

**UNREALIZED AND UNREALIZABLE: ARCHITECTURAL PROJECTS AND
IDEAS IN INTERWAR BELGRADE AND ZAGREB**

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A DISSERTATION

in

History

**Presented to the Faculties of the Central European University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**Budapest, Hungary
2024**

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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

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Abstract

Exploring unimplemented projects could shed light on discontinuities, hidden conflicts, and marginal architectural trends, enriching the understanding of architecture within broader cultural, social, and political contexts. Focusing on unrealized projects and unrealizable ideas and comparing Belgrade and Zagreb, this dissertation analyzes the organization of the architectural process in interwar Yugoslavia: from formulating architectural ideas through decision-making and selection mechanisms to project implementation. The central hypothesis suggests that administrative dysfunction, political instability, divergences in architectural ideas, and inadequate coordination obstructed the realization of architectural projects.

The first chapter explores the ideas and visions of actors involved in the architectural process, debates about architecture, and how ideas aligned or diverged. It seeks to identify ideas that were unfeasible under the conditions of interwar Yugoslavia. The second chapter analyzes how architectural decision-making was organized, the obstacles that hindered it, and whether these challenges differed between Belgrade and Zagreb. This chapter focuses on projects whose feasibility was challenged already during the decision-making phase regarding what, how, and where to build. The third chapter investigates how architectural projects were selected and the selection logic employed by various institutions involved in the architectural process. It aims to identify which projects were rejected in various cases, considering differences between Belgrade and Zagreb and changes from the 1920s to the 1930s. The chapter's main focus is architectural competitions, considered as a communicative mechanism in order to reveal the factors which obstructed their functioning as a selection tool. The fourth chapter addresses project implementation as a coordination challenge and investigates factors

preventing the realization of selected projects, such as urban regulations, land and financial constraints, and opposition to the projects.

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List of Abbreviations

CIAM – Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne [International Congresses of Modern Architecture]

GAMP – Grupa Arhitekata Modernog Pravca [Group of Architects of Modern Direction]

NDH – Nezavisna Država Hrvatska [Independent State of Croatia]

HSS – Hrvatska seljačka stranka [Croatian Peasant Party]

OUZOR – Okružni Ured Za Osiguranje Radnika [District Office for Workers' Insurance]

RGZ – Radna grupa Zagreb [Working Group Zagreb]

SCS – Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

SUZOR – Središnji Ured Za Osiguranje Radnika [Central Office for Workers' Insurance]

UIIA – Udruženje Jugoslovenskih Inženjera i Arhitekata [Association of Yugoslav Engineers and Architects]

YMCA – Young Men's Christian Association

Introduction

On February 7, 1936, in Zagreb, architect Josip Pičman committed suicide¹. This tragic event was preceded by a period of depression, but Pičman also struggled with professional fulfilment. His projects won awards in competitions and attracted media attention, but success in competitions did not always result in their realization. The final straw was the long wait for the decision to implement his project for the National House in Sušak, which was awarded the first prize². By this time, Pičman may have already learned about the fate of his first-prize-awarded project for the Main Post Office, Main Telegraph, and Postal Savings Bank building in Belgrade (Fig. 1, Fig. A.1).




Figure 1. The first-prize competition project for the Main Post Office, Main Telegraph, and Postal Savings Bank building in Belgrade, Josip Pičman and Andrija Baranja, 1930.
Source: Andrija Mutnjaković, *Arhitekt Josip Pičman* (Zagreb, 1997), 45.

¹ Josip Pičman graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1929, had an internship in Hans Poelzig's atelier and was a member of RGZ. See more about his life and career in Andrija Mutnjaković, *Arhitekt Josip Pičman* (Zagreb, 1997).

² See more about his project in Josip Pičman, "Natječaj za osnove narodnog doma na Sušaku," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 7-8 (1935): 101-105.

In 1930, Pičman's project, created in collaboration with engineer Andrija Baranja, won first prize³. At this competition, there were the highest awards among Belgrade's architectural competitions for individual buildings, and all three prizes were awarded to modernist designs⁴. *Politika* praised these modernist projects by younger architects, highlighting their imagination, boldness, and freedom from prejudice⁵. In contrast, a reviewer from *Život i rad* questioned these "ultramodern" designs, asking: "Is this architecture?" and "Does this suit Belgrade?"⁶. The Minister of Transport, Lazar Radivojević, responsible for approving the project, expressed similar concerns.

According to the jury and press, the winning project was described as "perfectly understood, clearly conceived, and easy to construct," making ideal use of the space and meeting all requirements⁷. As a result, the project was selected for implementation, but the final elaboration was entrusted to Dimitrije M. Leko⁸, an employee of the Ministry of Construction, which oversaw the construction of administrative buildings. However, Pičman's original design featured a simplified façade with an abundance of glass⁹, and it was the façade that became the stumbling block in the approval process.

³ Aco (Franc) Lavrenčić (Ljubljana-Prague) got the second award, and Mijo Hečimović (Prague) got the third (Hečimović, a Zagreb architect, was studying in Prague at the time). *Izveštaj ocenjivačkog suda o idejnim skicama za zgradu Poštanske Štedionice i Glavne Pošte i Telegrafa u Beogradu*, Museum of Science and Technology, Belgrade, MNT T: 111.153/2.

⁴ *Građevinski program za izradu idejnih skica za palatu Poštanske štedionice i Glavne pošte i Telegrafa u Beogradu*, fasc. 1525, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije. The jury included university professors from Belgrade (Dragutin Đorđević), Zagreb (Janko Holjac), and Ljubljana (Jože Plečnik), representatives of the Ministry of Construction and the head of Postal Savings Bank. In the project evaluation instead of Plečnik, his substitute Ivan Vurnik, also from Ljubljana University, took part. *Izveštaj ocenjivačkog suda o idejnim skicama za zgradu Poštanske Štedionice i Glavne Pošte i Telegrafa u Beogradu*, Museum of Science and Technology, Belgrade, MNT T: 111.153/2.

⁵ "Pred zidanje palate Glavne pošte i Poštanske štedionice u Beogradu," *Politika*, 18.09.1930, 7.

⁶ "Izložba projekata za palatu Pošte i njene Štedionice," *Život i rad* (1930): 793.

⁷ The document №619884 from 6.10.1931, fasc. 1525, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

⁸ The document №74066/30 and the protocol №3620/31, fasc. 1526, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije. Dimitrije M. Leko received his architectural education at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade and the Technical University in Karlsruhe. He worked from 1913 to 1933 in the Ministry of Construction, and afterward at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. See more about his career in Ljiljana Miletić-Abramović, "Život i delo arhitekta Dimitrija M. Leka," (Master's thesis, Univerzitet u Beogradu, 1999).

⁹ "Tehnički opis projekata P1B," fasc. 1526, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

Initially, in the late 1920s, during the intense planning for postal buildings, including the Main Post Office in Belgrade, Minister of Posts Vlatko Kocić stated that postal buildings should be "built according to modern designs"¹⁰. However, in 1929, the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs underwent a reduction, and its competencies were divided between the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Transport¹¹. As a result, the Ministry of Transport was also involved in constructing this building. The Minister of Transport, Lazar Radivojević, criticized the existing design as "too simple and uniform" and requested 2-3 variants for a more monumental and representative façade¹². Among the submitted variants, the minister selected the proposal by Vasilij Androsov¹³. Dimitrije M. Leko disagreed, arguing that "forcing an external shape onto this building just to align with the surroundings would, in my opinion, be both non-architectural and unnecessary"¹⁴. As a result, Androsov took over the further elaboration of the project (Fig. 2).



Figure 2. The final project for the Main Post Office, Main Telegraph, and Postal Savings Bank building in Belgrade, Vasilij Androsov, 1931.

¹⁰ "Beograd neka vrati imetak hrvatskih imovnih općina," *Jutarnji List*, 10.3.1928, 1.

¹¹ "Za ministarstvo pošta i telegrafa," *Naša Pošta* 4 (1929), 1-2.

¹² The document №3620 from 30.1.1931, fasc. 1526, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije. This Ministry was the owner of the future building.

¹³ The chief of the Architectural Department engaged Nikolay Krasnov, Vasilij Androsov, Vladimir Dević, and Dragomir Tadić. Krasnov and Dević sent two projects each, Androsov – one, Dragomir Tadić did not participate. The document №3620 from 10.3.1931 and the document №13728 from 3.4.1931, fasc. 1526, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije. Vasilij Androsov (*Василий Михайлович Андросов*) graduated from the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg in 1897, and served in the Ministry of Public Education of the Russian Empire. After emigration to the Kingdom of SCS in 1919 he worked in the Ministry of Construction until 1941, where he primarily focused on designing churches in the Serbian-Byzantine style. See more in Đurđija Borovnjak, "Prilozi proučavanju opusa arhitekta Vasilija Mihajlovića Androsova," *Arhiv* 1-2 (2014): 207–221.

¹⁴ The protocol №3620/31, fasc. 1526, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

Source: Dim. Jurišić, "Nova zgrada Poštanske štedionice, Glavne pošte, i Glavnog telegrafa u Beogradu", *Javan rad*, 17.3.1935, 10.

In 1935, construction began based on this design, which combined the modernist spatial organization from Pičman's project with a monumental neoclassical façade¹⁵. It is unknown whether Pičman saw the final project or how he would have commented on it. However, during the discussion after the Zagreb Foundation Block (*Zakladni Blok*) competition in 1930, Pičman had already criticized "the senile whining of old men for whom a building is not a building without several (preferably bad) columns, small columns, and other decorations"¹⁶. Architect Andrija Mutnjaković described the constructed building as follows: "And so, from the elegant horizontal lines of windows and parapets arose an eyesore of kitsch and an eclectic façade of petty-bourgeois taste, which still stands today as a monument to a misguided era and to a man whose personal and professional convictions were stifled by the dull incomprehension of a backward society"¹⁷.

This unrealized rejected project demonstrates administrative influence on the architectural process and divergences of ideas about architectural styles and architecture itself, thus inspiring this dissertation project.

Moreover, in Belgrade, besides constructed buildings concealing architectural dramas behind their façades, significant gaps in the urban landscape can be found, such as *Mitićeva rupa* (Mitić's hole) near Slavija Square, one of the city's central and busiest junctions. In the late 1930s, the prominent merchant Vlada Mitić planned to build Belgrade's first department store and the tallest building on this site¹⁸ (Fig. A.2). Planned as one of the largest privately

¹⁵ Dim. Jurišić, "Nova zgrada Poštanske štedionice, Glavne pošte, i Glavnog telegrafa u Beogradu", *Javan rad*, 17.3.1935, 10. "Prilike su, najzad, dozvolile zidanje palate za Glavnu poštu," *Politika*, 17.3.1935, 18.

¹⁶ "Regulacija Jelačićevog trga i parcelacija zemlišta Zakladne bolnice," *Jutarnji List*, 22.1.1930, 8-9.

¹⁷ Mutnjaković, *Arhitekt Josip Pičman*, 46.

¹⁸ "Na uglu Kralja Milana i Hartvigove ulice podići će se palata Mitić," *Vreme*, 4.12.1938, 7. "Podizanje najveće privatne građevine u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 10.11.1940, 7. See more in Dunja Andrić, Sanja Kiproski, "Nerealizovani projekat Robne kuće „Mitić” na Slaviji (1940)," *Zbornik Matice srpske za likovne umetnosti* 51 (2023): 153–169.

funded projects in interwar Belgrade, the building was never completed. Thus, the failure to implement this project, as well as subsequent ones intended for the site, remains apparent in Belgrade's landscape.

However, it is not an isolated case. In the heart of Belgrade, on Terazije, observers encounter another gap in the urban space known as Terazije Terrace. The large-scale project of a viewpoint with public buildings, planned since the beginning of the 20th century, remains unfinished as of 2024. On one side, a building stands as the only realized fragment of a broader vision, while the opposite side showcases urban disorder, offering a glimpse into the city's "backstage." The entire space awkwardly tries to pass as a park but fails in this role. Although Terazije Terrace was featured in the 1923 Master Plan, it remains incomplete a century later, despite repeated efforts to realize the project continuing even today.

Every city has its own history of unrealized projects, some more extensive, others less so. However, not every town so openly displays the gaps between what was planned and what was actually built. Usually, discovering these discrepancies requires searching in literature or archives. But for an attentive observer in Belgrade, it can become an intriguing experience to encounter these unfulfilled projects in the city's present urban fabric.

Typically, architectural historians focus on completed projects, treating unrealized ones as secondary tools. But what if we shift the research focus from implemented buildings to the multitude of rejected and unrealized projects? By doing so, one could better understand the architectural process by turning the research paradigm from results to the process itself. Such an approach would reveal how the process worked, from formulating architectural ideas through decision-making and selection mechanisms to various implementation stages. Exploring unrealized projects can uncover discontinuities, hidden conflicts, and marginal trends, ultimately enriching our comprehension of architecture while placing it in broader cultural, social, and political frameworks. To test this research approach, I chose to focus on

interwar Belgrade. Firstly, because of the abundance of unrealized projects, including rejected designs from architectural competitions. Secondly, due to the turbulent administrative and political history of the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia, whose impact on the architectural process can be analyzed through unrealized projects.

After the First World War, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was newly formed, incorporating the Kingdom of Serbia, the Kingdom of Montenegro, and several former regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Throughout the interwar period, the state sought to unify its administrative system, overcoming the differences in laws and governance processes. However, frequent political crises and instability further complicated the inherent administrative challenges¹⁹. Despite these issues, the new state had envisioned large-scale projects, which led to significant changes in the status and image of Belgrade. The city's population, territory, and urban infrastructure substantially grew, as did its construction activity. The newly established Kingdom required Belgrade to be transformed into a symbolic Yugoslav capital²⁰, with the construction of public buildings whose architecture would reflect the state's stability, prosperity, and emerging political and cultural identity.

Despite the attention paid to these initiatives, several key public projects remained unrealized, such as the complex of administrative buildings at Tašmajdan and the proposed buildings for museums and the Opera. In some cases, detailed architectural designs had already been prepared and even foundations laid, yet their implementation faced numerous obstacles. For other projects, selecting specific architectural solutions became a significant challenge. Some of these projects, which were the subject of ongoing discussions throughout the interwar period, stalled at the preparatory stages, thus pointing to substantial issues in the

¹⁹ See more in Dejan Djokić, *Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia* (London: Hurst & Company, 2007).

²⁰ Aleksandar Ignjatović, "Architecture, Urban Development, and the Yugoslavization of Belgrade," *Centropa* IX, no. 2 (2009): 114.

decision-making process for public works, likely stemming from the administrative difficulties of the newly formed kingdom.

Moreover, several realized public projects for which competitions were held demonstrate a breakdown in the competition mechanism, as projects initially chosen for implementation were later rejected. The project replacement reveals a gap between the preferences of the professional community and those of the authorities not only in terms of architectural style but also in their overall understanding of architecture.

In addition, various factors obstructed the implementation of selected architectural projects, such as unresolved land ownership and regulation issues, legal constraints, insufficient funding, preservation initiatives, and conflicts of interest between state and municipal authorities, the professional community, private investors, and the public interest.

To analyze the specifics of decision-making in architecture and construction, the work of the selection mechanism, and the factors that influenced project implementation, I used a comparative approach, researching not only Belgrade as the capital but also Zagreb, the second city of the Kingdom.

Besides the initial differences in urban structure, the case of Zagreb presents a different situation in terms of construction activities and architectural trends despite facing similar challenges during the interwar period. Unlike in Belgrade, the affirmation of modernism took place more easily and earlier in Zagreb's architectural scene. Moreover, the professional community in Zagreb was more developed, cohesive, and publicly active. Croatian architects played a leading role in UIJA's activities, and some of them had a strong social orientation, as demonstrated by the work of RGZ²¹. As Eve Blau suggested, Zagreb's urban development could be seen as an example of the "freedom of the periphery," where the

²¹ Tamara Bjažić Klarin, "Radna grupa Zagreb – osnutak i javno djelovanje na hrvatskoj kulturnoj sceni," *Prostor* 13 (2005): 41–53.

lack of state funds but also state pressure allowed for relatively greater creative freedom for architects compared to Belgrade²².

Private construction activity in Zagreb was approximately at the same level as in Belgrade. However, regarding public projects, Zagreb saw fewer large-scale state-funded initiatives. Most significant projects fell under municipal control, leading to more efficient execution. Nevertheless, many ideas proposed by Zagreb architects, particularly those aimed at addressing social issues, proved unfeasible within interwar Yugoslavia's social and political context.

As the capital and political center, Belgrade experienced more substantial political pressure on its architectural projects, influencing project selection and implementation. In contrast, interwar Zagreb could be considered a center of architectural activities. Yet, despite the "freedom of periphery," which led to more successful municipal developments, political tensions between central and local authorities also affected project implementation and sometimes obstructed it.

Methodological Considerations and Literature Review

Unbuilt projects have typically been used as supplementary tools in architectural history, often for analyzing completed buildings or as part of an architect's oeuvre. Using unrealized projects as central instruments for studying the architectural process is grounded in the negative case methodology. In the article "*The Power of Negative Thinking*," Rebecca Jean Emigh emphasizes that analyzing negative outcomes enhances theoretical explanations, encourages rethinking them, and addresses biases. Furthermore, she argues that "using

²² Eve Blau. "Modernizing Zagreb: The Freedom of Periphery," in *Races to Modernity. Metropolitan Aspirations in Eastern Europe, 1890–1940*. Eds. Jan C. Behrends and Martin Kohlrausch. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014): 292.

negative cases makes it easier to distinguish between important and irrelevant events, processes, structures, and patterns"²³.

On the one hand, architectural processes can be seen as a sequence of proposals, debates, and decisions involving various actors, each with their own architectural ideas and different opportunities to promote them and influence the decision-making process. Thus, by applying negative case methodology and focusing on unbuilt projects, particularly those that were either unrealizable or rejected, it becomes possible to reveal the actors' preferences, the logic behind selections, and the key divergences between their ideas.

On the other hand, the architectural process can be roughly divided into several stages. The first involves a series of decision-making actions: whether to build or not, what to build, how to finance the construction, and where to build. The second stage is the selection of a project for implementation, and the third is the actual realization of the selected project. While examining completed projects shows the joint contribution of various factors, since successful implementation only happens when all participants complete their tasks, unbuilt projects provide an opportunity to not only pinpoint the stage and mechanism where problems arise but also uncover the factors that "break" the chain of decision-making, selection, and implementation, making them a crucial element of the architectural process.

In architectural history, unrealizable projects often take center stage when examining visionary aspects of architecture, as seen in studies of French revolutionary architects, avant-garde movements, or interwar Soviet architecture²⁴. Such projects are viewed as a source of architectural innovation. Another significant trend in architectural historiography related to unrealized projects involves their use in theoretical discussions, as explored in Robert

²³ Rebecca Jean Emigh, "The Power of Negative Thinking: The Use of Negative Case Methodology in the Development of Sociological Theory," *Theory and Society* 26, no. 5 (1997): 658.

²⁴ For example, Emil Kaufmann, *Three Revolutionary Architects, Boullée, Ledoux and Lequeu*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1952. Antony Vidler, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux: Architecture and Utopia in the Era of the French Revolution*. Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006. Esther da Costa Meyer, *The Work of Antonio Sant'Elia: Retreat into the Future*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

Harbison's *The Built, the Unbuilt, and the Unbuildable*²⁵. These studies predominantly focus on visionary architecture, architectural fantasies, and experiments, emphasizing the unrealizable rather than the merely unrealized.

Thus, "unrealizable" is often equated with "paper architecture" and approached from a technological perspective. However, in Yugoslav interwar architecture, even projects not initially intended for construction were rarely unrealizable due to technological factors. While some projects proposed by architects were not feasible due to financial limitations, socio-political factors also greatly influenced the viability of many architectural endeavors. This dissertation examines some projects deemed unrealizable due to socio-political circumstances, but its primary focus remains on projects that were never realized despite being technologically, financially, and politically feasible.

Literature on unrealized projects is often based on case collections. For example, Tomislav Odak edited and published an anthology of unrealized projects in 20th-century Croatian architecture, including those for interwar Zagreb²⁶. However, two notable books on Prague and Warsaw contextualize unbuilt projects and consider the broader visions behind them, as well as the institutional and socio-political circumstances²⁷.

Studying the architectural process in public construction, with a focus on decision-making, requires moving beyond architectural history into institutional history. It is necessary to explore how decision-making bodies in architecture and construction were structured, reorganized, and functioned. In the case of interwar Yugoslavia, research has been conducted on the architectural activities of the Ministry of Construction by Snežana Toševa, though with

²⁵ Robert Harbison, *The Built, the Unbuilt, and the Unbuildable*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

²⁶ Tomislav Odak, *Hrvatska arhitektura dvadesetog stoljeća: neostvoreni projekti*. (Zagreb: Studio Forma Urbis, 2006).

²⁷ Klara Brůhová, *Praha nepostavená: Vltavské břehy jako urbanistické téma moderní metropole*. Praha: Česká technika - nakladatelství ČVUT, 2017. Jarosław Trybus, *Warszawa niezaistniała. Niezrealizowane projekty urbanistyczne i architektoniczne Warszawy dwudziestolecia międzywojennego*. Warszawa: Fundacja Bęc Zmiana, 2012.

a focus on Serbian architecture. In her dissertation, she analyzes both the administrative aspects of the Ministry of Construction's Architectural Department and the projects it executed²⁸.

It is also necessary to incorporate administrative theory to shift the focus from realized to unrealized projects and analyze the administrative aspects influencing the architectural process. In this dissertation, I employed the "administrative dysfunctionality" concept to identify and explain the potential problems within the administration that led to unrealized projects. Christopher Hood, in his article "*Administrative Diseases: Some Types of Dysfunctionality in Administration*," categorizes various types of ineffectiveness: diseconomy, counterproductive administration, and 'pure' ineffectiveness, and identifies several mechanisms contributing to dysfunctionality: 'over-organization,' 'under-organization,' administration in 'time,' and administration in 'space'²⁹. Among the types described by Hood, 'pure' ineffectiveness, failure to achieve results, could serve as an explanatory model for many unrealized projects in interwar Belgrade and Zagreb, in two forms: 'inertia,' where actions fail to provoke any response, and 'simple ineffectiveness,' where "responses merely rearrange the inputs and outputs of a system without meaningful change, substituting one activity for another without significant accomplishment by the authorities"³⁰.

Examining rejected projects as a source of insight into the selection logic of various actors involved in the architectural process and uncovering their ideas and potential divergences necessitates a combination of intellectual history and institutional architectural history, focusing on specific practices – architectural competitions. On the one hand, they serve as one of the mechanisms for selecting a project for implementation, while on the other

²⁸ Snežana Toševa, "Arhitektonsko odeljenje Ministarstva građevina Kraljevine Jugoslavije i njegov uticaj na razvoj graditeljstva u Srbiji između dva svetska rata," (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, 2013).

²⁹ Christopher Hood, "Administrative Diseases: Some Types of Dysfunctionality in Administration," *Public Administration* 52 (1974): 439-454.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 441-442.

hand, competitions are a platform where private and public investors interact with the broader professional community, and the results of this interaction are made public.

To compare built and rejected projects is essential for understanding competitive practices, as demonstrated in case study collections like *Architectural Competitions* by Cees de Jong and Erik Mattie, *Architects in Competition* by Hilde De Haan and Ids Haagsma, and *The Experimental Tradition: Essays on Competitions in Architecture*, edited by Helene Lipstadt³¹.

For interwar Yugoslavia, the leading researcher on architectural competitions is Tamara Bjažić Klarin, who wrote a book on competitions in interwar Zagreb. In this book, she explores competitions' organization and challenges and provides detailed information about major competitions, tracing the evolution of architectural trends through competition projects³². Bjažić Klarin also wrote articles on specific competitions that sparked major controversies, such as those for the *Railway Hospital* and the *Foundation Hospital*³³. Furthermore, comprehensive studies on architectural competitions in interwar Split have been conducted³⁴. Regarding Belgrade, a few case studies focus on specific competitions, such as the *State Printing House*³⁵, *White Court*³⁶, *St. Sava Cathedral*³⁷, and *Catholic Cathedral*³⁸. Gvozdana Šišović's dissertation, although primarily focused on urban planning competitions,

³¹ Cees de Jong, and Erik Mattie. *Architectural Competitions*. London: Thames & Hudson, 1996. Hilde de Haan, and Ids Haagsma. *Architects in competition: international architectural competitions of the last 200 years*. London: Thames & Hudson, 1988. Lipstadt, Helene, ed. *The Experimental Tradition: Essays on Competitions in Architecture*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1989.

³² Tamara Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb! – arhitektonski i urbanistički natječaji međuratnog Zagreba, 1918.–1941*. Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2017.

³³ Tamara Bjažić Klarin, "Natječaj za Željezničarsku bolnicu u Zagrebu – jedna međuratna afera," *Prostor* 14, no. 1(31) (2006): 64-73. Tamara Bjažić Klarin, "Međunarodni natječaj za Zakladnu bolnicu i klinike Medicinskog fakulteta u Zagrebu 1930.-1931. godine," *Prostor* 20, no. 2(44) (2012): 282-295.

³⁴ Darovan Tušek, *Arhitektonski natječaji u Splitu 1918-1941*. (Split: Društvo arhitekata Splita, 1994).

³⁵ Aleksandra Ilijevski, "Form and Function: Architectural Design Competition for the State Printing House of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia," *Zbornik Matice srpske za likovne umetnosti* 42 (2014): 259-277.

³⁶ Snežana Toševa, "Konkurs za Beli dvor na Dedinju," *Godišnjak grada Beograda XLV-XLVI* (1998-1999): 133-149.

³⁷ Tanja Damljanović, "'Fighting' the St. Sava: Public Reaction to the Competition for the Largest Belgrade Cathedral," *Centropa* V, no. 2 (2005): 125-135.

³⁸ Vladana Putnik, "Katedrala Beogradske nadbiskupije: od inicijative do nerealizovanog projekta," *Nasleđe* 15 (2014): 183-191.

also addresses the broader development of competitive practices and their role in fostering architectural autonomy in 20th-century Serbia³⁹.

Analyzing competitions from this angle is closely connected to a broader theoretical discussion of competitive practices. Hélène Lipstadt, for example, suggests using Bourdieu's concept of the field to understand how competitions function, proposing that architects' autonomy in competitions can be seen as a "field effect"⁴⁰. This approach initiated a series of theoretical applications to competition analysis. For instance, in their article "*Who— or What— Wins*" an Architectural Competition," Carlo Menon and David Vanderburgh apply Bruno Latour's actor-network theory to propose a model of competitions as interaction between all "participants," whether human or non-human⁴¹. Meanwhile, researchers from the University of Brighton have approached judgment in competitions as a communicative act, following Habermas's framework, to explain the "leap of communication" within the process⁴².

In the dissertation, I propose viewing competitions as a communication mechanism to identify the factors that hinder its effectiveness, mainly through the study of rejected projects. Competition can be understood as a sequence of communication acts, with key elements such as requirements, a program, projects, results, and decisions seen as 'information' in Luhmann's terms⁴³. A client first outlines their requirements, which are then "translated" into a competition program. Participants interpret the program's conditions and propose solutions in the form of projects. The jury evaluates these projects, ranks them, and awards them based

³⁹ Grozdana Šišović, "Arhitektonska konkursna praksa i pitanje autonomije arhitekture," (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2016).

⁴⁰ Hélène Lipstadt, "Theorizing the Competition: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu as a Challenge to Architectural History," *Thresholds* 21 (2000): 32-36. Hélène Lipstadt, "Can 'Art Professions' Be Bourdieuan Fields Of Cultural Production? The Case Of The Architecture Competition," *Cultural Studies* 17 (3-4) (2003): 390-419.

⁴¹ Carlo Menon, and David Vanderburgh, "Who - or What - Wins" an Architectural Competition? A Model and a Case Study," *FormAkademisk* 7, nr. 1 (2014): 1-19.

⁴² Nagham Al-Qaysi, et al. "Judgment in architectural competitions as communicative deliberative practice." Proceedings of the ICC 2016: 6th International Competitions Conference: The Competition Mesh. Leeds Beckett University, 2016.

⁴³ Niklas Luhmann, *Art As a Social System*, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000), 11-13.

on how well they meet the program's criteria, resulting in the final competition outcomes. Finally, the client reviews the results and selects which project to implement. When the highest awarded project was rejected, it signals that a communication breakdown occurred at one of these stages.

Examining the project realization process and its challenges necessitated engaging with public administration theory, particularly "coordination capacity." This concept refers to the investor's ability to efficiently manage and coordinate activities and resources throughout the implementation phase. Once an architectural project is chosen, its realization requires integrating it into the urban environment, a space where public and private interests converge. As a result, the project's realization depends on reconciling these often conflicting interests. Understanding urban planning history is also essential to grasp these processes.

For interwar Belgrade, Zlata Vuksanović-Macura, in her doctoral dissertation, compares what was planned and what was actually implemented from the 1923 Master Plan⁴⁴. She also authored a book on the competition for this Master Plan⁴⁵ and has written several articles on specific projects that emerged from this competition⁴⁶. For Zagreb, there are studies on the competition for the Master Plan in 1930/1931⁴⁷. Also, Darko Kahle published several articles about construction and urban regulations⁴⁸.

⁴⁴ Zlata Vuksanović Macura, *Generalni plan Beograda 1923: komparacija planiranog i ostvarenog* (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2014).

⁴⁵ Zlata Vuksanović Macura, *San o gradu: Međunarodni konkurs za urbanističko uređenje Beograda 1921-1922* (Beograd: Orion Art, 2015).

⁴⁶ Zlata Vuksanović Macura, "'Prestonica Karađorđevića': Emil Hope i Oto Šental na konkursu za Generalni plan Beograda," *Zbornik Muzeja primenjene umetnosti* 9 (2013): 103–115. Zlata Vuksanović Macura, "Singidunum Novissima: novo čitanje poznatog konkursnog rada," *Nasleđe* 15 (2014): 115–127.

⁴⁷ Aleksandar Laslo, "Internacionalni natječaj za generalnu regulatornu osnovu grada Zagreba, 1930/31," *Čovjek i prostor* 370 (1984): 25–31. Darja Radović Mahečić, i Sanja Štok, "Presedan zagrebačkog urbanizma," *Život umjetnosti* 59, br. 1 (1997): 10–27.

⁴⁸ Darko Kahle, "Građevinski propisi za grad Zagreb u razdoblju od 1919. do 1931. godine i Građevinski zakon iz 1931. Godine," *Prostor* 14, br. 1(31) (2006): 117–128. Darko Kahle, "Građevinski propisi za grad Zagreb u razdoblju od 1932. do 1945. godine," *Prostor* 14, br. 2(32) (2006): 219–227.

Generally, researchers of interwar architecture in Yugoslavia focus on individual cities or countries, with rare exceptions, for example, a recent book by Tanja D. Conley, "Urban Architectures in Interwar Yugoslavia," which considers Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana⁴⁹.

Research Aims

The dissertation examines the architectural process: from the formulation of architectural ideas and selection mechanisms to the various stages of project implementation, by analyzing unrealized, rejected, and unimplemented projects. The approach treats the architectural process as a sequence of proposals, debates, and decisions in which different actors: architects, their professional communities, state and municipal authorities, urban elites, and the general public, participate. These actors had distinct architectural preferences and varying capacities to promote their ideas and influence decision-making. The core hypothesis is that a lack of mutual understanding, effective communication between actors, and administrative dysfunction significantly influenced the realization of architectural projects. The divergence between architectural aspirations and the needs of state institutions hindered project initiation, and decision-making difficulties hampered choices regarding what and where to build. Communication breakdowns led to the rejection of projects, and a wide array of factors, particularly coordination challenges, delayed or prevented the construction of selected projects.

The first aim is to explore the ideas and visions held by the participants in the architectural process, how their ideas aligned or diverged, how these ideas evolved, and which were inherently unrealizable under the circumstances of interwar Yugoslavia (considering not only economic but also social and political factors). The second set of questions examines how the architectural decision-making process was organized, what obstacles hindered it, and

⁴⁹ Tanja D. Conley, *Urban Architectures in Interwar Yugoslavia* (London: Routledge, 2020).

whether these issues differed between Belgrade and Zagreb. The third aim is to clarify the selection logic of the various institutions involved in the architectural process and to identify which projects were rejected in different cases (considering the distinctions between Belgrade and Zagreb, as well as shifts from the 1920s to the 1930s). Lastly, the fourth set of questions focuses on the factors that prevented the realization of selected projects and how the authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb attempted to address them.

Thus, on the one hand, the architectural process, including decision-making, project selection, and implementation procedures, is analyzed through examples from interwar Belgrade and Zagreb. On the other hand, an important part of this research is the attempt to directly compare these processes in Belgrade and Zagreb because the existing literature mainly studies interwar Yugoslav architecture, either focusing on Zagreb and Croatian architecture or Belgrade and Serbian architecture.

From the perspective of architectural history, this research could contribute to a better understanding of the institutional mechanisms behind the architectural process, as well as the relationship between architecture and socio-political processes. While much of the existing literature on architecture and power focuses primarily on representation, this study will explore how political demands are translated into the architectural process, both at the state and municipal levels. Furthermore, the research aims to contribute not just to the field of architectural history but also to a deeper understanding of the institutional dynamics within the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia. By examining the work of the Ministry of Construction and the municipalities of Belgrade and Zagreb, this study will assess the functioning of these institutions and their interconnections and identify the factors that impede their operations.

Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is structured into four chapters connected to the four key research aims: to explore ideas about architecture, decision-making process, selection mechanism, and factors that obstructed project implementation.

The first chapter serves as an introduction, providing context for the architectural process by addressing issues such as urban transformations (including population growth, construction activity dynamics, and urban planning initiatives) and administrative development (such as the organizational structure and competencies of authorities involved in the architectural process, administrative-territorial division). This chapter also explores architectural development, focusing on professional aspects like educational systems, the institutional roles of architects, architects' groups and organizations, as well as broader architectural trends and the social visions driving them. Key debates surrounding architectural issues are analyzed, including discussions about the nature of architecture, its functions, façades, styles, and the creation of a distinct Yugoslav architecture. Furthermore, the chapter addresses ideas proposed by architects that were unrealizable due to social and political circumstances, highlighting the divergence between architectural ambitions and state demands.

The second chapter investigates the decision-making processes and how administrative dysfunctionality and political instability affect them. It begins by examining four mechanisms identified by Christopher Hood to explain administrative problems, 'over-organization,' 'under-organization,' administration in 'time,' and administration in 'space', in the context of interwar Yugoslavia. Through examples of projects that stalled in the early stages, the chapter explores challenges in deciding what and where to build and how to fund these projects. A key focus is on the decision-making process, particularly the prioritization of projects and the dilemmas posed by limited financial resources and available plots. The

chapter concludes with a case study of the attempts to construct Palaces of Justice in both Belgrade and Zagreb, investigating the issue of coordination in decision-making and the challenges posed by the desynchronization of governmental efforts.

The third chapter examines project selection mechanisms, such as commissioning, appointments, and competitions, primarily focusing on the latter. As public events, competitions made architectural ideas and preferences more visible. After exploring how competitions were organized and their possible outcomes, I propose using a communicative model of the competitions to identify factors that hindered its effectiveness as a selection mechanism. The second half of the chapter focuses on specific examples to investigate these potential factors, addressing issues such as problems with competition programs, jury judgment, investor decisions, external influences, and differing perspectives on architecture among actors.

The fourth chapter explores the process of implementing selected projects, focusing on coordination challenges in a broader context. It begins by addressing the alignment of projects with regulations, their integration into the urban environment, and the clash of competing interests in the urban space. This chapter also ties back to Chapter 2, revisiting financial and land-use dilemmas, but this time focusing on how these issues affected the realization of already chosen projects. The chapter concludes by analyzing the attempts to build crematoria in both Belgrade and Zagreb, using this case to examine how opposition to construction can become a significant obstacle to project implementation.

Note on the Sources

One of the key sources for this dissertation is interwar press materials. It includes professional journals such as *Arhitektura*, *Tehnički List*, *Građevinski Vjesnik*, and *Inženjer*, where architects shared their projects, including unrealized ones, along with commentary and

discussions on a wide array of architectural and urban issues. Municipal publications (*Savremena Opština*, *Beogradske Opštinske Novine*) and cultural magazines such as *Književnik*, *Umetnički Pregled*, also focused on these topics, often featuring views from non-architect specialists.

The most important sources, however, are daily newspapers (*Vreme*, *Politika*, *Pravda* from Belgrade; *Jutarnji List*, *Večer*, and *Novosti* from Zagreb). These newspapers were vital for creating a database of architectural competitions providing announcements, results, and critiques of entries. They also published unrealized projects and, most importantly, contextualized their creation, capturing debates around these projects. Tracing the decision-making process and differing perspectives is often more fruitful through press coverage than archival materials. Additionally, the press documented construction ideas that never materialized into concrete projects, allowing the history of attempts to realize them to be reconstructed.

In the case of archival materials, it became evident that the way some archival collections were organized was counter to studying unrealized projects, as these collections were primarily structured around completed projects. It was expected for city archives dealing with construction documentation since the technical documentation sections of municipal archives store projects that received building permits. Most of the projects central to this study never reached that stage. Even for those projects that did receive permits but were not constructed, these archival materials provide little insight into the factors behind their failure.

The most significant public projects fell under the Ministry of Construction's jurisdiction. The documentation is well-organized and easily found for many realized projects. Furthermore, for unrealized projects, the materials are hidden with lots of documents about road construction and hydrographic works within a part of the fond, where about 1,000 folders are labeled only by year. The absence of materials from the Ministry of Construction's

collection was partially compensated by the personal archive of Dobrivoje Stošović, who held various ministerial roles, including Minister of Construction, and by the Ministry of Education's archive.

Thus, relevant archival materials were found for only part of the projects in the archives, such as the Historical Archive of Belgrade, the Archive of Yugoslavia and the Croatian State Archives. Moreover, the archival materials provided financial, administrative, and legal information. Archival sources were used to supplement the database of architectural competitions, as well as materials from museums that preserve architects' legacies (such as Museum of Science and Technology).

Chapter 1. Contextualizing Architectural Process in Interwar Yugoslavia

The modernist project of a colossal skyscraper on the site of Belgrade Fortress would seem like a radical solution to housing problems even today, but let alone in 1936, when it was displayed at an exhibition and published in the newspaper *Vreme*⁵⁰ (Fig. 3). It was an entirely unfeasible project, firstly, because it was an independent personal initiative by the architect, aimed at highlighting a significant issue without official backing. This visionary project was part of architect Dragan Petrik's exhibition at the Hygienic Institute in 1936⁵¹. Beyond that, such an approach to housing was unfeasible given interwar Yugoslavia's social, political, and economic conditions. However, what could not be realized in practice could be embodied as bold and imaginative architectural drafts.




Figure 3. The project for a skyscraper on the site of Belgrade Fortress, Dragan Petrik, 1936.
Source: "Kako jedan čovek zamišlja moderni Beograd," *Vreme*, 31.3.1936, 8.

Besides designing commissioned buildings or working within government and municipal technical sections, participating in competitions and exhibitions, and publishing in

⁵⁰ "Kako jedan čovek zamišlja moderni Beograd," *Vreme*, 31.3.1936, 8.

⁵¹ Dragan Petrik graduated from the Department of Architecture at the Technical High School in Zagreb in 1924. See more about his career in Jasenka Kranjčević, "Zaboravljeni požeški arhitekt. Dragan (Rudolf) Petrik (13. 8. 1901. Požega – 22. 3. 1988. Cape Town)," *Kronika požeško-slavonska* 10, 487 (2011): 8.

professional journals, architects could also propose solutions to complex architectural, urban, and sometimes social issues, often through publications in daily press or visionary projects like Petrik's exhibition. Through it, Petrik sought to raise awareness of Belgrade's urban challenges and the need for affordable housing. This exhibition could serve as material for examination of the broader context of architectural and urban development in interwar Yugoslavia.

During the interwar period, housing shortages were a critical issue in Belgrade and Zagreb. Following the First World War and the establishment of the Kingdom of SCS, these cities underwent significant status changes. Once a border city and capital of a small, peripheral Balkan state, Belgrade became the capital of a larger, more ambitious, multinational kingdom. Zagreb, which under Austro-Hungary was a regional city, not even among the five largest, in the Kingdom of SCS, became the second city, positioning itself as a commercial, banking, and economic center⁵².

In the interwar period, Belgrade and Zagreb experienced significant population growth, reflecting their changing roles in the newly established kingdom, although to varying degrees. According to the 1921 census, the two cities' populations were nearly identical⁵³. Though Zagreb also experienced rapid growth, Belgrade's position as the political center of the Kingdom likely contributed to its faster expansion. By 1931, Belgrade's population had more than doubled⁵⁴, while in Zagreb, such growth occurred only by 1941. This sharp increase in Belgrade's population highlights its emergence as the capital, attracting migrants and government officials. However, despite significant population growth in Belgrade, the proportion of the country's population living in the capital increased only from 0.9% in 1921

⁵² "Zagreb kao trgovačko-privredni centar Jugoslavije," *Večer*, 15.4.1924, 5.

⁵³ *Definitivni rezultati popisa stanovništva: od 31 januara 1921 god.* (Beograd: Opšta državna statistika, 1932).

⁵⁴ *Definitivni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 31 marta 1931 godine. Knj. 1, Prisutno stanovništvo, broj kuća i domaćinstava* (Beograd: Opšta državna statistika, 1937).

to 2.2% by 1939⁵⁵. Thus, this figure remained relatively low compared to other European countries.

	Belgrade	Zagreb
1921	111 739	108 674
1931	238 775	185 581
before the Second World War	320 000	224 550

Table 1. Interwar Population Growth in Belgrade and Zagreb

The rapid influx of the population also sparked a construction boom. In Belgrade, war devastation, poor building conditions, and the misallocation of state institutions created an urgent need for extensive reconstruction. Nevertheless, construction activity fluctuated, with periods of intense building followed by slowdowns. Both Belgrade and Zagreb shared similar construction trends during the interwar period.

In the early 1920s, there was a construction boom, especially in the private sector, accompanied by optimism in public construction. This optimism extended beyond actual constructions to active discussions and preparations for future public projects. The mid-1920s, however, saw a decline in construction activities in both cities; thus, many public projects faced financial difficulties and were postponed. A sharp drop in construction was followed by a gradual rise, peaking in 1927-1928 for private construction and in 1929-1931 for public projects, particularly in Zagreb, driven by the administrative reforms during the royal dictatorship.

At the beginning of the 1930s, the economic crisis stimulated construction activity, as funds were actively invested in this sector, which was considered more reliable and

⁵⁵ Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923," 56.

profitable⁵⁶. Nevertheless, by the mid-1930s, the crisis had ultimately led to a decline in construction activity. Between 1933 and 1936, private construction declined sharply, and public building projects almost entirely stalled. Many projects were not only delayed but also ceased being discussed. Yet by the late 1930s, both sectors revived, with public construction surging, especially after 1937, when numerous projects that had long been discussed were finally built or prepared for construction.

The main drivers of these dynamics were economic factors, such as the crisis, rising costs, and real estate investment needs, with bank loans contributing to public and private construction activities. Fluctuations in construction material prices, cartel agreements among manufacturers, workers' strikes, and insufficient production of necessary materials also had an impact. Moreover, political and administrative factors influenced the process as well.

However, despite the construction activity, both cities faced a housing crisis, albeit to varying degrees. This shortage led to a rise in illegal settlements characterized by unhygienic living conditions. Many professionals argued that municipalities and state authorities were not paying enough attention to social housing. For example, Dragan Petrik's exhibition was organized to directly appeal to the authorities to address the "social, economic, construction, hygienic, and urban issues"⁵⁷.

One crucial aspect of Belgrade's interwar urban development, which Petrik's skyscraper project emphasized, was the issue of expanding outward rather than upward. Building skyscrapers could have addressed the challenge of providing many residential spaces in central areas without expanding the city's footprint, thus avoiding infrastructure and transportation problems⁵⁸. By the time of Petrik's exhibition, these issues were critical, as

⁵⁶ A.B. Herenda, "Veliko opadanje gradjevinske delatnosti u 1934 godine," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine* 2 (1935): 108.

⁵⁷ "Kako jedan čovek zamišlja moderni Beograd," *Vreme*, 31.3.1936, 8.

⁵⁸ "Gde će biti budući centar Beograda," *Politika*, 12.3.1936, 8.

Belgrade's territory had expanded significantly southward after World War I, primarily due to unregulated development on the city's outskirts. The rivers limited expansion in other directions⁵⁹. Despite bridges being built over the Sava and Danube and works starting in areas like modern-day New Belgrade and Pančevo Wetlands (*Pančevački Rit*), major urban growth across the rivers did not occur until after World War II. Zagreb's growth remained more stable, limited not only by natural features such as rivers and terrain but also by the railway line. While numerous public projects were proposed for the undeveloped southern parts of the city, concerns about their distance and isolation hindered implementation. Like Belgrade, the full-scale development of these areas only took place after World War II.

Until the late 1930s, areas outside Belgrade's city center saw more active development, partly due to the plot reservation for public projects, which were continually postponed, and partly due to a shortage of space for new construction, as land speculation in the city center left many old, low-rise buildings in place. The press often criticized this trend, especially because of the discrepancy between Belgrade's role as the capital intended to represent the entire country and the reality of its central areas, dominated by outdated and poorly maintained buildings. The municipality tried to resolve this issue in the late 1930s, first by offering tax breaks to encourage new construction and later by imposing a special tax on old buildings that did not meet the height criteria for central streets when the tax breaks failed to spur development. Despite many private residential buildings being constructed within and beyond the city centers in both Belgrade and Zagreb, social housing received less attention, especially from the Belgrade municipality. In contrast, Zagreb had more success in addressing this issue. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Dragan Petrik chose Belgrade as an example to showcase ideas for the hygienic construction of small apartments.

⁵⁹ See more in Ranka Gašić, "Problemi teritorijalnog širenja Beograda između dva svetska rata," *Istorija XX. veka* 28, br. 3 (2010): 57-68.

In addition to addressing housing issues, Dragan Petrik also explored broader urban problems in Belgrade at this exhibition, presenting solutions that, at the time, were considered ambitious and unfeasible. Among the proposed solutions was his idea to relocate the transport stations to the opposite Sava bank and to establish a new business district in the area of the former station, a plan that strikingly resonates with the urban development of this part of Belgrade in the early 21st century. Overall, his project can be viewed as a critique of Belgrade's urban planning, particularly the 1923 Master Plan, offering a clear alternative expressed through his visionary designs.

Amidst increasing construction activity, municipal authorities tried to regulate it through urban planning. In Belgrade in 1921, an international competition was announced to create a Master Plan, but the results fell short of expectations. The jury did not award the first prize, but three projects got the second: 'Urbs Magna' from Paris, 'Santé, beauté, commerce et traffic' from Budapest, and 'Singidunum novissima' from Vienna⁶⁰. Consequently, the municipality formed the Commission for Developing the Plan (*Komisija za izradu plana*) and a special technical bureau led by Georgy Kovalevsky⁶¹, which developed a master plan based on competition projects. The Master Plan was completed by 1923 and received approval from the Ministry of Construction on July 19, 1924⁶².

This 1923 Master Plan was criticized on multiple fronts. Firstly, it was deemed megalomaniacal and ill-timed, given the economic conditions⁶³. Secondly, the plan was

⁶⁰ 'Urbs Magna': Jean-Marcel Auburtin, Albert Henry Parenty, Jean-Emile Naville, Achille-Henri Chauauet. 'Santé, beauté, commerce et traffic': Imre Forbáth, Eugène Lechner, László Waga. 'Singidunum novissima': Rudolf Perco, Erwin Ilz, Erwin Böck. "Budući Beograd," *Vreme*, 7.5.1922, 3; "Novi Beograd," *Politika*, 7.5.1922, 1. See more about the competition in Vuksanović Macura, *San o gradu*.

⁶¹ Georgy Kovalevsky (Đorđe Kovaljevski, *Георгий Павлович Ковалевский*) graduated from the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, where he later taught. After emigrating to the Kingdom of SCS in 1920, he collaborated with the Belgrade municipality as a freelance engineer. In 1935, he secured a permanent position in the municipality, where he worked until emigration in 1944. *Personal dossier*, 314/94, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda. See more about his work in Marina Đurđević, "Urbanističko-arhitektonska delatnost Đorđa Pavloviča Kovaljevskog u Srbiji," *Godišnjak grada Beograda* XLIX–L (2002–2003): 169–181.

⁶² See more in Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923," 171–174.

⁶³ Jan Dubov, "Regulace Belehradu," *Stavba* 12 (1929): 180.

criticized for lacking a comprehensive understanding of urban problems and leaving many important questions unanswered⁶⁴. Additionally, the municipality frequently disregarded the plan and failed to implement it properly, often "working as though there was no Master Plan at all"⁶⁵. Due to an underdeveloped legal framework, insufficient elaboration of phases and priorities for implementing the plan, a lack of control mechanisms, and urgent construction needs, Belgrade continued to grow and develop haphazardly without proper planning. As a result, the 1923 Master Plan had to be altered around 190 times to suit the city's needs better⁶⁶. Thus, the 1923 Master Plan could be considered one of the major unrealized projects of interwar Belgrade, given the significant gap between the planned and actual outcomes of the proposals⁶⁷.

Unlike in Belgrade, where creating a master plan was a top priority in the early 1920s, in the case of Zagreb, the main tasks of urban planning of the city center were solved in the previous period. As a result, the Construction Department of the Zagreb Municipality proposed only the Town-Planning Act in 1923 for further city development⁶⁸. This act was a moderate proposal, introducing minor updates to the existing regulations and a street grid for the eastern expansion of the Lower Town, which was primarily implemented in the following decade. In the 1920s, urban regulation in Zagreb was only partial, and the competition for a new regulatory plan was initially intended to cover only the southern part of the city, but the Zagreb section of UJIA opposed such an approach⁶⁹. Finally, an international competition for a master plan was held in 1930⁷⁰. In the competition, the first prize was not awarded. There

⁶⁴ Miloš Somborski, "Razvoj Beograda između dva rata," *Urbanizam-arhitektura* 1–4 (1951): 6–7.

⁶⁵ Branko Maksimović, *Problemi urbanizma*, (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1932), 34.

⁶⁶ Oliver Minić, "Razvoj Beograda i njegova arhitektura između dva rata," *Godišnjak grada Beograda* I (1954): 182.

⁶⁷ See more in Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923."

⁶⁸ Mirela Slukan Altić, "Town planning of Zagreb 1862–1923 as a part of European cultural circle," *Ekonomika i ekohistorija* 8, br. 1 (2012): 100–107.

⁶⁹ "Zagrebački inženjeri i arhitekti traže regulatornu osnovu," *Jutarnji List*, 8.2.1927, 5.

⁷⁰ Radović Mahečić i Štok, "Presedan zagrebačkog urbanizma," 10

were two second prizes: one went to the team of Erich Kotzer, Ewald Liedecke, Peter Koller, and Karl Wehrmeister from Berlin; the other to the team of Hand Lübke, Edi Reisner, and Willy Schöne from Berlin and Halle (Saale). The third prize was awarded to the team of Zdenko Strižić, Hans Holzbauer, and Karlo Peteln from Berlin and Zagreb⁷¹. Based on the competition outcomes, the City Regulation Office prepared a draft of the general regulatory plan in 1932 and then a final plan by 1936, but it was not fully approved until 1940 due to the lengthy approval process⁷².

By the end of the 1930s, Belgrade recognized the need for a new regulatory plan due to the city's expansion and accumulated changes. A draft of a new regulatory plan was proposed in 1939 as well as a draft for its implementation decree in 1940⁷³. The regulatory plans and implementation decrees, for cities were mandatory according to the Construction Law, enacted in 1931⁷⁴.

Prior to the adoption of the Construction Law in 1931, there was no unified legislation for construction or urban planning, with different regions adhering to outdated laws, many from the 19th century. Moreover, since the Kingdom of SCS was created by merging different regions, Yugoslav cities varied in their urban layouts, legislation, infrastructure quality, and professional backgrounds, making it difficult to implement a cohesive urban policy. The Construction Law regulated the construction sector and mandated cities to adopt Construction Rulebooks in addition to regulatory plans. In Belgrade, the Rulebook was approved in 1935,

⁷¹ "Rezultate natječaja za izradu generalne regulatorne osnove za grad Zagreb," *Novosti*, 11.10.1931, 3. Zdenko Strižić graduated from the Technical University in Berlin, where he studied under Hans Poelzig. He began his career working in Poelzig's office. In 1933, he moved to Zagreb, where he primarily focused on urban planning issues. Strižić received one of the three first prizes in the international competition for the theater building in Kharkiv in 1930. Krešimir Galović, "Zdenko Strižić — Natječajni rad za kazalište u Harkovu," *Peristil* 40, br. 1 (1997): 137-147.

⁷² Kahle, "Građevinski propisi za grad Zagreb u razdoblju od 1932. do 1945. godine," 219-227. Architects Stjepan Hribar, Josip Seissl, Antun Ulrich, Vladimir Antolić, Ivan Zemljak participated in the plan elaboration.

⁷³ "Beogradska opština uputila je idejnu skicu Generalnog plana Beograda i uredbu za izvršenje Ministarstvu građevina," *Politika*, 12.11.1939, 9; "Nacrt uredbe za izvođenje regulacionog plana grada Beograda po idejnoj skici za regulaciju," *Opštinske novine* 21-22 (1940): dodatak.

⁷⁴ *Građevinski zakon* (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1931).

while in Zagreb, it was adopted in 1940⁷⁵. These Rulebooks detailed project approval procedures and technical standards, including aesthetic requirements. However, much like the regulatory plans, they were not without criticism.

An example of such criticism, embodied in concrete proposals, can be seen in the projects presented by Dragan Petrik. While the skyscraper instead of the Belgrade fortress and his urban visions at the exhibition were mainly attention-grabbing and unfeasible, Petrik also proposed a more actionable solution to the housing crisis. He developed a five-point program to address social housing, though it would have required a revision of existing construction regulations⁷⁶. This example can be viewed as part of the broader debate on Belgrade's development. Petrik advocated for a construction policy that would develop the city for its residents, especially the socially vulnerable, in contrast to the idea of Belgrade as a representative capital and city for the nation. Nevertheless, Petrik acknowledged its potential as an important center in considering Belgrade's urban challenges.

Construction and urban planning were shaped not only by management, legislation, and economic factors but also by people's ideas and visions of the city. Diverging perspectives among different stakeholders could influence the realization of projects.

During the interwar period, Belgrade quickly evolved from Serbia's capital to Yugoslavia's capital⁷⁷. In the press, Belgrade was frequently described as the "pivot of Yugoslavism," some went further, envisioning Belgrade as a regional leader, imagining it as "the future capital of the Balkan Empire"⁷⁸.

⁷⁵ *Građevinski pravilnik za grad Beograd* (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1935). "Gradjevinski pravilnik za grad Zagreb," *Narodne novine* 292, god. 104 (1940): 21-46.

⁷⁶ "Kako jedan čovek zamišlja moderni Beograd," *Vreme*, 31.3.1936, 8. "Gde će biti budući centar Beograda," *Politika*, 12.3.1936, 8.

⁷⁷ A. Mihajlović, "Od srpskog do jugoslovenskog Beograda," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine* 3 (1935): 174.

⁷⁸ Jovan Radenković, "Novi Beograd i narodno neimarstvo," *Politika*, 4.8.1928, 7; "Hoće li šta ostati od Generalnog plana," *Pravda*, 9.12.1927, 3; "20 godina intenzivnog podizanja prestonice," *Vreme*, 4.12.1938, 23.

Belgrade's image, as constructed in the press, had a strong orientation toward the future, often described as New Belgrade or Future Belgrade. This image invoked European models (with frequent comparisons to European capitals, usually unfavorable to Belgrade) and the proposal of large-scale projects suited to this vision of a city of the future: projects that did not align with the city's actual capabilities. Moreover, some professionals emphasized that planning for the future should be the foundation of urban development. By the late 1930s, the municipality had established an entire research department to meet the future "great Belgrade" needs⁷⁹.

Thus, discussions in the press about Belgrade often highlighted the disappointment over the gap between the envisioned and actual city⁸⁰, as well as the contrast between the potential and the results achieved. In the early 1920s, it seemed all the conditions were in place for careful development and planning from scratch, yet the outcomes were far from expected. Despite the 1923 Master Plan and the active construction efforts of the 1920s, the results were still deemed unsatisfactory. For instance, in 1931, in an interview, French architect Roger-Henri Expert shared his impressions of Belgrade, saying, "Everything was done irrationally, everything was misunderstood. Nowhere in the world were there better conditions for creating a beautiful city like in Belgrade, and yet, this is what you have done"⁸¹.

Thus, the criticized present-day Belgrade remained in the background, while the vision of future Belgrade, imagined as a proper Yugoslav capital, dominated decision-making. This vision emphasized a city for the nation and for representation rather than for its inhabitants.

⁷⁹ Ivan Zdravković, "Budući Beograd i njegov život," *Pravda*, 17.3.1939, 5; "Pri izgradjivanju Beograda treba naročito voditi računa da je on središte cele države," *Politika*, 28.12.1940, 11.

⁸⁰ "Današnji Beograd i Beograd u planovima i projektima," *Pravda*, 18.6.1925, 4.

⁸¹ "Kakav je Beograd, a kakav je mogao biti. Izjava Ekspera o beogradskoj arhitekturi," *Vreme*, 20.12.1931, 5.

From this perspective, the idea was that it should not be Belgraders who financed the city's transformation into a worthy capital but all Yugoslavs, the residents of the entire country⁸².

Although the press frequently complained that the state did little for Belgrade's development⁸³, state authorities focused on constructing public buildings and representative squares to pursue a modern, prosperous Yugoslav capital. Against this backdrop, social housing and infrastructure development issues were pushed aside. As these projects received less attention, their implementation was also limited. While the lack of attention to infrastructure was somewhat mitigated by private initiatives from "societies of improvement" in various districts, the execution of social housing projects in Belgrade remained minimal⁸⁴.

For instance, the debates over the Terazije Terrace revealed a stark contrast between the visions of the authorities and the general public, along with a disparity in the scale of their aspirations. From the 1923 Master Plan's perspective, the terrace promised magnificent views, "expanding the narrow horizon"⁸⁵. This vision was not only about landscape but also had a geopolitical aspect: the terrace represented Belgrade's dominant role, offering a view from the city center that stretched across the Sava River to "the Srem flats and Bosnian hills"⁸⁶. In contrast, critics, including ordinary passers-by, could only see "the shanty town and the slums of Savamala"⁸⁷. Among the critics was architect Milutin Borisavljević, who denounced the Terazije Terrace as "an unhealthy, violent, fabulously expensive, and unaesthetic idea"⁸⁸.

⁸² "Kako da izgradimo Beograd," *Pravda*, 18.12.1930, 5.

⁸³ "Država i Beograd kao prestonica," *Pravda*, 12.3.1927, 1.

⁸⁴ Zlata Vuksanović Macura, "Socijalni stanovi Beograda u prvoj polovini 20. veka," *Nasleđe* 12 (2011): 66.

⁸⁵ "Kako će se izgraditi Terazajska terasa," *Vreme*, 2.9.1928, 4.

⁸⁶ "Terazajska terasa," *Vreme*, 19.2.1922, 4.

⁸⁷ "Proširenje Terazajske Terasa," *Politika*, 10.8.1928, 3; "Terazajska terasa," *Politika*, 25.10.1929, 6.

⁸⁸ Milutin Borisavljević, "Problem Terazajske Terasa," *Pravda*, 4.3.1930, 1. Milutin Borisavljević graduated from the Belgrade Technical Faculty and the Sorbonne. Upon returning to Belgrade in 1926, he opened a private office and worked on design and construction management. Starting in 1934, he taught aesthetics at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. See more about his career in Ljiljana Miletić-Abramović, "Milutin Borisavljević," *Godišnjak grada Beograda XXXIII* (1986): 63–86.

The vision for Belgrade's future often overshadowed its past. The grand transformation plans for the city assumed it could be redesigned almost from the ground up. This approach was shaped by the belief that Belgrade was not a "city of the past"⁸⁹, as it lacked historical landmarks that reflected a heritage the authorities wanted to preserve. In the 1920s, the city experienced not only a construction boom but also a strong desire "to erase the traces of the Orient from Belgrade"⁹⁰. Although some worried that the city was losing its unique character by rapidly modernizing into a European metropolis, this was largely seen as an acceptable cost⁹¹.

By the late 1920s and early 1930s, there was a growing interest in monument preservation, with writers and artists contributing to the romanticization of Belgrade's past. Discussions emerged around preservation zones and lists of specific buildings to protect. However, the idea of establishing a historical reserve in the *Varoš Kapija* district was not realized. There was also an intention to preserve the fortress as a symbol of Belgrade's history⁹², although some proposals even suggested rebuilding the fortress, as a mentioned idea by Dragan Petrik.

Unlike in Belgrade, the monument protection movement in Zagreb was more active and influential, with monuments perceived as more valuable and capable of hindering construction projects. Moreover, an active and strong preservation movement in Zagreb opposed urban planning initiatives in the city center (for example, during the regulation of Kaptol and Dolac)⁹³. Historic sites in Zagreb's Upper Town were important for Croatian identity due to the role of the medieval Croatian Kingdom in the national myth. Furthermore, local elites focused on expressing Croatian identity in the urban landscape, as Zagreb was

⁸⁹ "Oko uredjenja Beograda," *Pravda*, 15.2.1925, 2.

⁹⁰ "20 godina intenzivnog podizanja prestonice," *Vreme*, 4.12.1938, 23.

⁹¹ "Beograd gubi svoju originalnost ali zato postaje sve više moderna varoš," *Vreme*, 9.4.1936, 7.

⁹² "Beograd 1918-1928," *Vreme*, 1.12.1928, 7.

⁹³ See debates in *Zagreb: Revija Društva Zagrebčana*, br. 1-6, 1934.

seen as the main Croatian city. As the second city of the Kingdom, Zagreb faced less pressure to undergo Yugoslavization.

Zagreb was the second city and a provincial capital. The local elites and professionals perceived it as the regional, national (Croatian), cultural, and economic capital. Croatian media depicted Zagreb as the most developed city in Yugoslavia, and Serbian newspapers even used its image as an example of Belgrade's development. Zagreb's local officials harbored ambitions to gain the same administrative status for the city as Belgrade had.

Unofficially, Zagreb aimed to be the cultural and economic capital. Cultural institutions (such as universities, high schools, theatres, and museums) were highly valued by the public, and it was a matter of prestige to preserve, develop, and house them in proper buildings. For central authorities, Zagreb's cultural institutions were not only economically redundant but also politically undesirable, as they challenged Belgrade's status⁹⁴. As a result, the construction and even maintenance of such buildings were among the main interwar issues for Zagreb, with the Ministry of Education creating financial and administrative obstacles. Funding for these institutions was often a subject of political bargaining.

Unlike state-financed projects, municipal initiatives were more successful due to Zagreb's status as an economic hub. The city's well-developed industry and banking system bolstered the municipal budget. However, local elites were dissatisfied with the distribution of state funds and argued that more should be spent on Zagreb rather than Belgrade, given that Zagreb's economy contributed more.

1.1. Administration Structure and Development in the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia

The Kingdom of SCS was created by uniting regions with different legal frameworks and administrative systems. During the interwar period, efforts were made to unify these laws

⁹⁴ "Zaspisnici sastanka Glavnog prosvetnog saveta," fasc. 486, fond 66. Arhiv Jugoslavije.

and build a cohesive administrative structure for the new state. However, the administrative reorganization process, political instability, and internal conflicts significantly hindered this effort. Administrative inefficiencies impacted various sectors, including architecture and urban planning, becoming a significant barrier to project execution both for private and public investors. Even private investors were required to coordinate their projects with building codes and urban regulations, which were often inconsistent and subject to change. Moreover, issues with state and municipal apparatus functioning significantly affected the construction of administrative and public buildings, where government bodies were the primary organizers.

The administrative history of the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia can be divided into several distinct periods. The first period, from the proclamation of the Kingdom of SCS on December 1, 1918, to the adoption of the constitution on June 28, 1921, saw the continuation of pre-war laws and administrative divisions. During this time, public building projects were mainly in the planning stages, including large-scale complexes in Belgrade.

The second period, lasting until January 6, 1929, was marked by efforts to centralize governance and establish unified legislation. However, unstable, frequently changing governments hindered these efforts. The country was divided into 33 regions (*oblast*) as part of centralization. Although overall optimism initially dominated the construction sector, with private construction booming in both cities and the Ministry of Construction's budgets increasing, many projects were halted by the late 1920s.

During the third period, from 1929 to 1931, under King Alexander's royal dictatorship, the most significant legal unification occurred, with numerous laws being enacted. A single government was in place during this time, although Ministers of Construction continued to rotate as often as in previous governments. In 1929, the Kingdom was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and its administrative structure was revised, dividing the country into nine

provinces (*banovina*) and the Belgrade City Administration as a separate unit. Construction responsibilities were decentralized. This period saw the highest budget allocations for the Ministry of Construction and its projects for administrative buildings. Public construction surged in both Zagreb and Belgrade, though Zagreb saw more growth compared to earlier years.

The fourth period, from the 1931 Constitution until 1939, can be further divided by 1934 when King Alexander was assassinated. Construction legislation continued to develop, and although governments still changed frequently, the political instability was less pronounced than in the 1920s. This period coincided with the economic crisis effects, significantly affecting the construction sector, as both Ministry of Construction budgets and administrative building projects suffered cuts, with many projects being frozen between 1934 and 1937. Growth resumed after this, reaching another peak by 1939, alongside intensified discussions regarding future projects.

The fifth period, from 1939 to 1941, started after the Cvetković-Maček Agreement, establishing the Banovina of Croatia. In Zagreb, hopes that the *banovina* would streamline decision-making and improve financing led to active discussions about potential projects, although little actual construction occurred. In Belgrade, the pace of administrative building construction also began to slow, with the implementation of projects initiated during the active phase in 1937 and 1938 becoming delayed.

The Ministry of Construction was central to public construction within the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia government. The Ministry's functions, organizational structure, and personnel were initially modeled on the Ministry of Construction of the Kingdom of Serbia. Milan Kapetanović, the last Minister of Construction in the Kingdom of Serbia, became the first Minister of Construction in the Kingdom of SCS. According to the 1919 Decree on the Ministry's structure, its responsibilities included 1) designing, constructing, and maintaining

state buildings, 2) planning cities, settlements, and spas in coordination with the Ministry of Public Health, 3) overseeing the design, construction, and maintenance of district, county, and municipal buildings, as well as private buildings intended for public use, and 4) supervising public works carried out by self-governing and private engineers, architects, and contractors⁹⁵. As such, the Ministry was the highest authority governing all areas of public construction.

Despite the Ministry of Construction's central role, some ministries had their technical departments, leading to tension with the Ministry of Construction, which aimed to consolidate all technical matters under its control. Moreover, in the early 1920s, even ministries without technical departments occasionally bypassed the Ministry of Construction to fulfill their architectural needs. One notable example was the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks, which in 1921 commissioned its building project directly from a private architect instead of consulting the Ministry of Construction⁹⁶.

The Ministry of Construction complained about the decentralization and insisted that all technical activities should be concentrated within it. The existence of technical departments in other ministries drew criticism not only from the Ministry of Construction but also sometimes from UJIA.

During administrative reform and reorganization following January 6, 1929, the Ministry of Construction asserted its claim to control all construction projects and to transfer the funds allocated for such projects into its budget⁹⁷. Meanwhile, UJIA proposed the creation of a joint Ministry of Public Works and Transport⁹⁸. This proposal aligned with the broader trend toward simplifying the administrative system in the Kingdom, mainly by reducing the number of ministries. Additionally, Stevan Savković, the first Minister of Construction in the

⁹⁵ *Uredba o Ustrojstvu Ministarstva Gradjevina* (n.p., 1919), 4.

⁹⁶ The contract from 13.5.1921, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

⁹⁷ The session of the Ministerial Council on February 21, 1929. Ljubodrag Dimić, Nikola Žutić, Blagoje Isailović, ur. *Zapisnici sa sednica Ministarskog saveta Kraljevine Jugoslavije: 1929-1931* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ; Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2002), 22-25.

⁹⁸ "Inženjeri o stvaranju Ministarstva Javnih Radova i Saobraćaja," *Vreme*, 27.3.1929, 3.

government formed after the establishment of the royal dictatorship, was optimistic that the regime change would enhance the efficiency of the administration, including the Ministry of Construction, by adopting a more effective management approach⁹⁹.

Moreover, the draft law on the organization of the supreme state administration outlined the creation of a Ministry of Public Works by merging the Ministry of Construction with the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, along with the Railway Construction Directorate from the Ministry of Transport and the Waterworks Directorate from the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks¹⁰⁰. Although the joint ministry never materialized, and the technical departments of other ministries remained intact, the Ministry of Construction's responsibilities expanded. In 1929, a new Decree on the Structure of the Ministry of Construction and its External Service was introduced, followed by the Law on the Organization of the Ministry of Construction in 1930. Under this new law, the Ministry of Construction shifted its focus from buildings to broader engineering tasks. According to the law, the Ministry of Construction was "the highest governing, the administrative and supervisory authority for the construction of all roads, bridges, buildings, hydro-technical facilities and electro-mechanical subdivisions intended for public use"¹⁰¹.

According to the 1919 Decree, the Ministry of Construction originally consisted of the Minister's Cabinet, the General Department, the Engineering Department with sections for Architecture and Accounting, and the Construction section¹⁰². The Architectural section included divisions for monumental buildings, monuments, and the artistic planning of cities and settlements; for schools and religious buildings; for hospitals, sanitary facilities, and spas;

⁹⁹ "Raspis ministra gradjevina," *Jutarnji List*, 18.1.1929, 6.

¹⁰⁰ "Četiri ministarstva se ukidaju," *Novosti*, 23.3.1929, 1.

¹⁰¹ *Zakon o ustrojstvu Ministarstva Građevina i njegove spoljne službe: od 16. januara 1930. godine sa izmenom od 29. marta 1930. godine*. (Beograd: Grafička radionica Ministarstva građevina, 1930), 3.

¹⁰² *Uredba o Ustrojstvu Ministarstva Građevina* (n.p., 1919), 4.

and for economic and industrial buildings¹⁰³. By 1930, the Ministry had expanded its structure due to its increased authority. There were General Affairs, Accounting and Finance, Roads, Hydrotechnics, Architecture, and Electro-mechanics departments¹⁰⁴. Under the 1930 Law, the Architectural Department was responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of all state buildings, existing regional self-governing buildings, and other architectural projects, excluding military buildings and the maintenance of buildings under the Ministry of Transport¹⁰⁵. It also oversaw the arrangement of spas in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Policy and Public Health and supervised the design and construction of all non-state and government buildings intended for public use¹⁰⁶.

The division within the Architectural Department was later streamlined, and by the 1936 Decree on the division of the Ministry of Construction, it was reduced to two sections: 1) the section for monumental buildings, religious buildings, and monuments, and 2) the section for state buildings, public-use buildings, and spa planning¹⁰⁷. The first section was tasked with designing monumental structures "for high state administration and historical national monuments" and managing the construction and restoration of religious buildings and monuments. The second section handled building design, construction supervision, and maintenance for administration and other public-use structures¹⁰⁸.

During the interwar period, the government changed 41 times, and in 18 cases, the Minister of Construction was replaced along with the government. In 9 instances, however, the minister changed within the same government¹⁰⁹. In total, 32 changes were made in the role of Minister of Construction, with 26 different individuals holding the position, most of

¹⁰³ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰⁴ *Zakon o ustrojstvu Ministarstva Građevina i njegove spoljne službe*, 3-4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ *Uredba o podeli odeljenja Ministarstva Građevina na oteke i odeljke*. (Beograd: Ministarstvo Građevina, 1936), 34-35.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Radoš Ljušić i dr. *Vlade Srbije: 1805-2005*, (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2005), 25.

whom lacked professional expertise in construction. Thus, political instability and frequent turnover contributed to a lack of continuity and consistency in decision-making.

Frequent changes in government were accompanied by multiple reorganizations of the administrative-territorial structure, impacting the division of authority between the Ministry of Construction and regional or local bodies. Under the 1919 Decree, regional Construction Directorates (*Gradjevinske direkcije*) were established¹¹⁰. Project costs determined their powers: they could independently decide on design and tenders for projects costing up to 100,000 dinars, while more expensive projects required approval from the Minister of Construction. Below the Directorates were the Construction Sections. The system was decentralized after the 1929 administrative reform, with technical responsibilities transferred from the Ministry's Directorates to the Technical Departments of the *Banovina* Administrations. The *ban* oversaw and approved projects for municipal and public-use private buildings, though this did not apply to Belgrade, where the Ministry of Construction continued to oversee and approve such projects¹¹¹. The Ministry also controlled the construction of state buildings and monuments. Despite decentralization, it remained the supreme oversight body in the construction sector¹¹². While the Ministry oversaw public construction, including private buildings intended for public use in the case of Belgrade, purely private building projects were under municipal jurisdiction, with municipalities approving their construction.

Under the 1921 constitution, the kingdom was divided into regions (*oblast*), districts (*srez*), and municipalities (*opštine*)¹¹³, which had self-governing authority, although the first two also functioned within the state administration system. While the law on regional and

¹¹⁰ *Uredba o Ustrojstvu Ministarstva Gradjevina* (n.p., 1919), 7-8.

¹¹¹ *Uredba o podeli odeljenja Ministarstva Građevina*, 36.

¹¹² "Arhitektonska služba Ministarstva Gradjevina," *Politika*, 19.10.1939, 8.

¹¹³ *Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca: od 28. juna, 1921. god.* (Beograd: Izdavačka knjižarnica Gece Kona, 1927).

district self-government was passed in 1922, the law on urban municipalities was only enacted in 1934, already after the adoption of the 1931 Constitution. Before this, urban self-government was regulated by earlier laws. In Belgrade, the 1903 Law on Municipalities from the Kingdom of Serbia remained in effect, while in Zagreb, the law from 1895 governed municipal affairs¹¹⁴. In Belgrade, municipal governance included the elected municipal council (*opštinski odbor*) and municipal court (*opštinski sud*) led by a chairman (*predsednik*), de facto mayor, and also municipal officials. In Zagreb, the elected bodies were the city council (*gradsko zastupstvo*) and mayor (*predsednik*), while municipal administration (*poglavarstvo*) included municipal staff. The 1934 Law on Urban Municipalities established a city council (*gradsko veće*) and mayor (*predsednik*) as the governing bodies¹¹⁵. The mayor and two-thirds of council members were elected, while one-third were appointed by the *ban* or by the Minister of Internal Affairs in the case of Belgrade. The division between elected bodies and municipal staff remained intact.

Municipal leadership also saw changes, though not as frequently as government ministers. In Belgrade, 12 mayors held the office, and in Zagreb – eight (but Stjepan Srkulj served twice)¹¹⁶.

In addition to the municipality, Belgrade had a special administrative unit of executive power, the Belgrade City Administration (*Uprava grada Beograda*), which was under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and also held police functions within the city. After the 1929 administrative reform, since Belgrade was not part of the *banovinas*, the Belgrade City Administration was an administrative-territorial unit. The role of the city administrator in Belgrade could be compared to that of a *ban*. The competencies of the

¹¹⁴ *Zakon o opštinama* (Beograd, 1902). *Zakon od 21. lipnja 1895. ob ustroju gradskih obćinah u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji* (Križevci: Tisak i naklada Gust. Neuberga, 1895).

¹¹⁵ *Zakon o gradskim opštinama: od 22. jula 1934. god.* (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1934).

¹¹⁶ Both calculations do not take into account the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Filip Filipović in Belgrade and Dragutin Tončić in Zagreb, who won the elections in 1920 but did not assume office due to the *Obznana* decree outlawing the party.

Belgrade City Administration in the construction sector, besides the maintenance of state buildings, included oversight of non-state buildings for public use¹¹⁷. However, the approval of their projects remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Construction¹¹⁸.

