

Dylan Thomas Mask

**SOUTH SLAVIC REFUGEES AND THEIR IMPACT ON HABSBURG
POLICIES TOWARD BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 1848—75**

Thesis submitted to the Department of History,
Central European University, Private University, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Comparative History

Supervisor: Professor Robyn Dora Radway
Second Reader: Professor Michael Laurence Miller
External Reader: Professor Johannes Feichtinger

Central European University, Private University

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Abstract

For centuries, South Slavic Ottoman Christians, from Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, fled as refugees to the Habsburg Monarchy during frequent periods of unrest. This thesis examines how these refugee movements contributed to internal Habsburg colonial imaginations toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, and impacted Habsburg refugee policies from the 1848–49 Revolutions until the “Eastern Crisis” in 1875. Habsburg territorial pretensions toward Bosnia and Herzegovina coalesced decades earlier than often formulated. I argue that Habsburg leaders frequently conceived of the Habsburg Monarchy as the preferred protector of Ottoman Christendom and welcomed South Slavic Christian refugees as a Christian moral imperative. However, over decades, critical failures in materially providing for refugees and security concerns along the Habsburg-Ottoman border stoked military and conservative rhetoric that portrayed the Ottoman Empire as an inherently “Oriental” and failing, advocating for the Habsburg strategic seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a long-contemplated colonial aspiration accentuated by state duties toward Christian refugees.

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The Habsburg Monarchy, 1848—1866, map created by Dylan Thomas Mask, March 21, 2025, referencing Friedrich Köke's *Local Map of the Austrian Empire*, Artaria & Comp, 1871.

Introduction: Colonial Imaginaries, Migrational Realities

In May 1855, Jovo and Malena Davidović, South Slavic Christians from the Ottoman Empire's Herzegovina province, fled to neighboring Dalmatia in the Habsburg Monarchy.² At the border, Habsburg officials interrogated the couple. The Davidoviés left the Ottoman Empire due to what Jovo cited as unbearable taxation and religious persecution from their Muslim landlord; the couple sought a less “oppressive” life in Christian Habsburg lands.³ The Davidoviés resided briefly in Knin, a common waystation for South Slavic Christian refugees in Dalmatia. A lack of available food and work opportunities prompted them to search elsewhere for more permanent resettlement.⁴ The couple applied for passports in Knin to emigrate north to Habsburg Croatia or Slavonia, which posed a dilemma for local officials since existing refugee policies pertained to large groups, not individual families.⁵ The Davidović's request reached the Interior Ministry in Vienna, where bureaucrats eventually granted it. While a seemingly inconsequential example, the Davidoviés emblemize a problem that Habsburg administrators increasingly encountered with greater consequences from the mid-nineteenth century onward: South Slavic Christian refugees from Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina seeking asylum throughout the Habsburg Monarchy.⁶

The following thesis examines South Slavic Christian refugee movements to the Habsburg Monarchy and their impact on Habsburg colonial pretensions toward Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 1848–49 Revolutions until the “Eastern Crisis's” commencement in 1875. In isolation, Austria-Hungary's 1878 occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, sanctioned by the European Great Powers signatories at the 1878 Berlin Congress, appears confusing. For decades, Habsburg bureaucrats in institutional reports and journalists in newspaper editorials portrayed Bosnia and

² I refer to Habsburg lands, from 1848—67 simply as the Habsburg Monarchy, in shorthand merely Habsburg, or to individual Habsburg crownlands by name; after the 1867 Compromise, I unilaterally use the term Austria-Hungary or when referring to individuals or groups, Habsburg.

³ Interior Ministry Protocol, June 24, 1855, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

⁴ Interior Ministry Protocol, June 24, 1855.

⁵ Interior Ministry Protocol, June 24, 1855.

⁶ Jovo and Melena Davidović represent two of only a few refugees referred to by name in Habsburg archival materials.

Herzegovina as an “Oriental” backwater rife with misguided “children” compared to Habsburg civilization.⁷ So then, how did the recurrent arrival of South Slavic Christian refugees impact Habsburg colonial and territorial aspirations toward Bosnia and Herzegovina?

First, the perceived, repeated persecution of South Slavic Christians by Bosnian Muslims offended Habsburg Catholic sensibilities. Habsburg leaders conceived of the Monarchy as a religious protectorate (*Kultusprotektorat*) for Ottoman Christendom, educating Catholic and Orthodox clergy from Ottoman lands, providing aid to Christian institutions in neighboring Ottoman provinces, and granting asylum to Christian refugees. Second, increased Habsburg interventionism on behalf of Ottoman Christians accentuated Habsburg “Oriental” territorial pretensions spurred from the loss of territories (among other political embarrassments), the Habsburg Netherlands (1797), Lombardy (1859), Venetia (1866), and Habsburg Archduke Maximilian I’s (1832—67) execution in Mexico (1867). The notion of a Habsburg colonial civilizing mission (*mission civilisatrice*) toward Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina existed among Viennese aristocrats and bureaucrats decades before the eventual Habsburg military occupation of those territories in 1878.

This thesis argues that recurrent administrative failures in South Slavic refugee policies (difficulties feeding and resettling refugees on Habsburg territory) repeatedly stoked Habsburg colonial imaginations portraying the Ottoman Empire as an inherently “Oriental,” failing institution, the so-called “sick man of Europe” and advocating for the Habsburg strategic acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸ The impacts of South Slavic refugees on Habsburg colonial imaginations of neighboring Ottoman territories remain understudied for the period in question. One reason for this lies with a persisting historiographical disconnect within the broader

⁷ “Unangenehmer Zuwachs,” *Kikeriki*, October 10, 1878. In the months following the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Austrian satirical magazine *Kikeriki*, visually and textually formulated a civilizational distinction between the peoples under “Mother Austria (*Mutter Austria*)” and dark-skinned Oriental additions.

⁸ Russian Tsar Nicholas I (1796—1855) reportedly coined the term “the sick man of Europe,” a moniker for the Ottoman Empire which elevated European narratives of Ottoman decline, accentuating, if only indirectly, European territorial pretensions toward Ottoman lands.

trajectory concerning migration, including the invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The significance of South Slavic Christian refugees to the Habsburg Monarchy lies in the institutional rhetoric and policy changes they arguably wrought across Habsburg lands.

Surviving Habsburg archival materials and Habsburg periodical presses provide an immense source base. The Austrian State Archives (*Österreichisches Staatsarchiv*) houses most textual reports concerning South Slavic refugees, split between the Foreign Ministry archives, the Interior Ministry archives, and the War Archives (*Kriegsarchiv*). Within most Habsburg sources, the German word for refugee (*Flüchtling*) maintained myriad meanings utilized by nineteenth-century Habsburg bureaucrats: refugee, political refugee, economic migrant, or fugitive. The nineteenth-century Habsburg definitions of the term refugee contrast with modern definitions, which often omit economic factors and even distinguish between those fleeing for political reasons. I define refugees in the chosen geo-historical context more loosely, much like Habsburg administrators, as individuals, families, or groups crossing an international border due to “well-founded fears of persecution,” often encountering immense hardships.⁹

Refugees crossed perilous borders in harrowing conditions, along the nearly one-thousand-kilometer-long border with the Habsburg Monarchy. Many refugees fled Ottoman lands voluntarily, primarily for economic reasons, though many reported interconfessional violence and religious persecution as pretexts for migration. Regardless of their reasons, Habsburg administrators legally considered refugees as foreigners (*Fremde*), a term that received little legal codification in the Habsburg Monarchy until the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁰ However, Ottoman Christian refugees to the Habsburg Monarchy long predated Habsburg formal legal definitions.

⁹ Andrew E. Shacknove, “Who Is a Refugee?” *Ethics*, no. 95 (January 1985): 274.

¹⁰ Brigitta Bader-Zaar, “Foreigners and the Law in Nineteenth Century Austria: Judicial Concepts and Legal Rights in the Light of the Development of Citizenship,” in *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World* eds. Andreas Fahrmeir et al, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 139.

Context

From the early sixteenth century until formally disbanded in 1881, the Croatian Military “Frontier” or Border (*Vojna Krajina* in Croatian, *Die Kroatische Militärgrenze* in German) functioned as a transitional zone between Habsburg Croatia and Slavonia, Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Venetian Dalmatia. A “frontier” conjures the idea of empty spaces, and even during the Croatian Military Border’s earlier history, it hardly functioned as one.¹¹ While sparsely populated, the Military Border implemented loose military order from its inception. Habsburg administrators labeled the migrants crossing the border as Vlachs (*Vlasi* in Croatian, *Wallachen* in German), or Uskoks (*uskoci*).¹² Few attached much meaning to these labels, even in the nineteenth century, so South Slav seems the most fitting and inclusive name. Migration to Habsburg Croatia and Slavonia often resulted in permanent settlement. The preexisting regimental system in the Croatian Military Border frequently recruited South Slav migrants to serve as border guards (*graničari* in Croatian, *Grenziers* in German, the term used throughout).¹³

The first recorded refugee families fled to the Croatian Military Border in 1530 when fifty Christian families emigrated from the only partially Ottoman-conquered Bihać region, prefiguring a centuries-long tradition of Ottoman Christians seeking Habsburg aid.¹⁴ Due to the Habsburg rulers’ Roman Catholic faith, administrators endemically favored Catholics over Orthodox Christians and Protestants, a divide widened by the Counterreformation (which intensified after 1620). The 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, in theory, established a “linear” border between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire; however, border disputes continued well into the mid-nineteenth-century.

¹¹ Michiel Baud and Willem Van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” *Journal of World History* 8, no. 2 (1997): 213.

¹² Sanja Lazanin, “Border-Crossings and Migration in the Croatian and Slavonian Military Frontiers in the Early Modern Period,” *History in Flux* 3 (2021): 63. *Uskoci* in Croatian roughly means to jump. The term initially referred to individuals who crossed territorial boundaries, though it later morphed to encompass piracy in the region.

¹³ Lazanin, “Border,” 64.

¹⁴ Lazanin, “Border,” 65-66.

In 1726, Habsburg military officials instituted sanitary cordons (*cordon sanitaire*) to increase border security and public safety, prevent the spread of plague, and formalize border controls.¹⁵ *Grenzzer* constructed sanitary facilities (*contumaz*) at strategic positions along the border to house, feed, and medically treat those involuntarily quarantined.¹⁶ During an imperial visit to the Croatian Military Border in 1768, Emperor Joseph II (1741—90) wrote, “We must well-maintain the cordon since, even in plague-free periods, brigands always lurk on the Turkish side.”¹⁷ Despite the Emperor’s observations, the Croatian Military Border faced endemic shortages. During the late eighteenth century, hundreds of Christian refugee families crossed the border illegally and without adhering to quarantine procedures.¹⁸

However, during Emperor Joseph II’s reign, centralized procedures for refugee resettlement increased tremendously. Emperor Joseph II favored settling Orthodox migrants in depopulated, recently acquired regions, such as the Serbian Vojvodina (1699) and the Temesvar Banat (1718): imperial peripheries. Prejudiced resettlement policies reflected his mother, Empress Maria Theresa’s (1717—80) ideal of the Habsburg Monarchy’s Catholic core.¹⁹ For Emperor Joseph II, refugees provided a solution to the issue of depopulation in seemingly “peripheral” Habsburg lands, which the 1781 Patent on Immigration (*Kolonisationspatent*) failed to mitigate effectively, issues that persisted well into the nineteenth century.²⁰ Offsetting the population decrease with refugees remained vital in the Croatian and Slavonian lands, the Vojvodina, and the Banat, a practice formalized in the eighteenth century.²¹

¹⁵ Mandić, “Emigration,” 46-48.

¹⁶ Mandić, “Emigration,” 46-47.

¹⁷ Antal Hegediš, “Josif II o svom putovanju u Banat. 1768 [Joseph II’s 1768 Journey through the Banat],” *Istraživanja*, 11, (1986): 249.

¹⁸ Mandić, “Emigration,” 48.

¹⁹ Jovan Pešalj and Josef Ehmer, “Hard Border Facilitates Migrations: The Habsburg-Ottoman Border Control Regime in the Eighteenth Century,” in *Borders and Mobility Control in and between Empires and Nation-States*, (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 107.

²⁰ Mandić, “Emigration,” 50.

²¹ Jovan Pešalj, “Monitoring Migrations: The Habsburg-Ottoman Border in the Eighteenth Century,” (diss., Leiden University, 2019), 115-119.

During those earlier centuries, Habsburg administrators bestowed more importance on *Grenzers*, who historically served as a bulwark against Ottoman raids into Habsburg lands, but by the mid-nineteenth century, the Croatian Military Border's utility steadily declined. In 1848, the region maintained a cumulative population of 572,000 people, split across eleven regimental districts, with around 50,000 trained and equipped soldiers, regarded as imperially loyal (*kaisertreu*), owing to their comparatively privileged imperial status.²² No military border existed in Dalmatia, a territory of the Republic of Venice, until the end of the eighteenth century, and few sources exist concerning the influx of Bosnian and Herzegovinian refugees into the region before Habsburg administration. The lack of scholarly literature on refugees across the area for the period in question (1848—75) emblemizes a broader historiographical issue.

Literature

Historiography on the Habsburg Monarchy often overlooks refugees in already scarce migrational studies. Many studies exist on migrants who travelled in unprecedented numbers during the nineteenth century, primarily from Europe to North America, but neglect intra-European migrations. Recently, more scholars began exploring migration to and from the Habsburg Monarchy, examining how non-state actors shaped imperial policies. As perceived, marginal non-state actors, South Slavic Christian refugees across Habsburg and Ottoman societies, collectively wrought immense institutional changes repeatedly over decades. The following historiographical categories remain vital to this study: studies of South Slavic refugee movements to the Habsburg Monarchy, the development of migrational policies within the Habsburg Monarchy, civil unrest in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the *Tanzimat* era,²³ and broader historiography on the Habsburg Monarchy's institutional structures and foreign policy.

²² Gunther E. Rothenberg, "The Struggle over the Dissolution of the Croatian Military Border, 1850- 1871," *Slavic Review* 23, no. 1 (1964): 65.

²³ The *Tanzimat*, *Neuordnung* (New Order) in German sources, represents a period of European-influenced reforms in Ottoman imperial history from 1839—76.

Scholarship on Habsburg colonial discourses, particularly Orientalism, shall act as a unifying framework throughout much of the relevant literature.

Historians of the Habsburg Monarchy only recently incorporated colonialism into scholarly analyses since, for decades, many Austrians claimed the country (and its Habsburg predecessor) maintained no colonial past.²⁴ While cursorily focused on overseas exploits, the Habsburg colonial imagination centered around the Monarchy's "Near Eastern (*Nah Osten*)" neighbors formed a much greater concern.²⁵ Unlike German imperial conquests in Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina stood on the cusp of the "core" Habsburg crownlands. The Habsburgs hardly acted alone in the colonial absorption of Ottoman territories: Russia in Bulgaria in 1878, France in Tunis in 1881, and Britain in Egypt in 1882 engaged in similar colonial exploits.²⁶ Yet, despite these dynamic changes, historians often portray Habsburg foreign policy in the nineteenth century as static, arguing that one could only "describe it, for it never changed."²⁷ However, the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina disproves such a generalization, and refugees greatly impacted the development of Habsburg colonial policy-making.

Concerning migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina, two works in particular bookend the thesis's periodization: Jared Manasek's dissertation and Jovan Pešalj's dissertation. Manasek argues the exponentially more significant number of predominantly Orthodox refugees from 1875—78, over 250,000, represented a complete failure of Ottoman governance and the collapse of Ottoman "domestic legitimacy" in Bosnia as an "indictment of the Ottoman Empire's ability to rule its European provinces."²⁸ The mass refugee crises that plagued the Habsburg Monarchy, according to Manasek, represented a "modernity" that transcended its predominant association with nation-

²⁴ The first English-language example of concerted efforts to reintroduce colonialism into Habsburg historiography appears in the 2012 special issue of *Austrian Studies*. See Walter, "Habsburg Colonial: Austria-Hungary's Role in European Overseas Expansion Reconsidered," *Austrian Studies*, vol. 20, (2012): 5-23.

²⁵ Clemens Ruthner, "Sleeping Beauty's Awakening: Habsburg Colonialism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878—1918," in *Imagining Bosnian Muslims in Central Europe*, ed. František Šítek, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2021), 76-79.

²⁶ Ruthner, "Colonialism," 79.

²⁷ Georg Schmid, "Der Ballhausplatz 1848-1918." *Österreichische Osthefte*, 23, (1981): 25.

²⁸ Jared Manasek, "Empire Displaced: Ottoman-Habsburg Forced Migration and the Near Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878." (diss., Columbia University, 2013), 4.

states; refugees represented a tool for “imperial legitimacy.”²⁹ Manasek tried to balance Habsburg and Ottoman perspectives in the dissertation, whereas perhaps focusing on one or the other might have proved more fruitful.

For Pešalj, the development of Habsburg-Ottoman border controls from 1699 to 1790 represented an asymmetrical power dynamic, which the Habsburg Monarchy often exploited. Pešalj argues that South Slavic migration to the Habsburg Monarchy aimed to facilitate, not restrict, travel to and from the Ottoman Empire.³⁰ However, Pešalj’s study lacks a precise analysis of the migrational consequences on the Habsburg Monarchy’s internal policymaking since the migrations, marginal population movements throughout the eighteenth century, hardly warranted the numbers for a strong centralized response. The long development of Habsburg border policies in his work shows how later refugees would eventually strain protocols instituted during a time with far fewer refugees.

The only available study on South Slavic Christian refugees in the mid-nineteenth-century examines only a sliver of the chosen period. Galib Šljivo’s article on North Bosnian refugees during the Crimean War (1853—56) recounts the Habsburg military and consular responses to the refugee crisis. With only regional aims, Šljivo overlooks how refugee movements factored into Habsburg migrational policies or Habsburg political considerations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conversely, Habsburg migrational studies often cover internal migrations from different ethnic regions within the Habsburg Monarchy; however, many studies overlook Habsburg migrational laws’ utility.³¹ Birgitta Bader-Zaar provides an intricate insight into these laws, categorizing foreigners in Habsburg society through an incrementally widened legal gap between citizens and aliens.³² Whereas, Waltraud Heindl-Langer and Edith Saurer’s edited volume examines the development of immigration in greater detail but only cursorily delves into the Habsburg Monarchy’s responses to

²⁹ Manasek, *Empire*, 9.

³⁰ Pešalj and Ehmer, “Migrations,” 307-309.

³¹ See Sylvia Hahn, “Inclusion and Exclusion of Migrants in the Multicultural Realm of the Habsburg “State of Many Peoples,” *Social History*, 33, no. 66, (2000): 309-310.

³² Bader-Zaar, “Foreigners,” 138-139.

refugees. This study reveals the development of the Habsburg Monarchy's refugee policies, a phenomenon vital in expanding historiography on migration to the Habsburg Monarchy.

Scholars of the Ottoman Empire have also examined reasons for taxation and “oppression,” civil unrest, and migration within nineteenth-century Bosnia and Herzegovina; Šljivo himself published a seven-volume work on the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the nineteenth century that often addressed these topics. However, Zafer Gölen's chapter helps illuminate the Ottoman factors in the unrest.³³ Gölen predominantly utilizes Ottoman archival documents to study the recurrent unrest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, arguing that the stringency of Bosnian Muslim elite privileges engendered an unwillingness for reform that stoked Christian rebellion.³⁴ While Gölen overemphasizes the role of Croatian and Serbian nationalism, his work provides a much-needed Ottoman archival perspective.

Anna Vakali's 2021 chapter expands upon Gölen's work, examining Christian agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the “*Tanzimat* rebellions,” predominantly, arguing that “nationalization” represented hardly a linear process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where social agency remained fluid, and rumors formed a primary impetus for rebel agitations.³⁵ I agree with Vakali's argument, especially concerning the importance of rumors within a largely illiterate society like Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, while disseminating information and rebel organizations among the Christian populace formed vital reasons for refugees' migrations, the often-circular migration of refugees (many of whom returned home after unrest subsided) and even “insurgents” to the Habsburg Monarchy remains a critical component that Vakali excludes. The literature surveyed here assists in showing the historiographical implications that refugees held in the

³³ Special thanks to Okan Kozanoğlu for his assistance in sourcing and interpreting Turkish language sources.

