

**DIPLOMACY IN WARTIME: STRENGTHENING UKRAINE'S  
STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS**

By  
Yuliia Balan

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Department of International Relations

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Supervisor: Christopher McIntosh

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## Introduction

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a turning point in Ukraine's multilateral engagement strategy. Confronted with an existential threat and a hostile permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Ukraine has sought to redefine its role within the United Nations system by leveraging the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Security Council, and the Human Rights Council (HRC) as platforms to mobilize international support, document violations of international law, and counterbalance Russia's institutional advantages. Over the past three years, Ukraine's diplomatic efforts at the UN have shown notable successes, including landmark resolutions, coalition-building across regional blocs, and the suspension of Russia from the HRC. However, these efforts have also exposed structural and geopolitical limitations that require strategic recalibration.

This capstone project examines Ukraine's evolving diplomatic strategy within the UN system and identifies pathways to enhance its advocacy, coalition-building, and strategic messaging. Through qualitative analysis of resolutions and statements made by the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN diplomats from February 2022 to early 2025, this research assesses how Ukraine has positioned itself within the UN and what obstacles it faces in maintaining international support amid shifting global alignments and peace negotiations.

The findings are organized into three main sections. First, the capstone analyzes the full spectrum of Ukraine's engagement at the UN through the resolutions and voting records, looking for shifts in support and abstentions and the changing behavior of key regional blocs. Second, it examines the evolution of Ukraine's strategic messaging by analyzing diplomatic speeches, statements, and framing choices made within the UNGA and UNSC. Finally, based on this analysis, the project offers targeted policy recommendations for the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN.

These recommendations focus on three core areas: developing differentiated messaging strategies for the UN member states to address regional concerns and historical sensitivities; investing in cross-regional coalition-building initiatives, especially with middle powers and swing states in the UNGA; and enhancing the strategic use of symbolic diplomacy, legal mechanisms, and norm-setting language to compensate for institutional constraints like the Russian veto in the UNSC.

Together, these recommendations aim to strengthen Ukraine's multilateral positioning in the context of ongoing war diplomacy and as part of its long-term international integration into institutions such as the European Union and NATO. Reframing the UN as both a site of resistance and opportunity, this capstone contributes to a broader understanding of medium-state diplomacy in contested multilateral spaces.

## 1. Historical and Political Contexts

Ukraine's proactive engagement with the UN started back in 2014. Between 2016 and 2021, Ukraine successfully advocated for the adoption of the UNGA resolutions, which condemned abuses and discrimination against residents in the occupied territories and expressed concern over the ongoing militarization of Crimea, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. Notably, resolutions such as A/RES/71/205 (United Nations General Assembly 2016), A/RES/72/190 (United Nations General Assembly 2017), A/RES/73/263 (United Nations General Assembly 2018b), A/RES/74/168 (United Nations General Assembly 2019b), A/RES/75/192 (United Nations General Assembly 2020b), and A/RES/76/179 (United Nations General Assembly 2021) addressed the human rights situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Additionally, UNGA resolutions like A/RES/73/194 (United Nations General Assembly 2018a), A/RES/74/17 (United Nations General Assembly 2019a), and A/RES/75/29 (United Nations General Assembly 2020a) focused on the problem of the militarization of the occupied regions.

The voting patterns of these resolutions demonstrate a gradual decline in support over time, with resolutions addressing human rights receiving more favorable votes than those focused on militarization. Additionally, the number of abstentions has consistently remained nearly equal to the votes in favor. While abstentions do not affect the adoption of these resolutions (only votes in favor and against matter), they highlight the reluctance of many states to take a firm stance against Russia. The UNGA resolutions, while symbolically significant, had limited enforcement mechanisms.

When invited to the Security Council meetings under Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the UNSC (Security Council, n.d.), Ukraine also engaged there to address security threats. Still, Russia's veto power repeatedly blocked any opportunity to pass pro-

Ukrainian resolutions, rendering the UNSC ineffective in resolving the conflict. In response to such weaknesses, growing calls have been made to reform the UNSC to increase its effectiveness. Proposals include expanding permanent membership to represent regions like Africa and Latin America better and introducing measures to limit or make the use of veto power more accountable (Patrick 2023). For instance, the United States has expressed support for adding permanent seats for African nations and implementing reforms to make the Council more inclusive (Nichols 2024). At the Human Rights Council, Ukraine sought investigative mechanisms and special rapporteurs to document abuses in annexed Crimea and occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Still, these efforts largely depended on voluntary cooperation from member states.

