning of the UNSC, main theoretical concepts related to non-state actors as a legal category, concepts of terrorism and violent extremism, and political and societal consequences of the paradigm change in the context of anti-migrant sentiments and Islamophobia in the EU and North America. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the data selection and methods. Research findings are presented in Chapter 4, while their discussion can be found in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework aims to explain main theoretical concepts needed for the understanding of the research questions, including the fundamentals of the foreign policy analysis, the UNSC and UN's counterterrorism strategy, the concepts that explain the role of non-state actors as a legal category in contemporary international relations, concepts of terrorism and violent extremism, followed by the instrumentalization of anti-Muslim prejudice.

2.1. Fundamentals of the Foreign Policy Analysis

In this subchapter, I will present two theoretical concepts that are vital for further understanding of the research findings – national interest and foreign policy.

Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy, as a sub-field of international relations, might be broadly defined as a governmental activity or a "behavior states mainly towards other states in the international system through their authorized agents."[47]

Over and above, Philip B.K. Potter offers an unambiguous definition of the ***foreign policy analysis (FPA)***, which is complementary to the research question posed in this thesis. According to Potter, "foreign policy analysis is the study of how states, or the individuals that lead them, make foreign policy, execute foreign policy, and react to the foreign policy of other states."[48]

The foreign policy analysis is an actor-specific approach,[49] and in that sense, one can differentiate three levels of analysis: individual, group, state, and system-level of analysis.[50] Through the development of the foreign policy analysis as a discipline, after the use of case studies and "event-data analysis,"[51] four research methods consolidated as central in the FPA: archival research, content analysis, interviews, and focus groups.[52]

While my primary focus is on the state level analysis content analysis through the approach of the critical discourse analysis, this thesis also explores the dynamic interaction between the

[47] Fatih M. Tayfur, "Main approaches to the study of foreign policy: A review," *METU studies in Development* 21, no. 1 (1994): 113.
[48] Philip B. K. Potter, "Methods of Foreign Policy Analysis" in *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, International Studies*, ed. Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), accessed 10 January 2024 https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-34?print=pdf, 1.
[49] Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations: Foreign Policy Analysis," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2005): 1–30.
[50] Carmen Gebhard, "Levels of Analysis in International Relations," *E-International Relations*, last modified 27 March 2022, https://www.e-ir.info/2022/03/27/levels-of-analysis-in-international-relations/
[51] Philip B. K. Potter, "Methods of Foreign Policy Analysis" in *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, International Studies*, ed. Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), accessed 10 January 2024 https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-34?print=pdf, 8-11.
[52] Philip B. K. Potter, "Methods of Foreign Policy Analysis" in *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, International Studies*, ed. Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), accessed 10 January 2024 https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-34?print=pdf, 12.

state-level and system-level, but also draws attention to the consequences that such an interaction has on the individual and group level of analysis.

The instruments or tools of foreign policy incorporate different manifestations of hard and soft power, including, but not limited to diplomacy, negotiations, economic sanctions, foreign aid and deterrence, military action or propaganda.[53] Considering that Potter's definition also has a "reactive" element, one might conclude that states also interact through discourses. Moreover, Ole Wæver correctly noted that the analysis of discourses, especially in Europe, might predict their foreign policies and security concerns.[54]

Besides international pressures, domestic influences greatly shape and stream behaviors of a state. Concepts of foreign policy and national interest are closely intertwined since the sustainability and continuity of foreign policy depends on the support and legitimacy that the main political actors receive at home, in domestic political landscape.[55]

National Interest

The main focus in different definitions of the concept of national interest might differ depending on the theoretical approach in international relations (realism, liberalism, social

[53] See more: Mustafa Aydin, "Foreign Policy Instruments of States (Diplomacy, Propaganda, Economic Methods)," in *Foreign Policy Analysis,* edited by Çağrı Erhan and Erhan Akdemir *(*Turkey: Anadolu University, 2016), 146-181; Ernest Petrič, *Foreign Policy: From Conception to Diplomatic Practice* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Nijhoff, 2013)
[54] Ole Wæver, "Identity, communities and foreign policy: discourse analysis as foreign policy theory," In *European integration and national identity*, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2003), 20-49.
[55] Nabin Kumar Khara, "Determinants of Foreign Policy: A Global Perspective," *IJRAR*, Volume 5, Issue 3 (2018): 105-115.

constructivism).[56] The concept of national interest, although vague, is often used to encompass a variety of different elements, which in theory present the needs of a nation.[57]

For example, Thomas W. Robinson, building on Hans Morgenthau's work,[58] tried to systematize and classify variations of national interest,[59] presented in the table below. In addition, this author also identifies three types of interests in international politics – identical, complementary, and conflicting,[60] which will be also confirmed through the research findings.

PRIMARY	SECONDARY	GENERAL	SPECIFIC	PERMANENT	VARIABLE
To protect physical, cultural and political identity of a nation; To survive from outside threats	To contribute to achieving primary intrests	Applicable to a wider geographical area	More specific, developed from general interests	Endure over longer period of time with minor changes	"what a given nation at any particular time chooses to regard as its national interests"[61]

Table 1. Categories of national interest according to Thomas W. Robinson[62]

2.2. The United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy

Chapter V of the United Nations Charter is dedicated to the Security Council's composition, functions, powers, procedural matters, and voting in the organ.[63]

The Security Council consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent members. Five permanent members (the so-called P5) are the United States of America, the United Kingdom,

[56] See more: Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler, eds. *Theories of international relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014)
[57] See more: Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler, eds. *Theories of international relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014)
[58] See more: Hans J. Morgenthau. *Politics among nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948)
[59] Thomas W. Robinson, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1967): 135-175.
[60] Thomas W. Robinson, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1967): 141.
[61] Thomas W. Robinson, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1967): 140
[62] Thomas W. Robinson, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (1967): 140
[63] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Chapter V

France, China, and Russia (before – the USSR). Non-permanent members are elected every two years based on the members' contribution to the organization and its purposes, also taking into account geographical distribution. Every member has one representative.[64]

The United Nations Charter (Charter) prescribes that member states "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,"[65] "to ensure prompt and effective action,"[66] and agree that the UNSC will act on their behalf while completing its duties,[67] in accordance with the purposes and principles defined in the Charter. [68] The duties of the UNSC are closely defined in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.[69]

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is relevant for this thesis because it refers to, among others, provisions on threats to international peace and security. According to Article 39, the UNSC determines the "existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,"[70] makes "recommendations"[71] or decides "what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41[72] and 42[73] to maintain or restore international peace and security."[74]

[64]United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 23
[65] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 24 (1)
[66] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 24 (1)
[67] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 24 (1)
[68] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 24 (2)
[69] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 24 (2)
[70] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 39
[71] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 39
[72] Article 41 of the UN Charter states: "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."
[73] Article 42 of the UN Charter states: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."
[74] United Nations, *United Nations Charter*, 1945, Article 39

Resolutions of different bodies of the UN present "formal expressions of the opinion or will of United Nations organs."[75] While the Security Council is, without any doubt, the body of great political and moral authority,[76] scholars have different standpoints about the Security Council's resolutions being legally binding. It is usually understood that the resolutions adopted under Chapter VII have a binding character and may impose obligations.[77]

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy[78] is a universal document that was first adopted in 2006.[79] It is reviewed every two years and based on four pillars of measures that need to be undertaken. The first pillar is dedicated to conditions that contribute to the spread of terrorism. The second pillar addresses measures for prevention and combating terrorism. The third one is focused on the measures to support the strengthening the role of the United Nations system and capacities of states in the field of counterterrorism. The fourth pillar promotes the rule of law and the respect for human rights as essential for this fight.[80]

At this moment, there are nineteen UN legal instruments dedicated to the fight against terrorism in different fields, such as financing, terrorist bombing, explosive materials, nuclear terrorism and nuclear material, the protection of international staff, civil aviation and maritime navigation.[81]

[75] "Resolutions," The United Nations Security Council, n.d, first accessed 10 April 2022 https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/.
[76] Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council," *Global Governance* 8, no. 1 (2002): 35–51.
[77] Michael C. Wood, "The interpretation of Security Council Resolutions," *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online* 2, no. 1 (1998): 77-78.
[78] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/288 (2006) The United Nations Global Couter-Terrorism Strategy, 8 September 2006, UN Doc A/RES/60/288
[79] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/288 (2006) The United Nations Global Couter-Terrorism Strategy, 8 September 2006, UN Doc A/RES/60/288
[80] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/288 (2006) The United Nations Global Couter-Terrorism Strategy, 8 September 2006, UN Doc A/RES/60/288
[81] "International Legal Instruments," United Nations, Office of Counter-Terrorism, n.d. accessed 25 August 2022 https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/international-legal-instruments

These conventions demonstrate the continues progressive development of the legal framework in this field, which aims to regulate different aspects of the fight against terrorism, also including obligations of states.

2.3. The Role of Non-State Actors in Contemporary International Relations

This chapter examines the role of non-state actors in contemporary international relations, with an aim to shed light on relevant debates that also apply to terrorist actors, and illustrate the ways these considerations might influence international decision-making and counterterrorism practice.

The discussion in this chapter will start with a brief reminder of the Noortmann and Ryngaert's (very) inclusive definition of non-state actors.[82] As the definition suggests, various actors can correspond to this term. In order to scrutinize the international obligations of non-state actors, it is important to raise the question **of international legal subjectivity** and accompanying issues, such as legitimacy and international responsibility of states.

Although the problem of **legitimacy** in international politics is usually debatable and prone to politization and ideological contemplations, the question about legitimacy posed concerning non-state actors is, according to Cedric Ryngaert,[83] quite clear. He questions whether the international community can impose international legal obligations on other legal actors besides states, feasibly without their consent, and further analyses the legitimacy of the so-established international rules.[84]

[82] Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, "Introduction: Non-State Actors: International Law's Problematic Case," *Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law. From Law-Takers to Law-Makers*¸ ed. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (London: Routledge, 2016), 1.
[83] Cedric Ryngaert, "Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International Law," *Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law,* ed. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (London: Routledge, 2016), 69-90.
[84] Cedric Ryngaert, "Imposing International Duties on Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International Law," *Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law,* ed. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (London: Routledge, 2016), 69-90.

In relation to the question of **legal subjectivity**, Janne Nijman warns that non-state actors can influence the international legal system in either of the two possible directions: either 1) further fragmentation of the international legal system, which might lead to undermining international institutions, or 2) strengthening the international legal system.[85] One the other hand, one of the leading contemporary scholars of Public International Law, Andrew Clapham, suggests a "radical rethinking."[86] He has in mind the need to reconceptualize international law – he argues that, besides standing obligations for governments,[87] and argues that scholars should change their focus to "*capacity (of...) to fulfill obligations"*[88] rather than only determining personality of non-state actors.[89]

In addition, with the increase in numbers and types of non-state actors, security threats they may pose, and their effects on international politics, it seems that scholars reached a consensus that all non-state actors, while acknowledging the various practical difficulties depending on the type of non-state actors, must comply with the universal human rights standards and principles of international human rights law.[90] In the light of this claim, it is vital to determine the role of states in preventing violations and respecting these human rights standards and rules of international humanitarian law.