³⁴ Zafer Gölen, “Tanzimat Dönemi Bosna Hersek İsyanlarının Nedenleri [Causes of Revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina During the Tanzimat Era],” in *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Eskişyalık ve Terör* ed., Osman Köse, (Samsun: 2009), 164.

³⁵ Anna Vakali, “Conspiracy under Trial: Christian Brigands, Rebels and Activists in Bosnia during the Tanzimat,” in *Age of Rogues: Rebels, Revolutionaries, and Racketeers at the Frontiers of Empires* eds. Ramazan Hakki Öytan and Alp Yenen, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 154.

Habsburg Monarchy's long process toward the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina but largely omits how developing Orientalist and colonialist rhetoric contributed to these processes.

Methodology

Austrian “Orientalist” Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall (1774—1856) pioneered the systematic scholarship of “the East (*Ostens*)” in the Habsburg Monarchy and maintained a much more romantic, if not infantilizing, outlook than other scholars at that time which he claimed existed as the “old cradle of humanity, from where religion and culture originated and where progressive history turns its gaze wistfully back to the lost paradise of its childhood.”³⁶ Hammer-Purgstall's linkage between East and West here contrasts with Edward Said's definition, which positioned Western conceptions of the “Orient” as a rhetorical justification for Western domination.³⁷ However, definitions of what constituted an “Oriental” culture and how scholars interpreted these cultures differed more broadly in Habsburg and German-speaking Europe than in Saidian models of “Western” Orientalism.³⁸

Habsburg discrimination against Slavic people, particularly Czechs and later Serbs, Croats, and other Slavs, as perceived “Orientals” pervaded nineteenth-century discourses across German-speaking Habsburg lands. The question of these Slavs' religion bore the most weight for Habsburg administrators. For a multi-ethnic, predominantly Roman Catholic conglomeration, the Habsburg Monarchy undoubtedly favored Catholic refugees from the Ottoman Empire but accepted Orthodox Christians as a “Christian moral duty.”³⁹ Habsburg charitable organizations and state aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina disproportionately favored Catholics but maintained ties with Orthodox clergy and community leaders (*knež*) in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro to

³⁶ Dilek Yücel-Kamadan, “Contribution of Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall to the Rise of Orientalism in the German-speaking world,” *Journal of International Eastern European Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2 (2020): 596.

³⁷ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Random House Publishing, 1978), 3-4.

³⁸ See Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

³⁹ Andreas Baumgartner to Alexander Bach, June 9, 1852, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

ameliorate Russian influences.⁴⁰ However, these dynamics reflect a form of coloniality, paternalistic cultural superiority among German-speaking Austrians, which for Bosnia and Herzegovina developed into full-fledged colonialism.

Historian Johannes Feichtinger identified three principal forms of Habsburg Orientalism: the identitarian, the civilizing or missionary, and the participatory.⁴¹ Participatory Orientalism uniquely applies to the Habsburg Monarchy's encounters with Ottoman Christians and yet receives little scholarly attention. In his study, Feichtinger examined scientists and writers from the Habsburg Monarchy who, instead of "representing their subject...gave them a voice."⁴² Elaborating on Feichtinger's argument, the encounters between South Slavic refugees, *Grenzgers*, and other South Slavs and the report of those events to central Habsburg authorities in Vienna represented a form of participatory Orientalism.

Many Habsburg administrators viewed the Ottoman Balkans as an "other within." They often described Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially its Christian populations) as part of the "Orient" or "Near East." This rhetoric persisted even though the neighboring Ottomans often resembled the people living on the Habsburg side of the border.⁴³ While Habsburg cultures generated identity by contrasting themselves against Ottoman cultures, administrative efforts also attempted to incorporate "Oriental" Christians into the Habsburg state-building project. Confessionally, Habsburg Orientalism represented a "bulwark" between Christian and Islamic Europe.⁴⁴ While locating colonialist and Orientalist rhetoric within source materials remained relatively straightforward, the sheer dearth of materials complicated research.

⁴⁰ Paul W. Schroeder, "Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853-1855," *The Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 2 (1968): 197.

⁴¹ Johannes Feichtinger, "Komplexer k.u.k. Orientalismus: Akteure, Institutionen, Diskurse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert in Österreich," in *Orientalismen in Ostmitteleuropa: Diskurse, Akteure und Disziplinen vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, eds. Robert Born and Sarah Lemmen, (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2014), 37-40.

⁴² Feichtinger, "Orientalismus," 61.

⁴³ Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), viii-x.

⁴⁴ Feichtinger, "Orientalismus," 33.

Sources

This thesis primarily utilizes textual archival materials from the Austrian State Archives, newspaper databases from the Austrian National Library (*Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek*), and digitized printed works. The *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv* hosts two vital collections: two boxes of institutional reports and protocols from the Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, and Interior Ministry concerning South Slavic Christian refugees, in two chronological collections, 1852—62 and 1863—68. The reports compiled there represent the decisions and opinions of leading Habsburg officials throughout the periods, including reports to and from Emperor Franz Joseph I (1830—1916), Interior Minister Count Alexander von Bach (1813—93), and Dalmatian Governor Count Lazarus von Mamula (1795—1878) to list a few examples. Further archival materials on South Slavic refugee movements from the other Austrian State Archives include Interior Ministry internal reports on Bosnian rebellions and refugees from Herzegovina and the War Archive's Croatian Military Border administrative collections.

The selected archival collections document the evolution of Habsburg rhetoric and institutional policies toward South Slavic refugees, highlighting how these refugees shaped those policies amid shifting political priorities over the decades. The Austrian National Library's (ANNO) database of word-searchable newspaper and periodical collections illuminates the often-conflicting perspectives propagated (often by the Habsburg government) within the diverse Habsburg presses. The provincial presses of most significant relevance, *Die Agramer Zeitung* (1830—1911) from Zagreb, Croatia, a government-sanctioned German-language publication that most often reported on regional issues, and closely covered the Habsburg-Bosnian border. Similarly, *Die Temesvarer Zeitung* (1852—1949) from Timisoara, Romania, also reported on the Bosnian border, often using reports from the Serbian Vojvodina. *Die Wiener Zeitung* (1711—Present), a more general journalistic survey of the Habsburg Monarchy, frequently touched upon issues in the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the Croatian Military Border. These three examples represent a cursory survey of the periodical presses consulted here

but emblemize the recurring German-language discourses on South Slavic Christians from across the Habsburg Monarchy. The sources themselves greatly influenced the structure of the thesis, which remains predominantly chronological.

Structure

The thesis contains three chapters, examining the rhetoric and policy changes that defined three distinct periods. The first chapter discusses the 1848—49 Revolutions within the Habsburg Monarchy and in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Habsburg governmental responses to Christian refugee crises in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro beginning in 1852, which worsened the following year, the Habsburg tightening responses to refugees during the Crimean War, including the Rescript of 1854, and finally the 1856 Treaty of Paris's ramifications for Habsburg Eastern policies and Ottoman South Slavic Christians. The second chapter examines alternative “modernities” in the Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina coalescing after the 1857—59 tax revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 1858 Bosnian Deputation to Vienna which shows how Bosnian Christians elicited the Habsburg Monarchy's intervention, evolving dissatisfaction in Habsburg South Slav Lands over refugees, the 1862 Bosnian and Herzegovinian revolts and their refugees, and finally coalescing Habsburg Bosnian policies and calls for occupation of Bosnia amid the negotiations for the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise. The third chapter examines state-building issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, devolving unrest in Habsburg South Slav lands, the 1873 “Bosnian Plenipotentiary Committee,” the increasing propagation of the occupation idea among Habsburg governmental circles, the outbreak of the 1875 Herzegovina Uprising, its hundreds of thousands of refugees, and its impact on Habsburg foreign policy toward occupation.

By employing a critical lens of Habsburg Orientalism and colonial imaginations toward neighboring Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, I argue that the religious and moral duty guided

Habsburg obligations toward South Slavic Christian refugees. Over the decades, Habsburg administrations attempted to incorporate these displaced Christians into state-building projects, whether through resettlement efforts or employing refugees in state works, despite policy failures. The recurrent arrival of refugees to Habsburg lands, conversely, stoked conservative and military rhetoric advocating for an invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 1848—49 Revolutions served as the impetus for Habsburg ideas of a modern administrative “state.” As such, while the arrival of South Slavic Christian refugees regularly occurred centuries before, the Revolutions irrevocably altered the Habsburg responses to the arrival and contested acceptance of these displaced, foreign South Slav Christians.

Chapter One: Revolutions, South Slavic Refugees, and Contentious Reforms Across Habsburg and Ottoman Lands, 1848—56

At the 1878 Berlin Congress, when a foreign diplomat admired the Grand Cross of the Royal Hungarian Order of St. Stephen, awarded to Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Gyula Andrassy in 1867, he allegedly replied, “Once my visage bore an altogether different necklace.”⁴⁵ Andrassy participated in the 1848—49 Hungarian Revolution as a Honvéd cavalry Major and later as the Hungarian revolutionary government’s ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul.⁴⁶ After Hungary’s capitulation, Andrassy relocated to Paris, like many Hungarian revolutionaries. In 1851, he read in the *Wiener Zeitung* that, as Hungary’s ambassador in a “revolutionary capacity,” the military court in Pest sentenced him *in absentia* to death.⁴⁷ Decades later, at the Berlin Congress, Andrassy championed an Austro-Hungarian military occupation of a land that once graciously hosted Hungarian revolutionary refugees: Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁸ Andrassy’s trajectory from a condemned, though immensely privileged, “refugee” to a decorated diplomat encapsulates the hypocrisy of Habsburg responses to the 1848—49 Revolutions, and their forbearance on Bosnian and Herzegovinian Christian populations.

This chapter examines Habsburg perceptions and responses to Ottoman South Slavic Christian refugee movements, which stood between 10,000 and 20,000 refugees, to the Habsburg Monarchy between 1848 and 1856, and the development of Habsburg refugee policies. Such a phenomenon raises the question: how did the first arrivals of large numbers of refugees to the Habsburg Monarchy, and the policies instituted to ameliorate related issues, impact Habsburg perceptions of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Reorienting the discussion on Habsburg utilizations of refugees for the advancement of institutional, Orientalist rhetoric, much earlier than previously suggested, this chapter utilizes sources from the Habsburg Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry, and

⁴⁵ Eduard Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrassy sein Leben und Seine Zeit Nach Ungedruckten Quellen* [Count Gyula Andrassy: *His Life and Times According to Unpublished Sources*], Volume I, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1910), 57-58.

⁴⁶ Wertheimer, *Andrassy*, 55-56.

⁴⁷ “Von Pesth,” *Die Wiener Zeitung*, Sept 25 1851.

⁴⁸ Ruthner, “Colonialism,” 78.

War archives, in addition to diverse periodicals. I argue that Habsburg leaders conceived of the Habsburg Monarchy as the preferred protector of Ottoman Christians and welcomed South Slavic Christian refugees not merely as a perceived Christian moral imperative but as a reflection of multifaceted Habsburg territorial pretensions in Ottoman Southeastern Europe. However, Habsburg policies toward the Ottoman Empire and Bosnian reform processes the 1848—49 Revolutions irrevocably shifted.

Habsburg and Ottoman Lands in Revolution and Counterrevolution

From the Croatian military intervention during the Vienna October 1848 Revolution to Hungarian revolutionary refugees quelling unrest in Bosnia under Omer Pasha Latas's (1806—71) counterrevolution, revolutions and counterrevolutions in the Habsburg Monarchy and Bosnia and Herzegovina shaped the region's political landscape for decades. For the Habsburg Monarchy, Orientalist conceptions of their South Slavic lands and Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, coupled with Habsburg diplomatic crises caused by revolutionary Hungarian refugees, left the newly "neo-absolutist" Habsburg Monarchy unprepared financially and ideologically for Bosnian Muslim unrest, which contributed to sharp increases in Bosnian, Herzegovinian, and Montenegrin refugees from the Spring of 1852 onward.⁴⁹

Revolutionary fervor across Europe in March 1848 wrought turmoil throughout the Habsburg Monarchy, only militarily quelled by Russian intervention in Hungary beginning in August 1849. Despite subsequent conservative counterrevolutionary measures, the Revolutions echoed via subsequent Habsburg economic deficits and political repressions.⁵⁰ The Vienna Revolution of October 1848 itself exemplifies a dichotomy between conservative and liberal conceptions concerning Habsburg South Slavs. Revolutionaries depicted South Slavs especially as an illiberal, "Oriental" influence on Emperor Ferdinand I (1793—1875), while conservatives often

⁴⁹ The "neo-absolutist" period ascribed to Habsburg history (1852—60) saw "liberal" reforms through state centralization, led by Alexander von Bach.

⁵⁰ David F. Good. *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 39-43.

viewed them as loyal subjects. This view lingered long after the Habsburg and Russian armies forcibly quelled the Revolutions.

When the Croatian army, under *ban*⁵¹ Josip Jelačić (1801—59), entered Vienna's outskirts on October 9, 1848; they arrived from the imperial periphery.⁵² Croatia's 1848–49 Revolutions exhibited a less extremist character than Vienna's. Croatian constitutional reformers advocated for the abolition of *corvée*, legal servitude, and equal legal rights for males at the Croatian Military Border.⁵³ However, Croatian revolutionary fervor predominantly subsided after military mobilization began to quell the revolutions in Austrian and Hungarian lands.⁵⁴ As it remained unclear if Habsburg imperial troops would besiege Vienna, an article from the *Leipziger Vaterlandsverein*, a revolutionary German press association, claimed that if victorious, “Slavs will seek to dominate these Germanic provinces.”⁵⁵ The authors implored that German-speaking Austrians must resist by limiting Slavic influence in Habsburg society. The warning stemmed from worries arose from the perceived development of malignant Habsburg “Pan-Slavism,” fears fanned by the first Prague Slavic Congress in June 1848.⁵⁶

Imperial troops, including *Grenzers*, occupied Vienna shortly thereafter, and many accused *Grenzer* troops, especially, of savage depravity: beatings, property destruction, and looting. Jelačić addressed the allegations publicly, which the Hungarian German-language newspaper *Der Ungar* reprinted; his letter circulated widely during the relative press freedoms briefly brought about by the Revolutions. He disabused perceived *Grenzers*' “individual excesses,” arguing that those aggrieved “should seek compensation from the rebels!”⁵⁷ His response reflected an apathy toward

⁵¹ Roughly translating to the viceroy, *ban* served as the customary title for the Habsburg and later Hungarian (1868) appointed ruler over *banal* or Civil Croatia and Slavonia.

⁵² Reuben John Rath, *The Viennese Revolution of 1848*, (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1957), 335.

⁵³ Vlasta Švoger, “Political Rights and Freedoms in the Croatian National Revival and the Croatian Political Movement of 1848–1849,” *Hungarian Historical Review*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2016): 85–86.

⁵⁴ Tomislav Markus, “Mađarski nacionalizam i hrvatska politika 1848.1849. [Hungarian Nationalism and Croatian Politics, 1848–1849].” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 29, (1997): 46–50.

⁵⁵ “Ausland. Deutschland. Wien,” *Der Ungar*, November 18, 1848.

⁵⁶ Stanley Z. Pech, “The Nationalist Movements of the Austrian Slavs in 1848: A Comparative Sociological Profile,” *Social History*, 9 (1976): 349, 351.

⁵⁷ “Ausland. Deutschland. Wien,” *Der Ungar*, November 21, 1848.

Vienna's revolutionaries and an arch-conservative Habsburg loyalty. Conservatives lauded Jelačić, disavowing accusations against *Grenzer* troops. Austrian historian Ignaz Kankoffer wrote a year later about the siege: "The Croats bled on the battlefield and helped preserve Maria Theresa's inheritance."⁵⁸ If *Grenzer* troops acted as imperial saviors, that analogy lost its esteem once those troops returned to the Croatian Military Border, especially once civil unrest commenced in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Even during the Revolution, in January 1849, the Viennese press, *Die Presse* compared South Slavs in Bosnia to those in Croatia as peoples "directly on the border of our empire, related in language and customs."⁵⁹ German-speaking Austrians' cautious curiosity toward Bosnia and Bosnian Christians reflected developing interests in the Ottoman province. On the Croatian Military Border, imperial apparatuses divided these related peoples: regimental structures, border fortresses, and quarantine protocols. In August 1849, as the Hungarian Revolution ended, *Die Presse* again asserted that "Austria should assume the role of protector and defender of Bosnian Christians."⁶⁰ The dual recognition of Ottoman Christians as "Oriental" yet deserving of Habsburg protection expanded in the succeeding years, though, Habsburg concerns with other refugees.

During and especially after the 1848—49 Revolutions, the focus on Ottoman European territories, including Bosnia, lay not with its native Christian populations but with Habsburg subjects, revolutionaries, fugitives, ethnic Austrians, Hungarians, and Poles seeking amnesty by the thousands in the Ottoman Empire. Hungarian refugees especially embodied a "collective national narrative" for those in exile, narratives of defeat, and a notion of continuing the struggle from abroad.⁶¹ Alexander von Bach in 1849 identified revolutionary refugees in the "Orient" as one of

⁵⁸ Ignaz Kankoffer, *Heldenmüthige Bertheidigung ber Stadt Wien gegen die Türken im Jahre 1683. Mit Hinblick auf das Jahr 1848*, (Vienna: Leopold Grund Verlag, 1849), 17-18.

⁵⁹ "Der Aufstand in Bosnien," *Die Presse*, August 2, 1849.

⁶⁰ *Die Presse*, August 2, 1849.

⁶¹ Michael Laurence Miller, "Cosmopolitan, International, and Jewish: '48ers in Exile," in *A Jew in the Street: New Perspectives on European Jewish History* ed. Nancy Sinkoff, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2024), 150.

three primary security concerns for the Habsburg Monarchy.⁶² The “Oriental” refugee question strained Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic relations, from a contentious partner to a tenuous, perceivably conquerable enemy.⁶³

Hundreds of revolutionary Habsburg subjects who fled as refugees remained in Bosnia. Some refugees accepted temporary refugee status and received “daily 10 kreuzers” in addition to “bread, rice, and meat” from the local governments in Banja Luka, Travnik, and Sarajevo, before many traveled onward to Istanbul or elsewhere in Europe.⁶⁴ The *Ost-Deutsche Post* reported in March 1850 that a detachment of former Hungarian soldiers, now refugees, in Travnik immediately “pledged military service to the local *vizier*.”⁶⁵ Reports of Hungarians converting to Islam and joining the Ottoman army in the hundreds concerned Habsburg officials, distracting them from devolving political conditions in Bosnia, even as isolated numbers of Bosnian Christian refugees started crossing the Sava River border.

Around the same time, a Habsburg undercover agent in Wallachia contacted Omer Pasha and secured an incomplete list of Austrian and Hungarian officers serving in his ranks.⁶⁶ The Habsburg consulate in Sarajevo sought these refugees’ immediate extradition. The Habsburg press seemed assured of Ottoman cooperation, claiming from sources in the Foreign Ministry that “We remain firmly convinced that the ongoing dispute between our government and the *Porte*⁶⁷ over Hungarian refugees will soon end in a mutually satisfactory resolution.”⁶⁸ However, for Austrian and Hungarian revolutionaries, especially those who converted to Islam, extradition proved a

⁶² Christos Aliprantis, “Transnational Policing after the 1848-1849 Revolutions: The Habsburg Empire in the Mediterranean,” *European History Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 3 (2020): 419.

⁶³ “Operationsentwurf No. 6,” Operationsentwurf für die in Kroatien zur Invasion in Bosnien bestimmte Armee, 1853. Box 39, Bosnien-Herzegovina Collection, Austrian State Archives, War Archives (KA).

⁶⁴ “Erste März von der bosnische Grenze,” *Das Ost-Deutsche Post*, March 5, 1850.

⁶⁵ *Das Ost Deutsche Post*, March 5, 1850.