## **2. Methodology**

Since February 2022, the United Nations has passed multiple resolutions addressing Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This capstone project analyzes eight resolutions of the 11th emergency session of the UNGA, three GA resolutions on human rights in the occupied territories, one GA resolution on the safety and security of nuclear power plants, two Security Council resolutions, and four HRC resolutions. This capstone also examines official statements from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN diplomats during UNGA debates and UNSC meetings under the agenda items "Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine" and "Threats to international peace and security" published on the Mission's website (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations 2025). The project will provide insight into the changing international views on the war and offer pathways for Ukraine to refine its diplomatic strategies by qualitatively analyzing the language, strategic messaging, and voting trends in these resolutions and statements.



### 3. Voting Trends and Shifts in Support of Resolutions

Appendix A shows that the early General Assembly resolutions, such as ES-11/1 (United Nations General Assembly 2022a) condemning Russian aggression, received overwhelming support with 141 approvals. However, over time, approvals have declined to around 93 votes, which indicates a drop in backing for Ukraine-created resolutions. While core allies, such as the European Union Member States (except Hungary), the Commonwealth and East Asian countries, and others remain committed, this decline can be explained by some member states' growing fatigue or hesitancy. Moreover, with the United States opposing the last Ukrainian resolution ES-11/7 passed on February 24, 2025, and pushing for its own alternative resolution for the first time since the full-scale war started, it is evident that even long-lasting partners can change their stances due to the domestic politics, for instance, the change of the president. This consequently leads the US partners, such as Israel, to take the same opposition stance, further influencing global diplomatic alignments.

Votes against have risen from a low of 2 to a peak of 24 over time. Countries consistently opposing include Russia (the party to the conflict), Belarus and North Korea (directly participating in the conflict), Syria (before the overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024), and Eritrea, with additional opposing members depending on resolution content. While the increase is not dramatic, it signals a growing coalition of Russia's allies or countries that oppose Western-led initiatives.

While abstentions do not count toward the approval decision, they have increased from five (earliest resolutions) to as many as 80 in the last GA resolutions. The median number of abstentions is 60, which shows that a substantial group of states prefers neutrality. Moreover, some Global South countries, including African, Asian, and Latin American ones, have shifted towards abstention rather than outright opposition. Some of the possible explanations are the

diplomatic pressure created by Russia, economic dependencies on Russia, or a broader reluctance to take sides in the crisis that involves a global power (Fenton and Kolyandr 2025).

As Appendix B shows, some of the UNSC resolutions received majority votes in favor but weren't adopted due to the use of veto power by Russia. These are the February 25, 2022, resolution that deplores Russia's aggression against Ukraine and demands the withdrawal of its forces and the September 30, 2022, resolution, which condemns the referendums conducted by Russia in occupied Ukrainian territories. China, India, and the United Arab Emirates abstained in the first resolution, with Brazil, China, Gabon, and India abstaining in the second.

Appendix C shows that the general trend in UNHRC voting behavior on Ukraine-related resolutions shows strong initial support for condemning Russia's actions, with most Western and allied nations voting in favor. However, there is a similar pattern of abstention, particularly among countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Over time, the support gradually decreases, which could reflect states' geopolitical considerations, economic ties to Russia, or non-alignment policies.

#### **4. Evolution of Strategic Messaging and Frameworks in Resolutions**

It is important to examine the language and messaging used in those resolutions. Early resolutions heavily focused on condemning in the strongest terms the Russian aggression and sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine violations. They also called for the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance to the civilians. The systematic language would also be stronger (e.g., "condemn," "deplore in the strongest terms") in the beginning (United Nations General Assembly 2022a; 2022b) with the shift towards more diplomatic terms such as "expresses grave concern," "noting with deep concern") (United Nations General Assembly 2025; 2023). This linguistic adjustment likely aimed to maintain broader support from undecided states, like those in the Global South.