Due to Belgrade's special status, the Ministry of Construction oversaw public building projects and urban planning. The responsibilities between the municipality and the Ministry of Construction were not strictly divided¹¹⁹. A significant issue in executing architectural and urban projects in Belgrade was the need for coordination between central and local authorities. The resolution of many important matters depended on the municipality and the state, and central authorities often directly intervened in Belgrade's affairs, using its capital status as justification. These interventions frequently disrupted the work of the municipality.

Unlike Belgrade, Zagreb's municipality implemented a more successful communal policy. This difference was particularly evident in the early 1920s; for example, in an article titled "*Our Big Cities*", a journalist from Belgrade newspaper *Pravda* remarked that Zagreb was governed more effectively than Belgrade¹²⁰. On the one hand, Zagreb's municipal authorities were perceived as more efficient than central or regional bodies¹²¹. On the other hand, part of Zagreb's success in communal policy could be attributed to its lower administrative status.

As Eve Blau argued, Zagreb's urban development showcased "the freedom of periphery," where the absence of state funding came with reduced state interference¹²². The reduced state pressure allowed for increased municipal independence and greater creative freedom for professionals, even in public service roles. Although Zagreb's administrative

¹¹⁷ Branislav Božović, *Beograd između dva svetska rata: Uprava grada Beograda 1918-1941* (Beograd: Istorijski arhiv Beograda, 1995), 365.

¹¹⁸ *Gradjevinski pravilnik za grad Beograd* (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1935), 101.

¹¹⁹ "Zapisnik veća starešina," fasc. 1648, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

¹²⁰ "Naši veliki gradovi," *Pravda*, 28.9.1929, 4.

¹²¹ "U zaštitu autonomije grada Zagreba," *Jutarnji List*, 9.3.1926, 6.

¹²² Blau, "Modernizing Zagreb: The Freedom of Periphery," 292.

structure was more complex (with three levels compared to two in Belgrade), regional authorities acted as intermediaries between central and local institutions. Thus, the local ministerial directorate and later the Sava *Banovina*'s Technical Department encountered interventions from the Ministry of Construction, affording the municipality greater autonomy¹²³. However, from the other perspective, the additional layer of regional governance was viewed as a source of complications that hindered the municipality's operations and added financial burdens. Thus, during the 1920's, discussions took place in Zagreb press about removing the city from its regional governance structure and elevating the mayor's role to match that of a *veliki župan* (regional prefect)¹²⁴. Proponents of these changes argued that more autonomy for municipal authorities would increase efficiency¹²⁵. Moreover, this issue was considered in the context of the city's economic and cultural development and in light of its rivalry with Belgrade¹²⁶. The issue became less prominent after establishing the banovinas in 1929, though it occasionally resurfaced¹²⁷.

In the case of Zagreb, from a local perspective, the main issue was the lack of state funding for public projects, which was a constant source of complaints and was perceived as financial deprivation in Zagreb¹²⁸. As a result, the municipal authorities sometimes had to address the construction needs of central government bodies, especially in the case of institutions under the Ministry of Education, where deprivation was felt particularly acutely¹²⁹.

¹²³ "Propisi o organizaciji uprave," kut. 1, fond 130, Hrvatski Državni arhiv.

¹²⁴ "Borba za autonomiju Zagreba," *Jutarnji List*, 19.5.1926, 8; "Hoće li vlada konačno ispuniti obećanja dana Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 28.4.1928, 15. One notable opponent of this idea was Stjepan Radić. "Radić protiv izdvajanja Zagreba iz oblasti," *Jutarnji List*, 30.3.1927, 3.

¹²⁵ "U zaštitu autonomije grada Zagreba," *Jutarnji List*, 9.3.1926, 6; "Nastojanje da se Zagreb izluči iz oblasti," *Novosti*, 14.3.1928, 2.

¹²⁶ "Autonomija Zagreba i oblasna samouprava," *Novosti*, 8.4.1927, 4.

¹²⁷ "Zagrebu postaje preteško," *Jutarnji List*, 11.9.1935, 10.

¹²⁸ See for example, "Država zapostavlja Zagreb gdje samo može," *Jutarnji List*, 14.3.1928, 11.

¹²⁹ "Sveučilište zahvaljuje gradskom zastupstvu," *Novosti*, 13.12.1927, 3.

Nevertheless, in Belgrade, financial matters were also a sensitive issue for the municipality, which was obligated to allocate funds in line with its capital status while the Ministry of Finance controlled its finances. Additionally, the state could expropriate municipal lands for its own needs, complicating coherent urban planning. Due to land distribution issues, the state owed the municipality an amount comparable to its entire budget¹³⁰.

Besides the Ministry of Construction and Municipalities, King Alexander, who had "a special love for architecture," was also involved in the architectural process¹³¹. Within the Royal Court Administration, the Construction Department handled projects directly for King, primarily for his residences¹³². In these cases, King Alexander personally selected and approved specific decisions. Nevertheless, tracing his involvement in other public projects is more complicated. Architect Petar Popović, who worked in the Ministry of Construction, mentioned in a speech delivered after laying flowers on the king's grave with a UJIA delegation that no decisions on prioritizing major technical works were made without the king's approval. However, no written evidence of this exists in the administrative records¹³³. Popović also stated that the king took a personal interest in Belgrade's major urban and architectural matters¹³⁴.

1.2. Architects and Architectural Development in Interwar Belgrade and Zagreb

In interwar Yugoslavia, the architectural community included diverse groups with different backgrounds, education, and experiences, influencing their architectural visions, ideas, and preferences.

¹³⁰ "Zapisnik VI redovne sednice Odbora Opštine Beogradske," *Opštinske Novine*, 11.2.1932, 88.

¹³¹ Petar Popović, "Kralj Aleksandar Prvi, ljubitelj arhitekture, umetnosti i tehnike uopšte" *Pravda*, 13.6.1931, 3.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ "Kralj Aleksandar Prvi kao ljubitelj arhitekture, umetnosti i tehnike," *Tehnički List* 11-12 (1935): 153.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

A significant factor that distinguished these groups was their education. Before the First World War, most architects were educated outside Zagreb and Belgrade, with Austro-Hungarian and German universities as the primary centers. In Belgrade, the Great School (which became the Belgrade University in 1905) had the Technical Faculty, where the Architectural Department was established in 1897¹³⁵. However, many architects still sought education abroad, also after graduation as an addition to their domestic education. After the war, Technical Faculties were founded in the universities of Zagreb and Ljubljana. In Zagreb, the Technical High School (*Tehnička visoka škola*) was opened in 1919 and became the Technical Faculty of the university in 1926¹³⁶.

In addition to the Technical Faculty, Zagreb had another center for architectural education – the School of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts. Founded in 1926, this school differed in its institutional status, its pronounced orientation toward modern trends, and the leadership of one architect throughout its existence – Drago Ibler¹³⁷. Unlike the Technical Faculty, Ibler's architecture course was structured more like an atelier than a traditional academic department. Most of Ibler's students were graduates of the State Secondary Technical School, qualifying them for the title of authorized builder (*ovlašćeni graditelj*). However, eight semesters at the School of Architecture awarded them the title of academic architect (*akademski arhitekt*), while graduates of the Technical Faculty earned the title of graduate engineer of architecture (*diplomirani inženjer arhitekture*). Among the School of

¹³⁵ Bogdan Nestorović i dr. *Visokoškolska nastava arhitekture u Srbiji*, (Beograd: Plato, 1996), 13.

¹³⁶ See Stjepan Jecić i Ivan Smolčić, "Tehnička visoka škola (1919–26) i Tehnički fakultet (1926–56) u Zagrebu – temelji suvremenoga razvoja tehnike u Hrvatskoj," *Studia lexicographica* 12, br. 23 (2018): 81-100.

¹³⁷ See more in Ariana Novina, "Škola za arhitekturu na Akademiji likovnih umjetnosti u Zagrebu — Iblerova škola arhitekture," *Peristil* 47, no. 1 (2004): 135-143. Darja Radović Mahečić, "Slučaj Iblerova laboratorija," u: *Majstorske radionice u umjetničkoj baštini Hrvatske*, ur. Dino Milinović, Ana Marinković i Ana Munk (Zagreb: FF press, 2014), 193–205. Drago Ibler graduated from the Technical University in Dresden in 1921 and then worked in Hans Poelzig's studio. In addition to teaching and designing, Ibler was a publicly active architect and the president of the *Zemlja* group. He was connected with Ivan Meštrović and Miroslav Krleža, as well as having ties in political circles, which he attempted to leverage to secure architectural commissions. See more about him in Željka Čorak, *U funkciji znaka: Drago Ibler i hrvatska arhitektura između dva rata*. Zagreb: Centar za povijesne znanosti; Društvo povjesničara umjetnosti, 1981.

Architecture graduates were Aleksandar Freudenreich, Lavoslav Horvat, Mladen Kauzlarić, Stjepan Planić, and Zvonimir Požgaj.

Representatives of both UJIA and Zagreb Technical Faculty criticized the School of Architecture, claiming its curriculum lacked depth, particularly in technical subjects¹³⁸. They also successfully lobbied in 1938 to prohibit the school's graduates from using the title *architect* and unsuccessfully called for the school's closure¹³⁹. This conflict was presented as stemming not only from professional competition but also from differing conceptions of architecture. For example, architect Vladimir Šterk, in his article "*The Academy of Fine Arts and the Modern Architect*," published in both *Tehnički List* and *Arhitektura*, argued that architecture did not belong to the Academy of Fine Arts, as it was not a visual art¹⁴⁰. He also criticized the notion of architecture as an art form, linking such perception with "styles" and "façades," while modern architecture was connected with technology, materials, and "social evolution"¹⁴¹. However, many graduates of the School of Architecture were also predominantly modernists and active proponents of the social role of modern architecture.

After both domestic and foreign education, architects started their careers with internships, including foreign architectural firms. For example, Zagreb architects often trained in the founders of modern European architecture studios, such as Adolf Loos, Hans Poelzig, and Le Corbusier¹⁴².

¹³⁸ "Rezolucije XX glavne godišnje skupštine U.J.I.A." *Tehnički List* 11-12 (1939): 157-8. Marko Vidaković, "Umjetnička akademija i savremeni arhitekt," *Arhitektura* 1-2 (1933): 27-30.

¹³⁹ "Pravilnik o delokrugu apsolutenata umetničke akademije arhitektonske struke," u *Zakon o ovlašćenim inženjerima: sa pravilnicima i dodacima*. Beograd: Savez inženjerskih komora Kraljevine Jugoslavije [n.d.]. "Rezolucije XX glavne godišnje skupštine U.J.I.A." *Tehnički List* 11-12 (1939): 158.

¹⁴⁰ Vladimir Šterk, "Umjetnička akademija i savremeni arhitekt," *Tehnički List* 1 (1933): 2; Vladimir Šterk, "Umjetnička akademija i savremeni arhitekt," *Arhitektura* 1-2 (1933): 26-27. Vladimir Šterk graduated from the Czech Technical University in Prague in 1921. After brief periods working at Ignjat Fischer's office, he opened his own practice, engaging in private architectural work as well as public activities. See more about his work in Darko Kahle, "Potpisani projekti i realizacije Vladimira Šterka u Zagrebu od 1923. do 1941.," *Prostor* 16, br. 2(36) (2008): 192-209.

¹⁴¹ Šterk, "Umjetnička akademija i savremeni arhitekt," 27.

¹⁴² Tomislav Premerl, *Hrvatska moderna arhitektura između dva rata - nova tradicija*. (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1990), 37. For example, in Loos' bureau worked Ernest Weismann and Zlatko Neumann; in

After completing their education and gaining two years of professional experience, architects could take a state technical exam overseen by the Ministry of Construction¹⁴³. Passing this exam granted them the right to open a private practice¹⁴⁴. Alternatively, they could choose a career in civil service, taking up positions in ministries, municipalities, or financial institutions. Such employment provided a stable salary and consistent workload, but on the other hand, it imposed limitations on potential earnings (as architect-officials were not allowed to take on private projects) and restricted creative freedom¹⁴⁵. Due to their workload, many architect-officials were less active in the public sphere; however, competitions were an essential outlet for realizing their creative potential. Private practice, by contrast, offered less stability: earnings were not capped but were also not guaranteed, and the workload could fluctuate¹⁴⁶. Even in private firms, though, architects faced constraints on creativity due to the need to appeal to investors¹⁴⁷. For private architects, publications, exhibitions, and competitions not only helped them meet their professional goals but also served as a form of self-promotion. On the other hand, many architects with successful private practices were not involved in public activities.

Architects had to navigate a highly competitive field, competing not only with fellow private architects but also with civil service employees who took on private commissions, as

Poelzig's office – Drago Ibler, Zdenko Stržić, and Josip Pičman; in Le Corbusier's studio - Ernest Weismann and Juraj Neidhardt.

¹⁴³ *Pravilnik o polaganju državnog tehničkog ispita* (Beograd: Ministarstvo građevina, 1922). *Pravilnik o polaganju državnog stručnog ispita u resoru Ministarstva građevina* (Beograd: Ministarstvo građevina, 1930).

¹⁴⁴ See more about architecture as professional field in Milan Đurić i Nebojša Antešević, "Arhitektonska profesija u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca / Kraljevini Jugoslaviji: moderne tendencije zakonodavnog okvira i objektivnost profesionalne prakse," u *Arhitektura i vizuelne umetnosti u jugoslovenskom kontekstu: 1918–1941*, ur. Aleksandar Kadijević, Aleksandra Ilijevski (Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za istoriju umetnosti, 2021), 15–22.

¹⁴⁵ Aleksandar Kadijević, "Državni arhitekta - stvaralac ili poslušnik?" *Zbornik Seminara za studije moderne umetnosti Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu* 10 (2014): 73.

¹⁴⁶ See more about architectural private practice in Marija Pokrajac, "Privatna projektantska praksa u Srbiji u međuratnom periodu: 1918–1941," u *Arhitektura i vizuelne umetnosti u jugoslovenskom kontekstu: 1918–1941*, ur. Aleksandar Kadijević, Aleksandra Ilijevski (Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za istoriju umetnosti, 2021), 45–52.

¹⁴⁷ Milutin Borisavljević, "Arhitekt i poslodavac," *Pravda*, 10.3.1939, 5.

well as with civil engineers¹⁴⁸. The division of labor between engineers and architects and the distinction between "engineer" and "architect" were key professional issues. For example, such distinction caused a discussion in the newspapers between two architects, Milutin Borisavljević, who graduated from the Belgrade Technical Faculty and Sorbonne, and Branislav Kojić, who got his degree in architecture at École Centrale des Arts et Manufactures in Paris¹⁴⁹. Borisavljević claimed that Kojić's education did not give him a right to call himself an architect¹⁵⁰. Kojić claimed that his education was equal to domestic architectural education and appealed to the Ministry of Construction and the Club of Architects of UJIA's Belgrade section to confirm his right¹⁵¹. According to Zoran Manević, different concepts of architecture as a profession were behind such discussion: elitist (closed community) and egalitarian (open community). In addition, both architects were active public figures, publishing about protecting professional interests such as salary, copyrights, and legal issues¹⁵².

The *Provisional Decree on Authorized Engineers and Architects* was adopted in 1924 to standardize the regulations across different regions of the country and define the rights and duties of engineers and architects¹⁵³. The rulebooks on the division of competencies and work

¹⁴⁸ Zoran Manević, "Srpska arhitektura 20. veka," u *Arhitektura XX vijeka*, ur. Zoran Manević i dr. (Beograd: Prosveta, 1986), 22. Since architects in civil service were not allowed to take on private projects, private architects signed their projects.

¹⁴⁹ Branislav Kojić, after completing his education in France, worked at the Ministry of Construction upon his return. He later opened an office with his wife, Danica Kojić. In addition to his private practice, he was a founder of GAMP, participated in exhibitions and competitions (both as a jury member and a competitor), and published articles. See more about him in Snežana Toševa, *Branislav Kojić* (Beograd: Građevinska knjiga, 1998).

¹⁵⁰ Milutin Borisavljević, "Arhitekt ili inženjer?" *Pravda*, 29.5.1928, 5; "Predavanje jednog inženjera o arhitekturi," *Pravda*, 31.12.1929, 14; "Šta je to Ecole Centrale?" *Pravda*, 11.1.1930, 8 i 12.1.1930, 5.

¹⁵¹ Branislav Kojić, "G. dr. Borisavljević – G. Kojić," *Pravda*, 4.1.1930, 10.

¹⁵² Branislav Kojić, "Arhitektura, arhitekt i građanin," *Politika*, 6.1.1936, 25; Milutin Borisavljević, "O određivanju honorara arhitektima," *Pravda*, 25.11.1928, 8; Milutin Borisavljević, "Zaštitimo arhitekta od onih koji nekažnjeno zloupotrebljavaju njihova prava," *Vreme* 4.4.1937, 14.

¹⁵³ "Privremena uredba o ovlašćenim inženjerima i arhitektima u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca," *Službene novine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 25.10.1924, 4-6.

awards later supplemented this decree¹⁵⁴. However, a comprehensive law governing the work of both engineers and architects, the *Law on Authorized Engineers*, was enacted only in 1937¹⁵⁵. In general, the regulation of the architectural profession was carried out within the broader engineering framework.

Architects also united with engineers at the Association of Yugoslav Engineers and Architects (UIJA, *Udruženje Jugoslovenskih Inženjera i Arhitekata*) to protect professional interests. It was founded in 1919 by unifying professional organizations from all regions of the new state¹⁵⁶. Thus, engineers and architects united in the Yugoslav association among the first¹⁵⁷, and as mentioned by Aleksandar Ignjatović, the idea of national cohesion played an essential role in its activities¹⁵⁸. The UIJA had sections in key cities where the Clubs of Architects operated.

Belgrade, as the capital of the Kingdom, was open to architects from other parts of the country¹⁵⁹. Creating a new representative Yugoslav capital caused suggestions to engage the most competent Yugoslav architects¹⁶⁰. For example, architects from Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, and Skopje participated and won awards in Belgrade competitions. In Zagreb, the professional community was more local: UIJA's Zagreb section actively fought to protect the interests of local architects. Moreover, architects from other cities rarely won awards in

¹⁵⁴ "Pravilnik o podeli i delokrugu pojedinih struka ovlašćenih inženjera i arhitekata," *Službene novine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 10.11.1925, 1-2. "Pravilnik za nagrade rada ovlašćenih inženjera i arhitekata," *Službene novine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 26.9.1928, 906-912.

¹⁵⁵ *Zakon o ovlašćenim inženjerima* (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1938).

¹⁵⁶ "Predradnje za ujedinjenje inženjerskih društava u kraljevstvu SHS u jedinstveno Udruženje," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 1 (1919): 7–8. See more about its foundation and activities in Ing. F. Horvat, "Desetogodišnjica postanka i rada Udruženja Jugoslovenskih inženjera i arhitekata, 1919-1929," u *Jugoslavija na tehničkom polju 1919 – 1929*, ur. Rajko Kušević (Zagreb: Udruženje jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata, 1929), 5-11.

¹⁵⁷ Rajko Kušević, ur. *Jugoslavija na tehničkom polju 1919 – 1929*, 17.

¹⁵⁸ Aleksandar Ignjatović, "Dom Udruženja jugoslovenskih inženjera i arhitekata u Beogradu," *Nasleđe* 7 (2006): 88-90.

¹⁵⁹ Zoran Manević, "Zagreb-Beograd (1912-1941)," *Čovjek i prostor* 10 (1988): 30. About Croatian architects in Belgrade see more in Aleksandar Kadijević, "Hrvatski arhitekti u izgradnji Beograda u 20. stoljeću," *Prostor* 2(42) (2011): 466-477, Nebojša Antešević, "Doprinos hrvatskih arhitekata i zagrebačke škole arhitekture beogradskom gradotvornom nasleđu tokom 20. veka," *Izgradnja* 9/10 (2015): 377–389.

¹⁶⁰ Kosta Strajnić, "Savremena arhitektura Jugoslovena," *Arhitektura* 4 (1933): 108.

Zagreb competitions, while Zagreb architects frequently participated in competitions in many cities across the country.

Besides local architects, foreign architects worked in Belgrade and Zagreb both as invited professionals for individual commissions and as persons with their bureaus. UJIA regularly opposed foreign architects and engineers, particularly during the 1930s, when the effects of the economic crisis were felt most acutely¹⁶¹.

Russian émigré architects formed a distinct subgroup within the architectural community. Aleksandar Kadijević estimates that approximately seventy Russian émigré architects were active in the Kingdom¹⁶². Those who arrived with both education and professional experience from the Russian Empire often secured positions in the civil service, particularly in the Ministry of Construction¹⁶³. However, as non-citizens, they worked on temporary contracts. For example, Nikolay Krasnov and Vasily Androsov worked in the Ministry of Construction, while Georgy Kovalevsky worked in the Belgrade Municipality. It was believed that they held a privileged position in the civil service, enjoying the support of King Alexander¹⁶⁴. Architects educated in the Russian Empire but lacking significant work experience mainly opted for private practice. Others completed their education in the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia and followed similar career paths as their Yugoslav counterparts. They often began their professional journeys through internships in the offices of local architects before establishing their own practices, for example, Andrej Papkov and Grigoriy Samoylov.

¹⁶¹ "Umjesto inozemnih inženjera treba zaposliti naše domaće," *Jutarnji List*, 16.12.1931, 3; Niko Armanda, "Protiv uposlenja stranih inženjera," *Pravda*, 26. 2.1934, 5.

¹⁶² Aleksandar Kadijević, "Uloga ruskih emigranata u beogradskoj arhitekturi između dva svetska rata," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda* XLIX – L (2002-2003): 131.

¹⁶³ See more in Snežana Toševa, "Rad ruskih arhitekata u Ministarstvu građevina u periodu između dva svetska rata," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda* LI (2004): 169–181.

¹⁶⁴ Miodrag Jovanović, "Kralj Aleksandar i ruski umetnici," u *Ruska emigracija u srpskoj kulturi XX veka*. T. 1., ur. Miloš Šibinović (Beograd: ČIP Štampa, 1994), 97.

A small number of Russian émigré architects worked in Zagreb, primarily from the younger generation who had received their architectural education at the Technical Faculty in Zagreb. The most prominent among them built their careers in teams with local architects, such as Georgy Kiverov and Zoja Nepenina (married name Dumengjić).

Except for architects who had completed their education in exile, Russian architects rarely participated in architectural competitions¹⁶⁵ or exhibitions organized by local architects. Only a quarter of them participated in exhibitions, and even then, primarily in those organized by the Russian artists' group "K.R.U.G."¹⁶⁶. Some Russian émigré architects were members of "The Union of Russian Engineers and Technicians"¹⁶⁷.

In Belgrade, the Group of Architects of Modern Direction (GAMP, *Grupa Arhitekata Modernog Pravca*) was established in 1928¹⁶⁸ by Branislav Kojić, Milan Zloković¹⁶⁹, Dušan Babić¹⁷⁰, and Jan Dubovy¹⁷¹. The group's main objective was to promote the principles of modern architecture. They organized public lectures and exhibitions, collaborated with other professional organizations, and published newspaper articles to achieve this. Despite

¹⁶⁵ Elvira Ibragimova, "Russkie arkhitektory-emigranty i arkhitekturnye konkursy v mezhvoennom Belgrade," *Slavyanovedenie* 1 (2021): 105–117.

¹⁶⁶ Aleksandar Kadijević, "Izložbe ruskih arhitekata u Beogradu između dva svetska rata," u *Ruska emigracija u srpskoj kulturi XX veka*. T. 1., ur. Miloš Sibinović (Beograd: ČIP Štampa, 1994): 299.

¹⁶⁷ Toma Milenković, *Ruski inženjeri u Jugoslaviji: 1919-1941*, (Beograd: Savez inženjera i tehničara Srbije, 1997), 64.

¹⁶⁸ Branislav Kojić, "Grupa arhitekata modernog pravca," *Politika*, 20.12.1928, 5. The group was active until 1934. Branislav Kojić, *Društveni uslovi razvitka arhitektonske struke u Beogradu*, (Beograd: SANU, 1978), 196.

¹⁶⁹ Milan Zloković started his education at the Technical University in Graz and completed it at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. He further advanced his studies at the École Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts in Paris. Later Zloković worked at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade and, in addition to teaching and private practice, was also a publicly active architect. See more about him in Marina Đurđević, "Život i delo arhitekta Milana Zlokovića (1898-1965)," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda*, XXXVIII (1991): 145–168.

¹⁷⁰ Dušan Babić graduated from the Technical University in Vienna. During the 1920s, he worked at the Ministry of Construction, first at the Construction Directorate in Sarajevo and later in the Architectural Department in Belgrade. After his resignation in 1929, he began a private practice in Belgrade. See more in Ivan R. Marković i Milan P. Milovanović, "Arhitekt Dušan Babić - rekonstrukcija identiteta," *Nasleđe* 21 (2020): 61-79.

¹⁷¹ Jan Dubovy (Jan Dubovi), a Czech architect, graduated from the Czech Technical University in Prague in 1921. After moving to Belgrade, he briefly worked at the firm of Czech architect Matej Blecha before becoming an employee of the Belgrade municipality. He was publicly active, particularly on issues of urbanism. See more in Dijana Milašinović-Marić, *Arhitekta Jan Dubovi* (Beograd: Zadužbina Andrejević, 2001).

occasional efforts to address social issues¹⁷², their social engagement was minimal compared to the broader modernist movement. Ljiljana Blagojević attributed this limited focus on socio-political themes to the group's desire to avoid leftist connotations, which could have hindered their activities under the dictatorship¹⁷³. Consequently, GAMP concentrated on matters of style, but there was a noticeable gap between their statements and practices, as many modernist architects continued to use other architectural styles to meet the demands of investors¹⁷⁴.

In Zagreb, from 1932 to 1933, the Working Group Zagreb (RGZ, *Radna grupa Zagreb*) operated, formed at the initiative of Ernest Weismann as the Yugoslav branch of CIAM¹⁷⁵. In addition to Weismann, the group included Vladimir Antolić, Viktor Hećimović, Zvonimir Kavurić, Josip Pičman, Josip Seissel, and Bogdan Teodorović¹⁷⁶. Unlike GAMP, RGZ paid less attention to questions of style and had a more socially oriented focus, as in the case of Ernst Weissmann, who "wanted architecture based on Marxist principles"¹⁷⁷. Moreover, RGZ was not merely a club of like-minded individuals but a working group that collaborated on projects and participated in competitions. For example, to contribute to resolving social issues, the group prepared the section "House and Life," exhibited as part of

¹⁷² Branislav Kojić, "Stremljenja moderne arhitekture," *Arhitektura* 8 (1932): 218.

¹⁷³ Ljiljana Blagojević, *Modernism in Serbia: The Elusive Margins of Belgrade Architecture*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 60.

¹⁷⁴ Marina Đurđević, "60 godina od osnivanja grupe arhitekata modernog pravca," *Moment* 13 (1989): 87; Blagojević, *Modernism in Serbia*, 61.

¹⁷⁵ Tamara Bjažić Klarin, "Međunarodni kongres moderne arhitekture (CIAM) i hrvatska arhitektura 20. stoljeća. Proces umrežavanja – Ernest Weissmann i Radna grupa Zagreb," u *Zbornik III. kongresa hrvatskih povjesničara umjetnosti*, ur. Andrej Žmegač (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2013), 221-226. Ernest Weismann graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1926, then worked in the offices of Adolf Loos and Le Corbusier. He participated in the work of CIAM, maintained a private practice in Zagreb, and actively promoted modernism. After World War II, he served as a UN Housing and Planning Officer and Head of the Industrial Reconstruction Department (UNRRA). See more in Tamara Bjažić Klarin, *Ernest Weissmann: društveno angažirana arhitektura, 1926-1939* (Zagreb: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti; Hrvatski muzej arhitekture, 2015).

¹⁷⁶ Tamara Bjažić Klarin, "Radna grupa Zagreb – osnutak i javno djelovanje na hrvatskoj kulturnoj sceni," *Prostor* 13, br. 1(29) (2005): 41-51.

¹⁷⁷ Bjažić Klarin, "Međunarodni kongres moderne arhitekture (CIAM) i hrvatska arhitektura 20. stoljeća," 222.

the fourth *Zemlja* exhibition¹⁷⁸. *Zemlja* was an association of visual artists that operated from 1929 to 1935 and included architects, such as founding member Drago Ibler¹⁷⁹. The association had a strong social orientation, criticized the existing socio-political circumstances, and promoted engaged art and its democratization. *Zemlja* not only explored themes rooted in rural and working-class experiences but also sought to involve people from these communities in artistic practice. The architecture was seen as a tool for social change, primarily focusing on social housing issues¹⁸⁰. *Zemlja* organized four exhibitions in Zagreb and one in Belgrade. However, their fifth Zagreb exhibition in 1935 was banned by the police, marking the end of the group's activities.

The coexistence of diverse stylistic trends marked the architectural development of Belgrade during the interwar period. Belgrade's appearance has often been criticized for its heterogeneous and eclectic mix of styles¹⁸¹. In the 1920s, the architectural scene displayed maximum variety: remnants of Secession (Art Nouveau) and the emergence of Art Deco, the Serbo-Byzantine style and folklorism, academism and early modernism. By the 1930s, the stylistic landscape was largely shaped by the coexistence of academism and modernism, while variations of the national style became secondary tendencies. For instance, despite public debates around the importance of creating buildings with a "racial (national) character" in Belgrade, largely referencing the Serbo-Byzantine style¹⁸², this style was predominantly limited to sacral architecture and selected projects by enthusiastic architects¹⁸³. The bulk of

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Željka Čorak, "Grupa »Zemlja« i hrvatska arhitektura između dva rata," *Arhitektura* 40 (1987), 52-57.

¹⁸⁰ Tomislav Premerl, "Arhitektonska i društvena avangarda. Arhitekti u »Zemlji«," *Čovjek i prostor* 6/7 (1979): 30-31.

¹⁸¹ Branislav Kojić, "Arhitektura Beograda," *Vreme*, 6.1.1929, 23; "Beograd, varoš čudne građevinske mešavine i nesklada," *Politika* 31.12.1931, 5.

¹⁸² Milosolav Stojadinović, "Nešto o uređenju Beograda," *Politika*, 25 i 27.5.1927, 1. "Kako treba urediti Pozorišni trg," *Vreme*, 15.6.1929, 7.

¹⁸³ See more about a national style in Serbian architecture in Aleksandar Kadijević, *Jedan vek traženja nacionalnog stila u srpskoj arhitekturi, sredina XIX – sredina XX veka* (Beograd: Građevinska knjiga, 1997).

architectural production was characterized by academicism, modernism, and transitional forms that could be classified as Art Deco¹⁸⁴.

The stylistic diversity in Belgrade's architecture was influenced not only by various trends in different functional types and the preferences of state authorities but also by the heterogeneity of the professional community itself. Many architects from the older generation, who held prominent positions at the Technical Faculty and the Ministry of Construction, leaned toward various revivalist styles, including national styles, though to a lesser extent. Some enthusiast architects focused on vernacular architecture, striving to modernize the Serbo-Byzantine style or nationalize modernism¹⁸⁵. Among the younger generation, modernism was actively supported, although many architects also continued to work in other styles. This distinction was also noticeable among Russian émigré architects in Belgrade: while the older generation built their careers using academism and the Serbo-Byzantine style, modernism spread among the younger generation.

In the 1920s, academism was the dominant architectural style in Belgrade, particularly in the construction of public buildings¹⁸⁶. By adopting European architectural models, academism became the preferred style for government buildings, symbolizing the state's stability and prosperity. It also gained prominence in residential architecture, as middle- and upper-class clients sought designs that reflected their social status¹⁸⁷. Despite its prominence, academism faced a crisis between 1928 and 1935 with the rise of modernism. However, by the late 1930s, academism reemerged in a modernized form, influenced by the trend toward

¹⁸⁴ See more about Art Deco development in Serbia in Milan Prosen, "Ar deko u srpskoj arhitekturi," (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2014).

¹⁸⁵ For example, Momir Korunović, Aleksandar Deroko, Branislav Kojić. See more about folklorism in Vladana Putnik, "Folklorizam u arhitekturi Beograda (1918-1950)," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda* LVII (2010): 175-210.

¹⁸⁶ See more about academism in Aleksandar Kadijević, *Estetika arhitekture akademizma*, (Beograd: Građevinska knjiga, 2005).

¹⁸⁷ Ljiljana Blagojević, *Moderna kuća u Beogradu (1920-1941)* (Beograd: Zadužbina Andrejević, 2000), 24.

monumentalization in stripped classicism¹⁸⁸. Nevertheless, it was criticized for its decorative elements and perceived outdated architectural approach¹⁸⁹.

In Belgrade, modernism first appeared in the second half of the 1920s, primarily in residential construction, and gradually made its way into public projects¹⁹⁰. This shift was partly supported by the regime's cultural policies during the dictatorship period from 1929 to 1931 and the active efforts of GAMP during this period. However, throughout the 1930s, modernism's acceptance was complicated by the preferences of government authorities, public criticism, and the limitations of an underdeveloped construction industry. Modern architecture was often criticized for being faceless and international, making it seem unsuitable for reflecting local or national identity¹⁹¹. Nevertheless, modernist architects attempted to create architectural forms that reflected Belgrade's unique way of life¹⁹². Also, modernist projects by architects from Zagreb frequently stood out in Belgrade's architectural competitions, often receiving awards.

In contrast to Belgrade, where the affirmation of modernism was complicated by the coexistence with other styles and the preferences of the state authorities, interwar Zagreb's architectural development largely embraced modernism. During the 1920s, modernism gradually gained affirmation, while trends evolved from late Art Nouveau to two predominant trends: modernized classicism and classicized modernism. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, architecture transitioned from academic forms, reduced in line with modernist principles,

¹⁸⁸ See more about trends in Serbian architecture in the late 1930s in Tadija Stefanović, "Tokovi u srpskoj arhitekturi (1935-1941)," (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2014).

¹⁸⁹ "Ka narodnoj arhitekturi," *Politika*, 16.2.1924, 3.

¹⁹⁰ Blagojević, *Modernism in Serbia*; Zoran Manević, "Pojava moderne arhitekture u Srbiji," (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, 1979); Zoran Manević, "Beogradski arhitektonski modernizam," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda XXVI* (1979): 209-226.

¹⁹¹ Jovan Radenković, "Novi Beograd i narodno neimarstvo," *Politika*, 4.8.1928, 7.

¹⁹² Branislav Kojić, "Arhitektura Beograda," *Vreme*, 6.1.1929, 25.

toward pure modernism¹⁹³. However, as in Belgrade, the second half of the 1930s saw the rise of stripped classicism as another variation of modernized classicism.

Moreover, the affirmation of modernism in Zagreb was partly influenced by the traditions of Croatian architecture, where modern trends were seen as national alternatives to imported revivalist styles¹⁹⁴, and by a general focus on pragmatism and rationality. For example, Karin Šerman notes that even academism in Croatian architecture was reduced and simplified, linking this to economic deprivation that encouraged the rationalization of architectural forms and the search for new ones¹⁹⁵. On the other hand, a crucial factor in the rise of modernism in Zagreb was the professional community, where both older and younger generations largely embraced modernist principles, including architect-officials working in municipal and regional governments¹⁹⁶. Furthermore, through public activities via UJIA, publications, and participation in competitions in other cities, Zagreb architects promoted modernism within a broader Yugoslav context. Zoran Manević points out that the projects of Zagreb architects at Belgrade competitions were examples of modernism for Belgrade architects, and quotes one of them, Branislav Marinković: "We envied them, but we could not work like that, as it simply did not function in our case"¹⁹⁷.

Nevertheless, some Zagreb architects, such as Ivan Zemljak and Ernest Weissmann, distinguished true modernist architects from those who merely followed trends. They argued for a more precise separation between modernism as a comprehensive concept, which

¹⁹³ See more in Premerl, *Hrvatska moderna arhitektura između dva rata*; Darja Radović Mahečić, *Moderna arhitektura u Hrvatskoj 1930-ih / Modern architecture in Croatia 1930's* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2007).

¹⁹⁴ Tanja Damjanovic Conley, "Conceptualizing National Architectures: Architectural Histories and National Ideologies Among the South Slavs," in *Nationalism and Architecture*, eds. Raymond Quek, Darren Deane and Sarah Butler (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012): 100.

¹⁹⁵ Karin Šerman, "Utjecaj Bauhauza na hrvatsku međuratnu arhitekturu," *Prostor* 17, br. 2(38) (2009): 332-334.

¹⁹⁶ Bjažić Klarin, *Ernest Weissmann*, 50.

¹⁹⁷ Manević, "Zagreb-Beograd (1912-1941)," 30.

embraced new construction techniques and approaches to space organization, and superficial stylistic exercises where modernism was limited to undecorated façades¹⁹⁸.

From the perspective of opponents of modernism, it was, on the whole, seen as a temporary, passing trend¹⁹⁹. Thus, despite the successful affirmation of modernism within Zagreb's professional circles, there were still objections from the public²⁰⁰. It was especially true when it came to symbolically significant projects and locations. For example, a journalist from *Jutarnji List*, commenting on new buildings on Ban Jelačić Square, argued that such architecture might be suitable for the suburbs but not for the city center²⁰¹. Similarly, modernism was considered inappropriate for the Upper Town. In 1937, a journalist from *Večer*, discussing the future appearance of the *ban's* palace, urged to "keep those modern architects with their smooth surfaces far away"²⁰². Similarly, in 1938, a journalist from *Jutarnji List*, discussing the same building, expressed confusion over why modernism was still "so jealously guarded in Zagreb, for completely incomprehensible reasons"²⁰³.

1.3. Key Topics in Debates about Architecture

Different actors in the architectural process had their ideas about architecture and stylistic preferences, as well as varying degrees of influence on decision-making. The extent to which their ideas aligned or diverged often impacted the implementation of projects.

Besides architectural professionals, other actors, such as the King, ministries, municipalities, and private investors, also played a role in the architectural process. Nevertheless, it is not easy to reconstruct architectural preferences outside the professional circle. King Alexander was noted for his keen interest in various issues, including urban and

¹⁹⁸ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 210-211.

¹⁹⁹ "Najbolje rješenje za konačno uređenje Trga Kralja Petra," *Jutarnji List*, 4.5.1932, 6.

²⁰⁰ See more about perception of modernist architecture in Zagreb in Tamara Bjažić Klarin, "Inicijacija novog građenja – od nepopularne novotarije do „izvoznog“ proizvoda," *Život umjetnosti* 82, br. 1 (2008): 22-31.

²⁰¹ "Novogradnja palace na Jelačićevom trgu," *Jutarnji List*, 17.1.1928, 7.

²⁰² "Novu bansku palaču treba sagraditi na Griču," *Večer*, 10.12.1937, 3.

²⁰³ "Umjesto iznajmljivanja privatne zgrade – potrebno je graditi novu bansku palaču," *Jutarnji List*, 12.7.1938.

architectural matters²⁰⁴. Architect Petar Popović described him as a supporter of the Serbo-Byzantine style but also pointed out that the king "had a taste and a sense for supporting and maintaining our styles"²⁰⁵. For example, the Royal palace (*Kraljevski dvor*) in Dedinje, in which construction the King was personally involved, was built "in our beautiful national style"²⁰⁶.

Nevertheless, in the competition for the Crown Prince's palace, also known as White Palace (*Beli dvor*), although the façade was required to match the rest of the complex and the competition projects adhered to these requirements²⁰⁷, the project by Aleksandar Djordjević was altered at the King's request after the competition, and the final building was realized in a Palladian architectural style²⁰⁸.

Moreover, for the building of the Main Post Office, Main Telegraph, and Postal Savings Bank in Belgrade, there is a version which claims that King Alexander himself demanded changes to the façade, as "in front of the Parliament he did not want a building, which children could smash by slingshot," attributing this account to the memoirs of Dimitrije M. Leko²⁰⁹. The 1935 *Politika* article, reporting the start of the building's construction, stated

²⁰⁴ A. Krstić, "Visoko staranje kralja Aleksandra za urbanističko podizanje Beograda," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine* 11 (1934): 761-764.

²⁰⁵ As an example, Popović mentioned that for the villa in the residence near Budva, he chose "coastal style". "Kralj Aleksandar Prvi kao ljubitelj arhitekture, umetnosti i tehnike," *Tehnički List* 11-12 (1935): 155. Petar (Pera) Popović graduated from the Technical Faculty of the Great School in Belgrade. From 1897 to 1927, he worked at the Ministry of Construction, and from 1919 to 1927, he taught Byzantine architecture at the Technical Faculty. He was one of the key protagonists of the Serbian-Byzantine style. See more in Danijela Milošević, "Arhitekta Petar J. Popović (1873–1945)," (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2019).

²⁰⁶ Pavle Kara-Radovanović, "Jedno urbanističko pitanje Dedinja," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine* 12 (1934): 859. Petar Popović, "Kralj Aleksandar Prvi, ljubitelj arhitekture, umetnosti i tehnike uopšte," *Pravda*, 15.6.1931, 1.

²⁰⁷ Toševa, "Konkurs za Beli dvor na Dedinju," 135.

²⁰⁸ Aleksandar Djordjević graduated from the Technical University in Karlsruhe in 1914. He began his career in Belgrade at the construction company "Rad," later opening his own office and engaging in private practice. See more about his life, career and work on the White Palace in Milan Prosen, "Graditeljski opus arhitekta Aleksandra Đorđevića (1890-1952)," *Nasleđe* 7 (2006):167-203.

²⁰⁹ Zoran Manević, "Jučerašnje graditeljstvo," *Urbanizam Beograda*, prilog (1979).

that for modified Androsov's project, the King gave "definitive instructions regarding the façade's architectural treatment to ensure harmony around the Parliament"²¹⁰.

Additionally, King Alexander was known to support Russian architects²¹¹. In addition to personal and political reasons, stylistic preferences also influenced it, as the older generation of these architects had expertise in Neo-Byzantine and academic styles, which King Alexander was inclined toward.

Aside from the King, government authorities as actors were an unstable category in interwar Yugoslavia due to frequent personnel changes and administrative reforms. Therefore, their positions and preferences could vary, although specific examples examined in later chapters will demonstrate particular architectural views and preferences stemming from government bodies. In revealing the preferences of public and private investors, it is essential to consider selection mechanisms, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. On the one hand, commissioning and appointment typically involve selecting an architect first, not a specific project. In such cases, direct communication did not always clarify whether stylistic demands were part of the requirements.

On the other hand, architectural competitions display ideas and preferences more clearly. Competitions as a selection method tend to shift the influence over architectural decisions toward the professional community, as architects were involved in both preparing competition programs and judging submissions (although, after the results were announced, they do not always influence the investor's decisions regarding the choice of a project for implementation, even though in some cases they tried to ensure that competition results were followed). For example, an investor may have had a vision for the building's style, but the professional community often viewed such stylistic requirements as contradictory to the

²¹⁰ "Prilike su, najzad, dozvolile zidanje palate za Glavnu poštu," *Politika*, 17.3.1935, 18.

²¹¹ Jovanović, "Kralj Aleksandar i ruski umetnici," 96.

purpose of a competition. As a result, most competition programs only provided general comments on the external appearance of buildings, often leaving style up to the participants under the banner of a "free style." For instance, the board of the War Invalids Association (*Invalidsko Udruženje*) initially intended to construct its building in Belgrade "in our old national style"²¹². However, the original competition announcement did not follow the UIJA's rulebook on competitions, and the intervention of UIJA's Belgrade section succeeded²¹³. When the competition was eventually held in 1928, the original stylistic requirements were not included in its program. As a result, two projects were awarded: one in a romantic academic style by Milan Sekulić, who won the second prize (Fig. A.29), and a modernist, ornament-free design by Milan Zloković and Andrej Papkov, which took the third prize²¹⁴.

In rare instances, competition programs included stylistic requirements, revealing investor preferences. For example, the first competition for the Ministry of Finance building, announced in 1924, had no such requirements. The jury awarded one project and purchased seven others²¹⁵, most of which followed an academic style, except Žarko Tatić's project in Serbo-Byzantine style, which received the highest purchase. Nevertheless, following a controversy in the competition (covered in Chapter 3), the Ministry of Finance organized an additional competition focused solely on the façade, specifying that it had to be in the "National Serbo-Byzantine style"²¹⁶.

²¹² "Dom ratnih invalida," *Pravda*, 16.6.1926, 3.

²¹³ "Izveštaj o radu kluba Arhitekta Udruženja Jugoslovenskig Inženjera i Arhitekta – Sekcija Beograd," *Tehnički List* 7 (1927).

²¹⁴ The jury included three architects (Martin Pilar from Zagreb, Janko Šafarik, Svetoslav Putnik) and one representative of the War Invalids Association. "Pred zidanjem invalidskog doma," *Politika*, 19.9.1928, 10. Milan Sekulić graduated from the Royal Joseph Polytechnic University in Budapest. In Belgrade, together with another graduate of the same university, Dragiša Brašovan, he founded the bureau "Arhitekt" (1921–1924), after 1924 he ran his own private practice. Andrej Papkov (*Андрей Васильевич Панков*) graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade and worked in the offices of Milan Zloković and Dragiša Brašovan. In 1932, he opened his own bureau and began a private practice. See more in Marina Đurđević, "Arhitekta Andrej Vasiljevič Papkov," *Godišnjak grada Beograda* LII 52 (2005): 297–312.

²¹⁵ Rezultat javne utakmice za izradu skica za zgradu Ministarstva Finansija u Beogradu. K6-2770, Istorijski arhiv Beograda, 23.

²¹⁶ "Izrada planova za novu palatu Ministarstva finansija," *Politika*, 16.4.1925, 7.

Certain architects in Belgrade and Zagreb were actively engaged in public discourse, publishing articles about architectural and urban issues. The professional press played a key role in shaping architectural discourse. From the very beginning of its activities, UJIA published *Tehnički List* (titled *Tehnički list Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* until 1924). However, this journal primarily focused on reporting UJIA's meetings and addressing professional concerns, with a dominant focus on engineering topics. Aside from the publication of individual projects, both realized and competition entries, there were relatively few articles on architectural issues. Another journal, *Građevinski vjesnik*, brought architects and construction engineers together and was published from 1932 until 1941. Between 1931 and 1934, a separate journal explicitly dedicated to architecture was launched: *Arhitektura*, published in Ljubljana. Its goal was to unite architects to advance Yugoslavian architecture and create a modern building culture²¹⁷.

Moreover, articles by architects, including architectural criticism and polemical writings, were also published in art journals such as *Umetnički Pregled*, literary journals like *Srpski Književni Glasnik* and *Književnik*, as well as in other magazines like *Život i rad*, *Savremena Opština*, and *Javnost*. These publications also featured non-architect writings on architectural topics. Journalists also displayed a keen interest in these matters, resulting in the dissemination of architectural and urban planning-related materials not only in professional journals but also in non-specialized daily newspapers and journals. Interviews with architects, opinion surveys on various urban issues, articles by journalists, and, less frequently, programmatic articles by architects were also covered in the daily press.

²¹⁷ "Uvodne besede," *Arhitektura* 1 (1931): 1. See more in Alenka Di Battista, "Revija Arhitektura (1931–1934). Prelom s tradicijo," u *Arhitektura i vizuelne umetnosti u jugoslovenskom kontekstu: 1918–1941*, ur. Aleksandar Kadijević, Aleksandra Ilijevski (Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za istoriju umetnosti, 2021), 187-195.

During the interwar period in Belgrade, the leading newspapers were *Politika*, *Pravda*, and *Vreme*. Founded in 1904, *Politika* and *Pravda* maintained a relatively neutral political stance during this period²¹⁸ compared to *Vreme*. It was launched in 1921 and was a pro-regime newspaper, initially closely aligned with King Alexander, People's Radical Party and later Yugoslav National Party, while in the second half of the 1930s, *Vreme* came under the influence of Milan Stojadinović²¹⁹. In Zagreb, *Jutarnji List* and *Novosti*, both founded in 1912, were the key newspapers. *Jutarnji List* (which also published an evening edition, *Večer*) generally aligned with the pro-HSS stance, while *Novosti*, owned by *Jugoslovenska štampa*, had a more pro-Yugoslav orientation. Until his assassination in 1929, the director of *Novosti* was Antun Schlegel, who had connections with Svetozar Pribićević's Independent Democratic Party²²⁰. On matters of architecture and urbanism, Tamara Bjažić Klarin identifies *Jutarnji List* as a more conservative newspaper and *Novosti* as more liberal, as evidenced by their differing reactions to the Foundation Block competition²²¹. Among Belgrade's newspapers, *Politika* was the most supportive of modernist architecture.

Although various print platforms were available for architects to share their ideas, the number of architects actively participating in these activities was limited. Even fewer architects wrote in-depth articles rather than just publishing their projects with brief commentary. In Zagreb, the most active writers included Ernest Weissmann, Marko Vidaković, and Stjepan Planić (who edited the publication *Problems of Contemporary*

²¹⁸ *Pravda* was initially associated with the progressivists, but after a change in ownership in 1913, it was no longer affiliated with political parties. During the interwar period, the newspaper was owned by Manojlo Sokić. From 1924, *Politika* was led by Vladislav S. Ribnikar, the nephew of its founder, who was trained as an architect and had connections with the communists. See more in Vladimir Barović, "Značaj Vladislava S. Ribnikara u Medijskom Razvoju i Jačanju Dnevnog Informativno-Političkog Lista 'Politika,'" *Godišnjak Filozofskog Fakulteta u Novom Sadu* 41, 1 (2016): 33–46.

²¹⁹ Vuk Dragović, *Srpska štampa između dva rata. Osnova za bibliografiju srpske periodike: 1915-1945*, (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka, 1956), 52–54.

²²⁰ See more in Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević, "Antun Schlegel: vodeća ličnost u novinarstvu Hrvatske do 1929. godine," *Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice* (2001): 91-114.

²²¹ Tamara Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok u Zagrebu: Urbanističke i arhitektonske odlike," *Prostor* 18, br. 2(40) (2010): 326-327.

Architecture in 1932)²²². In Belgrade, notable contributors were Branislav Kojić, Milan Zloković, Ivan Zdravković²²³, and Milutin Borisavljević. Borisavljević stands out as an exception since most architects engaged in these discussions were modernists, whereas he was not. Additionally, Borisavljević typically published his work in newspapers rather than specialized architectural journals.

This diverse range of publications, alongside official documentation, could help to reconstruct key topics in architectural debates and understand the various positions held by different actors. Primarily, there was a divergence in the very understanding of architecture. While state authorities predominantly viewed architecture as a decorative art form, emphasizing its representational possibilities, publicly active architects were inclined to perceive it as a social matter extending beyond mere aesthetics. Private investors consider architecture as a practical matter, focusing on profitability and utility. Ivan Zdravković described the discrepancy between architects' and investors' positions as a contradiction between the idealist and the materialist, the collectivist and the individualist. While an investor pursues individual interests, trying to make the most of the land plot and make a profit, an architect should think about the people who will use the building and their comfort²²⁴. Thus, professional requirements did not meet the investors' expectations.

²²² Marko Vidaković graduated from the Czech Technical University in Prague in 1919. In Zagreb he established a construction company and engaged in private practice, as well as public activities (for example, organized the exhibition *Czechoslovak Contemporary Architecture* in 1928). See more in Dragan Damjanović, "Arhitekt Marko Vidaković i arhitektura Zagreba između dva svjetska rata," *Zbornik Seminara za studije moderne umetnosti Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu* 12 (2016): 139-165. Stjepan Planić graduated from the State Secondary Technical School and the School of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb. He began his career in Rudolf Lubynski's studio and opened his own office in 1927. He was also a member of the *Zemlja* group. See more in Darja Radović Mahečić i Ivana Haničar, *Stjepan Planić 1900.–1980* (Zagreb: Gliptoteka HAZU; Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2003), 66.

²²³ Ivan Zdravković graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. He taught at the State Secondary Technical School in Belgrade from 1931 to 1938, after which he worked at the Museum of Prince Paul. Although he designed relatively few buildings, he was publicly active, he published articles and engaged in architectural criticism. See more in Aleksandra Ilijevski, "Arhitekt Ivan Zdravković: naučna i stručna delatnost u periodu između dva svjetska rata," u *Arhitektura i vizuelne umetnosti u jugoslovenskom kontekstu: 1918–1941*, ur. Aleksandar Kadijević, Aleksandra Ilijevski (Beograd: Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za istoriju umetnosti, 2021), 115-124.

²²⁴ Ivan Zdravković, "Konkursi i njihovi ishodi," in Kojić, *Društveni uslovi razvitka*, 220.

Among some architects, their social awareness grew, and they reconsidered their role in society as a maximum, pretending to create better living conditions and social relations and even to level class differences²²⁵. These ideas were especially prominent among architects who trained with leading figures of modernism like Le Corbusier and were involved in CIAM's activities, such as Ernest Weissmann and RGZ. Moreover, they also found expression among architects associated with *Zemlja*. For example, architect Stjepan Planić proposed to rethink the role of architects, and he claimed that "the work does not consist of creating beautiful decoration, but in creating and organizing spaces in which it will be possible for people to work more successfully, as well to live healthier and merrier lives"²²⁶. Moreover, the architecture that served only the ruling class was criticized²²⁷. From this perspective, architects paid greater attention to social housing issues, but such ideas were socially unfeasible under the political conditions of interwar Yugoslavia.

The different understanding of architecture also influenced the actors' position on essential questions of interwar architecture – about space organization and façade decoration. While functional and rational space became crucial for architects, investors, especially state authorities, continued to demand decorated façades and considered them the essence of architecture. A façade was a kind of screen that translated representations. Thus, the state authorities put efforts into getting richly decorated façades for administrative buildings meant to express stability and prosperity. Architects criticized this approach because it was economically unjustified and did not correspond with the buildings' function and space organization²²⁸. At the same time, customers often perceived the façade as separate from the entire building, while for architects, the façade was an inseparable element.

²²⁵ Stjepan Planić, "Progres graditeljstva," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 1 (1932): 9; "Principi savremene arhitekture, predavanje g. M. Zlokovića, profesora Univerziteta," *Vreme*, 15.11.1933, 7.

²²⁶ Stjepan Planić, "Nešto o arhitekturi," *Književnik* 1 (1932): 27.

²²⁷ Ing. T.E.N., "Problemi arhitekture," *Književnik* 2 (1934): 58.

²²⁸ Svetomir Lazić, "Posleratna arhitektura naše prestonice," *Umetnički Pregled* 6-7 (1940): 214.

For example, when the construction of the Belgrade Main Post Office began in 1935, the project was based on modernist space organization from the first-awarded competition project by Josip Pičman, but with a monumental neoclassical façade added by Vasilij Androsov (discussed in Introduction). The final project drew criticism not only from some architects. In the article *"Is it necessary to build luxury public buildings?"* the entrepreneur S. Djaković criticized this building's expensive façades (one-third of the overall costs) as useless²²⁹. He mentioned that public buildings should represent their time, which meant "an age of modesty," and proposed to save five million on façade and distribute them to more important social needs.

Some architects were also against the concept of "beautiful façades" itself. For example, Bogdan Rajkovic described buildings with beautiful façades as "graves for the living dead" and claimed that "human stupidity is that mighty sovereign who has impeded progress and hygiene in the field of architecture for the sake of beautiful form"²³⁰. Moreover, architects reproached their colleagues: by indulging their clients and forgetting architectural ideals, they "kill architecture"²³¹, as well as by perceiving architecture as a profession, not a vocation. Colleagues who believed in the primacy of aesthetics in architecture were also criticized because they "continue to deny the most necessary living conditions, light, and comfort for the sake of symmetry and beautiful form"²³².

The aesthetic treatment of façades inevitably raised questions about materials. Investors often favored luxurious façades featuring expensive natural materials or sculptural detailing. In contrast, modernist architects promoted reinforced concrete and glass, prioritizing the building's overall form over the façade as a decorative element. However, the

²²⁹ S. Djaković, "Da li je potrebno zidati luksuzne javne gradjevine," *Vreme*, 16.2.1935, 7.

²³⁰ Bogdan Rajkovic, "Misli o novoj arhitekturi," *Arhitektura* 11-12 (1932): 281.

²³¹ Persida Tričković, "Arhitektura kao socijalni problem," *Život i rad* 1 (1932): 25

²³² Bogdan Rajkovic, "Misli o novoj arhitekturi," *Arhitektura* 11-12 (1932): 281.

architectural competition juries and the press criticized the preference for glass, labeling it as aesthetically unsuitable and functionally inadequate.

To justify using new materials and construction technologies, architects frequently emphasized their cost-effectiveness, an argument particularly relevant for projects struggling with financial constraints. Nevertheless, as Ernest Weissmann noted after the Foundation Hospital competition in Zagreb, modern prefabricated construction methods, while reducing construction costs, also lowered the involved actors' profits²³³. Moreover, the proposed cost-efficiency of such solutions was often undermined by the realities of the Yugoslav economy, including cartel agreements among cement manufacturers and shortages of reinforcing steel²³⁴.

While architects were paying more and more attention to social issues and the functional organization of space, the state authorities were also interested in creating architecture that could embody the Yugoslav identity. However, attempts to develop Yugoslav architecture could be considered an impossible task due to three difficulties: the ideological struggle over the content of the term "Yugoslavism," translating its content into the language of architecture, and the ambiguous interpretation of architectural projects labeled as Yugoslav. Moreover, patterns of national architecture were different in Yugoslav regions, where before the creation of the Kingdom of SCS, various trends were affirmed in architecture.

The Serbian case demonstrated a conventional approach to developing a national architectural style. Serbian architects use a version of the Neo-Byzantine style inspired by

²³³ Bjažić Klarin, *Ernest Weissmann*, 123.

²³⁴ See for example "Kartel cementa zaustavio je tempo gradjenja u prestonici," *Pravda*, 19.02.1934, 8; "Gradjevinaska delatnost tej je počela a već se oseća oskudica u betonskom gvoždju," *Vreme*, 7.4.1940, 8; "Pomanjkanje betonskog željeza ugrožava gradjevnju djelatnost," *Večer*, 13.4.1940, 3.

authentic Serbian regional architectural traditions, such as the Morava style²³⁵. Thus, they created the so-called Serbo-Byzantine style, which played a prominent role in representing the state after Serbia achieved its independence. Moreover, despite efforts to develop a distinct Yugoslav architectural style in the interwar period, the Serbo-Byzantine style was still in use, particularly in Orthodox sacral architecture. For example, even in texts that indicate the Yugoslav character of Belgrade, there was an idea of using “old Serbian architecture”²³⁶. However, attempts were made to incorporate Neo-Byzantine elements into Yugoslav architecture, but imposing the Serbian national style as the Yugoslav style while disregarding the architectural traditions of other regions attracted criticism.

While creating a national style based on revival architecture was common in many European countries, the Croatian and Slovenian cases demonstrate a different trend. Firstly, amidst the dominance of imported revival styles from Vienna, modernist tendencies emerged as a distinct national alternative in architecture. Secondly, as Tanja Damljanovic Conley highlights, it was not architectural styles but the figures of individual architects, seen as the “fathers” of national architecture, that played a pivotal role in shaping architectural identity, such as Viktor Kovačić in Croatia and Jože Plečnik in Slovenia²³⁷.

Another difficulty in creating the Yugoslav style was the divergence in understanding the essence of Yugoslavism. “Integral Yugoslavism” presupposed a denial of differences between “tribes” (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) and total integration into a single nation²³⁸. However, not only nationalistic ideologies opposed integral Yugoslavism but also another understanding of Yugoslavism – realist. “Realist Yugoslavism” offered a multicultural model

²³⁵ Aleksandar Ignjatović, “Između žezla i ključa - nacionalni identitet i arhitektonsko nasleđe Beograda i Srbije u XIX i prvoj polovini XX veka,” *Nasleđe* 9 (2008): 61.

²³⁶ Jovan Radenković, “Novi Beograd i narodno neimarstvo,” *Politika*, 4.8.1928, 7.

²³⁷ Damljanovic Conley, “Conceptualizing National Architectures,” 99-100.

²³⁸ Aleksandar Ignjatović, *Jugoslovenstvo u arhitekturi 1904-1941* (Beograd: Građevinska knjiga, 2007), 34.

of national unification, which recognizes existing cultural and ethnic differences and suggests a gradual construction of national unity²³⁹.

Moreover, several possible strategies existed to create Yugoslav architecture: referring to the past, synthesizing different regional traditions, universalizing them, or looking to the future.

Referring to the past was a conventional approach to creating national architecture as it appeals to established architectural traditions. Nevertheless, this method proved challenging to implement within Yugoslav architecture. A possible way to adopt this model was to use traditions of vernacular architecture, which reflected a shared historical heritage and common past. The vernacular architecture was deemed the most common for all territories, less foreign-influenced, unchangeable, and therefore the most authentic²⁴⁰. For example, Branislav Kojić noted that Balkan vernacular architecture did not have religious or national connotations, only territorial²⁴¹. The idea of referencing folk construction traditions formed the basis for an architectural direction known as folklorism²⁴². Nevertheless, folklorism was found to be limited in its suitability for representative purposes due to its lack of monumental elements, and it was rarely used in public buildings. As a result, it was primarily popular in residential architecture.

The second strategy (to synthesize) was substantially similar to the first because it implied using architectural traditions. Moreover, instead of searching for common patterns, it was supposed to synthesize particular historical architectural features of different regions. Thus, in the framework of this strategy, architects created hybrid variants of historical revival styles that combined features of Byzantine, Romanesque, and sometimes Oriental (Islamic)

²³⁹ Ibid., 137.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 180, 187.

²⁴¹ Branislav Kojić, "O Balkanskoj profanoj arhitekturi," *Tehnički List* 1-2 (1935): 6.

²⁴² Aleksandar Deroko, "Nas nacionalni stil u arhitekturi," *Vreme*, 6.1.1941, 21. See more in Putnik, "Folklorizam u arhitekturi Beograda (1918-1950)."

architecture. Such a strategy met the requirement to represent the Yugoslav identity as a synthesis of particular traditions²⁴³. Despite appearing in design practice, most synthesizing projects have remained unimplemented because they were difficult to realize from an architectural perspective.

The third strategy implied using Neo-Classical or Neo-Renaissance styles as the most universal architectural paradigm. On the one hand, they can represent Yugoslav unity because they did not contain any regional or national connotations. On the other hand, they were representative enough to be used for public buildings and met requirements to embody the stability and prosperity of the state. Firstly, this strategy was associated with governmental architecture. Almost all buildings created during the interwar period for ministries and some other state institutions were made in the academism style. The embodiment of state strength, compliance with European political models, and Yugoslav unity were significant for governmental buildings, and academism contributed to their implementation. Despite the widespread use and royal support, this strategy was criticized as faceless and exported from foreign architectural traditions.

The fourth strategy tried to adopt modernism to meet the needs of national representation. In such a complicated case as Yugoslav, a denial of referring to the past seemed to be a fruitful strategy because different parts of different regions significantly aggravated the construction of the unit²⁴⁴. Thus, modernist architects could create architectural expressions of Yugoslav identity as highly modernized.

However, “Yugoslav architecture” was rarely mentioned in architects' publications. The primary expression was ambiguous: “our style” or “our architecture,” sometimes

²⁴³ Ignjatović, *Jugoslovenstvo u arhitekturi*, 311.

²⁴⁴ Lubodrag Dimić, *Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji - 1918-1941*. Tom I. (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 1996): 248. Aleksandar Kadijević, "Between Unitarism and Regionalisms: Architecture in Yugoslavia (1918–1941)," in *Architecture of Independence in Central Europe*, eds. Magdalena Link-Lenczowska and Łukasz Galusek (Krakow: International Cultural Centre, 2018), 248-274.

referring to local, city variants of architecture. In professional circles, there is more debate about style than about Yugoslav architecture.

One of the most intense debates on the issue of architectural styles unfolded in the context of the construction of the Church of St. Sava: in 1932 around 30 articles were published about it in two months.

Overall, style requirements played an essential role in debates about sacral buildings. At the St. Sava Temple competition in 1926, projects were supposed to be "in the spirit of old Serbian church architecture"²⁴⁵, and UJIA opposed the competition requirements and urged its members not to participate²⁴⁶. The jury awarded only one project with the second award, created by Bogdan Nestrović, and purchased 13 projects, among which were some projects "with the hallmark of Byzantine Constantinople, and not Serbian style"²⁴⁷. In the exhibition review, Milan Kašanin explained unsuccessful competition results through style restrictions of creative freedom of architects²⁴⁸, which later became commonplace in all discussions about St. Sava Temple.

Despite architects' criticism, in 1930, the Church of St. Mark also announced a competition with similar requirements: projects should follow the exact architectural model of the Gračanica monastery²⁴⁹. The winning project by the Krstić brothers²⁵⁰ was criticized as a

²⁴⁵ "Stečaj društva za podizanje hrama Sv. Savi," *Vreme*, 3.11.1926, 3. The jury included four architects: Professor Andra Stevanović from the Technical Faculty and three representatives from the Ministry of Construction: Petar Popović, Dušan Živanović, and Momir Korunović. Additionally, the jury featured Patriarch Dimitrije, the President of the Academy of Sciences Jovan Cvijić, and Professor Bogdan Popović.

²⁴⁶ "Stečaj za hram Sv. Save," *Pravda*, 6.3.1927, 4.

²⁴⁷ "Pred izložbu nagradjenih skica za hram Sv. Save," *Vreme*, 28.6.1927, 7. Bogdan Nestorović, the son of architect Nikola Nestorović, graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade and later studied at the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris. He began his career at the firm "Arhitekt" run by Milan Sekulić and Dragiša Brašovan. From 1930, he taught at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. See more in Divna Đurić-Zamolo, "Profesor arhitekta Bogdan Nestorović," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda XXII* (1975): 365–369.

²⁴⁸ Milan Kašanin, "Izložba skica za hram Svetom Savi," *Srpski Književni Glasnik* (1932): 534–536.

²⁴⁹ "Kako će izgledati novi hram Sv. Marka na nekadašnjem Starom groblju," *Vreme*, 14.9.1929, 6. The jury included three architects: Petar Popović and Dragutin Maslac from the Ministry of Construction, and Milan Minić, as well as two priests. Three participants were invited: Krstić brothers, Bogdan Nestorović, the team Aleksandar Deroko and Grigoriy Samoylov. Besides them, three other architects participated: Rajko Tatić, Aleksandar Vasić, Živko Piperski.

caricature, but the critic Djurdje Bošković blamed the competition organizers for this and proposed to turn from “imitation of dead traditions to modern ways” in sacral architecture²⁵¹. In *Život i rad*, Predrag Karalić drew attention to the danger of monotony because both churches' designs followed the Gračanica model²⁵². Nevertheless, the St. Sava Temple concept was changed. The board for the construction organized a technical section²⁵³, which created a definite project based on two projects: one by Bogdan Nestrović, whose project was awarded, and another by Aleksandar Deroko²⁵⁴, whose project was purchased. The new project was Neo-Byzantine and based on the Hagia Sophia model²⁵⁵. The announcement of this decision resulted in the most active architectural public debates in interwar Belgrade. Djurdje Bošković tried to summarise the discussion by dividing opinions into four groups²⁵⁶:

- opponents of construction;
- supporters of Serbo-Byzantine style;
- supporters of the Hagia Sophia model;
- supporters of "absolute creative freedom."

Besides stylistic aspects themselves, the discussion reflected all key topics in the architectural discourse of the period: understanding of architects' role; correspondence between façade and space layout; conflict between tradition and modernization; creation of

²⁵⁰ Petar Krstić and Branko Krstić both graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. They had a joint private practice and later both taught at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. See more in Marina Đurđević, *Arhitekti Petar i Branko Krstić* (Beograd: Republički zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture, 1996).

²⁵¹ Djurdje Bošković, "Crkva Sv. Marka u Beogradu kao karikatura Gračanice," *Srpski Književni Glasnik* XXXVI (1932): 302–304.

²⁵² Predrag Karalić, "Izložba projekata povodom konkursa za podizanje katoličke katedrale," *Život i rad* (1930): 474.

²⁵³ It included architects from the jury Dušan Živanović, Petar Popović, Momir Korunović, awarded architect Bogdan Nestorović, and two delegates from the Technical Faculty Dragutin Djordjević and Aleksandar Deroko. "Definitivna skica za Svetosavski hram," *Politika*, 18.12.1930, 7.

²⁵⁴ Aleksandar Deroko graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1926 (and also spent two semesters at the Czech Technical University in Prague). He taught Byzantine architecture at the Technical Faculty and conducted studies on vernacular architecture. See more in Zoran M. Jovanović, *Aleksandar Deroko*, (Beograd: Republički zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture: Društvo konzervatora Srbije, 1991).

²⁵⁵ Aleksandar Ignjatović supposed that besides stylistic consideration, this transformation had strong political and ideological connotations, see more in Aleksandar Ignjatović, *U srpsko-vizantijskog kaleidoskopu* (Beograd: Orion Art, 2016): 241–334.

²⁵⁶ Djurdje Bošković, "Problem Svetosavskog hrama," *Srpski Književni Glasnik* XXXV (1932): 368–371.

Yugoslav architecture; creative freedom, copyright, and decision-making in architecture.

Opponents of construction were in the minority²⁵⁷. Nikola Dobrović claimed that architects were social benefactors; their patriotic duty was to contribute to social housing, not to construct monumental churches²⁵⁸. He proposed a memorial St. Sava building for educational institutions and smaller local churches as a compromise. Other discussion participants agreed that St. Sava Temple was essential to construct, and most architects proposed a new competition with creative freedom, an international or only Yugoslav one. Aleksander Deroko, the only technical section member who participated in the debates, justified the initial selection procedure. According to him, the public campaign resulted from architects' desire to get this job and modernists' desire to propagandize their views²⁵⁹.

In the discussion on the choice between the Gračanica and Hagia Sophia models, architects put the question of façade/space organization at the forefront: Gračanica provided an expressive façade, whereas Hagia Sophia provided better space organization, which could be more suitable for the monumental temple. However, there was also a question of whether the Hagia Sophia model could be appropriate from the point of view of the national style. For example, Djurdje Bošković emphasized that Hagia Sophia was 'foreign for us by type, by spirit, by overall psychological conception' and not an Orthodox church²⁶⁰. The national question was also sensitive because St. Sava Temple also had to serve as a kind of Yugoslav Pantheon; thus, Kosta Strajnić and Ivan Meštrović opposed the following of these models and

²⁵⁷ Besides Nikola Dobrović, Zarija Marković claimed that the Temple was too expensive and better to spend on educational and humanitarian needs. "Sinoćno rešavanje u Udruženju arhitekta o podizanju Hrama Svetog Save," *Pravda*, 6.2.1932, 2. Probably, there was also an idea to construct a hospital complex with a small church for St. Sava inside, against which was archpriest Milivoj M. Petrović. "O hramu Sv. Save," *Pravda*, 18.2.1932, 2.

²⁵⁸ "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Svetoga Save," *Vreme*, 31.1.1932, 2. Nikola Dobrović began studying architecture at the Royal Joseph Polytechnic University in Budapest and graduated from the Czech Technical University in Prague in 1923. He started his career in Prague and, by 1934, was running a private practice in Dubrovnik. He participated in architectural competitions and actively promoted modernist architecture in the press. See more in Aleksandar Kadijević, "Delo koje ne zastareva - 125 godina od rođenja arhitekta Nikole Dobrovića (1897-2022)," *Nasleđe* 23 (2022): 147-157.

²⁵⁹ Aleksandar Deroko, "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Svetoga Save," *Vreme*, 10.2.1932, 2.

²⁶⁰ Djurdje Bošković, "Problem Svetosavskog hrama," *Srpski Književni Glasnik XXXV* (1932): 370.

proposed the creation of a Yugoslav architectural form based on modernist tendencies²⁶¹. Among Serbian architects, the only one who believed in the Temple as Yugoslav was Persida Tričković, who described it as a place where 'every citizen of mighty Yugoslavia could pray with equal piety, regardless of his faith or ethnicity'²⁶².

While discussion participants from the Church and the Board representatives supported the Serbo-Byzantine style requirements, justifying them, among other reasons, by the people's adherence to traditions, architects emphasized the progressive character of St. Sava activities to support their attitudes toward creative freedom and originality²⁶³. Although the idea that architecture should represent its time was commonplace in architects' texts, only one, Jan Dubovy, proposed openly modern forms²⁶⁴. Other Serbian architects opposed this idea because modernist universal forms seemed inappropriate for such a significant task²⁶⁵. Milutin Borisavljević used an example of competition for the Catholic Cathedral in 1930, where "the first awarded project resembles a movie theatre"²⁶⁶.

The Belgrade Catholic Cathedral was considered a 'rival' to St. Sava Temple, and some construction board members feared that Catholics would build their cathedral earlier²⁶⁷. One of them, Petar J. Odavić, in 1928, opened a debate in *Pravda* about the Catholic cathedral construction, claiming that "if we cannot prevent Catholics from erecting such a large catholic church here in Belgrade, we can stop them from building it in Gothic style"²⁶⁸. As a result, the competition was announced in 1930 with the remark that "the competition completely

²⁶¹ Kosta Strajnić, "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Svetoga Save," *Vreme*, 26.1.1932, 2; Ivan Meštrović, "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Svetoga Save," *Vreme*, 27.1.1932, 2.

²⁶² Persida Tričković, "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Svetoga Save," *Vreme*, 1.2.1932, 2.

²⁶³ "Kako treba da izgleda budući hram Sv. Save. Interesantna diskusija u Klubu arhitekta," *Vreme*, 30.1.1932, 2. Architects and art critics were especially against copying historical models. "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Sv. Save," *Vreme*, 8.2.1932, 4.

²⁶⁴ "Kako bi morao izgledati spomen-hram Svetog Save," *Vreme*, 19.1.1932, 6.

²⁶⁵ Aleksandar Deroko, "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Svetoga Save," *Vreme*, 10.2.1932, 2.

²⁶⁶ Milutin Borisavljević, "Kako treba da izgleda budući monumentalni hram Svetoga Save," *Vreme*, 21.1.1932, 2.

²⁶⁷ For example, "Akcija za podizanje hrama Sv. Save," *Pravda*, 13.2.1925, 9.

²⁶⁸ Petar J. Odavić, "Katolička katedrala u Beogradu," *Pravda*, 6.3.1928, 5

excluded the Gothic style"²⁶⁹. The competition was international; among 129 projects, around 90% were modernist. The jury awarded three projects, not radical modernist designs, but even they were a novelty for a sacral building in Belgrade²⁷⁰. The first awarded project by German architect Josef Wentzler was accepted for realization. *Glasnik Katoličke Crkve u Beogradu* published an article that justified the decision. Agreeing that the project is unusual and "does not appear to have anything beautiful at first glance," the author emphasized its monumental forms, practical space organization, and the new way modern architecture represented God²⁷¹. Moreover, other catholic churches built in the 1930s in Belgrade also presented moderate modernist designs²⁷².

1.4. Unrealizable Architectural Ideas

Most of the projects discussed in the dissertation were potentially feasible, though they remained unrealized. However, some projects and ideas can be identified as being initially unrealizable. In general, the genre of "paper architecture," projects created without the intention of actual construction, was rare among Yugoslav architects during the interwar period. Such projects were either student exercises or bold, mostly urbanistic ideas displayed in exhibitions or published in the press to draw attention to specific issues.

Sometimes, architects also proposed more realizable projects on their initiative, but in these cases, the main barrier to their realization was their creation without the support of actors who could not only finance the construction but also organize it. Unlike many other art forms, architecture relies on the figure of the client, who is essential for bringing architectural ideas into material existence. Without this support, even viable projects remain unbuilt, existing only as paper architecture or general concepts that never develop into concrete

²⁶⁹ "Konkurs za katoličku katedralu u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 16.11.1929, 7

²⁷⁰ "Izložba projekata za Beogradsku katoličku katedralu," *Politika*, 5.5.1930, 6.

²⁷¹ "Naša Katedrala," *Glasnik Katoličke Crkve u Beogradu* 6 (1930): 3.