⁶⁶ Klezl to Felix Schwarzenberg, November 13, 1850, Verzeichnis der in Bosnien befindlichen Flüchtlinge, die eine höhere Charge bekleiden, 1850, MdA IB A document 10-3901, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

⁶⁷ The *Porte* or Sublime *Porte* refers to the Ottoman Empire’s central government in Istanbul. The name originates from the Turkish name for the Ottoman Grand Vizier’s office, “Eminence Gate (*Bâb-ı Âlî*).”

⁶⁸ Wien, 8 Oktober,” *Die Presse*, October 9, 1849.

delicate issue.⁶⁹ The cooperation that the Habsburg Monarchy predicted and sought hardly materialized, and hundreds of Habsburg subjects remained in Ottoman lands for years.⁷⁰

In Bosnia, revolutionary ideas that gripped Europe arrived late and manifested fundamentally differently. Bosnia's Governor General at the time, Mehmed Tahir Pasha, believed that Bosnia's Christian populace, almost feudally tied to the land and its Muslim owners, could hardly comprehend the concept of pan-European constitutional revolution, and thought Christian peasants would not revolt, which proved naïve.⁷¹ Hardly revolutionary, Tahir Pasha's *Tanzimat* reforms unsuccessfully attempted to restructure the *agaluk* estate system, abolishing compulsory peasant labor requirements. In return, he raised the grain tax from one-fourth to one-third of the yearly yield.⁷² In practice, many landlords instituted the latter reform without abolishing the former, further exacerbating the economic strain on the predominantly agrarian Christian populace.

Poor harvests in 1850 and 1851 exacerbated already heavily taxed Christian communities.⁷³ In response to growing tensions in Bosnia, Sultan Abdülmecid I (1823—61) wrote that “It is unthinkable to consider that my Muslim and Christian subjects in Bosnia shall be deprived of rights [that] the region is exempt from the *Tanzimat* is unacceptable to me.”⁷⁴ After Tahir Pasha died in 1850, Bosnian Muslims revolted to maintain traditional “feudal” privileges, leading Ottoman reformers to appoint Omer Pasha and his army to quell the rebellion in Bosnia. At first, Omer Pasha's authoritarian policies, exiling rebel instigators, worked; some Bosnian Christians even viewed him and his army as a liberating force, but those sentiments soon faded.⁷⁵

Amidst Muslim unrest in Bosnia, one Bosnian Christian sought rights and protections for the region's Christians. Friar Ivo Franjo Jukić (1818—57), a Bosnian Franciscan, published a

⁶⁹ Aliprantis, “Policing,” 421-423.

⁷⁰ Semra Isin, “1848 İhtilallerinin Osmanlı Devleti Üzerine Etkileri: Bosna Örneği [The Effects of the 1848 Revolutions on the Ottoman Empire: The Bosnian Example],” *Kadim*, issue 6, (2023): 178.

⁷¹ Isin, “Bosna,” 178.

⁷² Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, (London: McMillan Publishers, 1994), 124.

⁷³ Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856)*, (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2010), 294.

⁷⁴ Cited in Zafer Gölen, “The Trials of Bosnians in the Ottoman Empire During the Tanzimat Period,” *Journal of Ottoman Legacy Studies*, vol. 2, no. 4, (2015): 104.

⁷⁵ “Kronländer. Zara, 10 April,” *Die Wiener Zeitung*, April 14, 1851.

Croatian-language book in 1850, *Geography and History of Bosnia*, under the pseudonym of a Bosnian Slavophile (*Slavoljub Bošnjak*). Jukić noted that before the *Tanzimat*, Croats and “Bosnians,” meaning Bosnian Christians, maintained a total ignorance toward one another.⁷⁶ Jukić lamented the conditions of “sad Christian slaves in Turkey” whose poverty forced them to “emigrate to foreign lands or starve.”⁷⁷ He implored that European rulers, especially Emperor Franz Joseph I, beseech the Sultan Abdulmejid I (1823—61) to improve Christians’ lives in Bosnia.⁷⁸ However, Jukić’s work hardly reflected national separatism as he never advocated for a Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather, he believed the Sultan ruled as an enlightened sovereign but received false information from his advisors concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mere months before Jukić published his book in Croatia, he wrote and submitted a German-translated petition on April 1, 1850, titled “Wishes and Requests of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Christians.”⁷⁹ The petition accentuated Jukić’s desperation for Bosnian Christians, manifested in three principal reforms. The first requested equal treatment as Ottoman subjects, including legal equality, which the 1839 *Tanzimat* Edict already nominally guaranteed.⁸⁰ The second requested abolition of the *harac* or poll tax, which, while not included in previous reforms, appeared well within the existing dimensions of ongoing Ottoman tax restructuring.⁸¹ Finally, number twenty-seven bore the most weight. He wrote, “We [Christians] should be allowed to emigrate to other lands outside the Ottoman Empire.”⁸² Jukić’s inflammatory request reflected the dilemma felt by many Ottoman Christians as confined to provinces in crisis seeking recourse by fleeing to Habsburg lands.

⁷⁶ Ivan Franjo Jukić, *Zemljopis i Poviestnica Bosne* [*Geography and History of Bosnia*], (Zagreb: Ljudevit Gaj, 1850), v.

⁷⁷ Jukić, *Poviestnica*, 155-156.

⁷⁸ Jukić, *Poviestnica*, 154.

⁷⁹ Jukić most certainly wrote the April 1850 petition to Franz Joseph I, given that it appears as an appendix to his 1850 book.

⁸⁰ Ivan Franjo Jukić to Emperor Franz Joseph I, April 1, 1850, Brief von Christen aus Bosnien und Herzegowina an den Kaiser betreffend Wünsche und Bitten, SB NI item 9-1-17, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

⁸¹ Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 125.

⁸² Jukić to Emperor Franz Joseph I, April 1, 1850.

For Jukić's political activities, Omer Pasha summarily exiled him from Bosnia. Jukić settled in Croatia like many refugees but died only a few years later. Around the same time as Jukić's petition, the *Wiener Zeitung* reported, "From April 4 to the end of April, 223 men and 159 women, totaling 287 Bosnian refugees, passed through the Brood⁸³ Quarantine Station," and family members, already settled in Croatia, met them at the border.⁸⁴ At that time, most sporadic refugee movements from Bosnia to the Croatian Military Border involved Bosnian Christians from the Posavina, Banja Luka, or Bihać regions. These regions lie not only closer to the Habsburg border but are geographically less treacherous than other border regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since many refugees need only cross the Sava River.

In July 1851, the Habsburg consul in Sarajevo, Demeter Atanasković, wrote to Foreign Minister Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg (1800—52) that Christians now openly protested Omer Pasha's campaign.⁸⁵ The bulk of Christian disgruntlement lay with Omer Pasha's disarmament of Bosnia's Christian populace. Firearm ownership across the provinces constituted a cornerstone of Bosnian Muslim and Christian culture. In January 1852, Bosnian authorities arrested Orthodox and Catholic conspirators, including clergy, wealthy merchants, and *knežovi*, in association with an anti-Ottoman plot.⁸⁶ Early attempts to incite a Christian revolt failed. *Die Wiener Zeitung*, which, along with other presses that survived the revolutions, acted as state mouthpieces, noted that the Bosnian government feared a Christian "mass exodus" and, following the plot, increased Sava River border surveillance, even confiscating and smashing boats.⁸⁷

Omer Pasha's counterrevolution accomplished an end to Muslim unrest in Bosnia. However, his widespread Christian firearm confiscation policies and his appointment of corrupt officials who further perpetuated tax exploitation of the Christian peasantry left Christians almost

⁸³ Known today as Slavonski Brod, Brod, or also Brood, as it often appeared in German-language texts, Brod served as a vital Habsburg border military installation for centuries.

⁸⁴ "Kronländer. Brood (Slavonien)," *Die Wiener Zeitung*, May 9, 1850.

⁸⁵ Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 125.

⁸⁶ Miloš Jagodić, "Serbian Secret Organization in Eastern Bosnia, 1849-1855," *Journal of Historical Research*, (27) (2016): 195-196.

⁸⁷ "Kronländer. Agram, 1 März," *Die Wiener Zeitung*, March 3, 1852.

worse off than before his occupation.⁸⁸ In the Habsburg Monarchy, the 1848—49 Revolutions emblemized the liberal-conservative divide over diverse Habsburg positionalities toward the nearby Ottoman “Orient.” Revolutionary Habsburg subjects who turned into political refugees in Ottoman lands posed a primary national security concern that left leading Habsburg officials largely ignorant toward internal Bosnian strife. After revolutions in the Habsburg Monarchy and anti-reform unrest in Bosnia, many Christian peasants more acutely contemplated leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina altogether.

The Tisovac/Tiškovac Refugees: An Early Neo-absolutist Crisis

On March 16, 1852, over one hundred Bosnian Christians crossed the Dalmatian border at Plavno, seeking refuge.⁸⁹ Numbers grew as disparate refugee groups trekked with sparse provisions in frigid Spring temperatures over snowcapped mountains. The poor weather initially prevented the refugees’ relocation away from the border to Knin, in Central Dalmatia, by Dalmatian border guards.⁹⁰ Despite the unforgiving weather, another reason for the refugees’ unwillingness to leave the border lay with their uncertainty as to their legal status. At first, refugees at the border checkpoint petitioned Habsburg authorities to allow them to settle permanently in Dalmatia. In a March 28 letter from Finance Minister Count Andreas von Baumgartner (1793—1865) to Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg (sent mere days before Schwarzenberg’s death) Baumgartner noted with urgency the arrival of some five hundred, not one hundred Bosnian Christian refugees, all from the village of Tisovac/Tiškovac, located along the Bosnian border with mountainous Northern Dalmatia.⁹¹ Dalmatian officials rebuked the refugees’ wishes to remain in Dalmatia, citing concerns about sourcing already scarce arable land, so the refugees waited.⁹²

⁸⁸ Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 125-126.

⁸⁹ “Zara, 16 März,” *Das Fremden Blatt*, March 20, 1852.

⁹⁰ “Kronländer. Zara, 25 März,” *Die Wiener Zeitung*, March 30, 1852.

⁹¹ Andreas von Baumgartner to Felix zu Schwarzenberg, March 28, 1852, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

⁹² Baumgartner to Schwarzenberg, March 28, 1852.

The refugees' arrival in Dalmatia coincided with seismic shifts in Habsburg policies, domestic and foreign. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Habsburg Monarchy lacked a legal framework for *Fremde* or alien status. Beginning in 1842, German-speaking Austrian legal scholars started formally labeling migrant laws under similar categories as military and police law, but such legalistic categories failed to capture the nuance of Bosnian Christian refugees' circumstances.⁹³ After Schwarzenberg's death, Interior Minister Bach garnered greater license to enact centralizing, "neo-absolutist" reforms within the Interior Ministry, reinforcing and relying heavily on centralized bureaucratic systems, including increased reporting on refugee arrivals.

In interviews with refugees conducted by Dalmatian border officials, many Tisovac/Tiškovac refugees cited two primary reasons for migration: the arrest and abuse of their clergy and *knežovi* and excessive taxes levied by Tisovac/Tiškovac's landlord, Osman *beg*.⁹⁴ The refugees claimed that the arrests occurred without any rightful cause, and the incarcerated endured immense bodily harm in custody.⁹⁵ Baumgartner relayed that Habsburg consular officials in Bosnia investigated the refugees' claims and corroborated that Bosnian officials indeed arrested ten clergy members in conjunction with an anti-Ottoman conspiracy, disproving the refugees' claim that their arrests occurred without cause.⁹⁶ However, for Baumgartner, at least, the reasons why the refugees fled mattered less than the Habsburg Monarchy's responsibilities toward those foreign, Ottoman Christians.

Baumgartner argued that "Imperial interests lie with granting protection to those persecuted Christian subjects in neighboring lands."⁹⁷ Baumgartner's convictions might appear illogical considering the deep deficit, weak currency, and national debts that plagued the postrevolutionary Habsburg Monarchy. For Baumgartner, the military costs associated with

⁹³ Bader-Zaar, "Foreigners," 139, 141.

⁹⁴ Baumgartner to Schwarzenberg, March 28, 1852.

⁹⁵ Baumgartner to Schwarzenberg, March 28, 1852.

⁹⁶ Merner to Karl Buol, May 29, 1852 Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

⁹⁷ Baumgartner to Schwarzenberg, March 28, 1852.

the “Turkish Question” could bankrupt the Habsburg Monarchy altogether, so Baumgartner backed supporting refugees to maintain influence in Ottoman lands instead of military intervention.⁹⁸ For Bach, the refugees could hardly arrive at a worse time. After Schwarzenberg’s death, the transition of power seemed tenuous, and Bach vainly hoped Emperor Franz Joseph I would choose him as Schwarzenberg’s successor.⁹⁹ When those hopes faded, Bach consolidated his power through stringent bureaucracy, creating a secret police wing within the central police run by Count Johann Franz Kempen von Fichtenstamm (1793—1863).¹⁰⁰ While Bach maintained influence among the police, Kempen resisted many of Bach’s reform policies.¹⁰¹

Schwarzenberg’s successor in the foreign ministry, Count Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein (1797—1865) focused more on the Habsburg Monarchy’s relations with the Ottoman Empire than his predecessor.¹⁰² Despite this, Bosnian refugee policies remained solely for the Ministries of Finance and the Interior. The Interior and Finance Ministries hardly lacked precedent for Ottoman refugee resettlement. Baumgartner suggested that Habsburg officials relocate the refugees to the Serbian Vojvodina or the Temesvar Banat.¹⁰³ The Banat and the Vojvodina joined the Hungarian crownlands in 1779 as depopulated regions from centuries as Ottoman borderlands; the *corvée*’s abolition in 1848 only depopulated the regions further.¹⁰⁴

Baumgartner and Bach called upon local officials from those crownlands to scout potential resettlement locations. An official named Stowalk proposed Zombor/Sombor in the Vojvodina as the first candidate for the region’s flat, arable land, and that the “entire district consists of Vlachs,” a people perceived as related to the refugees by confession and cultural customs, at least

⁹⁸ Anton Schrötter, *Andreas Freiherr von Baumgartner: Eine Lebensskizze*, (Vienna: K.K. Hof und Staatsdeuckerei, 1866), 35-36.

⁹⁹ Eva Macho, *Alexander Freiherr von Bach: Stationen einer umstrittenen Karriere*, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009), 154.

¹⁰⁰ Macho, *Bach*, 162-166.

¹⁰¹ Macho, *Bach*, 154-155.

¹⁰² Theodor Sosnosky, *Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866*, vol. 1, (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913), 61-62.

¹⁰³ Baumgartner to Schwarzenberg, March 28, 1852.

¹⁰⁴ Stowalk to Andreas von Baumgartner, April 2, 1852, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

by Habsburg bureaucrats in Vienna.¹⁰⁵ However, when Habsburg officials started searching for resettlement sites in the Tisovac/Tiškovac at the beginning of April, refugee material conditions at Plavno and Knin worsened, and their numbers dwindled. Osman *beg* capitalized on Habsburg indecision, offering amnesty to the refugees if they returned to their homes and pastures in Tisovac/Tiškovac.¹⁰⁶ The *beg's* gambit worked. Of nearly five hundred refugees, by April 6, only 125 remained the majority women and children, with them 15 horses, 40 cattle, and 240 sheep; the men supposedly already returned to Bosnia.¹⁰⁷ Despite the swift decrease in refugees, officials in Vienna and elsewhere continued resettlement efforts.

On April 18, a court official in Sztapár/Stapar, in the Vojvodina, provided Baumgartner with a detailed resettlement plan, far more detailed than the plans from Zombor/Sombor, with plans to resettle the remaining 125 refugees in Brestovac.¹⁰⁸ South Slavs predominantly populated the region with minority Hungarian and Vlach populations, maintaining active Catholic and Orthodox churches that would “serve the spiritual needs of the settlers,” implying that the refugees belonged to both denominations.¹⁰⁹ Materially, he estimated that each family would require 22 yokes,¹¹⁰ 1584 yokes in total.¹¹¹ The settlers would lease the land at a rate of 1 florin 30 kreuzers per yoke annually, with an advance of 60 florins, reminiscent of late-eighteenth-century “colonization” procedures used in Banat and Arad.¹¹²

Brestovac’s flat river lands and the cultivation of its primary cash crop, tobacco, remained unknown to the refugees accustomed to mountainous pastoral life. Officials in Sztapár/Stapar identified climate and agricultural discrepancies as a potentially significant issue since relocation in

¹⁰⁵ Stowalk to Baumgartner, April 2, 1852.

¹⁰⁶ Baumgartner to Schwarzenberg March 28, 1852.

¹⁰⁷ Interior Ministry Protocol, April 12, 1852, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁰⁸ Sztapár/Stapar Officials to Andreas von Baumgartner April 18, 1852, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁰⁹ Sztapár/Stapar Officials to Baumgartner April 18, 1852.

¹¹⁰ A *joch* or yoke encompasses the area of a 40 *klafter* square, equivalent to 0.575 hectares or 1.42 acres.

¹¹¹ Sztapár/Stapar Officials to Baumgartner, April 18, 1852.

¹¹² Colin Thomas, “The Anatomy of a Colonization Frontier: The Banat of Temešvar,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 19, no. 2 (1984): 7-10.

a region lacking grazing lands would “require [the refugees] to sell their livestock, something impossible for them.”¹¹³ For the Tisovac/Tiškovac refugees, that issue proved moot. By April 21, only two of the some five hundred refugees remained in Dalmatia; the others returned home voluntarily in less than a month, well before Habsburg officials enacted resettlement plans. Refugees who accepted Osman *beg*’s amnesty returned home unmolested, an amnesty enforced by the Ottoman provincial court in Livno.¹¹⁴ News of the refugees’ return reached Vojvodina and Banat weeks later, so local officials continued searching for land for people no longer considered refugees due to the lengthy delays in Habsburg bureaucratic communication. However, resettlement surveys in the Vojvodina and Banat would contribute significantly to later Habsburg refugee policies.

Overall, the Tisovac/Tiškovac refugee crisis served as the first significant influx of Bosnian Christians onto Habsburg territory after the 1848—49 Revolutions. The refugees’ movements coincided with contentious transitions of power across central Habsburg institutions, especially the Foreign and Interior Ministries. Baumgartner, as Finance Minister, represents a clear example of a Habsburg minister who aligned moral Christian duties with protecting Ottoman Christian refugees. While all the Tisovac/Tiškovac refugees returned to Bosnia in about one month, these refugees reignited discussions on Habsburg resettlement policies, reflecting Bach’s authoritarian state-building trends. They alerted Habsburg officials to the deteriorating situation for Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the possibility of a general Christian tax revolt followed by subsequent refugee influxes.

Broadening South Slavic Refugee Crises Before the Crimean War

South Slavic refugee crises worsened from the Summer of 1852 until the beginning of the Crimean War in October 1853. Almost immediately after the Tisovac/Tiškovac refugees returned

¹¹³ Andreas von Baumgartner Note, April 19, 1852, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹¹⁴ Interior Ministry Protocol, April 23, 1852, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

to Bosnia, widespread dissent on taxation reached an impasse. Many officials whom Omer Pasha appointed in Bosnia practiced the same exploitative taxation practices as their predecessors. By the year's end, the number of refugees in Croatia alone reached over five thousand; Habsburg officials in Vienna ineffectively sought to alleviate the crisis. While the resettlement efforts undertaken on behalf of the Tiscovac/Tiškovac refugees assisted in resettling subsequent refugees, the lack of centralized policies on South Slavic refugees hampered local and centralized efforts to financially provide for refugees, causing immense material suffering for refugee populations and frustration for local communities that waited years for Habsburg reimbursement for hosting refugees. By late May 1852, the number and frequency of refugees crossing into the Croatian Military Border increased exponentially. Vice *ban* of Croatia, Benedikt Lentulay (1792—1859), reported to Bach that refugee numbers in Croatia reached over 1,000.¹¹⁵ He noted that newly arrived refugees in Croatia and Slavonia wished to remain together, making resettlement nearly impossible.¹¹⁶ Lentulay saw the only viable solution as resettlement in depopulated regions across Slavonia and the Serbian Vojvodina, a project made even more urgent by the approaching Autumn.¹¹⁷

Land surveys in the Temesvar Banat, completed the month prior, certainly informed Lentulay's argument. The relatively few villages surveyed could hardly accommodate the large, fluctuating number of refugees. Unlike the Tisovac/Tiškovac refugees, the new refugees arrived without livestock or other means of sustenance, leaving (or robbed of) their goods before crossing the Sava River; so, providing food and shelter remained paramount.¹¹⁸ Local officials identified the Tisa Regulation Company¹¹⁹ as a potential source of work and shelter for Bosnian refugees until the end of the year, draining swamps.¹²⁰ Monitoring and transporting refugee groups posed more

¹¹⁵ Benedikt Lentulay to Alexander von Bach, July 3, 1852, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹¹⁶ Lentulay to Bach, July 3, 1852.