Later resolutions incorporated more specific references to international law, the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The emphasis was increased on Article 2 of the UN Charter (prohibition of using force) and the calls for an urgent end of war and lasting, comprehensive, and just peace between the parties. The resolutions have placed growing calls on the accountability of the Russian war crimes and International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations, especially reminding of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling of March 16, 2022, that calls Russia to stop its military actions in Ukraine. The incorporation of civilian protection, attacks on critical infrastructure, and targeted mentions of Bucha, Mariupol, and other war crime sites also marks a legalistic shift in the GA resolutions.

Except for the general resolutions of the eleventh emergency session, the GA passed special resolutions that addressed specific issues. For instance, the A/RES/78/316 from July 11, 2024, sheds light on the nuclear dimension of the war, especially the risks associated with the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (occupied by Russians since February 2022) (United Nations General Assembly 2024).

Other three special resolutions called "Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol" strongly define Russia's actions as aggression rather than a "special military operation," which counters Russia's traditional narratives (UNHRC 2022; 2023; 2024). They also reaffirm that any Russian-established entities in occupied territories lack legitimacy and should be referred to as "occupying authorities of the Russian Federation."

This aligns with broader calls for Security Council reform, as Russia's veto has repeatedly blocked direct SC action on Ukraine. One of the recent examples is Russia vetoing five amendments proposed by the UK, France, Denmark, Slovenia, and Greece to alter the American 2775 resolution, which doesn't have a single notion of Russia being an aggressor. (Security Council 2025). It's also crucial as resolution 2774 is one of the two resolutions passed

in the SC for three years. The other resolution, 2623, was adopted to create the 11th emergency session of the GA on the war in Ukraine (Security Council 2022). As the advocacy to restructure the membership of the UNSC increases, Russia's use of veto resonates with middle-power states advocating for more democratic and inclusive UN decision-making structures.

The UNHRC's four resolutions follow a similar trajectory from initial condemnation to active pursuit of accountability. They call for investigative bodies to ensure thorough documentation of violations to facilitate future prosecutions. It is essential to say that each resolution of the analyzed UN bodies shows consistent and unwavering support for Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

## **5. Evolution of Strategic Messaging in Statements and Speeches**

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN diplomats, especially its Ambassador Serhii Kyslytsia (December 2020-December 2024), have given strong messages to the UN community in their speeches on the UNGA and the UNSC meetings. Every speech was deliberately constructed with the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call for support, counter Russian narratives and propaganda, and reinforce Ukraine's position as a sovereign nation, defending its own territorial integrity, independence, international security and law. The rhetoric used has changed over three years, reflecting the shifts on the battlefield, support from different international actors, and broader consequences of the war. The Ukrainian Mission's diplomatic approach at the UN bodies can be analyzed through distinct phases with different strategic priorities, messaging techniques, and structures.

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the Ukrainian representative's rhetoric was full of urgency, emotions, and a strong moral appeal. These early speeches, delivered in February and March 2022, framed Russia's aggression as an unequivocal and blatant violation of the UN Charter and emphasized the illegal nature of the war. His Excellency repeatedly

referenced Article 51 about Ukraine's inherent right to self-defense (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN, 2022).

He also invoked the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and sought to rally broad international condemnation. As figured out from the informal conversations with the Mission's diplomats, the MFA supervision of the UN statements was suspended for the first two months of the war. Thus, the representative could use more direct and confrontational language. He also strongly appealed to the immense suffering of Ukrainian civilians and urged immediate international intervention. References to the occupation atrocities in still occupied Mariupol (Donetsk region), deliberated Bucha (Kyiv region), and other cities played a central role in constructing a narrative of Ukraine as an innocent victim of unprovoked aggression from Russia (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN 2022a; 2022b; 2022).

