

# **How Hannah Pearl Davis Single-Handedly Redefines Social Roles Online: An Analysis of Social Reality of Social Media Spaces**

By

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## **Abstract**

Drawing on Sally Haslanger's model of social roles agents take under objectification and Miranda Fricker's theory of epistemic injustice, I argue that Hannah Pearl Davis, a prominent anti-feminist personality, embodies a social role not captured by Haslanger's existing categorization in the social reality, such as social media spaces. By adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women without the action pattern, Pearl attains social power through epistemic power under such systems. Through analysis of Pearl's rhetoric and positioning, I demonstrate that social media spaces function as a model of social reality and systems of knowledge production as they shape social reality. I propose an expanded typology of social roles: objectifier, collaborator, complier, object, and feminist, which better accounts for the ways agents socially engage with systems of knowledge production in social media spaces. Ultimately, I show how such systems manipulate objectivity and identity to reproduce gendered hierarchies, while exploiting agents like Pearl to mask and maintain male epistemic dominance.

## AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, Palina Baranova, candidate for the BA degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, declare herewith that the present thesis titled *How Hannah Pearl Davis Single-Handedly Redefines Social Roles Online: An Analysis of Social Reality of Social Media Spaces* is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person's or institution's copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.

Vienna, 26 May 2025

Palina Baranova

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## Introduction

“Pearl Davis: Romantic Chivalry and The Rise of Gynocentrism” is the title of a roughly eight-minute-long section of a bigger video by a YouTube creator Hannah Pearl Davis, which is currently available on another YouTube channel under the name of Peter Wright, who has reuploaded the said section on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of October 2023. Hannah Pearl Davis is an infamous online anti-feminist personality, who advocates for traditional dating and marital relations; she also took a stance against divorce and abortion rights. She initially gained fame by interviewing prominent faces of the so-called “manosphere”, which is a loosely connected network of websites, forums, blogs, and online communities, where predominantly men discuss issues related to masculinity, gender roles, and men's rights, asking people provocative questions in street interviews for her YouTube channel, which currently has two million subscribers. She hosts a podcast, where she engages in social commentary and where the video segment referenced in the beginning originates. Pearl is also a self-proclaimed catholic and she often employs religious rhetoric in defence of her arguments. For example, in the video referenced, she voices the said “natural order of things” out loud: God, men, women, children.

The video itself is Pearl reacting to a street interview of a woman, questioned upon how much a man should spend on the first date with her. After hearing the answer (200\$), Pearl begins accusing said woman of being “unfair to men”. At the 2:07 mark of the video Pearl first proclaims: “Gynocentrism messes up the natural order of things”. According to an article published by UN Women, a website of United Nations entity, which is dedicated to gender equality and empowerment of women, “gynocentrism”, a term used loosely to refer to the way of thinking that centers women, their experiences and opinions (2025). This concept is explained by Pearl in the video using the example of chivalry. According to her, knights used to kneel to kings because they

are “weaker men submitting to stronger men”, which is “natural”. “What they did, is replaced the stronger man with a woman, and that’s gynocentric: it’s putting the men below the women”, says Pearl at 2:31 (2023). “And that’s why we have all the problems we have today. It didn’t start a hundred years ago, it didn’t start two hundred years ago, this goes back a thousand years”, she concludes. This is not, however, just Pearl’s opinion: a simple internet search of gynocentrism reveals a comprehensive system of knowledge compiled about male-female interactions throughout the whole history of human civilization, framing women as oppressors of men. My personal impression has always been that the opposite is true of the social reality we live in.

Gynocentrism.com is an online library containing information about cultural and social gender dynamics, owned and maintained by prior-mentioned Peter Wright, historian and male issues advocate. Upon getting myself familiar with Wright’s agenda through his website, I came to a frightening realisation of how robust his knowledge system is: the oldest entries date all the way back to August 2012, meaning they have been available online and informing wondering minds on questions of gender and social inequality for at least the past 13 years. For example, the chivalry reference Pearl uses in the cited video, can be found on Wright’s website cited as one of the cultural roots of the current gynocentric social model (Wright, 2022). Overall, Wright’s comprehensive analysis of the socio-political system we currently live under spikes a difficult conversation. Do we actually live in a gynocentric world?

In short, no. If we were to live in a gynocentric world, it still would be puzzling to me that some people, particularly some women, such as Pearl, believe that the opposite should be the case. It is counterintuitive that someone would give up their superior position over someone else willingly, and, moreover, submit to them. On the contrary, throughout this paper, I will argue that objectification of women dictates the circumstances of our social reality, thus favoring male

experience, opinions, and position over female, consequently excluding the possibility of gynocentrist ideology prevailing under such system, since to me it is evident that the claim about gynocentrist ideology prevailing in social reality is false. I set out to explore why the opposite is the case for Pearl. By assessing her position in social reality of social media space, I attempt to reconstruct a more realistic picture of the world than the one supported by Wright's research and transmitted into masses by people like him, including through "exploiting" people like Hannah Pearl Davis.