[85] Janne E. Nijman, "Non-State Actors and the International Rule of Law: Revisiting the 'Realist Theory' of International Legal Personality," *Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law,* ed. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (London: Routledge, 2016), 92.
[86] Andrew Clapham, *The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed Non-State Actors: The Legal Landscape & Issues Surrounding Engagement*, 1569636, 1 Feb. 2010, *Social Science Research Network*, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1569636, 3.
[87] Andrew Clapham, "Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations," *International Review of the Red Cross* 88, no. 863 (2006): 491–523.
[88] Andrew Clapham, "Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations," *International Review of the Red Cross* 88, no. 863 (2006): 493.
[89] Andrew Clapham, "Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations," *International Review of the Red Cross* 88, no. 863 (2006): 491–523.
[90] See more (for example): Clapham, Andrew. "Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations." *International Review of the Red Cross* 88, no. 863 (2006): 491–523; Ronen, Yael. "Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors." *Cornell International Law Journal,* Vol. 45, No. 1 (2013): 21-47.

International responsibility of states appears when a wrongful act is committed.[91] An international wrongful act of states exists "when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State."[92] Duffy further states that, in the situations where conduct is directly connected to state officials or authorities, the states are in those cases considered to be directly responsible since those actions are considered the 'act of the state.'[93] Then, it must be determined whether actors (individuals or groups) who commit wrongful acts do or do not have formal relationships (implicit or explicit) with the authorities of the states in whose territory they are operating. However, while the states are not necessarily responsible for the wrongful deeds committed from their territory, it is usually understood that states are still accountable when they "exercise effective control"[94] over the territory where this type of conduct is happening.[95]

For example, Eric Heinze examines the development of international law in the post-9/11 context and raises addition questions, that can be applied to different cases of armed conflicts where non-state actors present a party in conflict. He explores the case of the war in Afghanistan and questions explicitly whether this was a "state-sponsored terrorism or non-state 'armed attack.'"[96] By the law on the use of force and complying with the United Nations Charter, there are only two legal exceptions from the prohibition of the use of force: authorization by the Security

[91] Helen Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law*. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 48.
[92] Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001, Article 2,; *cited in* Helen Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law*. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 48.
[93] Helen Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law*. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 48.
[94] Helen Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law*. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 49.
[95] Helen Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law*. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 48-49.
[96] Eric A. Heinze, "The evolution of international law in light of the 'global War on Terror," *Review of International studies* 37, no.3 (2011): 1077.

Council and self-defense.[97] Here, Heinze opens an important debate that has been ongoing since 9/11– is self-defense against non-state actors possible in the sense of Article 51[98] of the UN Charter? Moreover, one of the main conditions for invoking the right of self-defense is the existence of an armed attack, which must fulfil certain conditions and threshold, and, in the case of non-state actors as a legal category, after determining whether non-state actors can mount an armed attack against a state or not.[99]

2.4. Concepts of Terrorism and Violent Extremism

2.4.1. Difficulties in Conceptualization of Terrorism

The problem with defining terrorism is that the concept marks various phenomena in different disciplines – after in-depth research, I reached a conclusion that there is no consensus among scholar om the definition. For example, Jeffrey Simon discovered 212 different definitions of terrorism, where almost half of them are used by different state, international, and regional organizations.[100] One of the bravest academic endeavors in defining terrorism is an attempt by Alex Schmid, where he highlighted 22 elements of the definition:

"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons,

[97] Ruchi Anand, "International Legal Exceptions to the Prohibition on the Use of Force," in *Self-Defense in International Relations*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 60-83.
[98] United Nations, United Nations Charter, Article 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
[99] Kimberley N. Trapp, "Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed Attack?" in *The Oxford Handbook of The Use of Force in International Law*, ed. Marc Welle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 679-697.
[100]Alexander Spencer, "Questioning the concept of 'new terrorism'," *Peace, Conflict and Development* (2006): 3.

whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat—and violence—based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main target (audiences(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought."[101]

The analysis of international treaties suggests a lack of coherence, but emphasize two main components: the protected goods or interests, and special intention(s) (*dolus specialis).*[102]

The United Nations have recognized the need to draft a comprehensive definition of terrorism as early as during the 1970s[103] and continued to do so until today. In 2021, the mandate of the working group for finalizing the draft of a comprehensive definition of international terrorism was renewed.[104] Still, the United Nations Security Council has also attempted to define it and incorporate some of the UN's previous work in its resolutions. The United Nations Security Council's resolution 1566 partly resolves this confusion by stating that terrorist acts are: "*criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an*

[101] Alex Schmid, Albert Jongman et al., *Political Terrorism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 28.
[102] Marcello Di Filippo, "The definition(s) of terrorism in international law," in *Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism*, ed. Ben Saul, (Massachussets: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), 6.
[103] Helen Duffy, *The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law*. 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 19.
[104] "Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996," Ad Hoc and Special Committees Established on the Recommendation of the Sixth Committee, n.d., accessed 16 May 2022 https://legal.un.org/committees/terrorism/

international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act"[105] and such acts are "*under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature."*[106]

Between the Traditionality and Modernity – the Four Waves

David Rapoport's contemplation "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism" is one of the most prominent theories on terrorism and its evolution."[107] Rapoport correctly frames the four "waves" (anarchist, anticolonial, new left, and religious) around major historical events that had greatly influenced regional dynamics and international relations. I accept this premise because the reference point for this thesis is also a major historical event. According to Rapoport, a wave is "a cycle of activity in a given time period (…) characterized by expansion and contraction phases."[108]

According to this author, modern terrorism started in the Russian Empire in the 1880s and later spread across Asia and Europe. This wave was described as anarchist and the "first global or truly international terrorist experience in history."[109] The 1920s and the 1960s are marked as an anticolonial wave, followed by the so-called 'new left wave,' which slowly ended at the end of the 20th century. Finally, the 'religious wave' started in 1979 and is still ongoing.[110] While arguing that religion was a matter of politics to a much larger extent than in the previous waves,[111] Rapaport describes the fourth 'religious' wave in a blunt manner, by stating that "Islam is at the heart of the

[105] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), October 8 2004, UN Doc S/RES/1566 (2004)
[106] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), October 8 2004, UN Doc S/RES/1566 (2004)
[107] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf,
[108] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf, 47.
[109] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf,
[110]David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf,.
[111] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf, 62.

wave. Islamic groups have conducted the most significant, deadly, and profoundly international attacks."[112] In addition, the author emphasizes new methods and tactics, such as suicide bombing, the decline in the number of terrorist groups, and the changing role of the United States in international relations.[113]

Finally, Rapaport makes three significant notes: firstly, the most dominant characteristic (but not the only one!) is indicated in the name of each wave; secondly, according to the pattern he identified, it is expected that the religious wave will last until 2025; lastly, groups enhanced by nationalism existed in every wave and nationalist manifestations were sculpted by these waves differently.[114]

Nationalism and Religion as Potential Causes and Motivations for Terrorism and Violent Extremism

A rich scholarship has been written about nationalism and religion as one of the factors that could potentially contribute or be related to terrorism.[115] Furthermore, critical scholars examine how nationalism, patriotism, and terrorism can be intertwined or enhance each other. The classic scholarship on nationalism examines not only national and religious identities (or even transnational identities), but also the concept of *ethnicity without groups*.[116] Social scientists use different levels of analysis to try to discover what are those decisive factors. Combining individual

[112] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf, 61.
[113] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d. accessed 28 April 2022 https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf, 63.
[114] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf
[115] See more: Richard English, "Nationalism and Terrorism," in *The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism,* ed. by Erica Chenoweth, Richard English, Stathis N. Kalyvas, Andreas Gofas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 268-282: Qiong Li and Marilynn B. Brewer, "What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American Identity after 9/11," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 5 (2004): 727–739;
[116] Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without groups* (London and Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004)

and societal levels of analysis while exploring similar phenomena is crucial in getting a holistic picture of the problem, which would enable academics to gain a better understanding of the described phenomena on the one hand, and allow for practitioners to create appropriate and effective counterterrorism measures, on the other.[117] The search for 'personal significance' is often analyzed as one of the main causes and motivations that contribute to terrorism on the individual level,[118] which is often connected to push factors that lead to radicalization that will be discussed in the next section.

One might argue that there is a consensus among scholars exists when it comes to defining the most common causes and motivations for terrorism, which evolve due to political, religious, and socioeconomic factors.[119] Considering that this thesis examines the discourses in the UNSC about nationalism and religion and the ways they are connected to terrorism and violent extremism through those discourses, a few notes about the relationship between nationalism and religion should be made.

First, we should be reminded that, as Rapaport mentions, nationalist tendencies have existed in every wave of modern terrorism and their manifestations were shaped by dominant paradigms of the time.[120] Therefore, they cannot be examined outside of a context they are manifested, because the context gives them meaning. Second, the line between religious and

[117] See more: Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman. "Psychological factors in terrorism and counterterrorism: Individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis." *Social Issues and Policy Review* 3, no. 1 (2009): 1-44; John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart. "Responsible counterterrorism policy." *Cato Institute Policy Analysis* 755 (2014), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04947

[118] Kruglanski, Arie W., and Edward Orehek. "The role of the quest for personal significance in motivating terrorism" in *The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression*, ed. J. Forgas, A. Kruglanski, and K. Williams, 153-166. New York: Psychology Press, 2011.

[119] Amy Zalman, "Top Major Causes and Motivations of Terrorism," Thought Co, last modified 22 December 2018, https://davestuartjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/AoW-Terrorism_-Causes.pdf

[120] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf, 47.

political or nationalist claims, ambitions, and goals is somewhat blurred – no one can clearly distinguish between them and these claims should be seen as interconnected. Potentially good examples to support this claim are ethnic-nationalism and separatist terrorism.[121] In this case, terrorists are motivated by ethnic, nationalist, and/or secessionist ideologies, and, in one way or another, by the religious doctrine corresponding to the broader political goals they want to achieve with terrorist actions. The ideologies they promote are usually embedded in real or perceived grievances in the society they live and operate.[122] Additionally, Rogers Brubaker represents four approaches to describe the relations between nationalism and religion.[123] On that line, Rapaport emphasizes that this connection has always been present in modern terrorism because of the overlap of ethnic/nationalist and religious identities.[124]

2.4.2. Preventing violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism

Could all considerations mentioned in the previous section be jointly present a force that will transform into, in Rapoport's terms, the fifth wave? Would that wave be the wave of the far-right? It should be noted that extremism could be violent and non-violent in its manifestation, [125] and there is a usual distinction between the far-right and Islamic extremism, which are also interconnected.[126]

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[121] James J.F. Forest, "Nationalist and separatist terrorism," in *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, ed. Andrew Silke (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 74-87.
[122] James J.F. Forest, "Nationalist and separatist terrorism," in *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, ed. Andrew Silke (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 74.
[123] Rogers Brubaker, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches: Religion and Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 1 (2012): 2-20.
[124] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," n.d, accessed 28 April 2022, https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf, 61.
[125] Alex P. Schmid, "Violent and non-violent extremism: Two sides of the same coin," *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT*, last modified 12 May 2014, https://www.icct.nl/publication/violent-and-non-violent-extremism-two-sides-same-coin
[126] Julia Ebner, *The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism* (London, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020)

The European Union, among others, is trying to build resilience to radicalization and violent extremism as part of its counterterrorism agenda.[127] The European Union defines radicalization as "a phased and complex process in which an individual or a group embraces a radical ideology or belief that accepts, uses or condones violence, including acts of terrorism, to reach a specific political or ideological purpose."[128] Factors that contribute to radicalization that leads to violent extremism and terrorism are understood in the terms of "push" and "pull" factors.[129] Push factors are factors that attract individuals to violent extremism and they essentially present political, socio-economic, historical, etc. grievances (for example discrimination and marginalization of members of certain social groups: social, economic, and political inequality; the denial or limited access to rights and liberties, as well as education; perceived or realistic persecution).[130] Push factors nourish and strengthen this attraction to violent extremism, and are usually related to the membership in a violent extremist group with seductive discourses, programs and promises for radicalized individuals.[131] There is a widespread problem in providing the right definition of different concepts in this field. Violent extremism is no exception but different intergovernmental and governmental approach this concept differently.