As the war progressed into mid-2022, Ukrainian rhetoric at the UN shifted towards a more structured legal and institutional argument. The condemnation of Russia remained a focal point, but the messaging expanded to emphasize the need for accountability mechanisms, mainly through the International Criminal Court (ICC) and special war tribunals. The Ukrainian representative repeatedly called for international investigations into Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity and argued that impunity for such acts would have global consequences for security. This phase also saw increased advocacy for long-term military and economic support instead of emergency assistance, perhaps because it became evident the war was not to end soon. The Ukrainian Ambassador strategically linked Ukraine's fight to the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, comparing how Russia was using force against its "brotherly" neighbor.

By early 2023, as Ukraine launched counteroffensive operations and reclaimed occupied territories in Kharkiv and Kherson – eastern and southern parts, the diplomatic rhetoric took on a more assertive and confident tone. Ukraine was no longer positioned just as

a victim; the Mission instead showed Ukraine's resilience, military successes, and strategic importance of a strong Ukraine for European security and stability. Speeches from this period seemed to reinforce Ukraine's legitimacy as a capable actor deserving of NATO and EU memberships. The war was still frequently framed as a global issue, arguing that Russian aggression was not only a threat to Ukraine but to the entire rules-based international order. In one notable address, His Excellency stated: "It is one of ten points of the Peace Formula, the plan that Ukraine has proposed as a universal model to restore the rule-based order and the respect to the norms of international law and principles of the UN Charter" (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN 2023).

By 2024, as the war continued with no clear resolution, Ukraine's messaging at the UN increasingly focused on rebuilding Ukraine, prosecuting Russian war criminals, and preventing future aggression. The Ukrainian Ambassador began emphasizing that victory should not only be measured by reclaiming Ukrainian sovereign territory but also by securing Ukraine's place in the Euro-Atlantic community (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN 2024). This period also saw more engagement with the Global South as Ukraine tried to counter Russia's diplomatic influence in non-Western countries. In speeches directed at different UN audiences, the representative would highlight the war's global economic consequences, particularly its impact on food security. "Such strikes directly undermine food security in vulnerable regions across the globe. Today, over 40 countries rely on Ukrainian grain exports. These deliberate attacks risk deepening instability in areas already facing food shortages," he asserted in a 2024 address (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN 2024). In December 2024, His Excellency Serhii Kyslytsia finished his 5-year term and, for the time being, is replaced by the Chargée d'Affaires Khrystyna Hayovyshyn until the new Ambassador arrives.

The beginning of 2025 brought the start of peace talks and ceasefire agreements in the Black Sea and on energy infrastructure, which was highly emphasized in the statements made

until April. While Ukraine remained open to negotiations and the possibility of ending the war through diplomatic means, its representatives repeatedly underscored that Russia was violating every agreement, rendering these efforts ineffective. The rhetoric in this phase reflected a dual strategy: maintaining diplomatic engagement to demonstrate Ukraine's commitment to peace while simultaneously exposing Russia's bad faith and continued aggression. Ukraine wants to ensure that any diplomatic settlement would not be dictated by force but by adherence to international law.

## **6. Policy Recommendations for Ukraine's Diplomatic Strategy in the UN**

Based on the analysis of the resolutions and statements made after the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN is advised to take the following steps to improve its diplomatic effectiveness and leverage tools for increased support.

### ***6.1. Balancing Language in Resolutions for Broader Support***

While every resolution is carefully constructed in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ukrainian government, the Permanent Mission still calibrate the language of its resolutions, balancing strong language of condemnation of Russian aggression that avoids alienating feared and non-aligned states. Strategic messaging should include global security threats and violations of the UN Charter, drawing from successful diplomatic strategies to resolve other conflicts, such as those addressing Myanmar or Syria. The statements should also include long-term inaction for international law and security with using rhetorical structures such as “in adherence to the UN Charter and international law,” “in line with established international norms,” “to uphold the principles of collective security” and others.

### ***6.2. Mapping Interests by Regional Blocs for Targeted Diplomatic Outreach***

Given the rising abstention trend in votes, Ukraine should intensify its diplomatic outreach to different regions using different tactics.