## Framework: Definitions, Hypothesis, Thesis Statement

To set the scene better, I would like to define a few more notions, which will be used in this paper. “Objective reality” refers to how things are in the world, regardless of individual positions, opinions, or beliefs of agents operating in the world. “Epistemic reality” is what we know of the objective reality. Different “systems of knowledge production” contribute to shaping epistemic reality. By “a system of knowledge production” I mean a set of mechanisms that tells knowledge from beliefs common to a group of agents, who participate in shaping epistemic reality. Epistemic reality is reflected in “social reality” – how we adjust our behavior in light of said knowledge, meaning our knowledge of the world guides our social interactions. For example, when referring to “the natural order of things” in the video, Pearl lists it as an objective fact. This means that according to the system of knowledge production, such as the manosphere, the social reality must be as such that women are inferior to men, because it is “objectively in their nature”. In philosophy, “nature of things”, is often to refer to essences, or intrinsic qualities of things, which biologically determine our interactions with each other and the world. Such qualities are called “natural facts” (henceforth used interchangeably with NFs). NFs are neutral, objective, because they are statements about nature – objective reality. There are also “social facts” (henceforth used interchangeably with SFs), or evaluative statements about how things typically are in the social reality – typicality of things.

Many would consider Pearl a “pick-me”, which, according to Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, is a term used online to describe women, who seek validation from men by asserting themselves as different from other women. Examples of use suggest that pick-mes are characterized by “thinking like men” and “acting like men”, contrasting themselves to “other women”, who are framed negatively in pick-me rhetoric for not adopting such behaviors

(Merriam-Webster, n.d.). I believe Pearl is a pick-me, because her content transmits beliefs that favor men, and bring down women, consequently framing her as “different from other women”, better than them, more like men.

In *On Being Objective and Being Objectified*, Sally Haslanger discusses, among other things, social roles agents take in social reality (2002). The roles under analysis are that of an objectifier and a collaborator in objectification (and the object, which will be relevant to this paper to a lesser degree). According to Haslanger, an objectifier is a man, who thinks that women are inferior to men (“thought pattern of objectifying women”), acts as if women were inferior to men (“action pattern of objectifying women”), desires for women to behave as if they were inferior to men (“desire of objectifying women”), and has the power to influence behavior of women according to his desire (“social power of objectifying women”) (2002, p. 235). A collaborator need not have the latter two attributes but shares with the objectifier the first two (thought and/or action pattern).

I argue that Pearl’s claim about “natural order of things” is one instance of her adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women, as it is grounded in an objectifying “fact” (that God is objectively real and has made it so that women should submit to men). However, by sharing this thought pattern, she simultaneously contributes to production of knowledge in the manosphere, even if indirectly so. Afterall, it is through Peter Wright’s YouTube channel, a pillar of knowledge produced by the manosphere, I discovered Pearl. By initial assessment, Pearl could be a collaborator for sharing with the objectifier the thought pattern. At the same time, I cannot help but notice that Pearl does not adopt the action pattern of objectifying women: she is dominating the conversation and argumentative – a good part of the video is dedicated to her arguing with a man, another creator who also commented on the original interview (between 4:35 and 7:30). I

would think that following “the natural order of things”, Pearl would want to adopt the action pattern, which is more modest, inferior to men. What implications does adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women without the action pattern of objectifying women have for her? Lastly, is one wrong to claim that Pearl has at least some social power of objectifying women, by being a recognizable face with a relatively big audience?

I believe social media spaces, are in some sense reflective of social reality. For instance, Peter Wright’s YouTube channel, Gynocentrism.com, or the UN Women website, are examples of compiled knowledge produced by systems of knowledge production. People, who engage with Peter Wright and each other through such platforms, are social agents, which, by interacting online, participate in the production of knowledge by the manosphere. Hannah Pearl Davis would be one such agent, whose positioning in such social reality I set out to assess. I hypothesize that social media spaces are a kind of social reality, which by being reflective of social reality and systems of knowledge production as they shape social reality, call for redefinition of Haslanger’s social roles.

As Haslanger notes, her social roles could change dynamically, depending on the context of social interactions. I will argue that Pearl exemplifies a distinction between adopting the thought and the action pattern of objectifying women in social reality shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by the objectification of women. I will argue that engaging in one without the other leads to agents adopting distinct social roles in the social reality, such as social media space, meaning there are numerous ways of collaborating in the objectification of women. By the end of this paper, I aim to provide a potential expanded version of Haslanger’s social roles ascription, applicable to agents in social reality shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by the objectification of women, presented in *On being Objective and Being Objectified*. By doing so, I will counter the claims about gynocentric nature of social reality, made

by Pearl and promoted by Wright, ultimately showcasing how people like Pearl are used by people like Peter Wright to their own detriment in social reality of social media spaces.