²⁷² See more in Đurđija Borovnjak, *Verski objekti u Beogradu: projekti i ostvarenja u dokumentima Istorijiskog arhiva Beograda*, (Beograd: Istorijski arhiv Beograda, 2013), 54-64.

architectural designs. Nevertheless, only a small portion of the projects initiated by architects were technically unfeasible.

Additionally, some large-scale projects proposed by architect-entrepreneurs, which appeared financially viable at first glance, were ultimately unrealizable due to legal limitations, such as height restrictions and the lack of condominium ownership laws. Moreover, several housing-related projects, especially those concerning social housing, were politically undesirable under the socio-political climate of royal Yugoslavia.

For example, some projects proposed by architects had potential funding but lacked institutional support. In early 1931, Stevan Savić, an architect-entrepreneur from Chicago, proposed his solutions for two major problems facing Zagreb: constructing both a multifunctional skyscraper, which would include the City Hall, on the Foundation Block (Fig. 4), and the Foundation hospital²⁷³. Moreover, Savić assured the Zagreb municipality that he could secure a substantial loan of 10,000,000 dollars from an American bank, which would be sufficient not only for these two projects but also for addressing other significant municipal issues²⁷⁴. However, the Zagreb municipality did not find Savić's plan reliable²⁷⁵. After he failed in Zagreb, Savić turned his attention to Belgrade²⁷⁶.

²⁷³ "Izgradnja prostora Zakladne bolnice na Jelačićevom trgu," *Novosti*, 4.3.1931, 3.

²⁷⁴ "Zagrebački opštinski dom na dvadeset spratova," *Politika*, 17.5.1931, 5.

²⁷⁵ "Gradsko zastupstvo odlučuje o izgranji bloka Zakladne bolnice," *Novosti*, 29.5.1931, 6.

²⁷⁶ During this period, Savić also proposed his projects and investment loans in Osijek and Banja Luka. "Investicioni zajam Banja Luke," *Vreme*, 29.4.1931, 5; "Zagrebački opštinski dom na dvadeset spratova," *Politika*, 17.5.1931, 5.




Figure 4. Project for the Foundation block in Zagreb, Stevan Savić, 1931

Source: "Zagrebački opštinski dom na dvadeset spratova," *Politika*, 17.5.1931, 5.

In Belgrade, Savić proposed the construction of a 25-story skyscraper using the same potential funds he had initially offered to Zagreb²⁷⁷ (Fig. 5). Savić created this project for the kafana "Albania" site. After the Mortgage Bank of the Trade Fund purchased the site in 1936, Savić proposed it again directly to the new owner, who chose to organize a competition instead²⁷⁸.

The idea of a skyscraper in this location had already emerged among Belgrade architects in the early 1930s. For example, Branislav Kojić published *A Sketch for a Skyscraper in Belgrade* in the first issue of the journal *Arhitektura* in 1931, which was created at the request of a private investor who was planning to purchase the plot²⁷⁹ (Fig. 5). After the kafana "Albania" was demolished in 1936, the newspaper *Vreme* sought input from several architects, including Branislav Kojić, on the best way to develop the site. The interviewed architects supported the construction of a tall concrete, steel, and glass building and recommended that the design be selected through a competition²⁸⁰. While Belgrade architects

²⁷⁷ "Da li će Beograd uskoro dobiti oblakoder na 25 spratova," *Politika*, 31.5.1931, 5.

²⁷⁸ "Zemlište „Albanije“ prodato za zidanje oblakodera," *Politika*, 28.11.1936, 9. "Amerika na Terazijama, oblakoder kojim jedan Jugoslaven hoće da ukrasi Beograd," *Politika*, 29.11.1936, 14.

²⁷⁹ "Skica za oblakoder u Beogradu," *Arhitektura* 1 (1931): 21; "Na mestu srušene Albanije nova kafana sa staklenim zidovima," *Vreme*, 24.10.1936, 11.

²⁸⁰ Opinions of Milan Zloković, Svetomir Lazić, Branislav Kojić and Mihajlo Radovanović were published. Moreover, Kojić and Zloković advocated a local competition among Belgrade architects only. "Umesto srušene

endorsed the idea of a skyscraper, *Vreme* also published an alternative idea of building a monument to Karađorđe instead²⁸¹ and an interview with the German urban planner Hermann Janzen, who warned against constructing a skyscraper on this site²⁸². Nevertheless, beyond differing opinions and financial hurdles, another significant challenge to building a skyscraper on this site was legal, as the Construction Rulebook for Belgrade imposed general height restrictions, thus limiting the possibility of such a project²⁸³.




Figure 5. Projects for a skyscraper for the kafana “Albania” plot in Belgrade: Stevan Savić, 1931; Branislav Kojić, 1931; Milorad Pantović and Vladeta Maksimović, 1934.

Source: "Amerika na Terazijama, oblakoder kojim jedan Jugoslaven hoće da ukraši Beograd," *Politika*, 29.11.1936, 14; "Skica za oblakoder u Beogradu," *Arhitektura* 1 (1931): 21; "I Beograd bi mogao da dobije jedan oblakoder," *Vreme*, 2.11.1936, 6.

In the discussion surrounding the future of the site, *Vreme* also published an earlier bold idea that did not limit the skyscraper to the kafana “Albania” plot but proposed constructing a massive building across the entire block²⁸⁴ (Fig. 5). This project, designed by Milorad Pantović and Vladeta Maksimović, was for an enormous multifunctional skyscraper,

„Albanije“," *Vreme*, 21.10.1936, 11; "Na mestu srušene Albanije nova kafana sa staklenim zidovima," *Vreme*, 24.10.1936, 11; "Šta treba podići na mestu „Albanije“," *Vreme*, 25.10.1936, 9.

²⁸¹ "Na mestu „Albanije“ treba podići spomenik Karađordju," *Vreme*, 14.11.1936.

²⁸² "Najčuveniji nemački urbanista g. Janzen tvrdi da ne treba graditi oblakoder na mestu „Albanije“," *Vreme*, 11.11.1936, 11.

²⁸³ "Novi pravilnik neće dozvoliti da Beograd postane oblakoderska varoš," *Vreme*, 21.12.1934, 8.

²⁸⁴ "I Beograd bi mogao da dobije jedan oblakoder," *Vreme*, 2.11.1936, 6.

characterized by its dynamic form and extensive use of glass²⁸⁵. A journalist from *Vreme* labeled it unrealizable due to "the old prejudices of property owners" and pointed to practical difficulties in regulating property ownership: building such a unified structure on a block with multiple owners would require creating a separate joint-stock company²⁸⁶. Moreover, the project envisioned not only a hyper-modern skyscraper with elevators, a ventilation system, and an artificial forest on the roof (intended as camouflage in case of air attacks and as a recreational space) but also a massive underground garage and even a station, connected by a tunnel to the Pančevo Bridge²⁸⁷. Thus, the project was technologically unfeasible. From this perspective, the project could not be taken seriously, though one article humorously included the subtitle, "*This is not April Fools' Day*"²⁸⁸.

Milorad Pantović and Vladeta Maksimović were students at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade when this project was created. Student projects were classic examples of "paper architecture" as exercises not intended for realization. Yet, through exhibitions of student work, frequently covered in the press, these projects garnered attention and sparked public debate, especially during the 1930s. In the 1920s, student final assignments were detached from the urban environment, focusing on abstract, stand-alone buildings. Later, the approach shifted, and students were encouraged to propose solutions for key urban problem areas in Belgrade, such as Terazije Terrace or Theater Square (these locations were subjects of debates and numerous unrealized projects, discussed in subsequent chapters).

²⁸⁵ "Da li će se na Terazijama, umesto „Arbanije“ i okolnih zgrada, podići oblakoder," *Pravda*, 3.3.1934, 17. Milorad Pantović and Vladeta Maksimović both graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1934. Vladeta Maksimović engaged in private practice from 1935 to 1941. Milorad Pantović continued his education at the Technical University in Berlin, then worked with Le Corbusier in Paris, later he studied under Amédée Ozenfant in London and New York, and returned to Belgrade in 1939. See more about his career in Zoran Manević, *Pantović*, (Beograd: Savez arhitekata Srbije; Društvo arhitekata Beograda, 1985).

²⁸⁶ "Oblakoder umesto „Albanije“," *Vreme*, 18.2.1934, 7.

²⁸⁷ "Da li će se na Terazijama, umesto „Arbanije“ i okolnih zgrada, podići oblakoder," *Pravda*, 3.3.1934, 17.

²⁸⁸ "Oblakoder umesto Albanije," *Vreme*, 18.2.1934, 7.

Pantović's diploma project also attracted the attention of the press, not only being mentioned in articles about the student exhibition²⁸⁹ but also receiving a dedicated publication in the newspaper *Politika*. The article, titled "*Cultural Center in Iron and Glass for the Belgrade of the Future*," described a massive building that combined a theater, exhibition space, cinema, library, and bathhouse²⁹⁰ (Fig. 6). This project was proposed for the Manjež Park, a location where the 1923 Master Plan had initially designated an Opera house. Pantović explained that his project aimed to serve the needs of the "common man" (civil servants and workers), which had largely been overlooked in the city's development²⁹¹. His design featured a metal frame, glass walls, sliding panels, and many mechanisms. Yet, both Pantović and journalists noted that the enormous financial cost was the main challenge to the realization²⁹². Pantović believed that state or municipal bodies could take an interest in the project, but since it was unlikely to be funded through public budgets, he suggested the involvement of private patrons²⁹³.




Figure 6. *The project for a Cultural Center in Belgrade, Milorad Pantović, 1935.*
Source: "Dom kulture u gvoždju i staklu za Beograd budućnosti," *Politika*, 6.5.1935, 8.

²⁸⁹ "Kako će zidati naši najmladji arhitekti," *Politika*, 22.4.1935, 9; "Izložba diplomskih radova," *Vreme*, 23.4.1935, 10.

²⁹⁰ "Dom kulture u gvoždju i staklu za Beograd budućnosti," *Politika*, 6.5.1935, 8.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² "Izložba diplomskih radova," *Vreme*, 23.4.1935, 10.

²⁹³ "Dom kulture u gvoždju i staklu za Beograd budućnosti," *Politika*, 6.5.1935, 8.

Exhibitions played a key role in attracting attention to architectural projects, including those that could not be realized. In addition to student exhibitions, these could include specially organized exhibitions, as Dragan Petrik's exhibition, but also architects could also use exhibitions of competition projects in this way. Architects could submit projects that were not according to competition programs, including projects known to be unfeasible. This type of participation in architectural competitions can be called "performative submission." In such cases, the architect's goal was not to implement the project but either to draw attention to ideas and thus influence the development of architecture or even society, but also to its author in order to receive other private orders. For example, Pantović gained recognition in Belgrade's architectural competitions with projects that did not strictly adhere to the programs but presented bolder solutions, for instance, in the Belgrade Fair and the Opera House competitions²⁹⁴.

Pantović's most radical proposal came in the form of an urban reconstruction plan for Belgrade, designed in 1940 at the request of the Belgrade Tourist Association for an exhibition scheduled for the spring of 1941²⁹⁵. This project reflected ideas in the spirit of Le Corbusier, with whom Pantović had interned, incorporating radical modernist interventions into the cityscape (with only a few historical buildings to be preserved) and employing functional zone planning²⁹⁶. This project was never publicly displayed, but earlier, Pantović expressed his urbanistic ideas in the article "*Are the Existing Urban Systems Negative?*" in the journal *Savremena opština*, in the context of the 1937 competition for the Novi Sad regulatory plan²⁹⁷. His proposal was evaluated outside the competition because it did not

²⁹⁴ "Beogradsko sajmište prema idejnoj skici Popovića," *Vreme*, 18.4.1936, 10; Ivan Zdravković, "Ishod konkursa za Beogradsku operu," *Umetnički Pregled* 4-5 (1940): 147.

²⁹⁵ Ljiljana Blagojević, "Moderna arhitektura Beograda u osvit Drugog svetskog rata - sajam, stadion, logor," u *Istorija umetnosti u Srbiji XX vek: realizmi i modernizmi oko hladnog rata*, ur. Miško Šuvaković (Beograd: Orion Art, 2012), 119.

²⁹⁶ Manević, *Pantović*.

²⁹⁷ Milorad Pantović, "Jesu li dosadošnji urbanski sistemi negativni," *Savremena opština* 10-12 (1937): 253, 260.

adhere to the program, featured bold ideas, and lacked practical applicability²⁹⁸. For example, his approach to collective housing was characterized as "a precursor of an era that is still distant from us"²⁹⁹.

Juraj Neidhardt, another Yugoslav architect who had worked in Le Corbusier's office, held exhibitions of his projects in Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade, and Ljubljana in 1936 and 1937³⁰⁰. Besides specific projects, Neidhardt showcased broader urban planning ideas aimed at solving the problems that "the man of present and future" faced, including types of apartment buildings and districts with their free arrangement within parks³⁰¹. At the exhibition's opening in Belgrade, architect Milan Zloković called his ideas "architectural crystals"³⁰².

Proactive initiatives marked Neidhardt's career. In the mid-1930s, he focused on sharing his bold urban planning concepts with the broader public, proposing ideas that included solutions to housing problems. However, in the late 1920s, he presented his proposal to relevant authorities, for example, in the case of his project for Ban Jelačić Square that sought to preserve and integrate old buildings slated for demolition into modern architecture³⁰³ (Fig. A.3). A similar idea was reflected in Neidhardt's entry for the Foundation block competition, where he combined an old chapel with a large round building³⁰⁴ (Fig. A.3).

²⁹⁸ Drag. M. Popović, "Konkurs za regulacioni plan Novog Sada," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine* 7-8 (1937): 490, 493.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Juraj Neidhardt graduated from Peter Behrens' class at the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts in 1924. At the beginning of his career, he worked in Zagreb (in the studios of Rudolf Lubynski and Lav Kalda) and in Vienna (with Peter Behrens and Ernst Lichtblau). In the early 1930s, he worked in Behrens' office in Berlin and in Le Corbusier's bureau in Paris. In the latter half of the 1930s, he worked in several cities across Yugoslavia (Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade). See more about his career in Jelica Karlić-Kapetanović, *Juraj Najdhardt: život i djelo* (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990).

³⁰¹ Dušan Grabrijan, "Osvrt na arhitektonsku izložbu arh. J. Neidhardta," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 1 (1937): 5.

³⁰² "Arhitekta Najdhardt, djak Le Korbizijea, izlaže svoje projekte u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 29.6.1937, 10.

³⁰³ "Nestaje staroga Zagreba," *Novosti*, 3.7.1929.

³⁰⁴ "Futurističke osnove," *Svijet* 4, knj. 9 (1930): 88.

Moreover, this design diverged significantly from other submissions and failed to meet the competition criteria, resulting in no award being given for the project³⁰⁵.

Participating in the same competition, architect Zdenko Strižić, who received one of the awards, also presented in the press an additional project: a proposal for the redevelopment of the initial section of Ilica³⁰⁶ (Fig. 7). His plan involved widening the street and demolishing the existing buildings on the northern side, replacing them with modern blocks composed of two groups of varying heights. This arrangement aimed to create distinct urbanistic effects and served different purposes, with taller residential blocks integrated into a lower commercial section. Another participant in the Foundation Block competition, Josip Pičman, similarly offered an additional urbanistic idea to ease traffic on Ilica by cutting through an extra street³⁰⁷.




Figure 7. Proposal for Ilica street in Zagreb, Zdenko Strižić, 1930.

Source: "Izgradnja Ilice: od Mesničle do Duge ulice," *Jutarnji List*, 26.4.1931, 6.

Visionary projects and independent initiatives by architects were often tied to tasks far broader than designing individual buildings. Architects frequently proposed solutions for determining optimal locations for public buildings and for larger urban planning endeavors. Urbanistic projects, even when initiated by municipal authorities, were seldom fully realized

³⁰⁵ Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok," 326, 329.

³⁰⁶ "Izgradnja Ilice: od Mesničle do Duge ulice," *Jutarnji List*, 26.4.1931, 6.

³⁰⁷ "Praktičan predlog za rasterećenje Ilice," *Novosti*, 18.1.1930, 6.

due to their complexity, as they required the coordination of multiple interests and demanded financial and administrative resources that often exceeded what municipalities could provide. Architects' independent initiatives, especially those offering bold and radical solutions, were less likely to materialize. These initiatives were primarily intended to capture public attention and spark dialogue, both within the professional community and with government representatives.

The most challenging area where architects' initiatives encountered not only a lack of funding and institutional capacities but also legal restrictions and the political undesirability of their projects was the field of housing, particularly social housing and projects involving collective solutions. For example, in Belgrade, a group of enthusiasts, which included not only architects and engineers but also lawyers, founded the *Institute for Housing Culture* in 1937³⁰⁸, which also hosted Juraj Neidhardt's exhibition. The institute's opening exhibition showcased various affordable housing options, intending to show how innovative architectural and construction approaches could address the housing crisis with minimal resources³⁰⁹. Most of the proposed solutions involved the construction of standardized homes on a collective basis (Fig. A.4). Legal support was necessary to enable the development of joint residential buildings, as both the Construction Law and the lack of the condominium ownership law presented significant obstacles³¹⁰.

However, not only idealistically minded young professionals engaged in such projects. In Zagreb, for instance, the Purchasing Cooperative Merkur (*nabavljačka zadruga "Merkur"*) aimed to create a separate cooperative for constructing affordable houses based on condominium ownership³¹¹. The primary challenge was the absence of a proper legal

³⁰⁸ "Sutra pre podne otvara se izložba Instituta za stanbenu kulturu," *Pravda*, 6.6.1937, 7

³⁰⁹ "Sutra se otvara izložba Instituta za stanbenu kulturu," *Vreme*, 5.6.1937, 11.

³¹⁰ "U Beogradu je osnovan Institut za stanbenu kulturu," *Pravda*, 1.6.1937, 12

³¹¹ "Merkur će povesti akciju za gradnju kuća na temelju etažne svojine," *Večer*, 2.8.1939, 3.

framework despite many discussions advocating for the introduction of condominium ownership³¹². Although the Ministry of Justice began considering the issue³¹³, no special law was developed before World War II. In Zagreb, one of the key proponents of condominium ownership was Mayor Teodor Pejčić (1937-1939)³¹⁴, and after the formation of the Banovina of Croatia, the municipality pushed for the adoption of a decree on condominium ownership by the Banovina's government in order not to wait for the issue to be resolved at the central government level³¹⁵.

Nevertheless, there was a way to bypass the lack of a law on condominium ownership by using the Law on Commercial Cooperatives (*Zakon o privrednim zadrugama*), passed in 1937³¹⁶, to create construction cooperatives. While some legal experts cautioned that this method left many legal questions unresolved³¹⁷, projects for such construction began to emerge. The most ambitious was the idea of the First Belgrade Cooperative "Condominium ownership" (*Prva Beogradska Zadruga „Etažna Svojina“*) to construct a massive residential complex valued at 60 million dinars between Kolarčeva and Dečanska streets, including a 16-story skyscraper, which they hoped would be approved despite height restrictions³¹⁸ (Fig. A.5). The project was initiated by Boris Oshmyansky, an architect-entrepreneur of Russian émigré descent from France, who pointed to the potential financing from a French financial group³¹⁹. Among the cooperative's founders were the landowner Dušan Kuzmanović and the architect Georgy Kovalevsky, a municipal official in charge of urban planning, which

³¹² Several dozen such articles appeared in the press in the late 1930s, for example, "Da oživi gradjevna djelatnost u Zagrebu, treba nam zakon o etažnom vlasništvu," *Večer*, 23.3.1939, 5; "Klub arhitekata zalaže se za etažnu svojinu," *Pravda*, 1.2.1936, 8; "Pitanje izgradnje Beograda i etažne svojini," *Politika*, 17.12.1940.

³¹³ "Ministarstvo pravde prisupiče proučavanju pitanja etažne svojine," *Politika*, 7.2.1938, 6.

³¹⁴ "Pitanje etažne svojine," *Politika*, 16.2.1938, 6.

³¹⁵ "Gradska općina za etažano vlasništvo," *Večer*, 23.11.1940, 2.

³¹⁶ *Zakon o privrednim zadrugama* (Beograd Zadruga štamparija, 1937).

³¹⁷ Vojislav B. Lukić, "Zablude o etažnoj svojini. Za čist etažni protiv kooperativnog sistema," *Branič*, 1.2.1939, 69-72.

³¹⁸ "Uskoro treba da otpočne gradjenje prve palate sa etažnom svojinom," *Politika*, 28.8.1938, 14.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

increased the chances of the project's success. However, by the end of 1940, this cooperative was liquidated and ceased operations, never having started construction³²⁰.

Less ambitious projects by the similar Savings-construction cooperative "Own House" (*Štedno-gradjevinska zadruga "Svoj dom"*) were more successful³²¹, but even their skyscraper project failed (Fig. A.5). The skyscraper was planned for the site of the Hotel "Macedonia" on Kraljev Square (now *Studentski trg*). To implement this skyscraper called "Macedonia," "*Svoj dom*" sought advice from the Bulgarian National Union of Savings-Construction Cooperatives³²², as this construction method was more advanced and common in Bulgaria. The building's design was developed under the guidance of Bulgarian construction expert Stefan Bakalov by a team of Bulgarian and Yugoslav architects³²³. Although several apartments in the skyscraper had already been sold, construction never began due to funding challenges for such a large-scale project and difficulties obtaining approval for the skyscraper's construction.

The ideas of collective construction faced not only the underdevelopment of the legal framework but also distrust from the authorities. It was part of a broader reluctance to acknowledge architects' attempts to address social issues and view architecture as a means of solving them³²⁴. Although architects actively participated in discussions about social housing issues, many of their ideas about how architecture could contribute to housing remained speculative and often did not even materialize into specific architectural designs.

Moreover, the press frequently featured projects that offered solutions to housing issues, such as those proposed by Dragan Petrik, which ranged from small apartment

³²⁰ "Likvidacija Prve Beogradske Zadruga „Etažna Svojina“,“ *Vreme*, 27.12.1940, 6

³²¹ "U Beogradu je već praktično ostvarena etažna svojina," *Politika*, 27.10.1938, 10; "Udruživanjem u stanbeno zadrugarstvo svaki građanin može doći do sopstvenog doma," *Vreme*, 24.10.1940, 6.

³²² "Po principu etažne svojine kod Universitetskog parka zida se oblakoder sa trinaest spratova," *Politika*, 18.12.1938, 8.

³²³ "Oblakoder zadruga „Makedonija“,“ *Vreme*, 24.3.1939, 6.

³²⁴ Dragomir Tadić, "Socialjna uloga savremene arhitekture," *Javnost* 4 (1935): 78-80.

complexes and residential blocks based on condominium ownership to a skyscraper on the site of the Belgrade Fortress³²⁵. The radical nature of the skyscraper proposal could have drawn attention to his more moderate and realistic ideas. The exhibition of his works, organized at the Hygienic Institute in 1936, was primarily aimed at professionals involved in housing issues and attracting the attention of the authorities, thus increasing the chances of these ideas being implemented³²⁶. Although this did not happen in royal Yugoslavia, many of the ideas presented in Dragan Petrik's or Juraj Neidhardt's projects (Fig. 8) would later be realized in socialist Yugoslavia.




Figure 8. Proposals for residential blocks: Dragan Petrik; Juraj Neidhardt
Source: "Pitanje etažne svojine," *Politika*, 16.2.1938, 6; Dušan Grabrijan, "Osvrt na arhitektonsku izložbu arh. J. Neidhardta," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 1 (1937): 5.

³²⁵ "Kako jedan čovek zamišlja moderni Beograd," *Vreme*, 31.3.1936, 8.

³²⁶ "Gde će biti budući centar Beograda," *Politika*, 12.3.1936, 8.

Chapter 2. Decision-making, Administrative Dysfunctionality, and Administrative Buildings

“This is how it was supposed to be” (*Ovako je trebalo da bude*) – so reads the headline of an article published in *Vreme* on September 10, 1937³²⁷. The article outlined a plan for a public buildings complex on the former Old Cemetery, also known as Tašmajdan. Georgy Kovalevsky, the author of the 1923 Master Plan and a municipal urban planner, also created this project. The original plan (Fig. 9), as a part of the Master Plan, envisioned the construction of City Hall (21), several ministerial buildings (for the Ministry of Internal Affairs (3), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4), the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs (14)), and the Palace of Justice with the Ministry of Justice (13, 18), as well as the Academy of Fine Arts (36), the Church of St. Mark (41), and the Zoo (66).

Throughout the 1920s, some projects were delayed due to low priority, others lacked funding, and some could not be executed as planned because of land disputes. Furthermore, implementing the entire complex or its parts required collaboration between various stakeholders, including the Ministry of Construction and the municipality. Discrepancies between the original vision and the reality on the ground led to revisions in the plan.

Kovalevsky's updated plan (Fig. 9) for the complex reflected these changes, notably including public buildings that were either completed or under construction by 1937 (the Church of St. Mark (1), the Main Post Office and Postal Savings Bank (2), the Fire Station (10), and the First Women's Gymnasium (13))³²⁸. Despite the challenges, the updated plan retained a cluster of administrative buildings, with two already proposed in the previous plan – City Hall (5) and the Palace of Justice (6), now joined by the State Mortgage Bank (4) and the City Administration (7). Thus, the 1937 project proposed an expanded use of Tašmajdan.

³²⁷ "Ovako trebalo da bude," *Vreme*, 10.9.1937, 5.

³²⁸ The project did not include some existing buildings and envisioned their demolition, such as residential buildings along the boulevard and the Russian Church (it should be rebuilt in a different location).

While the 1936 regulatory plan for Tašmajdan envisioned only a new complex of three administrative buildings³²⁹, this plan also included the City Administration and public projects such as the Academy of Sciences (3) and the Professorial Association building (8). Moreover, in another part of the complex, it was planned to build a Protestant church (15), a Russian church (14), the YMCA building (16), and the Ministry of Construction (17). Consequently, as the availability of central plots for public buildings dwindled, the municipality increasingly redirected such projects to Tašmajdan, which provided more space.



Figure 9. Plans for the Tašmajdan complex in Belgrade: the 1923 Master Plan; the 1937 proposal.

Source: Jovan Obradović, Generalni regulacioni plan za grad Beograd, 1924, Digital National Library of Serbia; "Ovako trebalo da bude," *Vreme*, 10.9.1937, 5.

However, the contrast between the planned and actual state was evident already in 1937 – the newspaper published beside the plan a photograph titled "And what it looks like today" ("A ovako je danas"), showing the entrance to the former quarries with the alone church building. On the whole, from the entire complex, only those buildings that were already under construction by 1937 were completed, and none were built according to the Master Plan (even the Church of St. Mark, present in both projects, was built in a slightly different location).

³²⁹ Regulatory plan for Tašmajdan, 1936, KO-1496, Tehnička dokumentacija, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda.

While some projects remained unrealized even after the selection of specific architectural designs, several ideas about the necessity of construction stalled during the preliminary stages of deciding how and where to build them – as in the case of the City Hall and the Palace of Justice in this example, despite active discussions about their construction during the interwar period. Similarly, in Zagreb, many public building projects encountered decision-making hurdles, including also the construction of the City Hall and the Palace of Justice.

The architectural process can be considered as a series of decision-making acts: first, determining what needs to be built, how to fund the construction, and where to locate it; second, selecting a specific architectural design; and third, addressing coordination challenges during the execution of the chosen project. If a project was stalled in its early stages, the barriers to its realization likely stemmed from the decision-making process. This chapter analyzes the implementation of architectural projects through the lens of the decision-making challenges, faced by public authorities. The primary focus is on administrative buildings, whose construction history clearly illustrates the intersection of administrative and architectural considerations. However, to better understand the decision-making process and the role of different factors, other public building projects, where government or municipal bodies were also key actors, are examined for comparison.

Decision-making in conditions of limited resources, whether financial, land-related, or administrative, complicated the realization of projects in any architectural process. In various cases, not only in interwar Yugoslavia, public projects were left unrealized due to decisions deeming them low-priority, budgetary shortfalls, or land shortages. Thus, the sequence of decisions necessary to see a building constructed and the challenges faced along the way will generally be similar across cases. Moreover, the success of a project's implementation also depended on how these decisions were made: which bodies were involved, what procedures

were followed, and how competencies and cooperation were distributed among authorities. From this perspective, decision-making in the architectural process will be examined in light of the administrative features of the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia.

2.1. Administrative Dysfunctionality and Political Instability

The decision-making process in interwar Yugoslavia was significantly impeded by politico-administrative challenges, particularly political instability and administrative dysfunction, which were closely interlinked. Fueled by conflicting interests, political instability complicated the establishment and functioning of an effective administrative system. In turn, dysfunction within the administrative apparatus further disrupted the political process.

Dejan Djokić highlights that, beyond the national question and the Serb-Croat conflict, political life in interwar Yugoslavia was marked by intense power struggles, both interparty and intraparty³³⁰. These conflicts, interethnic and intraethnic (notably Serb-Serb), undermined efforts to establish a stable administrative structure. Interparty rivalries significantly hindered the unification of legislation, as the parliament in the 1920s often functioned more as an arena for political battles than a legislative body³³¹. Additionally, political parties frequently leveraged the administrative apparatus to further their own agendas.

Political instability resulted in frequent changes in leadership at various levels, undermining consistency in decision-making. For example, in the Ministry of Construction alone, ministers changed 32 times, with 26 different individuals holding the post³³². With an average tenure of just 8-9 months, ministers found it challenging to pursue coherent policies. According to Snežana Toševa, they often made decisions aligned with the current political

³³⁰ Djokić, *Elusive Compromise*, 44, 53.

³³¹ Nebojša A. Popović, "Srpske parlamentarne stranke u Kraljevini SHS 1918-1929," *Istorija 20. veka* 2 (2008): 95, 107.

³³² Radoš Ljušić i dr. *Vlade Srbije: 1805-2005*, 25.

climate to preserve their positions, placing construction tasks in the background³³³. This problem extended to other ministries, as the government experienced 41 changes during the interwar period.

Frequent personnel changes, lack of continuity, and work disruptions hindered the functioning of administrative bodies. In several instances, the success of decision-making and project progress was directly linked to specific individuals in power: projects advanced when a supportive figure held a key position but stalled when that figure was replaced.

Municipal authorities initially appeared less vulnerable to political instability as leadership changes were less frequent. In Belgrade, the mayor changed 12 times, with an average term of 1.68 years, while in Zagreb, there were nine changes, with an average term of 2.5 years. However, these changes had a more significant impact on municipalities. Only a minister changed in ministries, while most of the staff remained, ensuring some level of consistency in decision-making. In municipalities, not only was a mayor changed, but the entire elected city council as well. It meant that after each election, the process of forming a working majority temporarily stalled the effective functioning of the municipality³³⁴. Consequently, each new administration could tackle issues starting from scratch, addressing them only partially and focusing on immediate needs³³⁵.

Political factors introduced competing agendas that weakened the effectiveness of administrative operations and facilitated various forms of administrative abuse, including malpractice, maladministration, and corruption. Corruption, as a persistent characteristic of political life in royal Yugoslavia, has been emphasized not only during the socialist period, such as in Zvonimir Kulundžić's book *Politics and Corruption in Royal Yugoslavia*, but also

³³³ Toševa, "Arhitektonsko odeljenje Ministarstva građevina," 58.

³³⁴ For example, "Problemi grada Zagreba," *Jutarnji List*, 17.3.1925, 5.

³³⁵ Milica Krstić, "Uredjenje Beograda," *Ženski pokret*, 1.5.1926, 163.

by contemporary scholars³³⁶. This issue could also be linked to *bureaupathologies*, where systemic structures drive individuals toward malpractice³³⁷. Furthermore, state-building under the influence of competing agendas and a lack of consistency resulted in inherent dysfunctionality. The administrative system was structured in a way that rendered it incapable of functioning effectively.

Thus, dysfunctionality can occur both at the organizational level and in administrative performance. First, issues stem from how the administration is theoretically organized; the system may be either overly regulated (over-organization) or insufficiently regulated (under-organization). Additionally, responsibilities may be distributed in a way that leads to either an ‘underlap’ or ‘overlap’ of competencies. However, the system may be well-organized in theory, but problems could arise when it is put into practice, including malpractice cases.

In his article “*Administrative Diseases: Some Types of Dysfunctionality in Administration*,” Christopher Hood identifies various types of ineffectiveness³³⁸: diseconomy (achieving outcomes at unnecessarily high costs), counterproductive administration (achieving outcomes that contradict the intended goals), and ‘pure’ ineffectiveness (failing to achieve any results). The latter can manifest as either ‘inertia,’ where actions fail to provoke any responses, or as simple ineffectiveness, where “responses merely rearrange the inputs and outputs of a system with no net change, substituting one activity for another without significant accomplishment by the authorities”³³⁹. The hypothesis is that ‘pure’ ineffectiveness, whether through inertia or simple ineffectiveness, may account for a large portion of unrealized architectural projects in interwar Belgrade and Zagreb, particularly in

³³⁶ Zvonimir Kulundžić, *Politika i korupcija u kraljevskoj Jugoslaviji*. (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1968). Uroš Šuvaković, "Korupcija i političke stranke u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca," *Nauka, bezbednost, policija* 16(1) (2011): 57–68.

³³⁷ Gerald E. Caiden, "What Really Is Public Maladministration?" *Public Administration Review* 51, no. 6 (1991): 486–493.

³³⁸ Hood, "Administrative Diseases," 439-454.

³³⁹ *Ibid*, 441-442.

cases where difficulties arose early in the decision-making process regarding where and how to build, especially when it came to administrative buildings.

Hood identifies several mechanisms that contribute to dysfunctionality: ‘over-organization,’ ‘under-organization,’ administration in ‘time,’ and administration in ‘space’³⁴⁰.

Under-organization arises when insufficient regulation and a lack of transparent procedures complicate decision-making processes. This problem was particularly acute in Yugoslavia during the 1920s because of the "regulatory void"³⁴¹. Political strife and instability disrupted the functioning of the parliament, thus preventing the unification of laws³⁴². Nikola Žutić observes that although the Vidovdan Constitution was adopted in 1921, the constitutional provisional state persisted until 1929 due to the absence of legal regulations necessary for implementing this constitution³⁴³. As a result, the country lacked a unified legal framework, with different regions still adhering to pre-war laws. Administrative procedures were inconsistently established, and variations in practices among government bodies made project implementation more challenging. Moreover, the absence of mechanisms allowing municipal authorities to expedite their requests to central government institutions led to delays and inefficiencies in decision-making. Additionally, the lack of oversight mechanisms enabled abuses of administrative positions for personal and political gain³⁴⁴.

The under-organization was closely tied to the lack of comprehensive planning, an issue often highlighted by architects working in the Ministry of Construction. Architect Milica Krstić, for instance, in her article “*The Development of Belgrade*”, stressed the need

³⁴⁰ Ibid, 443-451.

³⁴¹ Dimić, Žutić, Isailović, ur. *Zapisnici sa sednica Ministarskog saveta*, LIV.

³⁴² See more in Marko Pavlović, "Problem izjednačenja zakona u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca / Jugoslaviji," *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu* 68, br. 3-4 (2018): 493-523.

³⁴³ Nikola Žutić, "Ministarski Savet Kraljevine Jugoslavije," *Istorija 20. veka* 1 (1998): 29.

³⁴⁴ Stipica Grgić, "The Kingdom of Diversity and Paternalism: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, 1918–1941," in *Interwar East Central Europe, 1918–1941: The Failure of Democracy-building, the Fate of Minorities*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (Abingdon – Oxon – New York: Routledge, 2020), 223. Alex N. Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System*, (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 63.

for a unified and thoroughly developed technical plan that would ensure continuity and efficiency, even with changes in municipal administrations³⁴⁵. The Ministry of Construction's efforts were criticized for lacking a coherent, well-developed plan. Architect Petar Gačić pointed out that with a proper plan, achieving much greater results in constructing public buildings would have been possible³⁴⁶. Moreover, Alex N. Dragnich notes that long-term programs were generally impossible at the national level in the 1920s due to inter-party conflicts and political instability³⁴⁷.

Over-organization is connected to red tape because excessive bureaucracy, unnecessary regulations, and complex administrative procedures complicate or slow the decision-making process. In Yugoslavia, this issue became more pronounced in the 1930s when the earlier problems of under-organization appeared to be resolved. However, public construction and urban planning depended heavily on the Ministry of Construction, whose centralized control complicated project implementation. Over-organization created situations where documentation would get caught in a bureaucratic loop between the Ministry of Construction and the municipality, particularly in Belgrade. Belgrade and Zagreb municipalities faced additional challenges when projects required interventions from the Ministry of Construction and other ministries. The more bodies involved in the process, the more difficult it became to move projects forward through the decision-making chain.

In this way, over-organization and under-organization could be interconnected. While the involvement of more government bodies was required, there were no mechanisms in place to influence the speed of their decision-making processes.

³⁴⁵ Milica Krstić, "Uredjenje Beograda," *Ženski pokret*, 1.5.1926, 163. Milica Krstić graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1910 and worked in the Ministry of Construction from 1915 to 1941. She was publicly active not only in the Architects' Club of UJIA Belgrade Section but also in women's organizations. See more in Snežana Toševa, "Arhitekt Milica Krstić (1887–1964)," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda XLIV* (1997): 95–114.

³⁴⁶ Petar Gačić, "Podizanje javnih gradevina u resoru Ministarstva Gradevina," u *Jugoslavija na tehničkom polju 1919 – 1929*, ur. Rajko Kušević (Zagreb: Udruženje jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekta, 1929), 60.

³⁴⁷ Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia*, 60.

The speed of administrative processes is closely tied to the issue of time lags within the administration. One aspect of the time problem lay in the varying pace at which different authorities handled matters within them. Moreover, some issues could pass through the same phases multiple times due to being temporarily removed from the agenda, postponed, or reintroduced. Such situations resulted in time gaps between project phases, often rendering earlier decisions irrelevant. Thus, the decision did not lead to the desired outcomes because the momentum from the decision faded during time gaps. Public projects, in particular, struggled with these delays during government approvals, but even government-led construction projects faced similar challenges. For instance, attempts to build Palaces of Justice, City Halls, and crematoriums in both cities highlighted these difficulties.

Since implementing construction policy required the development of rules and regulations, the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia also undertook efforts to unify its building legislation. However, creating a comprehensive legislative framework and urban plans took time, and many construction projects were initiated without adherence to the new regulations. Moreover, delays in establishing the necessary legal frameworks stalled project implementation, and the lack of planning often left projects unrealized. Additionally, while planned public projects were postponed, sometimes due to waiting for regulations, private buildings were constructed, further complicating the implementation of public projects. A related issue was the prevalence of temporary solutions.

In some cases, simpler or smaller structures were built as a compromise, but these later became impediments to implementing the initially planned projects. Another challenge tied to time lags was the practice of preparing plans and projects in advance, even when resources or opportunities for their implementation were not yet available³⁴⁸. However, when opportunities

³⁴⁸ "Rad ministarstva gradjevina," *Pravda*, 11.9.1922, 2.

to begin project implementation arose, such projects were often no longer aligned with current conditions.

Efforts to address these problems by accelerating the development of plans and legislation sometimes led to new issues, such as incomplete or poorly conceived documents. These documents frequently required revisions and amendments, leading to situations where projects started under one set of rules and finished under another. While more far-sighted planning could have been a solution, this required a unified vision and shared goals, often hindered by conflicting agendas among key actors and a lack of continuity in leadership. These challenges were deeply connected to the broader political context in which the administration operated.

However, the most complex issue was the speed of approvals in cases requiring involvement from multiple authorities or when decisions had to pass through several levels of government. While these delays could be explained by factors like staffing shortages or organizational complexities, they were also influenced by conflicting interests, differing project priorities between authorities, and, in some cases, deliberate sabotage of project execution.

This issue also had an additional layer, not only in terms of the speed of processes but also in terms of its perception. From Zagreb's perspective, there was a sense of administrative neglect of its issues by additional delays in administrative processes. For example, complaints appeared in the Zagreb press that municipal budget approvals for Zagreb took longer than for Belgrade³⁴⁹, as well as both obtaining loans and the approval of tenders or projects for public buildings³⁵⁰.

³⁴⁹ "Proračun zagrebačke gradske općine odobren od ministra finansija," *Jutarnji List*, 20.1.1928, 6.

³⁵⁰ "Beograd je jedno - Zagreb je drugo," *Večer*, 25.8.1927, 4; "Po treći put šalje banska uprava nacрте поште u Beograd," *Večer*, 16.8.1939.

However, efforts to resolve delays in administrative processes often ended up prolonging them. Commissions and conferences were organized to address the lack of synchronization in processes and broader coordination issues between government bodies. In theory, these platforms aimed to facilitate discussions and reduce the back-and-forth movement of documents between authorities, improving overall coordination. However, in practice, these commissions and conferences often exposed new conflicts of interest between government bodies, further extending timelines. This issue was satirized in works such as the article "*Zagreb in 2000*", published in *Jutarnji List* in 1925, which humorously suggested that current problems would not be solved even in 2000 because "not all surveys and commissions have finished their work"³⁵¹. Moreover, in some cases, journalists blamed the 'system of conferences and discussions' for the failure of construction projects³⁵².

Criticism of administrative inefficiencies frequently underscored the need for reorganization to solve structural and procedural challenges. For instance, issues of ineffective administration, including malpractices like corruption, were expected to be resolved not just through reorganization but also through radical political reform under the dictatorship of King Alexander³⁵³. However, reorganization itself posed challenges related to "time" issues, as it extended decision-making processes by altering mechanisms and disrupting established decision-making chains. In the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia, reorganization emerged as a critical issue, particularly concerning administrative-territorial divisions and the restructuring of executive powers, such as ministerial reforms. Additionally, the reorganization process sought to address administrative challenges in "space," focusing on the division of competencies and improving coordination among various authorities.

³⁵¹ "Zagreb u godini 2000," *Jutarnji List*, 15.11.1925, 9.

³⁵² "Zašto je sasvim propala gradnja radničke komore i burze rada," *Jutarnji List*, 30.9.1934, 8.

³⁵³ Peter Radan, "Constitutional experimentation and the national question in Interwar Yugoslavia," *Istorija 20. veka* 3 (2011): 32.

Hood identifies ‘multi-organizational sub-optimization’ as one of the key space-related issues³⁵⁴. On the one hand, some authorities may ignore the actions of others. Conversely, different administrative bodies may pursue divergent, even mutually exclusive, objectives. Thus, administrative dysfunctionality can be divided into two main categories. The first pertains to the internal organization of authorities and their operational challenges. The second category concerns the cooperation problems between different actors.

Cooperation issues can arise due to the division of responsibilities, such as ‘overlap,’ where an activity falls under the jurisdiction of multiple organizations, or ‘underlap,’ where no organization assumes responsibility. Cooperation challenges can be horizontal, between ministries or departments within the same organization, or vertical, between different levels of government or between the central authority and its branches. This study hypothesizes that the primary issue was vertical coordination between local and central authorities.

Two key aspects are at play here: administrative challenges and conflicts of interest. In Belgrade, as the capital, the Ministry of Construction’s involvement in public building projects and urban planning was more pronounced, resulting in overlapping competencies between the ministry and the municipality³⁵⁵. Moreover, potential conflicts between municipal and state interests were significant, as central authorities could intervene in municipal affairs to serve their objectives³⁵⁶. Public transferring the responsibility between the municipality and central authorities caused so-called “distrust crisis”³⁵⁷. According to Zlata Vuksanović Macura, while state and municipal authorities were investing in and attempting to carry out construction projects in Belgrade, a major issue was the lack of coordination regarding “time and space”³⁵⁸. Furthermore, as elections to the capital municipality were

³⁵⁴ Hood, "Administrative Diseases," 450.

³⁵⁵ "Zapisnik veća starešina," fasc. 1648, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

³⁵⁶ "Zapisnici konferencija," fasc. 3, collection 81, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

³⁵⁷ "Zapisnik VI redovne sednice Odbora Opštine Beogradske," *Opštinske Novine*, 11.2.1932, 88.

³⁵⁸ Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923," 82.

pivotal for the political standing of parties, intense political strife often led to the discrediting of municipal activities³⁵⁹.

In Zagreb, on the other hand, a key problem was a lack of state investment in public projects, leading to delays and even withdrawal of projects that had already begun. Consequently, the efforts of the Zagreb municipality could be seen as an example of inertia, as without state cooperation, their initiatives failed to achieve results.

In both cities, municipalities criticized central authorities for making them handle matters that fell under state jurisdiction, for poor coordination between their activities, and for the excessive politicization of the process³⁶⁰.

Political instability intensified the criticism and dissatisfaction with administrative processes, both from municipal employees and a wide range of construction professionals. While the Ministry of Construction pushed for fully centralizing technical work within its domain, some engineers proposed an alternative: transferring the state's technical services to private firms³⁶¹. Advocates of this idea argued that it would lead to cost savings, faster processes, and more innovative, cost-effective solutions through competition. In this model, the state would only serve as a technical auditor. The widespread dissatisfaction with the state administration was the main driving force behind such proposals.

2.2. Decision-making for Administrative and Public buildings

The architectural process can be conditionally divided into several parts for analytical purposes. Firstly, it involves a series of decision-making acts: whether to build or not, what exactly to construct, how to finance the construction, and where to build. In theory, once these key preliminary questions were answered, the next step was selecting a project for

³⁵⁹ Nadežda Jovanović, "Borba za beogradsku opštinu u opštinskim izborima 1926. godine," *Godišnjak grada Beograda* XVII (1970): 109.

³⁶⁰ "Naša državna administracija," *Jutarnji List*, 1.5.1926, 11. "Zakonom o Opštini grada Beograda treba da se bolje reguliše i odnos države prema opštini," *Vreme*, 10.11.1939, 8

³⁶¹ B. Djorić, "Uprošćavanje državne administracije u ustanovama sa tehničkim osobljem," *Vreme*, 18.1.1926, 6.

implementation, followed by the project execution phase (the last two phases will be covered in the following two chapters). This division is conditional, as it was not always strictly followed in practice. For example, architectural projects could be developed before it was clear where and how they might be built (such projects were more likely to remain unrealized). Moreover, decisions that have already been made could be changed or forced to change, potentially creating problems during the implementation phase.

In the case of private buildings, the investors, either an individual or a company, were the decision-makers, and once decisions were made, they were required to comply with legislation, adhere to regulatory plans, and obtain project approval. For public buildings, the decision-making process was more complex. On the one hand, decisions were made within collegial bodies, which experienced constant personnel changes due to political reasons. Furthermore, several actors might be involved in decision-making, as public projects often required cooperation between various ministries or levels of government. Municipalities were frequently engaged in public projects, at least through coordination with urban regulations such as regulatory plans. The issue might even be brought before the Ministerial Council in contentious matters.

To Build or Not to Build?

After the First World War, both Belgrade and Zagreb experienced population growth and changes in their administrative statuses, which demanded new construction activities. These ranged from addressing the housing shortage to the need to expand administrative facilities and also projects related to education and culture.

In the case of public projects, deciding what exactly to build was a complicated process. Factors like resource allocation, conflicting interests, and priority setting all came into play. For example, there was the issue of whether to construct administrative buildings

themselves or public buildings for the administration to carry out its functions (a particularly pressing concern in cases such as the Ministry of Education or the municipality). With limited resources, not only financial but also land plots and administrative capacity, the growing list of construction needs required careful prioritization, leading to debates about the necessity of specific buildings.

For example, some projects can be considered unrealizable at an early stage: few voices spoke in their support, but this momentum rarely extends beyond occasional press coverage. Some of these projects were proposed by architects on their own initiative, often to draw attention to specific problems, as discussed in Chapter 1. Others originated from institutions seeking suitable buildings for their operations. These were usually projects in education and culture, such as proposals to construct new, separate buildings for the Modern Gallery, the People's University in Zagreb, or the National Library in Belgrade.

While cultural projects often held significant symbolic value, their practical relevance could be questioned, leading to debates about whether their construction was urgent (although opponents did not generally dismiss the possibility of their realization in the future). For instance, in the early 1920s, funds were allocated for constructing the State Conservatory in Belgrade, and Klementije Bukovac created an architectural project³⁶² (Fig. 10). However, this decision faced criticism. For example, the Radical Party's newspaper *Zastava* published an article titled "*Disorder in the State and Society*," arguing that the conservatory served only hundreds while much-needed buildings for millions were left unbuilt³⁶³. In the end, the conservatory building was not constructed.

³⁶² "Zgrada državnog konzervatorijuma," *Vreme*, 30.3.1922, 1.

³⁶³ "Nesredjenost u državi i društvu," *Zastava*, 30.11.1921, 1.




Figure 10. The project for the State Conservatory in Belgrade, Klementije Bukovac, 1921.
Source: "Zgrada državnog konzervatorijuma," *Vreme*, 30.3.1922, 1.

In the early 1920s, there was widespread optimism about construction, with ambitious plans for various buildings and a belief that they could all be completed shortly. The 1923 Master Plan for Belgrade is a prime example of this optimism, envisioning large complexes of public buildings, monumental squares, and diagonal streets. However, this plan was clearly out of step with actual capacities, especially financial resources. It also reveals a key divergence in the perception of Belgrade and its construction priorities: as a city for the nation or a city for its residents. Thus, while much attention and effort in Belgrade were focused on the construction of administrative buildings, the issue of social housing was pushed to the background. In contrast, in the 1920s, Zagreb prioritized addressing social needs through municipal initiatives.

However, in Belgrade, these issues appear to be opposed only at first glance. The need for administrative buildings was closely linked to the housing shortage, as the growing administrative sector had to rent space in residential buildings³⁶⁴. For example, in 1926, the Minister of Construction, Velislav Vulović, even recognized that the state was partly

³⁶⁴ "Pitanje stanova," *Pravda*, 8.11.1919, 1.

responsible for the housing shortage³⁶⁵. Thus, constructing administrative buildings indirectly helped alleviate the housing problem (though not regarding social housing). Additionally, Belgrade's housing stock had been heavily damaged during the First World War, and the shortage of administrative buildings was already evident before it. In contrast, Zagreb's extensive public construction before the war mainly met the city's institutional needs through the 1920s, and most of the debates over the need for new administrative buildings in Zagreb started only in the late 1920s.

The issue of administrative buildings and the need for construction had multiple aspects. Firstly, the need for a new building typically arose when the existing one no longer met the requirements, either because it had become outdated, impractical, or too cramped. Secondly, some institutions had departments scattered across various buildings due to space shortages, sometimes even in different parts of the city. This lack of centralization was often used as an argument for constructing a new building that could house all departments under one roof, thereby improving operational efficiency³⁶⁶. Thirdly, only some institutions owned their buildings, while others had to rent.

The argument against building new facilities was often grounded in financial constraints or the need to address more urgent priorities. In contrast, the arguments in favor of new construction were more complex. For rented buildings, the justification was that regularly spending budget funds on rent was inefficient. It was argued that taking out a loan and redirecting rent payments towards loan repayment would be more practical and lead to obtaining not just a new building but an owned one³⁶⁷. However, these plans faced a timing issue: the construction period, during which both rent and loan payments had to be made.

³⁶⁵ "Država i kriza stanova," *Politika*, 3.1.1926, 3.

³⁶⁶ "Seoba predsedništva vlade," *Vreme*, 10.4.1929, 2.

³⁶⁷ "Ekspoze Ministra gradjevina," *Vreme*, 25.3.1927, 3.

Moreover, the general tendency for construction delays made such plans unreliable. When choosing between building new facilities or renovating, expanding, and adapting existing ones, the latter option, though cheaper, was often deemed irrational by advocates of new construction because it provided only a partial and temporary solution, further worsening the underlying problem³⁶⁸. The same reasoning applied to spending on renting additional spaces when existing buildings lacked sufficient space³⁶⁹.

The opposition to constructing new buildings for central government bodies was partly based on the idea that demand for such facilities could be reduced. It could be accomplished by consolidating ministries, reducing their numbers, and downsizing the administrative apparatus. As a result, the issue of limited administrative space was also tied into debates about simplifying public administration³⁷⁰.

During the 1920s, plans for new buildings for various ministries were discussed, including those that already had their premises, but only a few of these projects were built during that decade. Many faced obstacles and were postponed, and some projects were never revisited. In the 1930s, a few ministry buildings were completed, but constructing new facilities for ministries that already had buildings was no longer seen as essential.

The construction of administrative buildings in Belgrade was also influenced by the administrative-territorial reform of 1929, which introduced decentralization and encouraged the urban growth of *banovinas* centers. It led to a redistribution of public funds, particularly for administrative buildings.

However, the active construction of buildings for *banovinas* administration in various cities was also used as an argument in the debates about the need for a new *banovina* building

³⁶⁸ For example, such a contrast can be found in the debates about the construction of the Palace of Justice in Zagreb. "Kako će se najbrže izgraditi palača pravde u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 22.1.1937, 3.

³⁶⁹ For instance, as in the debates about the need for museum construction in Zagreb. "Ako Zagreb ne dobije novu muzejsku zgradu propast će najvrijednije hrvatske zbirke," *Jutarnji List*, 14.11.1940, 13.

³⁷⁰ "Država i kriza stanova," *Politika*, 3.1.1926, 3.

in Zagreb. For instance, an article in *Jutarnji List*, titled “Will Zagreb Get a New Ban Palace?”, pointed out that *ban* palaces were built in cities far less important than Zagreb³⁷¹. During the 1930s, despite the shortage of space, this issue was not seen as a priority and adapting existing buildings or renting extra spaces were actively discussed as solutions³⁷². These cheaper alternatives were criticized as irrational, short-sighted, and temporary solutions with the risk of becoming permanent³⁷³. After the Banovina of Croatia was formed, the construction of a new *ban* palace was no longer a subject of debate and had progressed to subsequent phases: in 1940, the Decree on the Execution of the Banovina of Croatia's Budget allowed the *ban* to take loans to construct administrative buildings and a competition was held in 1941³⁷⁴.

Although many administrative building projects, whether for central or regional authorities, were debated, questioning the necessity of their construction, the issue was particularly pronounced regarding municipal buildings in both Belgrade and Zagreb. The challenge stemmed from the fact that municipal responsibilities included executing construction projects for housing, healthcare, and schools, pushing the priority of building a municipal facility into the background. For example, in Zagreb at the end of the 1930s, it was noted that there were far more important unresolved tasks in the city, and thus, there was no need to spend funds, especially borrowed ones, on a new building for the municipality

³⁷¹ "Hoće li Zagreb dobiti novu palaču banske uprave," *Jutarnji List*, 11.8.1939, 10.

³⁷² "Gradnja nove banske palače predbežno je skinuta s dnevnog reda," *Jutarnji List*, 18.3.1938, 10.

³⁷³ "Banska uprava namjerava sagraditi nove banske dvore," *Večer*, 31.1.1938, 5; "Umjesto iznajmljivanja privatne zgrade – potrebno je graditi novu bansku palaču," *Jutarnji List*, 12.7.1938.

³⁷⁴ "Postoji namjera da se na Strossmayerovom šetalištu sagrade nove palače banske vlasti," *Večer*, 18.4.1940, 3; "Na prostoru između Strossmayerovog šetališta i Vranicanijeve ulice bit će podignuta banovinska zgrada sa stanom za bana," *Jutarnji List*, 11.3.1941, 10.

itself³⁷⁵. Furthermore, in both cities, constructing a municipal building was viewed as "financially unproductive"³⁷⁶.

In both cities, the municipalities were housed in their buildings, which were too small, forcing some departments to rent separate buildings, often spread across different parts of the city, complicating municipal operations. The main arguments for building a new, single municipal building were to centralize institutions for greater efficiency, make services more convenient for citizens, and reduce spending on rented private buildings. The poor condition of the existing buildings was also noted. An article in the newspaper *Novosti* illustrated how much the needs of Zagreb's own municipal offices were neglected, where, in reporting on the construction of a pavilion for exotic animals at the zoo, the journalist hinted that the municipality should pay attention to its staff as well³⁷⁷.

Despite all the shortcomings of the municipality's existing buildings, the low priority of new construction meant that alternative solutions were considered first: renovating and purchasing additional existing buildings for subsequent adaptation. In Belgrade, for instance, the old building was renovated in the late 1920s³⁷⁸, which improved its condition but failed to address the issues of space shortage and decentralization. As a result, the debate about constructing a new building resumed immediately after the renovation.

In 1930, the Zagreb municipality purchased Rauch Palace instead of constructing a new building, intending to use it for administrative purposes. The plan was to turn the palace into the City museum once a new municipal building was constructed later³⁷⁹. However, as the decision increasingly leaned towards not to build a new municipal facility and to find an

³⁷⁵ "Arhitekt Pisačić smatra da pitanje gradnje gradske vijećnice nije aktuelno," *Večer*, 25.10.1938, 3.

³⁷⁶ "Rad V kongresa Saveza gradova," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine*, 1.11.1933, 684; Ivan Peršić, "Dva problema grada Zagreba. Izgradnja bolničkog zemljišta - Sudbina Zbora," *Jutarnji List*, 3.3.1931, 7.

³⁷⁷ "Potreba proširenja gradske vijećnice," *Novosti*, 12.10.1929, 5.

³⁷⁸ "Svečano osvećenje obnovlenog opštinskog doma," *Pravda*, 2.12.1928, 3.

³⁷⁹ "Općina kupuje Rauchovu palaču," *Jutarnji List*, 20.12.1930, 4.

alternative solution, debates emerged about using the palace – for the municipality or the City museum³⁸⁰.

Since the adaptation and renovation of the existing building only partially addressed the problems, an alternative was proposed in Zagreb: expanding the current structure by purchasing neighboring buildings and adapting them³⁸¹. However, proponents of constructing a new building argued that acquiring additional properties would only solve immediate issues and fail to meet future needs, ultimately requiring more funds in the long term³⁸², even though it appeared cheaper at first³⁸³. These debates highlighted two contrasting approaches: one focused on long-term planning and the other on solving present challenges. In Zagreb, the debates about the new construction were closely linked to the question of a suitable location, which will be explored further in the chapter. The idea of situating the City Hall in the Upper Town excluded the new construction and focused on purchasing and adapting neighboring buildings³⁸⁴.

However, the problem was not just the presence of debates that hindered implementation and extended timelines but also the inconsistency in decision-making because each option had its pros and cons, and thus, no solution was fully realized. For instance, in Zagreb, opponents of constructing a new building succeeded in early 1939, leading to a decision to expand the existing structure in the Upper Town³⁸⁵. Yet, by the second half of the

³⁸⁰ "Gradska štedionica dala je 3 i pol milijuna dinara za gradnju gradskog muzeja," *Jutarnji List*, 30.3.1939, 10.

³⁸¹ "Gradi se velika i moderna gradska vijećnica," *Večer*, 1.10.1930, 1.

³⁸² Stjepan Korenić, "O gradnji nove Gradske vijećnice na zemljištu Zakladne bolnice," *Novosti*, 15.3.1931, 17-18.

³⁸³ Ivan Peršić, "Dva problema grada Zagreba. Izgradnja bolničkog zemljišta - Sudbina Zbora," *Jutarnji List*, 3.3.1931 7.

³⁸⁴ "Grad dobiva modernu vijećnicu," *Jutarnji List*, 2.11.1930, 6.

³⁸⁵ "Odlučena je prigradnja Gradske vijećnice u Gornjem Gradu," *Večer*, 25.5.1939, 3; "Gradnja palače u baroknom slogu za urede gradske općine," *Večer*, 1.4.1939, 3.

year, discussions were already underway about finding a suitable location for a new building³⁸⁶.

The debates about whether to build or not can be viewed not only in terms of the necessity of a specific building but also in terms of arguments about whether or not to develop a particular site. In this context, the arguments against construction focused on the belief that the proposed location should remain undeveloped as a park, playground, or viewpoint. For example, the desire to preserve parks casted doubt on plans to build a municipal building or an Opera House in Manjež Park in Belgrade, as well as excluded some potential locations for the municipal building in Zagreb, where parks or even the Botanical Garden existed³⁸⁷. Such situations represent one variant of the land-use dilemma, which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The dynamics of debates over the necessity of construction were heavily influenced by who made the decisions. On the one hand, changes in the mayors often led to shifts in the priorities of municipal activities. For example, in 1935, when industrialist Vlada Ilić became mayor, the focus shifted from constructing public buildings to infrastructure projects. On the other hand, the appointment of Croatian politicians to ministerial positions encouraged decisions favoring new construction in Zagreb during the 1930s, but especially after the Cvetković-Maček Agreement. The personal involvement of those in power also played a role. For example, more active steps toward building the *Ban* Palace in Zagreb were taken during Viktor Ružić's tenure as *Ban*³⁸⁸, but after he was appointed Minister of Justice, the project stalled while progress on the Palace of Justice in Zagreb began to advance³⁸⁹. Thus, frequent changes in government and municipal bodies led to inconsistency in decision-making about

³⁸⁶ "Gdje da se gradi nova gradska vijećnica," *Jutarnji List*, 8.6.1939, 10.

³⁸⁷ "Gradnja nove vijećnice na Svačićevom trgu," *Jutarnji List*, 8.3.1940, 17.

³⁸⁸ "Postoji namjera da se na Strossmayerovom šetalištu sagrade nove palače banske vlasti," *Večer*, 18.4.1940, 3.

³⁸⁹ "Palača pravde početak će se graditi ove godine," *Večer*, 8.2.1939, 1.

the necessity of construction. As a result, many projects, after repeated discussions, returned to the starting point.

Economic factors also shaped the dynamics of these debates. The effects of the financial crisis halted construction projects and even paused discussions on many of them between 1934 and 1937. For example, the construction of the Palace of Justice in Belgrade was actively covered in the press before and after this period, but not in 1935 or 1936. Although the economic crisis provided a new argument for public building projects, as construction was seen as a way to combat the crisis by reducing unemployment and boosting economic activity, this idea was frequently discussed in the Zagreb press³⁹⁰. Moreover, in the late 1930s, an institution's decision to acquire existing buildings and adapt them for its purposes instead of constructing a new one could be criticized in the press³⁹¹.

Furthermore, in the late 1930s, the Zagreb newspaper *Večer* mentioned interesting aspects of debates about the necessity of constructing new buildings for institutions already housed in adapted existing structures. The discussion focused on state self-governing bodies, particularly banks, either state-owned or with significant state involvement (the National Bank, the State Mortgage Bank, the Postal Savings Bank, and the Privileged Agrarian Bank)³⁹². In addition to the usual arguments concerning the inadequacy of these institutions' current buildings and the potential to improve efficiency through new construction, *Večer* introduced the notion that building new facilities was obligatory³⁹³. This obligation was framed as compensation to Zagreb as a contribution to stimulating construction activity by

³⁹⁰ For example, "Od čega očekujmo ublaženje nezaposlenosti i bijede," *Večer*, 26.3.1932, 4-5.

³⁹¹ "Zagrebački Mirovinski zavod kupio tri stare kuće, dok beogradski i ljubljanski gradi samo nove palace," *Večer*, 31.10.1939, 5.

³⁹² Thus, the focus was on actors who independently made construction decisions and possessed the financial means to undertake them. "Kakova je javna građevna djelatnost u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 16.2.1939, 5.

³⁹³ "Zagreb očekuje gradnju reprezentativnih palača," *Večer*, 17.12.1937, 2.

institutions operating and profiting within the city³⁹⁴. Moreover, this duty to build for state-connected actors was perceived as a component of addressing the Croatian question³⁹⁵.

In both Belgrade and Zagreb, discussions about the necessity of constructing public buildings intensified after 1937, as many projects were proposed for implementation, naturally leading to debates. With so many projects under consideration, it became clear that some involved dilemmas. This was especially apparent in projects under the Ministry of Education. For example, while the 1923 Master Plan for Belgrade included the construction of an Opera House, by the late 1920s, the need for this building was questioned by the proposal for a unified state opera that would tour between Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, rather than having permanent opera houses in each city³⁹⁶. Additionally, when discussions about building the Opera House in Belgrade reemerged in the late 1930s, criticism appeared in the press, with some arguing that constructing a new National Library should be the priority³⁹⁷.

In Belgrade, the 1923 Master Plan proposed ambitious public construction projects, including ministerial buildings, administrative complexes, and university and cultural facilities. However, no clear timeline or implementation strategy was established. As a result, many construction projects were initiated simultaneously in the early 1920s, some even before the Master plan was finalized, and not all adhered to its guidelines. While some projects were completed, others stalled at various stages of implementation.

The prioritization of administrative and cultural buildings evolved differently. In the optimistic construction atmosphere of the early 1920s, projects in both sectors were actively proposed and discussed. However, cultural projects that faced obstacles early in the decade

³⁹⁴ "Kakova je javna građevna djelatnost u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 16.2.1939, 5.

³⁹⁵ "Očekuje se da će država investirati znatne svote u građevnu djelatnost Zagreba," *Večer*, 25.2.1939, 5.

³⁹⁶ "Hoće li biti jedna opera u Zagrebu, Beogradu i Ljubljani," *Novost*, 31.5.1929.

³⁹⁷ S. Matić, "Za narodnu biblioteku," *Pravda*, 5.6.1938, 4; M. Predić, "Podizanje Opere i Narodnoj biblioteke," *Srpski Književni Glasnik*, 16.6.1938, 306-309.

were largely suspended, only becoming relevant again in the late 1930s. In contrast, administrative buildings, particularly those for ministries, were actively constructed throughout the 1920s to address the growing administrative needs of Belgrade as the capital. By the 1930s, the focus on such buildings had diminished. This shift occurred for two main reasons. First, the large-scale administrative buildings already constructed were sufficient to meet the needs not only of the ministries they were originally intended for but also of others. As a result, some of the ministerial buildings planned in the 1923 Master Plan became redundant. Second, some ministries were downsized, others were merged, and the administrative apparatus was perceived as excessively large. For example, by the late 1930s, plans for a new Ministry of Education building were replaced with a decision to reallocate the funds for constructing the Ethnographic Museum and preparing the construction of the Opera House³⁹⁸.

In Zagreb, by contrast, the city's status as a cultural capital and the national conservation agenda placed cultural and educational projects at the forefront of attention for local actors throughout the interwar period. The construction of such buildings was regarded not only as a practical necessity but also as a symbolically significant endeavor. This perspective was particularly evident in debates over the allocation of state funds. Furthermore, the prioritization of projects and the perceived necessity of construction were closely tied to the challenge of managing limited, particularly financial, resources.

How to Finance the Construction?

The decision-making process in architecture faced the significant challenge of allocating limited resources: financial, land, administrative, and human. Among them, the

³⁹⁸ *Finansijski zakon za 1938/39 godinu*, (Beograd, 1938), 64.

lack of financial resources is often used as the most obvious explanation for the failure to realize architectural projects.

As discussed earlier, limited financial resources affected the initial decision on what to build. After a decision had been made, determining precisely what the limited funds would be allocated to, the next issue was selecting the financing method. Securing funding for the construction of public buildings could be accomplished in various ways. In an ideal scenario, public projects would be financed through the regular state or municipal budget, depending on which authority was responsible. However, this was the most limited resource, and an alternative option was loans. For public buildings, though, loans had to go through the same budget approval process as regular budget funds. There were also several potential loan sources, including domestic options like the State Mortgage Bank (in the case of Zagreb, also loans from local banks like the City Savings Bank (*Gradska Štedionica*)) and the possibility of obtaining foreign loans³⁹⁹.

In many instances, the state would take out a general loan for public works, and funds would be redistributed to different projects. It led to conflicts of interest in both budget-funded construction and loan distribution.

Ideally, financing could be a clear process: selecting what to build and then finding the most suitable financing. In practice, these issues often became interwoven. At the financing stage, the question of how to allocate funds would arise again, casting doubt on the priority of the chosen construction project.

Furthermore, allocating funds for a specific project during the budget approval phase did not ensure their actual disbursement later. Delays in each step of the decision-making process often caused financial decisions to become outdated, especially when overall financial

³⁹⁹ For example, hopes for constructing an entire complex of administrative buildings in Belgrade in the early 1920s were tied to foreign loans, aiming to resolve this issue as quickly as possible. "Državne zgrade," *Politika*, 28.2.1921, 3.

circumstances changed. Leadership changes also had an impact: budgetary decisions made under one Minister of Finance might not be followed through under another. Due to these inconsistencies, many projects that initially seemed financially secure were either never or only partially realized (such examples will be discussed in Chapter 4).

In the early stages of deciding on the organization and financing of construction, the key issue was the conflict of interests during the budget approval process. The primary concern was how funds would be distributed among the ministries. Ministers would present their proposed budgets during detailed deliberations, which were discussed and often reduced. This outcome was anticipated and rarely attracted public criticism, although it was a frequent subject of complaints by ministers during debates. For example, during a session of the parliamentary Financial Committee at the end of 1927, Minister of Education Kosta Kumanudi expressed frustration over the continual cuts to his ministry's budget, and deputy Svetozar Pribičević argued that the reductions specifically targeting Zagreb were unacceptable, stating, "because Zagreb has too little"⁴⁰⁰.

Thus, the second issue was far more contentious, as it involved allocating budget funds and loans to construction projects across different regions. From Zagreb's viewpoint, the distribution of funds seemed unjust, creating the perception that Zagreb was financially neglected⁴⁰¹.

During the 1920s, in addition to the Ministry of Construction, which oversaw public buildings in Belgrade and thus a substantial portion of its budget was for construction in the capital, there were Construction Directorates with centers in Zagreb, Novi Sad, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Dubrovnik, Kruševac, and Skopje (thus, the data for the directorates reflects construction across the entire region under their jurisdiction, not just the center).

⁴⁰⁰ "Zagrebu se ne smije ništa ukinuti, jer Zagreb ima premalo," *Novosti*, 31.12.1927, 1.

⁴⁰¹ "Zagreb plaća," *Jutarnji List*, 22.11.1925, 3.

According to the data on funds spent on new public buildings from 1919 to 1929⁴⁰², the Zagreb Directorate ranked fourth among the directorates, following Kruševac, Novi Sad, and Skopje, and spent 1.41 times less than the Ministry itself. However, considering the existing public buildings, the Zagreb Directorate ranked first among the directorates in spending on building repairs, trailing the Ministry by only half a million dinars. Regarding expenditures for constructing new buildings and repairing existing ones, the Zagreb Directorate ranked third among the directorates, spending 1.24 times less than the Ministry's.




Table 2. The Expenses for Public Buildings in the 1920s

From the Zagreb perspective, the disparity in spending seemed far more dramatic when comparing expenditures for buildings for educational and cultural purposes. While the difference between expenses of the Ministry of Construction and the Zagreb Directorate for university buildings increased only moderately (overall spending was 1.62 times less for the Zagreb Directorate), for museums and theater buildings, the Zagreb Directorate spent 69 times less.

⁴⁰² The table was published in Rajko Kušević, ur., *Jugoslavija na tehničkom polju 1919 – 1929* (Zagreb: Udruženje jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekta, 1929), 61.

The local press frequently highlighted the taxes paid by Zagreb, accompanied by explicit references to the city's "construction needs"⁴⁰³. The situation was particularly sensitive in the field of education, especially for the University of Zagreb, which was regarded as a symbol of pride and an essential element of Zagreb's symbolic status, contrasted with the fact that "Belgrade has everything that makes a state a state"⁴⁰⁴. However, the problem was not only that funds were not allocated for Zagreb projects, which was justified by a lack of funds, insufficient loans, and austerity measures, but the situation was further worsened by the fact that, at the same time, funds were being allocated for Belgrade projects⁴⁰⁵. There was a recurring comparison between how much was built and spent in Belgrade versus Zagreb⁴⁰⁶. According to the estimates of a journalist from the *Večer* newspaper, by early 1939, the state had invested around 35 million into the construction of public buildings in Zagreb (including allocated but not yet used funds, while for completed buildings only 20 million), while in Belgrade, the investments exceeded 2,350,000,000⁴⁰⁷. In addition, the funding methods were also compared, with Belgrade receiving more state resources while Zagreb had to rely on its own⁴⁰⁸.

The primary strategy of Zagreb's mayors was to travel to Belgrade for meetings with various ministers to negotiate funding for Zagreb's projects. In his book "Zagreb Mayors," Zvonimir Milčec mentioned that mayor Vjekoslav Heinzl claimed, "All ministers are the same to me; the main thing is to get at least a million of interest-free loans for Zagreb because it's always better to get something than nothing, as Belgrade is always taking everything from

⁴⁰³ "Zagreb daje godišnje državi na svim prihodima svotu od 720 milijuna dinara," *Jutarnji List*, 13.6.1937, 7.

⁴⁰⁴ "Zagrebu se ne smije ništa ukinuti, jer Zagreb ima premalo," *Novosti*, 31.12.1927, 1.

⁴⁰⁵ "Dok se za Beograd troše novi milijuni - Zagrebu se otima ono što je njegovo," *Večer*, 22.11.1927, 4.

⁴⁰⁶ For example, "Beograd gradi. Siplju se milijuni, a za Zagreb nema kredita," *Večer*, 19.5.1928, 3.

⁴⁰⁷ "Očekuje se da će država investirati znatne svote u građevnu djelatnost Zagreba," *Večer*, 25.2.1939, 5.

⁴⁰⁸ "Kakova je javna građevna djelatnost u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 16.2.1939, 5.

⁴⁰⁸ "Zagrebu treba pomoći," *Jutarnji List*, 11.9.1925, 3.

Zagreb"⁴⁰⁹. Sometimes, these attempts were successful and caused excitement⁴¹⁰, but there was also the risk of a mismatch between what was promised during the visit and its subsequent fulfillment, which could be only partially realized, delayed, or not carried out at all⁴¹¹. The unsuccessful attempts to secure state funding led to frustrations, prompting suggestions that Zagreb should rely on its financial institutions or seek foreign loans instead of trying to obtain resources from state institutions like the State Mortgage Bank⁴¹². While these alternatives were seen as more effective since they avoided the delays caused by state decision-making (Zagreb felt both financially and administratively neglected), this approach also sparked resentment. The city found itself addressing issues that should have been managed by the state, for example, in the case of the construction of the Palace of Justice in Zagreb, discussed later in the chapter.

Such comparisons were not limited to Belgrade. For example, in the case of attempts to build the *ban* palace in Zagreb, two financial options were discussed in 1938: securing a loan or requesting a state subsidy. The primary argument for the subsidy was that similar *ban* palaces in other cities had been built with state assistance⁴¹³. However, by 1940, taking out a loan was chosen as the more realistic solution⁴¹⁴.

Furthermore, the issue of Zagreb's financial deprivation was raised not only during discussions on the distribution of funds in the state budget but also regarding aligning municipal and regional budgets with central authorities. The cases where budget allocations

⁴⁰⁹ Zvonimir Milčec, *Zagrebački gradonačelnici* (Zagreb: Alfa, 1993): 70. However, the author did not provide the source for this statement.

⁴¹⁰ "Vlada odobrila 35 milijona dinara za Zagreb," *Novosti*, 25.6.1927, 1; "Zadovoljstvo građana zbog uspjeha gradonačelnika u Beogradu," *Novosti*, 26.6.1927, 2.

⁴¹¹ "Kiša beogradskih obećanja," *Jutarnji List*, 27.11.1927; "Vlada i potrebe Zagreba," *Jutarnji List*, 6.1.1929, 1.

⁴¹² "Gradski zajmovi," *Jutarnji List*, 6.1.1926, 9.

⁴¹³ "Gradnja nove banske palače predbježno je skinuta s dnevnog reda," *Jutarnji List*, 18.3.1938, 10.

⁴¹⁴ "Postoji namjera da se na Strossmayerovom šetalištu sagrađe nove palače banske vlasti," *Večer*, 18.4.1940, 3.

were cut were perceived less as a fiscally motivated cost-saving measure and more as a direct attack on Zagreb's institutions⁴¹⁵.