- Latin America countries middle ground can be found in historical opposition to territorial violations and military interventions, as reflected in their condemnation of territorial intervention, such as those related to Falkland Islands dispute between Argentina and the UK (House of Lords Library 2022) and past interventions in Central America.
- African countries, even though mostly non-aligned, usually mention the impacts of the war in Ukraine on increased food insecurity and economic instability, particularly due to disruptions in grain and fertilizer supplies. Ukraine is advised to reference Russia's role in grain shortages – mainly the Russian withdrawal from the Black Sea Initiative with its consequences for regional stability (UN News 2023).
- Asian countries usually focus on economic and security implications, meaning that Ukraine should engage with the key actors such as India and ASEAN countries which have strategic interests in balancing relations with the West and Russia. If possible, Ukraine could start bilateral negotiations on potential trade partnerships, including agricultural exports (once safe routes are secured after the Black Sea ceasefire agreement) or technological collaboration, to provide alternatives to reliance on Russia and encourage closer ties with Ukraine.
- Middle East countries are key players in global energy markets, meaning that Ukraine can use arguments on the consequences of Russia's aggression, namely the reduced energy exports from Russia that caused volatile energy prices. Therefore, Ukraine should argue that global instability can disproportionately affect developing and energy-dependent nations in the Middle East, which rely on stable



markets for their own development. Similarly, sending clear messages about importance of respecting borders that reminds of the region's own territorial disputes and interventions (e.g., Iraq, Syria, Israeli-Palestinian conflict) could help in highlighting how Russia's aggressive actions could embolden non-state and state actors to pursue security destabilization path.

- Small island developing states' (SIDS) main concern, among others, is the negative impact of the war on environment, so Ukraine could draw connections between Russia's environmental damage, such as the contamination of soil and water and destruction of energy infrastructure, which exacerbates environmental degradation, such as rising sea levels and extreme weather events that affect.
- Improving multilateral relationships with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, and CELAC will be crucial for amplifying Ukraine's message within these groupings.

### ***6.3. Increasing Ukraine's Participation in High-Profile International Forums***

For the sake of maintaining awareness and enhancing professional advocacy, Ukraine could actively seek participation in key international forums that happen in New York City where expert voices on the war can gain greater legitimacy. Ukrainian Mission can advise its counterparts in European and other countries to involve in platforms such as the Munich Security Conference, G20 side meetings, and regional security summits to shape global discourse. The Mission could also use personal connections of Ukrainian experts, civil society leaders, and policymakers to participate in specialized UN panels and events (e.g., Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)) to reinforce the strategic narratives.

### ***6.4. Leverage Human Rights and Accountability Mechanisms***

With the outbreak of recent peace negotiations, Ukraine is advised to expand cooperation with international accountability institutions to ensure the just, long-lasting and comprehensive peace by:

- strengthening partnerships with the ICC, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and UNHRC to maintain global attention on Russia's war crimes and crimes against humanity;
- Using UN statements in the UNGA and UNSC to frame forced deportations, attacks on civilians, and the destruction of energy infrastructure as violations of international law with specific examples, perhaps using graphic visuals;
- Highlighting testimonies and evidence in diplomatic communications to ensure continued momentum for investigations and legal actions. One of the working examples was to bring the victims of conflict-related sexual violence as the part of Ukrainian delegation for the 69<sup>th</sup> CSW, where they shared real-life stories of violations of human rights in Russian captivity and occupation.

#### ***6.5. Exposing the Global Consequences of the Russia's Aggression***

While UNGA, UNSC, and UNHRC remain the key UN bodies to call for support and condemn Russia's aggression, Ukraine should also reinforce its engagement with specialized UN organizations to demonstrate the broader repercussions of Russia's war by:

- Collaborating with the IAEA on nuclear security, condemning Russia's militarization of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) and demanding its return to Ukrainian control;
- Partnering with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) to showcase the effects of Russia's blockade on global grain supplies, particularly in food-insecure regions of the Global South;

- Pushing the UN Environment Programme to investigate Russia's environmental war crimes, framing attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, such as the Kakhovka Dam destruction in June 2023, as both ecological disasters and violations of human rights.