## Chapter I

Sally Haslanger in *On Being objective and being Objectified* introduces the “norm of assumed objectivity”, which grants one the claim to be objective on certain “facts” without actually grounding such claim in objective reality (2002). Haslanger argues that this norm is a part of the thought pattern of objectifying women, it is a mechanism of objectification. Haslanger takes it is natural for humans to strive to know things’ natures to adjust their behaviors accordingly (238). Some phrases Pearl uses to make her point throughout the video, such as “natural order of things” or “only truly love”, are indicative of Haslanger’s point. It is obviously debatable, whether one can objectively measure or define love, however, Pearl evidently thinks that one can, which she does at 7:48 mark of the referenced video: “Women only truly love when they are doing the most for a guy, when they are serving a man”. In other words, Pearl thinks that ‘It is objectively true that a woman’s love for a man is in serving him’. I do not think it is objective. There are three norms, upholding which grants one an objective stance on one’s claim. Haslanger discusses (2002, p. 232-233) that in order to be objective, one has to be:

- epistemically neutral, that is they ought to take “genuine”<sup>4</sup> regularities in the object’s behavior as reflective of its nature,
- pragmatically neutral, that is they ought to adjust their behavior in accordance with things’ natures.
- In case of actual absolute objectivity, one is aperspective, in that their observation is carried out under “normal” circumstances and by a “normal” observer: the observation is not conditioned by the observer’s position and not directly influenced by them.

This norm exists to limit the observations to “actually genuine”, by dismissing “rigged observations”<sup>5</sup>. Consider this example: ‘Women are more nurturing than men’ is a social fact about

human interactions. The norm of assumed objectivity grants one extending this proposition to ‘Women are more nurturing than men by nature’, which would be a natural fact about women’s essences. Indeed, one can observe the women around them be predominantly occupied with catering to kids: mothers tend to be more involved in their children’s lives than fathers, and even childless women are more likely to hold positions of teachers, nurses, or social workers, than childless men. One would not be unjustified in assuming that it is likely due to women’s more nurturing biological natures. If such assumption held correct, they would also not be unjustified in desiring the social reality to adhere to this truth about human nature better: desiring women, not men, occupy caregiving positions, for example. However, there is no conclusive, objective evidence to “women’s nurturing nature” in contemporary biological or psychological research of human nature, meaning the observations were rigged. If the three norms granting one an objective stance on this aspect of human nature were fulfilled in the observations of women in caregiving occupations, one could not objectively conclude that women are nurturing by nature, as there are pre-existing conditions, such as influence of patriarchal norms, which disqualify the circumstances of the observation from “normal”. Therefore, ‘Women are more nurturing than men by nature’ is a social fact (SF) “masked as a natural fact” (henceforth used interchangeably with NSF). Haslanger claims that what helps an objectifier to solidify NSFs as “objective” is “the norm of *assumed* aperspectivity”, which replaces the norm of absolute aperspectivity (2002, p. 233). This means that the position, from which an objectifier carries out his observation, is only assumed by him to be irrelevant to the behavior of the object and the results of the observation. In actuality, he overlooks the socio-historical context, of which the consequence is the observed behavior of the object. Instead, he “masks” the outcome of his observation as “women’s nature”.

Similar thing occurs to ‘It is objectively true that a woman’s love for a man is in serving him’. By establishing the “natural order of things”: God, men, women, children, one is granted “objective knowledge” on women’s natures, which allows them to demand it to be reflected in social reality: a woman should serve a man to show her love, because God “objectively” has made it so. This is one example of how systems of knowledge production (such as the manosphere) have made one contribution to using the norm of assumed objectivity to form a thought pattern of objectifying women. This thought pattern has contributed to shaping epistemic reality, which guides the social reality, in which it was picked up and adopted by Pearl, transmitted through social media spaces to the members of the manosphere, as well as other members of other systems of knowledge production shaping epistemic reality of social media space. Adopting the ‘a woman should serve a man to show her love’ thought pattern makes one, as a woman, desire that all women are inferior to men, including oneself. This would suggest a woman, who desires that women submit to men would act accordingly: be modest, quiet. However, as mentioned prior, Pearl broadcasts her opinions to an audience, arguing with men online, meaning behavior contradicts her own beliefs about her own nature in the social reality she is situated – social media space.