[127] "Funding of research and projects on radicalization," European Commission, n.d., accessed 12 May 2022 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation/funding-research-and-projects-radicalisation_en

[128] "Prevention of radicalization," European Commission, last modified 9 February 2024 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/prevention-radicalisation_en#:~:text=Radicalisation%20is%20a%20phased%20and,specific%20political%20or%20ideological%20purpose

[129] UNESCO, "A Teacher's Guide on The Prevention of Violent Extremism" (Paris: UNESCO, 2016), 12.

[130] UNESCO, "A Teacher's Guide on The Prevention of Violent Extremism" (Paris: UNESCO, 2016), 12.

[131] UNESCO, "A Teacher's Guide on The Prevention of Violent Extremism" (Paris: UNESCO, 2016), 12.

2.5. Anti-Muslim prejudice and their political instrumentalization

This section will show how prejudice, especially xenophobia, anti-Muslim bias, and prejudice about Islamization, are created, maintained, and instrumentalized in different social and political circumstances and the political consequences of such actions. It aims to illustrate the struggles people face in everyday life, while facing institutional and non-institutional discrimination, xenophobia, and Islamophobia. Considerations in this subsection are vital for the understanding the consequences of how the top-down discourses in the Security Council and their proliferation in the foreign policy of the states that also correspond their national interests and internal policies.

According to Brown, a prejudice is "any attitude, emotion or behaviour towards members of a group, which directly or indirectly implies some negativity or antipathy towards that group."[132] Prejudices heavily shape and condition social identities within groups by adding positive values to the characteristics of the ingroup identity and negative values to outgroups. Consequently, all of these different processes influence the dynamics of various intergroup relations.[133]

In preparation for the report to the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council in November 2020, Imran Awan and Irene Zempi proposed the following working definition of Islamophobia:

"*A fear, prejudice and hatred of Muslims or non-Muslim individuals that leads to provocation, hostility and intolerance by means of threatening, harassment, abuse, incitement and intimidation of Muslims and non-Muslims, both in the online and offline world. Motivated by institutional,*

[132] Rupert Brown, *Prejudice: It's Social Psychology* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 7.
[133] Rupert Brown, *Prejudice: It's Social Psychology* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)

ideological, political and religious hostility that transcends into structural and cultural racism which targets the symbols and markers of a being a Muslim."[134]

I have chosen to present this definition of Islamophobia for several reasons relevant to this study. As the authors have also stated, this definition "emphasizes the link between the institutional levels of Islamophobia and manifestations of such attitudes, triggered by the visibility of the victim's (perceived) Muslim identity."[135] Furthermore, according to this point of view, Islamophobia can be interpreted "as a 'new' form of racism, whereby Islamic religion, tradition and culture are seen as a 'threat' to the British/Western values."[136] Both of these arguments are closely connected to this research and discourses present in the Results chapter. Additionally, as mentioned in the introduction, this Council warned that Islamophobia reached almost the level of epidemic in March 2021,[137] two decades after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which were the starting time point of this thesis. Finally, this working definition was presented in front of the Human Rights Council in November 2020.[138] Additionally, the speeches I examined in this research did not happen in a vacuum, as describes in previous chapters. At the same time, in the same way these events are intertwined with global affairs, they greatly influence societies with long-term political and societal consequences, both institutional and non-institutional.

[134] Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, *A working definition of Islamophobia: A Briefing Paper*, November 2020 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-2.pdf

[135] Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, *A working definition of Islamophobia: A Briefing Paper*, November 2020 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-2.pdf, 3.

[136] Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, *A working definition of Islamophobia: A Briefing Paper*, November 2020 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-2.pdf, 3.

[137] "Anti-Muslim hatred has reached 'epidemic proportions' says UN rights expert, urging actions by States," United Nations, UN News, last modified March 4 2021 https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086452

[138] The Human Rights Council is, officially, "an inter-governmental body within the United Nations system made up of 47 States responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights around the globe." ("Home," United Nations Human Rights Council, accessed 5 May 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/home)

Attitudes gathered in the public opinion poll do not differ to a great extent. It seems that overall nationalist and religious tendencies are often marked as the primary motivations for nationalists by the general population. Moreover, researchers have been examining the consequences of terrorist attacks on political attitudes.[139] In the last couple of years, social scientists examine how terrorist attacks influence the attitudes towards migration and immigrants in the receiving countries.[140]

[139] Giovanni Peri and Daniel I. Rees, and Brock Smith, "Terrorism and Political Attitudes: Evidence from European Social Surveys," *NBER Working Papers* No. 28662, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021, accessed 4 May 2022 https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/28662.html

[140] See more: Mónica Ferrín, Moreno Mancosu, and Teresa M. Cappiali, "Terrorist attacks and Europeans' attitudes towards immigrants: An experimental approach," *European Journal of Political Research* 59, no. 3 (2020): 491-516.

3. METHODS

I used qualitative content analysis and the approach of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in conducting this research. Additionally, I used quantitative content analysis as a supplementary method to determine quantitative evidence to justify the data selection.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) examines the discourses where concepts of nationalism and religion are connected to terrorism and violent extremism in the analyzed speeches, with an aim to determine their correlation to the national interests and foreign policies of the respective the members of the UNSC, including the pattern of change over a longer period of time. To be more precise, I believe that the discourse-historical approach (DHA) is appropriate for examining discourses in the UNSC, which consists of five powerful permanent members[141] and non-permanent members that change every two years, as previously described. As a problem-oriented and interdisciplinary approach, the DHA is used in this thesis to examine how "language is a mean to gain and maintain power via the use that powerful people make of it, and an expression of power relations,"[142] where "dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups"[143] and "power relations are legitimized or delegitimized through discourses."[144] The interdisciplinarity of this approach is additionally highlighted through the principle of triangulation, which emphasizes the use of a variety theories from different disciplines, methods and empirical observations.[145]

[141] As mentioned earlier – five great powers: USA, UK, Russia, China, France.
[142] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 26.
[143] Ruth Wodak, "What CDA is About – a Summary of its History, Important Concepts and Its Developments," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak, Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), 3.
[144] Ruth Wodak, "Critical discourse analysis, discourse-historical approach," in *The international encyclopedia of language and social interaction,* edited by Karen Tracy, Corneli Ilie, Todd Sandel (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons 2015), 4.
[145] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 26.

Considering that this approach takes into consideration the historical context and different historical orientations in the interpretation of the findings[146] it also "perceives both written and spoken language as a form of social practice"[147] or its analysis shows how "linguistic forms are used in various expressions and manipulations of power."[148]

With a focus on the international organization as a field of political action,[149] I encountered all five discursive strategies in the analysis of the select sources. These include discursive strategies of argumentation[150], nomination[151], prediction,[152] discourse representation/framing/perspectivization[153] and mitigation.[154]

Data sampling

Two types of data are used for this research - the Security Council's meeting records and corresponding resolutions. The documents were analyzed in pairs – first, I conducted a critical discourse analysis of the meeting records, and then I conducted the qualitative content analysis of the corresponding resolution. The distinction between the two types of documents conditioned the analysis "in pairs." Namely, the Security Council meetings are organized at any time when the

[146] Ruth Wodak, "Critical discourse analysis, discourse-historical approach," in *The international encyclopedia of language and social interaction,* edited by Karen Tracy, Corneli Ilie, Todd Sandel (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons 2015), 1-14.
[147]Ruth Wodak, "The Discouse-Historical Approach," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak, Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), 4.
[148] Ruth Wodak, "Critical discourse analysis, discourse-historical approach" in *The international encyclopedia of language and social interaction,* edited by Karen Tracy, Corneli Ilie, Todd Sandel (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons 2015), 4.
[149] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 29.
[150] The objective is justification and/or questioning of claims of truth (in: Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies (*London: SAGE, 2016), 33)
[151] The objective is discursive construction (in: Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 33)
[152] The objective is discursive qualification (in: Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 33)
[153] The objective is to show the speaker's perspective and express involvement or distance (in: Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 33)
[154] The objective is to intensify or mitigate the epistemic status (in: Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 33)

need to discuss threats to international peace and security arises. Usually, the speaking order is established by a draw with the President of the Council making his or her national statement last of the Council members. Although the Security Council meetings are held on a very high diplomatic level and delegations of member states prepare their statements in advance, there is still room for the member states to share their opinions or shed light on some issues that are not only important for the international community but could be of great importance in the domestic arena. On the other hand, Security Council's resolutions use very sterile, politically neutral language or language that should perceived as such. In addition, from the perspective of the CDA, this emphasizes intertextuality, recontextualization and interdiscursivity of the discourses under analysis.[155] Intertextuality means that, in this specific case, the texts of the proceedings from the meetings and corresponding resolutions were and are connected between each other. Moreover, the recontextualization means that these texts would acquire a new meaning when we take them out from a particular context to a new context. Finally, interdiscoursivity means that discourses have different links among each other.[156] All these characteristics of discourses are fully acknowledged in the findings, in the same way as they were during the research process.

The initial idea was to focus on two types of threats to international peace and security – the threats cause by terrorist acts (from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2021) and threats related to Afghanistan (from 11 September 2001 to 2011).

Although the case study of Afghanistan would be valuable for several reasons[157] and preliminary findings indicate that there are important insights about the state- and nation-building

[155] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016)
[156] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies* (London: SAGE, 2016), 28.
[157] The American invasion of Afghanistan presents a direct response to the events of 9/11; A terrorist group Al-Qaeda took responsibility for these attacks: The Security Council's activities connected to Afghanistan until Bin-Laden's

processes in Afghanistan through the selected time period, I chose not to pursue this niche further in order to focus this thesis on the discourses that connect nationalism and religion to the UN's counterterrorism practice and their correlation to the national and foreign policy orientation of the members of the UNSC.

The initial plan was to analyze the selected data, labeled on the agenda of the UNSC as "threats to international peace and security through terrorist acts" from September 11, 2001, until December 31, 2021. In the select time frame, my goal was to determine whether and how the Security Council's practice in this field was influenced by the foreign policy orientations of its member states. My assumption was that the practice of the Security Council in the years after 9/11 has set a political and legal basis for further action and power relations between member states, a thus a more extended period for analysis allowed for tracing this pattern and showing how different foreign policy aims, covertly articulated through discourses connected to concepts of nationalism and religion, affected possible changes in the Security Council's practice on counter-terrorism and the dynamics between the member states. The following table presents an overview of the number of pairs of documents in the last 20 years.