Moreover, a certain optimism emerged after the formation of the Banovina of Croatia. On the one hand, there was hope for a shift in state policy toward Croatia's needs, mainly because Croatian politician Juraj Šutej held the position of Minister of Finance in the government formed after the Cvetković-Maček Agreement. For instance, Banovina authorities anticipated that the Minister of Finance would approve the construction of a banovina financial administration building, which was planned on Savska Road (*Savska cesta*), near a planned large public building complex on Varaždin Road (*Varaždinska cesta*, nowadays *Ulica Grada Vukovara*)⁴¹⁶. This planned complex included the Palace of Justice, a museum complex, and the Philosophy and Law Faculties, and hopes for its realization were closely linked to these political changes. By 1940, it was noted that loans for the construction had already been secured⁴¹⁷. On the other hand, hopes for implementing some projects were directly tied to funding from Banovina's budget, for example, for the Music Academy⁴¹⁸. In such cases, since funding came from the Banovina rather than the Ministry of Education, there seemed to be no competition with projects in Belgrade.

Within municipal budgets, competition between construction projects was intense and led to the postponement of the construction of city halls. As a result, both Belgrade and Zagreb explored public-private partnership models for the City Halls, which could be multifunctional complexes with administrative parts. In 1927, Belgrade considered partnering with a foreign company to build a complex, part of which would house the Municipality and

⁴¹⁵ For example, "Ministar finansija protiv zagrebačkih kulturnih institucija," *Novosti*, 1.1.1929, 2.

⁴¹⁶ "Kad će započeti gradnjom palače finansijskog ravnateljstva," *Večer*, 7.5.1940, 5.

⁴¹⁷ "Četiri velike palače gradit će se na Varaždinskog cesti," *Jutarnji List*, 1.9.1940, 27.

⁴¹⁸ "18 milijuna dinara stajat će nova zgrada glazbene akademije," *Večer*, 13.9.1940, 5, "Nova reprezentativna palača Glazbene Akademije," *Jutarnji List*, 1.9.1940, 14.

City Administration Building on Terazije Terrace⁴¹⁹. The plan was for the municipality to provide the land, and a company would construct the complex, and in return, it would have the right to lease part of the complex for a period to recoup its investment. Similarly, during discussions around the Foundation Block and the potential sale of the site in Zagreb, a proposal was considered to build a complex including municipal offices financed by foreign capital with repayment through leasing⁴²⁰.

The impact of financial issues on the success of construction projects shifted over time. In the early 1920s, during the wave of construction optimism, many projects quickly progressed to the design phase and sometimes even to laying the foundations. However, the lack of financial resources soon became apparent, and these projects were often suspended. While some buildings were often completed on a second attempt when financial issues were resolved, many public projects became stalled due to other problems.

For example, in the early 1920s, projects like the City Hall and the Palace of Justice in Belgrade seemed to progress, with expectations that they would soon be completed. Nevertheless, by the mid-1920s, it became clear that these hopes were not financially feasible. After the postponements, subsequent attempts to build the Palace of Justice were hindered by cooperation issues, while for the City Hall, the municipality struggled with land acquisition problems. Meanwhile, private construction experienced a boom in both cities during the 1920s, while a lack of funds held back public projects, but plots for public buildings remained reserved. By the early 1930s, some site reservations were removed to encourage private construction in response to the economic crisis. Thus, by the late 1930s, when funds became available for many public projects and were included in financial laws and budgets, the realizations were complicated by another limitation: the lack of available plots.

⁴¹⁹ "Opštinski dom i Terazijaska terasa," *Politika*, 10.12.1927, 6.

⁴²⁰ See more in Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok u Zagrebu," 322-335.

Where to Build?

Along with financial constraints, lengthy debates over where to build could halt a project before it even reaches the project selection stage (although both factors could also obstruct the implementation phase later). Also, some land issues could be solved by additional financing (such as purchasing a privately owned plot for a public project). Like financial constraints, finding a location for a building was often made more difficult by competing interests and dilemmas.

When financial resources were delayed, inflation often necessitated larger sums, or alternative funding sources had to be sought, complicating project implementation. If delays led to the exhaustion of suitable sites in desirable locations, later construction attempts faced dilemmas regarding existing buildings or searching for alternative plots, which were not always seen as appropriate, threatening the project's feasibility. In terms of financing, different funding options could be compared based on their availability and cost-effectiveness, such as comparing loan terms from local versus foreign banks. However, selecting a suitable site was more complex, as it involved numerous factors that were not always directly comparable. For example, while plot size and proximity to the city center could be easily assessed, historical significance was a more nuanced argument. As a result, debates over appropriate locations posed more significant challenges, as the issue was not only about finding an available option but one that met a wide range of criteria, with differing opinions on what those criteria should be.

In Belgrade, the 1923 Master Plan designated locations for major public buildings, while in Zagreb, where the adoption of a master plan did not occur until the late 1930s, partial regulatory plans addressed site allocation. Some public projects were assigned to privately owned plots; thus, land prices and lengthy negotiations prevented the realization of these

projects according to the plan or, in some cases, stopped them altogether. Additionally, certain plots already had existing buildings, requiring demolition before the new project could proceed. Meanwhile, many locations outlined in the regulatory plans were disputed, with alternative locations being proposed during discussions. The issue was not just that these alternatives might also involve expropriation or demolition but that debates over suitable locations often delayed implementation, sometimes leading to decision-making paralysis. In several instances, project locations were changed (sometimes repeatedly), creating a chain reaction where one relocation impacted others, with some projects competing for the same sites, further complicating the decision-making process.

For instance, the 1923 Belgrade Master Plan proposed several government building complexes. One was planned along Kneza Miloša Street (Fig. 11), including ministerial and military buildings. Another was located near the Parliament and the Old Cemetery (Fig. 11), where other ministerial buildings (3, 4, 13, 14), the City Hall (21), the Palace of Justice (18), the new Royal Palace (1), the Main post office (56), and the Academy of Sciences were to be built. While the first complex was realized, with some deviations from the Master Plan⁴²¹, the second complex remained almost entirely unrealized. The first complex was planned on state-owned land and had already been forming since the 19th century⁴²². In contrast, the second complex faced numerous challenges, demonstrating the range of land issues.

⁴²¹ The Ministry of Construction building (73) was built on the site of the Agricultural Cooperative (62), which got another plot instead. The Ministry of Finance purchased the building of The Ministry of Trade and Industry (13), but its central building (7) remained unbuilt (this case will be examined in the next chapter).

⁴²² Several military buildings (ministry, barracks, academy), the building for the Ministry of Construction, and the complex of buildings for the Ministry of Finance were built as part of a complex before the First World War.



Figure 11. Complexes of administrative buildings in Belgrade according to the 1923 Master Plan: along Kneza Miloša Street; near the Parliament and the Old Cemetery (Tašmajdan)
Source: Jovan Obradović, Generalni regulacioni plan za grad Beograd, 1924, Digital National Library of Serbia.

Only the Parliament building (2), already in the final stages of construction, was realized according to the Master plan from the second complex. Across from the Parliament, the new Royal Palace was supposed to be built, forming a complex with the existing palaces on Kralja Milana Street. Nevertheless, this project was abandoned in favor of an **alternative location**. King Alexander I decided to relocate the royal palace from the city center "so that in peace and within the circle of his family, he could more easily and calmly manage state affairs"⁴²³. He chose Dedinje as the new location, and in 1924, after the Master Plan had been adopted, construction of the new royal palace began there⁴²⁴.

The plan envisioned the Parliament surrounded by additional buildings, including one for the Academy of Sciences⁴²⁵. However, the Academy abandoned its plans to build on the designated site in the 1920s. Both construction sites near the Parliament presented **dilemmas**:

⁴²³ Petar Popović, "Kralj Aleksandar Prvi, ljubitelj arhitekture, umetnosti i tehnike uopšte," *Pravda*, 15.6.1931, 1.

⁴²⁴ Biljana Crvenković, i dr. *Dvorski kompleks na Dedinju* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2012). 57.

⁴²⁵ Zlata Vuksanović-Macura supposed that the left part was "for unclear purpose," but both plots could be for the Academy of Science since on the Master plan in the text description two sectors were indicated for it, although there were no designation numbers on the plan itself. Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923," 226. Jovan Obradović, Generalni regulacioni plan za grad Beograd, 1924, Digital National Library of Serbia.

one was already occupied by existing buildings⁴²⁶, and the other was deemed more appropriate for a park (this decision may have also been influenced by the aesthetic concept of having the Parliament building as a free-standing structure⁴²⁷).

Both the Main Post Office and City Hall faced **issues with private ownership**, resulting in the Main Post Office being built on the site originally intended for City Hall, while the search for a suitable location for City Hall continued throughout the interwar period. The remaining part of the complex on the Old Cemetery, including buildings for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, and the Palace of Justice with the Ministry of Justice, also remained unbuilt. Beyond the dilemmas and issues with private ownership, the relocation of multiple projects further complicated the situation. Several public projects, including the Academy of Sciences, were moved to this complex, intensifying debates over land distribution. The only exception was the Church of St. Mark, which already owned its site and was completed with only a slight shift in location compared to the 1923 Master Plan.

Public Projects and Private Land Ownership

Placing public projects on privately owned land challenged their implementation. This issue stemmed from a municipal or state-owned land shortage, mistakes in land ownership attribution, and the desire to locate public buildings in the city center and concentrate them. While this problem could theoretically be solved through financing by purchasing the land, the cost of such plots was not regulated. In the case of the complex near the Parliament, which was envisioned as "a central point of the great Belgrade, the core and center of the spiritual

⁴²⁶ "Uklanjanje bloka zgrada izmedju Skupštine i Agrarne Banke," *Politika*, 7.12.1937, 8.

⁴²⁷ "Kako treba rešiti trg Parlamenta," *Vreme*, 18.1.1939, 10.

axis of the future city"⁴²⁸, the ambition to create a cohesive complex led to public projects being planned on privately owned plots.

The Main Post Office was initially planned for the corner of Vlajkovićeve and Dečanska streets, and in 1928, Momir Korunović designed the building⁴²⁹. However, the project remained unimplemented due to land issues. The Ministry of Posts should have purchased the plot but considered that landowners demanded an exorbitant price⁴³⁰. The press described this as "private speculation at the state's expense"⁴³¹. Another obstacle was the Municipality's refusal to buy land for street expansion. Due to the high prices and a conflict with the Municipality, the Minister of Posts, Bogoljub Kujundžić, opted to purchase an alternative plot, contrary to the 1923 Master Plan⁴³².

The Church of Saint Mark offered its plot at a relatively low price⁴³³, and the Main Post Office was later built there. Moreover, it was a plot for the City Hall according to the 1923 Master Plan, and the municipality believed it was their land. Nevertheless, the Church of Saint Mark insisted that the plot belonged to the church and successfully proved its ownership⁴³⁴. There was a proposal for the municipality to purchase the plot intended for the Main Post Office, but the Municipality then decided to build a City Hall closer to the city center⁴³⁵. Later, the Agrarian Bank was built on the corner of Vlajkovićeve and Dečanska streets. As a result, the buildings near the Parliament were not constructed according to the 1923 Master Plan.

⁴²⁸ "Kako bi trebalo urediti najglavniju i najlepšu tačku prestonice," *Vreme*, 11.11.1934, 7.

⁴²⁹ "Gradjenje palate Glavne Pošte i Poštanske Štedionice," *Vreme*, 19.5.1928, 5.

⁴³⁰ "Zgrada za beogradsku centralnu poštu, koja će se početi uskoro zidati, biće najveća palata Beograda," *Vreme*, 7.4.1928, 7.

⁴³¹ "Šta će se podići na zemljištu crkve Sv. Marka," *Vreme*, 3.6.1928, 9.

⁴³² "Pripreme za gradjenje palate za beogradsku Glavnu Poštu," *Vreme*, 10.4.1928, 7.

⁴³³ "Na zemljištu Markove Crkve, preko puta Nove Skupštine, podićiće se Glavna Pošta," *Vreme*, 18.5.1928, 5.

⁴³⁴ To protect its interests, the church appealed to the Patriarch, and through the Ministry of Faith, the issue reached the Ministerial Council. "Spor opštine i crkve Sv. Marka," *Vreme*, 31.5.1928, 5.

⁴³⁵ "Spor oko imanja crkve Sv. Marka likvidiran," *Politika*, 21.9.1928, 7.

The conflict between the municipality and St. Mark's Church hindered the construction of the administrative complex planned for the Old Cemetery site. St. Mark's Church administration was largely dissatisfied with the 1923 Master Plan, believing the complex violated its interests. The church council intended to use much of the site for its purposes, planning to construct a new church, a museum, residences for priests and the bishop, and several church-run humanitarian institutions⁴³⁶. The location of the new church was also affected by tensions between the church administration and the municipality. The 1923 Master Plan implied that the church would stand along the axis of the new boulevard, on the other side of which the Opera was planned. However, the municipality later abandoned the idea of cutting through a new boulevard. The administration of the church proposed changing the regulation and putting the church in alignment with Frakopanova Street (now Resavska). In this case, the church would not have to demolish the old Church of St. Mark and buy additional land. The municipality agreed but asked the church administration to cede part of its site free of charge for the expansion of Takovska Street, but it refused⁴³⁷. The church administration threatened to abandon its construction, arguing that the municipality was obstructing their plans while granting plots to churches of other faiths⁴³⁸. Besides the new temple, the church administration also proposed a new rental building on Kralja Aleksandra Boulevard to fund the temple's construction, which went against the 1923 Master Plan⁴³⁹. This rental building made constructing two ministerial buildings proposed in the plan impossible.

By the early 1930s, the 1923 Master Plan had become outdated, prompting the municipality to develop a new compromise plan for the complex at the Old Cemetery, which

⁴³⁶ "Spor opštine i crkve Sv. Marka," *Vreme*, 31.5.1928, 5.

⁴³⁷ "Uprava crkve Svetog Marka odustaje od namere da zida novi hram na Starom groblju," *Vreme*, 13.3.1930, 3.

⁴³⁸ "Spor opštine i crkve Sv. Marka," *Vreme*, 31.5.1928, 5.

⁴³⁹ "Gradjenje palate Glavne Beogradske Pošte i nove Crkve Sv. Marka," *Vreme*, 29.12.1928, 5.

took into account the changes that had already occurred, namely, the Main Post Office and the church's rental building. The St. Mark's Church administration was allocated a block behind the temple for three church buildings, while public buildings, including City Hall, were once again planned along the boulevard⁴⁴⁰. However, in later plans, the municipality abandoned its compromise with the church, no plots were designated for church buildings, and the demolition of the rental building was proposed. In 1934, plans were discussed for allocating the Academy of Sciences, the City Administration, the Professor's House, and the Palace of Justice⁴⁴¹. By 1937, the plan included the State Mortgage Bank, the City Hall, the Palace of Justice, the City Administration, the Ministry of Construction, the Professor's House, the Protestant Church, and the YMCA building⁴⁴². Nevertheless, none of these projects were realized, even though projects for the Professor's House and the YMCA house were designed⁴⁴³.

Private land ownership remained the primary challenge for the public buildings planned along Kralja Aleksandra Boulevard. Moreover, while these plans were being debated and altered, new buildings were constructed along the boulevard in addition to existing ones. To implement the public complex, all the private buildings must first be demolished and the land purchased⁴⁴⁴.

The mismatch between property ownership and the intended purpose of buildings, combined with the prolonged discussions about public projects, often resulted in private buildings being built on key central sites instead of planned public ones. While the issue of

⁴⁴⁰ "Staro groblje sa Taš-Majdanom postaće možda najlepši kraj," *Politika*, 10.6.1931, 9. One of the plots was assigned to the Palace of Justice. "Regulacija Starog groblja," *Vreme*, 5.9.1931, 4.

⁴⁴¹ "Rušenje starih štala i garaža na Taš-Majdanu i pripremanje terena za podizanje novih palata i javnih gradjevina," *Vreme*, 7.12.1934, 9.

⁴⁴² "Ovako trebalo da bude," *Vreme*, 10.9.1937, 5.

⁴⁴³ A competition was held for the Professor's House, while the YMCA commissioned a project from Milan Zloković. "Profesorsko društvo podiže na Taš-Majdanu impozantan dom," *Vreme*, 4.9.1935, 6; "HZMLj zida svoj dom," *Politika*, 13.3.1935, 6; "Hrišćanska zajednica mladih ljudi podiže Spomen-dom," *Vreme*, 11.2.1940, 8.

⁴⁴⁴ "Beogradska opština ruši palate," *Vreme*, 5.1.1938, 5.

placing public projects on private land could have been addressed through additional funding, the costs were high for the central and significant sites. In Belgrade, for instance, the 1923 Master Plan designated the Stock Exchange for the corner of Kneza Mihailova and Kolarčeva streets, between two central squares. However, this plot was privately owned and so expensive that the cost of the entire construction project was nearly equivalent to the price of the land. By 1926, Stock Exchange representatives began considering an alternative site already owned by institutions linked to the Stock Exchange⁴⁴⁵. Yet, the municipality maintained its intention to use the central plot for public buildings, proposing City Hall there in 1929⁴⁴⁶. Nevertheless, by the 1930s, the municipality had to remove the reservation on this site and permit private development, leading to the construction of the Mortgage Bank of Trade Foundation building (commonly known as the Palace “Albania”)⁴⁴⁷.

Besides the high price of land, particularly in the city center, the owner's unwillingness to sell the property, primarily due to the belief that land values might rise in the future, could also present a challenge. Amadeo Carnelutti highlighted this problem of possible land speculation as a potential obstacle to constructing new buildings in Zagreb, which had already been in place in 1919⁴⁴⁸.

In Zagreb, the City Hall construction was also hindered by complications related to private land ownership. In 1927, the municipal authorities had plans to build it on the Foundation Block, a part of the central Ban Jelačić Square, where the Foundation Hospital was intended to be demolished, and its plot was planned for sale. That same year, the magazine *Svijet* published a design of uncertain origin that showcased a monumental

⁴⁴⁵ "Gde će se podići palata Berze," *Vreme*, 22.4.1926, 8.

⁴⁴⁶ "Podizanje novog Opštinskog Doma," *Politika*, 4.2.1929, 8.

⁴⁴⁷ Milica Ceranić, "Istorija i arhitektura palate 'Albanije' u Beogradu," *Nasleđe* 6 (2005): 147-162.

⁴⁴⁸ Ing. A. Carnelutti, "Problem novogradnji u velikim gradovima sa posebnim osvrtom na grad Zagreb," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata list* 10 (1919): 122.

building⁴⁴⁹ (Fig. 12). However, the municipality could not buy this site, while the plot sale was crucial for funding the construction of a new hospital. In this instance, the problem extended beyond a mismatch between the function of the building and land ownership because it also involved disagreements over the most suitable location for the municipal building.



Figure 12. The proposal for the City Hall in Zagreb, 1927.

Source: "Predlog za Gradnju Gradske Vijećnice u Zagrebu," *Svijet*, 15.10.1927, 335.

Alternative Locations

In Zagreb, a city formed by merging different parts, debates over alternative locations often centered around the rivalry between the Upper and Lower Towns, mainly regarding symbolically significant projects. For example, in the case of the City Hall location, whose historical premises were located in Upper Town, such disputes arose. On one side, advocates for building the municipality on the Foundation Block highlighted its central location, the large plot size, and the opportunity to create not just an administrative building but a multifunctional complex with rentable spaces⁴⁵⁰. Additionally, the Lower Town was considered more convenient for most residents due to the city's growth as "a place where

⁴⁴⁹ "Pitanje zakladne bolnice," *Jutarnji List*, 1.12.1927, 6. "Predlog za Gradnju Gradske Vijećnice u Zagrebu," *Svijet*, 15.10.1927, 335. It was planned partly on the site of the Foundation Hospital, partly on the other side of Ilica street.

⁴⁵⁰ "Novu gradsku vijećnicu treba graditi na bloku Zakladne bolnice," *Novosti*, 8.4.1931; Stjepan Korenić, "O gradnji nove Gradske vijećnice na zemljištu Zakladne bolnice," *Novosti*, 15.3.1931, 17-18.

urban life takes place"⁴⁵¹. On the other side, Upper Town represented a traditional seat of administration and a place of profound historical importance, and relocating the City Hall was seen as a rupture with the city's heritage⁴⁵². Moreover, the debate over location was also tied to whether to build a new building since the Lower Town option implied new construction, while the Upper Town option suggested purchasing and adapting adjacent buildings⁴⁵³.

However, neither option was fully realized. Considering alternative project locations often complicated the decision-making process, as each option had advantages and disadvantages, leaving no definitive conclusion. The proposals kept alternating, debates continued, and all alternatives remained unrealized, like the projects according to the regulatory plans. Moreover, beyond proposing alternative locations for projects, suggestions for alternative uses of the same sites created additional dilemmas.

Moreover, the proposal of an alternative location for one project often disrupted the entire scheme of project distribution across plots, requiring further searches for alternative locations for more and more projects. Additionally, when a new location for one project was established, the remaining plans concerning other projects became irrelevant. As a result, constant changes in decisions led to a situation where, at any given moment, the overall picture of project distribution did not come together, as parts of the plans contradicted each other.

When initial plans for building locations were altered, public debates over suitable sites for various projects surged, with architects and urban planners proposing alternative solutions for individual projects and sometimes for entire complexes. For instance, amid the 1928 conflict between the Belgrade municipality and St. Mark's Church over land ownership, which jeopardized the implementation of the 1923 Master Plan, municipal architect Jan

⁴⁵¹ "Gradski senator Šeringer ostaje kod toga da je mjesto za vijećnicu u Donjem gradu," *Večer*, 17.10.1938, 3.

⁴⁵² Ivan Peršić, "Dva problema grada Zagreba. Izgradnja bolničkog zemljišta," *Jutarnji List*, 3.3.1931 7-8.

⁴⁵³ "Grad dobiva modernu vijećnicu," *Jutarnji List*, 2.11.1930, 6.

Dubovy proposed building the Opera House on the disputed plot and relocating City Hall to the kafana "Albania" plot⁴⁵⁴. In 1934, Georgy Kovalevsky, the author of the 1923 Master Plan, suggested a different complex for the site originally intended for a new royal palace: a monument to King Alexander, the largest square in Belgrade "for national meetings and festivities," along with buildings for the Senate, the State Council, and City Hall with a tower, "thereby marking the most important spot in Belgrade"⁴⁵⁵ (Fig. A.6). Similarly, in 1939, Ivan Zdravković proposed his solution to complement the existing Parliament building, suggesting new structures for the Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while recommending the Opera House be built on the kafana "Topola" site (at the end of Dečanska Street), where City Hall had been planned just a few years earlier⁴⁵⁶. It is no wonder that in many alternative Belgrade projects, both the Opera House and City Hall often appeared, sometimes overlapping, as finding the suitable location for these key buildings led to years of debate over the best sites.

In the case of Belgrade's City Hall, one reason for the extended debates was the initial selection of a site as in the 1923 Master Plan, which was criticized for being too far from the city center. Alternative locations, such as more central plots at Terazije Terrace and the kafana "Albania" site, were considered even before construction at the original site became impossible⁴⁵⁷. However, the first plot was designated to remain undeveloped to create a terrace, while an existing building occupied the second, and its site was assigned to the Stock Exchange building, which was also one of the most expensive plots in the city. Moreover,

⁴⁵⁴ "Šta će se podići na zemljištu crkve Svetog Marka," *Vreme*, 3.6.1928, 9.

⁴⁵⁵ "Kako bi trebalo urediti najglavniju i najlepšu tačku prestonice," *Vreme*, 11.11.1934, 7.

⁴⁵⁶ "Opera mogla bi se podići kod Skupštine," *Politika*, 25.2.1939, 14.

⁴⁵⁷ "Opštinski dom i Terazijaska terasa," *Politika*, 10.12.1927, 6.

placing City Hall on these plots in both instances had to compete with other proposed projects for those locations⁴⁵⁸.

In early 1929, as the debate over City Hall and Terazije Terrace leaned in favor of the latter, the municipality also considered the kafana "Albania" site, which was deemed suitable in size and location. Municipal architect Jan Dubovy even created a preliminary sketch of City Hall for this site⁴⁵⁹ (Fig. 13), but the high cost of the plot made this idea unfeasible. Meanwhile, for Terazije Terrace, where the municipality had been gradually purchasing plots, there were proposals to combine City Hall with the terrace to accommodate both projects. Yet, in these cases, either the City Hall location lacked representation, or the terrace became too limited⁴⁶⁰. Ultimately, the plot remained undeveloped, with neither City Hall nor a completed terrace.




Figure 13. The sketch of City Hall in Belgrade, Jan Dubovy, 1928.
Source: "Podizanje novog Opštinskog Doma," *Politika*, 4.2.1929, 8.

⁴⁵⁸ For example, the Stock Exchange, which was supposed to be built on the kafana "Albania" site according to the 1923 Master Plan, but then, due to difficulties in acquiring that plot, also considered a site on the Terazije Terrace. "Na kome će se mestu podići palata Beogradske Berze," *Vreme*, 5.2.1929, 2.

⁴⁵⁹ "Podizanje novog Opštinskog Doma," *Politika*, 4.2.1929, 8.

⁴⁶⁰ "Opštinski dom i Terazijaska terasa," *Politika*, 10.12.1927, 6. Branislav Nušić, "Pitanje oko ulepšavanja naše prestonice," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine*, 1.4.1933, 246.

By the 1930s, the municipality shifted its approach to site selection, focusing on more affordable plots. For example, in 1930, there were discussions about placing City Hall on the kafana "Topola" site⁴⁶¹. The municipality purchased the Manjež plot in 1931, but locating City Hall there faced two key issues. First, the 1923 Master Plan had reserved this site for the Opera House. Second, a park was proposed instead of City Hall, given the city's lack of green spaces. While most municipal deputies supported building City Hall⁴⁶², construction required a loan, leading the municipality to compromise by creating a temporary park with the option to build in the center of the site later on⁴⁶³. By 1935 the regulatory plan had designated the kafana "Topola" site for City Hall, which, unlike Manjež, still needed to be acquired but was more central and not tied to other projects. However, the consequences of the economic crisis halted discussions on construction. When the project resurfaced in late 1937, it was again proposed for the Old Cemetery complex⁴⁶⁴, again drawing criticism for not being central enough, and a new alternative location at Kraljev Square was suggested. Nevertheless, this further complicated matters as the City Administration also had claims on those sites.

This example, involving numerous alternative locations, illustrates that not only the extended debates about them delayed decision-making but also that, in a densely developed urban area with many projects in the early stages of planning, alternative locations inevitably created dilemmas. These dilemmas were complicated by the constant efforts to redistribute projects and, in some cases, were impossible to resolve due to the very nature of the dilemmas themselves.

⁴⁶¹ "Izmene generalnog plana," *Vreme*, 20.11.1930, 8.

⁴⁶² "Zaduženje Opštine kod Hipotekarne banke za kupovinu „Manježa“," *Politika*, 9.6.1931, 9.

⁴⁶³ "Prestonica dobija još jedan osobiti park," *Vreme*, 16.6.1932, 9.

⁴⁶⁴ "Ovako trebalo da bude," *Vreme*, 10.9.1937, 5.

Land Use Dilemmas

While the issue of placing public projects on privately owned land could theoretically be resolved, albeit at a higher cost, the distribution and redistribution of land plots due to alternative locations often led to dilemmas that were impossible to solve. Thus, there were situations where one project could not be realized without abandoning another, as both competed for the same site. Land-use dilemmas, however, extended beyond such situations. Challenges also arose when the alternative involved preserving existing structures on the site or when the alternative was to leave the land undeveloped (such as creating a park), leading to a dilemma in which either a building or an "unbuilt object" could be pursued.

Firstly, the dilemma of whether to build a new structure or preserve an existing one was inevitable when implementing projects in both cities in the interwar period, as it involved construction in already densely built-up areas, particularly for public projects that sought central locations, where the number of available undeveloped plots of suitable size was limited.

Such dilemmas were particularly challenging when they involved buildings with historical or architectural value. This issue was more pronounced in Zagreb, where the city center had been densely built before World War I. Additionally, Zagreb had a more active preservation movement, with Old Zagreb regarded as worth preserving, especially in the Upper Town, where the regulatory plan emphasized maximum preservation⁴⁶⁵. In contrast, Belgrade in the 1920s paid little attention to such concerns, as the construction boom prioritized the city's future over its past. However, by the late 1920s, a shift was marked by a growing romanticization of Belgrade's heritage, which led to increased preservation efforts in

⁴⁶⁵ "Pustite stari Zagreb na miru," *Večer*, 14.6.1938, 5. "Čuvajmo naše starine," *Jutarnji List*, 22.1.1932, 4. "Regulacija Gornjeg grada," *Večer*, 22.8.1936, 3-4.

the late 1930s⁴⁶⁶. For example, although the 1923 Master Plan proposed demolishing the Dositej's Lyceum to straighten the Gospodar Jevremova Street, there were also efforts to preserve it⁴⁶⁷. Nevertheless, the list of buildings considered worthy of preservation remained relatively small⁴⁶⁸. For example, according to the Draft Decree for the Implementation of the Regulatory Plan, in addition to the Belgrade fortress, eight other buildings were considered of historical and artistic significance and were to be preserved⁴⁶⁹.

In both cities, buildings from the second half of the 19th century were often not considered significant in such dilemmas. For example, in an interview on *Modern Construction in Zagreb*, architect Hugo Ehrlich⁴⁷⁰ noted that the time had come for most buildings of secular architecture from the second half of the 19th century to make way for new ones⁴⁷¹. When the *Ban Palace* was planned for construction in Zagreb on Strossmayer Promenade (*Strossmayerovo šetalište*) in 1937, the 19th-century buildings slated for demolition were dismissed as lacking value⁴⁷². The Chemical Institute (1883-1884, Herman Bollé) was set for demolition in the early 1930s to make way for the National Museum in Zagreb⁴⁷³. Furthermore, demands for its demolition arose even without any alternative construction projects in place⁴⁷⁴. In 1939, as the search for a location for the new City Hall intensified, this site was listed as one of the potential options, alongside the sites of the Palace of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (1877-1880, Friedrich von Schmidt), the Art

⁴⁶⁶ "Za zaštitu istoriskih spomenika u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 23.4.1933, 11. "Akcijski naših arhitekta," *Politika*, 26.11.1939, 16.

⁴⁶⁷ "Da li će Dositejev licej biti porušen ili će biti Jevremova ulica zalomljena," *Politika*, 11.1.1939, 9. See more in Angelina Banković, "Kako je spasen Dositejev licej (1923-1949)," *Nasleđe* 24 (2023): 101-117.

⁴⁶⁸ "Uredba o zaštiti beogradskih starina," *Beogradske Opštinske novine* 1 (1936): 82-88.

⁴⁶⁹ "Nacrt uredbe za izvodjenje regulacionog plana grada Beograda po idejnoj skici za regulaciju," *Opštinske novine* 21-22 (1940): dodatak, 38.

⁴⁷⁰ Hugo Ehrlich graduated from the Technical University in Vienna, where he worked after completing his studies. From 1909 to 1915, he had a bureau with Viktor Kovačić in Zagreb. Later he worked in the family construction company, and since 1925, he taught at the Technical Faculty in Zagreb. See more in Žarko Domljan, *Hugo Ehrlich*. (Zagreb: Društvo povjesničara umjetnosti Hrvatske, 1979), 175-179.

⁴⁷¹ "O modernoj izgradnji Zagreba," *Novosti*, 5.4.1929.

⁴⁷² "Novu bansku palaču treba sagrađiti na Griču," *Večer*, 10.12.1937, 3.

⁴⁷³ "Na Strossmayerovom trgu imao bi se izgraditi muzej Kralja Aleksandra," *Jutarnji List*, 7.10.1930, 4.

⁴⁷⁴ "Strossmayerov trg se preuredjuje u dječje igralište," *Večer*, 30.11.1938, 3.

Pavilion (1898, Ferdinand Fellner), the Secondary Schools building (1894-1895, Alfred Ludwig and Ljudevit Teodor Hülssner)⁴⁷⁵, and the building of "Hrvatski Sokol" and "Kolo" (1883-1885, Aleksander Seć, Ferdinand Kondrat, Matija Antolc)⁴⁷⁶. In the last case, other projects also claimed its plot. These situations sparked criticism, with calls to preserve the old buildings, as demolishing them was seen as an unnecessary sacrifice for new construction projects⁴⁷⁷.

In some cases, the existence of older buildings on a plot was not even considered a dilemma in Belgrade. For example, the old Ministry of Finance building (originally the palace of Prince Miloš's sons, 1836, Franz Dobi) was first slated for demolition in 1924-1925 to make way for the new Ministry of Finance building, and then again in 1937 for the State Monopolies Administration (*Uprava Državnih Monopola*) building. The fact that these plans involved demolishing a building from the first half of the 19th century was not discussed in the press publications about these construction projects.

When public projects were proposed on plots with existing buildings for other public purposes, the problem was not only that the building could be considered valuable and worthy of preservation. A further complication arose due to the need for relocation of the institution occupying it. For instance, in Zagreb, the State Mortgage Bank purchased the former palace of Baron Ljudevit Vranyczany (1881–1883, Otto von Hoffer), intending to demolish it to build a new structure⁴⁷⁸. Although the building, dating from the late 19th century, was not considered architecturally significant, it housed the Modern Gallery. The project assumed that the gallery would eventually be relocated to the museum complex on Varaždinska Road, a

⁴⁷⁵ "Gdje da se gradi nova gradska vijećnica," *Jutarnji List*, 8.6.1939, 10.

⁴⁷⁶ "Reprezentativna zgrada Gradske općine na mjestu gdje se nalazi zgrada bivšeg hrvatskog sokola," *Večer*, 7.10.1938, 5; "Gradski senator Šeringer ostaje kod toga da je mjesto za vijećnicu u Donjem gradu," *Večer*, 17.10.1938, 3.

⁴⁷⁷ "Za novu gradsku vijećnicu ima najviše mjesta u Varaždinskoj ulici," *Jutarnji List*, 13.8.1939, 8; "Gradnja nove vijećnice na Svačićevom trgu," *Jutarnji List*, 8.3.1940, 17.

⁴⁷⁸ "Državna Hipotekarna Banka gradit će novu palaču na Zrinjevcu," *Večer*, 23.11.1938, 2

project still in the future, but the temporary relocation was viewed as an unnecessary burden⁴⁷⁹. Because the Modern Gallery, rather than the building itself, was seen as significant, the State Mortgage Bank ultimately abandoned its construction plans for the site⁴⁸⁰.

If the existing buildings were private residential, the land use dilemma also highlighted the tension between public and private interests. The demolition of housing added a social dimension to the issue. In the context of a housing crisis, old and low-quality buildings provided affordable housing for people experiencing poverty in the city center. Consequently, even demolitions of non-historic buildings became contentious. For instance, in Belgrade, old kafanas buildings were considered easy targets for demolition, yet they were significant centers of local community life. For example, demolishing the kafana "Albania" became a widely publicized media event⁴⁸¹. It cannot be said that opponents of these demolitions were actively obstructing new projects, but they not only expressed their concerns in a nostalgic tone but also drew attention to the city's social housing and community issues. These dilemmas also mirrored the differing views on Belgrade as a city for the nation or a city for its residents.

Additionally, the presence of existing buildings on a plot not only complicated the decision-making process but also increased the cost of the project, mainly if the demolition involved relatively new structures. While public projects often underwent lengthy debates and decision-making phases, by the early 1930s, many reserved plots were released, allowing for private construction. In some cases, private owners even built on reserved plots without permission. As a result, by the late 1930s, when many public projects were once again approaching the construction phase, demolishing not only old small buildings but also new

⁴⁷⁹ "Moderna galerija treba ili novu zgradu ili ostati u svojim sadašnjim prostorijama," *Jutarnji List* 2.8.1938, 9

⁴⁸⁰ "Kako da se oživi gradjevna djelatnost ove godine," *Večer*, 26.2.1940, 3.

⁴⁸¹ "Noćas srušena kafana „Albanija“," *Vreme*, 17.10.1936, 8. "Protiv funkcionera opštine podignuta je tužba zbog rušenja „Albanije“," *Vreme*, 14.2.1937, 12.

and modern ones became necessary, such as the complex of public buildings at Tašmajdan, whose construction required the demolition of an entire block of buildings on Kralja Aleksandra Boulevard, including recently constructed ones⁴⁸².

For instance, the 1923 Master Plan designated the Manjež, owned by the Ministry of War, as the site for the Opera House⁴⁸³. Nevertheless, this plan required not only the demolition of the Ministry's barracks but also the Officers' House, designed in 1895 by Jovan Ilkić and Milorad Ruvidić. Although it is now recognized as a monument, at that time, it was not seen as significant, and its demolition was considered a contribution to the city's beautification⁴⁸⁴. By the end of 1930, the site reservation for the Opera was lifted since the Ministry of War planned to divide and sell the land for private development⁴⁸⁵. However, the municipality subsequently purchased the plot and demolished the barracks to create a park⁴⁸⁶.

By the late 1930s, when plans to build the Opera on the site were revived, it required the demolition of the recently constructed Manjež Theater⁴⁸⁷. In 1927, after the old stable, which had been converted into a theatre, burned down, it seemed like the ideal moment to start the Opera's construction, as the old building had already been destroyed. However, there were no financial resources to build the Opera on the scale envisioned by the 1923 Master Plan. In light of this, Milan Dimović, the Chief of the Art Department at the Ministry of Education, and Milan Predić, director of the National Theater, favored constructing a smaller

⁴⁸² "Beogradska opština ruši palate," *Vreme*, 5.1.1938, 5.

⁴⁸³ This plot could be easier to acquire since there were no private owners involved. "Pitanje Opere," *Politika*, 19.6.1922, 4.

⁴⁸⁴ "Projekat o rušenju Oficirskog doma, Ministarstva gradjevina i stare zgrade Ministarstva finansija," *Pravda*, 30.1.1938, 9.

⁴⁸⁵ "Komunalni problemi Beograda," *Vreme*, 6.12.1930, 6; "Parcelacija zemljišta na kome se nalazi „Manjež“ i Oficirski dom," *Vreme*, 18.3.1931, 5.

⁴⁸⁶ "Sednica opštinskog odbora," *Vreme*, 9.6.1931, 7; "Prestonica dobija još jedan osobiti park," *Vreme*, 16.6.1932, 9.

⁴⁸⁷ "Buduća beogradska Opera imaće 2.000 mesta," *Vreme*, 9.7.1939, 7.

theater building⁴⁸⁸. Stevan Hristić, the Opera's director, objected, arguing that if a temporary building were to be built, it should be for the Opera, not the theater, and stated that "if they don't give me an Opera costing 60 million, let them give me one costing seven to eight million so that we can separate [with the National Theater] as soon as possible"⁴⁸⁹. Architect Branko Maksimović criticized any idea of a temporary building, warning that such a solution would delay the original plan further, and when the time came to build the Opera, the temporary structure would need to be demolished⁴⁹⁰. Moreover, building this theater faced criticism in the Zagreb press, where it was deemed unnecessary⁴⁹¹. Nevertheless, the new temporary theater was built, and Maksimović's prediction came true, as the temporary solution became permanent, complicating the construction of the Opera.

Nevertheless, the dilemma of constructing the Opera on this site was not limited to the issue of demolishing existing buildings; a more complex problem emerged with the proposal to leave the plot undeveloped as a park. When the question of constructing the Opera was actively discussed again in the late 1930s, some municipality members, architects, and doctors expressed arguments in favor of preserving the park instead of building the Opera. Among the arguments were the shortage of parks in the city, the role of parks for public health, and the fact that more residents used parks than the Opera⁴⁹². The debate over whether to build the Opera also reflected a broader conflict of ideas about Belgrade as a city for representation or a town for its residents. Furthermore, different authorities presented different solutions to this dilemma. The municipality insisted that, in the interest of the city's

⁴⁸⁸ "Šta će Beograd dobiti na mestu izgorelog „Maneža“,“ *Politika*, 18.9.1927, 6; "Šta ćemo dobiti mesto izgorelog „Maneža“,“ *Politika*, 20.9.1927, 8; "Šta ćemo dobiti mesto izgorelog „Maneža“,“ *Politika*, 19.9.1927, 7.

⁴⁸⁹ "Šta ćemo dobiti mesto izgorelog „Maneža“,“ *Politika*, 20.9.1927, 8.

⁴⁹⁰ Branko Maksimović, "Manež ili Operu," *Politika*, 19.10.1927, 8.

⁴⁹¹ "Dok se za Beograd troše novi milijuni – Zagrebu se otima ono što je njegovo," *Večer*, 22.11.1927, 4.

⁴⁹² "Da li će Državna Opera podici na Slaviji," *Politika*, 11.1.1939, 9.

residents, the park at Manjež should be preserved and suggested the Opera be built on the neighboring Slavija square instead.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Construction supported the construction of the Opera at Manjež, as proposed in the 1923 Master Plan⁴⁹³. From the Ministry's perspective, the feasibility of construction on the site was crucial. Since the municipality had already purchased Manjež, the Ministry of Construction expected it to be possible to repurchase it from the municipality at the same price it was originally acquired. In contrast, placing the Opera on Slavija Square would require purchasing plots from private owners⁴⁹⁴. A dispute arose between the Municipality and the Ministry of Construction, with the final decision resting with the Ministry of Construction⁴⁹⁵.

The case of the Opera highlights the shifting dynamics of factors affecting project implementation. In the 1920s, the main obstacle was a lack of financial resources, but by the late 1930s, the necessary funding for the Opera's construction was already in place, and a competition for the design was planned⁴⁹⁶. However, the search for a suitable location had become so complex that, despite the various alternative sites under discussion⁴⁹⁷, the competition for the Opera building was announced without a definitive location being selected⁴⁹⁸.

Thus, in the case of public buildings, debates continued over whether to build, where, and how. Additionally, available plots in city centers were occupied, making the question of where to build increasingly complex and more frequently tied to dilemmas. In the 1920s, the

⁴⁹³ "Zapisnici konferencija," fasc. 3, collection 81, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

⁴⁹⁴ "Da li će Državna Opera podići na Slaviji," *Politika*, 11.1.1939, 9.

⁴⁹⁵ "Velika državna Opera biće podignuta u parku kod „Maneža“," *Politika*, 24.6.1939, 10.

⁴⁹⁶ "Za podizanje Opere u prestonici biće raspisan međunarodni konkurs," *Politika*, 25.3.1938, 8; "Oko zidanja velike Državne opere u Beogradu," *Politika*, 31.5.1938, 8; "Zapisnici konferencija," fasc. 3, collection 81, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

⁴⁹⁷ "Jedno stručno mišljenje o mestu na kome treba podići novu zgradu Opere," *Vreme*, 13.1.1939, 5; "Gde treba podići Operu," *Pravda*, 16.1.1939, 7; "Državna Opera mogla bi se podići kod Narodne Skupštine," *Politika*, 25.2.1939, 14.

⁴⁹⁸ *Internacionalna utakmica: za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Državne opere u Beogradu* (Beograd, 1939).

likelihood of facing such dilemmas was lower, but by the 1930s, this became a more common issue.

In the case of Zagreb City Hall, after all the debates and the decision to abandon expansion through the adaptation of existing buildings, the idea of constructing a new building resurfaced in the late 1930s. Nevertheless, nearly all the proposed sites involved dilemmas; the plots were occupied by parks or 19th-century buildings⁴⁹⁹. One of the options was the "Hrvatski Sokol" and "Kolo" building, where the dilemma became even more complicated as other projects claimed the same plot⁵⁰⁰.

A frequent land-use dilemma arises when two or more planned projects compete for the same site, which may already be developed or intended for use as a park. For instance, in Belgrade, the Ministry of Education and the Ethnographic Museum both claimed the same site, already occupied by a 19th-century building.

In Belgrade, the 1923 Master Plan initially addressed the issue of allocating projects to specific plots, seemingly resolving the problem, but only if the plan was executed as intended. However, emerging complications and alternative location proposals disrupted this distribution, leading to land-use dilemmas. In Zagreb, the situation was challenging from the start due to the absence of a master plan. Claims for sites were often based on earlier plans and the partial plans of the 1920s, while the Master plan was only developed and adopted during the 1930s. Despite these differences, both cities faced similar issues, with several projects competing for central sites, which were considered convenient and suitable for construction.

⁴⁹⁹ Also, one of the possible options was the location of the botanical garden. "Gradnja nove vijećnice na Svačićevom trgu," *Jutarnji List*, 8.3.1940, 17; "Za novu gradsku vijećnicu ima najviše mjesta u Varaždinskoj ulici," *Jutarnji List*, 13.8.1939, 8.

⁵⁰⁰ "Zagreb danas nema 50 milijuna dinara za gradnju jedne reprezentativne vijećnice," *Večer*, 11.10.1938, 5; "Reprezentativna zgrada Gradske općine na mjestu gdje se nalazi zgrada bivšeg hrvatskog sokola," *Večer*, 7.10.1938, 5; "Gradski senator Šeringer ostaje kod toga da je mjesto za vijećnicu u Donjem gradu," *Večer*, 17.10.1938, 3.

For instance, Mažuranić Square was considered a possible location for Zagreb City Hall, although regulatory plans designated it for university buildings⁵⁰¹. The university claimed the plot since it was adjacent to the complex of university buildings, but different faculties competed for it. In the early 1930s, there were plans to construct the Natural Science Institute of the Faculty of Philosophy and museums on the site⁵⁰². In early 1938, a plan was under discussion to build the main university building on the Mažuranić Square site, with a competition already being planned, while the old main university building site was being offered to the City hall⁵⁰³.

In 1939, the Faculty of Law claimed this plot but also encountered challenges. Initially, a loan had been approved, and a land exchange with the municipality had been sanctioned⁵⁰⁴. Thus, with the location and funding issues seemingly resolved, the dean of the Faculty of Law, Juraj Andrassy, planned to move forward with project selection⁵⁰⁵. In addition to the Faculty of Law, the site was being considered for the Faculty of Philosophy and the rector's office, which would require demolishing the existing building of "Hrvatski Sokol" and "Kolo"⁵⁰⁶. However, this plan conflicted with the regulatory plan, which envisioned constructing a single building in the park's center, while the park itself was considered an essential green space⁵⁰⁷.

Consequently, it was deemed that the plot was too small for the university, and the city's regulatory department proposed alternative locations outside the center⁵⁰⁸. By the late 1930s, for public projects that could no longer be accommodated in the city center, the

⁵⁰¹ "Zagreb danas nema 50 milijuna dinara za gradnju jedne reprezentativne vijećnice," *Večer*, 11.10.1938, 5.

⁵⁰² "Univerzitetska četvrt," *Novosti*, 21.5.1931.

⁵⁰³ "Tamo gdje je zgrada kola i sokola sagradit će se glavna sveučilišna zgrada," *Večer*, 18.3.1938, 5.

⁵⁰⁴ "Troškom od 9 milijuna dinara gradit će se na Marulićevom trgu kralj „Kola“ zgrada Pravnog Fakulteta," *Večer*, 13.5.1939, 3.

⁵⁰⁵ "9 milijuna dinara za gradnju nove zgrade pravnog fakulteta," *Večer*, 13.6.1939, 2.

⁵⁰⁶ "Nova glavna zgrada Hrvatskog sveučilišta," *Večer*, 19.3.1940, 3.

⁵⁰⁷ "„Sveučilišni grad“ gradit će se u istočnom dijelu grada," *Jutarnji List*, 18.5.1940, 14.

⁵⁰⁸ Dr. M. Ivšić, "Gdje da se u Zagrebu izgradi „Sveučilišni grad“? Potreban nam je zdrav plan, a ne krparenje," *Jutarnji List*, 22.12.1940, 20.

municipality often proposed plots on the undeveloped area of Varaždinska Road⁵⁰⁹. However, the location was criticized for being too far from the center and cut off by the railway. These debates mirrored differing perspectives on the city's growth, with some seeing it as an optimistic opportunity for expansion, while others viewed the location as impractical for the city's immediate needs⁵¹⁰.

While the municipality believed the plot issue for the Faculty of Law was solved, university representatives were dissatisfied and preferred to allocate funds to purchase a different plot, as financial resources had already been secured, but the suitable location had not⁵¹¹. One of the potential sites the Faculty of Law considered was a plot on Savska Road, which the municipality was also considering for the construction of City Hall⁵¹².

Meanwhile, the municipality, using the argument that the plot on Mažuranić Square was too small for the university buildings and had height restrictions, decided to allocate the site for other purposes – to the Postal Directorate in Zagreb to construct a Radio House⁵¹³. Nevertheless, the Radio House project also encountered problems related to the plot. First, the land use dilemma persisted, as the university continued to lay claim to the site. Second, contrary to the original argument, the proposal involved not only using the vacant land but also to demolish the building of "Hrvatski Sokol" and "Kolo"⁵¹⁴. The Singing Society "Kolo" opposed the demolition, defending the old building as a symbol of Croatian culture and protecting their interests, at the very least demanding compensation if the building were

⁵⁰⁹ "Četiri velike palače gradit će se na Varaždinskoj cesti," *Jutarnji List*, 1.9.1940, 27.

⁵¹⁰ "Gradnja nove vijećnice na Svačićevom trgu," *Jutarnji List*, 8.3.1940, 17.

⁵¹¹ "Gdje će se graditi zgrada Pravnog fakulteta Zagrebačkog sveučilišta," *Jutarnji List*, 23.10.1940, 11; "Pravni fakultet nije još dobio zemljište za gradnju zgrade," *Večer*, 2.4.1941, 5.

⁵¹² "Gradska vijećnica imala bi se graditi na savskoj cesti," *Večer*, 1.2.1941, 2; "Gradska općina ne sklapa nikakav zajam za gradnju vijećnice," *Večer*, 1.4.1941, 3.

⁵¹³ "Gradnja velikog doma radio i zgrada telefonskih podcentrala," *Večer*, 18.9.1940, 2.

⁵¹⁴ Ariana Štulhofer, i Iva Muraj, "Sportski i sveučilišni sadržaji na Mažuranićevu i Marulićevu trgu u Zagrebu," *Prostor* 14, br. 1(31) (2006): 43-52.

demolished⁵¹⁵. To resolve the issue, the municipality organized a conference with city and Banovina authorities without representatives from "Hrvatski Sokol" or "Kolo"⁵¹⁶.

Due to a series of dilemmas, none of the proposed projects were realized at this location, and the mentioned building and the park behind it remain preserved. These dilemmas not only created situations where a choice had to be made between two competing projects, but they also complicated the decision-making process to the point where none of the proposed projects were ultimately implemented.

While this outcome may be anticipated when multiple projects compete for the same plot of land, a paradoxical situation in Belgrade occurred where a similar deadlock in decision-making arose, even though two projects, the City Hall and the City Administration, were competing for two separate plots.

When it became impossible to build City Hall on the Old Cemetery complex according to the 1923 Master Plan, a long search for a suitable alternative location began. By 1937, the project was again considered for another part of the same Tašmajdan complex. However, like the initial choice in the early 1920s, this site faced criticism for being too far from the city center, and a location on Kraljev Square was proposed as an alternative location⁵¹⁷.

This site housed the mid-19th century buildings of the Belgrade City Administration, which, like the municipality, faced the issue of inadequate facilities. The 1923 Master Plan proposed constructing a new City Administration building on the same site. By 1926, a project in the academic architectural style typical of administrative buildings was created⁵¹⁸ (Fig. 14). Nevertheless, funding became a challenge for many projects in the 1920s, and the

⁵¹⁵ "Rješavanje problema Mažuranićevog trga," *Jutarnji List*, 24.3.1941, 7.

⁵¹⁶ "Anketa o gradnji Radio Doma na Mažuranićevom trgu," *Jutarnji List*, 29.3.1941, 11.

⁵¹⁷ "Gde da se podigne opštinski dom i kako da se uredi trg pred univerzitetom," *Politika*, 1.1.1939, 20.

⁵¹⁸ "Pred podizanjem nove zgrade Uprave Grada," *Vreme*, 26.10.1929, 6.

City Administration anticipated financial support from the state⁵¹⁹. To resolve this, the Financial Law of 1930-31 established a special fund for the construction⁵²⁰, and by 1932, the technical department of the City Administration had created a new project with a façade of artificial stone and terracotta⁵²¹.




Figure 14. The project for the City Administration Building in Belgrade, 1928.
Source: "Projekat za novu zgradu Uprave grada Beograda," *Ilustrovani list* 10 (1928), 28.

By 1936, the necessary funds had finally been accumulated, but by that time, a new proposal emerged to build the City Administration at the Old Cemetery complex (Tašmajdan), considering both the building's size and its proximity to the planned Palace of Justice⁵²². This proposal was also incorporated into Kovalevsky's project for the complex of public buildings at Tašmajdan⁵²³. However, by the end of 1937, municipal authorities decided to keep the City Administration building at Kraljev Square⁵²⁴.

⁵¹⁹ "Beogradska Opština će uskoro početi sa zidanjem novih zgrada za zatvore Uprave Grada," *Vreme*, 1.3.1928, 8; "Pred podizanjem nove zgrade Uprave grada," *Vreme*, 26.10.1929, 6.

⁵²⁰ *Finansijski zakon za 1930/1931 godinu* (Beograd, 1930).

⁵²¹ The state would give the municipality 50% of its expenditure on the territories of the Belgrade city administration. "Podizanje savremene policijske zgrade u Prestonici," *Vreme*, 3.3.1932, 6.

⁵²² "Palata Uprave grada treba da se podigne na Taš-Majdanu pošto opština nema drugo zemljište," *Vreme*, 13.8.1936, 9.

⁵²³ "Ovako trebalo da bude," *Vreme*, 10.9.1937, 5.

⁵²⁴ "Budući izgled Beograda," *Pravda*, 8.12.1937, 6.

Over the following two years, City Hall was still planned for Tašmajdan, as part of a complex that included the Palace of Justice and the State Mortgage Bank, with discussions about creating a unified architectural design⁵²⁵. However, in early 1939, municipal architect Marko Andrejević proposed a monumental stripped-classicism style building for the City Hall at Kraljev Square, stressing the importance of its central location⁵²⁶ (Fig. 15). Responding to this, the City Administration requested the municipality swap the allocated plots so they could receive the City Hall site at Tašmajdan⁵²⁷. The arguments remained the same: the City Administration would be built next to the Palace of Justice, and the City Hall would be in the old city center. Despite these arguments, the municipality continued with its plans for City Hall at Tašmajdan, and by late 1939, preparations were underway for an architectural competition⁵²⁸. However, after a change in municipal leadership in 1940, municipal authorities decided to build the City Hall at Kraljev Square, bringing Andrejević's project back to the forefront⁵²⁹.



Figure 15. The project for the City Hall at the Kraljev Square in Belgrade, Marko Andrejević, 1939.

⁵²⁵ "Državna Hipotekarna Banka podići će u Kralja Aleksandra ulici novu velelepnu palatu," *Politika*, 30.1.1938, 16; "Podizanje Palate Pravde u Beogradu treba da počne još ove godine," *Politika*, 2.2.1939, 11.

⁵²⁶ "Gde da se podigne Opštinski Dom i kako da se uredi trg pred Univerzitetom," *Politika*, 1.1.1939, 20.

⁵²⁷ "Uprava grada Beograda traži da joj se za podizanje njene palate ustupi zemljište u Aleksandrovoj ulici," *Politika*, 3.6.1939, 19.

⁵²⁸ "Uskoro će biti raspisan konkurs za izradu idejne skice novog reprezentativnog Opštinskog doma," *Pravda*, 29.10.1939; "Konkurs za dom beogradske opštine biće raspisan uskoro," *Politika*, 11.11.1939, 11.

⁵²⁹ "Opština podiže svoj dom," *Vreme*, 2.10.1940, 7.

Source: "Opština podiže svoj dom," Vreme, 2.10.1940, 7.

Due to the conflicting perspectives and the inability to make a definitive decision, where each option had its advantages and disadvantages, neither building was constructed, even though two suitable plots were available. Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the Tašmajdan complex also affected the construction of the Palace of Justice.

2.3. Decision-making and Cooperation

Limited resources hindered decision-making in the organization of public building construction. Additionally, choosing between options, each with its advantages and disadvantages, often led to hesitation, plan changes, and inconsistency, resulting in paralysis of the decision-making process. Such problems were evident even when a single state or municipal authority was the primary decision-maker, such as in the efforts to build City Halls in both cities.

The complexity of decision-making increased further because most public building projects involved multiple authorities, mainly for project approval and support. For instance, in Belgrade, there was usually an authority advocating for the building, and the Ministry of Construction played a role in developing, approving, and organizing construction, along with the municipality, which handled regulatory alignment. In Zagreb, even for projects under central government jurisdiction, their involvement was minimized, with key decisions being made through collaboration between regional and municipal bodies.

In these examples, there was typically a primary actor responsible for construction, attempting to resolve the main issues and coordinate with other entities (cases, where coordination challenges left selected projects unrealized, will be discussed in Chapter 4). However, when construction was planned in the interests of multiple authorities, cooperation

between them became essential. The lack of coordination and the desynchronization of efforts impeded the realization of these projects.

This problem was particularly evident in the first attempts to address the issue of administrative buildings by constructing an entire complex. One such effort was made in Belgrade immediately after the First World War, with proposed assistance from a foreign company⁵³⁰. In 1920, proposals were received from several companies, but due to the absence of a Master plan, the Minister of Construction rejected them⁵³¹. The Master Plan was not fully adopted until 1924, but by then, it was too late to reconsider such a large-scale project, as many ministries had already begun their construction processes separately. Moreover, individual buildings also encountered coordination issues, sometimes preventing the projects from progressing to the design selection stage. It was especially true when the buildings were intended to serve the needs of multiple actors, as seen with the construction of the Palace of Justice in both Belgrade and Zagreb.

In Belgrade, various courts (county, district, commercial, appeals, and cassation courts) were scattered across the city, often housed in rented private buildings that were not always suitable for their needs⁵³². Thus, the proposal to build the Palace of Justice was based on financial and administrative arguments and centralizing the courts to improve efficiency⁵³³.

The 1923 Belgrade Master Plan envisioned a large building that would accommodate both the Ministry of Justice and the Palace of Justice in the Tašmajdan complex. However, like many other projects in the Master Plan, this proposal faced challenges: primarily a lack of funds, which delayed construction throughout the 1920s, and difficulties in securing the land

⁵³⁰ "Zgrade i stanovi," *Pravda*, 2.1.1919, 2.

⁵³¹ For example, a french company proposed constructing a complex of public buildings for 5 years with the credit for 40 years. "Za obnovu Beograda," *Politika*, 10.10.1920, 2; "Državne zgrade u Beogradu," *Politika*, 24.10.1920, 3.

⁵³² "Beogradu je potrebna palata Pravde," *Pravda*, 14.11.1928, 4.

⁵³³ "Palata Pravde. Dostojni smeštaj i koncentracija naših sudova," *Pravda*, 23.5.1929, 1. It was also planned to concentrate judicial power by constructing palaces of justice in several cities: Belgrade, Zagreb, Split, Novi Sad, and Skopje. "Skupština Saveza Advokatskih komora," *Branič*, 1.6.1938, 317.

later. By the early 1930s, alternative locations began to be considered due to the need for expropriation and negotiations with private landowners at Tašmajdan⁵³⁴.

Additionally, the monumental scale of the proposed Palace of Justice, designed to house all the courts, required significant funding, which complicated the project implementation. As a result, in the early 1930s, the leadership of Belgrade's courts decided to divide the project, proposing to build a separate building for two courts (the Court of First Instance for the City of Belgrade and the Belgrade Commercial Court) on another plot within the Tašmajdan complex. However, the plot owner, the Church of St. Mark, became a key obstacle, and the church ultimately developed this proposed site as its residential building in 1932⁵³⁵. Consequently, constructing a single structure for all the courts was revived again.

For the joint project, it was expected that the Ministry of Justice would handle the financial aspects while the municipality would provide the plot. Thus, besides already existing difficulties, a lack of coordination between the authorities affected the decision-making process. Throughout 1934, the city worked to resolve the issue of the plot allocated in the 1923 Master Plan, and by the end of the year, a final decision was expected, but the problem was removed from the agenda for further study⁵³⁶.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice was more successful in securing funds, and the Financial Law of 1934/35 authorized the Minister of Justice to take out a loan from the State Mortgage Bank, using annual rents from court buildings as payment⁵³⁷. This provision was reaffirmed in later financial laws. Ministers of Justice were later criticized in the press for

⁵³⁴ For example, during the debates about the purchase of the Manjež plot by the municipality, the option of placing the Palace of Justice there was mentioned. "Zapisnik odborske sednice od 16 marta 1931," *Opštinske novine*, 1.6.1931, 769.

⁵³⁵ "Šta će se sve zidati na zemljištu crkve Sv. Marka," *Politika*, 24.2.1931, 7. Technical documentation II-54-1932, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijски arhiv Beograda.

⁵³⁶ "Zapisnik III redovne sednice Gradskog veća Opštine grada Beograda," *Opštinske Novine*, 1.11.1934, 422. It was expected that the municipality would soon return to discussing this issue. "Rušenje starih štala i garaža na Taš-Majdanu i pripremanje terena za podizanje novih palata i javnih gradjevina," *Vreme*, 7.12.1934, 9.

⁵³⁷ *Finansijski zakon za 1934/1935 godinu* (Beograd, 1934), 14.

failing to take advantage of this opportunity⁵³⁸. Minister Dragutin Kojić, however, claimed in early 1935 that the ministry had already secured the necessary funds and planned to organize a competition for the building's design, with only the need for the municipality to provide the land for free⁵³⁹.

While Kojić hoped the municipality would cooperate, the municipal authorities have changed. Until January 1935, the mayor was Milutin Petrović, a former official of the Ministry of Justice and former president of the Court of First Instance in Belgrade, who fully supported the construction of the Palace of Justice. However, when industrialist Vlada Ilić became a mayor, attention shifted towards infrastructure projects rather than public buildings, and Ilić had his views on the courts in Belgrade. He proposed to the Minister of Justice that the city courts be moved from the municipal budget to the state budget⁵⁴⁰, hoping that the construction of the Palace of Justice would no longer involve the municipality.

As a result, discussions about constructing the building resumed only in 1937, and by the end of the year, the plot for the Palace of Justice was again designated in line with the 1923 Master Plan. By that point, the municipality already owned around two-thirds of the site, but a portion still required expropriation⁵⁴¹. This decision came during a joint conference between the Prime Minister, representatives of various ministries, and the municipality, which aimed to address the challenges of cooperation and the prolonged negotiation process between the institutions involved in public building projects in Belgrade⁵⁴².

The Financial Law of 1938/39 introduced a new financing plan that divided the costs among the involved authorities. The Minister of Justice was authorized to allocate 40,000,000

⁵³⁸ Milan Živadinović, "Mesto Palate Pravde, nova seljakanja beogradskih sudova," *Branič* 1 (1940): 1; "Projekt Palate pravde u Beogradu izgleda ostaće još dugo samo projekt," *Pravda*, 3.1.1937, 21.

⁵³⁹ "Ministar pravde o reforme pravosudja," *Branič* 2 (1935), 82.

⁵⁴⁰ Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923," 76-77.

⁵⁴¹ "Projekt Palate pravde u Beogradu izgleda ostaće još dugo samo projekt," *Pravda*, 3.1.1937, 21; "Konferencija o regulaciji i urbanističkim problemima Beograda," *Vreme*, 4.12.1937, 6.

⁵⁴² "Zapisnici konferencija," fasc. 3, collection 81, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

dinars, while the Danube Banovina was required to contribute 3,000,000 dinars by selling the plot and the old District Court building in Belgrade⁵⁴³. The municipality was responsible for covering a quarter of the expenses, with the Ministry of Justice able to secure the remaining funds through a loan for public works⁵⁴⁴. The municipality planned to cover part of its expenses by providing the land⁵⁴⁵.

At this stage, the project implementation encountered the typical issue of time lags with projects designed "for the future." The Palace of Justice project was created in 1928, probably by municipal architect Jan Dubovy, but at that time, questions about the location and financing were still unresolved⁵⁴⁶. Nevertheless, after an agreement between the state and municipality on the division of funding was reached and the site was determined, it became necessary to develop a new design, as the original project no longer met the requirements⁵⁴⁷.

In the press, different options were mentioned for the type of project required: whether in a modern style or something "more monumental than the Main Post Office," given the building's representational purpose⁵⁴⁸. However, at this stage, the desynchronization of efforts between authorities became a problem, mainly due to the municipality. In early 1939, plans were made to coordinate the urban planning and architectural aspects of a public building complex, including the Palace of Justice, the City Hall, and the State Mortgage Bank building⁵⁴⁹. As discussed earlier, the municipality's inability to reach a final decision on the location of the City Hall indirectly hindered progress on the Palace of Justice as well.

⁵⁴³ *Finansijski zakon za 1938/1939 godinu* (Beograd, 1938), 56.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁵ "Zapisnik IV redovne sednice Gradskog veća Opštine grada Beograda," *Opštinske novine*, 23.5.1938, 211.

⁵⁴⁶ "Projekt Palate pravde u Beogradu izgleda ostaće još dugo samo projekt," *Pravda*, 3.1.1937, 21. Milašinović-Marić, *Arhitekta Jan Dubovi*, 36.

⁵⁴⁷ "Zapisnik X redovne skupštine Advokatske komore," *Branič* 11 (1938), 552.

⁵⁴⁸ "Podizanje Palate Pravde u Beogradu treba da počne još ove godine," *Politika*, 2.2.1939, 11; "Projekt Palate pravde u Beogradu izgleda ostaće još dugo samo projekt," *Pravda*, 3.1.1937, 21.

⁵⁴⁹ "Podizanje Palate Pravde u Beogradu treba da počne još ove godine," *Politika*, 2.2.1939, 11.

Furthermore, during the final stages of resolving the plot issue and its full expropriation, a legal problem emerged: the property owners' complaints were submitted to the District Court for the City of Belgrade (which was also expected to occupy part of the future Palace of Justice). The District Court initially declared itself incompetent in this matter, but the Court of Cassation later determined that this court was, in fact, responsible for addressing the complaints⁵⁵⁰.

The situation regarding court buildings in Zagreb closely resembled that of Belgrade. Courts were dispersed across different parts of the city, and the buildings were in poor condition, but they were state-owned, not rented. Intensive discussions about constructing a Palace of Justice in Zagreb began in the second half of the 1930s.

As with other public projects, there was a recurring comparison theme with Belgrade. According to the Financial Law of 1935/1936, the Minister of Justice was authorized to take out loans from the State Mortgage Bank for the new Palace of Justice in Belgrade, whereas in Zagreb, only for necessary repairs to the court buildings⁵⁵¹. In late 1935, Zagreb's mayor, Rudolf Erber, traveled to Belgrade to discuss the possibility of constructing a Palace of Justice in Zagreb with the Minister of Justice, Mile Miškulin⁵⁵², a Croatian lawyer who held the position from August 24, 1935, to March 7, 1936. Miškulin admitted that the situation in Zagreb was more difficult, but the mayor promised that the municipality would assist not only by providing the land but also financially⁵⁵³.

In 1936, the municipality allocated a plot at the corner of Varaždin Road and Trnjanska Road⁵⁵⁴. Although the municipality owned this plot, it was located in the undeveloped southern part of the city, where plots for public buildings were available, but

⁵⁵⁰ "Iz advokatske komore u Beogradu," *Branič* 2 (1941): 81.

⁵⁵¹ *Finansijski zakon za 1935/1936 godinu* (Beograd, 1935), 19.

⁵⁵² "Palače Pravde gradit će se u Beogradu i Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 1.12.1935, 4.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁴ "Gdje da se u Zagrebu izgradi pravosudna palača," *Jutarnji List*, 3.6.1936, 10

often criticized as too remote and separated by the railway from the city center. Consequently, discussions about alternative locations for the Palace of Justice began⁵⁵⁵.

The need for state participation in financing the construction of the Palace of Justice became the primary obstacle to its realization in Zagreb. From the Zagreb perspective, it was one more example of financial deprivation, as the central government overlooked Zagreb's problems, even though the city contributed significantly in taxes. From this point of view, constructing the Palace of Justice was considered a way to return funds paid as taxes to Zagreb through state funding⁵⁵⁶.

Recognizing that the state could not allocate funds through the budget, the legal community in Zagreb, represented by the Lawyer's Society, proposed several alternatives. For example, the Zagreb municipality and Savska Banovina could take out a loan, with the state gradually reimbursing these funds or transferring ownership of individual court buildings to the municipality⁵⁵⁷. It was an attempt to resolve the issue independently, as the state was not giving it sufficient attention. On the one hand, this approach could expedite the process, but on the other hand, the courts were the responsibility of state authorities, not municipal ones, and the municipality was already overburdened with its obligations⁵⁵⁸. Another proposal was for state authorities to take out a loan from the State Mortgage Bank or local banks (City or Savska Banovina Savings banks)⁵⁵⁹, which would require approval through the state budget.

Nevertheless, the municipality did not lose hope of receiving state funding, especially since it had been promised in 1937 that the budget would include a loan for constructing the

⁵⁵⁵ "Gdje treba sagraditi reprezentativnu Palaču pravde," *Večer*, 7.3.1939, 5.

⁵⁵⁶ "O palači Pravde i banskoj palači," *Jutarnji List*, 22.3.1938, 7.

⁵⁵⁷ "Predlog pravničkog društva da Zagreb jevtino dodje do Palate pravde," *Štampa*, 9.5.1935, 9; "Kako će se najbrže izgraditi palača pravde u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 22.1.1937, 3; "Postoji li mogućnost da gradska općina u svojoj režiji sagradi palaču pravde," *Večer*, 15.1.1938; "Za Palaču pravde," *Odvjetnik* 1-2 (1938), 27.

⁵⁵⁸ "20 do 30 milijuna dinara treba za gradnju Palače Pravde u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 23.1.1937, 7; "U pitanju gradnje palače pravde razilaze se mišljenja," *Večer*, 4.2.1937, 3.

⁵⁵⁹ "O palači Pravde i banskoj palači," *Jutarnji List*, 22.3.1938, 7; "Za Palaču pravde," *Odvjetnik* 1-2 (1938), 27.

Palace of Justice in Zagreb⁵⁶⁰. However, even the 1938/39 budget, like previous ones, did not allocate funds for the Zagreb Palace of Justice⁵⁶¹. Minister of Justice Milan Simonović promised that funding would come from a loan for public works⁵⁶². Thus, construction was once again delayed.

When Viktor Ružić, the former Ban of Savska Banovina, became Minister of Justice on February 5, 1939, hopes were renewed that the ministry's approach to financing the Palace of Justice in Zagreb might change⁵⁶³. Ružić hoped to secure a 20 million dinars loan for the project in the budget⁵⁶⁴. However, by the time he assumed office, the budget had already been set, so Ružić sought at least two million dinars to begin preliminary work on the Palace of Justice⁵⁶⁵. Despite these efforts, only 1 million dinars were made available for preparatory work, allowing at least organizing a design competition for the building⁵⁶⁶. Ružić planned to secure a 20 million dinars loan for the next budget⁵⁶⁷, but after the Cvetković–Maček Agreement, he was no longer the Minister of Justice. Nevertheless, the Banovina of Croatia was formed, and its authorities became key actors in the project's implementation, attempting to secure funds through the regional budget and organize a design competition, but this was not achieved until 1941⁵⁶⁸.

As with the Palace of Justice in Belgrade, the failure to implement the project resulted from the lack of coordination between the authorities. On the surface, the issue in Belgrade seemed to be about land, while it appeared to be financial in Zagreb. Moreover, these

⁵⁶⁰ "Zagreb za dvije godine može imati Palaču Pravde," *Jutarnji List*, 8.1.1937, 8; "Gradnja Palače Pravde," *Večer*, 8.12.1937, 7.

⁵⁶¹ "Ni ove se godine neće graditi Palača Pravde," *Večer*, 4.1.1938, 4. The Zagreb press noted that 40 million dinars were allocated for the Palace of Justice in Belgrade in this budget. "O palači Pravde i banskoj palači," *Jutarnji List*, 22.3.1938, 7.

⁵⁶² "Za Palaču pravde," *Odvjetnik* 3-4 (1938), 87.

⁵⁶³ "Palača pravde počeo će se graditi ove godine," *Večer*, 8.2.1939, 1.

⁵⁶⁴ "Zagreb će ipak uskoro dobiti Palaču pravde," *Jutarnji list*, 5.3.1939, 7.

⁵⁶⁵ "Ministar pravde odredio kredit od blizu 2 milijuna za prve radove Palače pravde," *Večer*, 23.2.1939, 5.

⁵⁶⁶ "Računa se da će Palača Pravde u Zagrebu stajati oko pedeset milijuna dinara," *Jutarnji List*, 14.5.1939, 8.

⁵⁶⁷ "20 milijuna dinara za palaču pravde u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 4.3.1939, 8; "Računa se da će Palača Pravde u Zagrebu stajati oko pedeset milijuna dinara," *Jutarnji List*, 14.5.1939, 8.

⁵⁶⁸ "Bit će raspisan natječaj za idejne skice palače pravde na Varaždinskoj ulici," *Večer*, 11.2.1941, 5.

challenges were driven by the municipality in the Belgrade case and the central government in the Zagreb case.

Chapter 3. Selection Mechanism, Communication Failure, and Rejected Projects

The previous chapter discussed the challenges encountered during the initial decision-making process: whether, what, where, and how to build. In theory, once these organizational questions were resolved, the next step was choosing a project for implementation. Different mechanisms for selecting architectural projects exist in interwar Yugoslav architecture, such as direct commission, assigning, and competition.

In a direct commission, a client selects an architectural firm or architect and requests a project, which is the main method for private buildings. Architects with private firms advertise their services, and clients make their selection based on education, reputation, personal connections, and recommendations.

For public buildings associated with the state or municipality, assignment was a more common selection method. A relevant organization assigns the task to an architect from its technical department. For municipal projects, this typically meant architects from the municipality's technical bureau, while for state buildings, architects from the Ministry of Construction (though some ministries had their technical departments), its regional directorate, or later banovinas' technical departments. In this case, the selection was influenced by the delineation of competencies between technical authorities, then by the architect's position within the bureaucratic hierarchy, education, experience, and specialization.

Both methods involve the initial selection of architects based on their personal qualities and position. In the case of a commission, investors approach bureaus directly, communicate their requirements, and architects elaborate projects. In the case of an assignment, government bodies contact other relevant authorities (or one department contacts

another within the same authority), heads of relevant departments appoint architects and convey requirements, and architects elaborate projects.

In both cases, factors outside of the specific project influence the selection. The architect may offer several options for certain aspects, such as the façade, or make adjustments to the initial design based on client requirements or related factors (such as changes in the budget or location). Nevertheless, direct communication leaves fewer written records and thus provides less material for analyzing the factors behind the choice. Additionally, both mechanisms typically involve modifying a single project rather than selecting from multiple options, reducing the amount of data available for analysis.

However, even in cases of direct commissioning, examples can be found that highlight the complexities of selection and the logic behind project choices. In many cases, the replacement of commissioned or assigned projects occurred due to time lags in decision-making. These delays happened when a project was designed before key construction issues were resolved, and by the time construction could begin, the project was considered outdated, often due to shifts in architectural trends. Even relatively short delays could lead to project replacements. For example, in Belgrade at the end of 1933, Professor Svetozar Jovanović from the Technical Faculty developed a design for the Faculty of Law in an academic classical style, but a modernist building was initially planned⁵⁶⁹ (Fig. A.7). This design followed the style of other buildings in the university complex, which were constructed in the 1920s, such as the University Library⁵⁷⁰. Nevertheless, the project was postponed first due to delays in confirming a loan by the Ministry of Education, which was included in the

⁵⁶⁹ "Na proleće treba da se zida novi pravni fakultet," *Politika*, 12.11.1933, 14; "Kako će izgledati palata Pravnog fakulteta," *Štampa*, 5.4.1934, 5. Svetozar Jovanović graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1905 and began his career at the Ministry of Construction. He pursued additional education at the Technical University in Charlottenburg. In the early 1920s, he combined his work at the ministry with teaching, later becoming a professor at the Technical Faculty and engaging in private practice. See more in Viktorija Kamilić, *Arhitekta Svetozar Jovanović*, (Beograd: Zadužbina Andrejević, 2011).

⁵⁷⁰ See more about the complex in Marina Pavlović, "Novi Univerzitetski centar međuratnog Beograda," *Kultura* 154 (2017): 109-133.