¹¹⁷ Lentulay to Bach, July 3, 1852.

¹¹⁸ "Wien, 4 October," *Die Presse*, October 6, 1852.

¹¹⁹ The Tisa Regulation Company, or *Tisa Regulierungsgesellschaft*, operated as a Habsburg-sanctioned civil engineering company that sought to divert sections of the Tisa River to drain swamps and promote state-sponsored agriculture.

¹²⁰ Dimitrevitsch to Ronse, September 19, 1852, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

concerns. Bach expressed unease over the refugees' perceived nomadic nature, noting that "settling these people somewhere would bring them under close supervision and prevent jeopardizing national security by a nomadic and unreliable population."¹²¹ Bach's critical assessment of Bosnian refugees reflected pragmatic national security concerns, which pervaded "neo-absolutist" state-building processes, for only an empire could possibly tolerate nomadic populations, not a "modern" state.

Die Presse echoed Bach's concerns, reporting that "Among the refugees, idle beggars and vagrants, even dangerous individuals, wandered requiring the authorities' attention and intervention" and, as a result, the "honorable" refugees "feared losing the sympathy of their Austrian hosts."¹²² The mention of nomadic "vagrants," in particular, implies the presence of Romani populations among the refugees since *Grenzers* would prevent unauthorized Muslims from crossing the border. Historically, Habsburg law considered Romani peoples, regardless of religion, as "undesirable" migrants, instituting statutes in 1744 and 1749 that oscillated between expulsion and assimilation in peripheral crownlands.¹²³

South Slavic Refugees' concerns reflected tenuous hospitality paradigms along the Croatian Military Border, but also a categorization of refugees from desirable Christian families to undesirables that Habsburg officials and journalists saw as abusing hospitality. Attempts to split refugees into categories shows how the Habsburg Monarchy welcomed Christians to its crownlands conditionally, since national security concerns served as one of the risks refugees posed. Baumgartner referred to Bach's discretion as to the extent of the use of state funds to cover the sustenance and relocation of Bosnian refugees.¹²⁴ However, Baumgartner maintained that "it is Austria's official duty to protect the Christian faith in the Orient," using state funds only as an

¹²¹ Alexander von Bach to Benedikt Lentulay, July 13, 1852, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹²² *Die Presse*, October 6, 1852.

¹²³ Bader-Zaar, "Foreigners," 142-143.

¹²⁴ Baumgartner to Bach, June 9, 1852.

arm of that “duty.”¹²⁵ For a government still in financial turmoil from revolutions mere years earlier, Baumgartner’s commitment reflected commitments toward positioning the Habsburg Monarchy as a paragon of conservative Catholic duty. However, in practice, local communities most acutely bore the financial burden.

The issue of fiscal responsibility for refugees caused tensions between local and imperial authorities. Essek/Osijek, the Slavonian provincial seat, and surrounding communities spent 3,521 florins from municipal emergency funds to accommodate refugees and sought immediate reimbursement from the Habsburg government.¹²⁶ *Gendarmerie* leaders in Croatia went further, arguing that duties surrounding Bosnian refugees belonged solely to the Interior Ministry and other “political authorities” and railed against using municipal Croatian funds.¹²⁷ As an institutional product of Habsburg centralization, the *Gendarmerie*’s rejection of local financial responsibility for refugees makes sense. However, Bach chose not to heed the Croatian *Gendarmerie*’s argument.¹²⁸ Ultimately, friction from Croatian authorities stemmed from a lack of centralized policies, a problem Baumgartner identified during the Tisovac/Tiškovac crisis.¹²⁹

Bach certainly saw the new refugees as a drain on state coffers and an opportunity to address depopulation in the Serbian Vojvodina and the Temesvar Banat when local populations began migrating to urban centers after 1848.¹³⁰ In a note to the governors of the Vojvodina and the Banat in August, Bach stressed the necessity to relocate Bosnian refugees there immediately, citing that the refugee numbers, over just a few short weeks, increased exponentially from 1,000 to over 4,000.¹³¹ Concerning refugees, Habsburg diplomatic overtures to Ottoman authorities

¹²⁵ Baumgartner to Bach, June 9, 1852.

¹²⁶ Benedikt Lentulay to Alexander von Bach, December 10, 1855, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹²⁷ Interior Ministry Protocol, June 12, 1855, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹²⁸ Mladan Medved, “The ‘Civilising Mission’ of the Austrian Passive Revolution (1849–1867),” *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften*, 31(2), (2020): 73.

¹²⁹ Baumgartner to Bach, June 9, 1852.

¹³⁰ Protocol from Alexander von Bach to Serbian Vojvodina and Temesvar Banat, August 23, 1852, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹³¹ Protocol from Bach to Serbian Vojvodina and Temesvar Banat, August 23, 1852.

garnered few results besides empty assurances of improving conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹³² Therefore, Bach viewed the Habsburg Monarchy's priorities toward moving refugees away from the border, where they posed security risks, toward otherwise underpopulated regions in Eastern crownlands.

By October, the number of Bosnian refugees rose further to over 5,500, and despite Bach's plans, many refugees resettled promptly in Slavonia or later in the Banat.¹³³ *Die Presse* reported that refugees "receive six kreuzers per adult per day and three kreuzers per child...in line with Christian duty."¹³⁴ Many Croats voluntarily practiced charity; around the same time, Croats founded a charity in Zagreb in *ban* Jelačić's name for injured war veterans.¹³⁵ However, *Grenzlers'* poverty restricted local charitable capacities along the Croatian Military Border. While the daily stipends from Habsburg authorities helped alleviate material suffering, they hardly represented a sustainable or scalable policy on refugee accommodation. As unrest across Bosnia and Herzegovina drove Christian peasants to the Habsburg Monarchy, in semi-autonomous Montenegro, unrest would threaten Habsburg Dalmatian territories and cause a further diplomatic rupture in Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic relations.

The Montenegrin case and the Herzegovinian case differ significantly from Bosnia. As a tiny, semi-autonomous land surrounded by Ottoman territories and Dalmatia, Montenegro often rebelled against Ottoman regional hegemony, leaving the Habsburg Monarchy diplomatically precarious in a territory already untenable to defend. Montenegrin brigands even previously raided villages in Southern Dalmatia, forcing Dalmatian Governor Count Lazarus von Mamula to significantly reinforce Cattaro/Kotor's garrison in 1850, effectively establishing a military border around the mountainous hinterland.¹³⁶ In November 1853, though, Ottoman commissioners

¹³² Protocol from Bach to Serbian Vojvodina and Temesvar Banat, August 23, 1852.

¹³³ Protocol from Bach to Serbian Vojvodina and Temesvar Banat, August 23, 1852.

¹³⁴ *Die Presse*, October 6, 1852.

¹³⁵ John Paul Newman and Tamara Scheer, "The Ban Jelačić Trust for Disabled Soldiers and Their Families: Habsburg Dynastic Loyalty beyond National Boundaries, 1849–51," *Austrian History Yearbook* 49 (2018): 152-154.

¹³⁶ Stjepo Obad, "Boka kotorska za neoapsolutizma [The Bay of Kotor during Neo-Absolutism]," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 41, br. 3 (2009): 807.

appointed Omer Pasha to respond to the Montenegrin unrest and amassed an overwhelming force along Dalmatia's southern borderland to quell Montenegrin and Herzegovinian aggression permanently.¹³⁷ Thousands of Montenegrins and Herzegovinians fled to Cattaro/Kotor. Mamula reported that thirty refugees arrived daily.¹³⁸ Maritime trade dominated the Southern Dalmatian economy, especially in remote Cattaro/Kotor; however, the local populace worried about sustaining supply lines to feed the incoming refugees.¹³⁹

Despite previous hostilities, relations between Dalmatians and Montenegrins remained amicable. According to Mamula, locals welcomed refugees.¹⁴⁰ The Montenegrin refugees, though, differed from those from Bosnia. The former senate president of Montenegro, Pero Tomov Petrović-Njegoš (1800—54), among others of the Montenegrin landed elites, fled to Cattaro/Kotor.¹⁴¹ Mamula pleaded for the establishment of a Dalmatian refugee fund as the refugees of landed Montenegrin classes “are not in a situation to earn a livelihood through manual labor.”¹⁴² Moreover, Mamula viewed the presence of an Ottoman army on Habsburg southern borders as unacceptable. Buol appointed commissioners to negotiate with Omer Pasha. Buol threatened to invade Bosnia with an army of 60,000 *Grenzers* again commanded by *ban* Jelačić if Ottoman troops occupied the Montenegrin border fortresses at Klek or Sutorina.¹⁴³ Omer Pasha heeded Habsburg threats, even promising to dismiss Hungarian and Polish converts in his army.¹⁴⁴ Still unsatisfied, Buol sent a second delegation to Omer Pasha, accompanied by two imperial Russian diplomats.

As Montenegrin refugees streamed into Cattaro/Kotor and Winter set in, resettlement half-measures and local communities' inability to accommodate refugees in Croatia led to many

¹³⁷ Hans-Jürgen Kornrumpf, “Bosnien nach Ömer Pascha, 1852-1861,” *Südost-Forschungen*, no. 58, (1999): 170.

¹³⁸ Lazarus von Mamula to Alexander von Bach, November 6, 1857, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹³⁹ Obad, “neoapsolutizma,” 811.

¹⁴⁰ Mamula to Bach, November 6, 1857.

¹⁴¹ Mamula to Bach, November 6, 1857.

¹⁴² Mamula to Bach, November 6, 1857.

¹⁴³ Sosnosky, *Balkanpolitik*, 62.

¹⁴⁴ Sosnosky, *Balkanpolitik*, 63.

refugees returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the promise of general amnesty, half of the estimated 4,300 refugees began their return journey to Bosnia “without any external pressure.”¹⁴⁵ Winter conditions along the Croatian Military Border proved too harsh, for many refugees. Regardless of the reasons, voluntary refugee repatriation reflected Habsburg refugee policy failures. Consequently, the *Agramer Zeitung* reported that “vast expanses of the most beautiful and fertile land lie fallow” in Bosnia because of the refugees.¹⁴⁶ Ottoman officials likely feared that the following year's harvest would suffer if Christian peasants failed to return to their homes before the Spring sowings.

In January 1853, as Habsburg diplomats continued efforts in Montenegro, Jelačić and other military officials prepared for the threats diplomats made to Omer Pasha about invasion. The inner machinations of the Habsburg imperial military complex manifested through the Operational Drafts for the invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The drafts reveal the Habsburg military strategies should diplomacy fail. The draft argued, “When Islam’s hold in Europe is finally extinguished, its territories formally divided, then [the Habsburg Monarchy] should protect its interests against competitors.”¹⁴⁷ Such Islamophobic and Orientalist rhetoric reflected the imperial army’s assumptions in the Ottoman Balkans but, more pragmatically, Habsburg policies in thwarting Russian pretensions to Ottoman lands.

Habsburg military strategists predicted that conquering Bosnia and Herzegovina would prove “harder to navigate than the Swiss or Italian Alps,” but surrounded by enemies and “cut off from the rest of Turkey” geographically and poorly garrisoned by Ottoman troops, Habsburg armies could easily conquer the provinces.¹⁴⁸ As early as 1848, Ottoman officials in Bosnia identified that if the Habsburg Monarchy invaded Bosnia or even separatist troops from Montenegro, Croatia, or Serbia, Ottoman forces would struggle to respond in kind because of

¹⁴⁵ Merner to Alexander von Bach, December 27, 1852, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁴⁶ *Die Agramer Zeitung*, July 19, 1853.

¹⁴⁷ “Operationsentwurf No. 6,” 1853.

¹⁴⁸ “Operationsentwurf No. 6,” 1853.

logistic difficulties alone.¹⁴⁹ As Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy stalled, conflicts spread to Eastern Herzegovina. The Habsburg vice consul in Mostar gathered evidence against Ottoman conduct against Christians in Grahovo (near the Montenegrin border) to justify intervention in the region on behalf of these Christian populations.¹⁵⁰

During his tour of the Habsburg Monarchy's southern reaches, Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian inspected the Ottoman military installations at Grahovo. According to reporting officials in the Interior Ministry, the young Archduke sympathized with the Montenegrin cause and personally ordered 200,000 portions of hardtack to feed the refugees in Cattaro/Kotor.¹⁵¹ Following Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian's example, Cattaro/Kotor's locals organized donations and aid to the mountainous Dalmatian border with Herzegovina, totaling 8,000 florins.¹⁵² Philanthropy, imperial and local, formed the basis for refugee aid in Dalmatia, more so than in Croatia. In contrast to Bosnia, most Montenegrin refugees returned to Montenegro after hostilities ceased in February 1853.

The Habsburg Monarchy diplomatically and militarily secured Montenegro's autonomy and border security at the expense of relations with the Ottoman Empire. The broadening crisis of Bosnian, Herzegovinian, and Montenegrin refugees before the Crimean War reflected Omer Pasha's failures to implement reforms that would improve Christian living standards and decrease tax burdens, which contributed to Bosnian Christians' willingness to emigrate altogether. The number of refugees, some 6,000 to 8,000, posed numerous dilemmas for Habsburg authorities, the greatest of all, a lack of centralized refugee policies for aid and resettlement. In Bosnia, as in Herzegovina and Montenegro, refugees informed Habsburg policies and military planning via perceived Ottoman hostilities, which would broaden during the Crimean War.

¹⁴⁹ Cited in Isin, "Bosna," 181-182.

¹⁵⁰ Report to Alexander von Bach, February 14, 1853, Zustände in Bosnien, Volksstimmung in Tirol, 1852-1859, Mdl Präsidium A 874, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (AVA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁵¹ Report to Alexander von Bach, March 1, 1853, Zustände in Bosnien, Volksstimmung in Tirol, 1852-1859, Mdl Präsidium A 874, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (AVA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁵² Report to Bach, March 1, 1853.

The Rescript of 1854: Seeking a Centralized Refugee Policy

The Crimean War informed the Habsburg Monarchy's refugee and Ottoman foreign policies until the “Eastern Crisis” in 1875. The increase in South Slavic Christian refugees contributed to coalescing Habsburg policies over refugees and contrasted imperial indecisions associated with the Habsburg Monarchy's nominal neutrality during the Crimean War. The strains on Habsburg diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire, damaged further by wartime economic policies, prompted Habsburg officials to institute formal refugee policies in May 1854. The Rescript of 1854, previously only studied concerning the 1875—78 refugee crises, significantly increased Habsburg financial commitments in the region, further fueling Habsburg territorial pretensions some twenty years before the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵³

German-speaking Austrian conservatives, especially military leaders, advocated for a Russian alliance and an immediate occupation of Bosnia. Baron Karl Ludwig von Bruck (1798—1860), the Habsburg ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, led conservative antagonism toward the Ottomans. In July 1853, Bruck sent Buol a lengthy polemic urging Buol to evaluate “what Russia thinks about Austrian claims to Turkish inheritance.”¹⁵⁴ Buol opposed Bruck's proposal. Bach supported Buol's more “Russophobic” tendencies and lauded cooperation with England and France to avoid a broader war that the Habsburg Monarchy stood ill-equipped to conduct.¹⁵⁵ When the Crimean War began in October, Habsburg's foreign policy seemed indecisive due to these internal divisions. In the Spring of 1854, General Karl Ludwig von Grünne (1808—84) and venerated though elderly Field Marshall Josef Radetzky von Radetz (1766-1858) urged Emperor Franz Joseph I to seize the opportunity and command the Habsburg Monarchy's alliance with

¹⁵³ Jared Manasek, “Protection, Repatriation and Categorization: Refugees and Empire at the end of the Nineteenth Century.” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 30, (2017): 307.

¹⁵⁴ Cited in Paul W. Schroeder, “Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853-1855.” *The Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 2 (1968): 198.

¹⁵⁵ Macho, *Bach*, 174.

imperial Russia and an invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁵⁶ Rumors of these internal Habsburg divisions fanned discord among Bosnian Muslims.

Bosnian Muslims, too, worried that the Habsburg Monarchy would ally with Russia and promptly invade. In April 1854, the *Agramer Zeitung* reported rumors from Bosnia that the Habsburg army prepared for an invasion, “causing fear among the native Mohammedans” and allegedly prompting Bosnian Muslim renovations of dilapidated border fortresses.¹⁵⁷ In contrast, Bosnian Muslim administrator, Hurshid Pasha, referred to the Christian refugees in the Habsburg Monarchy as “thieves and vagrants,” disavowing any influence the refugees maintained over the Habsburg policies.¹⁵⁸ Weary of further regional depopulations, Bosnian Muslim border officials again seized and destroyed boats along the Sava River and distributed firearms to Muslims in border towns.¹⁵⁹

For Bosnian Christians, the Crimean War brought more hardships, and increased border security complicated refugee movements. Heightened taxation during the War prompted a Bosnian Christian delegation to travel to Istanbul to request economic relief and oversee the return of weapons confiscated by Omer Pasha’s troops.¹⁶⁰ The bid for rearmament proved fruitless as Bosnian Muslim officials worried about another Christian uprising. The Habsburg vice consul in Tuzla, Jovan Maričić, informed consul Atanasković in Sarajevo that another mass migration of Bosnian Christians to Habsburg territory seemed imminent.¹⁶¹ By May, influxes of Bosnian refugees again reached the thousands.¹⁶²

Imperial military rescript number 1,753, or the Rescript of May 1854, formalized Habsburg policies toward “Turkish Christian families” who fled to the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁶³ It streamlined

¹⁵⁶ Schroeder, “Eastern,” 197.

¹⁵⁷ “Nichtamtlicher Theil. Aus Bosnien Ende März,” *Die Agramer Zeitung*, April 12, 1854.

¹⁵⁸ Galib Šljivo, “Emigriranje iz sjeverne Bosne u prekosavske krajeve u toku kirimskog rata [Emigration from Northern Bosnia to the Presava Region During the Crimean War],” in *Migracije i Bosna i Hercegovina*, ed. Nusret Šhic, (University of Sarajevo, 1990), 138.

¹⁵⁹ Šljivo, “Emigriranje,” 135-136.

¹⁶⁰ “Orientalische Angelegenheiten,” *Die Vereinigte Laibacher Zeitung*, April 14, 1854.

¹⁶¹ Cited in Šljivo, “Emigriranje,” 136.

¹⁶² *Die Agramer Zeitung*, April 12, 1854.

¹⁶³ Josef Hostinec, *Die k.k. Militärgrenze, ihre Organisation und Verfassung*, (Vienna: Hof und Staatsdruckerei 1862), 405.

Habsburg refugee protocols, reiterating that there existed “no reason to turn away distressed Turkish refugees” at the border.¹⁶⁴ Croatian Military Border authorities assumed the responsibility for providing prearranged stipends to refugees, lump sums of 7 kreuzers per adult and 31 ½ neukreuzers per child, which in theory would ease financial issues, and necessary reimbursements to local communities.¹⁶⁵ The Rescript additionally dictated that Bosnian Christian insurgents, bandits, deserters, and other fugitives, if admitted across the border, *Grenzgers* should immediately disarm.¹⁶⁶ The new policies sought to tie refugee aid to the Croatian Military Border but failed to fully lift the financial burden from Croatian and Slavonian municipalities.