I believe the described contradiction happens due to how Pearl’s desire shapes in such social reality. Desire is shaped by a complex of individual’s interests. In the context of this paper, personal interest, which depends on the unique circumstances of each individual, and social interest, which depends on one’s social position in such reality, are relevant to guiding Pearl’s desire of objectifying women. Social interest relates to a person’s sense of “belonging within the community” (Adler, 1933). Donating to charities, recycling empty plastic bottles, or even establishing friendships are all examples of actions caused by one’s social interest – to improve the well-being of one’s community. I argue that a woman operating in the social reality shaped by

systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification, such as social media space, has her social interest in resisting objectification of women, as it contributes to improving the well-being of her community. However, since Pearl has gained recognition through collaborating in spreading objectifying beliefs about women, her personal interest is in continuing objectification of women under such system. In summary, by adopting the thought pattern of an objectifier in the social reality of social media space, Pearl received an increase in social power, attributed to her, which motivated her to continue contributing to objectification of women, despite her social interest suggesting otherwise.

To conclude this section, upholding the norm of assumed objectivity consists in upholding three norms, which constitute it, and allows one to present false beliefs about women's natures, based on observations of social interactions, as "natural", objective facts. The norm of assumed objectivity is one part of the thought pattern of objectifying women. By adapting this thought pattern, a woman can develop a personal interest in continuing objectification of women in social reality, which is shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification of women. This happens due to an uncharacteristic increase in social power of the collaborator.

At the core of my issue with Haslanger's social roles are ascribed to agents the social reality of social media spaces is power. The kind of power an objectifier holds is social power, defined by Miranda Fricker in *Epistemic Injustice* as agent's capacity to influence the social world (2007, p. 9). She primarily focuses in the book on identity power, as a kind of social power, from which "epistemic power" is inferred as one of its pillars. One's epistemic power increases with gains in the level of credibility granted to one by hearers – other participants in knowledge production. In other words, the more people tend to believe an agent's testimony or agree with them, the greater is their level of credibility, the bigger is their epistemic power, the more accessible the participation



in knowledge production is for them. Consequently, people's perceived identities, constituted by what Fricker calls "commonly shared imagined concepts", such as stereotypes, for example, influence to which degree an agent is capable to participate in knowledge production (2007, p. 13).

Fricker differentiates between cases of "credibility deficit" – underestimation of one's credibility, and "credibility excess" – overestimation of one's credibility (2007). A testimonial injustice, a type of epistemic injustice, occurs when a knower systematically experiences a deficit in credibility granted to them by hearers, based on an identity prejudice (2007, pp. 17-22). Gaile Pohlhaus argues against Fricker's framing testimonial injustice as a kind of objectification (epistemic), based on that we, as hearers, make judgements about someone's credibility by the standards exclusively applicable to epistemic subjects, not objects (2014). She proposes that credibility deficit is instead a case of epistemic othering (forming subject/other relationship) and concludes that an agent facing credibility deficit is overall assessed as a subject, just with limited agency (Pohlhaus, 2014).

Although it is a plausible and well-supported claim, I believe it mischaracterizes objectification applied on the social reality of social media spaces. Identity is what difference individuals have from each other, as well as in themselves. They are both relations of qualities to each other, as well as independent qualities in relation to each other. For Fricker, the differences would be the "commonly shared imagined concepts", as they act in the same role in her model. Both "identity differences" and Fricker's "shared imagined concepts" are elements, which group people together and split them apart based on generalizations about human interactions. Once a person's identity is questioned based on a generalization (stereotyping could be one such example), their identity is equated to others' differences, instead of being considered a set of its own differences in a

particular context. Thus, by equating all women in their female difference as lesser than men, has made it the case that objectification predicates credibility assessment of a knower as a subject in the social reality of social media spaces. Under normal circumstances, an agent's credibility is evaluated by assessing natural facts about them and social facts about them. SFs about an agent are relative and include things like level of education, physical appeal, perceived authority, etc. NFs about agents are neutral. Under objectification of women, the norm of assumed objectivity enables the thought pattern, which allows to mask SFs as NFs, leading to NSF's to also contribute to the assessment of a knower's credibility. Therefore, I argue that deficits in credibility granted to female knowers due to their womanhood are conditioned by objectification of women in social media space, meaning the social reality of social media space Pearl operates in, favors men, their experiences, opinions and beliefs, and is thus not gynocentric.

From this deconstruction of Fricker it follows that a woman's capacity to participate in knowledge production by the manosphere in social media space, is not only contingent on her perceived identity but can also lead to her gaining power to actually influence people's behaviors. When one collaborates in objectifying women by adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women, one increases one's capacity to participate in production of knowledge about women in the manosphere, meaning one becomes "allowed" in the space typically dominated by men. This happens because the knowledge about women produced under objectification is knowledge shaped by the objectifier through employing mechanisms such as that of the norm of assumed objectivity. Pearl has participated in forming, discussing, and spreading false objectifying beliefs about women's natures and advocated for restricting women's freedom and human rights based on her false convictions within the manosphere. By aligning in this way her thought pattern with that of the system of knowledge production, which objectifies women, such as the manosphere in social

media space, she was granted access into the discourse, which built her recognition (social power) within the manosphere and then beyond. It stretched beyond the manosphere and into the real world, because in social reality, that is reflected by social media space, social power is granted for aligning with the beliefs objectifying women, not centering their experiences, opinions, beliefs. In other words, Pearl is an example of collaborating in objectifying women manifesting into gains in social power. She got the latter by 1) spreading objectifying beliefs about women, 2) experiencing gains in credibility attributed to her by hearers (“members“ of the manosphere) for that, 3) thus increasing her epistemic power, 4) by participating in production of objectifying knowledge about women. Her social power in this case is in gaining a fanbase, earning money from marketing contracts, being invited to shows, podcasts, etc. – her social capital in the social reality that is social media space.