#### **6.6. Aligning Messages with UN Reform Initiatives**

The use of veto power by Russia in the UNSC obstructs resolutions or amendments proposed by European permanent and non-permanent members-partners, which calls Ukraine to:

- Engage more with middle-power countries that advocate for Security Council reform to position Ukrainian interests within growing multilateral discussions on UN governance;

- Use its statements to highlight the need for the reform to prevent permanent members of using veto powers (Russia, USA, and China) in cases of mass atrocity crimes;

- Reaffirming to the UN community that Russia's vote on resolutions addressing its war against Ukraine is invalid, as Russia is a party to the dispute. Under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, Russia is obliged to abstain from voting in the Security Council on matters concerning the “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” (United Nations, n.d.). To preempt any misrepresentation of the war as a mere “special military operation,” Russia’s endorsement of Resolution 2774 explicitly referring to the “Russia-Ukraine conflict - serves as undeniable evidence of its role as a direct party to the conflict (Security Council 2025).

## Conclusion

This capstone project analyzed the changing patterns of Ukraine's diplomatic and strategic engagement with the multilateral UN system after Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Several key findings emerged through a qualitative analysis of resolutions and official statements, voting trends, and language framing across the UN General Assembly, Security Council, and Human Rights Council.

First, Ukraine achieved significant diplomatic breakthroughs early in the war, securing overwhelming support in UNGA resolutions and successfully suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council membership. However, this support has diminished over time, as shown by declining vote counts in favor, increasing abstentions, and shifting opinions from allies, including the United States. The war fatigue can explain this change as the third anniversary took place this year, geopolitical recalibration with the new American presidential administration and intensified relationships between Russian allies such as Iran, North Korea, and China, and the resilience of Russian diplomatic efforts, especially among Global South states which are dependent on Russia with their economies.

Second, Ukraine's messaging evolved in tandem with battlefield developments and international political shifts. What began as a morally charged and emotionally urgent call to stop the war transformed into legal appeals for justice, accountability, and structural UN reform, especially at the Security Council. The rhetoric used by Ukraine's Permanent Mission was not static because it adapted to shifting narratives, audiences, and priorities over time, which reflects the needed Ukrainian growing diplomatic sophistication.

Third, the above-mentioned structural limitations within the UN, such as the use of veto power in the UNSC, remain considerable obstacles to meaningful enforcement and justice in the system. However, these constraints have also prompted Ukraine and its allies to explore

alternative mechanisms within the UNGA and the HRC while simultaneously intensifying calls for long-overdue institutional reform.

In response to these significant findings, this capstone project proposes targeted policy recommendations to help Ukraine sustain and expand international support within the multilateral UN system.

1. Proactive outreach to Global South states framed around shared principles, such as sovereignty, food security, and economic stability, rather than alignment with Western narratives per se, can help reduce abstentions in voting for the resolutions.

2. Refining diplomatic messaging in the Ukrainian Mission's statements and speeches delivered across different platforms to emphasize global consequences of the war, such as food crises, legal precedents, and the risk of normalizing aggression that could encourage other authoritarian states such as Iran and North Korea to act, can enhance resonance across different member states.

3. Continued support for UNSC reform, including expansion of permanent membership and veto accountability, which is mentioned more often at the 78th session of the UNGA (agenda item 63, "Use of Veto"), aligns Ukraine with a growing group of middle powers seeking a more democratic, inclusive, and effective UN system.

4. Ukraine's UN diplomacy should not only react to war developments but also be proactive in shaping long-term narratives that support its Euro-Atlantic integration and reconstruction.

While these recommendations are grounded in the analytical insights from this research and are feasible within the constraints of the current international system and the UN Charter, their implementation has potential challenges. Building stronger alliances with Global South states will require sustained, resource-intensive engagement and may be hindered by competing Russian influence campaigns. Efforts to refine messaging must navigate different

cultural and political sensitivities, which could dilute Ukraine's core messages if not handled carefully. Advocacy for Security Council reform remains a harsh battle, given hard-core interests among the permanent members, and while aligning with middle powers increases credibility, substantial institutional change may remain slow. Lastly, sustaining proactive, long-term diplomacy will depend on Ukraine's domestic political stability, sufficient diplomatic capacity abroad and within the country, and continuous international attention despite growing fatigue.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Mission diplomats should consider these recommendations because they recognize and respond to fundamental changes in global political alignments, reflect Ukraine's strengths (legal argumentation, moral legitimacy, international visibility), and address the gaps among undecided or neutral states.