Atanasković estimated that from February to June 1855, 985 Bosnian Christians emigrated to the Habsburg Monarchy; most hailed from Bosnia’s Northern Posavina or Banja Luka districts.¹⁶⁷ The influx of refugees corresponded to Ottoman taxes to prevent Christian military conscription.¹⁶⁸ In response to the wartime tax burdens, Orthodox Christians in Eastern Bosnia sent a delegation to Belgrade to seek diplomatic amelioration of Bosnian Christian conditions through Serbian intervention, but their attempts failed.¹⁶⁹ For refugees in Croatia, the Rescript of 1854 reinforced Habsburg policies of relocating Bosnian refugees to the Vojvodina or the Banat, which some refugees resisted. Lentulay explained to Bach how refugees maintained hopes that Habsburg officials would provide them with free parcels of rich Croatian farmland to settle.¹⁷⁰ Instead, many waited on the border for months for resettlement in poor conditions or wandered, seeking accommodations and work in the countryside or Croatian cities such as Carlstadt/Karlovac and Agram/Zagreb.¹⁷¹ Authorities in Slavonia reported that Bosnian refugees arrived in Daruvar “sick and starving.”¹⁷² Instead of depleting their communal coffers and larders,

¹⁶⁴ Hostinec, *Militärgrenze*, 405.

¹⁶⁵ Hostinec, *Militärgrenze*, 405.

¹⁶⁶ Hostinec, *Militärgrenze*, 405-406.

¹⁶⁷ Cited in Šljivo, “Emigriranje,” 143.

¹⁶⁸ Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 125.

¹⁶⁹ Šljivo, “Emigriranje,” 138.

¹⁷⁰ Benedikt Lentulay to Alexander von Bach, May 26, 1855, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁷¹ Lentulay to Bach, May 26, 1855.

¹⁷² Lentulay to Bach, May 26, 1855.

officials in Daruvar immediately transported the refugees eastward by wagon to the Serbian Vojvodina.¹⁷³

The lack of available refugee interviews complicates constructing empathetic refugee narratives and how refugees navigated the Habsburg resettlement procedures. Croatian Military Border officials sought better intelligence from Bosnia as the Crimean War persisted. In December, the Ogulin regimental district commander sent Mile Stilić, a *Grenzer* officer, and Simo Ivančević, a Catholic priest, to interview Bosnian refugees.¹⁷⁴ In their report, wartime “excessive tax collection” formed the overwhelming answer from the refugees.¹⁷⁵ While Stilić and Ivančević’s work revealed little new information, it reinforced Habsburg conceptions that Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina stood on the brink of societal dissolution and that the Habsburg Monarchy should intervene and preserve order. While not in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Habsburg interventionist policies in the Crimean War’s final months contributed to an armistice.

The 1856 Treaty of Paris: Habsburg and Bosnian Ramifications

On December 28, 1855, the Habsburg ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Bálint László Esterházy de Galántha (1814—58), submitted a petition to Tsar Alexander II (1818—81) stipulating that the Habsburg Monarchy would join the War against the Russian Empire unless the Tsar agreed to an armistice and participated in subsequent peace negotiations.¹⁷⁶ The Habsburg ultimatum ruptured previously neutral, even conciliatory, Russian foreign policy. In February 1856, peace negotiations commenced in Paris between all belligerent parties, even the nominally neutral Habsburg Monarchy. South Slavic Ottoman Christians viewed the negotiations hopefully as a legal codification of rights and privileges.

¹⁷³ Lentulay to Bach, May 26, 1855.

¹⁷⁴ Benedikt Lentulay to Alexander von Bach, December 8, 1855, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge*, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁷⁵ Lentulay to Bach, December 8, 1855.

¹⁷⁶ Badem, *Ottoman*, 285-286.

As a stipulation for peace negotiations, Sultan Abdülmecid I published the Rescript of Reform (*Islahat Fermani*), a reformulation and expansion of the reforms in the 1839 *Tanzimat* Edict (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif*). The new *Tanzimat* Edict's publication coincided with the opening weeks of peace negotiations, which ended with the 1856 Treaty of Paris's ratification on March 30, 1856. The Edict sought to codify international paradigms of non-intervention in the Ottoman Empire while extending equal legal rights and imperial obligations to all Ottoman Christians, at least nominally. In addition, the 1856 Treaty of Paris provided an almost unintentional framework for Ottoman Christians to seek international redress against perceived Ottoman oppression that would remain intact until the "Eastern Crisis." The Crimean War's end crystallized Habsburg conservative opinion toward opportunistic interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reiterating Habsburg conventions towards protecting Ottoman Christians through Habsburg consulates and refugees through the Croatian Military Border and overseen by the Interior Ministry.

From a Habsburg perspective, the Treaty of Paris eclipsed the Metternichian order established at the 1815 Vienna Congress.¹⁷⁷ Ottoman entry into "the Concert of Europe," diplomatically at least, relied on the implementation of Ottoman reforms that legally established equality for Ottoman Christians.¹⁷⁸ Concerning taxation, the Ottomans asserted that tax collectors would take taxes and tithes equally and that "local taxes shall, as far as possible, be so imposed as not to affect the sources of production."¹⁷⁹ Naturally, Bosnian Muslims opposed the new reforms. Hasan *aga*, a Bosnian Muslim landlord, wrote in response to the Edict that "There is only one reason for these disasters: the Sultan and his *viziers* are plotting against Bosnia with the Russians, Serbs, and Montenegrins."¹⁸⁰ Hasan *aga's* accusation of the Sultan's supposed treason reflected the extent of Bosnian Muslim traditionalism, but while the new reforms provided a more explicit legal

¹⁷⁷ Francis Roy Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy Among the Great Powers, 1815-1918*, (New York: Berg Publishers, 1990), 61-63.

¹⁷⁸ Israel, *Treaties*, 949.

¹⁷⁹ Abdulmejid I, "Rescript of Reform—*Islahat Fermani* (18 February 1856)," Boğaziçi University Atatürk Institute of Modern Turkish History, translator unknown, 2005.

¹⁸⁰ Cited in Gölen, "Tanzimat," 165.

framework for Ottoman Christian rights, the material conditions for Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina hardly changed.

After the Treaty of Paris, the *Agrar Zeitung* wrote, “Vienna stands in closer geographical relation to Bosnia than Constantinople. Therefore, Austria must not allow any foreign influence in Bosnia.”¹⁸¹ The fear of foreign influence, particularly Russian, stemmed undoubtedly from long-perceived strategic vulnerabilities in Dalmatia but also from moral concerns for and perceived responsibilities toward Christians in neighboring Ottoman lands. University of Vienna Professor Lorenz von Stein (1815—90) echoed these ideas in his immediate postwar work, *Austria and the Peace* (*Österreich und das Frieden*). He characterized the Paris peace as confirmation that the burden of “civilizing” the Ottoman Balkans lay solely with the Habsburg Monarchy.¹⁸² Stein’s work lacked clear parameters for what many called the Habsburg “civilizing mission” in the Ottoman Balkans, though he unlikely envisioned a forthcoming invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Despite the Treaty of Paris’s explicit ban on European intervention in the Ottoman Empire, Field Marshall Radetzky disagreed. Dissatisfied with Habsburg politicking during the Crimean War, he circulated a memorandum among military and conservative circles. In the memorandum, Radetzky alluded to the advantage of a Habsburg invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸³ He claimed that as long as the Habsburg Monarchy held Istria and Dalmatia, controlling their vital harbors, “securing the right flank,” pacifying or conquering Bosnia and Herzegovina remained vital.¹⁸⁴ However, Radetzky thought that any Habsburg acquisitions of Ottoman territories must follow the firm settlement of Habsburg territorial disputes with Piedmont, in the Italian peninsula.¹⁸⁵ Radetzky’s convictions exemplified sentiments among Habsburg military leaders, machinations not reflected by Bach and Buol.

¹⁸¹ “Inland. Trieste, 21 August,” *Die Agrar Zeitung*, August 25, 1856.

¹⁸² Lorenz Stein, *Österreich und das Frieden*, (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1856), 39-42.

¹⁸³ Sosnosky, *Balkanpolitik*, 289.

¹⁸⁴ Cited in Sosnosky, *Balkanpolitik*, 290-291.

¹⁸⁵ Cited in Sosnosky, *Balkanpolitik*, 289-290.

Even months after the peace, Habsburg officials continued to resettle Bosnian refugees. While no precise numbers exist, many wartime refugees likely returned to their homes in Bosnia after the *Tanzimat* Edict's publication. On September 21, the Interior Ministry submitted a lengthy report to Emperor Franz Joseph I, still in his summer residence at Schönbrunn, summarizing the Habsburg financial and governmental responses to Ottoman South Slavic refugee crises since 1852. Bach argued that he sought to preserve and expand “the prestige and influence of Your Majesty’s government among Oriental Christians.”¹⁸⁶ The report reiterated Baumgartner’s rhetoric from March 1852, codifying Habsburg religious pretensions over Ottoman Christians even after the 1856 Treaty of Paris thwarted Habsburg territorial pretensions toward Ottoman lands.

After four years of acute Ottoman South Slavic refugee crises, Habsburg leaders discussed Bosnian Christian refugees in a reductive, paternalist manner and responded reflecting a vested interest in maintaining influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina as those Ottoman Christians’ “preferred protector.”¹⁸⁷ While wartime refugee numbers increased, Habsburg refugee policies and Habsburg leaders’ propensity toward maintaining influence in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina lingered. The lack of meaningful, systematic change in these Ottoman lands’ governing policies manifested in renewed Christian revolts in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro amid an unprecedented refugee numbers. Chapter two examines how the development of these refugee policies signified “modernization” processes in the Habsburg Monarchy and later in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina during renewed revolt and shifts in Habsburg refugee policies during a period that marked many transitions and economic challenges.

¹⁸⁶ Interior Ministry Report to Emperor Franz Joseph I, September 21, 1856, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

¹⁸⁷ Interior Ministry to Emperor Franz Joseph I, September 21, 1856.

Chapter Two: Renewed Refugee Movements Amid Alternative Habsburg and Ottoman Modernities, 1857—66

On April 25, 1857, Croatian historian Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski (1816—89) arrived at Alt/Stara Gradiška on the Croatian Military Border, to accompany a merchant friend on a business trip through Northern Bosnia.¹⁸⁸ As a scholar who studied at the University of Vienna, Sakcinski represented a rare, learned foreign visitor to that fringe European Ottoman province. On arriving at the Sava River border, Sakcinski seemed almost immediately disabused of any romantic fantasies of that “Oriental” threshold, writing, “If our Sava shore appears barren and desolate, one could easily say that the Bosnian shore rots there, entirely dead.”¹⁸⁹ During his month-long travels in Bosnia, Sakcinski repeatedly commented on the region's depopulation due to years of refugee movements, lamenting the “uncultivated fields and orchards” he passed on the roadside.¹⁹⁰ Sakcinski's observations portrayed a province at the beginning stages of *Tanzimat* reforms, a process more worryingly observed by Habsburg administrators in Vienna.

Despite the challenges associated with developing refugee policies under Habsburg “neo-absolutism,” this chapter examines how institutional reforms within the Habsburg Monarchy and in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina shaped Habsburg responses to renewed Christian refugee movements from these regions between 1857 and 1866. Well over 20,000 refugees fled to the Croatian Military Border during the revolts and Habsburg officials resettled thousands elsewhere. Seeking alternative forms of modernity within the Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Empire led to uneven industrialization and institutional reforms that only partially curtailed refugee crises and further fanned Habsburg colonial rhetoric toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. To analyze these concerns, I use sources from expanding Habsburg presses, the Habsburg Foreign Ministry and Interior Ministry archives, with a greater reliance on correspondence from Habsburg consular officials. I argue that developing resistance toward the accommodation of refugees across the

¹⁸⁸ Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, *Putovanje do Bosni* [*Travels through Bosnia*], (Zagreb: Lavoslav Župana), 3–4.

¹⁸⁹ Sakcinski, *Putovanje*, 5.

¹⁹⁰ Sakcinski, *Putovanje*, 12.

Habsburg Monarchy contributed to Viennese leaders' extraordinary plan to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina to permanently end the recurrent border issues, plans drafted despite ongoing efforts to reform and modernize Bosnian society.

The Refugee Question in Modernizing Habsburg and Ottoman Societies

By 1858, Vienna's city walls lay in a demolished heap; the Ringstraße, a modern boulevard lined with ministerial buildings, parks, and theaters, replaced the fortifications that guarded the city for centuries. However, palisades and star fortresses remained in daily use along the Croatian Military Border. The discontinuity between these two Habsburg crownlands emblemizes the unevenness of Habsburg modernization. In Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Tanzimat* reforms partially enacted a "defeudalization" between Muslim and Christian society.¹⁹¹ The uneven implementation of these processes reveals significant similarities between these two lands and challenges Habsburg rhetoric that labeled Bosnia uncivilized. By the end of the period, Bosnia (despite persistent corruption and traditionalism) matched the administrative and social development of its European neighbors.¹⁹²

The historiographical question of "modernity" in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire remains too large to examine here. Undoubtedly, the conceptualization and policies surrounding refugees for Habsburg and Ottoman officials existed within the realm of "modern" statecraft. Multi-ethnic imperial conglomerations, such as the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, rarely conjure images of modernity. While in terms of industrialization, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire lagged behind much of Europe, governmental reforms, the ongoing *Tanzimat* reforms in the Ottoman Empire, and parliamentary reforms, notably the 1860 October Diploma in the Habsburg Monarchy, suggest alternative forms of modernity. Continuing *Tanzimat* processes in Bosnia contributed to renewed conflicts with local

¹⁹¹ Hannes Grandits, *The End of Ottoman Rule in Bosnia: Conflicting Agencies and Imperial Appropriations*, (New York: Routledge, 2022), 1-3.

¹⁹² Grandits, *Bosnia*, 2.

Bosnian Muslim elites, who unsurprisingly resisted new reforms. In response, the flight of Christian peasants to the Habsburg Monarchy intensified, only mollified again by imperial intervention forcefully instituting reforms.

In the Habsburg Monarchy, the issues of assembling a modern centralized state created communication problems between central ministries in Vienna and provincial officials in Croatia and Slavonia concerning South Slavic refugees. Internal governmental struggles only intensified following foreign policy disasters and war. The 1859 Austro-Sardinian War resulted in a decisive Habsburg military defeat, ceding the Habsburg province of Lombardy to the Kingdom of Sardinia. Following the War, the Interior Minister and architect of Habsburg neo-absolutism, Alexander von Bach, resigned amid renewed calls for parliamentary reforms. Threatened by resignations and internal strife within the government, Emperor Franz Joseph I relented to his mother in 1860 that “Indeed, we shall institute a parliamentary government, but power shall remain in my hands.”¹⁹³ Despite the Emperor’s self-assurances, parliamentary reforms would prove unwieldy.

The 1860 October Diploma catalyzed federalization processes, broadening the divide between Habsburg officials concerning refugees, but more pressingly for Habsburg governance, parliamentary reforms alienated Hungarian politicians. From the upheaval of these transitions, two individuals rose to prominence within the Interior Ministry: Agenor Romuald Goluchowski (1812—75), who formulated the October Diploma, and his successor Anton von Schmerling (1806—1893), who remained Interior Minister until 1865. The new government achieved the exact opposite of what Schmerling and other federalists hoped.¹⁹⁴ In addition to these administrative concerns, life in the Habsburg Monarchy’s southern crownlands stood at odds with centralized Habsburg modernization.

¹⁹³ Franz Schnürer, *Briefe Kaiser Franz Josef an seine Mutter* (Salzburg: Kösel & Pustet, 1930), 301-302.

¹⁹⁴ Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 256-257.

According to the Habsburg Monarchy's 1857 census, Croatia and Slavonia hosted a population of 865,009 people, and the Croatian Military Border, 674,864 people.¹⁹⁵ In Croatia and Slavonia, 81 percent of the population claimed agricultural labor as a profession, the highest percentage in the Habsburg Monarchy; the Croatian Military Border ranked second at 75 percent.¹⁹⁶ Five years of intense refugee influxes across these crownlands left the region in poor shape by the time state-funded and private industrial projects slowly marched southward. One of the primary reasons for this economic neglect, at least in the Croatian Military Border, resulted from the contentious yet recurrent attempts to dissolve it altogether, joining the districts with Croatian and Slavonian crownlands. The institution no longer served a function in the rapidly modernizing Habsburg Monarchy. Liberal Habsburg governance opposed the *Grenzers* functioning as a separate social class, and "universal conscription" rendered the *Grenzers* relics of a mythologized military heritage.¹⁹⁷ Habsburg military leaders abolished the Transylvanian Military border in 1859, the Serbian Vojvodina's Military Border in 1873, and the Croatian Military Border, after much resistance, in 1881.¹⁹⁸ The resistance to dissolution marked a continued separation from Croatia and Slavonia, crownlands experiencing immense institutional changes.

Hungarian political and administrative encroachment into Croatia and Slavonia accompanied limited industrial increases heralded by the spread of railroads, which the Croatian landed elite supported to rebel against failing neo-absolutism.¹⁹⁹ Realignment with Hungarian interests alienated officials in the Croatian Military Border. The negotiations for compromise with Hungary, which began in 1865, further worried officials in the Croatian Military Border about the total loss of imperial privileges. While the Habsburg Monarchy struggled to modernize its South

¹⁹⁵ Mariann Nagy, "Croatia in the Economic Structure of the Habsburg Empire in the Light of the 1857 Census," *Historijski zbornik* 63 (2010): 79-80.

¹⁹⁶ Nagy, "Census," 81.

¹⁹⁷ Bogdan G. Popescu, *Imperial Borderlands: Institutions and Legacies of the Habsburg Military Border*, (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Economic History, 2024), 99.

¹⁹⁸ Popescu, *Borderlands*, 231.

¹⁹⁹ Mirjana Gross, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kroatien: Gesellschaft, Politik und Kultur in Zivil-Kroatien und -Slawonien in den ersten dreissig Jahren nach 1848*, (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 69.

Slavic crownlands, Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent rapid modernization.²⁰⁰ In 1861, when “Topal” Osman Sherif Pasha accepted the position as Bosnian Governor General (a position he held for nine years), Bosnia, gripped by infighting among Bosnian Muslim elites and Christian peasant uprisings, presented an immense challenge. However, while Osman Pasha failed to fully curb Christian discontent and refugee movements, through measured mediation, he transformed Bosnia. By 1864, decline discourse from within Bosnia and Herzegovina predominantly subsided, replaced by *Tanzimat* acceptance and discourse on how recent reforms positioned the Ottoman Empire equally with the rest of Europe.²⁰¹ In Bosnia, legal reforms accompanied more lenient economic policies. Under Osman Pasha, Bosnia and Herzegovina increasingly exported grain and other agricultural products, predominantly to the Habsburg Monarchy, the trade of which Bosnian officials previously stringently controlled or prevented through frequent trade embargos.²⁰²

In 1852, Bosnia maintained no modern transport infrastructure, merely single-track, packed earthen trading routes.²⁰³ Osman Pasha initiated state road-building programs that utilized conscripted labor from Christians and Muslims.²⁰⁴ These state road and bridge projects connected Bosnia and Herzegovina to Habsburg lands.²⁰⁵ Osman Pasha first prioritized a road from Sarajevo to Brod/Slavonski Brod, exponentially increasing trade with the Habsburg Monarchy. Joseph Koetschet (1830—98), Osman Pasha’s Swiss physician, wrote, “The whole population mobilized. Rich and poor, Muslim and Christian.”²⁰⁶ While the population’s mobilization for state works reflected a previously inconceivable cooperation between Muslim and Christian populations, individual Muslim landlords still abused Christian peasants, triggering frequent Christian movements, especially in Northern Bosnia, to Habsburg lands.

²⁰⁰ Milen V. Petrov, “Everyday Forms of Compliance: Subaltern Commentaries on Ottoman Reform, 1864–1868,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 46, no. 4 (2004): 731.

²⁰¹ Petrov, *Reform*, 741, 743.

²⁰² Grandits, *Bosnia*, 18.