The number of pairs of documents – *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.*	
2001	3
2002	4
2003	4
2004	4

assassination offer additional insights into general attitudes about counter-terrorism, The question of state responsibility for terrorism was raised and very crucial in debates about the relation to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda

2005	3
2006	1
2007	1
2008	2
2009	1
2010	1
2011	2
2012	2
2013	1
2014	5
2015	4
2016	2
2017	6
2018	0
2019	2
2020	2
2021	5

Table 2. Total numbers of pairs of documents on terrorist attacks (2001-2022)

The table clearly shows some quantitative patterns in the practice of the Security Council – the Council was the most active in the periods (highlighted blue) from 2001-2005, 2014-2017, and

2021, which correlates with previously described events that had heavily impacted the global political and social landscape.[158]

Considering a piece of quantitative evidence, similar methodology used by social scientist and the main goal of this research, I decided to specifically focus on the time periods that indicate the most activities (highlighted blue in the Table 2).

Finally, the total, narrowed down, number of analyzed documents is present in the Table 3.

Type of Sources	*Final Number of Documents*
Security Council's resolutions on threats caused by terrorist acts	*40*
Security Council's meeting records on threats caused by terrorist acts	*40*
TOTAL	***80***

Table 3. Final data selection

The Data Analysis

The meeting records were analyzed by using critical discourse analysis. Besides focusing on the direct implications on foreign policy, inter-state relations, I was mindful of the political and regional security situations of different countries at that moment in time. Additionally, I tried to

[158] Furthermore, to support this methodological approach, I provide an example of John Postill who focused on major social changes and their effects on media. (John Postill, "The diachronic ethnography of media: From social changing to actual social changes,".*Journal of Cultural Studies*, vol. 4 no. 1 (2017): 19–43.)

notice the things that the representatives were not talking about, but I expected them to discuss in specific time periods. Although it is not possible to present and analyze political situations and national interests of different countries it in this thesis, I noted some relevant events that were directly or indirectly addressed. As a supplementary method, I again used quantitative content analysis to determine the number of meetings that were purely procedural in nature.

Security Council's resolutions are analyzed using qualitative content analysis, in order to identify obligations the Security Council is imposing on non-state and state actors on counter-terrorism and to determine the Security Council's legal justification while invoking these resolutions. More precisely, I focused on the resolutions that were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this thesis, obligations imposed on state and non-state actors regarding counter-terrorism were examined in the following broader categories, which were identified after the preliminary pilot analysis of the resolutions:

Member States	Non-State Actors
Political and Security Obligations	Political and Security Obligations
Economic Obligations	Economic Obligations
Humanitarian Obligations	Humanitarian Obligations
Legal and Administrative Obligations	Legal and Administrative Obligations

Table 4. Obligations imposed on state and non-state actors in relation to counter-terrorism

I would like to also mention that, originally, there was an attempt to conduct an additional kind of quantitative content analysis on the meeting records, as well. The initial idea was to measure the presence of words "nationalism" and "religion" and their linguistic variations in the selected documents. However, I encountered difficulties during the research in conducting the described quantitative content analysis for several reasons. First, I analyzed a larger number of documents. Secondly, the language was often not very clear, which, on the other hand, provided additional

insights for the critical discourse analysis. Thirdly, the actors used the names of specific ethnic or religious communities, depending on their political and ideological positions, which I was not able to adequately sort within these categories.

I presented the findings in Chapter 4 – Results. Considering the characteristics of the DHA of the CDA and text-context interaction, I have also indicated some important findings related to the discourses and their characteristics in this chapter. However, the actual interpretation of discourses in the wider context of international politics and consequences on domestic policies is presented in Chapter 5 – Discussion.

4. RESULTS

During the research process, one of the main realizations was that the documents under scrutiny might also be adequate sources for numerous other questions that could be examined through different disciplines. Nevertheless, as previously explained. decided to narrow down the research topic and sources after the data analysis had been completed, while some additional recommendations for potential new research questions can be found in the Conclusion.

The findings are presented in the following way: research findings from the period of 2001-2005, research findings from the period of 2014-2017, and research findings from 2021. As indicated in the methods chapter, the meeting records and resolutions complement each other and they will be analyzed in that matter (*intertextuality in CDA*), in three separate time periods.

4.1. Findings from the period of 2001-2005

Discourses in the meeting records in the period of 2001-2005

In the period from 2001 to 2005, with a particular emphasis on 2001 as the starting year for analysis, I perceived multiple discourses that were present in the United Nations Security

Council, during its meetings on, as officially titled, "threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts."[159]

Eleven out of sixteen meetings in this time period were purely procedural in nature – no discussion took place. To correctly illustrate these discourses in the first time period, I selected the following meetings as the most relevant examples for the research question: the Security Council's 4370th meeting from 12 September 2001,[160] the 4413rd meeting form 12 November 2021,[161] the 4688th meeting – the high-level meeting on combating terrorism from 10 January 2003,[162] the 5053rd meeting from 8 October 2004,[163] and the 5246th meeting from 4 August 2005.[164]

In my analysis, I have perceived several simultaneous discourses during the selected UNSC's meetings. I took the liberty to name these discourses the following: the United Nations discourse (UN discourse), the discourse of the United States on the war on terror (US discourse), the double standards discourse, the clash of civilizations discourse, and the defensive discourse.

The UN discourse

At first, the dominant discourse in 2001 was *the UN discourse*. It was first used by the Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, during the meeting of 12 September 2001, where he stated that "a terrorist attack on one country is an attack on humanity as a whole"[165] and that terrorism is a global problem that requires a collective response.[166] Similar remarks were reiterated in the

[159] See more: "Resolution," United Nations Security Council, n.d, accessed 3 March 2022. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0
[160] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370
[161] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413
[162] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688
[163] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053
[164] United Nations Security Council, 5246th meeting record, 4 August 2005, UN Doc S/PV.5246
[165] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 2.
[166] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 3.

speeches of the representatives of the Western countries. The framing of this great threat by the US and other Western countries in 2001 is mainly characterized by condolences for the victims and certain buzz-words, such as "global issue,"[167] "attack on the whole modern civilization,"[168] reiterating the need for a spirit of response[169]/solidarity[170]/urgency[171] etc. However, one cannot but notice the general ubiquitous avoidance to engage in the matter or discussions any further.

Irish representative Mr. Ryan noted that terrorists can come from "every cultural background, by people of every religion and none."[172]

After two months, during the 4413rd meeting of the Security Council from November 2001, a slight shift can be noticed. The UN discourse, usually primarily produced by the Secretary-General, and reproduced and agreed to by the representatives of Western states, became a bit more practical. From a blur conglomerate of buzz words in the beginning the discourse has changed in its content by clearly emphasizing the need for strengthening the global norms, respecting existing legal documents, but also acknowledging the need not only for an appropriate definition, but also "the need for moral clarity."[173] At the same time, Mr. Knight (Jamaica), the President of the Security Council, has also started addressing some grievances that can also be interpreted as possibly contributing to radicalization and violent extremism that leads to terrorism, such as regional conflicts, human rights atrocities, inability to access educational and juridical systems, environmental challenges, and the absence of sustainable development in general.[174]

[167] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 3.
[168] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 3.
[169] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 2.
[170] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 4.
[171] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 7.
[172] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 5.
[173] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 3.
[174] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 4.

During the high-level meeting on terrorism of 10 January 2003, the discourse further developed and emphasized the need for "sustained, long-term action,"[175] while terrorism was labeled as "global scourge with global effects."[176] Now, a more programmatic UN discourse reiterated the role of the UN and highlighted the need for "strengthening mobilization of all against terrorism,"[177] together with the imperative for a faster verification and implementation of treaties on non-proliferation of different types of weapons.[178] Furthermore, the Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan correctly warned about, as it was phrased, "collateral damage"[179] in internal affairs of states, which includes different security concerns and treatment of minorities, refugees and asylum seekers "to ensure that entire groups in our societies are not tarred with one broad brush and punished for the reprehensible behaviour of a few."[180]

During the meeting,[181] different countries mentioned different obligations and challenges that should be tackled in the future, among others, including: cooperation with the CTC (Jeremy Greenstock, Russia, Guinea) and wide international cooperation (Germany, Cameroon, Angola, Mexico, US, China, Chile) and international solidarity (Russia, Guinea), respect, implementation and strengthening of the existing legal framework, including ratification of existing counterterrorism instruments, implementation of previous SC resolutions and creating of a

[175] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 2.
[176] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 2-3.
[177] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 2.
[178] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688
[179] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 3.
[180] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 3.
[181] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688

comprehensive declaration on anti-terrorism (Jeremy Greenstock, Germany, Cameroon, UK, Bulgaria, Angola, Mexico, Russia, Guinea), crisis and radicalization prevention by addressing societal grievances and inequalities (Germany, Camerron, Angola, Pakistan, Russia), conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes (Mexico). preventing, combating and disassembling terrorist networks (Angola), sanctions for assisting, aiding, harboring, encouraging, protecting and financing (Spain, Russia), non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other kinds of weapons (Russia, France). The UK representative, Mr. Straw emphasized that "today's terrorists (…) respect no values and no religion."[182]

The discussions that took place during the 5053rd meeting of 8 October 2004[183] and 5246th meeting of 4 August 2005[184] focused their discussions on the adoption of resolutions after terrorist attacks that took place shortly before the meetings were held. Representatives of respective states reaffirmed their previous positions and emphasized the importance of their adoption, particularly in relation to international cooperation of all states in combating terrorism,[185] non-existence of any kind of justification for such acts ("no political, ideological, religious or other views of any nature").[186]

The discourse of the United States – The war on terror

The US discourse on the war on terror is based on the antagonizing idea of the fight between good and evil. During Security Council meeting from 12 September 2001, the US Ambassador Mr. James B. Cunningham strongly argued that the US "will make no distinction

[182] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 8.
[183] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053
[184] United Nations Security Council, 5246th meeting record, 4 August 2005, UN Doc S/PV.5246
[185] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053; United Nations Security Council, 5246th meeting record, 4 August 2005, UN Doc S/PV.5246
[186] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 2

between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them"[187] and that "those who stand for peace, justice and security in the world stand together with the United States to win the war against terrorism."[188]

The US discourse continued to develop further away from the abstract ideas in the following years. During the 2003 high-level meeting on combating terrorism, Mr. Colin Powell, the US Representative and the former Secretary of State, stated that this country "totally reject terrorists and terrorism"[189] and openly declared that "the United Nations has long worked to marshal the international community against terrorism."[190] His statement was additionally supplemented with references on the obligation to "rid the civilized world of this cancer."[191][192] During the Security Council's 5053rd meeting from 8 October 2004,[193] Mr. John Danforth, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, began his speech by stating different terrorist attacks and the number of children that had died as a consequence of those attacks, stating that "some say that such murders of children are justified by "root causes.""[194] Here, the actors who committed terrorist attacks are again not named, it states that "they were cause-driven acts of violence."[195] Although he was hesitant in the beginning to name what he considers to be the causes of terrorism, he further stated that these actions could never be justifiable and made a list of possible reasons.

[187] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 8.
[188] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 7.
[189] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 18.
[190] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 18.
[191] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 18.
[192] This also falls under the "clash of civilization" discourse as well. In assumes a leadership position in determining who does and who does not belong to the civilized world.
[193] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053
[194] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 7.
[195] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 7.