1935/1936 budget, and later because of land issues⁵⁷¹ (the municipality demanded compensation from the state for the plot, as the site donation made in 1911 was not considered valid⁵⁷²). By early 1936, when construction was finally possible, the original design was seen as unsuitable, and a new project in the style of monumental modernism was developed by another professor from the Technical Faculty, Petar Bajalović⁵⁷³.

The case where a series of commissions with some projects were rejected in favor of others, which could demonstrate the selection logic, was the creation of a crematorium in Belgrade, a unique architectural challenge for that time. In general, the task was made more difficult for architects not only by the relative novelty of such buildings but also by the contradictory tendencies in the ideology of the cremationist movement⁵⁷⁴. In interwar Europe, crematorium design was shaped by two primary approaches: one drawing inspiration from sacred architecture, often referencing ancient temples, and the other embracing modernist trends⁵⁷⁵.

The Society for the Promotion of Cremation *Oganj* commissioned architect Dragomir Tadić to design the crematorium project (Fig. 16), likely at the end of 1929, which was published in February 1930 in the newspapers *Vreme* and *Politika*⁵⁷⁶. Tadić created a design that combined elements of an ancient Greek temple with ziggurat-like ones, emphasizing the ancient roots of cremation and referencing Ancient Greece, which cremation advocates often

⁵⁷¹ "Pravnički fakultet dobija najzad zemljište," *Politika*, 19.2.1936, 7.

⁵⁷² "Zbog čega se ne gradi zgrada Pravnog faksa," *Pravda*, 12.2.1936, 7.

⁵⁷³ "Podiže se Pravni fakultet," *Vreme*, 1.3.1936, 5. Petar Bajalović graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1898. Later he pursued additional education at the Technical University in Charlottenburg. From 1906, he taught at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. He was the brother of architect Djura Bajalović.

⁵⁷⁴ See more in Elvira Ibragimova, "Unrealized Crematoria: Clash of Ideas and Administrative Dysfunctionality in Belgrade 1904–1964," in *Taming the Yugoslav Space: Continuities and Discontinuities in Coping with the Infrastructural Challenges of the 20th Century*, eds. Danijel Kežić, Vladimir Petrović, Edvin Pezo (Beograd – Regensburg 2023), 149–161.

⁵⁷⁵ See more in Matthew Rampley, "Building for the Departed: Free Thinking, Secular Politics and Crematorium Design in Central Europe, 1873–1932," in *The governance of style. Public buildings in Central Europe, ca. 1780–1920*, eds. Maximilian Hartmuth, Richard Kurdiovsky, Julia Rüdiger and Georg Vasold, (Vienna: Boehlau, 2023), 373–390.

⁵⁷⁶ "Pred podizanjem krematorijuma u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 6.2.1930, 3; "Oko beogradske Krematorije," *Politika*, 8.2.1930, 2.

used in their arguments. On the other hand, the cremationists' argumentation was future-oriented and aimed to present cremation outside of a religious context. From this perspective, a design referencing ancient temple architecture did not align with the movement's ideology. Unsurprisingly, by the end of 1930, *Oganj* commissioned a new project from architect Dragomir Popović, which was described as having no references to sacred buildings yet "glorifying death and leaving a ceremonial impression"⁵⁷⁷.

The change of the project not only highlights the challenge of finding the right architectural solution but also reveals the uncertainty within *Oganj* about what kind of design was needed. For example, in 1939, during another attempt to build the crematorium, a draft (Fig. 16) was published in the press in a modernist style reminiscing a monumental temple⁵⁷⁸. However, this design was also rejected. Moreover, there was a lack of clarity among *Oganj* members regarding how original the design needed to be. In 1931, even after commissioning Popović, the press mentioned Viennese architect August Kirstein's design for a crematorium in Most, Czechoslovakia, as a potential model for the future Belgrade crematorium⁵⁷⁹.




Figure 16. Projects for Belgrade crematorium: Dragomir Tadić, 1929; unknown author, 1939.

Source: "Pred podizanjem krematorijuma u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 6.2.1930, 3; "Beograd najzad dobija krematorium," *Vreme*, 15.7.1939, 5.

⁵⁷⁷ "Ostvaranje beogradske krematorije nije više daleko," *Politika*, 19.1.1931, 7.

⁵⁷⁸ "Beograd najzad dobija krematorium," *Vreme*, 15.7.1939, 5.

⁵⁷⁹ "Skupština društva Oganj," *Vreme*, 27.4.1931, 7.

In 1940, *Oganj* decided to use the crematorium and chapel at Lodge Hill Cemetery, Birmingham (Fig. 17), designed by Holland W. Hobbiss in 1936–37, as the model for the Belgrade crematorium⁵⁸⁰. The project elaboration was again entrusted to Dragomir Popović (Fig. 17). However, from a legal standpoint, he, as a municipal architect, could not get a private order. Thus, the project documentation was signed by the private architectural bureau of Dušan Babić⁵⁸¹. This example illustrates how the client's views, ideas, and decision-making processes influenced the project selection.




Figure 17. The crematorium at Lodge Hill Cemetery in Birmingham, Holland W. Hobbiss in 1936–37; the project for the Belgrade crematorium, Dragomir Popović, 1940.

Source: Crematorium booklet (City of Birmingham Parks & Cemeteries Department publication); Vojislav Kujundžić, *Četerdeset godina propagande za krematoriju u Beogradu* (Beograd: Planeta, 1945), 7.

For research on the logic of selection in the architectural process within a broader context, the third selection mechanism, competitions, plays a key role. This mechanism primarily implies choosing the project rather than its author (especially in open competitions where the authors are anonymous). Moreover, competitions involve indirect communication, which occurs through a jury as a mediator and various materials such as programs, submissions, and jury reports. Thus, competitions provide more material for understanding the logic behind project selection. Additionally, through competitions, investors engage with the professional community as a whole, and the competitions are largely public: their results

⁵⁸⁰ "Izveštaj o radu Glavne uprave društva Oganj," *Oganj* 2 (1940): 2.

⁵⁸¹ Technical documentation XV-8-1940, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda.

are exhibited, published, and discussed by professionals and a wider audience. Thus, competitions make ideas and preferences in the architectural domain visible.

However, before analyzing competition practices, it is important to address the issue of selecting between these three mechanisms. In the early 1920s, general administrative disorganization and the lack of established procedures in the Kingdom of SCS complicated choosing a selection mechanism. On the one hand, while competitions were not legally mandatory, they were considered essential for significant buildings, especially by the professional community⁵⁸². For instance, in 1921, UJIA adopted a resolution demanding that "for major public buildings, projects should only be obtained through competitions"⁵⁸³. On the other hand, the Ministry of Construction's responsibilities included "the design, construction, and maintenance of all state buildings"⁵⁸⁴. In response to the UJIA resolution, the Ministry stated that administrative buildings fell under its jurisdiction and competitions would only be held if there was a staff shortage⁵⁸⁵. These two approaches did not directly contradict one another, as the conceptual design obtained through competition could be elaborated for implementation within the Ministry, though this would compromise the integrity of the original design. In practice, the inconsistency between regulations and actual practice led to problems affecting buildings' appearance and their realization.

Nevertheless, when choosing a selection mechanism, various actors could oppose each other and support different options. For example, for the Commercial Academy building in Zagreb, Minister of Trade and Industry Juraj Demetorović secured a loan of 4 million dinars from the State Mortgage Bank in 1930, and it was expected that the municipality would

⁵⁸² For example, in "The Rules for Competitions in the Field of Architecture and Engineering," adopted by UJIA in 1920, it is stated that competitions are "in the interest of both the building owners and the architects and engineers." See "Pravila za raspisivanje natečaja (utakmica) u oblasti arhitekture i inženjerstva," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 6 (1921): 65.

⁵⁸³ "Druga Redovna Skupština UJIA u Ljubljani," *Tehnički list* 3 (1921): 132.

⁵⁸⁴ *Uredba o Ustrojstvu Ministarstva Gradjevina* (n.p., 1919), 4.

⁵⁸⁵ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 62.

donate the plot⁵⁸⁶. To secure the loan, conditions regarding site documentation had to be met, including transferring the land to state ownership. However, the municipality demanded that an open competition be held as a condition for transferring the land, which led the Commercial Academy's director, Ljubomir Hadžić, to question whether the municipality had any right to make such demands, particularly since "the state has its technical institutions," including the Banovinas' technical department and the Ministry of Construction⁵⁸⁷. At that moment, the mayor of Zagreb was Stjepan Srkulj, whose policies Tamara Bjažić Klarin characterizes as pro-competition⁵⁸⁸. However, since holding competitions was not mandatory, the building was constructed based on a design developed by the Technical Department of the Sava Banovina⁵⁸⁹.

In the case of the building for the Ministry of Forestry and Mining and the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks in Belgrade, choosing a selection mechanism involving all three of them was even more complicated. In 1921, the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks commissioned the project directly, without competition, from the renowned pre-war architect Nikola Nestorović, who designed a classicized Art Nouveau building⁵⁹⁰ (Fig. A.8). According to Marina Pavlović, the ministry had requested a modern building⁵⁹¹. The Ministry of Forestry and Mining obtained the adjacent plot and approached the Ministry of Construction to develop their project⁵⁹². It required a monumental building featuring rich decoration to "worthily and pronouncedly represent the Ministry, which manages both overground and

⁵⁸⁶ "Trgovačka akademija dobiva vlastitu zgradu," *Novosti*, 19.4.1930

⁵⁸⁷ "Zapreke podizanju zgrade Trgovačke akademije u Zagrebu," *Novosti*, 27.9.1930, 7.

⁵⁸⁸ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 70.

⁵⁸⁹ "Kakova će biti nova zgrada Trgovačke akademije," *Novosti*, 12.2.1931, 4.

⁵⁹⁰ The contract from 13.5.1921, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije. Pavlović supposed that he was invited because of his membership in the Serbian agricultural society. Marina Pavlović, "Život i delo arhitekta Nikole Nestorovića," (PhD diss., Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2014), 352. Nikola Nestorović graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1891. He began his career at the Ministry of Construction and later pursued additional education at the Technical University in Charlottenburg (1895–1897). From 1898, he taught at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade while maintaining a private practice.

⁵⁹¹ Pavlović, "Život i delo arhitekta Nikole Nestorovića," 366.

⁵⁹² The document №8842 from 10.4.1921, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

underground natural wealth"⁵⁹³. Given the idea of unifying these buildings to create a cohesive complex, a competition was announced in November 1921 for the Ministry of Forestry and Mining's building, with the stipulation that it should "form a harmonious whole with the planned building for the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks," but it was allowed to change the façade and, to some extent, the layout of the existing project⁵⁹⁴.

Thus, this situation demonstrates the absence of established procedures in constructing public buildings. Moreover, as Marina Pavlović points out, this example highlights a conflict between private architects and the state authority⁵⁹⁵. However, in the context of unclear regulations in the early 1920s, the competition between private architects and state-employed architects for commissions was only part of the issue. As Tamara Bjažić Klarin notes, it was initially planned to hold the competition among only Belgrade architects, and UJIA protested, arguing that this was an administrative building of national significance, leading to architects from other cities being allowed to participate⁵⁹⁶. Among the fifteen submissions, the project by the bureau *Arhitekt* (Dragiša Brašovan and Milan Sekulić) won first prize⁵⁹⁷ (Fig. A.8).

Thus, the Ministry of Construction, the bureau *Arhitekt*, and Nikola Nestorović claimed to elaborate the joined project for both ministries. The Ministry of Construction appealed to its authority over public buildings. The bureau *Arhitekt* referenced the rulebook on competitions, which stated that execution should be entrusted to the contestant whose work received first prize. Nestorović appealed to his contract with the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks. Initially, Nestorović succeeded in getting the task, but the bureau *Arhitekt*

⁵⁹³ The document №2191 from 25.1.1921, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

⁵⁹⁴ "Stečaj za izradu nacrtu za zgradu Ministarstva Šuma i Rudnika," *Službene novine*, 3.11.1921, 3.

⁵⁹⁵ Pavlović, "Život i delo arhitekta Nikole Nestorovića," 367.

⁵⁹⁶ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 62.

⁵⁹⁷ The jury included three architects: Dragutin Djordjević, Dušan Živanović, Danilo Vladislavljević. "Nova zgrada Ministarstva Šuma i Ruda," *Politika*, 1.1.1922, 3. Dragiša Brašovan graduated from the Royal Joseph Polytechnic University in Budapest in 1912 and began his career at the Töry & Pogány office in Budapest. In Belgrade, he co-founded the bureau *Arhitekt* with Milan Sekulić. From 1925, he continued his private practice in his own office. See more in Aleksandar Kadijević, "Život i delo arhitekta Dragiše Brašovana (1887-1965)," *Godišnjak grada Beograda XXXVII* (1990): 141-173.

contested this decision, turning to UJIA to defend its right as the competition winner, and got the task⁵⁹⁸. Subsequently, Nestorović and the bureau teamed up to create a joint project (Fig. A.9), but the Ministry of Construction criticized it and demanded revisions⁵⁹⁹. For instance, the building's façade was deemed too pretentious and luxurious, featuring an unacceptable mix of styles and violating "aesthetic and architectural rules"⁶⁰⁰. Based on this criticism, the Ministry terminated the contract with *Arhitekt* and Nestorović and assigned the development of the final project to its employee, Russian émigré architect Nikolay Krasnov⁶⁰¹. Krasnov altered the façade but retained the spatial organization based on Brašovan's original idea⁶⁰².

The differences between the final project and the rejected ones demonstrate not only the difficulties in establishing selection procedures but also the divergence in selection criteria. Moreover, this case led to a shift in competitive practices, as the Ministry decided to avoid "experiments of private architects on governmental buildings"⁶⁰³, and its Architectural department later elaborated most of the public projects. As a result, the separation of projects from architects as well as the separation of façades from layouts would not be isolated incidents (for example, the Main Post Office case had a similar combination of the

⁵⁹⁸ Pavlović, "Život i delo arhitekta Nikole Nestorovića," 368.

⁵⁹⁹ Svetislav Vladislavljević, "Zgrada Ministarstva poljoprivrede i voda i Ministarstva šuma i rudnika," *Godišnjak Grada Beograda* XLIV (1997): 212-213.

⁶⁰⁰ Protocol 22700/1923 and protocol 14.241 from 4.6.1926, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije. See more in Marina Pavlović and Saša Mihajlov, "Zgrada ministarstva spoljnih poslova u Beogradu," *Nasleđe* 23 (2022): 61-102.

⁶⁰¹ Protocol 68049 from 1.9.1926, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije. Nikolay Krasnov (Николай Петрович Краснов) graduated from the Moscow School of Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture in 1876. He served as the Chief Architect of Yalta and designed the Livadia Palace for Nicholas II. In the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia he worked at the Ministry of Construction from 1922 until his death in 1939. Primarily, he designed public buildings in the academic style. See more in Aleksandar Kadijević, "Prilog proučavanju dela arhitekta Nikole Krasnova u Jugoslaviji, 1922-1939," *Saopštenja* XXVI (1994): 181-192, Aleksandar Kadijević, "Rad Nikolaja Krasnova u Ministarstvu građevina Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije u Beogradu od 1922. do 1939. godine," *Godišnjak grada Beograda* XLIV (1997): 221-255, Sanja Kiproski, *Beogradski opus arhitekta Nikolaja Petroviča Krasnova: (1922-1939)*, Novi Sad: Spomen-zbirka Pavla Beljanskog, 2024.

⁶⁰² Ivan Marković, Milan P. Milovanović, "Prilog proučavanju opusa arhitekta Dragiše Brašovana (1887-1965)," *Zbornik Matice srpske za likovne umetnosti* 44 (2016): 350. After the building was constructed, the good space organization was specially mentioned in the press ("Velika zgrada ministarstva staje 76 000 000 dinara," *Pravda*, 2.3.1929, 6; "Zgrada u koje se useljuju četiri ministarstva," *Politika*, 13.4.1929, 4), but architects mainly criticized its façade.

⁶⁰³ The protocol 14241 from 27.5.1926, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

competition's layout with a façade developed by the Ministry of Construction). Therefore, the issue was not just about differences in aesthetic preferences but also about various understandings of an architectural project as a whole (and whether it is acceptable to separate its components).

The challenges of the competitive practice during its development in the 1920s could become a factor hindering the realization of projects. For example, a complex for the Ministry of Finance was planned next to the buildings of these two ministries. In 1924, the Ministry of Finance acquired the building of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which was already under construction at the corner of Nemanjina and Kneza Miloša streets⁶⁰⁴, and announced a competition for a new building for the Ministry of Finance on the site of its old building at the center of the complex⁶⁰⁵. Only the second award to the bureau *Arhitekt* (Fig. 18) was given at this competition, and seven projects were purchased⁶⁰⁶. The awarded project exactly followed the program but implied the most expensive building compared to the purchased projects (approximately 84 million dinars, while the average cost in purchased projects was 60 million)⁶⁰⁷. Moreover, four purchased projects were created by architects who worked in the Architectural Department of the Ministry of Construction.

⁶⁰⁴ Document №1296 from 15.4.1924, fasc. 1371, fond 62, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

⁶⁰⁵ "Konkurs za izradu idejnih skica za novu palatu Ministarstva finansija," *Tehnički List* 11 (1924): III. The jury included four architects: Nikola Nestorović, representing the Technical Faculty; Petar Popović, representing the Ministry of Construction; Edo Šen, representing UJIA; and Momir Korunović, as well as one representative from the Ministry of Finance, Djordje Rašić.

⁶⁰⁶ Rezultat javne utakmice za izradu skica za zgradu Ministarstva Finansija u Beogradu. K6-2770, Istorijski arhiv Beograda, 1.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., 23-45.




Figure 18. The only awarded competition project for the Ministry of Finance building in Belgrade, the bureau "Arhitekt," 1924.

Source: Rezultat javne utakmice za izradu skica za zgradu Ministarstva Finansija u Beogradu. K6-2770, Istorijski arhiv Beograda, 10-12.

However, after the competition, one of the jury members, Edo Šen⁶⁰⁸ from Zagreb, questioned the jury's decision, as the only award was given to the bureau, where Bogdan Nestorović, the son of the jury chairman, Nikola Nestorović, was employed⁶⁰⁹. UJIA attempted to contest the jury's decision by submitting complaints to the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Construction, and the Prime Minister⁶¹⁰. Finally, the Ministry of Finance organized another competition, but the jury remained the same (besides Edo Šen)⁶¹¹. Moreover, the new competition was only for the façade, which was requested to be in "National Serbian-Byzantine style," and the project had to be based on the project awarded at the initial competition⁶¹². This repeat competition not only failed to address the concerns raised by UJIA, as the jury remained unchanged and the controversial project served as the basis, but it also contradicted professional ideals by separating the façade and limiting

⁶⁰⁸ Edo Šen (Schön) graduated from the Technical University in Vienna in 1900. He began his career in Vienna in the studio of Max Fabiani and later worked for the Zagreb Municipality until 1908. After that, he focused on private practice and teaching. He was one of the founders of the Technical High School in Zagreb, where he served as a professor. See more in Krešimir Galović, *Arhitekt Edo Šen: skice i crteži*, (Zagreb: Biblioteka Psefizma, 1998).

⁶⁰⁹ "Razne vesti," *Tehnički List* 19 (1924): 248. Moreover, at that time, Nestorović and the bureau were jointly working on a project for the buildings for the Ministry of Forestry and Mining and the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks.

⁶¹⁰ In this case, although it was a public project, the Minister of Construction refused to intervene. "Vesti iz udruženja," *Tehnički List* 4 (1925): 63-64.

⁶¹¹ "Ponovni konkurs za izradu fasade za novu palatu Ministarstva Finansija," *Tehnički List* (1925), 162.

⁶¹² "Izrada planova za novu palatu Ministarstva finansija," *Politika*, 16.4.1925, 7.

creative freedom with the requirement of a specific style. UJIA called for a boycott of this competition, but seven projects were submitted⁶¹³. The first two prizes were not awarded, and two third prizes went to Nikolay Krasnov and the team of Josif Najman and Bogdan Nestorović⁶¹⁴, the same son of that same jury member. The competitions did not resolve the issue of project selection, and as a result, the project was postponed and later abandoned.

However, in the 1930s, competition could also be a factor that delayed and complicated project realization. For the same plot, at the end of 1936, a competition was announced for the State Monopolies Administration, the Government, and the cadastre department⁶¹⁵. A Zagreb-based team, Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer⁶¹⁶, won first prize for a complex of connected buildings with a simplified modernist façade (Fig. A.10), while the Belgrade team Rajko Tatić and Jovan Ranković secured second place with a monumental neoclassical design⁶¹⁷ (Fig. A.11).

Architect Petar Gačić, in an article published in *Pravda*, criticized all the awarded projects, particularly emphasizing that Haberle and Bauer's project was inappropriate because it "would look exactly like an industrial building, not the Government palace"⁶¹⁸. Under the influence of this criticism, the Administration of State Monopolies organized a second-stage

⁶¹³ "Odluka inženjera i arhitekata povodom konkursa za fasadu palate Ministarstva Finansija," *Politika*, 25.4.1925, 6. Also, two projects were sent out of competition. "Izložba skica za zgradu min. Finansija," *Pravda*, 16.10.1925, 4.

⁶¹⁴ "Fasada Ministarstva Finansija," *Vreme*, 16.10.1925. Josif Najman graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1923, then continued his studies at the École des Beaux-Arts and worked at the National Bank in Paris. Upon returning to Belgrade in 1927, he worked for the National Bank and engaged in private practice. See more in Saša Mihajlov, *Arhitektonsko stvaralaštvo Josifa Najmana* (Beograd: Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture grada Beograda; Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2022).

⁶¹⁵ "Raspisan konkurs za izradu zgrade Ministarskog Saveta i Uprave Monopola," *Pravda*, 22.1.1937, 16. The jury included three architects: Nikola Nestorović, Branislav Kojić and Branko Maksimović, as well as two representatives of the State Monopolies Administration.

⁶¹⁶ Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer both graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb and began their careers in the office of Rudolf Lubynski. Later, Haberle worked with Stjepan Hribar, while Bauer worked with Zlatko Neumann. From 1936 to 1940, they ran a joint practice.

⁶¹⁷ "Zgrada Uprave monopola u kojoj će biti smešteno i Predsedništvo Vlade biće najveća i najrepresentativnija u zemlji," *Vreme*, 13.4.1937, 12. Rajko Tatić graduated from the Belgrade Technical Faculty in 1927 and worked in the Belgrade Municipality from 1928 to 1941. See more in Saša Mihajlov, *Rajko M. Tatić: 1900–1979*. (Beograd: Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture grada Beograda, 2013).

⁶¹⁸ "Da li će se palata Predsedništva vlade, Katastra i Uprave Državnih Monopola podići prema nagradjenim skicama," *Pravda*, 23.4.1937, 5.

competition between the authors of awarded and purchased projects⁶¹⁹, but probably no final project was chosen. The new competition for the State Monopolies Administration building was organized in 1939 for another location on Kralja Petra Street⁶²⁰. The result of this competition was also far from serving its intended function of selecting the best project for realization. The prize fund of 250,000 dinars was distributed among three second-place awards, two third-place, three fourth-place, and nine fifth-place awards, with no first-place prize given, despite an initial plan to award 75,000 dinars for first place⁶²¹.

These cases demonstrated that the mechanism intended to select a project for realization failed to do so due to inconsistent procedures and conflicting preferences, highlighting problems in its operation. Before examining these issues, the question of how competition practices were organized in interwar Yugoslavia will be discussed.

3.1. Competitive Practice Arrangement

In Belgrade and Zagreb, investors began organizing architectural competitions at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, but it became a regular practice during the interwar period. The total number of contests in the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia was about 200: approximately 64 in Belgrade, 56 in Zagreb, 30 in Split, and 50 in other cities⁶²². The number of competitions increased over time, with only 15 held in Belgrade and 21 in Zagreb during the 1920s.

⁶¹⁹ Mihajlov, *Rajko M. Tatić: 1900–1979*, 93.

⁶²⁰ "Rezultat konkursa za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Uprave državnih monopola," *Vreme*, 30.11.1939, 15. The jury included four architects: Branislav Kojić, Milan Zloković, Dimitrije M. Leko and Hristofor Racković, who was an architect of the State Monopolies Administration, also three other representatives of it participated.

⁶²¹ Of the 17 total awards, Belgrade architects received 9, Zagreb architects received 6, and architects from Sarajevo and Skopje received one each. "Natječaj za novu zgradu drž, Monopola u Beogradu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 3 (1940): 25; "Konkurs za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Uprave državnih monopola," *Pravda*, 19.8.1939, 31.

⁶²² For Belgrade competitions, I created a database based on information from newspapers and archival materials. For Zagreb competitions, the information published in the book of Tamara Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!* For Split see more in Tušek, *Arhitektonski natječaji u Splitu 1918-1941*.

Number of competitions per year




Table 3. Number of Competitions per Year in Belgrade and Zagreb

Most architectural competitions in Belgrade and Zagreb were organized to construct buildings for various associations or administrative, financial, and cultural institutions, while competitions for town planning, sacral, industrial, or health service buildings were less frequent. In general, holding a competition implied both the significance and the representative potential of a building. Private investors could use competitions to attract attention, while state investors could highlight the symbolic value of the building.

Competitions served as a mechanism for finding the best solutions both in construction and within architecture as an academic discipline⁶²³. Architects viewed competitions as opportunities for professional recognition, attracting clients, and as "a platform for developing new ideas"⁶²⁴. Grozdana Šišović, who studied competitions in the context of architectural autonomy, argued that competitions offered more creative freedom compared to direct

⁶²³ Barry Bergdoll demonstrates that both types of architectural competitions developed together. Barry Bergdoll, "Competing in the Academy and in the Marketplace: European Architecture Competition, 1401-1927," in *The Experimental Tradition: Essays on Competitions in Architecture*, ed. H. Lipstadt (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1989).

⁶²⁴ Kojić, *Društveni uslovi razvitka*, 219.

commissions⁶²⁵. While clients gained a variety of design solutions and publicity, competitions also brought longer timelines, additional expenses, and the risk of unsatisfactory results. As a result, competitions were not as frequent as architects would have preferred.

Architects frequently complained about appointments being made without competition, particularly when foreign architects were given the task, which domestic architects viewed as a sign of distrust in Yugoslav architecture⁶²⁶. As in other countries, established professionals had better chances of securing commissions, while younger architects had to rely on competitions. In Yugoslavia, the gap between generations was not the only issue; various groups of architects with different backgrounds, preferences, and experiences coexisted and competed, as discussed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, competitions did not always guarantee equal access to jobs, as they could be invitation-only or because an investor could disregard the results of the competition.

To protect their rights, including those related to competitions, architects acted through UJIA. The first step was adopting *The Rules for Competitions in the Field of Architecture and Engineering* in 1920, created by UJIA's Zagreb section⁶²⁷. It contained recommendations for all stages of competitions. However, the Rulebook was ineffective because it was only accepted by the professional association and was not legally binding for investors. For instance, when UJIA tried to intervene in the competition for the St. Sava Temple, Petar J. Odavić, a member of its construction board, asked, "Why did they decide that the rulebooks, which they created for themselves, should be obligatory for everyone?"⁶²⁸.

⁶²⁵ See more in Šišović, "Arhitektonska konkursna praksa i pitanje autonomije arhitekture," 29-35.

⁶²⁶ "Beogradski inženjeri i arhitekti protiv toga da se poslovi poveravaju inostranim stručnjacima, bez konsultacija naših ljudi," *Politika*, 20.8.1940, 12.

⁶²⁷ "Pravila za raspisivanje natečaja (utakmica) u oblasti arhitekture i inženjerstva," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 6 (1921): 65–67; *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 7 (1921): 78–81.

⁶²⁸ Petar J. Odavić, "Hram Svetoga Save i Meštrovićev Kosovski hram," *Pravda*, 3.4.1927, 8.

The only available measures were appeals to authorities for intervention or calls for architects to boycott the competition as jury members and participants.

In cooperation with the Engineering Chamber, UJIA sought the Ministry of Construction's adoption of a Rulebook, which they finally achieved in 1938⁶²⁹. Architects expected that this Rulebook would enhance the effectiveness of competitions and better protect their rights, but it led to a reduction in the number of competitions⁶³⁰.

The Rulebooks regulated the composition of juries. The 1920 Rulebook recommended an odd number of jury members, with at least two-thirds professionals⁶³¹. According to the 1938 Rulebook, a simple majority was sufficient, but one member had to represent the Engineering Chamber⁶³². In practice, juries with an even number of members were found in 13% of cases in Zagreb and 20% in Belgrade. Moreover, the share of professionals was less than or equal to 50% in a quarter of the cases in both cities. On average, professionals constituted 58% of juries per competition in Zagreb and 66% in Belgrade.

Architects maintained that jury composition was crucial for the success of competitions. They argued that non-professionals on the jury should have sufficient knowledge to judge projects⁶³³, or their vote should not be decisive in selecting the project⁶³⁴. Ideally, they advocated for an entirely professional jury, reasoning that "if the majority is made up of non-experts, then it is clear that the jury itself does not guarantee quality. When non-experts are in the minority, they may align with an isolated opinion from some professionals and thus create a false majority"⁶³⁵. Moreover, architects not only criticized the

⁶²⁹ "Pravilnik o obavljanju konkursa za izradu idejnih skica za javne građevine i o pravima učesnika," *Službene novine*, 13.10.1938, 1174-1178.

⁶³⁰ "Arhitekti-projektanti zaštićeni su novim pravilnicama na svim javnim konkursima," *Pravda*, 18.11.1938, 5; Vlado Antolić, "Arhitektonski natječaji i kriza u arhitekturi," *Inženjer prilog A* (1940): 74.

⁶³¹ "Pravila za raspisivanje natečaja," 66.

⁶³² "Pravilnik o obavljanju konkursa," 1174.

⁶³³ D.P., "O raspisu natječaja i njihovom uspjehu," *Građevinski vjesnik* 4 (1932): 65.

⁶³⁴ Jovan Korka, "Povodom gradnje narodnog doma „Kralja Aleksandra“ u Zemunu," *Pravda*, 12.3.1933, 9.

⁶³⁵ Branislav Kojić, "Pred pravilnikom za natjecaji," *Građevinski vjesnik* 10 (1938): 153.

judgment of customer representatives but also doubted the qualifications of some professional jury members⁶³⁶. There was also no agreement between the professional organizations, UJIA and the Engineers' Chamber, regarding whose representatives should be invited to serve on the jury⁶³⁷. From the perspective of the professional community, a higher proportion of professionals on the jury would ensure a higher quality of judging, making the competition results more accurately reflect the quality of the submissions. However, given the divergence in views between professionals and investors, a higher share of professionals could influence the replacement of projects. For example, in both cities, the correlation between the proportion of professionals on the jury and the degree to which competition results are realized was negative but weak.

The selection of jury members was a prerogative of the customer, who invited the "professional elite," including university professors, members of professional organizations, and officials (architects employed in municipal, regional, or state authorities). A group of architects specialized in judging competitions during the interwar period: in Belgrade, the most frequent jury members were Petar Bajalović, Petar Popović, and Dimitrije M. Leko; in Zagreb – Edo Šen, Martin Pilar⁶³⁸, and Ivan Zemljak⁶³⁹.

The Rulebooks suggested types of competitions based on eligibility to participate. In the 1920 Rulebook, there were open competitions and invitation-only ones (common (*opći*) and restricted (*ograničeni*) in terms of the Rulebook)⁶⁴⁰. The open competitions could be

⁶³⁶ Drago Ibler, "Jury i natečaji," *Pečat* 1-2(1939): 109.

⁶³⁷ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 63.

⁶³⁸ Martin Pilar graduated from the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna. He began his career in the Hermann Bollé and Kuno Waidmann bureau; later, he opened the construction firm Pilar, Mally & Bauda. He was one of the founders of the Technical High School in Zagreb and a member of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts.

⁶³⁹ Ivan Zemljak began studying architecture at the Technical Faculty in Graz and graduated from the German Technical University in Prague in 1920. He started his career in the office of Viktor Kovačić and later worked for the Zagreb Municipality. See more in Ivo Maroević, "Arhitektura Ive Zemljaka," *Život umjetnosti* 9 (1969): 72-80.

⁶⁴⁰ "Pravila za raspisivanje natečaja," 67.

local, Yugoslav, pan-Slavic⁶⁴¹, or international. Some competition announcements specifically mentioned that Russian émigré architects residing in the Kingdom could participate, but they participated in open Yugoslav competitions even though they were persons without citizenship. After an open competition, a second round could be organized, in which authors of the awarded and purchased projects participated. In some cases, the investor initially stated that the selection procedure would be two-tiered, but more often the decision for a second stage was made after the open competition, which architects could perceive as an attempt to avoid following the competition results.

Invitation-only competitions provided honorariums to all invited participants, but investors could allow other architects to join the competition without receiving remuneration (for example, the competitions for the Agrarian Bank in Belgrade and the Art Pavilion in Zagreb were mixed). This type of competition was an intermediate selection method, combining elements of direct commissioning and competitions since some architects were initially chosen before their projects.

The 1938 Rulebook eliminated local and invitation-only competitions, allowing the latter only as a second-round option. However, invitation-only competitions continued to be held after the Rulebook was adopted. Furthermore, in violation of the rules, competitions could include additional restrictions, such as participation being limited to members of specific organizations or even national and religious identities. In Belgrade, UJIA itself held a competition for its building, where only its members could participate⁶⁴². Moreover, in Šabac, a competition was held in 1927 for The Fund for Poor Pupils of Primary Schools building, in

⁶⁴¹ All Slavic architects, regardless of citizenship, could participate. In practice, the pan-Slavic competitions were sporadic in Belgrade and Zagreb. One example is the competition for the Sokol house in Zagreb, held in 1931, where, besides Yugoslav citizens, all Slavic architects who resided in Yugoslavia could participate.

⁶⁴² "Sekcija Beograd Udruženja Jugoslovenskih Inženjera i Arhitekata raspisuje stečaj za izradu skica za svoj novi dom," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 5 (1923), 20.

which only "Serbs of the Orthodox faith" were eligible to participate⁶⁴³, and the fact that such an announcement was published in *Tehnički list*, the media outlet of UJIA (Association of Yugoslav Engineers and Architects), caused outrage at a meeting of UJIA's Zagreb section⁶⁴⁴.

In Belgrade, no more than 20 percent of competitions were invitation-only, while in Zagreb, slightly more than half fell into this category. Nevertheless, as early as 1921, in Zagreb such competitions were criticized as ineffective following the Stock Exchange building competition⁶⁴⁵. Most competitions were open Yugoslav ones. For the open competition, the number of participants ranged from 11 to 129, with a median of 37 in Belgrade and 8 to 225, with a median of 18 in Zagreb.

Factors like advertising, the value of awards, deadlines, and task complexity influenced participation. On average, only one-third of the participants were compensated through awards or purchase payments. Furthermore, since the awards were often modest, the primary motivation for architects was the opportunity to implement their designs and secure the contract for the final project's elaboration.

Competitions were crucial for private architects due to the opportunities for advertisement and securing project elaboration contracts, but architects employed in administrative and educational institutions also took part. For instance, according to the distribution of awarded projects in Belgrade, 54% of awards went to private architects, 26% to officials, and 20% to professors. In Zagreb, during the Palace of Workers' Institutions (*Palača Radničkih Ustanova*) competition in 1932, after even a second round had been held, the organizers decided to exclude the projects of architect-officials from those eligible for

⁶⁴³ "Natečaj," *Tehnički List* 5 (1927), II.

⁶⁴⁴ "Izveštaj Kluba Arhitekta Sekcije Zagreb," *Tehnički List* 10 (1927), 156.

⁶⁴⁵ Ing. B., "Gradnja burzovne zgrade u Zagrebu," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 12 (1921): 141-142.

realization⁶⁴⁶. On the one hand, the reasoning was that "they might neglect their official duties due to such private work"⁶⁴⁷. However, the main intent was to support private architects, especially during the economic crisis, by helping them secure jobs and thus "ease their struggle for survival"⁶⁴⁸. While this was an exceptional case, competitions were sometimes seen as having a social purpose, offering support to financially disadvantaged architects, particularly younger ones⁶⁴⁹.

For young architects, competitions were also crucial for advancing their careers. In Belgrade, the average age of authors of awarded projects was 34, while the average age of jury members was 53, highlighting a generational gap between jury members and participants, with exceptions, particularly in international competitions.

Architects were not only driven by practical reasons to participate; they also believed that competitions could foster the development of ideas and viewed participation as a professional duty⁶⁵⁰. However, dissatisfaction with competition results or conditions sometimes led architects to threaten non-participation, as well as UJIA could even call for a boycott of a competition⁶⁵¹.

The understanding of competitions varied between investors and architects. Investors expected competitions to identify the best project, with the added benefit of publicity. For architects, competitions were about ensuring equal access to commissions, but for some, the opportunity to secure an order was only a practical aspect. They saw competitions as a platform for experimentation and architectural innovation.

⁶⁴⁶ "Sa prvim danima proljeća počinje se gradnjom doma radničkih ustanova na Ciglani," *Jutarnji List*, 8.2.1933, 8

⁶⁴⁷ "Gradnja zgrade radničkih ustanova," *Novosti*, 10.2.1933, 6.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Antolić, "Arhitektonski natječaji i kriza u arhitekturi," 75.

⁶⁵⁰ Stjepan Planić, "Uz izložbu arhitekata," *Književnik* 5 (1932): 197.

⁶⁵¹ Ivan Zdravković, "Konkursi i njihovi ishodi," in Kojić, *Društveni uslovi razvitka*, 222.

There were two dimensions of participation: "in favor of the profession," meaning securing an order, and "in favor of architecture," which involved presenting new ideas. Architects were likelier to experiment in town planning and other large-scale competitions that attracted public attention. Architects, employed in administrative or educational institutions, viewed competitions as a space for creative freedom since they were less dependent on getting commissions than private architects. It seems that architects' dissatisfaction with competition outcomes did not reduce the number of participants but instead shifted the nature of their involvement. When participants felt the chances of project realization were slim, they focused more on advancing architectural ideas, widening the gap in understanding between investors and architects.

Submission "in favor of architecture" could be highly valued but ultimately deemed unsuitable for implementation, as in cases of "performative submissions," discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, the 1920 Rulebook already distinguishes between the logic of awarding and the logic of feasibility, as the rules recommended: "to entrust the execution of a project to the competitor who received the first prize or to the competitor whose work the jury considered most suitable for implementation"⁶⁵². This divergence between the logic of awarding and assessing feasibility could affect the overall success of competition practices. Thus, even projects that were sent following the competition conditions with the hope of their implementation could remain unrealized, even if won.

3.2. Competition Results and the Communication Model of Competition Practice

An ideal competition outcome assumed that the investor would select the highest awarded project for implementation, entrust its elaboration to the original author, and execute it without significant modifications. However, the 1920 Rulebook only recommended

⁶⁵² "Pravila za raspisivanje natečaja," 79.

entrusting the project to the first-prize winner, but in cases where no first prize was awarded, the jury could recommend the project considered the most suitable for execution⁶⁵³. More attention in the Rulebook was given to preventing the separation of the author from the project, stating that construction should be entrusted to the one whose concept was selected for realization⁶⁵⁴. In cases where this was impossible, the Rulebook explicitly noted that the commissioning of execution to another specialist should be done in agreement with the original author⁶⁵⁵.

Considering architects' complaints and discussions about competition practices violations, the 1938 Rulebook included stricter guidelines, stating that "the competition organizer is obliged to entrust the project elaboration and supervision to the first-prize author"⁶⁵⁶. Furthermore, if an investor chooses another specialist for the execution or selects a different project for realization, they must pay double the copyright fee to the first-awarded author⁶⁵⁷. Only one copyright fee would be paid if the author was not a licensed architect or the investor was a state or municipal authority with its technical bureau⁶⁵⁸.

The Rulebook also recognized the division of competencies in the sphere of private and public construction, acknowledging that state or municipal authorities, unlike private investors, were not obliged to entrust the elaboration of the project to the first-prize author⁶⁵⁹. Nevertheless, a competition award and a copyright compensation structure did not fully satisfy architects, as the best-paid job was the elaboration of the final project⁶⁶⁰.

⁶⁵³ "Pravila za raspisivanje natečaja," 81.

⁶⁵⁴ "Pravila za raspisivanje natečaja," 79.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ "Pravilnik o obavljanju konkursa," 1175.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ D.P., "O raspisu natječaja i njihovom uspjehu," *Građevinski vjesnik* 4 (1932): 64. Architects received a fee of 3 percent of the total project cost.

Both rulebooks focused on the first prize, and most competition announcements listed anticipated awards for first, second, and third places. However, the percentage of competitions, where awards were distributed as stated in the announcements, did not exceed a quarter of the cases in either Belgrade or Zagreb (though in Zagreb, this figure increased in the second half of the 1930s). Instead of the traditional first-second-third award scheme, many variations emerged: multiple equal prizes for any rank, awarding only second or third prizes, splitting a single prize among several participants, reducing prizes in favor of purchasing more projects, and even purchasing all submissions. Interestingly, UJIA itself did not follow the classical scheme of awards in any of the three competitions organized for its building in Belgrade⁶⁶¹: a first prize was not awarded in the first competition in 1923⁶⁶², all projects were purchased in the second one in 1930⁶⁶³, and the third one was a free competition without awards payment in 1933⁶⁶⁴.

The primary issue was the lack of first prizes: the jury awarded the first prize in only about half the cases in Belgrade and two-thirds in Zagreb. This situation improved in the 1930s in both cities. However, by the late 1930s, the absence of a first prize in competitions had become so common that relative rankings were used in media publications. For example, no first prize was awarded in the second competition for the State Monopolies Administration building in 1939, and three second-place prizes were given to Milovan Kovačević from

⁶⁶¹ See more Ignjatović, "Dom udruženja jugoslovenskih inženjera i arhitekata," 87-118.

⁶⁶² Janko Šafarik got the second prize, and Velimir Gavrilović got the third, and five projects were purchased. The jury included four architects (Branko Tanazević, Milivoje Smiljanić, Dragutin Maslac, Petar Bajalović) and one engineer, Jovan Nikolić. "Gradnja doma UJIA u Beogradu," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 10-11 (1923), 78-79.

⁶⁶³ Among the participants were Rajko Tatić, Dušan Babić, and the project by the team "Genjić-Tričković" was mentioned as the most suitable. The jury included four architects (Branko Tanazević, Milivoje Smiljanić, Janko Šafarik, Dimitrije M. Leko) and one engineer, Svetozar Arandjelović. "Ni jedna skica za dom UJIA nije dobila prvu nagradu," *Vreme*, 22.2.1931, 9; "Stečaj," *Vreme*, 12.7.1930, 10.

⁶⁶⁴ Out of 14 participants, five were chosen for the second stage: Djura Borošić, Milan Zloković, Jovan Jovanović, Miša Manojlović, Jan Dubovy. The jury included Dragiša Brašovan, Dimitrije M. Leko, Čedomir Glišić. Ing. Arch. Dr. J. Dubovy, "Iz Beograda," *Arhitektura* 5-6 (1933): 92.

Zagreb⁶⁶⁵ (Fig. 19), Aleksandar Gusina from Belgrade, and the team of Vladimir Turina and Hinko Gottwald from Zagreb⁶⁶⁶.




Figure 19. The second-prize competition project for the State Monopolies Administration in Belgrade, Milovan Kovačević, 1939.

Source: "Natječaj za novu zgradu drž. Monopola u Beogradu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 3 (1940): 25.

The Belgrade newspaper *Politika* published an image of Milovan Kovačević's second-place project, listed as the first among the second-place winners, with a caption stating that his design was considered the best, and under the headline "*The Future Building of the State Monopolies Administration in Belgrade*"⁶⁶⁷. The newspaper *Jutarnji List* also published an article titled "*More on the Victory of Zagreb Architects in the Belgrade Competition*," highlighting that two of the three second-place prizes went to Zagreb architects⁶⁶⁸.

Nonetheless, architects complained about the lack of first prizes, not only because it created a negative image of their abilities⁶⁶⁹ but also because they felt that the absence of a first prize was a direct violation of competition practices. After yet another competition

⁶⁶⁵ Milovan Kovačević began studying architecture at the Czech Technical University in Prague and graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1929. He started his career in the studio of Ignjat Fischer and later joined the office of Edo Šen. From 1932, he engaged in private practice independently, and from 1935, he worked as Šen's assistant at the Technical Faculty in Zagreb. See more in Dubravka Kisić, *Arhitekt Milovan Kovačević: pobornik internacionalnog modernizma u Hrvatskoj*, (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2023).

⁶⁶⁶ Vladimir Turina graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1936. From 1936 to 1940, he worked at the construction companies of Mate Crnić, Bogdan Petrović, and Zorislav Franjetić. See more in Žarko Domljan, "Arhitekt Vladimir Turina 1913–1968," *Život umjetnosti* 9 (1969): 59–71.

⁶⁶⁷ "Buduća zgrada uprave državnih monopola u Beogradu," *Politika*, 29.11.1939, 9.

⁶⁶⁸ "Još o pobjedi zagrebačkih arhitekta na natječaju u Beogradu," *Jutarnji List*, 30.11.1939, 10.

⁶⁶⁹ Potočnjak, "O arhitektonskim natječajima kod nas," 33.

without a first prize in Belgrade, an article in *Politika* titled "*Give us whatever - A bad habit of reversal of the first prize*" claimed that investors withheld the first prize to "secure a job for someone in the background"⁶⁷⁰. Moreover, its author argued that if not the first prize, at least the highest award should always be given⁶⁷¹. Architects emphasized that among the submissions, there would always be one that was "relatively the best"⁶⁷². It reflected another divergence between participants and investors: while investors recognized only the first prize, architects considered the highest award important and took competition rankings more seriously.

In some competitions, the announcement explicitly stated that the investor had no intention of entrusting the implementation to the author of the first-prize-awarded project. For example, in the competition for the complex of the State Craft School and the City Central Vocational School (*Državna obrtna škola i Gradska centralna stručna podružna škola*) in Zagreb, it was noted that "the Sava Banovina administration or the Zagreb municipality will draw up the execution plans"⁶⁷³. Architects Josip Pičman and Josip Seissel even submitted their projects outside the competition in protest⁶⁷⁴. However, the first prize was not awarded, and the team Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer got the second prize⁶⁷⁵.

⁶⁷⁰ It was a competition organized by the Mortgage Bank of the Trade Fund for its building on the kafana "Albania" site. "Daj šta daš' – Izložba nacrtā za zgradu »Albanije« na Tehničkom fakultetu. Rđav običaj ukidanja prve nagrade," *Politika*, 21.4.1938, 8.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² Ing D. P., "O raspisu natječaja i njihovom uspjehu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 4 (1932), 64-65.

⁶⁷³ Ing. Arh. B. J., "Rezultat natječaja za idejne skice za gradnju Državne obrtne škole i Gradske centralne stručne podružne škole," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 12 (1935), 149. Among seven jury members, four were architects, Ignjat Fischer, Egon Steinmann, Ivan Zemljak, Stjepan Hribar.

⁶⁷⁴ See more Mutnjaković, *Arhitekt Josip Pičman*, 47-49. Josip Seissel graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1929 and then worked in the City Planning Department of Zagreb. In the early 1920s, he was involved in the Zenit movement. See more about their joint projects in Vesna Mikić, "Zajednički projekti arhitekata Seissela i Pičmana; Uz Seisselovu skicu „Putujući grad” iz 1932. godine," *Prostor* 18, br. 2(40) (2010): 348-359.

⁶⁷⁵ Also three third prizes were awarded to Alfred Albini, the team Despot Nikola and Vid Vrbanić, and Ernest Weissmann. Ing. Arh. B. J., "Rezultat natječaja za idejne skice za gradnju Državne obrtne škole i Gradske centralne stručne podružne škole," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 12 (1935), 149.

The municipal architect and member of the jury for this competition, Ivan Zemljak, later published an article in *Gradjevinski Vjesnik*, justifying such a decision not only based on administrative accounting but also pointing out that "for the organizer, it is prudent not to bind themselves to obligations towards the competitors, the consequences of which they cannot foresee in advance"⁶⁷⁶.

In general, the practice was established that for projects related to state and municipal bodies with technical departments, the responsibility for project implementation would lie within that department, which was also stated in the 1938 Rulebook⁶⁷⁷. However, later on, representatives of the Engineering Chamber, which had participated in creating this rulebook, opposed developing projects for public buildings within state and municipal institutions. They argued that public buildings must represent the creative power of the entire nation, meaning it was necessary to find not only the best project but also the most capable designer⁶⁷⁸. Initially, this opinion was raised during a discussion of a specific project, a museum complex in Zagreb. A few months later, at the General Assembly of the Association of Engineering Chambers, it was mentioned that not only should open competitions be held for all significant public buildings but that the practice of elaborating post-competition projects within state and municipal departments should be abandoned⁶⁷⁹.

Overall, besides projects involving state or municipal bodies, the situation in which an investor chose the winning project but entrusted its elaboration to another architect was rare. In most cases, choosing other architects would also mean altering the project or selecting a different design altogether.

⁶⁷⁶ Ing. I. Z., "Natječaj za idejne skice za Državnu obrtnu školu i Gradsku centralnu stručnu podružnu školu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 2 (1936), 25.

⁶⁷⁷ "Pravilnik o obavljanju konkursa," 1175.

⁶⁷⁸ "Inženjerska komora traži raspis javnog natječaja za gradnju palače kulturnih ustanova u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 14.1.1939, 9.

⁶⁷⁹ "Svi inženjiri traže da se izradba nacrtu za gradnje ne provodi u državnim i samoupravnim uredima," *Jutarnji List*, 4.4.1939, 8.

However, in the competition mentioned above for the school complex, aside from the controversial announcement that the project elaboration would not be entrusted to participants, it was also stated that the awarded and purchased projects would become the property of the Sava Banovina administration or the Zagreb municipality⁶⁸⁰. In general, many investors claimed the rights to the awarded and purchased projects, including the rights to use their parts and combine them to develop the final project. Architects were concerned about the protection of their copyright in this context. Thus, the issue was not just about separating the author from the project but also about separating the project parts (post-competition modifications often involved separating the façade from the layout). The actors' opinions diverged regarding an architectural project's status as a work of art and the importance of maintaining its artistic integrity. Architects claimed that "the entire work, from conception to realization, is a unified whole and cannot be carried out by various architects without harming the artwork itself"⁶⁸¹. Nevertheless, Ivan Zemljak, in the debates surrounding the school complex competition, pointed out that copyright infringement was inevitable to some extent in competitions, regardless of who elaborated the final project. Since all competition submissions could influence the final formation of requirements, even an author of a first-awarded project, based on an investor's post-competition comments, would also violate someone's copyright when realizing a project after a competition.

The question of architectural project integrity concerned architects even when an investor selected the highest-awarded project for implementation and entrusted its elaboration to the original author but required modifications. In this case, the process resembled direct commissioning, involving direct communication during the project's development. However, altering the competition project reflected the same differences in architectural vision that

⁶⁸⁰ Ing. Arh. B. J., "Rezultat natječaja za idejne skice za gradnju Državne obrtne škole i Gradske centralne stručne podružne škole," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 12 (1935): 149.

⁶⁸¹ Kojić, *Društveni uslovi razvitka*, 212.

could lead to project replacement (as seen in the case of the OUZOR building in Belgrade, discussed later in the chapter).

Thus, besides the ideal competition outcome, choosing the highest-awarded project, assigning its elaboration to the author, and implementing it without changes, there were two close results: either by another author without changes or by the same author with modifications. In these scenarios, at least half of the project-author combination, derived from the competition, remained intact.

Nevertheless, another situation was also possible, where the highest awarded project selected for realization was elaborated by another architect with significant changes (as in the case of the Main Post Office in Belgrade, for example). In such instances, the competition result was formally respected, but the connection between the author and the project was severed, and the project itself was significantly modified. This outcome resembles a complete project replacement, where a different design was chosen for implementation instead of the highest-awarded project. However, the replacement could occur within the competition mechanism and not be considered problematic. This situation was related to the second round of competition between authors of awarded and purchased projects. The choice made after the second round was considered legitimate in such cases.

In cases where another project was chosen for implementation, not due to the second round, various gradations were possible. It could be another project that received an award, was purchased during the competition, or participated in the competition. Moreover, there were situations where a project created by a jury member was selected for implementation. Sometimes, a project entirely unrelated to the competition was chosen instead of any possible competition-related projects.

The competition outcome could also remain unrealized if construction never began after the competition, regardless of the chosen project. This group could also include cases

where another project for the same purpose was built in a different location unrelated to the competition results (or even on the same site for projects implemented after World War II).

Thus, competition outcomes and their variations can be viewed as a spectrum with many nuances. However, in theory, they can be divided into three main categories based on the degree of realization:

I. The realization of the first or the highest awarded project (including projects with changes made by the same architect, projects without changes made by another architect, the realization of one of the equally awarded projects, or the realization of a project chosen as a result of the second stage of the competition).

II. The realization of another project (including the highest awarded project realized with changes by another architect).

III. Unrealized competition project (including cases where another project for the same purpose was built in a different location unrelated to the competition results).

Theoretically, the distribution of results into three groups should be equal. In both cities, the proportion of unrealized competition outcomes is approximately the same, accounting for about one-third of the total results. Nevertheless, the distribution of other competition results shows that competitive practice was more successful in Zagreb, while in Belgrade, the project's replacement occurred more frequently. In some instances, another project was selected for implementation but was not built, which is not reflected in the table but will be discussed further.

Competitions	I	II	III
Zagreb	39,39%	27,27%	33,3%
Belgrade	28,57%	38,77%	32,65%

Table 4. Distribution of Competition Results in Zagreb and Belgrade

In Belgrade during the 1920s, the distribution of competition results across the three groups was close to the theoretical prediction, with approximately one-third falling into each category. However, in the 1930s, the number of projects being replaced increased significantly. In Zagreb, competitions were more successful in the 1920s, with an even higher proportion of projects being realized. Yet, by the 1930s, the proportion of unrealized projects also rose. In Zagreb, more successful competition results can be attributed to the professional community, which was better at defending its rights. For example, Tamara Bjažić Klarin highlights two cases where the intervention of UJIA's Zagreb section ensured that the highest-awarded architects were granted the right to realize their project: the competitions for SUZOR in 1924 and for the School of Public Health in 1925⁶⁸². In the second case, the first prize was not awarded, and there was an attempt to entrust the realization to Marko Vidaković, who was a jury member, but the UJIA's Zagreb section's intervention led to choosing the team Juraj Denzler and Mladen Kauzlarić, who received one of the two second awards⁶⁸³.

Overall, architects faced similar problems with competition results worldwide and complained about jury work and competition programs similarly⁶⁸⁴. The issue of project replacement inevitably accompanied competition practices. However, considering the

⁶⁸² Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 63. Rudolf Lubynski got the first award in the SUZOR building competition. The jury included five professionals (Josip Dryak, Franjo Gabrić, Karlo Gentzkow, Ladislav Sitzer, and Dragutin Karlo Vajda) as well as eight representatives of SUZOR. In the School of Public Health competition, two second prizes were awarded to the team Juraj Denzler and Mladen Kauzlarić, and to Aco Lavrenčić from Ljubljana. Ignjat Fischer got the third prize. Three of the five jury members were architects and engineers: Mirko Ferić, Ćiril Iveković, Marko Vidaković.

⁶⁸³ Juraj Denzler began studying architecture at the Technical University in Vienna and graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1924. He started his career in the bureaus of Hugo Ehrlich and Edo Šen, later engaging in private practice independently. From 1930, he also taught at the Technical Faculty in Zagreb. See more in Nataša Jakšić, "Arhitektonski opus Jurja Denzlara tridesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća," (PhD diss., Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 2007). Mladen Kauzlarić graduated from the State Secondary Technical School and the School of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb. He began his career in the office of Hugo Ehrlich in the 1920s, later running a private practice in partnership with Stjepan Gomboš in the 1930s. He was also a member of the Zemlja group. See more in Hela Vukadin-Doronjga, *24 sata heroja: Mladen Kauzlarić - ukus međuratnog Zagreba*, (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2003).

⁶⁸⁴ Hilde de Haan, Ids Haagsma, et al., *Architects in competition: international architectural competitions of the last 200 years*, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988).

theoretically equal distribution of the three types of results, the Belgrade case demonstrates a higher percentage of project replacements.

The first group of results can be considered an example of the competition mechanism working well. The third group, where the building remained unbuilt, highlighted problems stemming from other factors that became relevant during the transition from project selection to its realization. The second group, replacement of projects, showed that the competitive mechanism was obstructed. Examining competitions as a communicative mechanism is proposed to uncover the factors hindering competitive practices.

In general, architectural competitions may be considered a platform where clients interact with the professional community, and the public nature of competitions makes architectural ideas and preferences visible. There are four levels:

- what architects (typically younger ones) can offer;
- what architectural elites evaluate as relevant;
- what clients finally choose for implementation;
- which aspects are discussed in the media.

Finding the correspondence between these levels is complicated because competitions do not include direct contact between clients and architects but rely on communication through documents codified in architectural language. A competition can be viewed as a mechanism consisting of a series of communication acts, with key elements (requirements, program, projects, result, decision) described as 'information' in Luhmann's terms⁶⁸⁵. The sequence and details of these acts may differ from case to case. To examine competitive practices within a particular city or country during a specific period, a communication mechanism model can be developed based on regulatory documents.

⁶⁸⁵ Luhmann, *Art As a Social System*, 11-13.

Thus, the model would include the following communication acts for interwar Yugoslavia. A client outlines their **requirements** to invited professionals (future jury members); these professionals "translate" the requirements into a competition **program**; participants interpret the program's conditions and propose solutions in the form of **projects**; the jury reviews these projects, ranks them, and awards them based on their adherence to the program, producing competition **results**; finally, the client examines the results and makes a **decision** which project to implement.




Table 5. The Communication Model of Architectural Competitions

Ideally, all 'information' components should reflect one another: the program contains the requirements, the projects align with the program, the results are derived from both, and the decision follows the results. Project replacement indicates that communication failure occurred at some of these stages.

3.3. Communication Failure and Rejected Projects.

There are various possible explanations for communication failure in architectural competitions. The first one lies in the professional domain. Architects might have proposed projects that did not meet program conditions if they considered the requirements irrelevant. Additionally, jury members might not have accurately 'translated' the investor's needs into the competition program. Furthermore, juries could evaluate projects based on criteria unrelated to the program, such as personal preferences or relationships with participants.

The second set of explanations is more closely related to investors. Competition results could have become irrelevant if a building concept changed after a competition. Even when results aligned with a program, an investor might have chosen not to implement a highest-awarded project due to external factors such as corruption or favoritism. Another possibility was that an investor realized results did not meet their expectations because their evaluation criteria differed from professionals' ones. This divergence could occur because professionals and investors assessed what was relevant in architecture differently, using distinct 'codes,' which could lead to communication failure.

The Competitions Programs

Programs played a key role in the communication between investors and architects. In most cases, investors invited a professional (or a small group) to develop a competition program, which would reflect the investor's requirements (these professionals later also were jury members in most cases). Architects would then create their competition projects based on the program. In the article "*About organization of competitions and their success*," signed by Ing. D. P. (likely Dragan Petrik), a competition program was compared to a contract that both parties must adhere to⁶⁸⁶. However, in practice, potential breakdowns in the first or second stages of communication often caused issues with the competition mechanism if either a program did not align with an investor's requirements or architects failed to follow a program.

Architects could intentionally propose projects that did not align with competition programs. Their decision could be a reaction to a specific competition and a way to express disagreement with the investor's requirements, or it might stem from broader dissatisfaction with the competition process. As mentioned earlier, frustration over the lack of awards often led architects to focus more on developing architectural ideas and experimenting rather than

⁶⁸⁶ D.P., "O raspisu natječaja i njihovom uspjehu," *Građevinski vjesnik* 4 (1932): 64.

meeting the investor's expectations. For instance, in Belgrade's Opera House competition, a project by Milorad Pantović, in collaboration with Božidar Obradović, deliberately disregarded the program's requirements but still received a special out-of-competition award due to its originality⁶⁸⁷.

Projects that did not adhere to the program sometimes not only caught the jury's attention but also attracted public interest if published, but occasionally were awarded within competitions. For instance, in the 1932 competition for the Palace of Workers' Institutions, four additional projects that did not follow the program's limitations were purchased, besides awarding two projects that met the program's requirements⁶⁸⁸. The second round was held among awarded and purchased projects.

However, in most cases, juries argued that the projects did not fully meet the program's requirements as justification for not awarding first prizes, a frequent occurrence in both Belgrade and Zagreb competitions. The jury's comments and the competition outcomes illustrated a disconnect between what the architects proposed and what the investor and jury deemed important and relevant. These results not only cast a shadow on the architects' reputations but were also used as an argument against competitions, labeling them as unsuccessful. Professionals pointed out that such outcomes resulted from organizational errors in competitions, which could have been avoided with well-constructed programs (and impartial professional judging)⁶⁸⁹.

Thus, architects believed that unsuccessful competitions stemmed from poorly developed programs. From the early 1920s, competition programs were frequently criticized for lacking essential information, having poorly defined tasks, a limited understanding of

⁶⁸⁷ Ivan Zdravković, "Ishod konkursa za Beogradsku operu," *Umetnički Pregled* 4-5 (1940): 147.

⁶⁸⁸ "Rezultat natječaja za gradnju palače radničkih ustanova," *Novosti*, 15.7.1932, 4.

⁶⁸⁹ "Inženjerska komora traži raspis javnog natječaja za gradnju palače kulturnih ustanova u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 14.1.1939, 9.

architectural features, unrealistic expectations, and even contradictory requirements⁶⁹⁰. Architects pointed out that problems with the programs make the competitions ineffective, leading to the waste of their efforts⁶⁹¹. Moreover, when such issues arose, it became impossible for architects to adhere to the program.

The issue of competition requirements was also linked to the question of deadlines, as excessively short deadlines could lead to irrelevant results, complicating the competition process. For open architectural competitions, the average deadline was approximately two months in Belgrade and around 2.5 months in Zagreb. Nevertheless, several competitions with deadlines of less than a month were considered insufficient in Belgrade. For instance, in the case of the Belgrade Fairground competition, architects mainly complained that for such a complex task, the deadline was about three weeks, and it even took longer for the jury to evaluate the projects than the time given to architects to create them⁶⁹².

The thoroughness of competition programs and the issue of deadlines reflect a fundamental contradiction between investors and participants. When investors opted for competitions as a selection mechanism, they were already facing extended project timelines, so it was in their interest to shorten the competition period wherever possible.

However, beyond the program quality, a key issue was how effectively the investor's requirements were communicated in the program. Architect Ivan Zdravković noted, "If the jury presents the investor's ideas in the program well, and the participants follow the program, both will be satisfied"⁶⁹³. The challenge lay not only in translating requirements into a well-detailed and thought-out program but also in the inevitable interplay of the elements identified earlier as "information" in the competition process.

⁶⁹⁰ Sigma, "Jedan natječaj. Povodom natječaja za novogradnju „Prve hrvatske obrtne banke d.d. u Zagrebu“,” *Jutarnji List*, 6.5.1920, 5; D. Jurišić, "O faktorima konkursa," *Tehnički List* 3-4 (1936): 47; D.P., "O raspisu natječaja i njihovom uspjehu," *Građevinski vjesnik* 4 (1932): 64.

⁶⁹¹ Jovan Korka, "Povodom gradnje narodnog doma „Kralja Aleksandra“ u Zemunu," *Pravda*, 12.3.1933, 9.

⁶⁹² "Zagonetka Beogradskog sajmišta," *Pravda*, 24.6.1936, 4.

⁶⁹³ Zdravković, "Konkursi i njihovi ishodi," in Kojić, *Društveni uslovi razvitka*, 220.

Requirements, programs, projects, results, and decisions are not only elements of the mechanism that facilitate communication between investors and participants via the jury, but they also interact dynamically throughout the process. As Carlo Menon and David Vanderburgh suggest, competitions can be examined through Bruno Latour's actor-network theory, where both "human" and "non-human" participants are involved in the interaction⁶⁹⁴. This means that competition projects can reshape both the investor's and jury's perceptions of the initial requirements and the program itself. For example, Ivan Zemljak, a member of many competition juries in Zagreb, mentioned this effect in his article about one of the Zagreb competitions⁶⁹⁵.

Thus, not only the requirements outlined in the program but also the competition entries and the jury's discussions of them influence the evaluation criteria, creating a leap in communication⁶⁹⁶. Thus, the judgment process in architectural communication itself generates an incompatibility between the program's requirements and the project evaluation criteria.

Another explanation for this incompatibility lies in the possibility of personal preferences or connections influencing the results instead of the quality of the projects and the degree to which they met the program. Architects frequently associated competition problems with the jury's biases⁶⁹⁷.

The Jury as a Mediator

Since competitions exclude direct communication between the client and the architect, the jury plays an important role as a mediator between them, and problems in its work impact the effectiveness of the competition mechanism. The judgment process in competitions is not

⁶⁹⁴ Menon and Vanderburgh, "Who - or What - "Wins" an Architectural Competition?" 3.

⁶⁹⁵ Ing. I. Z., "Natječaj za idejne skice za Državnu obrtnu školu i Gradsku centralnu stručnu podružnu školu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 2 (1936): 25.

⁶⁹⁶ Al-Qaysi, et al. "Judgment in architectural competitions," 7.

⁶⁹⁷ "Beogradski arhitekti o konkursima i njihovim ishodima," *Politika*, 10.3.1937, 19.

only complex but also controversial due to the relative and fluid nature of architectural values. Additionally, the jury members have different preferences, expertise, and background knowledge, which influence their judgment. Many architects believed that the problems arose because competition results were based on “friendly feelings and various interests, and rarely on the project’s value”⁶⁹⁸. Therefore, the discrepancy between the awards and the project implementation could occur because the jury's decisions did not reflect the project qualities but rather the jury members’ preferences or their relationships with the competition participants.

These relations called the competition practice into question. The 1938 Rulebook prohibited participation for anyone involved in preparing the competition program and judging the projects, as well as for “persons who are related to them as a friend, family member, official, private bureau, or assistant”⁶⁹⁹. Milivoj Petrik believed the comma between 'official' and 'private bureau' was a misprint, suggesting that the intention was to exclude colleagues who worked with a jury member in the same private bureau and not in administration⁷⁰⁰. Otherwise, many architect-officials would be excluded, including the most qualified ones.

Immediately after adopting the rulebook, a scandal erupted at the Railway Hospital (*Železničarska bolnica*) competition in Zagreb⁷⁰¹. In this competition, Stanko Kliska won first prize (Fig. A.12), Teodor Tepeš received second, and the team of Zvonimir Vrkljan, Selimir, and Zoja Dumengjić took third⁷⁰². However, after the competition, a group of participants,

⁶⁹⁸ Svetomir Lazić, "Posleratna arhitektura naše prestonice," *Umetnički Pregled* 6-7 (1940): 214.

⁶⁹⁹ "Pravilnik o obavljanju konkursa," 1174.

⁷⁰⁰ Milivoj Petrik, "Javni natječaji," *VPS* 4 (1938): 572-577.

⁷⁰¹ Full name Hospital of the Patients' Fund for State Transportation Employees (*Bolnica Bolesničkog fonda za Državno Saobraćajno Osoblje*). See more about the competition in Bjažić Klarin, "Natječaj za Željezničarsku bolnicu u Zagrebu."

⁷⁰² "Natječaj za idejni projekat bolnice Bolesničkog fonda za drž. Saobr. Osoblje na Rebru u Zagrebu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 11 (1938): 164. Stanko Kliska began studying architecture at the Technical University in Vienna and graduated from the Technical High School in Zagreb in 1923. He started his career in the studio of

joined by other colleagues, protested against the results and complained to the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Transport⁷⁰³. The competition results were questioned because Franjo Gabrić, who had direct ties with Stanko Kliska and Teodor Tepeš, was on the jury⁷⁰⁴. Nevertheless, according to the 1938 Rulebook, the third prize was also problematic, as Berislav Borčić, the director of the Hygienic Institute where the Dumengjić couple worked, was also on the jury⁷⁰⁵. Moreover, Milovan Kovačević's project was purchased, but he worked at the Technical Faculty in Zagreb as Edo Šen's assistant, who was the deputy member of the jury, but Šen stated after the competition that he did not participate in the jury's work⁷⁰⁶.

However, considering that the rulebook was adopted after the competition announcement but before the jury's decision, opinions varied on whether it should have been applied in this case⁷⁰⁷. The first prize, awarded to Stanko Kliska, violated not only the rule prohibiting participation due to professional ties with a jury member but also due to involvement in the preliminary stages of the competition. It turned out that even before the decision was made to hold the competition, Stanko Kliska had developed a preliminary design for the building (which was also seen as evidence of his connections with two other jury

Viktor Kovačić, later worked at the Construction Directorate, and from 1929 to 1941 ran his own practice. See more in Marta Vukotić Lazar, "Stanko Kliska - 1896-1969," *Arhitektura i urbanizam* 12-13 (2003): 122-27. Zvonimir Vrkljan graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1924. He began his career in the studio of Ignjat Fischer and, from 1931, ran a private practice, often collaborating with architects Selimir and Zoja Dumengjić (Зоя Петровна Непенина). Both Selimir and Zoja graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1927. Zoja started her career in Ignjat Fischer's studio. Both worked at the Hygienic Institute and the School of Public Health in Zagreb (Selimir from 1929 to 1942, and Zoja from 1931 to 1941). See more about Zoja Dumengjić and their joint projects in Zrinka Barišić Marenčić, "Arhitektica Zoja Dumengjić," (PhD diss., Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 2020).

⁷⁰³ Bjažić Klarin, "Natječaj za Željezničarsku bolnicu u Zagrebu," 70-71.

⁷⁰⁴ "Arhitekti traže poništenje natječaja za Željezničarsku bolnicu na Rebru," *Večer*, 2.11.1938, 3. Franjo Gabrić graduated from the Technical University in Graz in 1902, where he began his career by participating in the construction of a hospital complex. From 1919 to 1922, he worked in the Construction Department of the Provincial Government in Zagreb. Starting in 1922, he served as the director of the construction company *Pionir*, and in 1936, he became a professor at the Technical Faculty in Zagreb. See more in Sandra Križić Roban, "Zaboravljeni arhitekt Franjo Gabrić," *Radovi Instituta za povijest umjetnosti* 22 (1998): 137-149.

⁷⁰⁵ Bjažić Klarin, "Natječaj za Željezničarsku bolnicu u Zagrebu," 71.

⁷⁰⁶ "Prof. Ing. Edo Šen nije bio član žirija kod konkursa za izradu skice Željezničarske bolnice na Rebru," *Novosti*, 5.11.1938, 7.

⁷⁰⁷ "Što je u stvari s natječajem za Željezničarsku bolnicu u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 15.11.1938, 3.

members besides Gabrić)⁷⁰⁸. Despite the scandal and complaints, Stanko Kliska's project was chosen for implementation⁷⁰⁹, but the project was elaborated by Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer, who were among the protesters⁷¹⁰.

Nevertheless, Stanko Kliska won first prize (Fig. A.12), Milovan Kovačević came second, and the team of Zvonimir Vrkljan, Selimir, and Zoja Dumengjić placed third in the competition for the Railway Hospital in Belgrade in 1940, despite the jury members being different⁷¹¹.

A similar scandal occurred at the Belgrade Fairground competition organized by the Municipality in 1936. It was not only related to accusations of connections but also to the fact that the author of the first-prize-awarded project had participated in the design even before the competition and together with the jury chairman. When the competition was announced, it unexpectedly had short deadlines and relatively modest awards for a project of such complexity and importance⁷¹². The jury awarded the first prize to Ignjat Popović, who was still an employee of the Belgrade Municipality Technical Directorate at the time; Milan Zloković and collaborators got the second award; Miša Manojlović and Isaak Azriel got the third⁷¹³. Moreover, after the competition, it was revealed that the jury chairman, engineer Milan Nešić, a member of the municipal board, during discussions on whether to hold a

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ "Nova železničarska bolnica na Rebru gradit će se na proleće," *Jutarnji List*, 17.11.1938, 8.

⁷¹⁰ Bjažić Klarin, "Natječaj za Željezničarsku bolnicu u Zagrebu," 73.

⁷¹¹ "U Beogradu se podiže još jedna velika bolnica," *Vreme*, 31.5.1940, 10; "Konkurs za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Bolnice Bolesničkog fonda za državno saobraćajno osoblje," *Vreme*, 1.3.1940, 15. Among nine Belgrade jury members, one was a deputy member of the jury in the Zagreb competition.

⁷¹² "Natječaj," *Vreme*, 23.2.1936, 15. Among five jury members, two were architects – Djura Bajalović, Branislav Kojić.

⁷¹³ D.S., "Beogradsko sajmište – prema idejnoj skici g. Ignjata Popovića koji je dobio prvu nagradu," *Vreme*, 18.4.1936, 10. Ignjat Popović graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1929. He worked for the Belgrade Municipality until 8.5.1936, after which he ran a private practice. Miša Manojlović graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1928. After his studies, he spent some time in Berlin (there was a joint competition project for the building of the State Mortgage Bank in Belgrade in 1929 with Zdenko Strižić, who was then working under Hans Poelzig). During the 1930s, he ran a private practice in Belgrade in partnership with Isaak Azriel. See more in Aleksandra Ilijevski, "The Lost Voices of Serbian Modernism: Miša Manojlović and Isak Azriel," *Serbian Studies* 27, no. 1-2 (2013): 121-135.

competition, had mentioned the Fairground project he had been working on for 2.5 years together with his colleague, Ignjat Popović⁷¹⁴. From the recollections of Branislav Kojić, who was also on the jury, it is known that Nešić insisted on awarding the first prize to this project⁷¹⁵. The participants protested and demanded a new jury to reevaluate the projects⁷¹⁶. Nešić responded by claiming that participants were complaining because they would not be given the right to elaborate the project, while the Fairground committee decided that the final project should be a compilation of the competition entries⁷¹⁷. Finally, the project was developed by architects from the Belgrade Municipality Technical Directorate (Milivoj Trčković, Đorđe Lukić, and Rajko Tatić)⁷¹⁸.

On the one hand, professional relations were unavoidable because the professional community was small, and its key figures were often invited to serve on the jury. For example, university professors taught many participants, architects-officials worked in the same institutions, and UJIA members were among the most active jury members and competition participants. The problem was not only that such connections might have influenced the impartiality of the judging but also that they called the anonymity of the projects into question, as, for example, chiefs could recognize the visual style of their subordinates⁷¹⁹. Theoretically, the most significant ties were those held by architects working in administrative and educational institutions (since their direct colleagues could be on the jury), but they won only 15% of Belgrade awards. In the 1930s, architects from Zagreb won

⁷¹⁴ "Iza kulisa Hoće li Beograd dobiti Sajmište kakvo zaslužuje," *Pravda*, 4.5.1936, 8.

⁷¹⁵ Kojić, *Društveni uslove*, 208.

⁷¹⁶ "Iza kulisa Hoće li Beograd dobiti Sajmište kakvo zaslužuje," *Pravda*, 4.5.1936, 8.

⁷¹⁷ "Odbor sajma izagrada javnost i projektante," *Pravda*, 24.6.1936, 4.

⁷¹⁸ Marta Vukotić-Lazar, "Staro beogradsko sajmište: Osnivanje i izgradnja," *Godišnjak Grada Beograd LI* (2004): 145. Milivoje Trčković graduated from the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris in 1926. From 1927 to 1941, he worked at the Technical Directorate of the Belgrade Municipality. He was the husband of architect Persida Trčković. See more in Marija Pokrajac, "Beogradski arhitekta Milivoje Trčković (1895-1981)," *Nasleđe* 22 (2021): 37-58.

⁷¹⁹ For example, Branislav Kojić mentioned such a case, which had happened to him. Kojić, *Društveni uslove*, 206.

almost one-third of the Belgrade competitions awards, and they mostly had no direct professional contact with the jury members in Belgrade.