²⁰³ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 11.

²⁰⁴ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 12.

²⁰⁵ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 13.

²⁰⁶ Josef Koetschet, *Osman Pascha, der Letzte Grosse Wesier Bosniens, und Seine Nachfolger*, (Sarajevo: Daniel A. Kajon Verlag, 1909), 11.

Despite recurrent refugee and, in turn, depopulation issues, by 1872, the Bosnian government oversaw the construction of over 1,500 kilometers of modern roads, none of which existed before Osman Pasha's reign.²⁰⁷ However, the unyielding inequity perceived by Christian peasants and Habsburg observers in Bosnian and Herzegovinian society often overshadowed milestones of Bosnian “modernity.” Paradoxically, an 1858 diplomatic mission by Bosnian Christians to Vienna to implement promised *Tanzimat* reforms, thereby attempting to broker peace, and return refugees arguably spurred the incremental, nonlinear legal reform and modernization processes in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, while testing Habsburg commitments to neutrality and supporting Ottoman Christians.

The Bosnian Deputation: A Late-Neo-absolutist Opportunity

In May 1857, soon after Sakcinski left Bosnia, Christian peasant revolts erupted in Zvornik, near the Serbian border. Dissatisfied with the 1856 *Tanzimat* reforms’ break with traditional privileges, Bosnian Muslim landowners who held military land grants and “tax farms” urged Muslim and Christian peasants (themselves outraged by the postwar tax increases) to revolt against Ottoman tax collectors’ attempts to centrally register land.²⁰⁸ Around 400 Christian peasants gathered in Zvornik on May 1, 1857, to protest the *tretina* (a one-third tax) to the district governor, igniting nearly two years of bitter unrest and refugee movements.²⁰⁹ The Habsburg press often reported on the bitter unrest in Bosnia, which the *Die Pester Lloyd* newspaper heralded as a conspiracy to “dismantle the Ottoman Empire.”²¹⁰ As unrest spread, Montenegrin authorities seized Grahovo in nearby Herzegovina.²¹¹

In January 1858, the Habsburg consul in Sarajevo, Demeter Atanasković, reported to Foreign Minister Buol that “if the situation in Bosnia does not improve, countless Bosnian

²⁰⁷ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 12.

²⁰⁸ Vakali, “Conspiracy,” 157.

²⁰⁹ Zafer Gölen, “1857-59 Bosna Hersek İsyanı [The Bosnia-Herzegovina Revolts, 1857-1859],” *Belleten*, 73 (2009): 7.

²¹⁰ “Montenegro 30 Jänner,” *Die Pester Lloyd*, January 31, 1858.

²¹¹ Vladislav Lilić, *Empire of States: Law and International Order in Ottoman Europe, c. 1830-1912*, (diss., Vanderbilt University, 2024), 111-112.

Christians will seek asylum in [Habsburg lands].”²¹² Atanasković worried that if the Habsburg Monarchy failed to facilitate many of the Bosnian Christians’ requests diplomatically, many thousands more Bosnian Christians would emigrate to the Habsburg Monarchy, an outcome unacceptable, but likely.²¹³ That same month, a delegation of eight Bosnian *kneževi*, Orthodox Christian leaders, sponsored by 159 Eastern Bosnian Christian communities, crossed the frozen Sava River on a diplomatic mission to Vienna.²¹⁴ The Bosnian Deputation (*bosnische Deputation*),²¹⁵ as the German-language Austrian press labeled them, embarked on their mission because Bosnian Muslim officials thwarted previous attempts to convey a petition of Bosnian Christian grievances to Sultan Abdülmecid I in Istanbul.²¹⁶

The Bosnian Deputation provides an unstudied example of how one group of mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Christians utilized the 1856 Treaty of Paris to leverage supposed European commitments to Ottoman Christians toward diplomatic aid in accomplishing internal Ottoman reforms thereby ameliorating refugee crises. The Deputation conveyed their petition to the Ottoman ambassador to the Habsburg Monarchy, Alexandre Kalimaki *bey*, an Albanian. The Delegation hoped Kalimaki *bey* would send their petition directly to the Sultan, circumventing Bosnian Muslim authorities.²¹⁷ If not, the Deputation and their Habsburg South Slav allies hoped to more directly sway Habsburg authorities toward enforcing such an outcome diplomatically.²¹⁸ If all else failed, the Deputation could encourage the 159 communities they represented to flee to Habsburg lands, an unacceptable outcome for either the Ottoman Empire or the Habsburg Monarchy.

²¹² Cited in Gölen, “Tanzimat,” [9].

²¹³ Šljivo, “Emigriranje,” 138-139.

²¹⁴ “Von Brod an der Save, Ende Jänner,” *Agrar Zeit*, February 8, 1858. The Bosnian Deputation remains wholly absent from historiography, appearing only in newspapers in the Habsburg Monarchy and the German States. However, upon further investigation, I hypothesize that Habsburg governmental sources on the Deputation might lie in Buol’s Foreign Ministry papers.

²¹⁵ The *Wiener Zeitung* translation and republication of the Bosnian Deputation’s petition included the eight Deputation members’ names: “Athanasius Beselinović, Božo Zličić, Georg Rončević, Thomas Meršić, Simeon Jovanović, Johann Koić, Johann Božić, and Georg Todorović,” *Die Wiener Zeitung*, February 27, 1858.

²¹⁶ “Von Bosnien und Herzegovina,” *Die Neue Zeit*, February 14, 1858.

²¹⁷ “Wien, 22 März,” *Die Agrar Zeit*, March 27, 1858.

²¹⁸ *Die Neue Zeit*, February 14, 1858.

The Bosnian Deputation knowingly reinforced conceptions of the Habsburg Monarchy as the preferred protector of Ottoman Christendom. In addition, the Bosnian Deputation utilized its diplomatic overtures with Habsburg officials to leverage Kalimaki *bey* toward renewed negotiations between Christian peasants and Bosnian Muslim elites over contested taxation and land ownership reforms. In the Deputation's detailed petition, they positioned themselves foremost as loyal Ottoman subjects. Despite this fact, the Deputation sought Emperor Franz Joseph I's mediation to attract the Sultan's attention and sympathy for their cause.²¹⁹ As such, Ivan Franjo Jukić's failed 1850 petition provides a precedent for the 1858 Bosnian Deputation and illustrates a shift in Bosnian Christian strategy from seeking direct Habsburg intervention through more indirect diplomatic measures.

In Vienna, the Bosnian Deputation met with Habsburg South Slavs, whom the press implies accommodated, made introductions for, and interpreted for the Deputation during their months-long stay in Vienna.²²⁰ Perceived Habsburg South Slavic interventions most probably contributed to the Deputation's wide coverage in the press. The *Illustrirte Zeitung's* textual descriptions of the Bosnian Deputation (published toward the end of the Deputation's mission in April) portrayed what the newspaper identified as the Deputation's "immense poverty (*große Armut*)."²²¹ The otherness inherent in the press's depictions of the Deputation stemmed from their clothing, which closely resembled Bosnian Muslim or Ottoman dress, but hardly indicated any poverty. Instead, the newspaper's charged conceptions fed into preexisting stereotypes and "ideal portraits" of Ottoman or otherwise "Oriental" Christians.²²²

According to the *Illustrirte Zeitung*, the Ottoman consul in Vienna, Kalimaki *bey*, met with the Deputation only hesitantly, fearing that they acted on behalf of Herzegovinian rebels, despite

²¹⁹ *Die Agramer Zeitung*, March 27, 1858.

²²⁰ "Die bosnische Deputation in Wien," *Die Illustrirte Zeitung*, April 10, 1858.

²²¹ *Die Illustrirte Zeitung*, April 10, 1858.

²²² Nóra Veszprémi, "Ideals for Sale: "Ideal Portraits" and the Display of National Identity in the Nineteenth-Century Austrian Empire," *Art History*, 42, 2 (2019): 275-278.

the Deputation maintaining no contact with any rebel groups.²²³ For Kalimaki *bey*, labeling the Deputation broadly as insurgents abroad posed fewer legal quandaries than a more accurate label: loyal Ottoman subjects seeking the fulfillment of *Tanzimat* promises. The Deputation's petition, demands, and wording interested the Habsburg press but concerned Kalimaki *bey* more. According to the *Agramer Zeitung*, he worried that submitting the Deputation's petition to Istanbul would result in the revocation of his post in Vienna or worse.²²⁴

The Deputation's Habsburg South Slav allies initially secured the publication of the petition in *Srbski dnevnik* on February 9. *Srbski dnevnik*, a biweekly Serbian Cyrillic publication which served as a primary periodical for South Slavs in the multiethnic, Habsburg-controlled Serbian Vojvodina. However, the newspaper maintained a relatively small audience of Serbian-language readers. The Deputation's allies later translated the petition into German to secure a broader readership. They published it first in the provincial *Agramer Zeitung* and later in the widely circulated *Wiener Zeitung*. The petition itself listed four principal demands. First, Bosnian officials must abolish the *tretina* tax outright; second, all Bosnian subjects shall pay all tithes and taxes directly to the Sultan (which the 1856 *Tanzimat* edict already stipulated); third, Bosnian officials will allow Christian peasants to enlist in the Ottoman military voluntarily; finally, the undersigned Deputation requested amnesty and imperial protection against any Bosnian Muslim retribution upon their return to Bosnia.²²⁵

In contrast to Jukić's 1850 petition, the Bosnian Deputation's petition omits any mention of the Habsburg Monarchy or its Emperor's intentions toward Ottoman Christendom. The Deputation frequently asserted loyalty to the Sultan, trusting in the Sultan's "benevolent intentions toward Christians."²²⁶ The Deputation posited that the Sultan's reforms failed to reach Bosnia due to intrinsic local corruption. Despite the Habsburg depictions of the Deputation as poor

²²³ *Die Illustrirte Zeitung*, April 10, 1858.

²²⁴ *Die Illustrirte Zeitung*, April 10, 1858.

²²⁵ *Die Wiener Zeitung*, February 27, 1858.

²²⁶ "Wien, 12 Februar," *Die Agramer Zeitung*, February 15, 1858.

“Orientals,” the Deputation, judging by their thoughtfully crafted petition, closely read the 1856 Treaty of Paris, in particular Article VII, which noted the establishment of legal equality within the Ottoman Empire in the framework of the “Concert of Europe” and, therefore, inadvertently created a means for Ottoman subjects to request redress from European governments concerning internal Ottoman affairs.²²⁷

While Habsburg officials rebuffed the Deputation’s interventionist overtures, asserting a commitment to non-interference, the Deputation allegedly influenced external perceptions of Habsburg foreign policy by merely securing meetings with Habsburg officials.²²⁸ The *Agrarier Zeitung* cited that German and French newspapers perceived of the Bosnian Delegation as a breach of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, evidence of “Austrian interventionism and expansionist ambitions.”²²⁹ However, such brash accusations hardly reflected reality. By 1858, for Foreign Minister Buol and Interior Minister Bach, maintaining Ottoman sovereignty over perceived Russian intrusions in Ottoman South Slavic lands remained paramount, overshadowing any vaguely formulated Habsburg military plans for an occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²³⁰

On March 23, Kalimaki *bey* met with Buol to formally discuss ongoing Christian unrest in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the refugee crisis on the Habsburg border.²³¹ Buol allegedly recommended that Ottoman Bosnian officials immediately implement the tax and land reforms promised two years prior.²³² For Kalimaki *bey*, Buol’s recommendations appeared blasé since Bosnia’s Governor General and traditionalist Muslim elites seemed unwilling to negotiate policies with central Ottoman authorities.²³³ So, little changed in the weeks after Kalimaki *bey* sent the Deputation’s petition to Istanbul. The Bosnian Deputation’s perseverance in sending the petition

²²⁷ Israel, *Treaties*, 948. See Jared Manasek, “The High Stakes of Small Numbers: Flight, Diplomacy, and Refugee Return on the Habsburg-Ottoman Border 1873–74.” *Austrian History Yearbook* 51 (2020): 60–72.

²²⁸ *Die Neue Zeit*, February 14, 1858.

²²⁹ *Die Agrarier Zeitung*, March 27, 1858.

²³⁰ Sosnosky, *Balkanpolitik*, 289–291.

²³¹ *Die Agrarier Zeitung*, March 27, 1858.

²³² *Die Agrarier Zeitung*, March 27, 1858.

²³³ *Die Agrarier Zeitung*, March 27, 1858.

exemplifies how Ottoman Christians leveraged mass migration to Habsburg lands to strongarm promised tax and land reforms. Even though the Bosnian Deputation failed to achieve its primary objectives, it provides a vital example of how Bosnian Christians attempted to bring about institutional change in their homeland, thereby mitigating refugee movements to the Habsburg Monarchy. However, widespread revolts continued throughout Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Many thousands more Bosnian Christian refugees would flee to the Habsburg Monarchy before the Bosnian Governor General and Muslim elites relented and implemented the promised reforms.

During the 1857—59 revolts Habsburg officials, overwhelmed by the constant influx of refugees, failed to compile accurate refugee statistics, though undoubtedly, the numbers surpassed the 1852—53 crisis. As the Deputation concluded its mission in Vienna, at the beginning of April 1858, Croatian Military Border officials at Brod/Slavonski Brod reported how *Grenzers* there, overwhelmed by refugees, regularly organized the transportation of refugees to Slavonia, outside their jurisdiction.²³⁴ However, county officials in Požega, in Eastern Slavonia, openly resisted settling any more Bosnian Christians in the region, citing a lack of reliable work and even arable land.²³⁵ Slavonian provincial officials' worries seemed warranted. While many previous refugees returned home after mere weeks or months, by April 1858, the revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina raged for another year wholly unabated.

Despite Slavonian pessimism, Habsburg officials in Vienna showed a surprising optimism that once the Bosnian provincial government repealed the *tretina* tax, most refugees would voluntarily return home.²³⁶ After the Bosnian Deputation left Vienna, numerous Bosnian delegations traveled to Sarajevo. Bosnian Governor General Mehmed Pasha's closest advisors,

²³⁴ Protocol from Alexander von Bach to Essek/Osijek and Požega, April 6, 1858, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²³⁵ Protocol from Bach to Essek/Osijek and Požega, April 6, 1858.

²³⁶ Merner to Karl Buol April 28, 1858, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

Redja and Abdulah Effendi, often directed Christian petitioners away from him.²³⁷ In Mostar, one delegation succeeded in parlaying with Mehmed Pasha, who, according to the *Temesvarer Zeitung*, disregarded Christian delegations as mere agents for “hostile foreign influence.”²³⁸ However, such accusations hardly ended with the Bosnian Deputation but extended to Bosnian Christian refugees in the Habsburg Monarchy, whom many Bosnian Muslims labeled blanketly as “insurgents.”

Without mediation, the number of Bosnian Christian refugees only intensified. The *Temesvarer Zeitung* reported that from July 4—6, “fanatical Muslim troops” pursued a column of some 4,700 Bosnian Christian refugees armed merely with pitchforks and other farming implements that, after great hardship, crossed the Habsburg border at Kostajnica along the Sava River border.²³⁹ By August, caravans covered the breadth Habsburg side of the Sava River, estimated at around 15,000 refugees.²⁴⁰ Habsburg officials required months to find proper resettlement locations, all in provincial Croatia and Slavonia, because refugees refused to move far from the border: “like all mountain people, they seem attached to their homeland.”²⁴¹ The most critical aspect of 1857—59 refugee crises lay with this exponential increase in refugees.

The national security risks refugees repeatedly posed prompted the Habsburg Monarchy to adopt a more active diplomatic approach to coercing the implementation of Bosnian tax and land reforms, as well as resolving border disputes in Montenegro. Habsburg officials hoped these measures would lead to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, restoring order on the Croatian Military Border.²⁴² In November 1858, a convention met in Istanbul between Ottoman officials and ambassadors from the Habsburg Monarchy, the Russian Empire, the Second French Empire, Great Britain, and the Kingdom of Prussia to manufacture a solution to unrest across Bosnia,

²³⁷ “Ausland,” *Die Temesvarer Zeitung*, October 8, 1858.

²³⁸ “Bosnien. Mostar,” *Die Temesvarer Zeitung*, July 10, 1858.

²³⁹ “Von der bosnischen Grenze. 10 Juli,” *Die Temesvarer Zeitung*, July 22, 1858.

²⁴⁰ “Wien, Unter der Donau, 4 August,” *Der Ost Deutsche Post*, August 11, 1858.

²⁴¹ *Der Ost Deutsche Post*, August 11, 1858.

²⁴² “Wien, 18 September,” *Die Temesvarer Zeitung*, September 25, 1858.

Herzegovina, and Montenegro which led to the November 1858 Land Law, marking the final phase of the revolt.²⁴³

In the Spring of 1859, most violence and refugee movements ceased in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro.²⁴⁴ As word of the negotiated peace spread, thousands of Bosnian refugees voluntarily returned home, but Habsburg sources only mention the many thousands that remained after the 1857—59 revolts. The refugees' return and the limited restabilization of the Habsburg-Bosnian border occurred at a most opportune time as the Austro-Sardinian War soon overshadowed Habsburg efforts (and monetary commitments) to South Slavic Christian refugees. After declaring war, Emperor Franz Joseph I ordered the full mobilization of troops on the Croatian Military Border. *Grenzer* regiments performed poorly during the War, so much so that Habsburg military command converted them from light infantry to regular line infantry.²⁴⁵ One Habsburg military leader observed that the *Grenzers*' performance proved they no longer served any vital military functions, merely "political considerations," a "neo-absolutist" pawn against perceived Hungarian insurrectionism.²⁴⁶ Needless to say, the resulting Habsburg loss of Lombardy economically weakened the Habsburg Monarchy.²⁴⁷

The end of "neo-absolutist" rule in the months after the War allowed for more liberal institutional reforms. In late 1859, the Habsburg Monarchy reformed its consular services in the Ottoman Empire, reallocating the administration of consular offices from the Trade Ministry to the Foreign Ministry.²⁴⁸ The transition reflected a growing importance of Habsburg consular offices in the Ottoman Empire as Ottoman Christians more regularly contacted Habsburg consular agents with complaints of religious oppression. While the end of the 1857—59 revolts in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro brought nominal peace to the Habsburg-Ottoman border,

²⁴³ Lilić, *Empire*, 124-126.

²⁴⁴ Vakali, "Conspiracy," 160-161.

²⁴⁵ Rothenberg, "Dissolution," 66-67.

²⁴⁶ Cited in Rothenberg, "Dissolution," 67.

²⁴⁷ Bridge, *Habsburg*, 67.

²⁴⁸ Holly Case, "The Quiet Revolution: Consuls and the International System in the Nineteenth Century," in *The Balkans as Europe, 1821-1914*, eds. Timothy Snyder and Katherine Younger, (Rochester Studies in East and Central Europe: Boydell and Brewer, 2018), 122.

the many refugees who remained and continued to flee to Habsburg lands weighed heavily on the financially troubled Habsburg Monarchy. Fissures formed increasingly between provincial administrators and bureaucrats in Vienna over the refugee question as refugees, while slightly decreased in number, continually crossed into the Croatian Military Border.

Habsburg Communication Failures Concerning Recurrent South Slavic Refugees

On March 1, 1860, the Governor of the Serbian Vojvodina formally requested that Habsburg officials refrain from sending further refugees to the crownland.²⁴⁹ Officials in Agram/Zagreb cited famine in Bosnia, from depopulation and poor harvests in 1859, as a primary cause of the marked spike in refugee numbers in 1860. Since material conditions on the Croatian Military Border also considerably deteriorated during the refugee influxes, refugees could no longer rely on local charity for sustenance; so, their immediate relocation remained vital. This time, however, resettlement plans originated from provincial officials in Croatia and Slavonia, not from bureaucrats in Vienna.²⁵⁰ Mere days after the Vojvodina governor's dissent, an "elderly Christian peasant (*Rajab*)" from Poljana, near Tuzla in Northeastern Bosnia, reported to *Grenzers* that bands of "Turks" roved through Christian villages extorting and beating the locals, so, he decided to leave "cursed Bosnia (*proklete Bosne*)" altogether.²⁵¹ Despite such harsh words, in April 1860, only 173 male and 128 female Bosnian Christians crossed into the Croatian Military Border.²⁵² While a marked decrease, the steady influx of refugees consistently strained communities within the Croatian Military Border, Croatia, and Slavonia. Interestingly, three priests travelled among these refugees in the Spring of 1860 seeking resettlement in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Catholic and Orthodox clergy formed a vital tool for Habsburg officials in controlling these displaced populations. The resettlement of clergy also reflected the Habsburg Monarchy's

²⁴⁹ Saringer to Agenor Goluchowski, May 16, 1860, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁵⁰ Saringer to Goluchowski, May 3, 1860.

