CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2025
| Author | Lyu, Beike |
|---|---|
| Title | Accommodating Moral Supervenience In Moral Realism |
| Summary | Most metaethical philosophers accept Moral Supervenience, which is roughly the idea that no moral changes can happen without natural changes. Moral Supervenience indicates the metaphysical necessary relations between moral facts and natural facts. On the other hand, Moral Realism is generally the idea that moral truths are independent of what people might think. Some philosophers argue that Moral Realists cannot explain Moral Supervenience, which is a significant theoretical cost. In the thesis I will discuss the supervenience challenge to Moral Realism. After introducing Blackburn’s original argument and its modern interpretation, I will discuss several responses from different kinds of Moral Realism. I shall argue that they all fail to explain Moral Supervenience based on current debates over the issue. Then I will offer an analysis of why they fail and argue that a metaphysical picture is not enough for a completed explanation of Moral Supervenience. What is required as well is a substantial explanation of why it is the case. |
| Supervisor | Simon Rippon |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2025/lyu_beike.pdf |
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