On the other hand, family ties and commercial relationships proved more problematic than close professional contacts. For example, at the Ministry of Finance competition in 1924, Bogdan Nestorović, the son of Nikola Nestorović, the jury chairman, worked in the bureau that was awarded the only prize⁷²⁰. However, the most important issue was likely not the participants' connections with the professionals on the jury, as most participants had such connections, but rather their relationships with the investors' representatives, which would later in the chapter be considered a form of favoritism.

Competition regulations were aimed at ensuring the anonymity of the projects. Naturally, architects could inform their colleagues about their project's code, which went against professional ethics. However, the frequent involvement of experienced jury members also compromised project anonymity, as they could recognize the authors based on the project's visual style. In the previous example of the Fairground competition, Milan Nešić, in his defense, hinted that he could not recognize projects, unlike one of the architects on the jury⁷²¹. For instance, Tamara Bjažić Klarin claimed that local patriotism was the reason why Zagreb architects received the most awards at Zagreb competitions, as the jury members could recognize their colleagues' projects and wanted the local architects to secure the commissions⁷²².

The intersections between jury members and awarded architects show that they were less frequent in Zagreb than in Belgrade. In Zagreb, twelve pairs appeared twice, and only one pair appeared three times, which was related to a close professional connection: three times, then university professor Edo Šen was a jury member, his assistant Milovan Kovačević got

⁷²⁰ "Razne vesti," *Tehnički List* 19 (1924): 248.

⁷²¹ "Zagonetka Beogradskog sajmišta," *Pravda*, 24.6.1936, 4.

⁷²² Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 293.

awards. The number of open competitions in Zagreb was almost half that of Belgrade. Still, the number of appearances among active jury members is comparable between the two cities, whereas the number of awards among active participants is not. Five architects judged between 7 and 11 competitions in Zagreb, while six architects judged between 7 and 12 competitions in Belgrade. In Zagreb, eight participants won three awards each, while in Belgrade, seven participants won between 5 and 8 awards each. The team Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer was among the most successful participants in both cases. Therefore, Zagreb competitions produced more varied results.

Among frequent intersections in the Belgrade competitions, some demonstrate a direct connection between a jury member and a participant: Dimitrije M. Leko and Dragan Gudović were not only colleagues in the Ministry of Construction but also co-authors, while Dimitrije M. Leko and Mate Bajlon were friends⁷²³. However, there were no such direct contacts in other cases. Most intersections occurred between the most active jury members and the most awarded architects, but their number is higher than statistically predicted (the number of competitions in which their joint appearance would be likely, considering the frequency of their participation⁷²⁴).

Intersection	Number	Jury participation	Awards	Statistical prediction
Petar Bajalović; Miladin Prljević	4	12	8	2,29
Dimitrije M. Leko; Mate Bajlon	4	11	4	1,05
Djura Bajalović; Milan Zloković	3	5	7	0,83
Petar Bajalović; Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer	3	12	6	1,71
Svetozar Jovanović; Miladin	3	9	8	1,71

⁷²³ Dragan Gudović graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1930. He began his career in the studio of Dragiša Brašovan and later worked at the Ministry of Construction. Mate Bajlon graduated from the Technical University in Vienna in 1926. From 1928 to 1941, he worked for the Sarajevo municipality. See more in Predrag V. Milošević, *Mate Bajlon, arhitekta: (1903-1995)*, (Beograd: Zadužbina Andrejević, 2007).

⁷²⁴ $P(A)$ – the probability of the jury member's participation, $P(B)$ – the probability of the architect's participation, and $P(A \cap B)$ – the probability of their intersection. In the table, the statistical prediction is the product of $P(A \cap B)$ and the number of competitions, which gives the number of competitions where their intersection was likely to compare with the actual intersection.

Prljević				
Dimitrije M. Leko; Dragan Gudović	3	11	5	1,31

Table 6. Intersections Between Jury Members and Participants in Belgrade Competitions

Generally, not only the jury members' preferences but also broader concepts and ideas about architecture and their expertise and knowledge influenced competition results. There was a gap between them because, in some cases, completely different projects received awards⁷²⁵. Tamara Bjažić Klarin illustrates the coexistence of various trends in Zagreb architecture in the mid-1920s with the example of three awarded projects in the competition for the Braće Janenković building: the first prize went to Juraj Denzler for his classicized modernism, the second to Aleksandar Freudenreich and Pavao Deutsch for their neoclassical project, and the third to Vladimir Šterk for his modernist project⁷²⁶.

In Belgrade, at the competition for the Warrior's House in 1929, the academic project by Jovan Jovanović and Živojin Piperski and the Byzantine-Romanesque project by Bogdan Nestorović and Jovan Šnajder both received second prizes, which were the highest awards⁷²⁷ (Fig. A.13). The jury did not give a first prize, insisting that changes were necessary for these projects, particularly regarding the façades⁷²⁸. Architect Milutin Borisavljević published an article criticizing not only the awarded projects but also the competition program, proposing that such a building should have a more military character with more brutal forms⁷²⁹. The

⁷²⁵ Jurišić, "O faktorima konkursa," 46.

⁷²⁶ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 156. Aleksandar Freudenreich graduated from the Construction School in 1911 and the School of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb in 1930. He began his career working at the construction company *Kalda i Stefan*. In 1923, he co-founded a joint office with Pavao Deutsch. Pavao Deutsch, the son of architect Julije Deutsch, graduated from the Technical University in Vienna. See more in Zdravko Živković, *Aleksandar Freudenreich: arhitekt i graditelj*, Zagreb: Društvo konzervatora Hrvatske, 1992.

⁷²⁷ "Pred podizanjem Ratničkog doma u Beogradu," *Pravda*, 16.5.1929, 6. For the history of the Warrior's House qv Aleksandar Ignjatović, "Između univerzalnog i autentičnog: o arhitekturi Ratničkog doma u Beogradu," *Godišnjak grada Beograda* LII (2005): 313–332.

⁷²⁸ "Skice za ratnički dom," *Vreme*, 16.5.1929, 3. The jury included four architects, Petar Popović, Dragutin Maslac, Svetozar Jovanović, Branko Popović, and three Association of Reserve Officers and Warriors representatives.

⁷²⁹ Milutin Borisavljević, "Konkurs za Ratnički dom," *Pravda*, 24.5.1929, 5.

investor chose the project by Jovan Jovanović and Živojin Piperski⁷³⁰, but the building was implemented with changes, which reflected the influence of Borisavljević's vision.

In the 1930s, the main confrontation in competition results occurred between modernist and academist projects. However, it could be observed in Belgrade competition more often, while the situation was rare in Zagreb. For example, in Zagreb at the 1930 competition for the *Hrvatski Radiša* building, the jury awarded only two projects: Oswald Schindler won first prize with a design in the stripped classicism style, while Alfred Albini's modernist project placed third⁷³¹ (Fig. 20).




Figure 20. Competition projects for *Hrvatski Radiša* building in Zagreb: the first-prize project by Oswald Schindler; the third-prize project by Alfred Albini, 1930.

Source: "Kako će izgledati monumentalna palača Hrvatskog Radiše," *Jutarnji List*, 12.11.1930, 4; "U Zvonimirovoj ulici izgradit će Hrvatski Radiša," *Večer*, 11.10.1930, 3.

In Belgrade, at the competition for the State Monopolies Administration, the Government, and the cadastre department in 1936/1937, the jury awarded two projects: one by the Zagreb team Marijan Haberle and Hinko Bauer (Fig. A.10) and another by the Serbian team Rajko Tatić and Jovan Ranković⁷³² (Fig. A.11). The first was a complex of connected buildings with a simplified modernist façade, while the second was a single monumental neoclassical building. This combination likely stemmed from the specific requirements of the competition program. On the one hand, the building was designed to house three institutions,

⁷³⁰ "Ratnički dom," *Politika*, 29.8.1929, 14.

⁷³¹ Among seven jury members, four were professionals: Ćiril Iveković, Martin Pilar, August Pisačić, Josip Seifert. "U Zvonimirovoj ulici izgradit će Hrvatski Radiša," *Večer*, 11.10.1930, 3. Alfred Albini began studying architecture in Vienna in 1919 and completed his education at the Technical High School in Zagreb in 1923, where he remained as a teaching assistant to Viktor Kovačić and later to Hugo Ehrlich. See more in Andrej Uchytíl i Ariana Štulhofer, *Arhitekt Alfred Albini*, (Zagreb: Arhitektonski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2007).

⁷³² "Zgrada Uprave monopola u kojoj će biti smešteno i Predsedništvo Vlade biće najveća i najreprezentativnija u zemlji," *Vreme*, 13.4.1937, 12.

and their spatial and functional needs had to be adequately addressed⁷³³. In this regard, the Haberle-Bauer project, which separated different parts of the building, was well-suited. On the other hand, while the program allowed flexibility in the external architecture, the central section, designated for government use, needed to be highly representative⁷³⁴. Additionally, since the building was to become part of a complex of administrative buildings constructed in the 1920s in academism, the program required that the new building be harmonized with them⁷³⁵. In this respect, the Tatić-Ranković team's project, designed in striped classicism, complemented the complex, with the central section for the government distinguished by a tower.

In 1940, at the Opera competition, the Italian team Pasquale Marabotto, Luigi Orestano, and others, with a neoclassical project, and the Zagreb team Vladimir Turina and Hinko Gottwald, with a modernist project, both received the highest awards, second ones⁷³⁶ (Fig. A.14). In the press, the first project was praised for its "architectural-artistic" qualities, while the second was noted for its "interesting space layout"⁷³⁷. The jury also awarded four other projects (by German, Belgian, American teams, and Serbian architects). Ivan Zdravković explained these results by dividing experts into "two camps with opposite views on architecture"⁷³⁸.

Moreover, the split in preferences could have existed both among the professionals on the jury and between them and the investors' representatives. For example, the Stock Exchange competition in 1932 illustrates such a disagreement. The jury awarded only the second prize to the project by Aleksandar Djordjević (Fig. A.15), but eight projects were

⁷³³ *Uslovi i program utakmice za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Uprave državnih monopola u Beogradu*, (Beograd: Štampa Državne markarnice, 1936).

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷³⁶ "Izložba idejnih skica za Operu," *Vreme*, 6.4.1940, 7. Among 11 jury members, five were architects: Edo Šen from Zagreb, Ivan Vurnik from Ljubljana, Svetozar Jovanović, Ivan Ivačić, Dimitrije M. Leko from Belgrade.

⁷³⁷ "Kako će izgledati nova državna opera u Beogradu," *Politika*, 29.3.1940, 11.

⁷³⁸ Ivan Zdravković, "Ishod konkursa za Beogradsku operu," *Umetnički Pregled* 4-5 (1940): 144.

purchased⁷³⁹. In the second stage, professionals proposed projects by Milivoje Tričković or Branislav Ristić (Fig. A.15) as the best solutions⁷⁴⁰. Nevertheless, Milan Stojadinović, the Stock Exchange chairman, insisted that elaboration should be entrusted to Aleksandar Djordjević because "according to the Stock Exchange members, his work most suited it due to the façade"⁷⁴¹.

However, the different awarded projects demonstrate not only the divergence of views between jury members but also the complex coexistence of various architectural trends. For example, at the OUZOR competition in 1929, where both the results and the jury votes are known, the modernist project by Lavoslav Horvat⁷⁴² from Zagreb (Fig. A.16) received the first award with 8 out of 9 votes, while the neoclassical project by the team Miladin Prljević and Živojin Piperski from Belgrade (Fig. A.16) took second place, also with 8 out of 9 votes⁷⁴³.

While the jury members' ideas and preferences influenced the competition results, the main issue arose when the investor's decisions did not align with them.

Investor Decisions and Competition Results

The discrepancy between the investor's decision and the competition results could be due to the irrelevance of the competition outcomes caused by project changes, favoritism, or

⁷³⁹ "Konkurs za izradu idejne skice nove zgrade Berze u Beogradu," *Pravda*, 17.5.1932. The jury included three architects (Branko Tanazević, Janko Šafarik, Branislav Kojić) and three representatives of the Stock Exchange.

⁷⁴⁰ "Problem projekta nove zgrade Berze," *Vreme*, 26.7.1932, 5.

⁷⁴¹ "Nova zgrada Berze, rezultat konkursa," *Politika*, 19.7.1932, 13.

⁷⁴² Lavoslav Horvat graduated from the School of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb. He began his career in Rudolf Lubynski's studio and opened his own office in 1930. He was also a member of the *Zemlja* group. See more in Zrinka Paladino, "Arhitekt Lavoslav Horvat i „Udruženje umjetnika Zemlja”,“ *Prostor* 14, br. 2(32) (2006): 167-175.

⁷⁴³ The jury included five architects, three of whom represented Technical Faculties: Petar Bajalović from Belgrade, Ćiril Iveković from Zagreb, and Ivan Vurnik from Ljubljana. Two others were from the Belgrade Municipality (Vojislav Zadgina) and the Ministry of Construction (Dragutin Maslac). Also, five representatives of OUZOR were on the jury. "Konkurs, Okružni ured u Beogradu." The collection of Museum of Science and Technology T: 111.151/31. Miladin Prljević graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1925 and began his career at the Ministry of Construction. From 1927, in addition to his private practice, he taught at the State Technical School in Belgrade. See more in Ivan R. Marković, *Arhitekta Miladin Prljević*, (Užice: Istorijски arhiv, 2013).

because the jury's criteria for awarding projects differed from the investor's criteria for making the final selection.

A common reason for rejecting competition results was the relocation of the project. However, in some cases, the decision to entrust the project to the competition's winner remained in place even after the location change. In rare cases, the project was just adapted to the new site (for example, the State Printing House in Belgrade), but more often, the competition project underwent significant changes for the new location (for example, the Art Pavilion (*Umetnički paviljon*) in Belgrade). Nevertheless, in most cases, a post-competition location change resulted in a new project, a different author, and occasionally even a change in the selection mechanism. For example, in Zagreb, the Shareholders' Association for the Construction of Inns and Bathhouses (*Dioničarsko društvo za izgradnju svratišta i kupališta*) initially announced an open Yugoslav competition. Nevertheless, after difficulties acquiring the site and relocation, it held an international invitation-only competition. Similarly, the Croatian Art Society Strossmayer (*Hrvatsko društvo umjetnosti Strossmayer*) initially conducted a mixed competition for the Art pavilion, but after a location change, they opted for direct commissioning. In such cases, the original competition project may be considered unrealized rather than rejected, and these instances will be discussed in the next chapter.

However, when the building concept changed after the competition, rendering the competition results irrelevant, this constituted a direct rejection of the competition results by the investor. In Belgrade, the State Mortgage Bank announced a competition in 1929 with the requirement to combine the new building with an existing one, leaving the choice of how to do so up to the participants⁷⁴⁴. The jury awarded the highest second prize to Dimitrije M.

⁷⁴⁴ Dimitrije M. Leko, "Konkurs za izradu skice za novu zgradu centrale Državne Hipotekarne Banke u Beogradu," *Tehnički List* 5 (1930): 65-67.

Leko and two third prizes to Milan Sekulić and Alfred Felner⁷⁴⁵. Leko's project featured an academic-style façade and well-organized space, which led the jury to recommend it for construction⁷⁴⁶. Nevertheless, the press focused on Alfred Felner's third-prize project due to its innovative approach of combining the existing two-story building with a modernist steel-framed nine-story structure⁷⁴⁷. The bank chose the most conservative option: to keep the old building unchanged, extend it, and entrust the project development to its in-house architect, Vojin Petrović⁷⁴⁸. Leko published an article criticizing the technical aspects of this decision and the competition process, pointing out that the program conditions and the final decision were inconsistent⁷⁴⁹.

Another example is the Ministry of Transport, which, after conducting the Dunav Railway Station competition in Belgrade in 1931, where even a first prize was awarded, decided to change the concept and build the station according to a model project⁷⁵⁰.

Overall, these examples demonstrate that unresolved key construction issues (where and how to build) affected the implementation of competition results. Nevertheless, a more complex problem was the arbitrariness of investor decisions, where choices were made without considering the competition results and without an objective reason to explain their irrelevance.

A straightforward explanation for ignoring competition results could be corruption. However, selecting a winning project did not affect project funding to the same extent as tenders, in which technical bureaus competed for engineering works and building

⁷⁴⁵ "Nova zgrada Državne Hipotekarne Banke," *Politika*, 2.7.1929, 4. The jury included two architects from Belgrade Technical Faculty, Dragutin Djordjević and Svetozar Jovanović, and one representative of the bank.

⁷⁴⁶ Leko, "Konkurs za izradu skice," 65.

⁷⁴⁷ "Jedan projekt nove zgrade Hipotekarne banke," *Politika*, 3.7.1929, 8; "Projekt nove zgrade Hipotekarne banke," *Vreme*, 3.7.1929, 7.

⁷⁴⁸ "Rešeno je pitanje palate Državne hipotekarne banke u Beogradu," *Politika* 5.2.1930, 6.

⁷⁴⁹ Leko, "Konkurs za izradu skice," 66.

⁷⁵⁰ Vsevolod Tatarinov (Всеволод Александрович Татаринов) got the first award, Evstafy Mamukov (Евстафий Игнатьевич Мамуков) got the second, and Siniša Savić got the third. "Beograd dobija još jednu novu modernu železničku stanicu," *Vreme*, 25.6.1931, 9.

construction, where corruption was more likely. In theory, architects could have paid to bypass the competition results and have their project selected, but it is not easy to verify such cases. Moreover, one of the few known cases in which an architect offered financial support to a minister in exchange for a contract to project elaboration was linked to an attempt to ensure the realization of his first-prize-awarded project. Drago Ibler told his students in 1953 about such an attempt, but a minister change disrupted his plan⁷⁵¹. The project in question was his first prize design in the 1935 competition for the OUZOR building in Osijek⁷⁵². However, the building was eventually constructed according to the design by Bela Auer and Zvonimir Vrkljan, who had won second prize, with the involvement of jury member Branimir Iveković⁷⁵³.

A more likely scenario was that an architect could have offered a significantly lower fee after a competition. For example, no first prize was awarded in the competition for the Croatian Mountaineering Association (*Hrvatsko Planinarsko Društvo*) building. The second prize went to the team of Georg Kiverov, Jovan Korka, and Djordje Krekić, while two third prizes were given to Josip Pičman and the team of Selimir and Zoja Dumengjić⁷⁵⁴. Besides the results, *Jutarnji List* and *Večer* illustrated their articles with Josip Pičman's project (Fig.

⁷⁵¹ Željka Čorak, *U funkciji znaka*, 245. Ibler mentioned Minister Miha Krek. However, based on the timeline and ministerial appointments, it seems more likely that another Slovenian politician Drago Marušić, who served as Minister of Social Policy and Public Health until June 19, 1935, was the figure involved.

⁷⁵² "Rezultat natječaja za idejnu osnovu uredske zgrade Okružnog ureda za osiguranje radnika u Osijeku," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 3 (1935).

⁷⁵³ See more about the building in Zrinka Barišić Marenčić, "Okružni ured za osiguranje radnika u Osijeku," u *Osječka arhitektura: 1918.-1945.*, ur. Julio Martinčić i Dubravka Hackenberger (Zagreb-Osijek: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti u Zagrebu, Zavod za znanstveni i umjetnički rad u Osijeku, 2006), 201-212.

⁷⁵⁴ "Pala je odluka o osnovama planinarskog doma," *Večer*, 17.8.1934, 3. "Niz idejnih osnova za planinarsku kuću na Medvednici," *Jutarnji List*, 18.8.1934, 9. Georg Kiverov (Георгиј Яковлевич Киверов) and Jovan Korka both graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1926 and began their careers in the office of Vladimir Šterk, where Korka would later become a partner. Djordje Krekić graduated in 1928 from the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna, where he started his career in the studio of Clemens Holzmeister. After moving to Zagreb, he joined Vladimir Šterk's office. From 1933, he taught at the Arts and Crafts High School in Zagreb. From 1937 to 1940, the three worked together independently of Šterk. See more in Darko Kahle, "Architectural Work of Georg Kiverov, Jovan Korka and Đorđe Krekić in Zagreb, 1926-1940," *Prostor* 25, no. 2(54) (2017): 256-271; and Cela Matan, "Architecture competition proposals in the body of work of the KKK Group (1931-1939) in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia," *Építés-építészettudomány* 48, 1-2 (2019): 147-173.

21). Initially, a second round was planned⁷⁵⁵, but instead, the investor commissioned Stjepan Planić, whom UJIA's Zagreb Section accused of underbidding to secure the contract⁷⁵⁶. Furthermore, rumors circulated that Planić's project was under consideration for implementation even before the competition had ended⁷⁵⁷.




Figure 21. The third-prize competition project for the Croatian Mountaineering Association in Zagreb, Josip Pičman, 1934.

Source: "Pala je odluka o osnovama planinarskog doma," *Večer*, 17.8.1934, 3.

To ensure that their project was chosen for realization, architects could not only offer lower service costs but also propose financing options for the construction using their connections. For example, after the controversial competition for the theater building in Novi Sad, Nikola Dobrović, whose project was purchased, wrote a letter to the mayor offering to secure funding from a "group of Czech financiers from Prague" on the condition that his project be chosen for implementation, but his proposal was rejected⁷⁵⁸.

⁷⁵⁵ "Izložba idejnih skica za Tomislavov dom na Sljemenu," *Jutarnji List*, 29.8.1934, 9. The jury included five architects (Aleksander Freudenreich, Stjepan Hribar, Edo Šen, Ivan Zemljak, Lujo Sendjerdji [Szöntgyöry]) and three representatives of the Croatian Mountaineering Association.

⁷⁵⁶ "Inženjeri i arhitekti protiv planinarskog društva," *Jutarnji List*, 22.9.1934, 10.

⁷⁵⁷ "Kako će biti uredjen novi planinarski dom na Sljemenu?" *Večer*, 9.6.1934, 5.

⁷⁵⁸ Vladimir Mitrović, "Nikola Dobrović: konkurs za pozorište u Novom Sadu iz 1928–1929. godine," *Kultura* 159 (2018): 161. The controversy following the competition arose because jury member Dragiša Brašovan proposed his own project for realization. "Oko projekta za novu zgradu pozorišta u Novom Sadu," *Vreme*, 26.4.1929, 5.

Although several other cases are known where architects attempted to secure the commission after the competition, they primarily relied on connections, and such examples are more likely instances of favoritism rather than outright corruption.

The connections between participants and the investor's representatives could increase participants' chances for project elaboration and implementation. For example, at the Aeroclub competition in 1932 in Belgrade, Miša Manojlović received the only award, the second one (Fig. A.17), and eight projects were purchased⁷⁵⁹. Among the purchased projects was a joint submission by Miladin Prljević and Vojin Simeonović (Fig. A.17). The Aeroclub chose not a project but an architect for the final elaboration task⁷⁶⁰. It was Vojin Simeonović, and the choice may be attributed to the fact that he was "himself a hydro-pilot and a member of the Aeroclub"⁷⁶¹. He created a project unrelated to his purchased competition entry, choosing instead to implement his project submitted for another competition the same year for the Stock exchange building, which was ultimately realized⁷⁶².

In theory, such connections would not have influenced decision-making if all participants had them. Some competitions for association buildings were restricted (even though there was not such a type according to both rulebooks), allowing only members to participate. Nevertheless, this did not always help the competition mechanism function properly. For example, such a restriction was applied in the competition for the Peasant Economic Union (*Gospodarska Sloga*) building in Zagreb, where Zvonimir Požgaj won first

⁷⁵⁹ St. M., "Rezultat konkursa za idejnu skicu doma Aero-kluba u Beogradu," *Naša krila* 95 (1932): 1734. Among three jury members, one was an architect, Petar Bajalović.

⁷⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁶¹ "Osvećenje kamena temeljca doma Aerokluba," *Politika*, 27.7.1932, 5. Vojin Simeonović graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1925. He began his career in the offices of Aleksandar Djordjević and Miladin Prljević. Since 1932, he has been engaged in private practice in his own bureau. See more in Ivana Simeonović Ćelić, Milan P. Milovanović, Ivan R. Marković, Savo Popović, *Vojin Simeonović: arhitekta i pilot*. (Beograd: Muzej Zepter, 2022).

⁷⁶² Technical documentation X-5-1932, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda. His competition project for the Stock exchange building was published in Simeonović Ćelić, Milovanović, Marković, i Popović, *Vojin Simeonović: arhitekta i pilot*, 88.

prize⁷⁶³ (Fig. A.18). However, for the implementation, it was suggested that elements from various competition projects be combined⁷⁶⁴, and the realization was entrusted to Stjepan Gomboš and Mladen Kauzlarić⁷⁶⁵.

The issue of favoritism was closely intertwined with the problem of fair judgment, as investor representatives were often also jury members. For example, in the case of the State Stamps Printing House (*Državna Markarnica*) competition in 1936 in Belgrade, the jury awarded two second prizes to the team of Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer from Zagreb and to Miladin Prljević from Belgrade, while the third prize went to Jovan Korka from Zagreb and several other projects were also purchased⁷⁶⁶. Miladin Prljević explained the absence of the first prize by claiming that the intention was to entrust the project elaboration to "a participant whose work was rated among the lowest but who was rumored to be receiving the job in advance"⁷⁶⁷. Branislav Kojić, who was a deputy jury member in this competition, mentioned that the jury chairman and director of the State Monopolies Administration, Marko Marković, insisted that one of the lower purchases should go to a project not highly rated by the professionals in the jury and that this project was ultimately realized⁷⁶⁸. It was the project by Josif Najman, and Saša Mihajlov, author of the dissertation and monograph on Najman's work, believes that he was granted the right to elaborate the project because he was the only

⁷⁶³ "Projekt arh. Požgaja za dom gospodske sloge u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 5.4.1937. Zvonimir Požgaj graduated from the School of Architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb. After his studies, he spent several years in Paris, and upon returning to Zagreb, he opened his own studio. See more in Andrej Uchytíl, Ariana Štulhofer i Zrinka Barišić Marenčić, *Arhitekt Zvonimir Požgaj*, (Zagreb: Arhitektonski fakultet Sveučilišta, 2007).

⁷⁶⁴ "Rezultat natječaja za Dom gospodarske sloge," *Jutarnji List*, 5.5.1937, 6. Among five jury members were two architects, Zvonimir Kavurić and Ivan Zemljak.

⁷⁶⁵ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 372. Presumably, this decision may have been related to financial issues and the lower cost of implementation, as limited funds for construction constrained *Gospodarska Sloga*. "Dom gospodarske sloge stajat će oko tri i pol milijuna," *Jutarnji List*, 24.4.1937, 7. Stjepan Gomboš graduated from the Royal Joseph Polytechnic University in Budapest in 1921. He began his career in the offices of Rudolf Lubynski and Hugo Ehrlich in the 1920s, later running a private practice in partnership with Mladen Kauzlarić in the 1930s.

⁷⁶⁶ *Izveštaj Ocenjivačkog suda sa utakmice za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Državne Markarnice u Beogradu* (Beograd: Štampa Državna Markarnica, 1936), 14. The jury included four architects (Petar Bajalović, Dimitrije M. Leko, Svetozar Genić, Branislav Kojić) and two representatives of the State Monopolies Administration.

⁷⁶⁷ Miladin Prljević, "O konkursima i njihovim ishodima," cited in Branislav Kojić, *Društveni uslovi*, 224.

⁷⁶⁸ Kojić, *Društveni uslovi razvitka*, 208.

participant with experience in executing similar complexes, such as the Topčider Institute for Manufacturing Banknotes and Coins⁷⁶⁹. However, this raises the question: if experience played a decisive role in the selection of a project for implementation, why did not this same experience help to impress the professionals on the jury with his competition entry?

From this perspective, implementing the highest awarded project did not necessarily indicate that the competition mechanism worked effectively, as favoritism could still be at play. In Belgrade, at least two cases show connections between a customer's representative on the jury and the author of the highest-awarded implemented project. Aleksandar Djordjević, who received the highest (second) prize at the Stock Exchange building competition, had previously designed a villa for Tihomir Panić, a jury member and representative of the Stock Exchange board⁷⁷⁰. Grigoriy Samoylov, who won first prize at the National Bank Pension Fund building competition, had previously constructed several buildings for industrialist Vlada Teokarović, the jury chairman⁷⁷¹. On the one hand, this was not necessarily the reason for the final decision, as the investor's collegial body made the choice. On the other hand, the example of the State Stamps Printing House demonstrates that sometimes, the vote of a single jury member was enough to influence the competition outcome.

According to Tamara Bjažić Klarin, exhibitions of competition projects played an important role as a deterrent to direct favoritism in competition results, as both the public and a broader circle of specialists had the opportunity to assess the jury decisions⁷⁷². However, this did not help in cases where favoritism led to the replacement of the winning project after the results were announced.

⁷⁶⁹ Mihajlov, *Arhitektonsko stvaralaštvo Josifa Najmana*, 294.

⁷⁷⁰ Milan Prosen, "Graditeljski opus arhitekta Aleksandra Đorđevića," 167-203.

⁷⁷¹ Grigoriy Samoylov (*Григорий Иванович Самойлов*, Grigorije Samojlov) graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade. He began his career in the office of Aleksandar Djordjević, later opening his own practice and engaging in private architectural work. See more in Milan Prosen, "Prilog poznavanju beogradskog opusa Grigorija I. Samojlova," *Nasleđe* 3 (2001): 89–104.

⁷⁷² Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 7.

Some decisions to replace a project highlight the arbitrariness of such choices. For example, in the 1932 Zagreb competition for the administrative Building of City Enterprises, no first prize was awarded, with the second prize going to Stanko Kliska (Fig. 22) and two third prizes to Juraj Denzler and the team of Stjepan Gomboš and Mladen Kauzlarić⁷⁷³. The Municipality Gas and Electricity Board commissioned the task to Juraj Denzler⁷⁷⁴. The board members emphasized that they "did not overlook Stanko Kliska for any reason, especially not for professional or real motives"⁷⁷⁵.




Figure 22. The second-prize competition project for the administrative building of City Enterprises in Zagreb, Stanko Kliska, 1932.

Source: "Pred gradnjom nove palače gradskih poduzeća," *Jutarnji List*, 5.6.1932, 5.

Other Non-competition Factors

As mentioned above, an investor's decision not to follow the competition results could be influenced by alternative proposals from architects who bypassed the competition outcomes⁷⁷⁶. From the perspective of the architectural profession, competitions held a special position. On the one hand, they were a space for professional rivalry and competition for commissions. On the other hand, competitions also fostered collaboration, especially when it came to collectively defending professional interests in cases of violations of competition practices.

⁷⁷³ "Tri nagradjene osnove za palaču gradskih poduzeća," *Jutarnji List*, 4.6.1932, 6; "Pred gradnjom nove palače gradskih poduzeća," *Jutarnji List*, 5.6.1932, 5. Four of the seven members were architects: Martin Pilar, Ivan Zemljak, August Pisačić, Dragutin Šaj.

⁷⁷⁴ "Palača gradskih poduzeća stajt će oko 12 milijuna dinara," *Jutarnji List*, 10.6.1932, 6.

⁷⁷⁵ "Rezultat narječaja za izradu idejnih skica za novu upravnu zgradu Gradskih poduzeća u Zagrebu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 2 (1932): 33.

⁷⁷⁶ Kojić, *Društvene uslove*, 219.

Some architects demonstrated a mixed attitude toward competition outcomes. For example, Drago Ibler actively protested after the Zagreb Railway Hospital competition⁷⁷⁷ and complained to the investor when a non-competing project was chosen in the 1936 invitation-only competition for *Napretkova Zadruga*⁷⁷⁸. However, Ibler's project was selected, bypassing competition results in the 1931 competition for the Art Pavilion (*Umjetnički paviljon*) in Zagreb⁷⁷⁹. After the Foundation Hospital competition, he not only tried to use his connections to secure the commission but also sought to benefit from architect Ernst Weismann, who had won one of the first prizes in the competition⁷⁸⁰.

Not only individual architects' actions but also organizations such as UJIA could influence the divergence between competition results and investor decisions. Logically, UJIA should have prevented investors from disregarding competition outcomes, as in the cases of the 1924 competitions for SUZOR and the 1925 competition for the School of Public Health, where UJIA's Zagreb section ensured that the highest-awarded architects were granted the right to realize their projects⁷⁸¹. However, some instances show the opposite.

In 1920, the First Croatian Commercial Bank (*Prva Hrvatska Obrtna banka*) in Zagreb announced a competition, where Vjekoslav Bastl⁷⁸² won first prize, but the building was realized later based on Hugo Ehrlich's design after a location change⁷⁸³. Tamara Bjažić Klarin suggests an intriguing explanation tied to another competition. In 1922, at the

⁷⁷⁷ Based on the discussions, he published an article: Ibler, "Jury i natečaj," 109-118. Ibler himself did not participate in the competition.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibler participated in this competition. Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 85.

⁷⁷⁹ "Ove godine bit će novi Umjetnički dom pod krovom," *Jutarnji List*, 9.2.1932, 3. Moreover, he created the preliminary sketch before the competition. "Umjetnički paviljon u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 24.12.1930, 7.

⁷⁸⁰ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 76. See more Bjažić Klarin, "Međunarodni natječaj za Zakladnu bolnicu," 282-295.

⁷⁸¹ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 63.

⁷⁸² Vjekoslav Bastl graduated from Otto Wagner's class at the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts. Starting in 1901, he worked at the construction company Hönigsberg & Deutsch in Zagreb, and from 1919, he taught at the State Secondary Technical School in Zagreb. See more in Martina Pavković, "Arhitekt Vjekoslav Bastl," (PhD diss., Sveučilište u Zadru, 2017). Josip Costaperaria from Ljubljana got the second prize, and Aleksander Freudenreich got the third. Three of the five members were architects and engineers: Gustav Baldauf, Janko Holjac, Edo Šen.

⁷⁸³ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 354.

international competition for the Shareholders' Association for the Construction of Inns and Bathhouses Otto Rehning from Berlin won the only prize, and Hugo Ehrlich also participated⁷⁸⁴. This decision caused discontent among Zagreb architects, and Edo Šen published a critique in *Jutarnji List*, defending Hugo Ehrlich's project⁷⁸⁵. Bjažić Klarin theorizes that Ehrlich received the bank project as compensation for not getting the hotel contract⁷⁸⁶. In the end, Dionis Sunko⁷⁸⁷, rather than Rehning, realized the hotel project, as the Zagreb professional community in the early 1920s prioritized defending not just professional interests but also those of local architects⁷⁸⁸.

Discrepancies in "Codes"

Investors and architects not only had different perceptions of the competition process but also varying understandings of architecture: what architecture is, why it is needed, what is important in a building, and how it should look. These differences in viewpoints and preferences affected the competition mechanism by disrupting communication due to the misalignment of "codes" between professionals and investors.

In general, these divergences also impacted the architectural process, influencing other project selection mechanisms. For example, architect Milan Zloković noted that between investors and architects, "there is a lack of necessary and meaningful contact" and that "cases of expert, fully understanding cooperation with responsibility were rare"⁷⁸⁹.

⁷⁸⁴ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 354-355. The jury consisted of four architects: Lav Kalda, Edo Šen, and Josip Vančaš, and Herman Muthesius from Germany.

⁷⁸⁵ Schön Edo, "Izgradnja novog otelja," *Jutarnji List*, 2.4.1922, 6.

⁷⁸⁶ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 69. The First Croatian Commercial Bank was one of the founders of the Shareholders' Association for the Construction of Inns and Bathhouses.

⁷⁸⁷ Dionis Sunko graduated from the Technical University in Karlsruhe and worked in Hamburg. Starting in 1909, he was based in Zagreb, where he initially ran his own office and, from 1919, co-founded a joint company with Rudolf Jungman. See more in Ivan R. Marković, "Prva hrvatska štedionica arhitekta Dionisa Sunka," *Nasleđe* 5 (2004): 103-18.

⁷⁸⁸ For example, in the early 1920s, the Belgrade Section of UJIA suggested following Zagreb's example, where they successfully addressed the dominance of foreign architects and where "local architects design all bank palaces." "Sekcija Beograd UJIA," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 8 (1922): 86.

⁷⁸⁹ Milan Zloković, "Glavna obeležja savremene arhitekture," *Nova Smena* 4 (1938): 86.

However, competition materials allow us to compare what architects could offer, what jury members judged as the best submissions, and what investors ultimately chose for implementation. The inconsistency between the criteria the jury used to award projects and those the investor applied when selecting a project can be explained not only by favoritism but also by the differences in their ideas, described in Chapter 1.

For example, many competition submissions are available for analysis from the Privileged Agrarian Bank competition in Belgrade, announced at the end of 1930⁷⁹⁰, where the investor ultimately rejected the first-prize-awarded project. The competition was mixed: eight architects were invited, but other participants were also allowed to participate⁷⁹¹. The jury included two Bank representatives and professors, Petar Popović from Belgrade and Martin Pilar from Zagreb⁷⁹². Edo Šen from Zagreb won first prize (Fig. 23), Stjepan Hribar⁷⁹³ from Zagreb took second (Fig. 23), and the Krstić brothers from Belgrade earned third⁷⁹⁴. The competition received significant media attention, with leading Belgrade newspapers like *Politika*, *Vreme*, and *Pravda* covering the results and publishing six projects, except the two highest-awarded ones, which were published by the Zagreb newspaper *Novosti*⁷⁹⁵.

⁷⁹⁰ "Konkurs. Privilegovana Agrarna banka," *Vreme*, 31.12.1930, 10. The Privileged Agrarian Bank, founded in 1929, financed agricultural loans and accumulated peasants' debts to the state. Although it was in mixed ownership, its activities were under strict state management. Dragana Gnjatović, *Privilegovana agrarna banka: prilog istoriji poljoprivrednog kredita Srbije 1836-1947*, (Beograd: Udruženje banaka Srbije, 2013), 114-123.

⁷⁹¹ "Konkurs. Privilegovana Agrarna banka," *Vreme*, 31.12.1930, 10. 18 non-invited architects participated.

⁷⁹² "Izložba skica za zgradu Agrarne Banke," *Vreme*, 18.2.1931, 7.

⁷⁹³ Stjepan Hribar graduated from the Technical University in Dresden in 1914. He began his career at the construction company *Pionir*, and later established his own practice while also teaching at the Technical Faculty in Zagreb. From 1928 to 1941, he served in the Zagreb municipality, serving also as the head of the City Planning Department. Between 1932 and 1936, he and his team worked on developing the Regulatory Plan for Zagreb.

⁷⁹⁴ "Konkurs za izradu skice za zgradu Privilegovane agrarne banke u Beogradu," *Politika*, 16.2.1931, 6.

⁷⁹⁵ Overall, images of 7 awarded and purchased projects and 6 others are available. They demonstrated the domination of modernist tendencies with art-deco and neoclassical forms.




Figure 23. Competition projects for the Privileged Agrarian bank in Belgrade: the first-prize project by Edo Šen; the second-prize project by Stjepan Hribar, 1931.

Source: "Izložba planova za zgradu Agrarne banke u Beogradu," *Novosti*, 1.3.1931, 10.

In an article in *Pravda* about the exhibition of competition entries, the author briefly described the overall competition solutions and commented on the style of façades, with most characterized as *moderno shvaćene* (modernly interpreted), while several projects with Renaissance-style façades were also mentioned. The top five awarded projects presented an interesting gradation: Edo Šen's project was described as "excessively simplified," Stjepan Hribar's as "calm and closer to modern understanding," the Krstić brothers' as "modernly interpreted" (Fig. A.19), while Nikolay Krasnov and Dimitrije M. Leko's was characterized as "in modernized Renaissance style" (Fig. A.19), and Bogdan Nestorović's façade as "old-fashioned"⁷⁹⁶. Architects from the Ministry of Construction created the fourth project, and in one of *Politika*'s publications, its image was labeled "the best façade"⁷⁹⁷. Branko Maksimović also mentioned that this façade was the jury's favorite, stating that "the jury found solutions relying on classical architecture to be more pleasant and understandable"⁷⁹⁸.

Edo Šen's first-prize-winning project was praised in all articles for its well-organized space, room layout, and internal communication, meeting all requirements⁷⁹⁹. The façade was

⁷⁹⁶ "Privilegovana agrarna banka izložila je projektovane skice za svoju buduću palatu," *Pravda* 18.2.1931, 5.

⁷⁹⁷ "Sa izložbe skica za palatu Agrarne banke," *Politika*, 18.2.1931, 5.

⁷⁹⁸ Branko Maksimović, "Izložba skica za palatu Agrarne banke," *Politika*, 20.2.1931, 8.

⁷⁹⁹ "Privilegovana agrarna banka izložila je projektovane skice za svoju buduću palatu," *Pravda* 18.2.1931, 5; Branko Maksimović, "Sa izložbe skica za palatu Agrarne banke," *Politika*, 20.2.1931, 8; "Izložba planova za zgradu Agrarne banke u Beogradu," *Novosti*, 1.3.1931, 10; "Izložba skica za zgradu Agrarne banke," *Vreme*, 18.2.1931, 7.

described as calm, modest, and harmonious in *Novosti* and *Politika* (in Branko Maksimović's article), but in *Pravda* and *Vreme*, it was criticized as excessively simplified⁸⁰⁰. The author of the *Pravda* article concluded that "Belgrade and such an important institution deserved a more impressive building"⁸⁰¹.

Although among the modernist projects in this competition, Šen's façade was still a compromise, Branko Maksimović, for example, selected as an illustration only Nikola Dobrović's project, which received sixth place⁸⁰² (Fig. A.19), but *Pravda* described its façade as entirely modern, with too much glass⁸⁰³.

However, the Bank Committee was likely interested in a greater compromise, and instead of choosing the first- or second-prize-winning projects, they opted to realize the third-prize project by the Krstić brothers. Branko Maksimović described its façade as modern but reminiscent of a traditional interpretation⁸⁰⁴. Among the top five awards in the competition, based on descriptions from *Pravda*, were ranked from the more modernist to the more academic façade, the third-prize project represented a compromise. The original competition project was not realized, as the Bank Committee insisted on adding a more classical façade⁸⁰⁵, and such a project was created. The final solution was a compromise between the two versions, with modernized classical forms incorporated into the initial design⁸⁰⁶.

Although buildings were never realized after some competitions, and thus their results can be categorized in the third group, for some of these, it is known that non-realization was preceded by project replacement.

⁸⁰⁰ "Privilegovana agrarna banka izložila je projektovane skice za svoju buduću palatu," *Pravda* 18.2.1931, 5; "Izložba skica za zgradu Agrarne banke," *Vreme*, 18.2.1931, 7.

⁸⁰¹ "Privilegovana agrarna banka izložila je projektovane skice za svoju buduću palatu," *Pravda* 18.2.1931, 5.

⁸⁰² Branko Maksimović, "Sa izložbe skica za palatu Agrarne banke," *Politika*, 20.2.1931, 8.

⁸⁰³ "Privilegovana agrarna banka izložila je projektovane skice za svoju buduću palatu," *Pravda* 18.2.1931, 5.

⁸⁰⁴ Branko Maksimović, "Sa izložbe skica za palatu Agrarne banke," *Politika*, 20.2.1931, 8.

⁸⁰⁵ Marina Đurđević, "Zgrada Agrarne banke u Beogradu," *Flogiston* 8 (1998): 175.

⁸⁰⁶ Milan Prosen, "Palata Privilegovane agrarne banke u Beogradu," *Nasleđe* 15 (2014): 67.

For example, the 1937 competition for the Ministry of Education building in Belgrade ended without a first prize, with the jury commenting that none of the entries fully satisfied the task⁸⁰⁷. The jury awarded two second prizes to projects by the team Haberle-Bauer from Zagreb (Fig. A.20) and Miho Čakelja from Skopje⁸⁰⁸, and the third to Mate Bajlon and Emanuel Šamanek from Sarajevo⁸⁰⁹. Both Belgrade and Zagreb newspapers published the Haberle-Bauer project, and *Jutarnji List* not only mentioned its advantages but presented it as the highest awarded and proof of the ability of Zagreb architects⁸¹⁰. However, the jury noted that “excessive use of glass could not be accepted”⁸¹¹. While most of the projects were modernist, Grigoriy Samoylov submitted a typically academic one (Fig. A.20). According to his memoirs, the Minister of Education, Dimitrije Magarašević, suggested that Samoylov should develop the final project⁸¹². Perhaps this was just a rumor, but it aligns with a familiar pattern: investors choosing projects with more representative façades, disregarding the modernist qualities of awarded designs.

The competition for the Ethnographical Museum was organized in 1938 for the same site, with an almost identical jury and similar results⁸¹³. As in the previous case, the jury did not award a first prize, commenting that none of the projects “fully satisfied the conditions,”

⁸⁰⁷ *Zapisnik ocenjivačkog suda za ocenu idejnih skica za novu zgradu Ministarstva Prosvete*, (Beograd: 1937), 20.

⁸⁰⁸ Miho Čakelja was a Croatian architect who graduated from the Technical Faculty in Belgrade in 1933 and moved to Skopje, where he worked until the end of his life.

⁸⁰⁹ The jury consisted of two Ministry of Education officials, architects Svetozar Jovanović and Dimitrije M. Leko, and engineer Radoslav Todorović from the ministry. *Zapisnik ocenjivačkog suda za ocenu idejnih skica za novu zgradu Ministarstva Prosvete*, (Beograd: 1937), 20.

⁸¹⁰ “Haberle i Bauer iz Zagreba osvojili su prvo mjesto u natječaju za izradbu idejnih skica palače Ministarstva prosvete,” *Jutarnji List*, 3.11.1937, 9.

⁸¹¹ *Zapisnik ocenjivačkog suda za ocenu idejnih skica za novu zgradu Ministarstva Prosvete*, (Beograd: 1937), 20.

⁸¹² Milan Milovanović, “Arhitekt Grigorij Samojlov,” v *Russkaja emigracija v Jugoslavii*, redkol. Aleksej Arsenjev, Olga Kirillova i Miodrag Sibinović, (Moskva: Indrik, 1996), 285. Samoylov’s wife was an official in the Ministry of Education.

⁸¹³ For the same jury two members were added – Ivan Ivačić, architect from the Ministry of Construction, and Borivoje Drobnjaković, the director of the museum. *Izveštaj ocenjivačkog suda sa utakmice za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Etnografskog muzeja u Beogradu* (Beograd, 1938), 10.

and one second prize went to the team Mate Bajlon and Emanuel Šamanek from Sarajevo⁸¹⁴. The team Georg Kiverov, Jovan Korka, and Djordje Krekić from Zagreb got another second prize (Fig. A.21), and third place went to Dragan Gudović from Belgrade⁸¹⁵. Most of the 21 projects were modernist, while one was mentioned in a Byzantine style⁸¹⁶. The Ministry of Education chose the third-prize project by Dragan Gudović for further development as "the most appropriate." Dragan Gudović later collaborated with Radoslav Todorović, jury member and Chief of the Technical Bureau of the Ministry of Education, on the final project, which combined ideas from the competition⁸¹⁷. While the space organization was based on the competition submissions, the Ministry treated the façade as a separate element, as in some other cases due to different understanding of architecture. The Ministry required Gudović and Todorović to create several drafts for the façade and chose a monumental neoclassical design⁸¹⁸. However, the project was never constructed (this case will be further examined in Chapter 4).

These examples demonstrate the rejection of modernist projects; though they were awarded, more academically inclined designs were chosen for realization. Moreover, the example of the Ethnographical Museum also highlights the issue of combining competition solutions and the separation of the façade from the building itself, emphasizing the important difference in understanding the essence of an architectural project and its integrity.

However, the difference lies not only in the fact that for architects, the façade is an inseparable element, while investors view it as a separate entity, but also in the importance

⁸¹⁴ *Izveštaj ocenjivačkog suda sa utakmice za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Etnografskog muzeja u Beogradu* (Beograd, 1938), 9.

⁸¹⁵ "Kako će izgledati novi Etnografski muzej koji će uskoro početi da se gradi," *Politika*, 19.8.1938, 7.

⁸¹⁶ "Na konkursu za novu zgradu Etnografskog muzeja dodeljene su dve druge i jedna treća nagrada," *Vreme*, 19.8.1938, 5.

⁸¹⁷ Borivoje Drobnjaković, "Etnografski muzej u 1938. god.," *Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja u Beogradu* 13(1938): 178.

⁸¹⁸ "Na uglu Miloša Velikog i Birčaninove ulice podići će se nova zgrada Etnografskog muzeja, najveća i najmodernija gradjevina ove vrste na Balkanu," *Pravda*, 28.6.1940, 9.

placed on façades. On the one hand, competition programs focused on space organization, juries awarded projects based on how well this was addressed, and façades were rarely even mentioned in jury reports. On the other hand, investors emphasized façades during decision-making, either façades directly influencing the project selection or investors requiring façade changes afterward. For many investors, architecture was viewed as a decorative art form, with façades being central. Conversely, architects in the interwar period prioritized functional and rational space organization, seeing architecture as a public mission, emphasizing light, air, hygiene, and user comfort.

Not only did divergence in priorities between space organization and façade decoration influence competition outcomes, but also preferences for different space layouts. For example, at the Foundation Hospital and Clinics of the Medical Faculty (*Zakladna bolnica i Klinike Medicinskog Fakulteta*) competition in Zagreb in 1930/1931, three awards were given to projects proposing a pavilion layout, including one by local architect Ernst Weismann, and only two of the five purchased projects suggested a monoblock project⁸¹⁹. Nevertheless, despite these results, the investor chose to implement a monoblock design by Hans Tietmann and Karl Haake, whose project had been purchased⁸²⁰. Ernst Weismann fought for the right to realize his project, which won one of the first prizes. In this struggle, debates over the pavilion layout, modernism, and the defense of local architects' interests intertwined⁸²¹. Eventually, only the Foundation Hospital was built, based on a non-competition design involving jury member Franjo Gabrić⁸²².

Nevertheless, even projects with the highest awards chosen for implementation could face demands for changes after the competition. While final adaptations to meet investor

⁸¹⁹ Bjažić Klarin, "Međunarodni natječaj za Zakladnu bolnicu," 289.

⁸²⁰ Ibid, 291.

⁸²¹ Bjažić Klarin, *Ernest Weissmann*, 120-123.

⁸²² Bjažić Klarin, "Međunarodni natječaj za Zakladnu bolnicu," 292.

requirements through direct communication were inevitable, some examples reflect the influence of stylistic preferences. These changes mainly affected façades, especially in administrative buildings. Even UJIA itself requested additional façade decoration for its modernist building in Belgrade. In *Arhitektura* in 1933, Jan Dubovy reported that after the second round, a combination of his project and Miša Manojlović's was selected⁸²³, but Miša Manojlović and Isaak Azriel ultimately developed the project⁸²⁴. However, after complaints that the project was too simple, lacking decoration, and resembling a chest, Dragiša Brašovan, the jury member, changed the façade⁸²⁵.

For example, the competition for the OUZOR building in Belgrade demonstrates a notable transformation of the first-awarded project. At the open competition, Lavoslav Horvat from Zagreb took first place, the Belgrade team of Miladin Prljević and Živojin Piperski received second, Milan Sekulić came third, and two purchase awards went to Josip Costaperaria from Ljubljana and Rudolf Lubynski from Zagreb⁸²⁶. After the open competition, a second stage was organized, where both Zagreb architects were awarded. Horvat revised his project to make it less modernist (Fig. A.22), a successful strategy that led to its selection for implementation. He elaborated the final project, but due to later disagreements between the investor and him, architect Petar Gačić got the job and transformed Horvat's project into a more classical design⁸²⁷. A comparison of these projects shows how the design evolved under the influence of both the jury and the investor.

Although most divergences in preferences affecting competition results are linked to the contrast between modernist and neoclassical projects in the 1930s, examples from the 1920s highlight other types of differences.

⁸²³ Ing. Arch. Dr. J. Dubovy, "Iz Beograda," *Arhitektura* 5-6 (1933): 92.

⁸²⁴ "Inženjeri i arhitekte zidaju sebi dom," *Politika*, 6.9.1933, 7.

⁸²⁵ "Spasena je čast beogradskih arhitekta," *Politika*, 25.10.1934, 13.

⁸²⁶ "Konkurs, Okružni ured u Beogradu." The collection of Museum of Science and Technology T: 111.151/31

⁸²⁷ Zrinka Paladino, "Arhitektonski opus Lavoslava Horvata u Beogradu," *Prostor* 20 (2012): 315.

In 1925, the competition for the Art Pavilion 'Cvijeta Zuzorić' in Belgrade required the building's style to be in harmony with its surroundings, as the original location was near early 19th-century buildings⁸²⁸. Branislav Kojić won first prize, Milan Zloković second, and Petar Krstić and Mihajlo Radovanović third⁸²⁹. Kojić's project was selected for realization, which he described as adapting "old Balkan secular architecture to a modern task"⁸³⁰ (Fig. A.23). After a location change, Kojić adapted his project for a new site. Nevertheless, Kosta Kumanudi, the municipal chairman, intervened, providing the plot and municipal financial support conditional on altering the building's appearance to reflect a more classical architectural style⁸³¹ (Fig. A.23).

Project alterations or replacements due to stylistic disagreements were relatively rare in Zagreb. One notable example is the 1930 competition for the *Hrvatski Radiša* building, where Oswald Schindler got first prize for a project in the stripped classicism style⁸³² (Fig. 20). Although Schindler's project was selected for realization (in collaboration with Vladimir Šterk), it was proposed that the façade be altered to reflect the *old-Croatian* style, incorporating folk motifs in the decoration to "externally demonstrate the building's purpose"⁸³³. Nevertheless, before construction began, *Novosti* published a design that slightly differed from the competition entry, leaning toward academic architecture⁸³⁴ (Fig. A.24). This version was not approved by the municipality, which demanded that the façade be given a "more modern appearance." Schindler and Šterk then revised the design accordingly, and the

⁸²⁸ Kojić, *Društvene uslove*, 205.

⁸²⁹ "Umetnjički paviljon," *Vreme*, 19.7.1925, 5. Among six members, the jury included only one architect – Petar Gačić, a representative from the Ministry of Construction,

⁸³⁰ Kojić, *Društvene uslove*, 206.

⁸³¹ Kojić, *Društvene uslove*, 206. The modified project was eventually realized.

⁸³² "U Zvonimirovoj ulici izgradit će Hrvatski Radiša," *Večer*, 11.10.1930, 3.

⁸³³ "Gradnja monumentalne palače „Hrvatskog Radiše“ u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 11.11.1930, 5. "Kako će izgledati monumentalna palača Hrvatskog Radiše," *Jutarnji List*, 12.11.1930, 4.

⁸³⁴ "Započeta gradnja velike palače Hrv Radiše u Zvonimirovoj ulici," *Novosti*, 10.3.1931, 6.

modified project was ultimately realized⁸³⁵ (Fig. A.24). This example illustrates how municipal authorities' intervention led to the modification of a project toward modernism in Zagreb. However, most Belgrade examples show a tendency among the authorities to favor more academic architecture.

Among Zagreb competitions, rare examples could be found where the project chosen for implementation deviated from the first prize winner by moving away from modernism. One such case was the competition for the student dormitory of the Croatian Cultural Society "*Napredak*"⁸³⁶. The first prize was awarded to the team Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer, whose design was characterized by extensive use of glass, balconies, and an emphasis on horizontal lines (Fig. A.25), and a similar design by Zvonimir Požgaj won third prize⁸³⁷. An article on the competition results mentioned that funding had been secured, and construction was expected to be completed by the end of 1937⁸³⁸. Nevertheless, financial difficulties arose, and by late 1938, *Napredak* was still trying to gather funds⁸³⁹. In March 1939, a different design was published, featuring a more restrained façade⁸⁴⁰ (Fig. A.25), probably also created by Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer, but it was never realized.

An important divergence emerged in the late 1920s in Belgrade's competition practices. While more modernist projects received awards in competitions, they were not always realized. It reveals a gap between the stylistic preferences of professionals and investors, particularly the authorities. As noted earlier, while in the 1920s, the distribution of competition results across three groups was roughly equal, the 1930s saw an increase in

⁸³⁵ "Hrvatski radiša grade moderne internate," *Novosti*, 15.4.1931, 3.

⁸³⁶ See more about the society in Zdravko Dizdar, "Djelovanje HKD "Napredak" u banskoj Hrvatskoj (1902.-1941.)," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 36, br. 3 (2004): 1081-1099.

⁸³⁷ "Hrvatsko kulturno društvo „Napredak“ gradi u Derenčinovoj ulici svoj konvikt," *Jutarnji List*, 22.1.1937, 9. Among 7 members, three were architect Juraj Denzler, Stjepan Hribar, Ivan Zemljak.

⁸³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁹ "HKD Napredak dat će Zagrebu moderan dom za visokoškolce," *Jutarnji List*, 20.12.1938, 9

⁸⁴⁰ "U Derenčinovoj ulici gradit će se Napretkov dom za visokoškolce," *Večer*, 28.3.1939, 5.

project rejections. The hypothesis is that this was linked to differing dynamics in the affirmation of modernism among actors involved in competition practices.

From this perspective, a group of Zagreb architects stands out in Belgrade competitions, having won nearly one-third of the awards in the 1930s, though their projects were rarely realized. Their designs were chosen for realization in only two cases but were altered during the elaboration process: Lavoslav Horvat's project for OUZOR and Josip Pičman's for the Main Post Office. Both examples illustrate a similar shift from modernist designs to more academic ones during the final stages of project implementation.

Unlike in Belgrade, the share of unrealized but not rejected projects increased in Zagreb during the 1930s. Tamara Bjažić Klarin notes that in Zagreb, both generations of architects actively promoted modernism, thus also having a stronger influence on investors⁸⁴¹. This more rapid affirmation of modernism in Zagreb may explain the difference in the rate of project rejection between the two cities.

However, the issue of rejected projects in Belgrade competitions can be viewed from another perspective. While the local patriotism of jury members in Zagreb influenced the results of the competitions, in the Belgrade competition, architects from other cities were more frequently awarded. Nevertheless, in some cases, not juries but investors might demonstrate local patriotism, ignoring all awarded projects until one by a Belgrade architect was found among the awarded. It can be seen in the Agrarian Bank and the Ethnographic Museum competitions, where different stylistic elements were also at play. Nevertheless, decisions favoring Belgrade architects could occur even when both projects were modernists. For instance, in the Yugoslav Professors' Society building competition, the first prize went to

⁸⁴¹ Bjažić Klarin, *Za novi, ljepši Zagreb!*, 31

the team Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer from Zagreb⁸⁴². Moreover, the society's board did not find any of the awarded projects entirely satisfactory, and the chairman approached Miladin Prljević, a Belgrade architect who had won third prize, to develop the project⁸⁴³. Nevertheless, Miladin Prljević's project was never realized.

⁸⁴² "Profesorsko društvo podiže na Tašmajdanu impozantan dom," *Vreme*, 4.9.1935, 6. The jury included three architects (Svetozar Jovanović, Petar Bajalović, Dragutin Maslac) and two representatives of the Yugoslav Professors' Society.

⁸⁴³ Letter to Miladin Prljević from the chairman of the Yugoslav Professors' Society main board, Nedeljko Divac, The collection of Museum of Science and Technology T: 111.177/1.

Chapter 4. Project Implementation, Coordination, and Public Buildings

Figure 24 illustrates the project by architect Josef Wentzler from Dortmund, which won first prize in the Belgrade Catholic Cathedral competition in 1930⁸⁴⁴. Despite the challenges in competitive practice, some competitions fulfilled their purpose, with the first prize being awarded and the winning project selected for implementation. For example, in the case of the Catholic Cathedral, the jury's decision to award the first prize was endorsed by Archbishop Ivan Rafael Rodić, who chose the winning project for implementation⁸⁴⁵.




Figure 24. The first prize competition project for the Belgrade Catholic Cathedral, Josef Wentzler, 1930.

Source: "Izložba projekata za Beogradsku katoličku katedralu," *Politika*, 5.5.1930, 6.

However, like other modernist projects that won first prizes, this one also raised some questions. In the article "Our Cathedral" in *Glasnik Katoličke Crkve U Beogradu*, an anonymous author acknowledged that concerns about selecting a modernist design were valid,

⁸⁴⁴ Régis Joseph Jarrel from Paris got the second award and Richard Steidle from Munich received the third one. "Izložba projekata za Beogradsku katoličku katedralu," *Politika*, 5.5.1930, 6.

⁸⁴⁵ The jury consisted of five architects: three from Belgrade: Petar Bajalović, Jovan Ćikadić, and Josif Hrnčirž; and two from Zagreb: Ćiril Metod Iveković and Amadeo Carnelutti. Additionally, the jury included Archbishop Ivan Rafael Rodić, Belgrade mayor Miloš Savčić, archaeologist Franjo Bulić, parish priest Privat Belard, and Karlo Mataušek, president of the Cathedral Construction Society. "Beogradska katolička katedrala," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 3 (1930): 3; "Naša katedrala," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 6 (1930): 3.

admitting that "at first glance, it seems there is nothing beautiful about this project"⁸⁴⁶. Nevertheless, the author emphasized the project's strengths, describing it as a monumental building with a practical space organization. The competition was initially announced for a location on Moravska Street (now Savska), but it soon became clear that the site was unsuitable. Unlike many other competitions, the final choice of the project remained unchanged even after the location was changed⁸⁴⁷.

Unlike projects for which key initial decisions were not made or those rejected during the selection process, discussed in previous chapters, some projects faced obstacles in their realization due to factors related to the coordination of construction itself. During the implementation stage, the impacts of initial decisions, discussed in Chapter 2, become apparent. If the questions of where and how to build were not adequately resolved, and if the question of whether to build faced objections from project opponents, an idea that had already been embodied in an architectural project could not be realized. Therefore, the actors' capacity to handle challenges that arise during construction, such as financial issues, land use dilemmas, or opposition to the project, becomes critical. Additionally, the project needed to be harmonized with the urban space, which included compliance with city regulations and alignment with public interest. Project implementation required coordination among various stakeholders regardless of whether the investor was private or public. Moreover, coordination efforts in a narrow sense were necessary not only for public projects involving multiple stakeholders but could also arise in other projects when the actor was collective or included multiple parties.

⁸⁴⁶ "Naša katedrala," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 6 (1930): 3.

⁸⁴⁷ Josef Wentzler adopted his project twice for new locations. Technical documentation XXI-7-1932, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda. See more about its architectural features in Putnik, "Katedrala Beogradske nadbiskupije," 187-188.

In this chapter, the organization of the construction process as a coordination task in a broad sense is examined. Unlike Chapter 2, which focused on decision-making processes using administrative buildings as key examples, this chapter covers a wider range of public building projects. This broader scope allows to explore not only the coordination within the administration but also the larger issues of reconciling interests in urban spaces.

The main focus of this chapter is on cases where architectural projects had already been elaborated but were not realized due to factors that became insurmountable obstacles during the implementation stage. However, projects that never materialized in architectural form will also be considered for comparative purposes. The chapter begins by analyzing two cases, the Belgrade Catholic Cathedral in Belgrade and the Zagreb Mosque, using these examples to examine the combination of factors involved in the coordination process. Each of these factors will be analyzed individually in subsequent sections.

In the case of the Belgrade Catholic Cathedral, the factor that obstructed its implementation seems evident at first glance: it could be the **lack of funding**, as the competition was organized before securing the necessary finances for construction. In 1931, Archbishop Ivan Rafael Rodić and The Society of St. Vincent (*Društvo Svetog Vinka*) organized a lottery to raise funds⁸⁴⁸. The public campaign for the lottery included newspaper advertisements featuring images of the future Cathedral, sometimes even claiming that purchasing these lottery tickets would help solve the problem of unemployment (as shown in Fig. 25). This approach was particularly relevant in the aftermath of the economic crisis, but ticket sales were slow. For instance, Petar Vlašić, consultant of the Belgrade-Smederevo Archdiocese, expressed hope that the lottery would motivate "not only all Catholics but all our fellow citizens, regardless of faith, to help us begin the construction of the monumental

⁸⁴⁸ "Gradjenje katedrale počće već u toku iduće godine," *Vreme*, 14.12.1931, 7.

cathedral"⁸⁴⁹. Nevertheless, the lottery raised only 1,800,000 dinars due to insufficient ticket sales⁸⁵⁰. Since these funds were inadequate for the cathedral's construction, Rodić used the proceeds for other purposes⁸⁵¹.



Figure 25. Advertisement of the lottery for the Belgrade Catholic Cathedral construction, 1932.

Source: "Kupovanjem srećaka za gradnju Katedrale ukloni'e se najснаžnije nezaposlenost," *Vreme*, 10.4.1932, 12.

Moreover, this funding situation reveals a deeper issue with **coordinating efforts** within the Catholic circles in Belgrade. On the one hand, the need for a cathedral diminished due to the intensive construction of other Catholic churches⁸⁵². On the other hand, the decision to hold a lottery was tied to a conflict between Archbishop Rodić and the Society for the Construction of the Catholic Church (*Društvo za Gradjenje Katoličke Crkve*). Established

⁸⁴⁹ "Konzultor beogradske nadbiskupije o novoj katoličkoj katedrali u Beogradu," *Jutarnji List*, 13.12.1931, 3.

⁸⁵⁰ See more about the lottery and its problems in Rober Skenderbegović, "Crisinum i lutrija – dva neuspjela pothvata beogradskog nadbiskupa Rafaela Rodića (1924.–1936.)," *Croatica Christiana periodica* 24, br. 45 (2000): 170-173.

⁸⁵¹ Zoran M. Jovanović, *O neostvarenim graditeljskim vizijama Nadbiskupije beogradske: prilozi za istoriju Srbije između dva svetska rata*, (Beograd: Beogradska nadbiskupija, 2015), 69.

⁸⁵² In Belgrade, from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, four Catholic churches were constructed, and one was enlarged. See more in Borovnjak, *Verski objekti u Beogradu*, 54-64.

in 1920, this society had been involved in preparations for the cathedral's construction, including fundraising efforts. For instance, after the competition, they planned to raise funds through the distribution of coupons, known as "blocks," primarily in regions with a significant Catholic population⁸⁵³. After Rodić dissolved this society, the responsibility for securing funds was taken over by the Society of St. Vincent (which already existed and was engaged in charitable activities) and Rodić himself, who opted for a lottery instead⁸⁵⁴.

However, the conflict that led to the dissolution of the Society was primarily rooted in disagreements over **the construction site**, which had been a problematic issue. According to the 1923 Master Plan, the cathedral was supposed to be near the Kalenić market, but this plot was privately owned, and Rodić, with the Society for the Construction of the Catholic Church, did not want to purchase it, insisting that the municipality provide free land⁸⁵⁵. Several options were discussed simultaneously, including a location near the *Vozarev Krst* area, a municipal site at the corner of Sarajevska and Nemanjina streets, or near the kafana "*Lepi Izgled*"⁸⁵⁶. Ultimately, the municipality donated a municipal plot on Moravska Street⁸⁵⁷, for which the competition was held. Immediately after the competition, this location was criticized, and a new one was sought⁸⁵⁸. One of the options was within the Tašmajdan complex: architect Josef Wentzler modified his project for this new site, and Mayor Milan Nešić approved the idea, but the approval from the municipal board was pending⁸⁵⁹. Later, Nešić informed that "no decision has been made yet due to a lack of suitable space"⁸⁶⁰, and

⁸⁵³ "Prikupljanje priloga," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 4 (1930): 4.

⁸⁵⁴ Moreover, the situation with the lottery led to further conflicts and an anonymous complaint to the Vatican against the organizers of the lottery, see more in Jovanović, *O neostvarenim graditeljskim vizijama Nadbiskupije beogradske*, 62-63.

⁸⁵⁵ "Prestonički katolici kod g. dr. K. Kumanudija," *Pravda*, 13.3.1928, 1.

⁸⁵⁶ "Opština je odredila zemljište za podizanje nove katoličke crkve u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 10.2.1929, 9.

⁸⁵⁷ "Rad opštinskog odbora," *Opštinske Novine*, 1.5.1929, 20.

⁸⁵⁸ "Pred podizanjem katoličke katedrale u Beogradu," *Pravda*, 26.7.1930, 6.

⁸⁵⁹ "Društvo za gradjenje katedrale," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 7 (1930): 4; "Naša katedrala," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 9 (1930): 3.

⁸⁶⁰ "Kod predsednika opštine Beograd," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 2 (1931): 6.

the municipality could only offer a site in Dorćol, which was supposed to become a public garden according to the 1923 Master Plan⁸⁶¹.

The proposed location caused a split: the Society opposed the site and even perceived its suggestion as an insult because it was in the Jewish Quarter, on marshy land, in a neglected part of the city far from the center⁸⁶². However, archdiocese representatives were more receptive to the location, viewing it as a historic area previously associated with Catholics and a developing district⁸⁶³. Moreover, plans had already been made in 1930 to establish a parish with its church for this part of the city⁸⁶⁴. The conflict directly led Rodić to dissolve the Society⁸⁶⁵ and indirectly caused the project to remain unrealized.

Nevertheless, the case of the Catholic Cathedral in Belgrade also reveals an additional dimension to the question of "to build or not to build," as the project's implementation was also influenced by its **opponents**. Despite the dilemmas regarding the feasibility of construction and debates over the prioritization of building projects, few projects faced direct opposition.

Overall, the construction of the Catholic Cathedral in Belgrade was perceived within the context of the complex relationship between the Catholic and Orthodox churches, involving constant comparisons. For example, when the Society for the Construction of the Catholic Church faced difficulties in obtaining the promised site in Tašmajdan, they noted that "the municipalities in Maribor, Ljubljana, and Celje donated the best locations for the construction of Orthodox churches"⁸⁶⁶. On the other hand, the Society for the Construction of the Church of St. Sava viewed these two construction projects in Belgrade as competing⁸⁶⁷. In

⁸⁶¹ "Sednica opštinskog odbora," *Vreme*, 9.6.1931, 7.

⁸⁶² Skenderbegović, "Crisinum i lutrija, 169.

⁸⁶³ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁴ "Za katolike Dorćola i Palilule," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 9 (1930): 4.

⁸⁶⁵ "Oko podizanja katoličke crkve u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 25.9.1931, 7.

⁸⁶⁶ "Kod predsedjnika opštine Beograd," *Glasnik Katoličke crkve u Beogradu* 2 (1931): 6.

⁸⁶⁷ For example, "Skupština društva za podizanje hrama Sv Save," *Vreme*, 13.2.1928, 4.

the article "*The Catholic Cathedral in Belgrade*," Petar J. Odavić urged, "We, Serbs, must not allow the Catholics to erect such a building in Belgrade, at least not before we build a worthy memorial church for St. Sava," perceiving the Cathedral as a project of Catholic propaganda and almost as an expression of hatred toward the Serbian people⁸⁶⁸. Despite some members of the Society for the Construction of the Church of St. Sava being part of the municipal board, the difficulties in realizing the cathedral project were not directly caused by the activities of its opponents. However, in one respect, their efforts were quite successful. In his article, Odavić insisted that the cathedral should not be allowed to be built in the Gothic style, and as a result, this restriction was included in the competition program⁸⁶⁹. After the signing of the concordat with the Vatican and the subsequent concordat crisis⁸⁷⁰, plans for constructing the Catholic Cathedral in Belgrade were no longer discussed, although the allocated site remained reserved for the project. It was only in 1940 that construction plans were mentioned again⁸⁷¹.

Unlike the Catholic Cathedral in Belgrade, the attempts to build a mosque in Zagreb did not face direct opposition to construction, although they were met with irony and sarcasm in some circles, both Catholic and integral Yugoslavist⁸⁷². In this case, religious differences were perceived differently within the political context. Thus, the arguments for building the mosque in Zagreb varied from efforts to "preserve the love of our Muslim brothers"⁸⁷³ in the 1920s to attempts to "demonstrate the unity of the Croatian people of both faiths"⁸⁷⁴ during the NDH. In addition to the difficulties of finding a location and securing funding, project

⁸⁶⁸ Petar J. Odavić, "Katolička katedrala u Beogradu," *Pravda*, 6.3.1928, 5.

⁸⁶⁹ "Konkurs za katoličku katedralu," *Vreme*, 16.11.1929, 7.

⁸⁷⁰ See more in Marjan Marino Ninčević i Filip Brčić, "Diplomatski odnosi Vatikana i Kraljevine Jugoslavije: konkordat iz 1935. Godine," *Nova prisutnost* XIV, br. 2 (2016): 299-307.

⁸⁷¹ "Nacrt uredbe za izvođenje regulacionog plana grada Beograda po idejnoj skici za regulaciju," *Opštinske novine* 21-22 (1940): dodata, 38.

⁸⁷² See more in Zlatko Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu 1878.-1945. Doba utemeljenja*, (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu, Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2007), 250, 263.

⁸⁷³ Dr. K "Gradnja džamije u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 16.4.1927.

⁸⁷⁴ Ismet Muftić, "U ime Boga obćega Dobročinitelja Milostivog," u *Džamija u Zagrebu. U spomen otvorenja* (Zagreb: Zakladni odbor za izgradnju džamije u Zagrebu, 1943), 5.

implementation was complicated by various actors and initiatives that were not coordinated with each other.

In the first stage, the initiative came from non-Muslim circles, which can be seen as an expression of Croatian paternalism towards Muslims. Even before World War I, there were two attempts to raise funds for the construction of a mosque in Zagreb: by the Party of Rights in 1908⁸⁷⁵ and by the Society of Brethren of the Croatian Dragon (*Družba "Braća Hrvatskoga Zmaja"*) in 1912⁸⁷⁶. However, the collected funds were lost during the war⁸⁷⁷. In 1920, a committee for the construction was formed under the patronage of Ivo Pilar, Croatian lawyer and politician, with plans to start fundraising and secure a plot from the municipality⁸⁷⁸. The attempt was unsuccessful: according to one version, due to the municipality's refusal⁸⁷⁹; according to another, the committee itself realized that plots were granted with the obligation to build within a certain timeframe. Doubting their ability to raise the necessary funds quickly, they abandoned the idea⁸⁸⁰. In 1922, rumors began circulating that the Croatian Bloc included in its municipal election platform the construction of a "mosque in the Moorish style in the Upper Town," which sparked renewed efforts to organize fundraising for the building⁸⁸¹. In 1924, Zagreb municipality also donated money for the mosque's construction after the *Reis-ul-Ulema* Džemaludin Čaušević approached Mayor Heinzl through Ismet

⁸⁷⁵ See more in Zlatko Hasanbegović, "Islam i muslimani u pravaškoj ideologiji: o pokušajima gradnje 'pravaške' džamije u Zagrebu 1908," u *Pravaška misao i politika*, ur. Jasna Turkalj, Zlatko Matijević, Stjepan Matković (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2007), 87-96.

⁸⁷⁶ Mirko Jurkić, "Misao kroz prošlost," u *Džamija u Zagrebu. U spomen otvorenja* (Zagreb: Zakladni odbor za izgradnju džamije u Zagrebu, 1943), 40.

⁸⁷⁷ Dr. K "Gradnja džamije u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 16.4.1927.

⁸⁷⁸ "Četvrt stoljeća Hrvatske islamske vjerske zajednice," *Jutarnji List*, 13.3.1941, 19.

⁸⁷⁹ Jurkić, "Misao kroz prošlost," 40.

⁸⁸⁰ Because "building regulations do not allow cheap and inharmonious construction activity in the city center." "Bosanski muslimani u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 1.1.1931, 6.

⁸⁸¹ Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu*, 249-250.

Muftić⁸⁸², who was imam and later mufti, and in the 1920s the leading representative of Muslims in Zagreb⁸⁸³.

Later, more Muslim organizations appeared and became involved in the building process, but they had not only different political orientations but also ideas about what kind of mosque to build in Zagreb, which complicated the coordination of their efforts. For example, in 1930, the organization *Narodna Uzdanica*, originally a student academic society, began functioning in Zagreb as a civic cultural society⁸⁸⁴ and also attempted to start fundraising for the mosque's construction⁸⁸⁵. While they proposed to build a small, modest mosque, there was also an opinion that a mosque "that would match the place and purpose in size and beauty" should be constructed⁸⁸⁶. In 1931, the Society of Zagreb Muslims (*Društvo Zagrebačkih Muslimana*) was formed, deliberately distancing itself from *Narodna Uzdanica* and its political affiliations⁸⁸⁷. By 1935, the Local Islamic Council (*Džematski Medžlis*) was also established as a Muslim representative body. Amid the difficulties in relations between these societies and the internal divisions within *Narodna Uzdanica*, their efforts to support the mosque's construction led nowhere⁸⁸⁸. Several organizations attempted to raise funds but with unclear outcomes. For example, a journalist from the newspaper *Večer* noted that the funds already collected were handed over to the municipality⁸⁸⁹, but these finances were not mentioned again after that.