Finally, this capstone project reflects on Ukraine's evolving role within the UN as a victim of aggression and an increasingly capable and norm-defending state. Being the founding member of the UN among 51 others, Ukraine shows that its diplomatic strategies have matured, demonstrating adaptability to the fast-changing environments, strategic framing, and resilience under the pressure of the permanent and nuclear member of the UN. Going forward, Ukraine's position at the UN will be shaped by its battlefield success and its ability to lead on issues like accountability, institutional reform, and multilateral cooperation. As Ukraine seeks European Union and NATO integration in the future, its leadership within the UN system can serve as both a proving ground and a platform for shaping a more just and secure global order.

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## Appendix A – United Nations General Assembly

Resolution Number	Date	Name of the Resolution	Voting Pattern
A/RES/ES/11-1	March 2, 2022	Aggression about Ukraine	In favor: 141. Against: 1 (Russia) Abstentions: 5 (Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Russia, Syria). Absents: 12.
A/RES/ES/11-2	March 24, 2022	Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine	In favor: 140. Against: 5 (same). Abstentions: 38. Absents: 10.
A/RES/ES/11-3	April 7, 2022	Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council	In favor: 93. Against: 24 (Russia) Abstentions: 58. Absents: 18.
A/RES/ES/11-4	October 13, 2022	Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the UN	In favor: 143. Against: 5 (Russia) Abstentions: 35. Absents: 10.
A/RES/ES/11-5	November 14, 2022	Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine	In favor: 94. Against: 14. Abstentions: 73. Absents: 12.
A/RES/77/229	December 15, 2022	Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine	In favor: 82. Against: 14. Abstentions: 80. Absents: 17.
A/RES/ES/11-6	February 23, 2023	Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine	In favor: 141. Against: 7 (Belarus, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Syria). Abstentions: 3. Absents:
A/RES/78/221	December 19, 2023	Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine	In favor: 78. Against: 15. Abstentions: 79. Absents: 21.
A/RES/78/316	July 11, 2024	Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the	In favor: 99. Against: 9 (Belarus, Burundi, Eritrea,

		Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant	Cuba, Mali, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Syria). Abstentions: 60. Absents: 25.
A/RES/79/184	December 17, 2024	Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine	In favor: 81. Against: 14. Abstentions: 80. Absents: 18.
A/RES/ES/11-7	February 24, 2025	Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine	In favor: 93. Against: 18 (including the USA). Abstentions: 65. Absents: 17.
A/RES/ES/11-8	February 24, 2025	The pace to peace	In favor: 93. Against: 8 (Belarus, Burkina Faso, Mali, Nicaragua, Niger, North Korea, Russia, Sudan). Abstentions: 73 (including the USA). Absents: 13.

### Appendix B – United Nations Security Council

Resolution Number	Date	Topic	Voting Pattern
S/RES/2623	February 27, 2022	Calling an 11 <sup>th</sup> emergency special session of the GA	In favor: 11. Against: 1 (Russia) Abstentions: 3.
S/RES/2774	February 24, 2025	Imploring swift end to conflict and urging lasting peace between two nations	In favor: 10. Against: 0. Abstentions: 5.

### Appendix C – United Nations Human Rights Council

Resolution Number	Date	Name of the Resolution	Voting Pattern
A/HRC/RES/49/1	March 4, 2022	Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression	In favor: 32. Against: 2 (Russia and Eritrea). Abstentions: 13.
A/HRC/RES/S-34/1	May 12, 2022	The deteriorating human rights situation in Ukraine	In favor: 33. Against: 2 (China and Eritrea). Abstentions: 12.

		stemming from the Russian aggression	
A/HRC/RES/52/32	April 4, 2023	Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression	In favor: 28. Against: 2 (China and Eritrea). Abstentions: 17.
A/HRC/RES/55/23	April 4, 2024	Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression	In favor: 27. Against: 3 (Burundi, China and Eritrea). Abstentions: 17.