This is not to say that a collaborator’s epistemic “supremacy”<sup>6</sup> over other representatives of their social group (women) necessarily manifest in gains in social power. Emmalon Davis have successfully argued that cases of credibility excess, such as positive stereotyping, are just as harmful and unjust to agents as knowers, as credibility deficit situations are (2016). According to Davis, positive stereotyping is what is often perceived as benign or complimentary stereotypes (2016, p. 2). ‘Women are more nurturing by nature’ can be considered that kind of stereotype, because on the surface it seems to be complimentary to women for being good at caregiving. However, it has been demonstrated that this claim is rooted in flawed reasoning and is epistemically harmful; following Davis’ line of arguing it is also harmful socially, **since it diminishes an agent to their social position.** To bring it back to Pohlhaus, I believe that talking about epistemic othering is more relevant to cases of credibility excess, rather than deficit, since “excess” is being granted, even if conditionally, one’s social position reflected in knowledge

production, based on one's identity, while "deficit" is being denied one's social position reflected in knowledge production, based on it. In other words, agents experiencing credibility deficit, based on their perceived identities, are not allowed to produce knowledge relevant to the interest of their social group. Agents experiencing credibility excess, based on their perceived identities, are allowed to produce knowledge in the interest of their social group, in a capacity dictated by the group which dominates knowledge production. Under objectification of women, such group would be men. I think both of these epistemic positions (deficit or excess) can to some degree account for Pearl's position in the social media space. Pearl, by adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women, is allowed to produce knowledge in the interest of *another* social group (men) based on her identity (of a woman). Instead of being "a credible woman" she has become "credible, like a man" in the social reality of social media space shaped by systems of knowledge production, dominated by the manosphere's objectification of women. To summarize, cases discussed by Davis are in fact unjust, in that they exploit a marginalized knower to justify the dominant knower as a non-oppressor. However, while positive stereotyping is used to mask gender inequality under diversity of input into knowledge production, by allowing occasional conditioned production of knowledge in the interest of a less dominant social group, people like Pearl are exploited to justify lack of said diversity and perpetuate harmful, objectifying beliefs.

Summarizing, according to a system of knowledge production, such as the manosphere in social media space, the most credible and objective is the agent with "ultimate credibility", a man. He decides, who else and to what degree is credible and consequently able to participate in knowledge production. A woman with access to credibility - a woman almost as credible as a man, a woman like Pearl - is allowed in knowledge production by virtue of sharing the thought pattern with the man, which limits the reflection of her social interest in producing knowledge.

She is in the position of credibility excess, in that she is recognized by other members of the manosphere (reposted, invited to podcasts, etc.), yet she also experiences credibility deficit, because as a woman her position is not reflected in how she contributes to knowledge production, participates in shaping epistemic and social reality of social media spaces. A woman experiencing credibility excess, a supposed “credible for a woman” woman is allowed to participate in knowledge production in the interest of her social group conditionally. For example, if a woman has produced knowledge in another knowledge system, which unlike the manosphere is gynocentric, however such knowledge aligns with the thought pattern within the manosphere, such woman would situationally be granted some epistemic power through credibility excess. A woman experiencing credibility deficit is not allowed to participate in knowledge production under objectification, consequently limiting the reflection of her social interest in produced knowledge under systems, such as manosphere. The social role of the object is an example of one such actor in Haslanger’s model. Consequently, these positions are distinct in social power attribution, for it has been established that Fricker’s model presupposes a system of complex trade-offs in acquiring social power (2007, p. 71-72). I will show that such trade-offs in social reality of social media space are translated into balancing fulfilling personal and social interests in the following chapter.

To conclude, the social role of a collaborator, as defined by Haslanger, is not universally applicable to any woman collaborating in objectification of women, which has been proven using the example of Hannah Pearl Davis. In the social reality, shaped by the systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification, such as social media space as Pearl operates in it, this happens when adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women, such that it contributes to knowledge production under the dominating system. This happens when a dominant knower, whose thought pattern is consistent with objectification of women, exploits a marginalized

knower, whose thought pattern is consistent with objectification, to promote objectification of women, such as when Peter Wright reposts segments of Pearl's content on his YouTube channel to contribute to the knowledge system that is the manosphere, which is aimed at objectifying Pearl (as a woman). For that, collaborators like Pearl are granted more social power, than other women, who participate in knowledge production under such system. Yet, she becomes deprived of fulfilling her social interest in the social reality of social media space through participating in knowledge production.