⁸⁸² Jurkić, "Misao kroz prošlost," 42.

⁸⁸³ See more about changes in his status in Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu*, 56-61.

⁸⁸⁴ *Narodna uzdanica* was created under the patronage of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization as an alternative to Pro-Serbian *Gajret*. While it had a nationally neutral stance in Sarajevo, aligned with the politics of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, the Zagreb branch leaned more towards Croatian national identification. See more in Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu*, 89-91.

⁸⁸⁵ "Akcija za izgradnju džamije u Zagrebu," *Večer*; 28.10.1931, 5.

⁸⁸⁶ Jurkić, "Misao kroz prošlost," 43.

⁸⁸⁷ Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu*, 139-140.

⁸⁸⁸ Muftić claimed that the Society of Zagreb Muslims interfered in religious matters, which fell under his exclusive jurisdiction. In 1937, the new president of the Society of Zagreb Muslims, Salih Ljubunčić, who had a Yugoslav orientation, criticized Muftić for his pro-Croatian stance. Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu*, 147, 251.

⁸⁸⁹ "U Zagrebu će se graditi džamija," *Večer*, 4.12.1937, 4.

As a result, the fragmented initiatives and their coordination took considerable time, so active efforts to organize the construction only began in the late 1930s. In 1938, the foundation charter and statute for the Foundation for the Construction of the Mosque (*Zaklada za Izgradnju Džamije*) were approved, funds were secured to start the work, and Ismet Muftić, along with the Local Islamic Council, organized meetings with representatives of city and regional authorities, as well as members of the HSS, to secure support, funding, and a plot of land for the project⁸⁹⁰.

A significant shift in the construction process came with the formation of the Banovina of Croatia, as the number of Muslims in this administrative unit increased due to the inclusion of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Zagreb as the center of the Banovina of Croatia was perceived as a "religious center for all faiths" ⁸⁹¹.

At the time, it was expected that the funds from the foundation, widespread fundraising efforts, and support from the Banovina and city authorities would resolve the issue of financing. However, as with many other projects, finding a suitable site proved to be a complex problem. The city offered several sites, each with advantages, disadvantages, and nuances regarding its acquisition. The best option was the Botanical Garden, but it was only possible if a new location could be found for the garden itself⁸⁹².

This situation highlights not only the difficulties in making decisions about the allocation of limited resources but also the challenge of coordinating the municipality's capabilities with the project's needs. As a result, reaching a final decision became increasingly complicated. Initially, the municipality allocated a site at *Gupčeva Zvijezda*, but it was far from the city center⁸⁹³. Then, a site at *Zelengaj* was designated but it was too small⁸⁹⁴. Later,

⁸⁹⁰ Jurkić, "Misao kroz prošlost," 45-46. "Četvrt stoljeća Hrvatske islamske vjerske zajednice," *Jutarnji List*, 13.3.1941, 19. "U toku je velika akcija za gradnju džamije u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 24.11.1938.

⁸⁹¹ "Za gradnju džamije u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 21.4.1940, 21.

⁸⁹² "Četvrt stoljeća Hrvatske islamske vjerske zajednice," *Jutarnji List*, 13.3.1941, 19.

⁸⁹³ "Gradnja džamije na Gupčevoj Zvijezdi," *Jutarnji List*, 26.6.1940, 13.

the plot at *Gupčeva Zvijezda* was proposed again, and shortly afterward, a new switch to the *Zelengaj* option, while the hope to get the Botanical garden site remained⁸⁹⁵.

While the choice of a site sparked debates, the architectural vision for the mosque was clear — "with elegant minarets in the finest and purest Ottoman style"⁸⁹⁶. In this spirit, artist Omer Mujadžić created the first historicist version, dated 1939/1940, and later the second version with architect Zvonimir Požgaj, which was more modest and modernized⁸⁹⁷ (Fig. 26).



Figure 26. The project for the mosque in Zagreb, Omer Mujadžić and Zvonimir Požgaj, 1940. Source: *Džamija u Zagrebu. U spomen otvorenja*, (Zagreb: Zakladni odbor za izgradnju džamije u Zagrebu, 1943), 1939.

During the NDH period, the Society for the Beautification of Zagreb (*Društvo za poljepšavanje grada Zagreba*) and the Society of Zagreb Citizens (*Društvo Zagrepčana*) also became involved in the project. Despite the project's exhibition and approval by the *Reis-ul-Ulema* Fehim Spaho, it was never realized due to the direct intervention of Ante Pavelić⁸⁹⁸. He insisted on a more central location for the mosque and proposed an alternative solution.

⁸⁹⁴ "Četvrt stoljeća Hrvatske islamske vjerske zajednice," *Jutarnji List*, 13.3.1941, 19.

⁸⁹⁵ Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu*, 258.

⁸⁹⁶ "Za gradnju džamije u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 21.4.1940, 21.

⁸⁹⁷ See more about the architectural features of both projects in Alen Žunić, "Moderna i suvremena islamska arhitektura u Hrvatskoj," *Prostor* 19, br. 1(41) (2011): 96-97.

⁸⁹⁸ Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu*, 260.

Thus, under the Zvonimir Požgaj and Stjepan Planić project, the already constructed Art Pavilion was converted into a mosque⁸⁹⁹.

Thus, the questions of whether, where, and how to build, addressed during the decision-making phase, were crucial for realizing the chosen architectural project. These decisions could delay the project's materialization, led to the creation of ephemeral projects (where a design was completed, but there was no certainty about securing land or funding), or complicated its implementation. However, the organization of the construction process itself can be seen as a broad coordination task, including managing limited resources (such as land or financial means).

On the one hand, the success of an architectural project depends on the coordination of efforts among the actors involved. On the other hand, it also requires reconciling different interests: private and public, local and state. During the implementation phase, a particular architectural project becomes part of the urban environment: requiring alignment with urban planning regulations (1), coordination with other projects, primarily through resolving land use dilemmas (2), securing financial resources in practice (3), and reconciling the interests of various stakeholders (4), including opponents of the construction (5). These five groups of factors will be examined in this chapter.

4.1. Urban Regulations and Alignment of Public and Private Interest

After project selection and elaboration, its implementation required integrating it into the urban environment, which could be considered a space where public and private interests intersect. The realization process involved reconciling these interests, from practical architectural and urban planning details to broader visions and concepts.

⁸⁹⁹ Žunić, "Moderna i suvremena islamska arhitektura u Hrvatskoj," 97-98. Ismet Muftić even mentioned that, while in exile, Pavelić thought about building a mosque in Zagreb and had even drafted a design. Muftić, "U ime Boga obćega Dobročinitelja Milostivog," 5-6.

For example, several competitions where the highest-awarded project was implemented but with changes demonstrate an interesting divergence between the logic of different stages of realization. At the selection stage, the primary focus was on the project's characteristics: its quality, alignment with the program, or even external factors connected to the project or its architect. This focus is noticeable even in the presentation of competition entries, where the surrounding urban environment is usually represented schematically, if at all. However, during implementation, the project not only integrates into the surrounding cityscape but sometimes directly conflicts with it, which can result in project alterations. For instance, in the invitation-only competition for the building of the Jewish Religious Community, the design by the team Aleksandar Freudenreich and Pavao Deutsch was chosen⁹⁰⁰. The original plan attracted attention due to its sharp corners and contrasting volumes, but the final version featured a fully rounded corner to align with the appearance of the neighboring buildings⁹⁰¹.

The investor should receive a building permit issued by the municipal construction committees, ensuring that the project complies with construction regulations (the Construction Law and building codes) and urban planning regulations. Moreover, in interwar Yugoslavia, administrative complexities, discussed in Chapter 2, complicated both legislative development and urban planning and thus indirectly hindered the realization of projects.

Regarding building regulations, the main issue was the lengthy process of developing unified legislation for the construction sector. In general, established norms did not lead to the complete abandonment of projects. However, they did extend timelines, as projects were either adjusted to comply with the rules or investors negotiated for broader or more flexible

⁹⁰⁰ "Novogradnja palače izraelitske bogoslovske općine," *Novosti*, 4.6.1927, 8.

⁹⁰¹ Ibid.

interpretations of the regulations⁹⁰². Additionally, besides technical rules, there were more subjective aesthetic guidelines. For example, when the municipality stopped the construction of the Hotel “*Milinov*” on Zagreb’s central square over aesthetic concerns, the investor expressed dissatisfaction, stating that “tastes differ, and the concept of beauty is undefined”⁹⁰³. Furthermore, with the enactment of the Construction Law in 1931, it became prohibited to issue building permits for structures that would “uglify the appearance of the area or street”⁹⁰⁴.

In theory, urban planning regulations were also not a significant problem as long as they were stable: after the regulations' adoption, projects could be aligned with them and implemented. Inconsistent or disputed urban regulations harmed project realization. This issue was particularly challenging for key urban spaces where regulation was practically and symbolically important, such as *Kaptol* and *Dolac* in Zagreb, *Terazije* and Slavija Square in Belgrade, and the central squares in both cities.

In Zagreb, the main issue was the lack of a master plan. The city was regulated by partial plans, while in some cases, regulations were still based on late 19th-century plans⁹⁰⁵. Even after a competition for the master plan was held in 1930/1931, the development and approval of the plan took several years, leaving projects to be realized under this temporary state. Moreover, during the discussions about the master plan, potential investors were concerned that it would lead to a decline in construction activity since “One can not build against the regulatory plan because it is prohibited, and one can not build according to it because the financial burdens are enormous, and profitability is hopeless”⁹⁰⁶. Additionally, the

⁹⁰² For example, in Zagreb, there were cases where the municipality required to align the project with regulations and thus delayed construction for the central Ban Jelačić Square and the adjacent Dolac. However, both buildings were eventually completed. “Jos jedna sprečena novogradnja na Jelačićevom trgu,” *Jutarnji List*, 14.3.1937, 12; “Pitanje gradnje kuća na Dolcu,” *Jutarnji List*, 12.5.1929, 26. “Jedinstvenost stila zgrada na Dolcu,” *Novosti*, 18.4.1929.

⁹⁰³ “Zašto je obustavljena gradnja novog hotela,” *Novosti*, 30.4.1929, 6.

⁹⁰⁴ *Gradjevinski zakon*, (Beograd: Geca Kon, 1931), 163.

⁹⁰⁵ “Mjesto regulatorne osnove, smicalica,” *Jutarnji List*, 31.7.1935, 6.

⁹⁰⁶ “Kućevlasnici, zemljoposjednici, novčari i regulacija grada,” *Jutarnji List*, 26.6.1935, 8.

plan was criticized as unrealistic and focused on long-term development rather than addressing current needs⁹⁰⁷.

In Belgrade, the Master Plan was accepted in the early 1920s but was also unrealistic. As Zlata Vuksanović Macura demonstrated in her dissertation, there were significant discrepancies between what was planned and what was achieved. For example, she noted that 32 of the 41 envisioned squares were never realized⁹⁰⁸. In many cases, the 1923 Master Plan proposed ideas that did not align with the municipality's capabilities.

On the one hand, there was a mismatch in administrative capacities. Despite the Master Plan's status, several projects were built without considering it, not only by private investors but also by state authorities. On the other hand, there was a financial mismatch, as creating squares, diagonal transport routes, and wide streets required funds for land expropriation, which the municipality could not afford at the scale proposed by the plan.

This required the municipality to establish a list of priorities for purchasing land plots, but private investors could not wait for their turn in this priority list, often proceeding with construction, which further complicated the plan's implementation. In an attempt to balance general and private interests, regulation of some areas became a constant topic of discussion, negotiations, and changes. Under these conditions of fluid regulation, project implementation was impossible if investors were unwilling to engage in illegal construction without permits.

This situation is particularly well illustrated by the projects in the central Theater Square (*Pozorišni trg*)⁹⁰⁹, now known as Republic Square, one of the central squares in Belgrade, established initially on the site of former fortifications and gates. While its northwestern part was already shaped by the buildings of the Funds Administration (*Uprava*

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁸ Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923," 77.

⁹⁰⁹ Since 1896, the official name of the square was *Knežev Spomenik*, but colloquially, as well as in press publications, the name *Pozorišni trg* was used.

Fondova) and the National Theater (*Narodno Pozorište*), for further development of the square, there were two options discussed during the elaboration of the 1923 Master Plan: aligning the square from the theater towards Knez Mihailova Street or Kolarčeva Street. The second option was chosen⁹¹⁰ (Fig. 27), which implied a wide square and, thus, expropriation of private sites belonging to Belgrade Cooperative (*Beogradska Zadruga*) and Kolarac's Endowment (*Kolarčeva Zadužbina*).

While the maximum width of the square, as in the 1923 Master Plan, complicated construction on both sites, presenting a dilemma between private construction and urban planning purposes, the discussed compromises created a dilemma between the two buildings: either a larger section was cut off from Kolarac's Endowment, allowing the construction of the Belgrade Cooperative, or the opposite. Thus, not only did the municipality try to find a balance between representative central square and spending of municipal funds, but compromise solutions could also favor one of the private actors. Moreover, debates about the possible reorientation of the square continued even after the 1923 Master Plan was adopted. In such conditions, the municipality could not reach a final decision, frequently altering the regulations. As a result, both buildings, as well as the square's regulation according to the 1923 Master Plan, remained unrealized due to their interconnections.

Considering that it would take a considerable amount of money to expropriate plots for the square of 84 meters wide, the Committee for the Development of the Master Plan began to consider other options for regulation as early as 1926⁹¹¹. That same year, Kolarac's Endowment decided to construct a building for the People's University on its plot⁹¹². However, this project could only be realized if the 1923 Master plan was changed, which

⁹¹⁰ "Kako će izgledati Pozorišni trg u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 11.9.1929, 5; Milutin Borisavljević, "Problem Pozorišnog Trga," *Pravda*, 24.9.1929, 4.

⁹¹¹ Branko Maksimović, "Projekat rekonstrukcije Pozorišnog trga 1926. godine," *Godišnjak grada Beograda* XXII (1975): 359.

⁹¹² "Kolarčev fond namerava ove godine da zida dom za Univerzitet," *Vreme*, 6.11.1926, 4.

drew criticism from the member of the municipal board A. Stanojević, who objected to altering the Master Plan for the sake of a single building⁹¹³. In discussing the issue, he remarked that “we are accustomed to permanent impermanence”⁹¹⁴, a fitting description of the ongoing regulatory changes for the Theater Square.

On the one hand, the Board of Kolarac’s Endowment attempted to fit the building into the available space, which could be considered a compromise. On the other hand, it was only possible if the façade faced the theater, leaving the future representative square with the building’s side turned towards it. In 1928, the Board held a competition with no first prize awarded, but there were two second prizes to Andrej Papkov (Fig. A.26) and Bogdan Nestorović⁹¹⁵. Nevertheless, after the competition, the Board chose for realization a project by Petar Bajalović, which was selected outside of the competition (Fig. A.26). This project had its façade oriented towards Knez Miletina Street (nowadays Bulevar Despota Stefana) completely turning the building away from the square. As a result, the municipal Construction Board refused to grant a construction permit, insisting that the Kolarac’s Endowment should design their entire complex architecturally because the site would be reduced according to the 1923 Master Plan so that other buildings facing the square would no longer fit.

⁹¹³ A. Stanojević, "Kakav oblik treba dati danas Kolarčevoj zamisli i kakav univerzitet osnovati?" *Vreme*, 8.12.1926, 6.

⁹¹⁴ Ibid.

⁹¹⁵ "Kolarčev Narodni Univerzitet," *Politika*, 14.6.1928, 5. Rajko Tatić got the third prize. The jury included only three architects: Branko Tanazević and Dragutin Djordjević as representatives of the Belgrade Technical Faculty, and Dragutin Maslac as a representative of the Ministry of Construction.




Figure 27. Regulations of the Theater Square in Belgrade: according to the 1923 Master plan; changes were proposed in 1929.

Source: Jovan Obradović, Generalni regulacioni plan za grad Beograd, 1924, Digital National Library of Serbia; "Regulacija Pozorišnog Trga," *Politika*, 13.1.1929, 8.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of 1929, the municipality decided to change the square's regulation, reducing its width from 84 to 50 meters (Fig. 27), and the Construction Board's decision became irrelevant. Moreover, its decision was opposed not only by the representatives of Kolarac's Endowment but also by the Construction Section of the City Administration, leading to a dispute that required the intervention of the Ministry of Construction⁹¹⁶. Initially, the Ministry approved the proposed regulation change, which made constructing the Kolarac's Endowment building possible⁹¹⁷. In September 1929, the municipality proposed a further modification, favoring the Endowment even more by minimally reducing their plot and cutting off the maximum possible from the Belgrade Cooperative's site as proposed in the 1923 Master Plan⁹¹⁸. This regulation meant that Kolarac's Endowment building could be constructed, but the Belgrade Cooperative building could not.

⁹¹⁶ "Jedan administrativno tehnički spor oko palate Narodnog univerziteta," *Vreme*, 20.3.1929, 7.

⁹¹⁷ "Sednica opštinskog odbora," *Vreme*, 20.4.1929, 7.

⁹¹⁸ "Kako će izgledati Pozorišni trg u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 11.9.1929, 5.

Shortly after this proposal, the Belgrade Cooperative published a project for its building and expected to begin construction within the same year⁹¹⁹ (Fig. A.27). The chairman of the Belgrade Cooperative, Mihajlo Šonda, criticized the municipality and its proposed regulation, stating, "My goal is to have true palaces for the people and to foster the development of labor and progress in Belgrade, not to create unnecessary squares"⁹²⁰.

While regulatory issues hindered the construction of these two buildings, the municipality approved the plans for the insurance company *Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà* building at the corner of Čika Ljubina Street and Obiličev Venac⁹²¹. Thus, the alternative option of orienting the square towards Knez Mihailova Street, which had been discussed during the Master Plan elaboration, became impossible, although it had many supporters, including architects and urbanists⁹²².

In September 1929, amidst changes in regulations and news of construction plans by the Belgrade Cooperative and the insurance company, debates about the square's regulation emerged in the press. Moreover, for the municipality, regulating Theater Square was not a priority. In 1929, the city actively purchased plots on the Terazije Terrace while claiming a lack of funds for expropriating plots to regulate Theater Square.

Nevertheless, the professional community paid attention to the issue, offering alternative regulation plans and compromise solutions, such as proposing arcades for buildings in disputed areas⁹²³. Architects also suggested that the municipality regulate building heights and façade types⁹²⁴, which could have potentially complicated the approval

⁹¹⁹ "Problem uredjenja Pozorišnog trga i skvera Kneza Mihajla," *Vreme*, 13.9.1929, 5.

⁹²⁰ Ibid.

⁹²¹ Technical documentation XXVI-6-1929, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda. See more about the building in Aleksandar Kadijević, "O arhitekturi beogradske palate „Reunione“,“ *Zbornik Muzeja primenjenih umetnosti* 9 (2013): 131.

⁹²² "Regulacija Pozorišnog Trga," *Politika*, 9.9.1929, 4; "Problem uredjenja Pozorišnog trga i skvera Kneza Mihajla," *Vreme*, 13.9.1929, 5; "Oko regulacije Pozorišnog trga," *Vreme*, 17.9.1929, 6.

⁹²³ "Problem regulacije Pozorišnog trga," *Vreme*, 15.9.1929, 9.

⁹²⁴ Ibid.

and construction process even further. Kolarac's Endowment resolved this problem by purchasing another site on Kraljev Square for the People's University⁹²⁵, and the building was completed by 1932.

However, the Belgrade Cooperative did not abandon the idea of constructing its building. At the end of 1930, the municipality proposed a new regulation, which further reduced the square's width to 40 meters, minimally cutting the Belgrade Cooperative's plot while significantly decreasing the Kolarac's Endowment site⁹²⁶ (Fig. 28). Nevertheless, the Ministry of Construction did not approve this regulation and instead proposed cutting more from the Belgrade Cooperative site and less from the Kolarac's Endowment plot⁹²⁷. While the municipality attempted to find the best possible compromise, the Ministry of Construction concluded that "the plan does not suit the needs of either the square or the traffic"⁹²⁸. Despite this, municipal authorities insisted on their version, and the Ministry of Construction approved it.




Figure 28. Regulation of the Theatre Square according to the municipality's plan in 1930. Source: "Regulacija Pozorišnog Trga," *Vreme*, 19.11.1930, 3.

⁹²⁵ "Kolarčev univerzitet će počinje se podizati 1. maja," *Pravda*, 6.4.1930, 8.

⁹²⁶ The façades of the buildings should be identical, "Regulacija Pozorišnog trga," *Vreme*, 19.11.1930, 3.

⁹²⁷ "Izmena regulacionog plana Pozorišnog Trga," *Politika*, 1.5.1931, 8.

⁹²⁸ Ibid.

Thus, constructing the Belgrade Cooperative building became possible, and the cooperative announced a competition for its design⁹²⁹. The results were published in November 1931, and the first prize was awarded to Sime Milosavljević⁹³⁰ (Fig. A.27), but the construction was once again postponed.

In the first half of the 1930s, Belgrade experienced a decline in construction activity due to the effects of the economic crisis, and the issue of regulating and developing Theater Square became relevant again by the end of 1936. The Belgrade Cooperative announced a competition at the end of 1936, awarded three projects the first prize, and expected to begin construction in the spring of 1937⁹³¹. Nevertheless, at the end of 1936, the Belgrade Municipality also announced a competition to regulate both Theater Square and Crown Prince's Square (*Prestolonaslednikov trg*, nowadays Terazije). At the same time, the municipality introduced a tax on buildings up to one floor to stimulate development in the city center. Yet, due to the ongoing competition, the municipality imposed a ban on construction until the regulatory issues were resolved⁹³², which could be seen as an example of inconsistency in decision-making.

The Kolarac's Endowment also intended to build up its site with several buildings⁹³³, but like the Belgrade Cooperative, it had to wait until the end of the regulation competition. Its results sparked a series of debates in the press. The competition program and the awarded

⁹²⁹ The competition drew public attention because all submitted projects were published in *Vreme* from 24.9.1931 to 20.10.1931, and a competition between newspaper readers to guess which projects would be awarded was held.

⁹³⁰ Adolf Sabo got the second prize, and Blaž Misit-Katušić got the third. "Svršetak konkursa za palatu Beogradske zadruge," *Vreme*, 6.11.1931, 5.

⁹³¹ The three first prizes got Miladin Prljević from Belgrade, Branislav Marinković from Belgrade, and the team Kiverov-Korka-Krekić from Zagreb. "Na svome imanju preko puta „Kolarca“ Beogradska zadruga poduže palatu," *Vreme*, 29.11.1936, 10; "Palata Beogradske zadruge na čiju će gradnju biti utrošeno 15 miliona dinara počinje da se zida još obog proleća," *Vreme*, 10.2.1937, 8; "Rezultat utakmice za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Beogradske zadruge," *Vreme*, 11.2.1937, 15.

⁹³² "Još godinu dana centar Beograda ostaće neizgrađen," *Vreme*, 17.2.1937, 12.

⁹³³ "Kolarčeva zadužbina podiže bioskop sa dve i po hiljade mesta i luksuzni hotel s apartmanima za visoke goste," *Politika*, 21.5.1937, 7.

projects were criticized for addressing urban planning issues without considering financial feasibility, existing buildings, and other factors, making the projects unrealizable⁹³⁴.

The municipality once again demonstrated inconsistency in decision-making when Mayor Vlada Ilić allowed construction on Terazije without considering the competition results, aiming to avoid wasting the construction season⁹³⁵. Professionals urged him to revoke the permit, arguing that it would be impossible to implement the regulations after construction⁹³⁶. While Ilić sought to accommodate investors' demands on Terazije, his decision did not extend to Theater Square. He attempted to persuade the Belgrade Cooperative to abandon its plans for the site⁹³⁷. However, in the autumn of 1937, the Belgrade Cooperative sought approval for the final project by Ignjat Popović, which followed regulation lines approved in 1931, to begin construction in the spring of 1938⁹³⁸. It proved impossible, as the regulation issue remained unresolved at the beginning of 1938⁹³⁹. Kolarac's Endowment faced similar challenges: their project for the largest hotel in Belgrade also had to wait for the municipality to make a final decision regarding the square's regulation⁹⁴⁰.

In February 1938, the municipality proposed a new draft regulation by the author of the 1923 Master Plan Kovalevsky (Fig. 29). However, the process of approving the plan proved rather long: public inquiry, City Council, again public inquiry, approval by the Ministry of Construction⁹⁴¹. A meeting was held between Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović

⁹³⁴ "Međunarodni konkurs za uređenje Terazija i Pozorišnog trga pogrešno je raspisan," *Vreme*, 14.5.1937, 19; "Nagrađeni radovi nisu dali ni osnove ni arhitektonske obrade koje zadovoljavaju i koje bi se mogle primeniti za uređenje Terazija," *Politika*, 1.6.1937, 7.

⁹³⁵ "Predsednik Opštine dozvolio je zidanje na Terazijama bez obzira na rezultate konkursa," *Vreme*, 27.5.1937, 5.

⁹³⁶ "Ne upropašćujmo Beograd," *Vreme*, 28.5.1937, 5.

⁹³⁷ "Predsednik Opštine dozvolio je zidanje na Terazijama bez obzira na rezultate konkursa," *Vreme*, 27.5.1937, 5.

⁹³⁸ "Beogradska zadruga podiže palatu u kojoj će biti pored banke kafana, bar i velika bioskopska sala," *Vreme*, 28.9.1937, 7. His project was chosen out of the competition. See technical documentation XXXI-1-1937, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijски arhiv Beograda.

⁹³⁹ "Beogradska zadruga," *Politika*, 1.5.1938, 54.

⁹⁴⁰ "Kolarčeva zadužbina podiže najveći hotel," *Vreme*, 29.12.1937, 7.

⁹⁴¹ "Pozorišni trg dobio je konačnu regulaciju politika," *Politika*, 10.2.1938, 13.

and Minister of Construction Dobrivoje Stošović, where discussions were held regarding not only the regulation itself but also the idea of choosing the façade of buildings for the sake of representation and the idea of a “decorative and architectural square” again came to the fore⁹⁴². Thus, the already developed project for the Belgrade Cooperative building was ignored. Moreover, this regulation proposed a significant reduction of its plot, and its objections were dismissed as insignificant during the public inquiry⁹⁴³. Moreover, its elaborated project followed the previous regulation lines from 1931, contrasting with the new regulation. The regulation envisaged a more complicated scheme for the Kolarac's Endowment's site; while the municipality planned to pave a new street, it would get a part of the municipal plot. Nevertheless, the approval and expropriation processes were delayed so much that the projects remained unrealized.




Figure 29. Regulation of the Theatre Square according to the municipality's plan in 1938. Source: "Rešeno je kako će biti regulisan Pozorišni Trg," *Politika*, 21.7.1938, 14.

In Belgrade, the final shaping of the square and the associated regulatory changes became obstacles to private investors' realization of buildings. In Zagreb, the central Ban

⁹⁴² "Kako će u budućnosti izgledati trg oko Kneževog spomenika," *Vreme*, 12.2.1938, 10; "Kako je izvršena definitivna regulacija Pozorišnog trga," *Vreme*, 21.7.1938, 8.

⁹⁴³ "Zapisnik IV redovne sednice Gradskog veća Opštinske grada Beograda," *Opštinske Novine*, 27.7.1938, 335.

Jelačić Square, was shaped before World War I⁹⁴⁴, but one plot played a key role in the final arrangement of the square and became a point of conflict between public and private interests: the Foundation Block⁹⁴⁵. While two buildings on this block, facing the square and Ilica, were constructed in the first half of the 1930s according to the 1930 regulatory plan, the central skyscraper, also proposed in the plan, was not built before World War II. The 1930 regulatory plan for the Foundation Block was created by the municipal architecture department (*gradski gradjevni odjel*), incorporating ideas from the competition's award-winning projects⁹⁴⁶. One of the awarded architects was Drago Ibler, whom the Bata company later commissioned to design the skyscraper after it purchased the site. Although the project generally complied with the requirements of the 1930 regulatory plan, Ibler incorporated more from his competition design⁹⁴⁷ (Fig. A.28). This project needed approval from the municipal architecture department, which delayed the decision, partly due to voices calling for a review of the 1930 plan⁹⁴⁸.

However, for the Foundation Block and Ban Jelačić Square, it was not the regulatory complexities that hindered the realization of projects but rather the dilemma between interests, expressed through questions about regulating the plot. In the example of Belgrade Theater Square, a project enters the urban environment after the design phase and faces the challenge of aligning with it, with inconsistent regulations complicating its implementation. In the case of Zagreb's Foundation Block, regulatory issues and particular projects were closely intertwined.

⁹⁴⁴ See more in Olga Maruševski, *Od Manduševca do Trga Republike*, (Zagreb: Društvo povjesničara umjetnosti Hrvatske, 1987).

⁹⁴⁵ See more about the Foundation block in Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok u Zagrebu."

⁹⁴⁶ "Definitivna parcelaciona i regulatorna osnova Jelačićevog trga," *Večer*, 21.1.1930, 3; Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok u Zagrebu," 327.

⁹⁴⁷ "O gradskoj općini ovisi hoće li Bata početi graditi svoju zgradu," *Večer*, 11.3.1939, 7.

⁹⁴⁸ "Je li opravdana borba protiv nebodera na Jelačićevom trgu," *Večer*, 8.4.1939, 7.

This plot became a possible space for various projects due to the relocation of the Foundation Hospital. The old hospital building was planned to be demolished, and the site should be sold to generate funds to cover part of the construction costs for the new hospital complex⁹⁴⁹. From the perspective of the municipality and the public, this was a crucial plot on the central square. Moreover, in the context of a shortage of available land for public buildings in the city center, this prime plot should have been developed for a project serving the public interest. On the other hand, the hospital's representatives (Foundation Board) focused on obtaining the maximum sum from the land sale. There were three mutually exclusive possible development options for the plot: a single building, a complex of buildings for one investor, or separate buildings for different investors.

Initially, the idea of a single building on the plot was considered for the municipality, as discussed in Chapter 2, but such a large-scale project did not align with its financial capabilities. There was also consideration for a multifunctional building that, in addition to administrative offices, would serve broader public purposes and generate revenue by renting commercial and residential spaces. For example, at the 1929 competition for the block's regulation, two projects proposed a single building instead of parceling the block created by Juraj Neidhardt and Ernest Weissmann⁹⁵⁰ (Fig. A.3, Fig. 30). Weissmann presented his project as being in the public interest for the city as the landowner⁹⁵¹. Tamara Bjažić Klarin pointed out that his project did not win an award because it was "theoretically very interesting but practically unfeasible"⁹⁵².

⁹⁴⁹ See more in Bjažić Klarin, "Medjunarodni natječaj za Zakladnu bolnicu," 282-295.

⁹⁵⁰ Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok u Zagrebu," 326.

⁹⁵¹ Ernest Weissmann, "Izgradjivanje modernog grada. Veliki gradovi budućnosti - povodom izgradnje Jelačićevog trga," *Jutarnji List*, 27.1.1930, 3.

⁹⁵² Bjažić Klarin, *Ernest Weissmann*, 70.



Figure 30. Competition project for the Foundation Block in Zagreb, Ernest Weissmann, 1930. Source: "Futurističke osnove," *Svijet* 4, knj. 9 (1930): 88.

The awards in the competition were given to projects that generally followed the program⁹⁵³ and, thus, the scheme developed by the municipality. Based on the competition entries, the Municipal Construction Department elaborated a parceling plan, which, after some modifications, was approved⁹⁵⁴. This plan did not exclude the option of developing the block in the public interest. A more realistic alternative than a single building financed by the municipality was a multifunctional building (or a complex of buildings) implemented by a single investor (with the involvement of foreign capital). The scheme proposed that the city gradually purchase the building and the plot through a public-private partnership. There were three such proposals at the first auction for the plot sale.

One of them was excluded from serious consideration. It was the proposal of Stevan Savić, an architect-entrepreneur from the USA. His design envisioned constructing a single massive building⁹⁵⁵ (Fig. 4), disregarding the approved regulations. Despite the striking image of the future building published in *Politika*, the proposal lacked detailed elaboration, and the loan for its realization required a "full guarantee from the municipality"⁹⁵⁶. The firm "Carnelutti brothers" proposed a project (Fig. 31), elaborated by themselves, with financing

⁹⁵³ Drago Ibler, Milovan Kovačević, Zdenko Strižić, and the team Dionis Sunko and Rudolf Jungmann got awards. The jury included the mayor Stjepan Srkulj, the former mayor Vjekoslav Heinzel, and architects and engineers: Juraj Denzler, Pavao Deutsch, Aleksander Freudenreich, Mate Jurković, Martin Pilar, August Pisačić, Edo Šen.

⁹⁵⁴ See more Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok u Zagrebu," 323-335.

⁹⁵⁵ "Izgradnja prostora Zakladne bolnice na Jelačićevom trgu," *Novosti*, 4.3.1931, 3.

⁹⁵⁶ "Zagrebački opštinski dom na dvadeset spratova," *Politika*, 17.5.1931, 5. "Gradsko zastupstvo odlučuje o izgradnji bloka Zakladne bolnice," *Novosti*, 29.5.1931, 6.

offered by a Belgian-Swiss consortium⁹⁵⁷. The third project was presented by Dušan Plavšić, who represented German-American capital with a design by Josip Pičman and Josip Seissel⁹⁵⁸. During the municipal discussions, journalists anticipated that Dušan Plavšić's plan would be accepted⁹⁵⁹. However, a new auction for the sale of the plots was announced, as the municipality felt it had not received sufficient guarantees that these projects could actually be realized⁹⁶⁰.




Figure 31. The project for the Foundation block in Zagreb, Cernelutti, 1931.
Source: "Neboder usred Zagreba," *Novosti*, 21.5.1931, 4.

During the debates over the Foundation Block, the option of partially selling it to private individuals raised concerns that "urban planning and aesthetic aspects would be neglected in favor of profit"⁹⁶¹. Despite criticism from an urban planning perspective, the plot was sold to different investors to construct separate buildings⁹⁶². However, the external appearance of these buildings had to adhere to the municipality's plan, which at least allowed

⁹⁵⁷ "Neboder usred Zagreba," *Novosti*, 21.5.1931, 4.

⁹⁵⁸ Bjažić Klarin, "Zakladni blok u Zagrebu," 330.

⁹⁵⁹ "Gradsko zastupstvo odlučuje o izgradnji bloka Zakladne bolnice," *Novosti*, 29.5.1931, 6.

⁹⁶⁰ "Uprava Zakladne bolnice poništila dražbu o prodaji gradilišta," *Novosti*, 31.5.1931, 6.

⁹⁶¹ "Zagreb raste, Zagreb se širi," *Večer*, 4.4.1931, 5.

⁹⁶² Edo Šen, "O regulaciji Jelačićevog trga," *Novosti*, 11.2.1931, 4. Stjepan Planić, "Grad i društvo. Dva predavanja Ing. Vlade Antolića u Pučkom sveučilištu," *Književnik* 4 (1933): 167.

for a cohesive visual effect across the entire complex⁹⁶³. Two buildings were constructed on the side of the block facing the square, but the central skyscraper remained unrealized.

Thus, the block was predominantly developed with residential buildings. The hospital profited from the sale of the land, and the investors gained profit from the construction. Eventually, public interests were left unfulfilled, including the planned municipal building or multifunctional projects with a concert hall, cinemas, and other public facilities.

Thus, not only were private investors unable to implement their projects due to conflicts with public interests, which urban regulations sought to protect in the city's space, as in the case of buildings on Theater Square in Belgrade, but public projects also remained unrealized, giving in to particular interests in a dilemma situation. In the case of the Foundation Block, municipal requests were pushed to the background because this private commercial development, through the sale of the land, still contributed to the broader public interest – the construction of the new Foundation Hospital. Nevertheless, there were also situations where the municipality abandoned public projects, ceding plots to private investors, yet still acting in favor of the public interest.

For example, in Zagreb in the early 1920s, a new square, *Trg N* (now *Trg žrtava fašizma*), was planned on the former fairground site. Unlike attempts to regulate squares within densely built-up areas, in this case, the regulations were easier, and by the late 1920s, most of the square's perimeter had been developed with private buildings. The southern part of the square, designated by regulations for public projects, including a proposed city museum, remained undeveloped⁹⁶⁴. In 1929, the municipality decided to lift its reservation and sell the plots, with the condition that construction must begin soon⁹⁶⁵. In this way, the city

⁹⁶³ This, in turn, provoked criticism from an architectural standpoint as "the forced construction 'from the outside in.'" Slavko Löwy, "Novogradnje na Zakladnom bloku u Zagrebu," *Arhitektura* 3-4 (1933): 49.

⁹⁶⁴ "Jaka gradjevna djelatnost u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 3.6.1928, 16.

⁹⁶⁵ "Veliki interes za gradilišta gradske općine na trgu „N“,," *Jutarnji List*, 30.5.1929, 27.

authorities sought to fill gaps in the urban landscape and stimulate construction activity for its economic benefits (an aspect that would become even more significant as the effects of the 1929 financial crisis were felt).

Nevertheless, implementing public projects could also be complicated by direct conflicts with private interests, particularly when dealing with privately owned land. On the one hand, regulatory plans could designate public projects only on plots already owned by the municipality or the state. On the other hand, regulations aimed to create representative central spaces with monumental public buildings, meaning some public projects were planned for privately owned plots. The cost of such plots and negotiations with owners could complicate the realization of public projects, as seen in the case of the Stock Exchange and City Hall projects in Belgrade on the kafana "Albania" site.

Apart from the challenges of aligning projects with regulations and city authorities, decision-making for private construction was simpler, requiring fewer approvals than public projects. As a result, both cities were actively developed by private investors, leaving less and less space for public projects. As Branislav Nušić noted in 1933, "We have not preserved large spaces for large public buildings in our capital"⁹⁶⁶. Moreover, in Belgrade, municipal policy was criticized for responding to private demands while neglecting the bigger picture and the public good⁹⁶⁷.

In the 1920s, a general sense of optimism prevailed, construction activity increased, and many public projects were considered resolved. Plans for numerous buildings were frequently mentioned in the press, though many remained ephemeral, as decisions on where and how to build were delayed. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, both Zagreb and Belgrade faced a situation where certain plots had been reserved for public use, including plots owned

⁹⁶⁶ Branislav Nušić, "Pitanja oko ulepšavanja naše prestonice," *Beogradske Opštinske Novine* 1-4 (1933): 248.

⁹⁶⁷ Milica Krstić, "Uredjenje Beograda," *Ženski pokret*, 1.5.1926, 163.

by municipalities, the state, or privately owned with a building ban, creating gaps in the urban landscape. During this period, authorities started to lift these reservations and allowed construction based on both urban planning arguments and needs for economic stimulation. However, by the late 1930s, when a new wave of optimism regarding public projects arose, it became clear that suitable plots were scarce, and the issue of land availability emerged as a major obstacle to implementation.

4.2. Land Tenure and Land Use Dilemmas

Placing public projects on privately owned plots complicated the implementation of both public and private developments. On one hand, the land was considered reserved, and owners were prohibited from building on it, although the ban was not always respected. On the other hand, the state or municipality had to purchase such plots, but their prices were not strictly regulated. As a result, centrally located plots could become prohibitively expensive, making the construction of public buildings on them financially unfeasible.

Not only did attempts to place public projects on privately owned plots complicate construction, but even the allocation of public buildings on municipal or state-owned land was not without issues, especially in Belgrade. The first issue was contested land ownership, for example, in the City Hall in Belgrade case discussed in Chapter 2, where the municipality mistakenly considered a private plot as its own. The second issue was the state treatment of municipal plots in Belgrade because the state authorities often occupied them for their use without making the necessary payments, creating conflict between the state and municipality⁹⁶⁸.

The main problem was the shortage of such plots, leading to dilemmas where multiple construction projects competed for the same sites. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2,

⁹⁶⁸ Vuksanović Macura, "Generalni plan Beograda 1923," 77.

dilemmas could arise when projects were planned on already developed plots or when the alternative was leaving the land undeveloped (for creating parks, for instance). In most cases, land use dilemmas played a role during the early decision-making stages of a project and rarely became an obstacle to the implementation of already selected projects, though such cases did occur.

For example, the first project for the National Museum in Zagreb encountered a land use dilemma due to the existing building on the site. In 1930, Josip Šilović, the Ban of Sava Banovina, proposed a building for the museum complex on Strossmayer Square dedicated to King Alexander, and the project was commissioned to Edo Šen⁹⁶⁹. However, its realization hinged on resolving the issue of the Chemical Institute building, which was university-owned⁹⁷⁰. Therefore, the project required a new building to be constructed for the institute, the institute to be relocated, the plot with the building to be purchased, and the existing building to be demolished⁹⁷¹. It made the museum project more expensive and its completion longer. In the mid-1930s, this project still seemed viable, and plans were even made to demolish the old Art Pavilion building, where a triumphal arch in honor of King Alexander was to be erected⁹⁷². Moreover, due to the difficulties in acquiring the land, the project was eventually abandoned, and the municipality offered a site outside the city center for the museum complex.

Thus, when a project's realization required a change of ownership, it complicated the process. Similarly, when the plot selection involved lengthy negotiations between the interests of all parties or presented a dilemma, it also caused delays. A journalist from *Jutarnji List*, commenting on the disputes over a suitable location for the Emigration Commissariat, noted

⁹⁶⁹ "Na Strossmayerovom trgu imao bi se izgraditi muzej Kralja Aleksandra," *Jutarnji List*, 7.10.1930, 4.

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁷¹ "Pred akcijom za izgradnju reprezentativne palače Etnografskog muzeja," *Jutarnji List*, 13.10.1931, 7.

⁹⁷² "Na jesen će se pristupiti široj akciji za izgradnju palače muzeja," *Jutarnji List*, 19.6.1935, 8.

that "it is always better to build where it is possible, rather than only wanting to build where one would like"⁹⁷³. However, attempting to resolve the land issue by taking the path of least resistance could also lead to difficulties if the plot, either owned or agreed upon, turned out to be unsuitable.

For example, the Jewish Community in Zagreb took the path of least resistance in addressing the land issue by planning to build a Jewish hospital on its plot⁹⁷⁴. Initial expectations were optimistic: three-quarters of the necessary funds had been raised besides already owning the land⁹⁷⁵, and the international competition attracted many participants (225)⁹⁷⁶. The first prize was not awarded; the second prizes went to Thoma Heinz from Düsseldorf and the team Josef Neufeld and Sigmund Ochs from Berlin (Fig. 32). The third prize was awarded to the team Stjepan Gomboš and Mladen Kauzlarić from Zagreb, while the reduced third prize went to Ernest Weissmann from Zagreb (Fig. 33).




Figure 32. The second-prize competition projects for the Jewish hospital in Zagreb: Thoma Heinz; Josef Neufeld and Sigmund Ochs, 1931.

Source: "Završen natječaj idejnih skica za zgradu Židovske bolnice u Zagrebu," *Židov*, 27.3.1931, 7; "Nagradjeni nacrt "Rfua" za židovsku bolnicu u Zagrebu," *Židov*, 17.4.1931, 7.

⁹⁷³ "Pitanje gradnje Iseljeničkog doma u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 11.11.1929, 9.

⁹⁷⁴ "Gradnja moderne židovske bolnice," *Večer*, 1.2.1930, 7.

⁹⁷⁵ "Izgradnja židovske bolnice u Zagrebu," *Židov*, 6.6.1930, 8.

⁹⁷⁶ "Osnove Židovske bolnice. Dvije Zagrebačke nagrade među 225 ocjenjenih radova," *Večer*, 21.3.1931, 3; "Izložba u Zagrebačkom Zboru idejnih skica za Židovsku bolnicu," *Novosti*, 26.3.1931; "Završen natječaj idejnih skica za zgradu Židovske bolnice u Zagrebu," *Židov*, 27.3.1931, 7. Five of the seven members were architects and engineers: Hugo Ehrlich, Franjo Gabrić, Stjepan Hribar, Iso Menzer, and Carl Mohr, who was from Berlin.



Figure 33. The third-prize competition projects for the Jewish hospital in Zagreb: Stjepan Gomboš and Mladen Kauzlarić; Ernest Weissmann, 1931.

Source: "Završen natječaj idejnih skica za zgradu Židovske bolnice u Zagrebu," *Židov*, 27.3.1931, 7.

After the competition, the construction committee concluded that the location was too small and unsuitable. This approach was criticized in the publication *"Problems of Contemporary Architecture"* for wasting the efforts of architects, as a competition on a more suitable plot would have provided better results⁹⁷⁷. Representatives of the Jewish Community approached the municipality to request a free plot at *Rebro*⁹⁷⁸, but after prolonged negotiations, they abandoned the idea and purchased a plot on Ksaverska Road (*Ksaverska Cesta*)⁹⁷⁹. Although the financial aspect was once again considered resolved, the opportunity to begin construction was missed. According to Zrinka Barišić Marenčić, the issue of building the hospital lost importance as the focus of the Jewish Community shifted to providing aid to refugees from Germany⁹⁸⁰.

In general, several options were possible when a competition had already been held but problems with the land were discovered afterward. The first option was to transfer the competition project to a new location, where it could be implemented with minimal changes, with significant changes, or not implemented at all. In this scenario, either the project was realized, or factors beyond the location issue played a role in its non-implementation. The

⁹⁷⁷ "Problem izgradnje židovske bolnice u Zagrebu," u *Problemi savremene arhitekture*, ur. Stjepan Planić (Zagreb: Jugoslovenska štampa, 1932), 37.

⁹⁷⁸ "Oko gradnje židovske bolnice," *Židov*, 8.5.1931, 6.

⁹⁷⁹ "Nova židovska bolnica," *Večer*, 8.2.1933, 1.

⁹⁸⁰ Barišić Marenčić, "Arhitektica Zoja Dumengjić," 190.

second option was to select a new project for a new location, either through holding another competition or, in some cases, the change of location was accompanied by a change in the selection mechanism. Thus, the problems with location could ultimately prevent the selected project from being realized.

For example, the selected project was abandoned due to a location change in the case of the War Invalids Home (*Dom Ratnih Invalida*) in Belgrade. In 1928, the War Invalids Association organized a competition for a site granted by the municipality near *Mali Kalemegdan*⁹⁸¹. The first prize was not awarded, but Milan Sekulić won the second prize (Fig. A.29), and the team of Milan Zloković and Andrej Papkov took third⁹⁸². Presumably, Sekulić's project was selected for implementation, and a foundation stone was laid⁹⁸³. However, construction stalled due to a lack of funds, and discussions about it resumed only in 1932 after additional funding was secured⁹⁸⁴.

There was a significant shift in the project concept. In the optimistic building climate of the 1920s, when it seemed that all sorts of projects could be realized, the project implied the monumental War Invalids Home, which would include not only a shelter but also a hospital and a museum⁹⁸⁵. By the 1930s, not only was the construction budget reduced due to the effects of the economic crisis, but the association also took a more practical approach to the project, considering the need to create rentable spaces. This conceptual change played a key role in the relocation: while the first site near the fortress was suitable for a representative monument-like building (since it was close to Belgrade fortress and to the planned complex of

⁹⁸¹ "Natečaj. Dom Invalida na Malom Kalemegdanu," *Vreme*, 7.6.1928, 10.

⁹⁸² "Pred zidanjem invalidskog doma," *Politika*, 19.9.1928, 10.

⁹⁸³ "Osvećenje kamena temeljca Invalidskog doma," *Vreme*, 8.10.1928, 5.

⁹⁸⁴ "Podizanje Doma ratnih invalida," *Vreme*, 18.8.1932, 7.

⁹⁸⁵ "Dom ratnih invalida," *Pravda*, 16.6.1923, 3.

four museums and the Pantheon), it was no longer suitable for the financially viable building because of the distance from the center⁹⁸⁶.

The choice of a new site was not easy: in the summer of 1932, a location near the railway station was discussed; at the end of 1932, a site at the corner of Kralja Aleksandra Boulevard and Beogradska Street was proposed, and finally, in 1933 a plot near the railway station was finally chosen⁹⁸⁷. For the site on the boulevard, the War Invalids Association had even commissioned a project, which was published in *Politika* and was likely designed by Dragutin Maslac, as he was a member of the construction committee⁹⁸⁸ (Fig. A.29). However, a new competition was held for the location near the railway station: the first prize was not awarded⁹⁸⁹, and the purchased project by Dimitrije M. Leko was selected for implementation⁹⁹⁰.

Nevertheless, changing the location did not always resolve a project's issues, and in some cases, the results of competitions held for different locations remained unrealized. In such cases, the challenges went beyond land-related problems. For example, in the case of the two competitions for the State Monopolies Administration building, the first one was held in 1936/1937 for a location in Financial Park for the State Monopolies Administration, the Government, and the cadastre department (discussed in Chapter 3)⁹⁹¹. On the one hand, due to coordination issues after the first competition, which did not help in choosing a project for

⁹⁸⁶ "Podizanje Doma ratnih invalida," *Vreme*, 18.8.1932, 7.

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid., "Dom ratnih invalida biće podignut na starome trkalištu," *Vreme*, 8.11.1932, 5, "Gradjenje Invalidskog doma," *Pravda*, 26.8.1933, 7.

⁹⁸⁸ "Podizanje doma ratnih invalida," *Politika*, 19.10.1932, 10, "Dom ratnih invalida biće podignut na starome trkalištu," *Vreme*, 8.11.1932, 5.

⁹⁸⁹ Two second prizes were given: one to Petar Gačić from Belgrade and the other to a team consisting of Velimir Janicki, Rudolf Kunst, and Stjepan Jinter from Zagreb. Two third prizes were also awarded to Andrej Papkov and Velimir Gavrilović from Belgrade, and to Marijan Haberle and Vljeko Janić from Zagreb. "Gradjenje Invalidskog doma," *Pravda*, 26.8.1933, 7. The jury included three architects (Petar Popović, Dragutin Maslac, Dragiša Brašovan) and two representatives of the War Invalids Association.

⁹⁹⁰ See more about this project in Sanja Kiproski, "Zgrada Doma ratnih invalida (1933-1935) u Beogradu: ostvarenje arhitekta Dimitrija M. Leka," *Zbornik Muzeja primenjene umetnosti* 18 (2022): 51-62.

⁹⁹¹ "Zgrada Uprave monopola u kojoj će biti smešteno i Pretsedništvo Vlade biće najveća i najreprezentativnija u zemlji," *Vreme*, 13.4.1937, 12.

elaboration, its second stage between awarded and purchased project was organized, but only for the State Monopolies Administration and the cadastre department, without the Government building⁹⁹².

Moreover, in 1938, part of the complex was allocated to the new Ministry of Construction building. Thus, the State Monopolies Administration had to look for a new plot⁹⁹³. The National Bank sold its plot on Kralja Petra Street, where previously demolished a building from 1841⁹⁹⁴. Thus, the administration held a new competition for the new location⁹⁹⁵. The main issue for the second attempt was no longer land-related but rather the unexpected rise in the cost of building materials, which delayed the project⁹⁹⁶.

Furthermore, the issue for project realization might not have been the plot itself but the conditions under which it was acquired. In both cities, various organizations and institutions sought plots from municipalities, often for free or at a reduced price. Moreover, in some cases, a city was willing to provide the land, but only for temporary use. It, for instance, became an obstacle to constructing the first version of the Art Pavilion in Zagreb.

The Croatian Society of Arts "Strossmayer" asked the municipality to give a free plot for the new Art Pavilion, and the municipality decided to lease a plot on Mažuranić Square for 20 years⁹⁹⁷. This decision had its opponents, as the plot was theoretically reserved for future university buildings⁹⁹⁸ (dilemmas surrounding this plot were discussed in Chapter 2). To secure the plot, the society had to present a preliminary idea of what the building would

⁹⁹² Mihajlov, *Rajko M. Tatić*, 93.

⁹⁹³ "Oglas. Uprava državnih monopola otkupiće za svoju palatu kompleks zemljišta," *Politika*, 10.3.1938, 25.

⁹⁹⁴ "Ruši se prvi beogradski hotel," *Vreme*, 18.3.1938, 7.

⁹⁹⁵ "Rezultat konkursa za izradu idejne skice za novu zgradu Uprave državnih monopola," *Vreme*, 30.11.1939, 15.

⁹⁹⁶ "Zbog skoka cena građevinskog materijala i radne snage odloženo je zidanje palate Uprave državnih monopola," *Vreme*, 3.7.1940, 7.

⁹⁹⁷ "Novi umjetnički paviljon," *Novosti*, 10.5.1930, 6, "Besplatno odstupanje zemljišta Zagrebačkom zboru, novi umjetnički paviljon," *Novosti*, 4.7.1930, 5.

⁹⁹⁸ "Umjetnički paviljon u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 24.12.1930, 7.

look like, and they asked architect Drago Ibler to create a sketch⁹⁹⁹ (Fig. A.30). For the building design, the society organized a mixed competition, inviting four participants, including Ibler¹⁰⁰⁰. Given the conditions of receiving the plot, the competition was organized for a temporary building, and the participants considered this in their designs¹⁰⁰¹. Nevertheless, when making its decision, the jury refused to consider the building as temporary, pointing to the institution's importance and the impracticality of using the plot for other purposes (a park was deemed urbanistically unjustified, and large-scale development would involve demolishing the existing the building of "Hrvatski Sokol" and "Kolo" building)¹⁰⁰². As a result, the jury concluded that none of the projects were suitable for realization¹⁰⁰³.

After the competition, the society negotiated with the municipality to reconsider, at the very least, the term for leasing the plot¹⁰⁰⁴. Despite the competition results, Ibler's project was chosen for implementation, which was characterized as a modern yet representative design featuring large stone columns¹⁰⁰⁵ (Fig. A.30). However, an agreement could not be reached, while the society wanted the plot for 30 years, in 1932 the municipality revoked even the 20-year lease, and the society had to request a new plot¹⁰⁰⁶. The municipality offered a plot at *Ciglana*, but the society rejected it, citing its distance from the city center¹⁰⁰⁷. Additionally, while the society had funds for a temporary building, the funds were not enough for a

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁰ "Pred izgradnjom reprezentativnog umjetničkog doma u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 8.11.1930, 5. Among five jury members, two were architects Ivan Zemljak and Lav Kalda.

¹⁰⁰¹ "Izložba radnja za gradnju novog Umjetničkog doma," *Novosti*, 8.2.1931, 6.

¹⁰⁰² "Umjetnički dom u Zagreb," *Jutarnji List*, 8.2.1931, 8.

¹⁰⁰³ Five projects received equal awards – Alfred Albini and Josip Pičman, Juraj Denzler, Lavoslav Horvat, Mladen Kauzlarić, and Marko Vidaković. "Idejne skice za Umjetnički paviljon," *Jutarnji List*, 5.2.1931, 6.

¹⁰⁰⁴ "Na proljeće se gradi novi umjetnički paviljon," *Jutarnji List*, 13.11.1931, 5.

¹⁰⁰⁵ "Ove godine bit će novi Umjetnički dom pod krovom," *Jutarnji List*, 9.2.1932, 3.

¹⁰⁰⁶ "Novi umjetnički paviljon se ove godine neće graditi," *Jutarnji List*, 2.4.1932, 7.

¹⁰⁰⁷ "Važna sjednica gradskog zastupstva," *Jutarnji List*, 24.6.1932, 7.

permanent one¹⁰⁰⁸. Finally, while the repeated request for the site on Mažuranić Square was denied, the society obtained a plot on Kralja Petra Square instead¹⁰⁰⁹.

With this change of location came a shift in the building concept. Initially, the building was not intended to be monumental but "beautiful in form, modern, and rationally equipped"¹⁰¹⁰. The modernism was abandoned at the new location, and a monumental pavilion in a classical style with large columns was required¹⁰¹¹. Moreover, the Art Pavilion project at this stage was combined with the plan for a monument to King Petar and the idea of regulating the square¹⁰¹². Although a new competition was initially planned¹⁰¹³, the project was commissioned to sculptor Ivan Meštrović, a jury member for the 1931 Art Pavilion competition¹⁰¹⁴.

The plot on Mažuranić Square, around which disputes arose in the 1930s, ultimately remained undeveloped. As in many situations, when multiple projects competed for a plot, dilemmas would arise, and as a result, the plot would stay undeveloped. In Belgrade, there is an example of a dilemma regarding whether to build on a plot, where, paradoxically, both options remained unrealized. For Terazije Terrace, two competing projects clashed: constructing a monumental building between the hotels *Moskva* and *Balkan* or leaving the plot undeveloped to create an observation deck. However, even the second option involved construction, not on the plot itself, but around its edges.

This dilemma had been discussed even before the First World War, when experts proposed either creating an observation deck or constructing a building (such as for

¹⁰⁰⁸ "Novi umjetnički dom imao bi se sagraditi na Ciglanu," *Jutarnji List*, 24.9.1932, 6.

¹⁰⁰⁹ "Traži se zemljište za novi umjetnički paviljon," *Jutarnji List*, 18.11.1932, 6.

¹⁰¹⁰ "Gradnja novog umjetničkog paviljona u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 18.1.1930, 10.

¹⁰¹¹ "Najbolje riješenje za konačno uređenje Trga Kralja Petra," *Jutarnji List*, 4.5.1932, 6. "Novi umjetnički paviljon na Trgu Kralja Petra," *Jutarnji List*, 13.5.1933, 7.

¹⁰¹² "Osnova za gradnju Umjetničkog paviljona," *Svijet*, 12.5.1934, 395.

¹⁰¹³ "Dom kralja Petra," *Novosti*, 30.11.1933, 5.

¹⁰¹⁴ See more about the architecture of the constructed pavilion in Andrija Mutnjaković, "Meštrovićev Dom umjetnosti: građenje, razgrađivanje i obnavljanje," *Art bulletin* 61 (2011): 67-110.

Parliament or City Hall)¹⁰¹⁵. While professionals were busy debating, the owners of the plots began construction, and the entire terrace area was used up. In the early 1920s, the idea of developing a terrace resurfaced. At that time, the owner of the key site, Vračar Cooperative (*Vračarska Zadruga*), planned construction, but the municipality purchased the site to leave it undeveloped for the future terrace¹⁰¹⁶.

The terrace project, with buildings on the sides for administration and entertainment, was included in the 1923 Master Plan, which envisioned the creation of several observation decks with "beautiful panoramas" to adapt the city to its natural location¹⁰¹⁷. Despite criticism of the Terazije Terrace idea, discussed in Chapter 1, the municipality systematically purchased land from private owners and demolished the buildings there. By 1927, discussions had already begun about financing the terrace's creation through a loan or a public-private partnership with a foreign company¹⁰¹⁸. Two preliminary projects were also developed: one larger scale, including buildings for the Municipality and City Administration, and another more modest one, adapted to financial possibilities¹⁰¹⁹. However, given the representative importance of the project, the municipal plans were abandoned in favor of holding a competition. At this stage, there was also the question of limiting the terrace to the upper part, where the plots had already been bought out, or expanding it to Kraljica Natalija Street, which would require additional funds for further buyouts¹⁰²⁰.

Amid debates over whether to create an open terrace with side buildings or combine a monumental building with a terrace behind it, the initial version of the competition gave

¹⁰¹⁵ Zlata Vuksanović-Macura, "Emil Hope i Oto Šental: Malo Poznat Projekat Za Terazijску Terasu," *Nasleđe* 14 (2013): 156.

¹⁰¹⁶ "Terazijska terasa," *Vreme*, 21.12.1922, 2.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Izveštaj o generalnom planu za grad Beograd* (Beograd, 1923), 34.

¹⁰¹⁸ "Beograd kroz godinu dana," *Pravda*, 6.5.1927, 7.

¹⁰¹⁹ "Opštinski dom i Terazijska terasa," *Politika*, 10.12.1927, 6; "Kako će se izgraditi Terasa na Terazijama," *Vreme*, 2.9.1928, 4.

¹⁰²⁰ "Konkurs za Terazijску terasu," *Politika*, 10.2.1929, 8.

participants the freedom to choose either option¹⁰²¹. After Miloš Savčić became mayor, the new municipal administration reissued the competition in September 1929, specifying an open terrace and appointing a different jury¹⁰²². Architect Milutin Borisavljević criticized the new municipality, arguing that the competition should have allowed a free choice between the terrace and a building¹⁰²³. According to the competition's guidelines, the buildings framing the terraces were required to be "in a monumental and clear architectural style," which the participants could freely choose¹⁰²⁴. Nikola Dobrović won the first prize (Fig. A.31), and jury member Branko Popović praised his project in the press as "modern and monumental architecture," noted for its innovative approach and efficient use of space¹⁰²⁵. The project garnered significant media attention, with *Politika* publishing a dedicated article titled "*Terazije Terrace in Concrete, Steel, and Glass*"¹⁰²⁶. While this project had the potential to be a landmark moment in Belgrade's development, it remains one of the city's most famous unrealized projects¹⁰²⁷.

Despite the competition, by 1933, the possibility of building the City Hall on this plot was raised again, with professionals from the municipality supporting the idea¹⁰²⁸. However, just a few months later, the city returned to the concept of an open terrace, though in a reduced size¹⁰²⁹. This compromise solution was also included in the 1939 draft of the Master

¹⁰²¹ "Kako će se izgraditi Terasa na Terazijama," *Vreme*, 2.9.1928, 4. The jury members were to be the chairman of the Municipality Kosta Kumanudi, the director of the Technical Department Vulović, professor Branko Tanazović, Svetozar Pešić, Joca Obradović and a representative of UJIA. "Konkurs za Terazijsku terasu," *Politika*, 10.2.1929, 8.

¹⁰²² "Nagrade za idejnu skicu Terazijske terase," *Politika*, 15.6.1930, 6. The jury members were architects Branko Popović, Djura Bajalović, Georgy Kovalevsky (who was the author of the 1923 Master plan, which included the open terrace), engineers Klementije Bukovac, Ranislav Avramović i Vojislav Zadjina.

¹⁰²³ "Problem Terazijske Terasa," *Pravda*, 4.3.1930, 1.

¹⁰²⁴ "Za uredjenje Terazijske terase," *Vreme*, 26.4.1930, 7.

¹⁰²⁵ The second award got Otho Orlando Kurz from Munich, the third – Mihajlo Hečumović and Gustav Bohutinsky from Prague, and the fourth – Branislav Marinković from Belgrade. Six projects were purchased. Branko Popović, "Kako će izgledati Teraziska terasa " *Politika*, 6.7.1930, 7.

¹⁰²⁶ "Teraziska terasa u betonu, čeliku i staklu," *Politika*, 18.6.1930, 5.

¹⁰²⁷ See more in Grozdana Šišović, "Architectural competitions and the issue of the autonomy of architecture: The case of Terazije Terrace," *Spatium* 35 (2016): 45-53.

¹⁰²⁸ "Kako će biti uredjene Terazije," *Politika*, 15.5.1933, 6.

¹⁰²⁹ "Tri nove izmene generalnog plana Beograda," *Vreme*, 27.10.1933, 9.

Plan. While debates over land use and the inconsistency of municipal decisions slowed down the project's development, the financial issue played a key role in the project's ultimate failure. In 1932, Nikola Dobrović himself published articles about his project, proposing ideas on how to finance it¹⁰³⁰. Nevertheless, considering that various financing schemes were proposed back in 1927 when the project was first discussed, the lack of funding was only part of the problem. There was also uncertainty about the project's necessity and a decline in priority compared to other municipal tasks.

4.3. Financial Dilemmas

A lack of funds is the simplest and most obvious explanation when discussing unrealized projects. However, many projects that initially seem to have faced funding issues reveal that other factors lie behind the financial problems. For instance, in many state-funded projects, funds were often allocated at the budget planning stage, but due to administrative issues, lack of cooperation, or conflicting interests, the funds could not be accessed. In private projects, there were cases where part of the funding was secured, and the remaining amount could theoretically be raised during construction, but due to other complications, their construction never started.

Nevertheless, there are also projects where unresolved financial issues directly hinder implementation. In the case of private projects of this kind, excessive optimism was often observed because the project was selected for implementation without addressing where it could be built or without a clear understanding of financial capabilities, sometimes even with the optimistic assumption that funds would be found after construction started, for example, as the first attempt to build the War Invalids Home in Belgrade, which was discussed earlier.

¹⁰³⁰ Nikola Dobrović, "Terazijska terasa," *Vreme*, 26.2.1932, 2, and 27.2.1932, 2.

A typical example of this optimistic approach is the Croatian Choral House (*Hrvatski Pjevački Dom*) project (Fig. A.32), designed by architect Stjepan Planić at the very beginning of his career in 1927¹⁰³¹. Fundraising efforts were planned to start in 1926¹⁰³², and the project had become more precise by 1927¹⁰³³. Despite the prepared project and secured plot, broader fundraising efforts were still needed two years later¹⁰³⁴. The 1929 financial crisis derailed these efforts¹⁰³⁵, and the project remained unrealized. In this case, the creation of the architectural design can be viewed as an initiative by the architect himself, which, like the projects described in Chapter 1, had very little chance of realization.

Like other limited resources, financial reasons could make competition results irrelevant and lead to repeating competitions for the same building at the same location. For example, in the case of the Officers' House (*Oficirski Dom*) project in Zagreb, the competition was organized in 1927 on the corner of Kralja Aleksandra Square (nowadays Republike Hrvatske Square), hoping to secure funding and get assistance from the Ministry of Army and Navy¹⁰³⁶. The outcome of the competition is unclear, but after the competition, Hugo Ehrlich elaborated a series of designs in different styles, ranging from historicism to modernism¹⁰³⁷. According to discussions in officer circles, some designs were created as cost alternatives to each other. A journalist from the newspaper *Novosti* mentioned that despite having a 6 million dinars design, officers were advocating for a 15 million dinars version, arguing for the

¹⁰³¹ Radović Mahečić i Haničar, *Stjepan Planić 1900.–1980*, 66.

¹⁰³² Nada Bezić, "The Hrvatski pjevački savez [Croatian Choral Union] in its breakthrough decade of 1924–1934 and its relation to the Južnoslovenski pevački savez [South-Slav Choral Union]," in *Kosta P. Manojlović (1890. - 1949.) and the Idea of Slavic and Balkan Cultural Unification*, eds. Vesna Peno, Ivana Vesić, Aleksandar Vasić (Belgrade: Institute of Musicology SASA, 2017), 94.

¹⁰³³ Rudolf Matz, "Hrvatski pjevački dom," *Glazbeni vjesnik* 4 (1927): 39–40.

¹⁰³⁴ "Izgradnja doma Hrvatskog pjevačkog saveza," *Jutarnji List*, 29.11.1929, 3.

¹⁰³⁵ "Zapisnik sjednice središnjeg odbora Hrvatskog Pjevačkog Saveza, održane 15. prosinca 1929," kut. 23, fond 639, Hrvatski Državni Arhiv.

¹⁰³⁶ The Officers' House was planned for the same location even before World War I, "Nova i monumentalna gradjevina u Zagrebu. Pred gradnjom nove palače oficirskog doma," *Jutarnji List*, 15.3.1927, 6.

¹⁰³⁷ See more in Domljan, *Hugo Ehrlich*, 175–179.

necessity of a representative and monumental building¹⁰³⁸. However, construction was delayed due to financial problems.

By 1931, it seemed that the financial issues had been resolved, and the project could move forward¹⁰³⁹. Yet, while headlines in 1931 declared the construction as a "done deal," two years later, the project was described as having only "good prospects," with the process being described as "Sisyphean labor"¹⁰⁴⁰. It was also framed in terms of Zagreb's deprivation compared to other cities, as Belgrade already had two officers' houses¹⁰⁴¹. According to Žarko Domljan, after Hugo Ehrlich died in 1936, his colleague Juraj Meniga continued the negotiations for the project¹⁰⁴². However, in 1937, a new competition was organized for the Officers' House on the same site. According to Nataša Jakšić, the first prize went to Juraj Denzler, who also developed a design that remained unrealized¹⁰⁴³.

This example can be viewed not only in the context of financial shortages but also as a case of a lack of cooperation and mutual understanding. Each time, the officers' association made new attempts, influenced by new promises from authorities, but each time, these promises turned out to be fleeting.

While competitions were repeated from time to time due to the complexity of allocating land and financial resources, there is an example in Belgrade where a competition for the same building was held three times, and in this case, land and financial issues were closely intertwined. It was the building for UJIA's Belgrade Section, which, in 1921, purchased a plot with an existing building and intended to rent out part of the premises¹⁰⁴⁴. In

¹⁰³⁸ "Osnova da se u Zagrebu podigne oficirski dom," *Novosti*, 1.11.1929, 4.

¹⁰³⁹ Enes, "Gradnja oficirskog doma - gotova stvar," *Novosti*, 30.12.1931, 3-4.

¹⁰⁴⁰ "Oficirski dom u zgradi Novinarskog doma," *Novosti*, 17.3.1933.

¹⁰⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴² Domljan, *Hugo Ehrlich*, 176.

¹⁰⁴³ Jakšić, "Arhitektonski opus Jurja Denzlara," 111.

¹⁰⁴⁴ "Dom inženjera i arhitekta u Beogradu," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata*, 20-21 (1921), 247. Technical documentation III-65-1921, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijiski arhiv Beograda.

1923, the section held a competition for a new building¹⁰⁴⁵, and it was planned to create a project based on the awarded and purchased projects, but this process faced challenges with approvals within the section¹⁰⁴⁶. Additionally, there was internal disagreement over whether to construct a new representative building or renovate the existing one¹⁰⁴⁷.

Nevertheless, the main issue was the lack of funds, so UJIA's Belgrade Section decided to buy a different, cheaper plot and sell or mortgage the existing one to secure part of the construction funds¹⁰⁴⁸. A plot at a low price was obtained from the municipality in 1930 at the corner of Tetovska (now Milovana Milovanovića) and Bosanska (now Gavril Principa) streets¹⁰⁴⁹. A competition was held for the new location, but no prizes were awarded, and all eight sketches were purchased¹⁰⁵⁰. In 1931, the final design for the building was created by Svetozar Genić, who was the deputy member of the jury, and Rajko Tatić, who was among participants¹⁰⁵¹ (Fig. 34).

¹⁰⁴⁵ "Sekcija Beograd Udruženja Jugoslovenskih Inženjera i Arhitekata raspisuje stečaj za izradu skica za svoj novi dom," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata*, 3 (1923), 20. No first prize was awarded, but second and third prizes were given. "Gradnja doma UJIA u Beogradu," *Tehnički List Udruženja Jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata* 10-11 (1923), 78-79.

¹⁰⁴⁶ "Izveštaj Uprave Doma Sekcije Beograd UJIA o radu i stanju Doma za 1923. godinu," *Tehnički List* 6 (1924), 81.

¹⁰⁴⁷ "Zapisnik vanredne skupštine Udruženja jugoslavenskih inženjera i arhitekata – Sekcije Beograd održane 26. juna 1930. godine, u Beogradu," *Tehnički List* 17 (1930), 243.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁹ The municipality sold the plot for 500 dinars per square meter, with the condition that construction must begin within a year after half of the plot's cost was paid and ownership was transferred to UJIA's Belgrade section. "Zapisnik VII - Druge redovne sednice odbora Opštine Beogradske," *Opštinske novine* 9-10 (1930), 525.

¹⁰⁵⁰ "Stečaj za izradu idejnih skica za novi dom sekcije Beograd UJIA," *Vreme*, 12.7.1930, 10. "Ni jedna skica za dom UJIA nije dobila prvu nagradu," *Vreme*, 22.2.1931, 9.

¹⁰⁵¹ "Beogradski inženjeri i arhitekti podižu svoj Dom," *Politika*, 26.5.1931, 7. Technical documentation XXXIL-22-1931, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijiski arhiv Beograda.




Figure 34. The project for the UJIA building in Belgrade, Svetozar Genić and Rajko Tatić, 1931.

Source: "Beogradski inženjeri i arhitekti podižu svoj Dom," *Politika*, 26.5.1931, 7.

Moreover, to proceed with construction, the committee needed to mortgage both plots, which required approval from the section assembly, which was delayed¹⁰⁵². The land issue was the main reason for abandoning this project, which the city authorities had already approved. The Railway Directorate also claimed the plot for its building, as the location was near the railway station¹⁰⁵³. As a result, the site was sold, and UJIA's Belgrade Section decided to build on its original plot. In 1933, the third competition was held, and the building was finally realized¹⁰⁵⁴.

In the case of buildings for societies and associations, the financial issue was primarily about aligning desires with capabilities and managing expectations versus reality. It was especially relevant for projects from the 1920s when many organizations considered building their premises with optimistic expectations: they even got free or cheap plots from municipalities. Nevertheless, these ideas remained unrealized due to the inability to secure the necessary funds. In contrast, for public projects funded by municipal or state budgets,

¹⁰⁵² "Skupština beogradske sekcije Inženjerskog udruženja," *Politika*, 22.10.1931, 10.

¹⁰⁵³ "Zapisnik XIII. Redovne godišnje skupštine Sekcije Beograd UJIA," *Tehnički List* 12 (1932), 166. A sale at the price of 1500 dinars was considered (it is claimed that this was the price at which the plot was purchased from the municipality, but there is a mention of 500, which could be a typo).

¹⁰⁵⁴ See more in Ignjatović, "Dom udruženja jugoslovenskih inženjera i arhitekata," 87-118.

financial problems take on the nature of a dilemma, as they involve the distribution of a limited resource.

The most challenging situation in funding construction projects arose in education and culture. First, buildings are essential for the functioning of this sector: schools, universities, theaters, and museums rely on spaces. Second, these projects carry significant symbolic value and attract public attention. However, their practical value (except for schools) was often perceived as lower, which affected the allocation of budgetary funds.

At first glance, budgetary funding also appears to be a matter of aligning desires with capabilities, as seen in the case of another attempt to build the National Museum in Zagreb. Unlike the first project, the second one was planned at an empty site on Varaždin Road, which was donated by the municipality, but again with the involvement of the Ban of the Sava Banovina (at this period, it was Viktor Ružić)¹⁰⁵⁵. In March 1938, news emerged about plans to build a "House of Culture," which would include the Archaeological Museum, the Museum of Arts and Crafts, and the Modern Gallery, with a budget of 16 million dinars described as already secured in the Sava Banovina's budget¹⁰⁵⁶.

Just a month later, a more ambitious project was described in *Jutarnji List*: along with the institutions mentioned, the complex was also to house the Natural History Museum and the Ethnographic Museum, with the total cost growing to 100 million dinars¹⁰⁵⁷. The project was to be carried out in phases, and a competition was planned¹⁰⁵⁸. The criticism arose over the site being on the periphery, while significant and expensive projects were expected to be built in the city center¹⁰⁵⁹. Moreover, the project was financially unrealistic. Although the

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Reprezentativna muzealna palača „Dom kulture“ gradit će se na Varaždinskoj cesti," *Jutarnji List*, 10.3.1938, 10.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ibid. Perhaps a preliminary design for this building was created by Egon Steinmann. "Ako Zagreb ne dobije novu muzejsku zgradu propast će najvrijednije hrvatske zbirke," *Jutarnji List*, 14.11.1940, 13.

¹⁰⁵⁷ "U najskorije će vrijeme biti raspisan idejni natječaj za skice narodnog muzeja," *Jutarnji List*, 16.4.1938, 11.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ivan Peršić, "Spada li muzealna palača od 100 milijuna na Varaždinsku cestu?" *Jutarnji List*, 10.8.1938, 11.

Ministry of Education acknowledged the need for the construction, and the Ministry of Finance approved a loan of 12 million dinars, receiving these funds proved difficult¹⁰⁶⁰. Due to financial problems and coordination challenges, a separate building was planned for the Archaeological-Historical National Museum¹⁰⁶¹. The newspaper article about the plan was illustrated by a monumental classical-style project created by Lovro Celio-Cega¹⁰⁶² (Fig. 35), which probably resulted from the competition, but the project never moved forward.