Among the noted reasons, according to Danforth, religion, nationality, and ethnicity were stated last, after political, philosophical, and ideological reasons.[196]

The US representative Mr. Danforth reflected on possible alternative interpretations of the resolution under discussion and added:

"The alternative position is that some "root causes" may from time to time justify terrorists in detonating bombs in crowds of children. The alternative position to the resolution before us is to say that circumstances may be sufficient to justify such terrorism. (...) Either terrorism is never justifiable, or it is sometimes justifiable. Either the massacre of innocents always deserves punishment, or it is sometimes absolved from punishment."[197]

Additionally, during the meeting of 4 August 2005, while addressing the situation in Iraq, he encouraged "all Member States of the United Nations, especially in the Arab world, to come forward and support the Iraqi people at this critical point in their development of constitutional structures of representative government."[198]

The Double Standards discourse

The main carriers of the double standards discourse in international politics over the years in the analyzed sample were the Russian Federation and China.

In the meeting of 12 September 2001, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, first expressed condolences for the American victims and shared that terrorism presents a challenge for the whole international community.[199] At the same time, he pointed to the

[196] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 7.
[197] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 7.
[198] United Nations Security Council, 5246th meeting record, 4 August 2005, UN Doc S/PV.5246, 3.
[199] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 5.

double standards in international politics in defining terrorism, terrorist actors, and terrorist crimes.[200]He quoted the Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, who stated on September 11, 2011, that "Russia knows very well what terror is and so we understand better than most the feeling of the American people."[201] Two months later, during the Security Council's 4413th meeting, Mr. Igor Ivanov recalled the 1999 "massive attacks by international terrorists."[202] He also stated here that terrorism has "no nationality or clear territorial affiliation"[203] and that "it would be an unforgivable mistake to identify terrorism with any religion, nationality or culture."[204]

"We have repeatedly made a point that there can be no double standards. There can be no bad or good terrorists, whatever slogans they hide behind. The war against them in any part of the world must be waged robustly and decisively."[205]

The double standards discourse remained present in the speeches of the Russian representatives in the following years. During the high-level meeting in 2003, Mr. Ivanov repeated that the international community still needs cooperation, solidarity and decisive actions,[206] and reaffirmed the concern of the Secretary-General related to political and ideological differences that might be as an obstacle to achieving such actions.[207] Two years later, on 4 August 2005, the

[200] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 5.
[201] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 5.
[202] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 10.
[203] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 11.
[204] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 11.
[205] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 11.
[206] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 15-16.
[207] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 16.

Russian diplomat Mr. Aleksandr Konuzin compared the danger of the "propagandizing ideologies and terrorist practices"[208] with the danger of misuse of mass media.[209]

The Chinese discourse follows the same pattern as the Russian discourse. During the meeting from 12 September 2001, the Chinese representative Mr. Wang Yingfan expressed condolences for the American victims and showed willingness for international cooperation in implementing counterterrorism measures.[210] During the 4413th meeting, which took place two months later that year, Mr. Tang Jiaxuan stated that China "oppose linking terrorism to any specific religion or ethnicity. China also believes that there should be no double standards with regard to counter-terrorism."[211] The combination of the UN discourse and the double standards discourse is again present here. China also refers to its own conflict - "the "East Turkestan" terrorist forces,"[212] as it was phrased. Mr. Jiaxuan also labeled poverty, underdevelopment, and poverty as s problems that should be resolved to contribute international cooperation and the fight against terrorism.[213] During the high-level meeting from 2003, he added other grievances to this in this list, including disparity, underdevelopment and, in order to achieve a comprehensive response to terrorist threats, he called for better "understanding and integration among civilizations,"[214] which is an indication of a discourse which will be explained next.

Besides Russia and China, other countries, such as Pakistan or Syria, inclined to this discourse sporadically, usually as an expansion to their main discourse in the statements of the

[208] United Nations Security Council, 5246th meeting record, 4 August 2005, UN Doc S/PV.5246, 5.
[209] United Nations Security Council, 5246th meeting record, 4 August 2005, UN Doc S/PV.5246, 5.
[210] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370. 5.
[211] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 4.
[212] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 5.
[213] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 5.
[214] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 20.

respective countries. This was especially highlighted during the high-level meeting on terrorism in 2003. For example, the Syrian representative Mr. Wehbe stated:

"In today's world, justice is mixed with injustice, freedom with oppression and principles with double standards. Briefly but more significantly, truth is mixed with falsehood."[215] Additionally, Wehbe noted that over the years, his country was urging the UN "to define terrorism and to distinguish between terrorism and a people's struggle for freedom."[216]

Similarly, the Pakistani representative Mr. Kasuri noted that:

"Greater effort is necessary to identify those acts of terrorism which are the consequence of incorrigible fanaticism or criminal intent, and others which arise from a sense of political or economic injustice."[217]

Furthermore, the following was stated:

"At this juncture, however, I would like to point out that some States have unfortunately sought to misuse the campaign against terror to denigrate and suppress the right of peoples to self-determination, such as those in occupied Jammu and Kashmir and in Palestine. (…) There should be no double standards in combating terrorism. We are surprised that acts of terrorism committed by other religious fanatics in non-Muslim societies have not been condemned as vigorously."[218]

[215] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 22-23.
[216] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 23.
[217] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 12.
[218] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 12-13.

The EU's clash of civilizations discourse

Samuel Huntington's clash of civilization theory states that cultural and religious identities are main sources of conflicts in the post-Cold war world and separates the world into eight different civilizations: Western, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, African, Latin American, Confucian, Japanese, and Hindu.[219]

In addition to the parts of the speech presented in the previous sections, the US representative US, Mr. Powell also directly referred to the clash of civilizations during the 4413rd session:

"Those who seek to define terrorism need look no further. No one can defend such heartless acts against innocent people. This is not about a clash of civilizations or religions. It was an attack on civilization and religion themselves. This is what terrorism means."[220]

During the 2003 high-level meeting on combating terrorism, Mr. Joseph Martin Joschka Fisher, the former vice-chancellor of Germany, relived the clash of the civilizations discourse with a clear European perspective.[221] In his speech, he stated the following:

"First, international terrorism poses a strategic threat to peace and the international order. It is aimed at forcing us to react rashly and entangling us in a war among civilizations. That must not be our response. We must react in a way which weakens terrorism. However, crisis prevention, conflict management, participation, poverty reduction, the promotion of education and a dialogue

[219] Huntington Samuel. "The clash of civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49.
[220] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 16.
[221] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 5-6.

among civilizations are equally important. It is crucial to prevent acts of terrorism, but it is even better to prevent people from becoming terrorists. We also attach particular importance to dialogue with other civilizations, particularly the Islamic world, in that context."[222]

Furthermore, a manifestation of this discourse could be found as a supplement to the co-existing discourse in the speech of the Chinese representative, Mr. Jixuan:

"Terrorism is a common enemy of all civilizations, ethnic groups and religions. The fight against terrorism should provide civilizations with a new opportunity to learn from one another through mutual exchanges, a new starting point for their dialogue and integration and a new engine for their common progress and prosperity, rather than be a cause of greater ethnic hatred, racial conflict, clashes of civilizations or rifts between peoples."[223]

Additionally, the UK representative, Mr. Straw stated: "*Fourthly, we have absolutely and emphatically to reject the lie that the action of the international community in fighting terrorism and rogue States is anti-Muslim. It is not. It is pro-Muslim, as well as pro-Christian, pro-Buddhist, pro-Jew, pro-Hindu, pro-Sikh — pro-humanity."*[224]

The Spanish representative, Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo stated the following during the 5053rd meeting of 8 October 2004:

[222] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 6.
[223] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 20.
[224] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 9.

"At the same time, the preambular part of the resolution also reflects the need for improved dialogue and broader understanding among civilizations. In that context, I cannot fail to refer to what the President of the Spanish Government said at the 4th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on 21 September, when he offered the idea of establishing an alliance of civilizations to combat terrorism, extremism and pointless violence."[225]

Additionally, I noticed a phenomenom that could be understood as a sub-discourse of both, the UN and the double standards discourse, which is focused on the misuse of these terms for political purposes. While the connection to the double standards discourse is quite obvious, the connection to the UN discourse may depend on the states whose representatives are chairing the UNSC and the UNGA at the moment.

Very early on, the Secretary General evaluated that the use of the "T word"[226] was increased with an aim of to "demonize political opponents, to throttle freedom of speech and the press and to delegitimize legitimate political grievances."[227] Similar remarks was made by representative of other respective states, as well:

"The inability to overcome political and ideological differences runs counter to the interests of the entire international community and raises doubts about our ability to act effectively and responsibly in complex situations." – Mr. Ivanov, Russian Federation [228]

[225] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 4.
[226] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 2.
[227] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 3.
[228] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 16.

"Political disputes and differences should not overshadow our commitment to combat this evil, which affects the international community as a whole." – Mr. Fall Guinea[229]

"*At this juncture, however, I would like to point out that some States have unfortunately sought to misuse the campaign against terror to denigrate and suppress the right of peoples to self-determination, such as those in occupied Jammu and Kashmir and in Palestine."*- Mr. Kasuri, Pakistan.[230]

The defensive discourse of the countries with Muslim majorities – addressing double standards, clash of civilizations, and resolving the situation in the Middle East

The results indicated that the speeches of the representatives of the countries with Muslim majorities, mainly Pakistan, Jordan, and Syria over the analyzed time period, foster a discourse which was defensive, or even apologetic in its nature, especially while addressing the matter of religion. The results have showed that these countries accepted and reinforced the "clash of civilization" discourse, but in a disparted and defensive way.

For example, the Tunisian representative, Mr. Ben Yahia stated the following during the 4413rd meeting of 12 November 2001:

"*We welcome, in this regard, the conclusions of that debate, particularly the following: the call to avoid confusing Islam with the acts of certain extremist terrorist groups that have no relationship whatsoever with the religion, which is one of tolerance, mediation and moderation; the affirmation of the rights of people to self-determination in accordance with the Charter and*

[229] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 21.
[230]United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 12.

within the framework of international legality; and the call for strengthening international cooperation and solidarity with a view to eliminating the factors of frustration and deprivation in the world and to finding solutions to pending international issues, particularly the question of Palestine. By doing so, we ensure that those problems are not used by terrorist and extremist movements to destabilize the world."[231]

During the 2003 high-level meeting on combating terrorism, Mr. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, called for a promotion of a "greater cultural and religious harmony all over the world,"[232] while he directly pointed out double standards in international relations:

"Terrorism has no creed, culture or religion. Pakistan resolutely rejects attempts to identify our noble religion, Islam, with terrorism. (...) There should be no double standards in combating terrorism. We are surprised that acts of terrorism committed by other religious fanatics in non-Muslim societies have not been condemned as vigorously."[233]

Moreover, the Pakistani representatives reiterated these concerns in the following years and quoted the preambular of the draft resolution on the agenda[234] of the 5053rd meeting from 8 October 2004,[235] which spotlighted the need of:

"enhancing dialogue and broadening the understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and addressing unresolved

[231] United Nations Security Council, 4413rd meeting record, 12 November 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4413, 13.
[232] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 13.
[233] United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 13.
[234] United Nations Security Council, Draft Resolution, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/2004/792
[235] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053

regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development issues, will contribute to international cooperation, which by itself is necessary to sustain the broadest possible fight against terrorism."[236]

Quantitative content analysis of the UNSC resolutions in the period of 2001-2005

In total, as indicated in the data selection, I analyzed eighteen Security Council resolutions on the topic, which had been adopted from 2001 to 2005. Out of eighteen resolutions: **six were adopted under Chapter VII**, seven resolutions condemned terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, while five were either declarations on combating terrorism or resolutions that reaffirmed previous resolutions adopted under Chapter VII.