## Chapter II

To remind the reader, Haslanger's social roles are characterized by four attributes, namely 1) the desire of objectifying women, 2) the thought pattern of objectifying women, 3) the action pattern of objectifying women and 4) the social power of objectifying women. Haslanger defines an objectifier as someone, who has all four, and the collaborator as someone, who has at least 2) and 3). Chapter I has shown that Hannah Pearl Davis has 1), 2), and 4), disqualifying her from being neither an objectifier, nor a collaborator in objectifying women, when the social roles are applied on social media space. Chapter I has also established that by virtue of participating in systems of knowledge production in social reality of social media spaces, women, who contribute to other systems of knowledge production are sometimes situationally attributed epistemic power (credibility excess) in the manosphere, when aligning their produced knowledge with the thought pattern of the manosphere. This suggests that there are more ways of collaborating in objectification of women in the social reality of social media spaces, as shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification of women, than initially proposed by Haslanger.

To stay as close to Haslanger's framework as possible for cohesiveness, I say that I believe that there are in fact at least two ways of contributing to continuing the objectification of women, namely being an objectifier and being a cooperator, a term, which I will explain further. However, there are numerous ways of cooperating, or aligning with the objectifier. There are (at least) three forms of alliance with the oppressor, which I find relevant in the context of this paper. 1) Cooperation is "the act of working together with someone or doing what they ask you" (Cambridge Online Dictionary, n.d.). 2) Collaboration is "the situation of two or more people working together to create or achieve the same thing" (Cambridge Online Dictionary, n.d.). 3) Compliance is "the

act of obeying a law or rule, especially one that controls a particular industry” (Cambridge Online Dictionary, n.d.). Although tightly related and interlinked in their meanings, these are three distinct forms of alliance. One can derive social roles from them, which, in order, will be characterized by distinct, unique assemblages of attributes. In such model of social roles, a cooperator would be anyone who aligns with the objectifier in objectifying women, shares with them at least one, **any** attribute; a collaborator is someone who assists the objectifier in producing knowledge about women, shares with the objectifier at least and mainly the thought pattern; a complier is someone who acts in accordance with the objectifier’s desire, follows the norms of behavior set under objectification of women. In other words, a complier employs at least the action pattern of objectifying women. By cooperation I thus mean aligning with the objectifier in objectifying women in either of these two ways.

In social reality shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification, such as for Pearl social media space, each of these social roles would be characterized by a unique assemblage of attributes of an objectifier (thought pattern, action pattern, desire, social power). The assemblages, in order, are reflective of distinct epistemic (credibility deficit, credibility excess, access to credibility) and social positions knowers hold in social reality of social media spaces, as shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification. Together they determine one’s social role. By “social position” I mean one’s position in the social hierarchy. As discussed, under objectification, the hierarchy is men above women. However, it need not be the case for other systems of knowledge production shaping social reality of social media spaces.

Although there are 25 unique combinations four variables can produce ( $4!=24$ , and the “no variable” option), I will focus on the following five forms of cooperating in objectification of



women further, which are characterized by the following assemblages of attributes of the objectifier:

1. Thought Pattern + Action Pattern + Desire + Social Power = Objectifier.
2. Thought Pattern + Action Pattern = Haslanger's Collaborator.
3. Action Pattern + Social Power = Complier.
4. Thought Pattern + Desire + Social Power = Collaborator.
5. "No variable" option = Resistant Feminist.

As discussed above, Haslanger's model only allows to describe Pearl as 2, as she is a woman who aligns with men in objectifying women, by sharing with them the thought pattern. I have proven that Pearl rather falls under the definition 4 of "collaborator" in my list of roles: she shares with the objectifier the thought pattern, for that being attributed social power of objectifying women, consequently desiring that women stay subordinate to men. The way this social power is attributed to her is through increase in her epistemic power, by virtue of participation in knowledge production that objectifies women, in the social reality of social media spaces dominated by the manosphere. Therefore, her personal interest suggests she should desire women stay subordinate to men, while her social interest of a woman of resisting objectification is not fulfilled under the system of knowledge production, which governs her operating in social reality of social media spaces. Additionally, I argue that compliers get social power of objectifying women by virtue of sharing the action pattern of objectifying women. For instance, one such case of social power attribution could be a case of a female social media influencer, an Instagram model. When she publishes content that reflects behavior deemed desirable according to the thought pattern of objectification of women, she receives increase in her social capital in the social reality of social media spaces – likes, comments, reposts, marketing contracts, etc.