Figure 35. The museum building project in Zagreb, Lovro Celio-Cega, 1940.

Source: "Ako Zagreb ne dobije novu muzejsku zgradu propast će najvrijednije hrvatske zbirke," *Jutarnji List*, 14.11.1940, 13.

Similar challenges were observed with the construction of museum buildings in Belgrade. According to the 1923 Master Plan, four museums were planned for the Belgrade Fortress area: Historical, Military, National, and Ethnographic, and two museums on the new square, the Natural History and Hygiene ones¹⁰⁶³. However, these projects never progressed beyond the planning stage. Despite complaints about the lack of museum space¹⁰⁶⁴, their construction was not considered a priority. Although both cities faced similar issues with

¹⁰⁶⁰ "Ako Zagreb ne dobije novu muzejsku zgradu propast će najvrijednije hrvatske zbirke," *Jutarnji List*, 14.11.1940, 13.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶² Lovro Celio-Cega graduated from the Technical Faculty in Zagreb in 1937, where he later worked as an assistant to Juraj Denzler. In 1940, he started to work in the City Planning Department.

¹⁰⁶³ The corner of Palmotićeva, Hilandarska, Dalmatinska, and Vidinska streets. Jovan Obradović, Generalni regulacioni plan za grad Beograd, 1924, Digital National Library of Serbia

¹⁰⁶⁴ "Beograd jedini grad bez prave muzejske zgrade," *Politika*, 6.11.1932, 8.

implementing educational and cultural construction projects, the situation appeared different from Zagreb's perspective.

For example, in a publication about the opening of the mosque in 1943 in the NDH, the failure of previous attempts to build a mosque was presented as part of a broader deprivation of Croatian interests¹⁰⁶⁵, with the narrative even exaggerating to say that "in Zagreb, almost no public building was erected for two whole decades; Zagreb was a tax target but had no share in significant investments from the state budget"¹⁰⁶⁶.

Although this is an exaggeration, the construction of public buildings financed from the state budget during the interwar period was perceived as insufficient¹⁰⁶⁷. This situation was viewed as financial deprivation for Zagreb: comparing how much Zagreb paid in taxes versus how much it received in funding from the budget was a constant topic of discussion¹⁰⁶⁸. Constant comparisons with Belgrade regarding the distribution of funds in education, culture, and other areas were frequent in Zagreb newspapers, often expressed in headlines like "Everything for Belgrade, nothing for Zagreb"¹⁰⁶⁹. This sentiment was not limited to state-funded projects but also appeared in discussions about the Officers' House.

Between 1920 and 1932, when Vjekoslav Heinzl and Stjepan Srkulj were mayors, their main strategy for securing state funding for Zagreb projects was to travel to Belgrade for meetings with the relevant ministries. These trips repeatedly generated optimism, as Zagreb's needs seemed to be understood, and support was verbally promised¹⁰⁷⁰. Nevertheless, in reality, the desired outcomes never materialized. For some projects, competitions were

¹⁰⁶⁵ Muftić, "U ime Boga obćega Dobročinitelja Milostivog," 5.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Jurkić, "Misao kroz prošlost," 43.

¹⁰⁶⁷ "Jaka gradjevna djelatnost u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 3.6.1928, 16.

¹⁰⁶⁸ "Bez izlučenja Zagreba iz oblasti nema napretka grada," *Jutarnji List*, 15.3.1928, 13.

¹⁰⁶⁹ "Zagrebačka oblast mora biti prva prosvjetna oblast u državi," *Jutarnji List*, 31.3.1927, 3. "Beogradu sve - Zagrebu ništa," *Jutarnji List*, 31.12.1927, 1.

¹⁰⁷⁰ "Kiša beogradskih obećanja," *Jutarnji List*, 27.11.1927; "Vlada i potrebe Zagreba," *Jutarnji List*, 6.1.1929, 1.

organized in the hope of this "rain of Belgrade promises," but after the competitions, the state did not participate in project implementation.

Some examples show that the realization of educational and cultural projects in Zagreb was influenced more by competition for funding between local projects rather than competition with Belgrade, as seen in the attempts to build the Ethnographic Museum in Zagreb. Despite all the discussions about the lack of space in the rented museum building and the need for a new building¹⁰⁷¹, the issue of financial allocation led to the abandonment of the idea of constructing a new building. In 1937, there was news that the initial funds for the building had been approved in the budget as a loan, and the museum approached the municipality for a free plot of land¹⁰⁷². Later, the museum was forced to give up part of the loan in favor of Zagreb University. Thereby, the construction of a new building became impossible, and instead, the idea of purchasing an existing one was considered¹⁰⁷³. Even this did not happen, as the common situation arose where funds were allocated, but their receiving was delayed due to administrative formalities¹⁰⁷⁴.

For many projects, it was mentioned that funds were secured, but construction did not proceed, as obtaining the funds often depended on coordination between government bodies.

4.4. Coordinational Tasks

In addition to the issues with securing the promised funding, the case of the Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade also serves as an example of the difficulties in cooperation

¹⁰⁷¹ "Pitanje zgrade za Etnografski muzej u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 6.10.1931, 4. "Ne kupovanje stare zgrade već gradnja nove za Etnografski muzej," *Večer*, 29.11.1939, 5.

¹⁰⁷² "Etnografski muzej traži zemlšte od gradske općine," *Večer*, 25.5.1937. However, the municipality delayed the resolution of this issue. "Gradska općina o projektu gradnje etnografskog muzeja u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 27.5.1937, 10.

¹⁰⁷³ "Još se ne zna kamo će se preseliti Etnografski muzej," *Večer*, 7.12.1939, 5, "Hrvatski etnografski muzej seli iz sadašnje zgrade," *Jutarnji List*, 29.11.1939, 12.

¹⁰⁷⁴ "Hrvatski etnografski muzej ostaje za sada u staroj zgradi," *Jutarnji List*, 9.12.1939, 20. "Etnografski muzej ostaje u svojoj dosadašnjoj zgrade i ne će se seliti u nove prostorije," *Večer*, 9.1.1940.

and coordination, as well as a dilemma, because in this rare situation, two competitions were held for different buildings on the same plot.

Near the administrative building complex on Kneza Miloša Street, discussed in Chapter 2, the Ministry of Education owned a plot and a building bequeathed by politician Stevča Mihajlović. This building housed the Ethnographic Museum, but according to the Financial Law for 1937-1938, a new building for the Ministry of Education was to be constructed on this plot, and the Ethnographic Museum was to be relocated to the former Ministry building (Kralja Milana 2)¹⁰⁷⁵. The Ministry of Education held a competition for the new building and secured a loan from the State Mortgage Bank¹⁰⁷⁶. However, the Financial Law for the next year, 1938/1939, implied already a new building for the Ethnographic Museum to be constructed on the same plot, and part of the loan was to be used for this construction¹⁰⁷⁷. Thus, both dilemmas regarding the site and the finances were resolved in favor of the Ethnographic Museum. The Ministry of Education received another loan to purchase a new plot at the corner of Nemanjina and Balkanska streets in 1939¹⁰⁷⁸, but no construction was carried out on this site either.

The Ministry of Education held a competition for the new Ethnographic Museum building, which was discussed in Chapter 3. After the competition, the head of the Technical Section of the Ministry of Education, engineer Radoslav Todorović, and architect Dragan Gudović, whose project won third prize, developed the construction plans using the

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Finansijski zakon za 1937/38 godinu* (Beograd, 1937), 36.

¹⁰⁷⁶ There was no first award; Miho Čakelja and the team Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer received two second awards. *Skica za novu zgradu Ministarstva Prosvete*, 7/5, fasc. 2, fond 81, Arhiv Jugoslavije. The document № 13524 from 5.7.1937, fasc. 590, fond 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

¹⁰⁷⁷ The remaining part of the loan should be used to prepare for the construction of the Opera building. *Finansijski zakon za 1938/39 godinu*, (Beograd, 1938), 64. The decision in favor of the Ethnographic Museum was also confirmed in Financial Law 1939-1940. *Finansijski zakon za 1939/40 godinu*. (Beograd, 1939), 70-71.

¹⁰⁷⁸ The document №36382 from 2.10.1939, fasc. 590, fond 66, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

competition entries¹⁰⁷⁹ (Fig. 36). During the development of the project, Todorović and Gudović, together with the museum director Borivoje Drobñjaković, traveled to Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland to explore modern museum buildings¹⁰⁸⁰.




Figure 36. The project for the Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade, Dragan Gudović and Radoslav Todorović, 1939.

Source: "Na uglu Miloša Velikog i Birčaninove ulice podići će se nova zgrada Etnografskog muzeja, najveća i najmodernija građevina ove vrste na Balkanu," *Pravda*, 28.6.1940, 9.

After modifications, both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Construction approved the project¹⁰⁸¹, and construction was set to begin. Nevertheless, at this stage, the Ministry of Finance became an obstacle: first, by delaying approval of the tender for the initial works and later by advocating for the postponement of the museum's construction altogether¹⁰⁸². The hypothesis is that political factors influenced this change in the Ministry of Finance's position regarding the project. In the government formed after the Cvetković-Maček Agreement on August 26, 1939, Juraj Šutej, a member of HSS, held the post of Minister of

¹⁰⁷⁹ Borivoje Drobñjaković, "Etnografski muzej u Beogradu u 1938. godini," *Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja* 13 (1938): 178.

¹⁰⁸⁰ "Etnografski muzej u Beogradu imaće zgradu po uzoru na zgrade evropskih muzeja te vrste," *Pravda*, 2.9.1938, 3.

¹⁰⁸¹ Borivoje Drobñjaković, "Etnografski muzej u Beogradu u 1939. godini," *Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja* 14 (1939): 125. The project was published in "Na uglu Miloša Velikog i Birčaninove ulice podići će se nova zgrada Etnografskog muzeja, najveća i najmodernija građevina ove vrste na Balkanu," *Pravda*, 28.6.1940, 9.

¹⁰⁸² Borivoje Drobñjaković, "Etnografski muzej u Beogradu u 1940. godini," *Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja* 15 (1940): 186.

Finance. Considering that projects within the Ministry of Education's competence were primarily those in which Zagreb was financially deprived, the attempt to postpone the construction of the Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade can be seen as an example of a reaction.

Coordination issues were closely intertwined with funding challenges. For example, some competition projects in Zagreb were partly implemented: joint projects combined facilities for state-run and municipal institutions. For instance, in 1930/1931, a competition was held for a hospital complex planned to unite Foundation Hospital (related to the municipality) and the Clinics of the Medical Faculty (as part of the university, they were under state jurisdiction)¹⁰⁸³. Nevertheless, due to funding difficulties that Zagreb University faced in the Ministry of Education, only the Foundation Hospital part was implemented¹⁰⁸⁴, while the construction of the Medical Faculty Clinics only began to move forward after the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia¹⁰⁸⁵. The Ministry of Education also played a role in the non-implementation of another joint project in Zagreb: for two schools, state one and municipal one (the State Craft School and the City Central Vocational School), for which a competition was held in 1935¹⁰⁸⁶. Funding for the state portion was not allocated, and only the municipal school, designed by Ivan Zemljak, a municipal architect and competition jury member, was built¹⁰⁸⁷.

Both of these cases fit well into Zagreb's financial deprivation paradigm when it came to building projects under the Ministry of Education's jurisdiction. However, another example of an unfulfilled competition outcome in Zagreb highlights the challenges of cooperation

¹⁰⁸³ "Važne odluke o novoj bolnici na Šalati," *Jutarnji List*, 18.1.1930, 8. See more about the competition Bjažić Klarin, "Medjunarodni natječaj za Zakladnu bolnicu".

¹⁰⁸⁴ "Konačna odluka o gradnji Zakladne bolnice," *Jutarnji List*, 6.9.1934, 10.

¹⁰⁸⁵ "Veliki planovi za izgradnju klinika i zavoda medicinskog fakulteta na Šalati," *Novosti*, 9.3.1941, 11.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ing. B. J., "Rezultat natječaja za idejne skice za gradnju Državne obrtne škole i Gradske centralne stručne produžne škole u Zagrebu," *Gradjevinski vjesnik* 12 (1935): 149.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Barišić Marenić, "Arhitektica Zoja Dumengjić," 201. "Za novu šegrtsku školu potrebno je preko 11 i pol milijuna a sada se ima svega nešto oko milijun i pol," *Večer*, 27.12.1936, 5.

between the various parties involved in resolving construction issues. It was the project for the Palace of Social Institutions (*Palača Socijalnih Ustanova*), which was intended to house three institutions: the Workers' Chamber, the Public Employment Service, and the Emigration Commissariat (*Radnička Komora, Javna Burza Rada, Iseljenički Komesarijat*).

Initially, the idea seemed rational: a shared building would consolidate common functions, thereby reducing construction costs¹⁰⁸⁸. Also, the project seemed to be easy to implement since, due to the activities of Minister Mate Drinković, the Ministry of Social Policy allocated funds, the municipality provided a site, and a joint committee was formed¹⁰⁸⁹. The municipality organized a conference with representatives from three organizations to draft the construction program, but at this stage, the Emigration Commissariat began stalling the process, leading to the postponement of the competition¹⁰⁹⁰.

The proposed construction site became the stumbling block. The municipality provided a plot at the *Ciglana* complex, but the Emigration Commissariat opposed it and insisted on another plot near the Main Railway Station¹⁰⁹¹. The Workers' Chamber and the Public Employment Service tried to influence Mate Drinković, and he supported the *Ciglana* location and believed construction needed to begin as early as possible because the financial side was already solved¹⁰⁹². However, the Emigration Commissariat refused to agree and attempted to resolve the issue independently of the municipality and ministry, negotiating directly with the State Railways Directorate to obtain the desired plot¹⁰⁹³. In the meantime, in

¹⁰⁸⁸ It was planned to be a single building from the outside but with separate entrances and internal divisions. However, there are shared spaces and central heating. "Pred gradnjom zgrade iseljeničkog komesarijata," *Jutarnji List*, 15.1.1931, 6. Initially, a joint project was conceived for the Public Employment Service and the Emigration Commissariat. "Gradnja palače Javne Burze rada na Ciglani," *Novosti*, 27.3.1929, 4.

¹⁰⁸⁹ "Palača Radničke komore, Burze Rada i Iseljeničkog komesarijata," *Novosti*, 14.5.1929, 3.

¹⁰⁹⁰ "Podizanje radničkog doma u Zagrebu," *Novosti*, 9.1.1930, 5.

¹⁰⁹¹ "Pitanje gradnje Iseljeničkog doma u Zagrebu," *Jutarnji List*, 11.11.1929, 9; "Gradnja Iseljeničkog doma," *Novosti*, 5.7.1929, 4; Representatives of the Emigration Commissariat acknowledged the need for a joint construction project for these institutions, but it was at a different location. "Iseljenici traže da se njihov dom gradi na Baroševoj cesti, a ne na Ciglani," *Novosti*, 11.10.1929, 4.

¹⁰⁹² "Izjava ministra g. dr. Mate Drinkovića," *Jutarnji List*, 19.1.1930, 7.

¹⁰⁹³ "Hoće li na Ciglani graditi zgrada Iseljeničkog komesarijata," *Jutarnji List*, 18.10.1930, 5.

May 1930, after the Ministry of Social Policy merged with the Ministry of National Health, Nikola Preka held the ministerial post, and the project participants awaited his final decision¹⁰⁹⁴. Moreover, he did not arrive until January 1931, when he listened to all sides at a joint conference and promised to decide later¹⁰⁹⁵.

The site issues were not limited to the objections from the Emigration Commissariat. At *Ciglana*, barracks were built, which served as an additional argument for new construction at the site, as their demolition would resolve the issues with them¹⁰⁹⁶. On the other hand, there were extra costs related to relocating the barracks' residents and demolition¹⁰⁹⁷.

Nevertheless, the dilemma situation with the Technical Faculty was much more complicated. It also claimed the site since the municipality had previously granted it the part of *Ciglana*, but the Technical Faculty failed to acquire the second part, which was in state ownership¹⁰⁹⁸. The municipality had allocated the land on the condition of construction within a specified timeframe. Although Hugo Ehrlich had designed a project¹⁰⁹⁹, the faculty faced difficulties obtaining funding from the Ministry of Education. As a result, the municipality reallocated the plot to another project¹¹⁰⁰, as by the late 1920s, there was already a shortage of available plots.

While representatives of the Workers' Chamber argued that there was enough space for both projects¹¹⁰¹, representatives of the Technical Faculty claimed the entire plot, also

¹⁰⁹⁴ "Konferencija zbog gradnje palače socijalnih ustanova," *Novosti*, 21.1.1931, 4.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁶ "Hoće li na Ciglani graditi zgrada Iseljeničkog komesarijata," *Jutarnji List*, 18.10.1930, 5.

¹⁰⁹⁷ "Još jedan milijun dinara treba za razselenje Ciglane," *Večer*, 26.9.1930, 2.

¹⁰⁹⁸ "Zagrebačka oblast mora biti prva prosvjetna oblast u državi," *Jutarnji List*, 31.3.1927, 3.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Domljan, *Hugo Ehrlich*, 169-172.

¹¹⁰⁰ "„Ciglana“, tehnički fakultet i Dom socijalnih ustanova," *Jutarnji List*, 25.1.1931, 8.

¹¹⁰¹ "Podizanje radničkog doma u Zagrebu," *Novosti*, 9.1.1930, 5. "„Ciglana“, tehnički fakultet i Dom socijalnih ustanova," *Jutarnji List*, 25.1.1931, 8.

pointing out that since the workers' quarters were located in the eastern part of the city, the building for those institutions should be constructed there¹¹⁰².

During discussions at joint conferences, another dilemma emerged regarding the site, as Josip Rasuhin, representative of the Hygiene Institute, advocated against construction and suggested that the area be turned into a park with a playground for children¹¹⁰³. By mid-1931, under pressure from the other two project participants, the municipality and the ministry, the Emigration Commissariat was forced to agree to the plot at *Ciglane*, and the committee was ready to announce a competition¹¹⁰⁴. Another stumbling block was the financial issues between the Public Employment Service and the Municipality.

The Ministry of Social Policy proposed the financing scheme, according to which the municipality would receive a 4-million loan for each institution involved in the construction¹¹⁰⁵. In the case of the Workers' Chamber and the Emigration Commissariat, this meant that after construction, they would receive their parts of the building, and the loan would be considered repaid. However, the situation was more complex for the Public Employment Service, as municipalities were required to provide space for these services under the §93b Workers' Protection Law¹¹⁰⁶. After construction, the municipality would retain ownership of the third part of the building while still being responsible for repaying the loan¹¹⁰⁷. A dispute arose over the municipality's plan to rent out part of the building to assist in repaying the loan and over which entity would be responsible for maintaining the workers'

¹¹⁰² "Drugo gledište. O „Ciglane“ izgradnji tehničkog fakulteta i Doma državnih socijalnih fakulteta," *Jutarnji List*, 30.1.1931, 5; "Gradnja palače radničkih ustanova na Ciglane," *Novosti*, 25.7.1931, 4

¹¹⁰³ "Konferencija o gradnji na Ciglane," *Jutarnji List*, 21.1.1931, 6

¹¹⁰⁴ "Na čemu je zapela gradnja palače socijalnih institucija na Ciglane," *Novosti*, 23.4.1931, 6

¹¹⁰⁵ "Gradska općina imala bi graditi socijalne ustanove iz fondova burze rada," *Novosti*, 21.6.1929, 4.

¹¹⁰⁶ §93b stated that municipalities are obliged to provide the necessary premises, both for the offices of the public employment service and for shelters and kitchens. *Zakon o zaštite radnika in Radničko Zaštitno Zakonodavstvo. Svezak 1* (Zagreb, 1931), 35.

¹¹⁰⁷ "Konferencija zbog gradnje palate radničkih ustanova," *Novosti*, 20.1.1931, 4.

kitchen in the new building¹¹⁰⁸. Additionally, the municipality argued that its contribution to the land should be considered a sufficient investment¹¹⁰⁹.

This issue was also raised at the conference with Minister Preka in January 1931, who promised to decide later, but this never happened. Only after another change of minister in June 1931 there was a new conference with new minister Marko Kostrenčić, where an agreement was finally reached¹¹¹⁰.

Nevertheless, the agreement became possible because the Emigration Commissariat decided not to participate directly in organizing the construction¹¹¹¹, and later, it withdrew from the project. Thus, the project was renamed from the Palace of Social Institutions to the Palace of Workers' Institutions. Its withdrawal from participation led to new disputes and complications. The Public Employment Service continued its conflict with the municipality, insisting that, regardless of the Emigration Commissariat's withdrawal, the municipality should still allocate the same plot of the same size¹¹¹². The municipality planned to give a smaller plot and use the remaining space for its interests¹¹¹³. The withdrawal also raised the issue of financing, as the project was initially intended to cost 12 million, with each institution contributing 4 million. The problem was resolved by increasing the contributions: the Workers' Chamber raised its share by 3 million, and the Public Employment Service by 1 million¹¹¹⁴.

Thus, despite all the difficulties, by 1932, the opportunity finally arose to hold a competition¹¹¹⁵. However, shortly after the competition was announced, the Ministry of Finance unexpectedly intervened, questioning the entire financing scheme through loans to

¹¹⁰⁸ "Gradnja palače radničkih ustanova na Ciglani," *Novosti*, 25.7.1931, 4.

¹¹⁰⁹ "Na čemu je zapela gradnja palače socijalnih institucija na Ciglani," *Novosti*, 23.4.1931, 6.

¹¹¹⁰ "Dom državnih socijalnih ustanova," *Jutarnji List*, 23.7.1931, 7.

¹¹¹¹ "Gradnja palače radničkih ustanova na Ciglani," *Novosti*, 25.7.1931, 4.

¹¹¹² "Pitanje doma socijalnih ustanova na Ciglani," *Jutarnji List*, 22.8.1931, 6.

¹¹¹³ "Gradsko zastupstvo o domu državnih socijalnih ustanova na Ciglani," *Jutarnji List*, 16.9.1931, 7.

¹¹¹⁴ "Na proleće će se graditi Dom socijalnih ustanova," *Jutarnji List*, 20.11.1931, 6.

¹¹¹⁵ "Prva velika gradnja 1932 u Zagrebu," *Novosti*, 16.2.1932, 6.

the municipality. Due to the financial implications of this interference, even the announcement of the competition results was delayed¹¹¹⁶. The only two awards in the competition were given to the team of Selimir and Zoja Dumenjić, and Jovan Korka (Fig. 37), both of whom submitted projects that strictly adhered to the program, including cost constraints¹¹¹⁷. Additionally, five other projects were purchased.




Figure 37. The awarded competition project for the Palace of Workers' Institutions in Zagreb, Jovan Korka, 1932.

Source: "Rezultat natječaja za gradnju palače radničkih ustanova," *Novosti*, 15.7.1932, 4.

The second stage was held among the authors of the awarded and purchased projects. After this round, the Board for Construction decided to exclude architect-officials¹¹¹⁸ (an issue discussed in Chapter 3), thus, the final selection was made between only four projects. Jovan Korka's project was selected for realization¹¹¹⁹ (Fig. 38), and he collaborated with Vladimir Šterk to further elaborate the design.

¹¹¹⁶ "Rezultat natječaja za gradnju palače radničkih ustanova," *Novosti*, 15.7.1932, 4.

¹¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹¹⁸ "Sa prvim danima proljeća počinje se gradnjom doma radničkih ustanova na Ciglani," *Jutarnji List*, 8.2.1933, 8

¹¹¹⁹ "Radnički dom. Javna burza rada odustaje od gradnje," *Novosti*, 31.3.1933.




Figure 38. The competition project, selected for implementation at the second stage for the Palace of Workers' Institutions in Zagreb, Jovan Korka, 1933.

Source: "Gradnja zgrade radničkih ustanova," *Novosti*, 10.2.1933, 6.

On the one hand, the project faced difficulties because of the economic crisis, as some of the allocated funds were frozen in the City Savings Bank¹¹²⁰. While a portion of the funds remained available for construction¹¹²¹, the Public Employment Service struggled to manage even these available resources due to issues in the relationship between SUZOR and the Central Office for Labor Mediation¹¹²². As a result, the latter allowed the Public Employment Service to sign the contract with Jovan Korka and pay him for project elaboration, bypassing SUZOR, with the rather specific justification that it was done to prevent blaming Belgrade as usual if the construction stalls¹¹²³.

In addition to financial difficulties, the municipal committee for façades did not approve Jovan Korka's project, which was created in collaboration with Vladimir Šterk. While the project was being revised, efforts were made to secure funds from the State Mortgage Bank instead of relying on the frozen funds in City Savings Bank¹¹²⁴. In 1934, after all the approvals and disputes, the Workers' Chamber and Public Employment Service decided to abandon the joint project and build their buildings separately¹¹²⁵. Journalists

¹¹²⁰ "Sa prvim danima proljeća počinje se gradnjom doma radničkih ustanova na Ciglani," *Jutarnji List*, 8.2.1933, 8.

¹¹²¹ "Finansijska strana gradnje palače socijalnih ustanova je osigurana," *Jutarnji List*, 4.3.1933, 8.

¹¹²² "Radnički dom. Javna burza rada odustaje od gradnje," *Novosti*, 31.3.1933.

¹¹²³ "Radnički dom ipak spasen," *Novosti*, 1.4.1933, 6.

¹¹²⁴ "Nova solucija za gradnju palače socijalnih ustanova," *Jutarnji List*, 4.11.1933, 9.

¹¹²⁵ "Zašto je sasvim propala gradnja radničke komore i burze rada," *Jutarnji List*, 30.9.1934, 8. Unlike the joint project, the individual buildings were constructed in the second half of the 1930s.

blamed the 'system of conferences and discussions instead of work'¹¹²⁶ and 'significant negotiations over trivial matters'¹¹²⁷ for failing to implement the joint project.

In Zagreb's case, the primary narrative surrounding the lack of coordination focuses on the city's deprivation: local actors tried to organize construction, but central authorities did not cooperate (by not allocating funds, delaying timelines, not approving projects, etc.). However, in some instances, such difficulties stemmed from the municipality itself. For example, in Zagreb, the Technical Department of the National Theatre commissioned the design of a storage facility for decorations from an architect and proposed a financing scheme by selling its more expensive plot and purchasing a cheaper one from the municipality¹¹²⁸. According to a journalist from *Večer*, the municipality did not approve the idea of parceling the plot for sale and later refused to engage in dialogue, leaving the project unrealized¹¹²⁹.

4.5. Opposition to the Project as a Factor

While a lack of coordination could relate to a refusal to support project implementation, even when sabotage is suspected, there is no open opposition to the projects. Most of the discussed buildings were generally seen as necessary. Even when debates occurred over whether to build, the need for the premises was acknowledged, albeit in existing buildings rather than constructing new ones. In discussions over financial and land-related dilemmas, supporters of one option rarely opposed the other, believing that the alternative also needed to be built in a different location, with various funding, or later.

For example, even in the case of the construction of the Catholic Cathedral in Belgrade, the voices raised against the project in the press were more focused on advocating

¹¹²⁶ "Zašto je sasvim propala gradnja radničke komore i burze rada," *Jutarnji List*, 30.9.1934, 8.

¹¹²⁷ "Zašto se ne gradi nova bolnica, nova carinarnica i novi dom soc ustanova," *Večer*, 18.5.1934, 3.

¹¹²⁸ "Narodno kazalište mora graditi drvenu baraku umjesto velikog modernog spremišta za dekoracije," *Večer*, 22.4.1939, 6.

¹¹²⁹ Ibid.

that it should be built only after the construction of the St. Sava Temple or in a non-Gothic style, but in general, the opponents came to terms with construction. Moreover, some projects faced significant opposition and criticism that prevented their completion. On the one hand, the opposition might not have been directed at the construction necessity itself but rather at the selection mechanism and the figure of its author, as was the case with the projects of German architect Werner March in Belgrade. On the other hand, the idea of building itself faced resistance in some cases, such as the crematorium projects in Belgrade and Zagreb.

With hopes to host the 1948 Olympic Games in Belgrade, the authorities commissioned a project for the Olympic Stadium from the German architect Werner March, who had designed the Stadium for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games¹¹³⁰. The project required coordination between the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of the Army and Navy, the Ministry of Physical Education, and the Municipality, which was managed through joint committees and conferences, also with Werner March himself¹¹³¹. His project was presented to the public at the exhibition *New German Construction* in October 1940¹¹³² (Fig. 39). In addition to the Olympic complex in the Lower Town of Belgrade Fortress, his project also included a regulation plan for the Upper Town, featuring two Military and National museum buildings and a national monument as a kind of Pantheon. Overall, the idea of a stadium in the Lower Town and a museum complex in the Upper Town (but with four museums: Military, National, Historical, and Ethnographic) was already outlined in the 1923 Master Plan. Also, the idea of building a Pantheon in the Upper Town (a "Monumental Temple to the

¹¹³⁰ See more about history of his projects in Belgrade in Dejan Zec, "Proposed Olympic Complex in Belgrade – Project by Hitler's Architect Werner March," CD Proceedings / International Conference Architecture and Ideology (September 28-29, 2012), edited by Vladimir Mako, Mirjana Roter Blagojević, Marta Vukotić Lazar, (Belgrade: Faculty of Architecture University of Belgrade, 2012), 958-966, and in Ivan R. Marković, "Provokacija nove estetike: dva projekta arhitekta Vernera Marha u Beogradu," *Zbornik Matice srpske za likovne umetnosti* 41 (2013): 163-181.

¹¹³¹ "Gradjenje olimpijskog stadiona," *Politika*, 3.8.1939, 13; "Zapisnik konferencije," fasc. 40, fond 71. Arhiv Jugoslavije.

¹¹³² Drago Ulaga, "Olimpijski stadion u Beogradu po zamisli profesora Vernera Marha," *Politika*, 10.10.1940, 7; Dragomir M. Popović, "Izložba novog nemačkog građevinarstva," *Umetnički Pregled* 8 (1940): 252.

Liberators") was actively discussed in the press in 1929¹¹³³. Moreover, in 1934, German architect Richard Staudinger proposed a project for the "Acropolis of Yugoslavism" in the Upper Town: a monumental building combining the Pantheon and museum spaces¹¹³⁴.




Figure 39. Model of the Olympic Stadium in the Lower Town of Belgrade Fortress, Werner March, 1940

Source: "Konferencija po pitanju podizanja stadiona u Donjem gradu," *Vreme*, 29.11.1940, 8.

March's design stood out for its monumental scale in stripped classicism style and required substantial financial investment, the coordination of several ministries, and solutions for monument preservation in the fortress. However, a significant obstacle arose due to the reaction from the professional community. When it became known that Werner March had been commissioned to design the Olympic Stadium, the Belgrade sections of the Engineering Chamber and UJIA criticized both the fact that the project had been awarded without a competition and that it had been entrusted to a foreign architect as this undermined the reputation of Yugoslav architects¹¹³⁵. Given the symbolic nature of the project, they declared that they "do not want a foreigner to construct buildings representing our people and culture"¹¹³⁶. At this point, UJIA proposed a compromise: using March's design as the basis

¹¹³³ "Kakav treba da bude spomenik Kralju Petru Velikom Oslobodiocu i na kom mestu da se podigne," *Vreme* 11.3.1929, 1, and 19.3.1929, 3.

¹¹³⁴ Jovan Obradović, Generalni regulacioni plan za grad Beograd, 1924, Digital National Library of Serbia. "Plan „Akropolja Jugoslovenstva“ u Gornjem gradu," *Politika*, 16.12.1934, 14.

¹¹³⁵ "Beogradski inženjeri i arhitekti protiv toga da se poslovi poveravaju inostranim stručnjacima, bez konsultacija naših ljudi," *Politika*, 20.8.1939, 12.

¹¹³⁶ Branko Maksimović, "Dva urbanistička problema," *Politika*, 15.7.1939, 8.

for a program in a future competition¹¹³⁷, ideally limited to Yugoslav architects rather than an international one. Nevertheless, the resolutions and letters sent by the professional community to various ministries were unsuccessful at this stage¹¹³⁸.

The second phase of protests began after March's design was presented at the exhibition, and news emerged about the start of preparatory works. A detailed critique of the project from both architectural and urbanistic perspectives and monument preservation was presented in the press and at a meeting with the Minister of Construction¹¹³⁹. However, a key theme remained that such a project had been commissioned from a foreign architect. Moreover, the project's architectural features were criticized as alien and not in harmony with the spirit of the place¹¹⁴⁰. At this stage, Belgrade architects and engineers united in opposition to the project, and professionals from other cities joined their Belgrade colleagues. There were also plans to involve representatives from cultural and sports organizations¹¹⁴¹. Despite these efforts, the project was not stopped by the professional community but rather by Germany's invasion of Yugoslavia.

In this case, the opposition was sparked by the project's design, its location, the selection process, and the chosen architect rather than by the idea of constructing the stadium itself. The professional community called for the stadium to be built but insisted that it "must be our work, a monument to our architectural culture"¹¹⁴². Nevertheless, in some instances, opposition was directed against the idea of the construction itself, as was the case with the crematoriums in Belgrade and Zagreb.

¹¹³⁷ "Vesti iz udruženja," *Tehnički List* 5-6 (1939): 76.

¹¹³⁸ For example, the Engineering Chamber and UJIA sent letters to the Minister of Construction and the Minister of Physical Education, fasc. 1505, fond 62; fasc. 67, fond 71, Arhiv Jugoslavije.

¹¹³⁹ "Beogradski arhitekti i pitanje stadiona," *Politika*, 14.12.1940, 11; "Arhitekta protiv podizanja stadiona u Donjem gradu," *Pravda*, 16.12.1940, 10.

¹¹⁴⁰ Djurdje Bošković, "Pitanje arhitektonskoga predredjenja beogradskoga grada," *Srpski Književni Glasnik* 5, LXI (1940), 382.

¹¹⁴¹ "Olimpijski stadion u središtu pažnje naših inženjera i arhitekata," *Politika*, 25.12.1940, 14.

¹¹⁴² Ibid.

The difficulties in selecting the crematorium project in Belgrade and its architectural features were examined in Chapter 3. Although these difficulties led to several rejected proposals, the primary obstacles to the crematorium's implementation were tied to the challenges of navigating the administrative processes due to the actions of cremation opponents¹¹⁴³.

In Belgrade, the Society for the Promotion of Cremation *Oganj* was founded in 1904, and after World War I, the society actively sought to build a crematorium. A key figure in this effort was its chairman, doctor Vojislav Kujundžić.

The first step was to secure changes in legislation in favor of cremation. *Oganj* approached the head of the Department of Hygiene at the Ministry of Public Health, Andrija Štampar, for cremation approval and attempted to have cremation included in the sanitation law by working through supporters of cremation among members of parliament¹¹⁴⁴. After one of the supporters, doctor Čedomir Mihajlović, became Minister of Public Health on July 27, 1928, he informed the Belgrade municipality that the law permits the burning of bodies and that the municipality "could begin work on establishing a crematorium"¹¹⁴⁵.

Afterward, *Oganj* attempted to coordinate the construction of the crematorium with the municipality, on the one hand, to resolve the location issue and, on the other, to convince the municipality to invest in the project¹¹⁴⁶. While the municipality delayed the decision regarding the plot, it finally approved the location of the crematorium in the New Cemetery in 1930¹¹⁴⁷. Nevertheless, the financial request was completely ignored.

¹¹⁴³ This part of dissertation is based on the chapter Ibragimova, "Unrealized Crematoria".

¹¹⁴⁴ Vojislav Kujundžić, "Za spaljivanje mrtvih, jedan apel gostima," *Vreme*, 5.10.1926, 4.

¹¹⁴⁵ "Ministarsvo narodnog zdravlja odobrilo je podizanje krematorijuma," *Vreme*, 25.1.1929, 4.

¹¹⁴⁶ One of the key arguments was the cheaper cost of burying the so-called "administrative corpses". "Pred podizanjem krematorijuma u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 6.2.1930, 3.

¹¹⁴⁷ "„Oganj“ će uskoro moći da spaljuje svoje umrle pristalice," *Vreme*, 28.4.1930, 2. A similar idea was put forward in 1906 when Kujundžić proposed to build a crematorium in front of the St. Nikola Church in the New Cemetery. Aleksandra Pavićević, *Plamena tela: spaljivanje mrtvih u Srbiji - od paganskog rituala do moderne kremacije* (Beograd: Etnografski institut SANU, 2016), 116.

Meanwhile, *Oganj* tried to address the primary challenge of aligning its interests with those of the church. They visited the Patriarch and communicated with the Holy Synod to achieve mutual understanding and tolerance¹¹⁴⁸. However, all attempts to reach an agreement were unsuccessful.

Oganj made very slow progress in the decision-making chain regarding the necessity of construction, location, financing, project selection, and coordination, sometimes even moving backward. By 1931, the plot issue, which seemed to have been resolved, again became a problem. While the cremation advocates promoted it and used the lack of space in cemeteries as an argument for building a crematorium, the site allocated for the crematorium was taken over by burials due to the shortage of space. Nevertheless, *Oganj* hoped to secure a plot in the new cemetery that the municipality in 1931 planned to establish¹¹⁴⁹.

The problem of space shortage was not limited to the cemetery but affected the city as a whole. In the early 1930s, instead of opening a new cemetery, the municipality only purchased land to expand the existing one. By 1932, *Oganj* already had an architectural project, a preliminary budget, and the financial means to construct a crematorium¹¹⁵⁰, but they still lacked a plot. *Oganj* sent a delegation to the chairman of the municipality, Milan Nešić, and as a result, the Municipality Board decided to allocate a new site for the crematorium¹¹⁵¹.

Thus, *Oganj* attempted to resolve the issue of crematorium construction in an "administrative way." The society's main tactic was personal communication with decision-makers and, where possible, working through like-minded individuals. However, given the administrative challenges in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, discussed in Chapter 2, such as the

¹¹⁴⁸ "Uprava Društva „Oganj“ moli Patrijarha da blogslavi akciju za spaljivanje mrtvaca," *Vreme*, 29.12.1930, 4.

¹¹⁴⁹ "Slava društva „Oganj“," *Vreme*, 31.7.1931, 7.

¹¹⁵⁰ "Krematorijum u Beogradu biće podignut još ove godine," *Politika*, 20.4.1932, 7.

¹¹⁵¹ "Sudbonosna skupština društva Oganj," *Vreme*, 25.4.1932, 5, "Zapisnik XXIII Redovne sednice Odbora Opštine beogradske," *Opštinske novine* 21 (1932): 324.

frequent personnel changes and thus the lack of continuity, this tactic ultimately proved unsuccessful.

Less than three weeks after it seemed to *Oganj* that the key issues regarding the construction had been resolved, the new mayor of Belgrade became Milutin Petrović, a former employee of the Ministry of Justice, who later was described a "son of the church" by members of *Oganj*¹¹⁵². His personal views led to the obstruction of the Municipality Board's decision regarding the plot for the crematorium, first by delaying the decision and later by refusing to follow it¹¹⁵³. *Oganj* attempted to communicate and negotiate with Petrović¹¹⁵⁴ while also seeking ways to act against his "arbitrariness." They appealed to the Ministerial Council, asking for intervention to compel Petrović to implement the decisions of the Ministry of National Health and the Municipality Board¹¹⁵⁵. The Ministerial Council, in turn, requested an explanation from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which then questioned Petrović about his refusal to execute the decisions, which Petrović justified on religious grounds¹¹⁵⁶.

Despite all of *Oganj*'s efforts, not only in promoting cremation but also in framing it exclusively as a communal and sanitary issue rather than a religious one¹¹⁵⁷, the matter continued to be perceived through a religious lens, generating ideological opposition not only within church circles but also among some believers¹¹⁵⁸.

When Petrović was mayor, *Oganj* tried not to rely on help from the municipality and attempted to purchase another plot in the city¹¹⁵⁹ or even sought to move the issue outside of

¹¹⁵² "Slava društva „Oganj“ bez sveštenika," *Pravda*, 31.7.1934, 18.

¹¹⁵³ "Religija u Beogradskoj Opštini," *Oganj* 5 (1934): 2.

¹¹⁵⁴ "U Beogradu se neće podići krematorijum," *Pravda*, 27.4.1934, 7.

¹¹⁵⁵ "Oganj u beogradskoj opštini," *Oganj* 1 (1934): 5.

¹¹⁵⁶ "Religija u Beogradskoj Opštini," *Oganj* 5 (1934): 2-3.

¹¹⁵⁷ For example, V. K., "Naša Krematorija," *Oganj* 10 (1935): 70-71.

¹¹⁵⁸ See more about religious debates in Pavićević, *Plamena tela*, 132-141.

¹¹⁵⁹ This became possible thanks to the legate of Mihailo S. Pavlović (about one million dinars). "Zidanje beogradske krematorije obezbedjeno je još za ovo proleće," *Politika*, 14.1.1934, 11. However, residents of the

Petrović's jurisdiction by finding land near Belgrade. Nevertheless, due to the expansion of Belgrade's territory, the available plots became increasingly distant¹¹⁶⁰.

After another change in the municipality in 1935, with Vlada Ilić becoming mayor and Milan Nešić joining the Municipality Board, *Oganj* once again hoped to secure a plot at the New Cemetery. However, a new problem arose this time with regulation. The Ministry of Construction did not approve the regulatory plan for the part of the New Cemetery and the surrounding area on Severni Boulevard proposed by the municipality, and the plan repeatedly bounced between the two bodies without any progress¹¹⁶¹. The issue was that partial regulation was impossible without developing the Master plan. Although the problem was not directly related to *Oganj* this time, its members continued their approach. They attempted to mediate between the municipality and the ministry, using personal communication to push for partial regulation of the required plot without waiting for the completion of the master plan¹¹⁶².

While the regulatory plan for the plot was being passed back and forth between the municipality and the ministry, the documents about the crematorium construction got lost within the municipality as it moved between various departments discussing the issue (the Department of Cemeteries, the Council for Municipal Goods, and the Sanitary Section)¹¹⁶³. Moreover, the signed document with the Municipality Board's decision to allocate the plot from April 22, 1932, also disappeared¹¹⁶⁴.

suburb "Kraljevića Andrije" opposed it. "Društvo Oganj podići će ipak krematoriju u predgradju Kraljevića Andreje," *Vreme*, 23.1.1934, 7.

¹¹⁶⁰ Initially, Kneževac was considered, then Pančevo and Stara Pazova. "Oganj u beogradskoj opštini," *Oganj* 1 (1934): 4-5. "Izveštaj o radu Glavne uprave društva Oganj," *Oganj* 4-5 (1935): 2.

¹¹⁶¹ "Izveštaj o radu Glavne uprave društva Oganj," *Oganj* 4-5 (1936): 2. "Izveštaj o radu Glavne uprave društva Oganj," *Oganj* 4-5 (1937): 2.

¹¹⁶² "Izveštaj o radu Glavne uprave društva Oganj," *Oganj* 4-5 (1939): 2.

¹¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁴ Technical documentation XV-8-1940, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda.

In this situation, the approval of the crematorium plans was also delayed, and this time, *Oganj* was convinced that Mayor Vlada Ilić was behind the delay¹¹⁶⁵. Once again, *Oganj* pinned its hopes on changes in municipal leadership when, on September 13, 1939, Vojin Djuričić became mayor. During his term, more attention was focused on burial-related issues, and finally, decisive steps were taken to open a new cemetery¹¹⁶⁶.

At this stage, the obstacles were no longer municipal but rather at the state level. First, *Oganj* was waiting for approval of the revised regulatory plan for the plot and the project from the Ministry of Construction¹¹⁶⁷. The ministry requested changes and corrections to the project¹¹⁶⁸, which Kujundžić believed stemmed from the reluctance of the minister, Miha Krek, to approve the project due to his clerical sentiments¹¹⁶⁹. However, it is more likely that the issue was indeed due to technical deficiencies in the project, as the Central Hygiene Institute also suggested changes¹¹⁷⁰.

Furthermore, in the second half of 1940, the Ministry of Internal Affairs became involved in the approval process and proposed seeking the opinions of representatives from various religious communities¹¹⁷¹. The Ministry of Construction referred this matter to the religious branch of the Ministry of Justice, which responded in 1941 that the Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish communities were opposed to the crematorium. Nevertheless, it emphasized that the decision should not consider religious arguments, stating, "This is not

¹¹⁶⁵ "Izveštaj o radu Glavne uprave društva Oganj," *Oganj* 4-5 (1940): 2.

¹¹⁶⁶ "Nacrte za groblje u Marinkovoj Šumi," *Politika*, 20.4.1940.

¹¹⁶⁷ "Izveštaj o radu Glavne uprave društva Oganj," *Oganj* 4-5 (1940): 2.

¹¹⁶⁸ Technical documentation XV-8-1940, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda.

¹¹⁶⁹ Vojislav Kujundžić, *Četerdeset godina propagande za krematoriju u Beogradu* (Beograd: Planeta, 1945), 5,13.

¹¹⁷⁰ Letter № 15545 from 5.7.1940, Technical documentation XV-8-1940, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda.

¹¹⁷¹ Letter № 19622 from 20.11.1940, Technical documentation XV-8-1940, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda.

about imposing obligatory cremation, but about allowing individuals the freedom to choose"¹¹⁷².

As a result of these administrative complications — closely tied to and sometimes caused by the actions of ideological opponents of cremation, the project remained unrealized even despite having the prepared project, secured funding, the plot, and support from some municipal departments.

In Zagreb, the construction of a crematorium also remained unrealized due to similar challenges. However, while the project in Belgrade advanced to the architectural design phase, the initiative in Zagreb encountered more difficulties. Unlike in Belgrade, where the Society for the Promotion of Cremation had been active since 1904, serving as the main driving force behind the project, in Zagreb, initiatives initially came from the municipality. As early as 1918, the city council approved the need for a crematorium¹¹⁷³. In the 1920s, they took the lead, repeatedly raising the issue, especially after changes in the city council. However, the initiative continually faced opposition from a few city representatives, who consistently created obstacles¹¹⁷⁴.

After unsuccessful attempts within the municipal structures, supporters of cremation in Zagreb first formed a branch of the Belgrade society *Oganj* in 1930 and then an independent society *Plamen* in 1932¹¹⁷⁵. Nevertheless, close ties with *Oganj* were maintained, as well as with the society *Oganj* founded in Maribor in 1931.

In Belgrade, opponents of the crematorium downplayed its importance by referring to the idea of opening a new cemetery (Central Cemetery). In Zagreb, plans were repeatedly made to expand the existing Mirogoj Cemetery further. Supporters of cremation used this as

¹¹⁷² Letter № 112371/40 from 1.1.1941, Technical documentation XV-8-1940, Opština Grada Beograda, Istorijski arhiv Beograda.

¹¹⁷³ Filip Šimetin Šegvić, "Kultura smrti u Zagrebu: Društvo prijatelja za podizanje krematorija "Plamen", " *Historijski zbornik* 68, br. 2 (2015): 307.

¹¹⁷⁴ "Da li Zagrebu potreban krematorij," *Jutarnji List*, 28.8.1926, 5.

¹¹⁷⁵ "Ognjeni pokret u Jugoslaviji," *Plamen* 1 (1937): 6.

an argument, pointing out that the funds spent on expanding the cemetery and exhumations could have already been used to build a crematorium and to solve the problem¹¹⁷⁶. Nevertheless, the lack of space at Mirogoj, and in the city in general, complicated the implementation of the project.

In 1936, the Zagreb regulatory plan designated a site on the outskirts (*Šestinski dol*) for the crematorium¹¹⁷⁷, though some members of *Plamen* believed that it should be built on the grounds of the existing Mirogoj Cemetery as a way to demonstrate the equality of burial and cremation¹¹⁷⁸. Nevertheless, even obtaining the plot according to the regulatory plan was complicated. In 1937, the city council decided to give the site at a symbolic price, stating that the crematorium should be built within four years¹¹⁷⁹. Because of the cost, the land transfer had to be approved by the Ministry of Finance in agreement with the Minister of Internal Affairs¹¹⁸⁰. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance did not approve it, arguing that the price of the land was unjustifiably low. According to the law, a lower price was only possible for projects that served a 'general public interest' or 'city improvement,' but the crematorium was not considered to meet these criteria¹¹⁸¹. Furthermore, members of *Plamen* noted that when the decision was made in late 1937, the Minister of Internal Affairs was Anton Korošec¹¹⁸², a clerical politician. Thus, even though the crematorium received more municipal support in Zagreb, state-level challenges remained similar to those in Belgrade.

Despite the problems with ministries, *Plamen* continued to ask the municipality not only for the plot but also for investments into crematorium construction or propose, as an

¹¹⁷⁶ For example, "Predstavka „Plamena“,“ *Plamen* 1 (1936): 2.

¹¹⁷⁷ "Krematorij u Zagrebu," *Plamen* 2 (1936): 43.

¹¹⁷⁸ "K izboru mjesta za krematorij u Zagrebu," *Plamen* 1-2 (1939): 30-31.

¹¹⁷⁹ Price was 20 dinars for „četvorni hvat“, which is approximately 3,6 square meters. "II Redovita glavna skupština društva „Pamen“ u Zagrebu," *Plamen* 2 (1937): 38.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Zakon o gradskim opštinama* (Beograd, 1934), 40-41.

¹¹⁸¹ Ibid., 49. "Izvestaj o IV redovitoj godišnjoj skupštini društva „Plamen“ u Zagrebu, održanoj 21.IV.1939," *Plamen* 1-2 (1939): 10.

¹¹⁸² "Izvestaj o IV redovitoj godišnjoj skupštini društva „Plamen“ u Zagrebu, održanoj 21.IV.1939," *Plamen* 1-2 (1939): 11.

option, that the municipality could organize the construction through a concession agreement¹¹⁸³. *Plamen* also attempted to raise funds¹¹⁸⁴, but the Zagreb initiative never progressed beyond the planning phase because issues regarding the location and financing of the project remained unresolved.

Both projects faced obstruction of the decision-making process from certain politicians who opposed cremation and criticism from religious groups. However, in Zagreb, the opposition was particularly strong. First, opponents of cremation tried to reframe the issue as a dilemma, arguing that hospitals and schools should be built instead of a crematorium. Second, critics from Catholic circles not only challenged the necessity of cremation but also perceived the cremation movement as directly opposing precisely the Catholic Church¹¹⁸⁵. They accused cremation supporters of being Freemasons and even having Yugoslavian sympathies¹¹⁸⁶.

¹¹⁸³ "Pretstavka „Plamena“ Gospodinu Dru Teodoru Peičiću," *Plamen* 3-4 (1938): 51.

¹¹⁸⁴ "Pravilnik Fonda za spalivanje mrtvaca u Zagrebu," kut. 1, fond 642, Hrvatski Državni Arhiv.

¹¹⁸⁵ For example, Antun Bauer, "Krematorij ili pokapanje?", *Obnovljeni život* 9/4 (1928): 223-235.

¹¹⁸⁶ See more in Filip Šimetin Šegvić, "Kultura smrti u Zagrebu: Društvo prijatelja za podizanje krematorija "Plamen", " *Historijski zbornik* 68, br. 2 (2015): 297-322.

Conclusion

While exploring Belgrade, I encountered gaps in the urban space, which clearly indicated that something was meant to be built there, and building façades that masked rejected competition projects. It sparked my interest in understanding how decisions about construction were made, how projects were selected, and what challenges actors faced during their implementation. My dissertation centers on unrealized, unrealizable, and rejected projects as a means, which could help to understand better how the architectural process functioned, to identify discontinuities, hidden conflicts, and marginal trends, and to examine architecture within a broader socio-political context. This approach is based on the negative case methodology and inspired by Rebecca Jean Emigh's article, "*The Power of Negative Thinking*," which proposes using negative cases to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant¹¹⁸⁷.

Belgrade, which initially inspired this research idea, became the primary subject of the study. The interwar period was selected due to the abundance of unrealized and rejected projects, combined with the complex administrative history of the Kingdom of SCS / Yugoslavia, which provided ample material and posed a challenge for the researcher. Belgrade, as the capital and political center of the state, was compared with Zagreb, the second city of the kingdom and its architectural center.

After World War I, both cities experienced status changes, went through a construction boom, and faced similar challenges, such as problems in competitive practices. However, in Belgrade, the construction of public buildings became a primary focus for state authorities as part of transforming the city into the Yugoslav capital. As a result, many projects were initiated, but some were never built due to decision-making issues despite being discussed throughout the interwar period. These issues were partly related to coordination

¹¹⁸⁷ Emigh, "The Power of Negative Thinking," 658.

problems, as Belgrade's status as the capital meant that the Ministry of Construction and central authorities intervened directly, sometimes causing difficulties in the relationship with the municipality. Also, the selection of projects and their architectural design were subject to more significant influence from authorities, which sometimes diverged from the professionals' views and hindered the affirmation of modernism. Overall, architectural development in Belgrade during the interwar period was characterized by the coexistence of various stylistic trends.

Unlike Belgrade, modernized forms and modernism were dominant in interwar Zagreb. Zagreb's case can be viewed as "the freedom of periphery," as described by Eve Blau, where professionals had greater creative liberty, and the municipality functioned more efficiently due to reduced state pressure¹¹⁸⁸. However, this came at a cost: insufficient state funding. From Zagreb's perspective, this financial deprivation was the primary obstacle to realizing public projects.

During the interwar period, particularly in Zagreb, some architects focused on the social role of architecture and the resolution of social issues. They developed proposals for social housing and urban planning, which were showcased at exhibitions and in publications, and in the late 1930s, the Institute for Housing Culture operated in Belgrade. However, both radical urban transformations and collectivist approaches, as well as more moderate initiatives regarding affordable housing, were doomed to remain unrealized due to the socio-political conditions of interwar Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, these ideas influenced housing and urban policies in socialist Yugoslavia.

The divergent views between the professional community and the authorities also extended to other aspects of architecture, including stylistic preferences, the understanding of the essence of architecture, and especially the importance of façades and their separability

¹¹⁸⁸ Blau, "Modernizing Zagreb: The Freedom of Periphery," 292.

from the building. Government authorities often leaned towards academicism, perceiving architecture as a decorative art and placing greater emphasis on façades, viewed as representation tools. Conversely, the architectural community embraced more modernism, advocating for architecture grounded in social context and rational spatial organization. This divide grew over time, becoming more pronounced in the 1930s, influencing project selection, particularly affecting the functioning of the competition mechanism. While Belgrade witnessed a generational divide within its architectural circles, including different stylistic preferences, Zagreb's professional community largely aligned with modernist ideals. This consensus extended its influence to municipal authorities, shaping the city's architectural preferences and policies.

Political instability, in particular, resulted in frequent leadership changes at various levels of governance. This lack of continuity led to the absence of long-term planning and disruptions in decision-making processes. As a result, the same questions were revisited multiple times for some projects, often without achieving tangible outcomes. Moreover, the frequent changes of decision-makers in ministries or municipalities impacted project dynamics. Projects advanced when a supporter of the initiative occupied a key position but stalled when leadership changed, leaving many initiatives vulnerable to being abandoned altogether. Conflicts of interest further exacerbated these challenges, particularly regarding allocating limited resources such as land plots and funding.

To analyze the administrative issues behind unrealized projects, I drew on Christopher Hood's article, "Administrative Diseases: Some Types of Dysfunctionality in Administration." Hood identifies four types of ineffectiveness: diseconomy, counterproductive administration, and 'pure' ineffectiveness, he highlights several

mechanisms contributing to dysfunction, including ‘over-organization,’ ‘under-organization,’ administration in ‘time,’ and administration in ‘space’¹¹⁸⁹.

In the 1920s, during political conflicts in parliament that hindered the unification of legislation, a key issue was under-organization. It included the lack of regulation, transparent and consistent administrative procedures, oversight mechanisms, and comprehensive planning. However, by the 1930s, the increasing complexity of regulations and procedures under the centralized control of the Ministry of Construction led to bureaucratic loops, causing projects to become stalled, thus introducing an opposing problem, ‘over-organization.’

The progression through decision-making phases was also tied to administration in ‘time.’ Time lags in decision-making, prolonged intervals between project phases, and the speed of approvals were significant issues. Political factors further exacerbated these issues. For example, from Zagreb’s perspective, there was administrative neglect, with additional delays in administrative processes, as well as potential sabotage of projects in Zagreb by their opponents.

Conflicts of interest also impacted administration in ‘space.’ Certain authorities disregarded the actions of others, and various administrative bodies frequently pursued conflicting objectives. This lack of alignment significantly hindered the cooperation necessary to implement most public projects successfully.

Regarding cooperation between central government bodies and municipalities, Belgrade faced challenges primarily stemming from the ‘overlap’ of responsibilities and direct interventions by state authorities due to its status as the capital. In contrast, Zagreb’s issues were characterized by an ‘underlap’: from the perspective of the local municipality,

¹¹⁸⁹ Hood, “Administrative Diseases,” 439-454.

state authorities neglected their responsibilities, leading to the failure to implement several collaborative projects.

The implementation of projects required resolving key questions: whether to build, how to secure funding, and where construction should take place. For public projects, deciding what exactly to build proved especially challenging. On one side, certain needs could be met either through new construction or by adapting existing structures. The hesitation between these options often hindered the realization of both options, as was the case with city halls in both Belgrade and Zagreb. On the other hand, many projects initiated in the 1920s were driven by a sense of construction optimism. However, as projects progressed, prioritization and decision-making between options became necessary, a process heavily influenced by conflicting interests and the limited allocation of resources.

Deciding how to finance public construction required selecting an appropriate method, whether through state, regional, or municipal budgets or domestic and foreign loans. However, the allocation of both budgetary funds and loans was often accompanied by significant financial dilemmas. Much like other decision-making challenges, these dilemmas led to delays and hesitation. Political factors further complicated the situation, as decisions to allocate funds at one stage did not necessarily ensure their availability at the next if decision-makers changed in the interim. Consequently, many projects remained unrealized despite funds being theoretically assigned. The very process of fund allocation also sparked additional conflicts. For instance, the Zagreb press consistently highlighted the issue of financial neglect toward Zagreb throughout the interwar period, especially regarding education and cultural projects.

Land plots were also a limited resource and debates over where to build frequently stalled project implementation. Challenges arose when public projects were planned on privately owned land or when differing opinions emerged about the most suitable locations

for specific initiatives. While the first issue could theoretically be resolved, albeit at a higher cost, the redistribution of land plots due to alternative locations often resulted in irresolvable dilemmas. Land-use dilemmas included situations where the alternative to constructing a new building was preserving existing structures or leaving the plot undeveloped, as well as cases where multiple projects competed for the same site. This problem intensified by the late 1930s, as the construction boom significantly reduced the availability of centrally located plots. Additionally, the indecision caused by such dilemmas created further complications. In Belgrade, for instance, in the late 1930s, although two plots were available for the City Hall and City Administration Building projects, both initiatives remained unrealized.

Overall, for projects that remained unrealized before materializing into architectural forms, one of the primary obstacles was decision-making paralysis stemming from dilemmas and difficulties in cooperation. Of the types proposed by Hood, 'pure' ineffectiveness offers a useful framework for explaining many unrealized projects in interwar Belgrade and Zagreb. On the one hand, actions often failed to provoke any response ('inertia'), while on the other, projects were discussed and some steps were taken, but these actions did not advance the projects to subsequent stages ('simple ineffectiveness'). Several examples illustrate these patterns, including the attempts to construct the Palace of Justice in both cities. In Zagreb, inertia was the predominant issue, particularly for projects requiring involvement from central government authorities. In contrast, Belgrade more frequently experienced simple ineffectiveness, especially when the municipality faced dilemmas.

The second stage of the architectural process involves selecting a project for implementation, typically through mechanisms such as commissioning, appointment, or competition. However, in the early 1920s, general administrative disorganization and the lack of established procedures in the Kingdom of SCS complicated the choice of a selection

mechanism for public buildings. Moreover, challenges within competitive practices during this period often became an additional obstacle to the realization of projects.

Architectural competitions provide valuable insights into the logic of selection, as they made architectural ideas visible and revealed what architects could propose, what juries rewarded, and what investors ultimately chose for realization. Ideally, competitions would result in investors selecting the highest-awarded project, assigning its development to the original author, and implementing it without major alterations. However, the possible outcomes formed a spectrum with many nuances in practice.

In theory, these outcomes can be categorized into three main groups based on the degree of realization: realization of the first or highest-awarded project, project replacement, and unrealized projects. Theoretically, the distribution across these three groups should be equal. However, the outcomes varied in reality: competition practices proved more effective in Zagreb, while project replacements were more frequent in Belgrade. In Belgrade, the proportion of project replacements increased during the 1930s, whereas in the 1920s, competition outcomes were closer to theoretical predictions. In Zagreb, the percentage of realized projects was higher during the 1920s, but by the 1930s, the proportion of unrealized projects had also increased.

To analyze competition practices, a model was used that treats competitions as a chain of communication acts: client requirements are translated into a competition program, participants interpret the program and submit their projects, the jury evaluates and awards them, and the client selects a project for implementation. The key elements (requirements, program, projects, results, decisions) are viewed as 'information' in Luhmann's terms¹¹⁹⁰.

When all 'information' components aligned, the competition mechanism operated effectively, and the investor selected the highest-awarded project for realization. Projects that

¹¹⁹⁰ Luhmann, *Art As a Social System*, 11-13.

remained unbuilt highlight issues arising from other factors that became significant during the transition from project selection to realization. However, project replacement indicates a communication failure. Such failures can be attributed to professional factors (e.g., issues with competition programs and jury evaluations), arbitrary investor decisions influenced by corruption or favoritism, or differing evaluation criteria stemming from varied understandings of architecture.

Complaints about competition programs, jury evaluations, and the arbitrariness of investor decisions were common in both cities throughout the interwar period. However, discrepancies in “codes” highlight differences in the functioning of the competition mechanism between Belgrade and Zagreb, as well as shifts in the nature of communication challenges over time. Varying understandings of architecture: what architecture is, why it is needed, what is important in a building, and how it should look, led to inconsistencies between the criteria used by juries to award projects and those applied by investors when selecting projects for implementation. These discrepancies can explain the increased share of project replacements in Belgrade during the 1930s. Architects often proposed and awarded modernist designs, whereas investors leaned towards academicism. Additionally, competition programs emphasized the rational organization of space, while investors focused more on façades. In contrast, Zagreb, where modernism gained more rapid affirmation and a more active professional community influenced investor preferences, saw a rise in the share of unrealized but not rejected projects during the 1930s.

Such projects selected for implementation but ultimately left unbuilt can often be attributed to broad coordination challenges during the third stage, which encompassed the actual construction process. After a project was selected and elaborated, its implementation required integrating it into the urban environment: a space where public and private interests intersected. The realization process involved reconciling these interests, addressing both

practical architectural and urban planning details and broader visions and concepts. Successfully realizing a project meant embedding it into the existing urban fabric while complying with regulations, city planning norms, and public interests. In theory, stable urban planning and construction regulations should not have posed significant obstacles. However, inconsistent or contested regulations often disrupted project realization, as illustrated by the Theater Square case in Belgrade. Not only did private investors face obstacles in implementing their projects due to conflicts with public interests, interests that urban regulations were meant to safeguard, but public projects also often remained unrealized. These failures frequently resulted from the dominance of particular interests in situations of conflicting priorities, as seen in the attempt to construct a city hall on the Foundation Block in Zagreb.

During the realization stage, issues resolved in the first stage could resurface, and if the investor failed to coordinate efforts to address these challenges, projects often remained unrealized, typically due to financial or land-related dilemmas. Additionally, constructing certain buildings required coordination in a narrow sense among involved parties, including municipalities and various ministries. Coordination difficulties stemming from conflicts of interest, political instability, and bureaucratic loops often led to either full or partial project non-realization. This is evident in many Zagreb examples, where for joint state and municipal projects, only the parts for which the municipality was responsible were constructed, or in the case of the Palace of Workers' Institutions, which faced difficulties at every stage and remained unbuilt, but individually, each institution managed to construct its own building. Some projects struggled with a lack of coordination due to refusal to support their implementation, but open opposition was rare. When it did occur, it was often directed not at the necessity of construction but at the selection process or the project's author. Still, in a few

cases, the very concept of construction faced resistance, as seen with the crematorium projects in both Belgrade and Zagreb.

Although some unrealized projects discussed in this dissertation were eventually constructed after World War II, many remained unbuilt. For example, crematoria were eventually built in both cities: Belgrade's first crematorium opened in an adapted building in 1964, and a new facility was constructed at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. In Zagreb, the crematorium was completed in 1985. Many of the aforementioned administrative buildings were also finally realized, including the Palaces of Justice in both cities (Belgrade between 1969 and 1973 and Zagreb from 1961 to 1970). Zagreb's municipal building was constructed between 1956 and 1958, while in Belgrade, the municipality took over the Old Palace (*Stari dvor*), and the City Administration was dissolved.

The competition mechanism functioned more effectively in Belgrade in socialist Yugoslavia, with a reduced percentage of rejected projects, though there was an increase in unrealized competition results, mainly due to the widening gap between optimistic planning and real-world constraints. Both in royal and socialist Yugoslavia, large-scale public projects for culture faced significant challenges in execution. Museum projects were mostly unrealized, with many museums housed in adapted pre-existing buildings. For instance, in Belgrade, only one museum from the planned complex at Ušće was built (which is still more than the unrealized museum complex planned at the fortress in interwar Belgrade). After one competition in royal Yugoslavia and two in socialist Yugoslavia, the issue of constructing an Opera House in Belgrade remains unresolved. While some projects faced new challenges in socialist Yugoslavia, many of the problems highlighted in the dissertation were persistent, continuing to complicate project realization not only in the latter half of the 20th century but also to the present day.

Appendix




Figure A.1. The first-prize competition project for the Main Post Office, Main Telegraph, and Postal Savings Bank building in Belgrade, Josip Pičman and Andrija Baranja, 1930.

Source: Stjepan Planić, *Problemi savremene arhitekture* (Zagreb: Jugoslovenska štampa, 1932), 98-99.




Figure A.2. The project for the Mitić's department store in Belgrade, 1938.

Source: "Na uglu Kralja Milana i Hartvigove ulice podići će se palata Mitić," *Vreme*, 4.12.1938, 7.




Figure A.3. Projects for the Foundation Block in Zagreb by Juraj Neidhardt: 1929; 1930.

Source: "Nestaje staroga Zagreba," *Novosti*, 3.7.1929; "Futurističke osnove," *Svijet* 4, knj. 9 (1930): 88.




Figure A.4. A project for a building with affordable apartments.

Source: "Sutra se otvara izložba Instituta za stanbenu kulturu," *Vreme*, 5.6.1937, 11.




Figure A.5. Projects for skyscrapers based on condominium ownership in Belgrade: the First Belgrade Cooperative "Condominium ownership"; Savings-construction cooperative "Own House".

Source: "Uskoro treba da otpočne gradjenje prve palate sa etažnom svojinom," *Politka*, 28.8.1938, 14; "Po principu etažne svojine kod Universitetskog parka zida se oblakoder sa trinaest spratova," *Politika*, 18.12.1938, 8.




Figure A.6. The proposal for a square with administrative buildings in Belgrade, Georgy Kovalevsky, 1934.

Source: "Kako bi trebalo urediti najglavniju i najlepšu tačku prestonice," *Vreme*, 11.11.1934, 7.




Figure A.7. The project for the Law Faculty building in Belgrade, Svetozar Jovanović, 1933. Source: "Beogradski univerzitet pod režimom „studentske majke“," *Štampa*, 25.11.1934, 5.





Figure A.8. The project for the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks in Belgrade, Nikola Nestorović, 1921; the first-prize competition project for the building of the Ministry of Forestry and Mining in Belgrade, the bureau "Arhitekt", 1921.

Source: Dimitrije M. Leko, "Nova zgrada Ministarstva poljoprivrede i voda i Ministarstva šuma i rudnika," *Tehnički List* 13-14 (1926): 194, 196.




Figure A.9. The final project for the joint building for the Ministry of Agriculture and Waterworks and the Ministry of Forestry and Mining in Belgrade, Nikola Nestorović and the bureau "Arhitekt", 1924.

Source: Dimitrije M. Leko, "Nova zgrada Ministarstva poljoprivrede i voda i Ministarstva šuma i rudnika," *Tehnički List* 13-14 (1926): 201.




Figure A.10. The first-prize competition project for the State Monopolies Administration, the Government, and the Cadastre Department in Belgrade, Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer, 1937.

Source: Hinko Bauer i Marjan Haberle, "Idejna skica za novu zgradu Uprave državnih monopola," *Građevinski Vjesnik* 5 (1937): 66-67.




Figure A.11. The second-prize competition project for the State Monopolies Administration, the Government, and the cadastre department in Belgrade, Rajko Tatić and Jovan Ranković, 1937.

Source: "Zgrada Uprave monopola u kojoj će biti smešteno i Predsedništvo Vlade biće najveća i najprezentativnija u zemlji," *Vreme*, 13.4.1937, 12.




Figure A.12. Stanko Kliska's first-prize competitions projects for the Railway Hospitals: in Zagreb, 1938; in Belgrade, 1940.

Source: "Nova željezničarska bolnica bit će dovršena prije Zakladne bolnice na Rebru," *Večer*, 16.11.1938, 5; "U Beogradu se podiže još jedna velika bolnica," *Vreme*, 31.5.1940, 10.




Figure A.13. Second-prize competition projects for the Warrior's House in Belgrade: Jovan Jovanović and Živojin Piperski; Bogdan Nestorović and Jovan Šnajder, 1929.
Source: "Kongres Ratnika u Beogradu," *Opštinske Novine*, 1.9.1929, 19; "Projekti za Ratnički dom u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 17.5.1929, 3.




Figure A.14. The highest awarded competition projects for the Opera House in Belgrade: Pasquale Marabotto, Luigi Orestano, and others; Vladimir Turina and Hinko Gottwald, 1940.

Source: Ivan Zdravković, "Ishod konkursa za Beogradsku operu," *Umetnički Pregled* 4-5 (1940): 144; 146.




Figure A.15. Competition projects for the Stock Exchange Office in Belgrade: the second prize project by Aleksandar Djordjević; one of purchased projects by Branislav Ristić, 1932.

Source: "Projekt palate Beogradske Berze," *Pravda*, 17.7.1932, 6; "Nova zgrada Beogradske Berze", *Politika*, 19.7.1932, 13.




Figure A.16. Competition projects for the OUZOR building in Belgrade: the first prize project by Lavoslav Horvat; the second prize project by the team Miladin Prljević and Živojin Piperski, 1929.

Source: "Palata Okružnog Ureda za osiguranje radnika," *Vreme*, 4.10.1929, 4



Figure A.17. Competition project for the Aeroclub building in Belgrade: the second prize project by Miša Manojlović; one of purchased projects by Miladin Prljević and Vojin Simeonović, 1932.

Source: St. M., "Rezultat konkursa za idejnu skicu doma Aero-kluba u Beogradu," *Naša krila* 95 (1932): 1734.




Figure A.18. The first-prize competition project for the Peasant Economic Union building in Zagreb, Zvonimir Požgaj, 1937.

Source: "Bit će priredjena izložba idejnih skica za dom Gospodarske sloge," *Večer*, 6.5.1937, 8.




Figure A.19. Competition projects for the Privileged Agrarian Bank building in Belgrade: third-prize awarded project by Petar and Branko Krstić; purchased project by Nikolay Krasnov and Dimitrije M. Leko; purchased project by Nikola Dobrović, 1931.

Source: "Sa izložbe skica za palatu Agrarne banke," *Politika*, 18.2.1931, 5; Branko Maksimović, "Izložba skica za palatu Agrarne banke," *Politika*, 20.2.1931, 8.




Figure A.20. Competition projects for the Ministry of Education building: the second-prize project by Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer, non-awarded project by Grigoriy Samoylov, 1937.

Source: "Nova palata Ministarstva prosvete," *Vreme*, 2.11.1937, 9; Milan Prosen, "Tvorchestvo arhitekta Grigorija Ivanovicha Samojlova," v *Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo, arhitektura i iskusstvovedenie Russkogo zarubezh'ja*, red. Oleg Lejkind. Sankt-Peterburg: Dmitrij Bulanin, 2008, 398.




Figure A.21. The second-prize competition project for the Ethnographic Museum in Belgrade, the team Georg Kiverov, Jovan Korka, and Djordje Krekić, 1938.

Source: "Kako će izgledati novi Etnografski muzej koji će uskoro početi da se gradi," *Politika*, 19.8.1938, 7.




Figure A.22. Competition projects for the OUZOR building in Belgrade by Lavoslav Horvat: first stage; second stage, 1929.

Source: "Palata Okružnog Ureda za osiguranje radnika," *Vreme*, 4.10.1929, 4; Stjepan Planić, *Problemi savremene arhitekture* (Zagreb: Jugoslovenska štampa, 1932).




Figure A.23. Projects for the Art Pavillion by Branislav Kojić: the first-prize competition project, 1925; the final project, 1927.

Source: "Umetnički paviljon u Beogradu," *Ilustrovani List* 48 (1925), 20; "Umetnički Paviljon koji se podiže u Beogradu," *Vreme*, 30.9.1927, 5.





Figure A.24. Projects for the building of Hrvatski Radiša in Zagreb by Oswald Schindler: the project elaborated after competition; the final project, 1931.

Source: "Započeta gradnja velike palače Hrv. Radiše u Zvonimirovoj ulici," *Novosti*, 10.3.1931, 6; "Hrvatski Radiša grade moderne internate," *Novosti*, 15.4.1931, 3.




Figure A.25. Projects for the student dormitory of the Croatian Cultural Society "Napredak" in Zagreb by Marjan Haberle and Hinko Bauer: the competition project, 1937; the final project, 1939.

Source: "Hrvatsko kulturno društvo „Napredak“ gradi u Derenčinovoj ulici svoj konvikt," *Jutarnji List*, 22.1.1937, 9; "U Derenčinovoj ulici gradit će se Napretkov dom za visokoškolce," *Večer*, 28.3.1939, 5.





Figure A.26. Project for the Kolarac People's University in Belgrade: the second-prize competition project by Andrej Papkov, 1928; the project chosen out of competition by Petar Bajalović, 1929.

Source: "Kolarčev Narodni Univerzitet," *Politika*, 14.6.1928, 5; "Jedan administrativno tehnički spor oko palate Narodnog univerziteta," *Vreme*, 20.3.1929, 7.




Figure A.27. Projects for the Belgrade Cooperative building: unknown author in 1929; the first-prize competition project by Sime Milosavljević in 1931.

Source: "Problem uređenja Pozorišnog trga," *Vreme*, 13.9.1929, 5; "Svršetak konkursa za palatu Beogradske zadruga," *Vreme*, 6.11.1931, 5.




Figure A.28. Drago Ibler's projects in Zagreb: the awarded competition project for the Foundation Block in 1931; the skyscraper project for the Bata company, 1939.

Source: "Futurističke osnove," *Svijet* 4, knj. 9 (1930): 89; "Je li opravdana borba protiv nebodera na Jelačićevom trgu," *Večer*, 8.4.1939, 7.




Figure A.29. Projects for the War Invalids Home in Belgrade: Milan Sekulić's second-prize competition project in 1928; unknown author's project in 1932.

Source: "Pred zidanjem invalidskog doma," *Politika*, 19.9.1928, 10; "Podizanje doma ratnih invalida," *Politika*, 19.10.1932, 10.



Figure A.30. Drago Ibler's projects for the Art Pavilion in Zagreb: preliminary sketch before the competition; the project chosen out of competition.

Source: "Umjetnički paviljon u Zagrebu," *Večer*, 24.12.1930, 7; "Ove godine bit će novi Umjetnički dom pod krovom," *Jutarnji List*, 9.2.1932, 3.




Figure A. 31. The first-prize competition project for Terazije Terrace in Belgrade, Nikola Dobrović, 1930.

Source: "Teraziska terasa u betonu, čeliku i staklu," *Politika*, 18.6.1930, 5.




Figure A. 32. The project for the Croatian Choral House in Zagreb, Stjepan Planić, 1927.

Source: "Izgradnja doma Hrvatskog pjevačkog saveza," *Jutarnji List*, 29.11.1929, 3.

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