²⁵¹ "Petrinja in der Banat, 13 März," *Die Presse*, March 18, 1860.

²⁵² Interior Ministry Protocol May 5, 1860, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

religious biases. For example, Habsburg officials resettled Catholic priests Jovan Davidović and Rade Klišović in parish churches in Požega County in Central Slavonia.²⁵³ In contrast, Habsburg officials resettled Orthodox priest Milislav Pužavac, from the Banja Luka region, in the Temesvar Banat.²⁵⁴ The discrimination inherent in these resettlement decisions also reflected local demographics, since disproportionately more Orthodox Christians resided in the Banat. Aside from the newly arrived priests, the other refugees, Habsburg officials reasoned, required immediate work. Local officials employed able-bodied refugees in public works projects, as proposed in 1852, this time in constructing the Szeged-Tisza railway.²⁵⁵ However, employing refugees as public workers proved cumbersome, so some Croatian officials even advised “preventing refugees from crossing the Habsburg border.”²⁵⁶ The local officials' suggestion violated centralized Habsburg policies, which up until then blanketly accepted Ottoman Christian refugees.

One Croatian official even wrote to the new Interior Minister Goluchowski that the “almost annual” arrival of thousands of Bosnian refugees negatively affected the economic conditions across Croatia and Slavonia since local authorities could not feasibly settle refugees within their districts.²⁵⁷ The unpredictable fluctuation in refugee numbers further precluded the Habsburg Monarchy’s ability to accurately track numbers, citing that conducting “a comprehensive record has been challenging.”²⁵⁸ The sustained inability of Habsburg officials to track refugees reflected not merely bureaucratic issues in communication but more acutely a failure to address the material concerns surrounding refugees. In other words, if Habsburg officials could not track refugees, they could not organize relief and resettlement. If they failed at that then local communities filled the void or, often, refugees fended for themselves and their families.

²⁵³ Interior Ministry Protocol February 13, 1860, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁵⁴ Interior Ministry Protocol February 13, 1860.

²⁵⁵ Saringer to Goluchowski, May 3, 1860.

²⁵⁶ Saringer to Goluchowski, May 3, 1860.

²⁵⁷ Saringer to Agenor Goluchowski, May 16, 1860, , *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862*, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁵⁸ Saringer to Goluchowski, May 16, 1860.

Many Bosnian Christian refugees tried to feed themselves by bringing livestock with them. Often, though, Bosnian Muslim border officials would confiscate these animals, or, without any money, refugees sold their livestock to Croatian merchants at underhanded prices. In Bosnia, though, long-promised modernization slowly materialized through Osman Pasha's appointment as Governor General in 1861. The most detailed source on Osman-pasha's rule originates from Koetschet's biography. During Osman Pasha's rule, the number of Bosnian Christian refugees consistently declined but persisted. Inequality for many Christians lingered as Bosnia and Herzegovina unevenly modernized. Despite this, Koetschet referred to Osman Pasha's rule as a "golden age" in Bosnia.²⁵⁹ Even as Osman Pasha entered his governorship, revolts broke out in Montenegro and Herzegovina. Around the same time, rumors spread among the Bosnian Muslim nobility that the European Great Powers met secretly and agreed to cede Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg Monarchy.²⁶⁰ These rumors allegedly provoked some privileged Bosnian Muslims to consider emigrating to the "Turkish interior," a prospect that, years later (after 1878), would come to fruition.²⁶¹

Piqued unrest provoked more Bosnian Christian refugees to flee across the Habsburg border. A Slavonian official reported that three districts: Carlstadt/Karlovac in the Croatian Military Border, Sombor in the Serbian Vojvodina, and Sisak in Croatia, bore the brunt of resettling 200 Bosnian Christian refugees.²⁶² Local Croatian landowners around Sisak seemed unwilling to relinquish even swampy parcels of land in those districts to assist in resettling refugees, writing that "even if the refugees were as diligent as the best laborer, in these areas, they would still not earn enough to support their families."²⁶³ During this period, perceived economic instability in rural Croatia and Slavonia certainly contributed to local hesitation toward refugees. After ten years

²⁵⁹ Koetschet, *Pasha*, 25-26.

²⁶⁰ "Zustände in Bosnien," *Die Temesvarer Zeitung*, June 12, 1861.

²⁶¹ Koetschet, *Pasha*, 25.

²⁶² Banjević to Josip Šokčević, June 28, 1862, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1852-1862, MdÄ IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁶³ Banjević to Josip Šokčević, June 28, 1862.

of near-constant refugee arrivals from Bosnia, many Habsburg subjects in the region reached a point of exhaustion.

In Dalmatia, while even more constrained by poor economic conditions, the central administration led a more centralized approach to the Montenegrin refugee question. As early as 1856, Field Marshall Karl Ludwig von Grünne established a 100,000-florin fund in Dalmatia to expand Habsburg influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁶⁴ While Dalmatian Governor Lazarus von Mamula used the funds to assist monasteries and schools, or bribe Orthodox or Catholic clergy directly, he also used them to accommodate Montenegrin refugees in Dalmatia. For Mamula, “The influence of the Habsburg government over the Christian population in Herzegovina and Bosnia, where it is declining, to awaken and revive it, and to prevent Russian influence” remained paramount as hostilities pervaded.²⁶⁵ Along the Dalmatian-Ottoman border, Bosnian Muslim forces began renovating border fortresses abandoned since the Ottoman conquest in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.²⁶⁶ The *Wiener Zeitung* argued that Ottoman refortification measures acted as yet another indicator of Bosnian Muslim anxiety of a Habsburg invasion. By December 1861, Montenegrin border raids into Herzegovina increased, provoking an Ottoman land blockade on trade goods throughout that Winter.²⁶⁷ When that failed, Ottoman officials appointed Omer Pasha to mount a punitive campaign against Montenegro.

During the following revolt, one Herzegovinian rebel leader drew international attention: Luka Vukalović. Vukalović hailed from the village of Bogojević. His father served as the village *knez*, and while Vukalović never received a formal education, he naturally filled local leadership positions.²⁶⁸ Vukalović led Herzegovinian rebels in the 1857—59 revolts, aiding Montenegro in its

²⁶⁴ Lazarus von Mamula to Anton von Schmerling, July 15, 1861, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge*, 1852-1862, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁶⁵ Lazarus von Mamula to Anton von Schmerling, December 5, 1861, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge*, 1852-1862, MdA IB annex 32, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁶⁶ “Von dem Omsanisches Reich,” *Die Wiener Zeitung*, May 16, 1862.

²⁶⁷ Elizabeth Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro*, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2007), 231-234.

²⁶⁸ Vladimir Ćorović, *Luka Vukalović: Bosanskohercegovački ustanci od 1852. do 1862. godine* [*Luka Vukalović: Bosnia and Herzegovina Uprisings from 1852 to 1862*], (Belgrade: Skerlić, 1923), 7-8.

unsuccessful campaign against the Ottoman Empire.²⁶⁹ In August 1862, Omer Pasha's forces decisively defeated the Montenegrin and Herzegovinian coalition. However, Montenegrin forces continued guerrilla warfare, including Vukalović and his rebels. In December 1862, the Habsburg Monarchy, again threatened by Ottoman troops on its borders, assisted in mollifying Montenegro, besieging the Montenegrin border fortress at Suttorina, routing Vukalović's rebels.²⁷⁰

Compared to previous revolts in and around Montenegro, the 1861—62 revolt remained localized, but numerous refugees fled into southern Dalmatia. The district commander in Ragusa/Dubrovnik reported that 447 refugees from the surrounding villages around Trebinje found temporary refuge in Bergatt/Brgat and Breno/Srebreno in the coastal regions near Ragusa/Dubrovnik.²⁷¹ The officials there could settle refugees on their borders more freely since they lacked the same, stringent legal frameworks as those maintained in the Croatian Military Border. In Agram/Zagreb, word of the revolt in Montenegro drew the attention of women's charitable organizations. Soon, a "Ladies Committee" for charity toward the "suffering brothers in Montenegro and Herzegovina" formed under the leadership of noblewoman Countess Clotilde Burratti.²⁷² While the committee's activities remained limited, the organization showed how Croatian elites perceived Ottoman Christian struggles favorably.

Following the Montenegrin defeat, Dalmatian officials dispersed remaining refugee groups throughout Dalmatia, though 1,000 of the 1,730 refugees returned home without prompting.²⁷³ Once relations on the border normalized, Habsburg officials negotiated a trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire that allowed Habsburg merchants to trade on Ottoman soil, abolishing customs duties for Habsburg subjects.²⁷⁴ With broadened access to foreign goods, Bosnian officials raised the tithe on the rural Christian population from 10 to 12.5 percent instead of implementing

²⁶⁹ Ćorović, *Vukalović*, 8-9.

²⁷⁰ "Das österreichische Heer in Montenegro," *Die Pester Lloyd*, December 24, 1862.

²⁷¹ Mamula to Schmerling, December 5, 1861.

²⁷² Iskra Iveljić, *Očevi i sinovi: privredna elita Zagreba u drugoj polovici 19. stoljeća* [*Fathers and Sons: Zagreb's Economic Elite in the Second Half of the 19th Century*], (Zagreb: Leykam International, 2007), cited in Manacek, *Empire*, 134.

²⁷³ Mamula to Schmerling, December 5, 1861.

²⁷⁴ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 14.

customs for Christian subjects.²⁷⁵ An unintended consequence of the treaty meant that many Bosnian Christians, perhaps some of whom fled to the Habsburg Monarchy as refugees and received citizenship, returned to Bosnia as “foreign” merchants, with immense legal protections and economic advantages over domestic competition.²⁷⁶

The new trade agreement's prompt economic successes led Osman Pasha to implement more drastic reforms. Osman Pasha negotiated with local Christian peasant leaders and armed militias along the Herzegovina-Montenegro border to transform these former rebel Christians into defenders of the Ottoman border with Montenegro and Habsburg Dalmatia, a system unique to Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁷⁷ However, as one crisis resolved, another emerged. In 1863, rumors circulated that the Principality of Serbia's Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1823— 1868) would immediately call for the Christian liberation of Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbia.²⁷⁸ The Habsburg vice consul in Brčko (near the Sava River boundary with the Croatian Military Border) reported that local Bosnian Muslims feared an imminent Serbian invasion, so much so that they deployed Muslim soldiers to Bijeljina along the border with Serbia.²⁷⁹ However, like previous rumors, Serbian threats never materialized.

Despite the ongoing reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, recurrent issues along the border emblemized prevailing concerns of invasion and the intrusion of foreign powers, primarily the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia. By the Summer of 1864, Bosnian Muslim elites almost wholly aligned themselves with Osman Pasha and his reform policies. Soon, the new military recruitment laws spread throughout the province. Around the same time, Osman Pasha instituted a small executive council. It consisted of three Muslims, two Christians, and one Jew, who advised him on issues concerning their religious communities across the provinces.²⁸⁰ Meanwhile, resistance

²⁷⁵ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 15.

²⁷⁶ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 15.

²⁷⁷ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 3.

²⁷⁸ Gross, *Kroatien*, 101.

²⁷⁹ Ivan Balta, “The Development of Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Boundaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Kadim*, 1, (April 2021): 141.

²⁸⁰ Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 128.

among Bosnian Christians transformed into “a surprising eagerness for cooperation.”²⁸¹ These reformed policies seemed inconceivable just a few years prior; however, the consequences of sustained refugee movements from the Ottoman lands soon resurfaced.

Shifts in Habsburg Refugee Policies toward Compromise

Depopulation from previous refugee movements continued to plague Bosnia. Refugees who stayed indefinitely in the Habsburg Monarchy, while no figures exist as to how many, depopulated whole regions in Bosnia. As Sakcinski witnessed in 1857, this presented a considerable problem. As a result of these labor shortages, Christian peasant families experienced greater mobility within Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially after 1858, when the option arose for Christian peasants to find work from different landlords, thereby allotting Christians more economic leverage.²⁸² Greater mobility brought about a partial “defeudalization” of Christian life in Bosnia during Osman Pasha’s reign. However, it only proved partially successful since Christian communities still faced abuse from individual landlords who committed violent crimes against their Christian tenants.

For example, in May 1864, forty-three individuals from the Bihać region threatened with execution by their Muslim landlords arrived in Agram/Zagreb on May 29. The Croatian *ban* allowed the refugees to remain in the city; however, the authorities would forcibly relocate them to rural Slavonia or the Temesvar Banat if they struggled to find work collectively.²⁸³ The numbers and instances of Bosnian refugees faltered during Osman Pasha’s reign, but that hardly means that Habsburg administrators devalued Habsburg influence in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, since imperial Russian influence also increased throughout the region, particularly through sustained Russian patronage in Montenegro.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹ Grandits, *Bosnia*, 4.

²⁸² Grandits, *Bosnia*, 24.

²⁸³ “Flüchtlinge von Bosnien in Agram,” *Die Wiener Zeitung*, June 14, 1864.

²⁸⁴ Lilić, *Empire*, 143-144.

To spread Habsburg influence among Herzegovinian and Montenegrin Christians further, Emperor Franz Joseph I allotted Mamula an annual stipend of 20,000 florins to provide gifts for clergy, monasteries, and religious schools in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Albania.²⁸⁵ Mamula seemed hesitant about blanketly giving gifts to Herzegovina's Orthodox clergy, citing that "these subsidies largely end up in the pockets of the clergy, without benefiting the populace."²⁸⁶ Therefore, Mamula used these renewed funds not to line the pockets of already influential clergy in Bosnia and Herzegovina but to furnish churches and monasteries close to the Dalmatian border, thereby strengthening the societal infrastructure that might deter refugees in the future.²⁸⁷ One group of unmoored refugees greatly concerned Habsburg officials.

In the wake of the 1862 revolt, Osman Pasha offered amnesty to anyone involved in the so-called "Vukalović Uprisings," even Vukalović and his closest supporters, though they refused.²⁸⁸ Soon, Vukalović and his followers fled Herzegovina, hatched plans to settle in the Russian Empire, and sought permanent asylum from imperial Russia. The Emperor of Russia, Alexander II (1818—81), initially granted Vukalović and his eleven compatriots' request for asylum.²⁸⁹ In the Spring of 1865, Vukalović formally requested permission to travel through the Habsburg Monarchy to the Russian Empire via Odessa, even requesting a travel stipend from the Habsburg authorities.²⁹⁰ Vukalović initially planned to travel to St. Petersburg, but these plans disintegrated as rifts formed between Vukalović and Russian officials in Odessa. Vukalović's group split there, with six, including Vukalović, seeking protection from the Habsburg Monarchy. The Habsburg consulate in Odessa prematurely issued Habsburg passes to the refugees, but the Foreign Minister Count

²⁸⁵ Johann von Rechberg to Anton von Schmerling January 3, 1864, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁸⁶ Lazarus von Mamula to Johann von Rechberg May 21, 1864, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁸⁷ Mamula to Rechberg May 21, 1864.

²⁸⁸ Manasek, *Empire*, 177.

²⁸⁹ Meysenburg to Alexander von Mensdorff May 28, 1865, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁹⁰ Alexander von Mensdorff to Anton von Belcredi October 19, 1865, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

Alexander Konstantin Albrecht von Mensdorff-Pouilly (1813—71) rescinded them.²⁹¹ Mensdorff feared that Vukalović's presence would spark another revolt in Herzegovina if allowed to settle anywhere in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Without much choice, Vukalović travelled to Belgrade, the Principality of Serbia's capital. The Serbian government maintained close correspondence with the Habsburg consul there, Gödel, who urged the Serbs to send Vukalović elsewhere.²⁹² Vukalović wrote to Gödel asking to live "peacefully in Austria" since he could find nowhere else to settle.²⁹³ So, he waited with "great impatience" for Gödel's response, though like Mensdorff, Gödel spurned the possibility of Vukalović settling permanently anywhere in Habsburg lands.²⁹⁴ Vukalović and his remaining compatriots reunited with their families, who previously received asylum in Dalmatia, and again traveled Odessa sometime in 1866, where Vukalović died in 1873.

While politically motivated, the denial of Vukalović and his followers also reflected trends in the still-evolving refugee settlement conflicts with provincial officials in Croatia, Slavonia, and the Temesvar Banat. At the same time, Vukalović and his followers sought asylum in the Habsburg Monarchy, provincial authorities in Eastern Slavonia and nearby Syrmia, along the border with the Serbian Vojvodina, turned away Bosnian Christian refugees for the first time, fearing a potential population saturation and thereby violating central Habsburg policies.²⁹⁵ *Grenzvers* directed repatriated refugees back to Bosnia; others they transported by wagon to the Serbian Vojvodina.²⁹⁶ The *ban's* council (*Statthalterrat*) in Croatia recognized the need to compile reports on the integration and assimilation of Bosnian refugees in Croatia. During the council's deliberations, one councilor noted many recently arrived refugees "moved onto other lands, particularly Serbia."²⁹⁷

²⁹¹ Mensdorff to Belcredi, October 19, 1865.

²⁹² Ćorović, *Vukalović*, 139-140.

²⁹³ Luka Vukalovic to Gödel December 9, 1865, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

²⁹⁴ Vukalović to Gödel, December 9, 1865.

²⁹⁵ "Die bosnische Flüchtlinge Frage," *Das Vaterland*, June 11, 1865.

²⁹⁶ *Das Vaterland*, June 11, 1865.

²⁹⁷ Franz von John to Anton von Schmerling, June 24, 1865, Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

While Interior Minister Bach set the legal precedent for settling South Slavic refugees in the Habsburg Monarchy over ten years prior, such policies proved unwieldy without further resources. Previously, destitute refugees could receive considerable welfare from the Habsburg government, but these funds largely receded after 1862. The Croatian *ban's* council failed to request a replenishment of these funds from the central Habsburg government, leaving the refugees dependent on local charity, potentially as a strategy for forcing them out of Croatia and Slavonia altogether.²⁹⁸ However, such harsh policies failed.

From August 1864 to May 1865, 2,843 refugees arrived in Croatia. Only a few moved on to Serbia or returned to Bosnia; the vast majority required permanent resettlement.²⁹⁹ War Minister Count Franz von John (1815—76), concerned about the refugees remaining on the Croatian Military Border, wrote, “No one is obligated to take them in. [The refugees] represent a growing social problem that burdens an already impoverished rural population and could threaten public security, especially as hunger and destitution increase.”³⁰⁰ John’s grim convictions that the Habsburg Monarchy owed no Christian duty to these refugees violated long-standing Foreign Ministry and Interior Ministry policies, which, despite issues, held fast. John’s report represents a vital shift in the internal refugee policies among a high-ranking Habsburg official, illustrating how the poor implementation of resettlement procedures and the immense costs associated with refugees led to a reevaluation of Habsburg conceptions of Bosnia as a state in decline, even during a period of relative stability.

In the Summer of 1865, Foreign Minister Belcredi further cut refugee funds to Dalmatia from 10,000 to 5,000 florins for the following year’s accommodation of Montenegrin refugees, writing that the Dalmatian government must “exercise the utmost frugality” with the allotted funds for the 1866 fiscal year.³⁰¹ While maintaining influence in Montenegro and elsewhere remained

²⁹⁸ John to Schmerling, June 24, 1865.

²⁹⁹ John to Schmerling, June 24, 1865.

³⁰⁰ John to Schmerling, June 24, 1865.