The main obligations of state and non-state actors are presented in the Tables 6 and 7 that could be found bellow.

CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS	Political and Security Obligations	Economic Obligations	Humanitarian Obligations	Legal and Administrative Obligations
1378 (2001) **1452 (2002)** **1455 (2003)** **1526 (2004)** **1566 (2004)** **1617(2005)**	Prevent any form of support Prevent the commission of terrorist acts Deny safe haven to terrorist or collaborators Assistance in investigations Prevent entry into, movement and	Suppress any kind of direct or indirect financing, supplies, or transfers Freeze terrorist funds and assets Sanctions	/	Criminalize direct and indirect financing Bring anyone who participates or collaborates to justice Informational exchange according to domestic and international law Accession to relevant

[236] United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 1-2.

	transit through their territories (border control) Better and full cooperation in the fight against terrorism Regular support, cooperation, and reporting to the SC Counter-Terrorism Committee, Monitoring group and other UN-founded bodies Cooperation with regional organizations			international conventions Respect international humanitarian law and human rights standards Enforcement and strengthening legal and administrative measures Full cooperation and reaching consensus on the draft of comprehensive convention on terrorism and other relevant documents Assisting and updating the Consolidated List

Table 5. Obligations imposed on state-actors in the UNSC resolutions adopted under Chapter VII (2001-2005)

As indicated in the table, the majority of the obligations of state actors concern the development and consolidation of the national legal frameworks and fulfillment of administrative requirements. Political and security requirements refer to cooperation and collaboration with newly-founded bodies, the UN and fellow member states in these international endeavors, together with the obligations related to preventing movement and/or aiding terrorist groups. Financial obligations relate to the measures contributing to suppressing of any kind of financial capabilities of terrorist groups.

CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS	Political and Security Obligations	Economic Obligations	Humanitarian Obligations	Legal and Administrative Obligations

1378 (2001) 1452 (2002) 1455 (2003) 1526 (2004) 1566 (2004) 1617(2005)	Cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Monitoring team (**regional organizations and different UN bodies**) Not to participate in preparing, planning, recruiting for, or facilitating any kind of activities in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban (**any individual, group, undertaking, or entity)**	Not to participate in, financing any kind of activities; not to participate in suppling, transferring and selling arms and related materials in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban (directly or indirectly) (**any individual, group, undertaking, or entity)**	/	Legal and administrative obligations related to their positions (**Secretary-General, Chairmans of the Committee, Monitoring group, Secretariat**) Cooperation between the United Nations and Interpol (**Secretary General)** Creating and updating Consolidated List (**UN officials**)

Table 6. Obligations imposed on non-state actors in the UNSC resolutions adopted under Chapter VII (2001-2005)

In the latter case of non-state actors, legal and administrative obligations are defined in a manner that focuses on the need for cooperation among different bodies obliged to professionally deal with these issues. Political, security and economic obligations are framed in a concrete form that underlines the denial of specific kinds of support to terrorists.

4.2. Findings from the period of 2014-2017

Discourses in the meeting records in the period of 2014-2017

The findings suggested that, in the period from 2001 to 2005, multiple simultaneous discourses from different international actors coexisted, supplemented or rejected each other.

However, during the Security Council's meetings on terrorist attacks in the period from 2014 to 2017, several changes occurred in comparison to the previous time period. Similarly to

the previous segment, the selected documents present the most comprehensive illustrations of the discourses that were perceived in this time period: the 7242nd meeting record from 15 August 2014,[237] the 7272nd meeting records from 24 September 2014,[238] the 7587th meeting of 17 December 2015.[239]

This time period of the analysis has several characteristics. First, the variety of discourses was much smaller. The main topics on the agenda were the prevention, resilience, and prescribing necessary measures for combating violent extremism, though different political and economic means. Moreover, the significance of the modern means of communication was heavily addressed by the majority of actors. Besides the main issue of foreign fighters, additional topics on the agendas of the meetings in question were also certain socio-economic matters, the use of social media and its mobilization potential, and suggestions on more pragmatic steps towards better international cooperation. Considering the variety (and intertextuality!) of the topics on the agenda, the speeches that were given can be described as much longer, more detailed, while the actual content of those statements was much less inflammatory in comparison with the previous data. At the first glance, respective states had a more comprehensive approach in making clear distinctions between acts of violent extremism and any kind of inherent connection to any nationality, religion or culture. However, although the complementarity is evident on the surface, the previously detected discourses were still covertly present.

Considering the global changes in this time period, different non-state actors that participate in conflicts around the world found their way to the speeches in the Security Council. It can also be observed that different non-state actors, both terrorist and extremist groups, were

[237] United Nations Security Council, 7242nd meeting record, 15 August 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7242
[238] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272
[239] United Nations Security Council, 7587th meeting, 17 December 2015, UN Doc S/PV.7587

discussed in a much more explicit manner in comparison to the previous time period of analysis. However, the concepts of "violent extremism" and "terrorism" were used almost interchangeably since no representative or UN official clearly distinguished between the concepts before attributing those characteristics to different groups. To illustrate this finding, I present the quote from the US representative Mr. Colin Powel who uses the terms interchangeably:

"ISIL and the Nusra Front have used Syria's civil war and Iraq's instability to claim territory, into which they attract others who are bent on violent extremism… (…) That is the new front of the terrorist threat, with a devastating human cost."[240]

The Blur Line between the US and UN discourses

Additionally, the 7272nd meeting in 2014, partly chaired by the US President Mr. Barack Obama presents a good example to demonstrate how one could not clearly distinguish between the so-called UN and American discourse. This is illustrated by the fact that Obama addressed the Council in the capacity of the President of the Security Council only on the procedural matters, while he discussed the items of the agenda as the President of the United States,[241] which shows the entanglement of these positions, and how important it is to make a clear distinction between these two capacities, but also how these two roles may affect the performance of each other.

Furthermore, the "*Letter dated 3 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General"*[242] was on the agenda of this meeting. The letter was signed by Ms. Samantha Power, announcing a summit

[240] United Nations Security Council, 7242nd meeting record, 15 August 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7242, 3.
[241] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272
[242] Samantha Power, *Letter dated 3 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,* 3 September 2014, UN Doc S/2014/648

on foreign terrorist fighters, framework in which this threat might be addressed, and the need for a much deeper international engagement.[243]

The Evolution of the Clash of Civilization Discourse

The "clash of the civilization" discourse was still dominantly present among the western European countries, but in a manner that was less obvious to recognize in comparison to the previous period.

For example, French President Mr. Hollande François stated that, although nationality and religion, are irrelevant when it comes to mobilization for violent extremism and terrorism, "it is attracting people, often young people, of all nationalities, and not just, as it is often said, those of Muslim origin – even though Islam has nothing to do with this fight."[244] Furthermore, he added:

"Finally, we must execute this strategy while respecting law and liberty. We must do it while respecting religions, including Islam. "[245]

In general, western European countries focused on Islamic extremism as the main threat to European societies. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. David Cameron took a strong stand by saying:

"Everywhere there is conflict and everywhere there is poor governance, the poisonous narrative of Islamist extremism has taken hold. (…) *However, as the evidence emerges about the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were initially influenced by preachers who claim not to encourage violence, but whose world view can be used*

[243] Samantha Power, *Letter dated 3 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,* 3 September 2014, UN Doc S/2014/648
[244] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 6.
[245] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 6.

as a justification for it. We know what this world view is: the peddling of lies that the attacks of 11 September were a Jewish plot or the 7 July London attacks were staged; the idea that Muslims are persecuted all over the world as a deliberate act of Western policy; and the concept of an inevitable clash of civilizations. We must be clear that to defeat the ideology of extremism, we need to deal with all forms of extremism, not just violent extremism"[246]

In 2015, the French representative Mr. Sapin stated:

"The terrorist threat is a threat not only to the whole world but also, more specifically, to the European project, given its consequences. Europeans must therefore be prepared to address it, and they have decided to do so."[247]

The representative of Luxembourg Mr. Bettel indicated that the growing number of foreign fighters presented a dangerous security threat not only for his country, but for Europe too.[248]

The "clash of civilization" discourse evidently became a dominant idea behind the official declarations related to the violent extremism in 2014, 2015. In 2016 and 2017, the issues that were on the agenda became more practical, such as international judicial cooperation, protection of critical infrastructure, non-proliferation of weapons, and additional global counter-terrorism efforts and obligations imposed on states in this field.

The double standards discourse

The findings determined the continuity of the double standards discourse. Primarily produced by the Russian Federation and China, it remained completely the same, while the representatives even repeated almost the same remarks as in the previously analyzed time period.

[246] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 13-14.
[247] United Nations Security Council, 7587th meeting, 17 December 2015, UN Doc S/PV.7587, 8.
[248] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 15.

Furthermore, one could notice a closer alignment between the double standards discourse and the discourse on political misuse – at this point, it is hard to distinguish between them.

For example, president of Rwanda, Mr. Kagama, while discussing the situation in his respective country, stated the following:

"Terrorism is not caused by religion, ethnicity or even poverty, but by misguided politics and false beliefs."[249]

The discourse of the countries with Muslim majorities

The discourse of the countries with Muslim majorities became less apologetic and much more aligned to the official UN discourse about violent extremism. Furthermore, the representatives of some states started openly addressing the problem of Islamophobia in western societies. The King of Jordan stated:

"I and others have made clear that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and related ideologies are in no way related to Islam. Nor should we permit any form of Islamophobia. Jordan has taken the lead in inter-faith initiatives, and we are working on introducing a Security Council resolution that will address the systematic targeting of religious communities."[250]

Furthermore, he addressed regional conflicts that might overflow to other countries: "First and foremost, we must have a just resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict."[251]

[249] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 10.
[250] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 11.
[251] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 11.

The President of Chad, Mr. Itno accentuated that foreign fighters come from all around the world "from more than 80 countries, most of them from the Middle East, but also from non-Muslim countries, including Western nations."[252]

Quantitative content analysis of the UNSC resolutions in the period of 2014-2017

As previously explained, violent extremism was a dominant topic on the agenda of the Security Council. Moreover, special attention was paid to the threat of foreign fighters and the international mechanisms and endeavors to overcome this challenge. From 2014 to 2017, there were seventeen Security Council resolutions that were adopted, of which **eight were adopted under Chapter VII**. The rest of them reaffirmed previous resolutions.

In the following tables, I wanted to emphasize the most important new obligations which were imposed on state and non-state actors by the adoption of nine new Chapter VII resolutions.

CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS	Political and Security Obligations	Economic Obligations	Humanitarian Obligations	Legal and Administrative Obligations
2160 (2014) 2161 (2014) 2170 (2014) 2178 (2014) 2199 (2015)	Surpress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters Bored control (foreign terrorist fighters) Improved comprehensive international cooperation (foreign terrorist fighters) Countering violent extremism in order to prevent terrorism	Arm embargo – all kinds of explosives and related materials (Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and any actor associated) Sanctions (ISIL included) Oil Trade Ban (Al-Qaida) Prevent the trade of Iraqi and Syrian	/	Consulting the Consolidated List for visa purposes Bring to justice of foreign terrorist fighters – establishing criminal offences in domestic laws Respect international refugee law

[252] United Nations Security Council, 7272nd meeting records, 24 September 2014, UN Doc S/PV.7272, 7.