As established in Chapter I, any person has an identity shaped by a set of social facts, natural facts, and NSFs. This perceived identity influences one's epistemic position and reflects their social position. Under normal circumstances, when only social and natural facts are assessed in granting one credibility, epistemic position of one is reflective of one's role in the social reality. However, the social reality shaped by the systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification of women, such as social media space under the manosphere, allows the social position of an agent, determined by false, unobjective beliefs (NSFs) to influence their social role too. This means that interests of agents, which shape their desires, are grounded in their two distinct positions: epistemic and social. I argue that personal interest is reflective of one's epistemic position, while social interest is reflective of one's social position, because epistemic position is determined individually from agent to agent, based on how they participate in the social reality shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification, while social position is more static, "predetermined" by "facts" independent of agents (NSFs). Consequently, an agent with the desire of objectifying women, should have the personal interest of objectifying women and the social interest of objectifying women. Their personal interest would be in continuing objectification of women, for which they would be granted social power of objectifying women, as explained in Chapter I. However, their social interest would be in resisting the objectification of women in the knowledge they produce. This would make the attributes of social roles to assemble in the following way:

1. Thought Pattern of Objectifying Women + Action Pattern of Objectifying Women + Desire (Personal Interest of Objectifying Women + Social Interest of Objectifying Women) + Social Power of Objectifying Women = Objectifier.

2. Thought Pattern of Objectifying Women + Action Pattern of Objectifying Women = Haslanger's collaborator (not relevant anymore, kept in the list for coherence).
3. Action Pattern of Objectifying Women + Social Power of Objectifying Women = Complier.
4. Thought Pattern of Objectifying Women + Desire (Personal Interest of Objectifying Women + Social Interest of Resisting Objectification) + Social Power of Objectifying Women = Collaborator.
5. "No variable" option = Resistant Feminist.

Notably, treating desire as a complex of interests suggests a more complicated system of social power attribution in such social reality. If one's social interest is in resisting objectification, social power can be attributed to them for resisting objectification, too. Just like there are systems of knowledge production in social media space, such as the manosphere, where knowledge is produced favoring male position, experiences, and beliefs, there exist systems that favor women's position, experiences, and beliefs – gynocentric systems of knowledge production. Both kinds of knowledge production systems contribute to producing knowledge about objective reality, which, under normal circumstances, is reflected in social reality. However, since Pearl's social reality is shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification of women, such social reality gets reflected in the knowledge of objective reality instead, through employing different mechanisms of objectification, such as that of the norm of assumed objectivity. This suggests that other systems of knowledge production also shape social reality of social media space, where Pearl operates but either, a) to a lesser degree (they are less dominating over social reality), or b) have to do with knowledge of other things. One such alternative system online could be reflective of social epistemology, as a system of knowledge production, feminist epistemology, in particular.

In “feminist epistemology sphere” online, Sally Haslanger acquires social power in the same way as Hannah Pearl Davis does in the manosphere. However, since Haslanger contributes to producing knowledge about women, which centers women’s position, experience, and beliefs, acts in women’s interest, and, in doing so, contributes to changing the norms of women’s behavior, she gains recognition (social power) among her colleagues in the sphere, as well as women, who share her “resistant” thought pattern. Social power of resisting objectification would be attributed opposite to how social power of objectifying women is attributed by the feminist epistemology sphere to an agent: **not** sharing with the objectifier the thought pattern<sup>10</sup> would lead to one gaining epistemic power in feminist epistemology sphere, consequently experiencing increase in social power among other women operating in social reality dominated by the same knowledge production system, since the appropriate thought pattern would be dictated by the opposite social position there (female). Pearl, by not following the thought pattern of feminist epistemology sphere, is in the credibility deficit position in such system of knowledge production, meaning she does not get access to social power attribution through participating in it.

What does it mean for other women who cooperate in objectifying women online? I argue that so long as they do not adopt the thought pattern of objectifying women, social power of resisting objectification is attributed to them, as well as social power of objectifying women. This happens because, unlike collaborators, other cooperators in objectifying women do not suffer from conflicting desire. For example, a complier, by not sharing with the objectifier the thought pattern of objectifying women, but only the action pattern, gains some “social power of resistance”, since ‘not sharing the thought pattern with the objectifier’ aligns with the thought pattern characteristic for systems of knowledge production resisting objectification of women. Adopting such thought pattern grants one increase in epistemic power with the consequent increase in social power under

systems of knowledge production, such as the feminist epistemology sphere. The social interest of a complier is fulfilled under feminist epistemology sphere, while the personal interest of a complier is fulfilled in the social reality of social media spaces, through being attributed social power of objectifying women. However, since not engaging in knowledge production, which promotes objectification of women, she gets social power of resisting objectification attributed to her too. Similarly, men, who objectify women, would not get any social power of resisting objectification attributed to them by systems of knowledge production, such as feminist epistemology sphere. However, since both their personal and social interests are unfulfilled in social reality of social media spaces, their desire would not be in conflict.

