CEU eTD Collection (2024); Sujster, Tin: Patronage and Inefficient Public Administration: Croatia's Weakness to Enforce Its Political Financing Law Since Independence

CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2024
Author Sujster, Tin
Title Patronage and Inefficient Public Administration: Croatia's Weakness to Enforce Its Political Financing Law Since Independence
Summary Political financing in Croatia has had continuous, regressive transparency and regulation implementation issues damaging electoral campaigns, previous research states. This thesis focuses on the political financing law’s weak enforcement to monitor party corruption as a missing research gap. Legal review, data analysis, and desk research were methodologically used. The thesis is accompanied by the civic political financing model theory, serving as an ‘ideal’ model for a political financing system based on three pre-achieved conditions: party system correspondence, collegiality, systemic voice and accountability evaluation, and a counterbalance to inherent party system pathologies.
The research examines two areas that the law inadequately regulates: patronage and public administration. Patronage plays a big role in establishing privileged relations with non-governmental actors, whose strategies mainstream parties are likely to utilize. Although its role formally exists, public administration fails to effectively practice the legal mechanism set by the law, implying inefficiency, but also potential collusion. The research discusses the presence of party corruption in Croatia and the population’s ignorance of its presence. This unfortunately legitimizes corruption in Croatian politics, undermining its democracy.
Supervisor Enyedi, Zsolt
Department Undergraduate Studies BA
Full texthttps://www.etd.ceu.edu/2024/sujster_tin.pdf

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