2253 (2015) 2368 (2017) 2396 (2017)		cultural heritage by terrorists Prevent terrorists access to financial institutions Implement new international standards for combating money laundering		

Table 7. Obligations imposed to state-actors by UNSC resolutions adopted under Chapter VII (2014-2017)

In comparison to the previously defined obligations, new obligations were largely focused on different aspects related to the prevention of financial support, in some cases directed to specific groups, which are mentioned in the brackets of the table. Furthermore, it is demanded to respect international refugee law, which presents, together with other administrative obligations, important steps towards tackling the challenges of the time.

CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS	Political and Security Obligations	Economic Obligations	Humanitarian Obligations	Legal and Administrative Obligations
2160 (2014) 2161 (2014) 2170 (2014) 2178 (2014) 2199 (2015) 2253 (2015) 2368 (2017) 2396 (2017)	All UN-bodies should focus on foreign fighters as a new security threat	No new obligations, the previous ones were reaffirmed	/	Delisting on the case-by-case bases All UN-bodies should focus on foreign fighters as a new security threat and adapt their work accordingly Update the ISIL (Daesh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List (**Committee**)

Table 8. Obligations imposed to non-state actors by UNSC resolutions adopted by Chapter VII (2014-2017)

Although focused on the UN bodies, which still consist of representatives of different states, these obligations reaffirm that the main focus in their work should be put on the issue of

foreign fighters, also including legal and administrative adaptation of their framework of competences.

4.3. Findings from 2021

Discourses in the meeting records in 2021 – the time of humanitarianism

The results of the data analysis from 2021 demonstrated the findings that were significantly different than preliminary expectations focused on this final time period, especially considering the situation in Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover of the country in August 2021.

The primary focus was on providing humanitarian and economic assistance which "should be accessible to all and must be distributed in a non-discriminatory manner, irrespective of ethnicity, religion or political belief."[253] The resolution 2615 on humanitarian assistance was drafted by the United States.[254] Considering the content of the analyzed data and the fact that this thesis was time limited by the end of 2021, the manifestation of this discourse is only analyzed in the previously mentioned meetings.

Furthermore, the UN discourse in 2021 mentions the Taliban in the same way as in 2001-2005. The representatives repeatedly emphasized that they "bear the primary responsibility"[255] for the situation in Afghanistan. In addition, the findings illustrate that the discourses presented in the Security Council are much milder in terms of addressing individual policy orientations of member states, while their argumentation strategies were much weaker, which can be understood in the general context that was focused on urgent humanitarian assistance.

[253] United Nations Security Council, 8941st meeting, 22 December 2021, UN Doc S/PV.8941, 5.
[254] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2615 (2021), 22 December 2021, UN Doc S/RES/2615
[255] United Nations Security Council, 8941st meeting, 22 December 2021, UN Doc S/PV.8941, 3.

Quantitative content analysis of the UNSC resolutions in 2021

During 2021, four resolutions in total were adopted in the Security Council. Out of four, **three resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII.**

CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS	Political and Security Obligations	Economic Obligations	Humanitarian Obligations	Legal and Administrative Obligations
2610 (2021) 2611 (2021) 2615 (2615)	No new obligations, the previous ones were reaffirmed	No new obligations, the previous ones were reaffirmed	No new obligations, the previous ones were reaffirmed	No new obligations, the previous ones were reaffirmed

Table 9. Obligations imposed to state-actors by UNSC resolutions adopted under Chapter VII (2021)

CHAPTER VII RESOLUTIONS	**Political and Security Obligations**	**Economic Obligations**	**Humanitarian Obligations**	**Legal and Administrative Obligations**
2610 (2021) **2611 (2021)** **2615 (2021)**	No new obligations, the previous ones were reaffirmed	No new obligations, the previous ones were reaffirmed	/	Regular Reporting to the Security Council (**Emergency Relief Coordinator**)

Table 10. Obligations imposed to non-state actors by UNSC resolutions adopted under Chapter VII (2021)

The resolutions reaffirming existing obligations, although the discourse analysis does not indicate that so clearly. Although the resolutions do not introduce almost anything new except the reporting obligation of the Emergency Relief Coordinator,[256] the analyzed resolutions strongly reaffirmed previous measures and requested their implementation. Furthermore, considering that these resolutions were analyzed through the whole conflict cycle – starting from terrorist attacks of 9/11 and American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, this

[256] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2615 (2021), 22 December 2021, UN Doc S/RES/2615, 2.

might be interpreted as a consolidation of the counter-terrorism obligations in the period of the last two decades.

4. DISCUSSION

The discussion will be divided into two segments: 1) general observations about the manifestation of perceived discourses; 2) analysis of individual discourses and their relation to national and foreign policy orientations; 3) the obligations imposed by the resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and their correspondence to the detected discourses.

5.1. General Observations

This research has shown a wide variety of coexisting and living discourses that could be supplemented, replaced, or even rejected by one another. In general, it indicated that one can draw a parallel between the discourses under analysis and the global distribution of power, but also national interests and foreign policy objectives of member states. Moreover, the findings demonstrate very well that all five discursive strategies in the discourse-historical approach were present in the analyzed data.

The findings suggest that the discourses that were produced from 2001 to 2005 present a strong base on which discourses had been further developed in the future. Questions of nationalism and religion, directly or indirectly, were addressed in all of these discourses, which present a solid base for member states to further argue different foreign policy implications.

The presentation of findings started by providing examples of the UN discourse, which is rarely exclusively present in the speeches under analysis. One of the first patterns that stood out is that the majority of the representatives of both Western and non-Western countries – which reproduce different, even contradicting discourses – usually start their speeches by giving opening statements

that align with the UN discourse. However, the pattern suggests that the shift of narratives occurs very soon. It seems that *what they need* or *are expected to say* about terrorist threats in discussed cases is covertly used in order to argue and address their own priorities This pattern is recognized as the first argumentation strategy, because the UN discourse is utilized to (partly) justify the discourses that build on at a later stage. Closer analysis suggests that these discourses are produced **by the great powers for the great powers** in order to determine, clarify, establish, and maintain the distribution of power.

During the period from 2014 to 2017, the topic that was clearly in the spotlight during the whole period was the problem of foreign fighters and the ways to overcome it. The analysis noted that all actors – the UN officials, and representatives of different states around the world – addressed the issue of foreign fighters, while, at the same time, building on the same discourses that were previously noted in the period of 2001-2005. In addition, it is important to mention that the main messages were much more complimentary in comparison with the time period that was previously analyzed, with a clear orientation on tackling the issue of foreign fighters, as an emerging problem in societies around the globe. However, it was noted that the terms "terrorism" and "violent extremism" were used interchangeably, which indicates lack of consensus for conceptual definitions.

Finally, the humanitarian discourse was present in the analyzed data in 2021, focused on the time period during and after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. It is important to mention that the statements of the respective representatives in the UNSC were aligned to the largest extend in the analyzed dataset. There are (at least) three possible explanations. First, after two decades, the practice of the Security Council is already working in the existing framework for counter-terrorism, which encompasses various challenges that had arisen in the last two decades. Secondly,

as mentioned in the previous chapter, there were almost no "new" obligations in the resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, expect reaffirming the ones that were previously declared, which could be understood as a consolidation of the counterterrorism framework. Last, but not least, the need for urgent humanitarian assistance was the highest priority

5.2. National and Foreign Policy Orientations in Discourses

Entanglement of the UN & US discourses

In the UN discourse in the period of 2001-2005, strategies of nomination and prediction strategies to label terrorist actors negatively and construct them as out-groups on the global level. At the beginning, the pattern of reproduction of the UN discourse that can be noted in later meetings. At that meeting, the President of the Security Council and the majority of the representatives of the Western countries did not name the perpetrators, conspicuously did not clearly address nationalism and religion nor connected them in any way to terrorism nor did they define terrorism, terrorist actors, or offered any plan of action, except the expression of the need that something needed to be done. Although the notion of avoidance is clearly present, one might notice the presence of the strategy of nomination (creating in- and out-groups), while avoiding to define who the out-groups are, and putting them in a vague and abstract description.[257] In addition, as previously mentioned, the states emphasized the need for "moral clarity."[258] However, the lack of this argumentation strategy where the emphasis is on moral could not be easily understood, as there is no universal understanding of moral, especially in the field of high politics, where national and political interests have a priority. The emphasis on moral and humanitarianism is one of the main characteristics of the ideology of liberalism, which became a dominant doctrine in the

[257] U United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370
[258] United Nations Security Council, 4370th meeting record, 12 September 2001, UN Doc S/PV.4370, 3.

Western world after the lifting of the Iron curtain. The analysis of the United Nations discourse has shown that it essentially supports the ideology of liberalism, as it is understood in the theory of international relations. It is not surprising that, on the one hand, the most powerful Western countries have also accepted this discourse to some degree, usually with supplementary discourses that represent different national interests and objections in foreign policy, while, on the other hand, the Russian Federation and China, as both the members of the Permanent Five but also the "underdogs" in the post-Cold war world, had also followed this pattern. A slight exception is the discourse of the countries with Muslim majorities – it seems fundamentally defensive, but different political aims can also be detected in this case as well.

Connections to nationalism and religion are, as shown in the Results chapter, made in a nuanced matter, while addressing grievances that exist in societies, but they are particularly important in those countries that were facing regional conflict. The notion of avoidance is still present here but true implications are rather hidden. Regional conflicts in the Middle East, which is one of the most important regions on the agenda of the Security Council, are inherently religious and ethnically-intertwined conflicts as well. Having said that, although the Secretary-General, as a manifestation of the UN discourse, avoided to openly address these conflicts and their sole essence, one might easily conclude that nationalism, religion, and their different manifestations actually present part of the grievances. To support this claim, one should be reminded that the representatives of non-Western countries spoke about conflicts directly, especially representatives of the Arab states in the Middle East in relation to the conflict between Palestine and Israel.

The discourse of the United States slightly differs from the general UN discourse, although it carries the same messages regarding international actions and necessary changes, and could be seen as intertwined or even blurred on multiple occasions. Discursive strategies that are present in

the majority of cases are strategies of nomination, predication, and discursive representation, taking into account that the representatives of the US clearly stated the criteria for the distinction between "good and evil." This discourse aims to provoke emotions and all discursive strategies are much more passionate. For this reason, the statements of the representatives of the United States often begin by listing the numbers of victims and describing the ways they died.[259] While this may be the case for a simple reason, such as respecting and commemorating the victims, there also are at least two possible options for this argumentation. First, the names and faces of the victims fuel an emotional response from the audience. This presents a contrast to the image of abstract, distant, dangerous enemies which we avoid to directly address, which strengthen the division between "us and them" even more. Secondly, these strategies also directly support and strengthen the general foreign policy orientation of that time period, primarily focused on the "war on terror." These premises are also supported by the case of Mr. Powell's statement in the "no distinction policy between the terrorists and those who harbor them", that might be interpreted as directed towards certain states who had taken a different stand in relation to the US, which would mark them as out-groups on the global level. Furthermore, Powell's quote could also be interpreted as an answer to the Russian and Chinese accusations of double standards in international politics, and may refer to different international interventions in that time period. International politics in the last two decades has shown that international interventions based on these values and deployed with the support of the United States (and, in some cases, other Western states) are rather selective.

The double standards discourse

[259] See more: United Nations Security Council, 5053rd meeting record, 8 October 2004, UN Doc S/PV.5053, 7-8.