To summarize, since multiple systems of knowledge production shape social reality that is social media space under objectification, social power can be attributed to an agent not only for sharing the objectifying thought pattern, but also for adopting the thought pattern of resisting objectification. I argue that this happens due to the following: by adopting the thought pattern, one can get “access” into the system of knowledge production, in which such thought pattern is dominant, including indirectly (like having one’s content reposted as a contribution to the knowledge production system). Examples of such systems are the manosphere or the feminist epistemology sphere. Hannah Pearl Davis or Sally Haslanger are examples of agents in such systems of knowledge production. At the same time, they are agents in the social reality of social media space with some social power attributed to them. Since other systems of knowledge production also participate in shaping social reality, just in a less dominating manner, social power attributed through relative epistemic power can be applied in either direction: for both objectifying women and resisting objectification. Therefore, Pearl, by adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women in a way, that makes her a participant in knowledge production under the

system that objectifies women (such as the manosphere), gets access to credibility in such system. For such participation she is attributed social power of objectifying women through epistemic power. On the other hand, Sally Haslanger, by producing knowledge about women directly and getting increase in her epistemic power under feminist epistemology sphere of knowledge production gets attributed social power of resistance by such knowledge system in social reality of social media space. Therefore, I argue in social reality shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification of women, when participating in knowledge production, the social roles agents adopt, being constituted by their epistemic position (credibility level according to the dominating system) and social position (man or woman), are as follows:

1. Objectifier: man – ultimate credibility, thought pattern of objectifying women, action pattern of objectifying women, desire (personal interest in objectifying women and social interest in objectifying women), social power of objectifying women.
2. Collaborator: woman – access to credibility, thought pattern of objectifying women, desire (personal interest in objectifying women and social interest in resisting objectification), social power of objectifying women.
3. Complier: woman – credibility deficit (does not participate in knowledge production directly, but indirectly: by not adopting objectifier's thought pattern), desire (personal interest of objectifying women and social interest of resisting objectification – indirect), social power of objectifying women (attributed through complying with the action pattern), social power of resisting objectification (gained by indirectly complying with the resistant thought pattern).
4. Object: woman – credibility deficit (does not participate in knowledge production), thought pattern (of some other system of knowledge production, in which she participates), action

pattern (based on norms found appropriate in light of adopted thought pattern of her knowledge system), desire (also relevant to her thought pattern).

5. Feminist: woman – credibility deficit in the dominating system, ultimate credibility in the feminist epistemology system, thought pattern of resisting objectification, action pattern of resisting objectification, desire (personal interest in resisting objectification and social interest in resisting objectification), social power of resisting objectification.

Notably, in such model a collaborator shares with the objectifier the thought pattern, the personal interest, and is attributed social power of objectifying women.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, Haslanger's initial social roles' ascription under objectification is not able to assess some cases of women cooperating in objectifying women. An example of a popular online personality Hannah Pearl Davis has demonstrated that in social media space cooperating in objectification of women by sharing with the objectifier the thought pattern can manifest in gains in social power, when sharing said thought pattern conditions one to participate in knowledge production. Pearl participates in knowledge production under the manosphere in the examined case, making her thought pattern not only exist in her head, but also contribute to further objectification of women by male knowers in the manosphere. Due to that, social power has been attributed to her due to increase in epistemic power. Using Fricker's credibility model to assess the success of Pearl's participation in knowledge production reveals that her epistemic position is as such that her personal and social interests are in conflict, meaning she personally benefits from maintaining objectification of women, while, as a woman, her social interest is in resisting objectification. However, due to adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women in a way that makes her a participant in knowledge production, she does not get her social interest of resisting objectification fulfilled in the social reality, unlike the cooperators, who comply by action pattern. Pearl's positioning in social reality is characterized by the thought pattern of objectifying women and the personal interest in objectifying women, contrary, to Haslanger's suggestion that collaborators share with objectifiers thought and/or action pattern. Ultimately, this paper shows that in the context of social reality, as of social media space, adopting these two patterns separately, can yield to acting under distinct roles in social reality shaped by systems of knowledge production dominated by objectification. Adopting the thought pattern of objectifying women in a way, which allows contributing to the dominating system of knowledge production leads to disabling



collaborator's access to their social interest being fulfilled in social reality. Meanwhile, due to not participating in knowledge production under system, such as manosphere, yet adopting the action pattern of objectifying women, the complier has some social power attributed to her by both feminist epistemology sphere and manosphere, thus providing access to both her personal and social interests fulfilled. The position, from which Pearl contributes to knowledge production is exploitative, since it does not let her fulfill her social interest, while contributing to fulfilling the objectifier's social interest.

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