The Russian and Chinese double standards discourse has a clear pattern – the opening statements acknowledges the basic premises of the UN discourse. Then, the speeches would be directed to specific political issues and the balance of power and argumentations in decision-making in the international environment. All of the mentioned actors (Putin, Lavrov, and Ivanov), referred to the Russian apartment bombings, a series of explosions in Moscow and other Russian cities in September 1999, where more than 200 people were killed and over 1000 injured. These events are usually understood as the Second Chechen War, where the Chechen leaders were considered responsible.[260] After these events, the Security Council has started deliberating on terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. The reference to double standards also signifies strategies of nomination and predication, although in a way that is a bit more subtle than the previous discourse. A less subtle representation of these strategies is manifested in relation to the Chechen. Finally, by using quotes made by the president of the country, who is a very important figure in international politics, the strategy of discursive representation transforms into a form of the leader, who signifies the strength and security of the whole nation. In addition, the pattern of argumentation when addressing the concepts of nationalism and religion is especially peculiar. The representatives would usually warn on the dangers of generalizations, which are often unfairly attributed to issues related to nationalism and religion. Nevertheless, this is not the central argument because the central question are, as always, the double standards created by the great powers in international politics, whose manifestation change depending on the topic on the agenda.

Additionally, the Russian representatives continuously make insinuations about the American foreign policy objectives, decisions, and global trends the US had been establishing.

[260] Joseph F. Dresen, "Foiled Attack or Failed Exercise? A Look at Ryazan 1999," Wilson Center, n.d., accessed 6 June 2022 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/foiled-attack-or-failed-exercise-look-ryazan-1999

First, American and Russian interests in different regions were usually quite different and they stayed different, especially in the Middle East, where both parties supported different state and non-state actors. Secondly, this is compatible with the United States discourse which states that no distinction was ever made. I see this dichotomy as a continuation of an ever-lasting power struggle, where the most powerful country has the power to define what terrorism is and who are terrorist actors. The double standards discourse in cases of both Russia and China lies in the idea that the experiences of these countries that are not perceived as legitimate and raise the question is who has enough power to define to start, build, and direct global counterterrorism measures, and with that, the global political trends.

Similarly, China also addressed internal conflict, but with one difference. In their statements, Chinese representatives also refer to the clash of civilizations. The question that needs to be asked here is whether China also supports, accepts, and promotes this discourse in its actions, especially taking into account the considerations related to the East Turkestan. East Turkestan or Xinjiang is officially a Chinese autonomous region. The ethnic population that lives there is the Uyghurs, mostly Muslim. So far, China has committed numerous crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs, while a number of UN member states have accused China of genocide.[261] With this additional information in mind, one might conclude that everything mentioned earlier is not only a simple additional argument to strengthen the double standards discourse, but also the use of multiple discursive strategies in an attempt to justify international war crimes.

Clash of civilizations discourse

[261] "Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide," BBC, last modified 24 May 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037

The clash of the civilizations discourse unfolds in two ways. First, as a discourse of the representatives of the mainly EU member states, which address the discrepancy of the values that are declared as European, and negatively evaluate the groups that do not share the values that are described in such a way or whose meaning is interpreted in that way. Secondly, the discourse of the non-EU countries that want to either express commitment or reject these values.

As mentioned in the Results chapter, the analysis of this data has shown that there were multiple statements where representatives invited the member of "other civilization" to dialogue. Although the invitation for dialogue might, at first glance, symbolize a positive gesture towards understanding and peace between different national and religious groups, the preliminary premise is the existence of conflict, where dialogue should contribute to its resolutions. This premise is especially important in the context of the demographic picture of, for example, Germany or France, considering the statements that were made in the speeches, and might shed additional light to the previous considerations of institutionalized Islamophobia and internal debates in different countries, which might be especially important during the conflict times, when different countries are faced with migrants and displaced people in need of a shelter. In connection to previously mentioned institutionalized Islamophobia, I would remind of the statements of the Western representative, who harshly rejected the so-called clash of civilization theory but still needed to express that some societal discrepancy continued to exist. This leads to a conclusion that Muslim people were already greatly faced with Islamophobia and that Islamophobic tendencies and obstacles needed to be dealt with from both top-down and bottom-up approach.

Defensive discourse of the countries with Muslim majorities

It was explained in the Results chapter that this discourse was at first very apologetic, while that started to change, especially over time when violent extremism was on the agenda.

Representatives of these used this discourse to build their argumentation on the need to resolve the situation in their region, especially the Israeli-Palestinian question, as a precondition for the successful implementation of global norms, counterterrorism, and finally stopping terrorism by cutting it in the roots. It is important to note that, while often building on the clash of civilizations discourse, the double standards discourse is also present simultaneously. This discourse also has wider foreign policy implications and shows how especially religion and religious identities may be instrumentalized for different foreign policy means, by connecting to regional conflicts where religion plays a major part to different acts of violence.

In addition, representatives of the Muslim counties would occasionally make a statement that could on the surface be understood as the UN discourse, but it is not. In this case, the countries where population dominantly confess Islam are using the same words, but with a different meaning. It is observed that they want to contest nomination and predication strategies used by the Western states, while defending their religion and their social system and emphasize the double standards when evaluating terrorist crimes that are committed by the non-Muslim terrorists. At the same time, this could be understood as criticism of the EU's clash of civilization discourse because dividing terrorists to Muslim and non-Muslim most definitely would lead to different criteria for evaluation activities of different countries, especially in terms of tacking national or religious discrimination.

When it comes to conflicts that are characterized by ethnic and/or religious tensions, different parties in a conflict often try to use nationalist and religious narratives in their argumentation strategies. Thus, the representative of Pakistan stated the abuse of the fight against terrorism may "suppress the right of peoples to self-determination, such as those in occupied

Jammu and Kashmir and in Palestine."[262] The reference to the Israeli-Palestinian question was quite common in the speeches of the representatives of the neighboring countries, as previously mentioned. In addition, Pakistani representative also here mentions Kashmir as an issue of national importance. Furthermore, The Syrian representative Mikhal Wehbe stated that Syria is "concerned also about the unacceptable political references that reflect negatively on the situation in the Middle East region, including the situation in the occupied Arab territories. (…) Israel is practicing the worst forms of terrorism and daily committing crimes against humanity in the occupied Arab territories."[263]

Finally, this discourse is focused on the existence are two sides: the Arab and the Israeli side, including the allies of both so defined sides. The "Arab side" does not consist of only Palestine, but also other Arab countries in the region, which can also be understood as a wider discursive representation of a whole religious group. Moreover, these strategies go hand in hand with the earlier mentioned discourse of double standard in defining the terrorist in dependance of their religion and background. In addition, the argumentation presented here leads to the conclusion that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian question would relieve any other tensions that exist in the region, and possibly by the great powers that have their interests in the region. At this point, it is important to note that the timeframe of this thesis ends at the end of 2021. Considering that fact, this thesis will not address further political developments in the mentioned region, although these findings could present the base for further research in this regard.

[262]United Nations Security Council, 4688th meeting records – High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism, 20 January 2003, UN Doc S/PV.4688, 12.
[263] United Nations Security Council, 4667th meeting record, 13 December 2002, UN Doc S/PV.4667, 2.

5.3. Obligations to state and non-state actors in the field of counter-terrorism and correspondence to the analyzed discourses

The scrutiny of the obligations presented in the tables in the Result chapter suggests two trends. First, obligations imposed to state actors are drastically more numerous than the ones imposed to non-state actors. The logical explanation lies in the debate on international legal personality of different non-state actors that was mentioned in Chapter 2 and the capacity to either fulfill obligations or bear with sanctions. An additional question is whether sanctions can be imposed on all kinds of non-state actors. That leads me to the second point. When it comes to non-state actors, the Security Council was able to clearly and strongly impose obligations only to different UN bodies, while obligations related to terrorist and violent extremist actors were defined negatively, with the use of action verbs as "prevent," "not participate," as *something they should not be done*, with a presumption that that is already being done. Having all of this considered, it is clear that the most numerous group of obligations are political and security-related obligations, economic, and legal and administrative obligations. No real humanitarian obligations were declared, with the note that respect for international humanitarian law, human rights law, and international refugee law was considered as primary legal obligations.

Finally, these obligations also correspond to the UN discourse that I identified in all time periods. To be reminded, the UN discourse was usually produced by the UN officials. Followingly, representatives of different states also reproduced this discourse in the same way but only as a base on which various discourses that correspond to their domestic interests, foreign policy aims, and the discursive representation they wanted to achieve. Finally, having considered the ways these discourses are used, the question that remained to be answered is whether and under what

circumstance the member states are really committed to any of these counter-terrorism measures. However, I believe that previously presented discourses may provide some indications.

5. CONCLUSION

It seems the Security Council meetings on terrorism were not only about counterterrorism after all. While there is a consensus that terrorism presents a global threat that affects all societies and that there is a need to tackle this challenge, there is not clear and coherent way to understand the concept, analyze it consequences and reach consensus on necessary political actions. Furthermore, it seems that, instead of resolving issues, a large part of the debate was dedicated to the blame-game between different countries.

The research findings demonstrate that discourses analyzed in the time period of 2001-2005 present the base for further development of the discourse in two other time periods that were analyzed. Furthermore, it is clear that the discourses align with national interest and foreign policies of the states that produce them, and they showed fluidity over time to adapt to the changing geopolitical circumstances and existing relations between states. Furthermore, the obligations imposed on state and non-state actors in the field of counter-terrorism correspond to the UN discourse, which presents a consensus among conflicting or contradicting attitudes of member states. This research has shown that nationalism and religion were always present in the discourses in the UNSC, but their presence was not always explicitly recognized - were used in argumentation strategies particularly by the five permanent members to justify various and often problematic national interests, security considerations, and foreign policy objections. Additionally, it became clear that discourses that essentially demonstrate Othering were very present in the discourses of Western countries, which may present a shred of evidence for the politically produced yet socially distinguished institutional Islamophobia, xenophobia, and various forms of discrimination.

Considering that the analysis was focused only on the UNSC, a large endeavor of analyzing these issues in a larger plenum, for example, in the UN General Assembly, could open additional research questions that would examine not only the power relations between states, but also show how the global division of power affects or does not affect issues of national and regional importance for members states around the world.

Finally, the research findings indicate that there are (at least) three main consequences when connections between acts of terrorism and violent extremism and understandings of nationalism and religion are being made in discourses:

1) On the societal (both individual and group) level: Othering, discrimination, xenophobia of certain religious or ethnic groups, which might lead to radicalization and violent extremism that leads to terrorism;

2) On the national and regional level: instrumentalization for justification purposes, in order to allow for ideological and logistical support to different non-state and their activities by some states due to different national and political interests;

3) On the international level: escalation and/or justification of military and non-military activities against states with population of certain ethnic and/religious groups.

Considering the limitations of these thesis, these three detected consequences, together with illustrations presented and explained in the previous chapters, could open new research questions. As this thesis aimed to show the change of patterns over time through the lenses of the global distribution of power in the UNSC, new research could also be focused on individual or comparative case studies of conflicts with ethnic and religious character, and the role different organizations or states play in maintaining or changing the status of contested territories, for

example. More specifically, on the national and societal level, besides the scrutiny of institutionalized Islamophobia and discrimination, one could look into the ways how nationalistic discourses presented in the UN or similar forums could be used for consolidating political power in the domestic political arena.

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