³⁰¹ Avinar to Anton von Belcredi, November 16, 1865, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

vital, more pragmatic financial concerns highlighted the Habsburg Monarchy's foreign policy failures as it transitioned to a more subdued economic role in Central Europe in response to encroaching Prussian political supremacy.³⁰² Foreign Minister Mensdorff, realizing the ineffectiveness of budget cuts, allocated a further 20,000 gulden for the accommodation and relocation of Montenegrin refugees.³⁰³ Before retiring at the end of 1865, Mamula proposed the permanent relocation of Montenegrin and Herzegovinian refugees residing in Dalmatia, just as Habsburg officials regularly organized for Bosnian refugees.³⁰⁴ However, unlike the Bosnian refugees, many of whom hailed from neighboring regions, the Montenegrins possessed almost no knowledge of the Temesvar Banat or the Serbian Vojvodina.

The resettlement plans took effect in early June 1866, a most inopportune time. Habsburg and Prussian hostilities regressed into war. The Austro-Prussian War resulted in another swift Habsburg defeat, which led to the loss of Habsburg Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy, along with Venetia's strategically vital ports. Following the loss, Habsburg Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff (1827—71) (echoing the recently deceased Radetzky) wrote that the Dalmatian coast garnered much greater military and economic significance; therefore, its protection from Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro remained paramount.³⁰⁵ Despite the seismic upheavals in Habsburg governance wrought by the War, the resettlement of Montenegrin refugees continued under the supervision of Field Marshal Count Joseph Philippovich von Philippsberg (1818—89) with approval from Interior Minister Belcredi. Philippovich considered rural villages in the Vojvodina and the Banat suitable places, given the recent resistance of Croatian and Slavonian authorities. Philippovitch estimated that resettling some 150 refugees would require 6,000 florins.³⁰⁶ A

³⁰² Good, *Economic*, 97.

³⁰³ Alexander von Mensdorff to Friedrich Beust, March 3, 1866, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁰⁴ Alexander von Mensdorff to Anton von Belcredi, June 4, 1866, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁰⁵ Martin Gabriel, "Bosnien und die Herzegowina in den militärstrategischen Planungen der Habsburgermonarchie 1700-1870," *Kakanien Revisited*, 9 (2011): 6.

³⁰⁶ Joseph Philippovitch to Anton von Belcredi, June 4, 1866, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

steamship would transfer the refugees to Fiume/Rijeka, from there a wagon to Karlstadt/Karlovac, then a boat from Sisak to Karlovitz/Sremski Karlovci.³⁰⁷ The devastating war with Prussia delayed the relocation of the Montenegrin refugees and paused the reporting on South Slavic Christian refugees from the Ottoman Empire, which saw a resurgence in the Autumn.

By early September, most of the 150 Montenegrin refugees arrived at Karlovitz/Sremski Karlovci, settling permanently.³⁰⁸ Not all, though, made the journey. A few eligible Montenegrin women married Habsburg subjects in Southern Dalmatia, rendering them or their mothers ineligible for relocation under Habsburg law.³⁰⁹ Overall, the Montenegrins' relocation to the Vojvodina reflected the already established refugee resettlement protocols within the Habsburg Monarchy. However, these webs of communication that included the highest officials in Vienna, cost a fortune. For the next fiscal year, 1867, the *Wiener Zeitung* reported that the figure allocated for supporting Montenegrin and Bosnian refugees decreased from 50,000 to 35,000 florins.³¹⁰ Whether the monetary decrease reflected an actual reduction in refugee numbers seems unlikely. More plausibly, after the Habsburg defeat to Prussia and Italy, Habsburg coffers could no longer warrant such a large sum to accommodate foreign "Oriental" refugees.

The economic and administrative upheavals within the Habsburg Monarchy following the Austro-Prussian War encouraged governmental compromise with Hungarian politicians. Amidst a negotiated reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy, it seemed as though the issue of refugees would no longer rest with Habsburg officials in Vienna, but with Hungarian-administered Croatian lands, aside from the Croatian Military Border. 1857 to late 1866, an inherent transitional period, saw immense changes in Habsburg South Slavic refugee policies and Habsburg perceptions toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. Habsburg responses to these crises reflected increasing policies of

³⁰⁷ Philippovitch to Belcredi, June 4, 1866.

³⁰⁸ Rosebacher to Stadion, September 6, 1866, *Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868*, MdÄ IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁰⁹ Rosebacher to Stadion, September 6, 1866.

³¹⁰ "Staatsvoranschlag fuer das Verwaltungsjahr 1867," *Die Wiener Zeitung*, December 30, 1866.

interventionism, either through Habsburg consulates in Bosnia and Herzegovina or through resettlement policies.

As I showed, even though Bosnian administrators implemented many of the sought-after tax and land reforms, Bosnian and Montenegrin refugees continued to cross Habsburg borders. Preexisting Habsburg policies dictated the blanket acceptance of refugees, but financial constraints placed extensive burdens on Croatian and Slavonian communities. Osman Pasha's successful reforms in Bosnia failed to stop the flow of refugees to the Habsburg Monarchy. However, the recurrent and expensive costs of resettling refugees contributed to a shift in Habsburg rhetoric from open acceptance toward regarding Bosnia as an "Oriental" land in decline, in direct opposition to Bosnia's nonlinear transformation through partially successful infrastructural and institutional reforms. Habsburg colonial pretensions toward Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue to fester as newly formed Austria-Hungary would need to respond to yet more crises from its southern, "Oriental" neighbors. Chapter three examines how unresolved issues between Habsburg central and provincial authorities over refugees and renewed unrests in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed to Habsburg colonial rhetoric toward occupation.

Chapter Three: South Slavic Refugees from Austro-Hungarian Compromise to “Eastern Crisis,” 1867—75

In 1846, Croatian poet, lawyer, and later Croatian *ban*, Ivan Mažuranić (1814–90), published the epic poem “*The Death of Smail-aga Čengić (Smrt Smail-age Čengića)*” in the popular *Iskra* literary journal. The poem romantically recounts the assassination of a local Muslim landlord by a Christian peasant that occurred in 1840 in Southern Herzegovina near the Montenegrin Border. Mažuranić’s usage of romantic imagery, while at times gratuitous, weaves a language of religious authority. When he writes, “Above all else that adorns this land [Herzegovina], a holy cross hangs over it. It gives us strength against our adversaries, protecting us from heaven above,” Mažuranić conjures the idea that Herzegovina rightly belongs to Christendom.³¹¹ Throughout the Orientalist poem, Mažuranić loosely adapted historical events to create a Croatian moral allegory for Christian resistance to Muslim rule across Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While the Croatian-literate public within the Habsburg Monarchy received the poem positively, for many decades, admirers considered it an apolitical work.³¹² However, as the South Slavic Christian refugee crisis from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg Monarchy intensified in subsequent years, Mažuranić’s work transformed into a political statement. Not long after Mažuranić ascended as *ban* in 1873, he corroborated his earlier, more literary convictions, writing that in Bosnia and Herzegovina “any form of slavery is pagan damnation.”³¹³ Despite these pointed platitudes, once the 1875 Herzegovina Uprising commenced, sparking the “Eastern Crisis,” Mažuranić received criticism from many of his constituents for failing to act decisively in support of the Ottoman Christian rebellions, acts which he once praised with religious zeal.³¹⁴ Mažuranić’s evolution over three decades reflected shifts in Habsburg policy toward South Slavic

³¹¹ Ivan Mazuranic, “Smrt Smail Age Čengića [The Death of Smail-age Čengić],” *Iskra*, 1846.

³¹² Marina Štimec Protrka, “Censor’s Scissors in Croatian Literature: Shaping a(n) (Inter)National Community,” *Neohelicon*, (2023): 9-11.

³¹³ Protrka, “Scissors,” 11.

³¹⁴ Protrka, “Literature,” 10-12.

Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina from a position of sympathy and moral duties to one of reserved diplomacy.

While the previous chapter showed how miscommunication about South Slavic refugees complicated Habsburg and Ottoman uneven “modernities,” this chapter examines Ottoman South Slavic refugees from the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 until the beginning of the “Eastern Crisis” in 1875, and the political upheavals in Habsburg lands and Bosnia and Herzegovina. To analyze these developments, how did the political change and, in some cases, revolt caused by the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise contribute to subsequent Habsburg responses to South Slavic refugee crises in subsequent years? This chapter seeks to reorient conceptions of the “Eastern Crisis” and the estimated 250,000 Ottoman Christian refugees who fled to Habsburg lands away from narrow explanations of the Habsburg colonial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³¹⁵ The chapter utilizes sources primarily from within the Habsburg Foreign Ministry archives, supplemented, more than previous chapters, by the Habsburg periodical press. I argue that political reformations in Habsburg and Ottoman lands worsened refugee crises, leading to decreases in Habsburg religious rhetoric toward refugees, yet compounding Habsburg colonial rhetoric toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlikely events progenerated via compromise.

The Consequences of Compromise for Habsburg Refugee Policies

The 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise instituted Dualism or the Dual Monarchy, cleaving the Habsburg Monarchy into two halves: Cisleithania, administered by Austria, and Transleithania, administered by Hungary. The split in Habsburg administrators’ focus between these two halves instituted reformed, and in many cases, equally ineffective refugee policies, which exacerbated already antiquated and underfunded refugee programs. In late 1867, Austria-Hungary’s civil codes on immigration underwent extensive revision concerning intra-imperial citizenship. However, little changed in how foreigners applied for and received citizenship, except

³¹⁵ Manasek, *Empire*, 3-4.

that consent for naturalization now stemmed directly from the Interior Ministry.³¹⁶ Despite these legal amendments, few refugees crossed the Croatian Military Border or Dalmatia's borders. The primary, albeit cursory, concern for Habsburg officials regarding South Slavic Christian refugees in 1867 lay with the ongoing resettlement procedures for Montenegrin refugees from 1866.

In Vienna, perceptions of South Slavic refugee crises that informed German-literate public opinions only appeared in the footnotes of Viennese newspapers. By 1867, the number of periodical presses soared, reaching over eight hundred across Austria-Hungary.³¹⁷ Despite this increase, the most recurring perception of Habsburg South Slavs among German-speaking Austrians attributed to backward "Oriental" conceptions of *Grenzer* soldiers, a legacy of the numerous visual and textual representations of *Grenzers* during the October 1848 Vienna Revolution.³¹⁸ After the Compromise, South Slavic nationalist rhetoric featured more prominently in Viennese newspapers. These ideas challenged liberal Austrian modernity, emblemizing a German-Slav "civilizational divide" that stoked misconceptions concerning South Slav politics and Ottoman South Slavic refugees.³¹⁹

Outside Vienna, in German and South Slavic language presses, coverage of Bosnia and Herzegovina drew greater attention. Amidst the political upheaval surrounding the 1867 Compromise, these presses interpreted Bosnian events through what I argue existed as an "Orientalist" lens. During Bosnia's first inter-confessional council meeting for 1867, the *Laibacher Zeitung* in Carniola mocked Osman Pasha and high-ranking Bosnian Muslim officials for treating Christian delegates as lackeys rather than government officials.³²⁰ In an editorial two months later, the paper went further, scrutinizing rumored French plans for the Great Powers to implement

³¹⁶ Hannelore Burger, "Passwesen und Staatsbürgerschaft," in *Grenze und Staat. Passwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremdenengesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750–1867*, eds. Waltraud Heindl-Langer and Edith Saurer, (Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2000), 164.

³¹⁷ Robin Okey, "The Neue Freie Presse and the South Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 85, no. 1 (2007): 82-83.

³¹⁸ For decades, journalists and artists in the Habsburg Monarchy Orientalized *Grenzer* soldiers, also referred to as *Seracens* (*serassaner*) due to their Ottoman-style military uniforms.

³¹⁹ Okey, "Presse," 83.

³²⁰ "Sarajevo in Bosnien 14 Jaenner," *Die Laibacher Zeitung*, February 5, 1867.

“civil equality of Christians and ‘Turks,” arguing that these ephemeral plans would hardly materialize against Bosnian Muslim entrenched traditionalism.³²¹

Habsburg South Slavic frustration over the Bosnian administration's treatment of Christians, combined with dissatisfaction with Habsburg and other European responses, formed a recurring theme in South Slavic newspapers at the time. The Croatian language newspaper *Obzor* even drew the attention of the Habsburg Foreign Ministry with its editorial, “Why do Turks Persecute Christians? (*Zašto Turci progone kršćane?*),” which expressed immense sympathy toward the plight of Bosnian Christians and advocated more effective Habsburg interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a conviction nearly absent in the German-language Austrian press.³²² Croatian language perceptions of Bosnian Christians only pertained to a limited Croatian-literate audience and reflected national linguistic developments toward writing political commentaries in Croatian, rather than German.

Amid these developments, rumors surfaced again about an impending Serbian invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Aggravated rumors led a committee of Croatian politicians to meet in Agram/Zagreb in September 1867 to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the most pressing issues facing Austria-Hungary.³²³ In 1868, a Serbian diplomat even contacted the new Habsburg Foreign Minister Gyula Andrassy on the matter of Serbia invading Bosnia, and Andrassy replied, “snatch up Bosnia and Herzegovina, but go no further. Keep clear of Bulgaria, for you might [collapse] all of European Turkey.”³²⁴ While Andrassy entertained Serbian overtures concerning Bosnia early in his long tenure as Foreign Minister, Ottoman leaders, too, worried that the Habsburg loss of Venetia to the Kingdom of Italy would lead to a forced relinquishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a form of compensation for previous Habsburg territorial losses in the Italian

³²¹ *Die Laibacher Zeitung*, February 5, 1867.

³²² “Zašto Turci progone kršćane [Why do Turks Persecute Christians?],” *Obzor*, July 4, 1872, in *Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiska 2. Teil, 1873*, MdA IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³²³ Balta, “Boundaries,” 140.

³²⁴ Cited in Balta, “Boundaries,” 141.

peninsula.³²⁵ Andrásy's noncommittal stance on Bosnia, though, reflected the broader bonding of Hungarian interests in Habsburg foreign and domestic policies.

In Hungary, trepidation emblemized most responses to South Slavic political movements and the settlement of South Slavic refugees from the Ottoman Empire to Austria-Hungary. The 1868 Croatian-Hungarian Compromise (*Nagodba*) allocated immense power to Hungary to oversee Croatia and Slavonia. The inherent imbalance of power, exacerbated by an imprecise compromise (at least in terms of public law), further muddled the political questions surrounding the Croatian Military Border.³²⁶ Hungarian politicians lobbied for the immediate dissolution of the Croatian Military Border and its absorption into Croatia and Slavonia, concerned about the continued existence of a potentially hostile military force on its borders. In early 1869, Andrásy interceded advocating the Military Border's immediate dissolution.³²⁷ While Emperor Franz Joseph I initially opposed these demands, Andrásy set the standard for asserting the Hungarian crown's rights.

In January 1870, the War Ministry appointed General Anton Mollinary von Montepastello (1820—1904) commander of the Croatian Military Border to formally administer the “demilitarization process” despite War Minister Franz von John's ardent objections.³²⁸ During his first days in office, Mollinary received numerous petitions from *Grenzgers* to preserve the Croatian Military Border.³²⁹ Compared to Bosnia, the Croatian Military Border hosted few schools, and only 33 percent of men and 25 percent of women living there could read.³³⁰ This reflects the failure of the Habsburg military administration of the province to oversee any form of industrialization or municipal centralization.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, nearly a decade of reforms and public works projects transformed the country physically but not culturally. Osman Pasha slowly accumulated enemies

³²⁵ Balta, “Boundaries,” 143.

³²⁶ Denes Sokcsevits, “The Story of Croatian Bosnia: Mythos, Empire-Building Aspirations, or a Failed Attempt at National Integration?” *Hungarian Historical Review* II, No. 4, (2022): 895.

³²⁷ Rothenberg, “Dissolution,” 70-71.

³²⁸ Rothenberg, “Dissolution,” 70, 74.

³²⁹ Rothenberg, “Dissolution,” 75.

³³⁰ Popescu, *Borderlands*, 97.

among Bosnian Muslim elites as rumors circulated about his antagonism with military leaders in Istanbul, his ownership of luxurious properties across Bosnia and Herzegovina (which violated Ottoman policy), and salacious accusations that he conducted illicit deals with Austria-Hungary. Regardless of their validity, all these rumors provided enough grounds for his removal in November 1868. For Bosnia and Herzegovina's Christian populations, Osman Pasha's dismissal reintroduced uncertainties concerning Christians' rights in Bosnian society. Meanwhile, Osman Pasha consistently proved to be a reliable collaborator to Habsburg officials.³³¹ His removal reinforced Habsburg views of Bosnia as an unstable, "Oriental" neighbor. While Habsburg prejudices failed to capture reality, the Christian peasant populace remained predominantly peaceful even as numerous Governor Generals arrived and left Bosnia in the following months and years. In contrast, Habsburg South Slavs repeatedly rebelled against Dualism, specifically military and economic reforms, and perceived Hungarian hegemony over South Slavic crownlands.

Rebelling Against Reform in Austria-Hungary and Expelling Rebels in Bosnia

The Croatian Military Border's dismemberment coupled with Hungarian political encroachment induced some South Slavs to rebel, troubling Habsburg military leaders. A limited uprising in Southern Dalmatia, an unsuccessful revolution in the Croatian Military Border, and a Bosnian Orthodox political refugee in Austria-Hungary exemplify that, while the relative numbers of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary remained low, the prospect of destabilizing unrest and invasion never entirely fled Habsburg leaders' minds. Despite the fundamental reorganization of Habsburg lands, the political response to these conflicts, unrest, and refugees remained predominately unchanged.

In 1869, Habsburg Military Chancellor, Count Friedrich von Beck-Rzikowsky (1830—1920), alarmed by the prospect of Montenegrin and Serbian expansionism, recommended an immediate invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Emperor Franz Joseph I, much like Field

³³¹ Koetschet, *Pasha*, 92-94. Osman Pasha even received the Habsburg diplomatic honor of the Grand Cross of the Austrian Order of the Leopard, but never in the sense that he would betray the Ottoman Empire.

Marshalls Joseph Radetzky von Radetz and Karl Ludwig von Grünne before him.³³² Previously, the Emperor could command an occupation with minimal oversight. Under Dualism, though, any Habsburg foray into Bosnia and Herzegovina required Hungarian support. However, before any formal Habsburg occupation plans could materialize, discontent with Dualism devolved into revolt in one of the more unlikely corners of Austria-Hungary.

In Southern Dalmatia, an uprising arose in late 1869 in response to the Dalmatian governor's (Field Marshal Sir Johann von Wagner, 1815—94) reforms to local militia conscription laws.³³³ The Krivošije Uprising (*Krivošijski ustanak*) centered around the mountainous hinterland north of the Bay of Kotor. Initially, roving rebels defeated Austro-Hungarian troops. Swift victories won the rebels' fulfillment of their demands, a general amnesty, and Wagner's resignation.³³⁴ In the rebellion's aftermath, Beck seemed convinced that the rebels received funding from either Serbia, Russia, or both, citing the rebels' Orthodox faith as reasons for treasonous espionage, an unlikely accusation.³³⁵ Ottoman officials in Bosnia worried that the revolt would incite Herzegovinian Christians to assist their "co-religionists" across the border in Dalmatia against Habsburg rule, though that accusation never yielded fruit.³³⁶

The Krivošije Uprising's summary conclusion prevented the revolt's spread into Herzegovina, but hardly reflected favorable conditions for Bosnian Christians. Discontent spread in Northern Bosnia as bands of Christian refugees started crossing the Sava River. In May 1870, the Viennese newspaper *Die Neue Freie Presse* cursorily reported that Bosnian families temporarily found shelter at the Alt/Stara Gradiška border checkpoint. However, unlike previous refugees, they arrived with permission to resettle in Nasice/Našice, in Central Slavonia.³³⁷ Although similar border crossings likely continued during this period, Viennese bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry

³³² Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, *Franz Josephs Weggefährte das Leben des Generalstabschefs Grafen Beck; nach seinen Aufzeichnungen und hinterlassenen Dokumenten*, (Zurich: Amalthea, 1930) 179-180. Cited in Gabriel, 9.

³³³ "Dalmatien. Wien 5 Jaenner," *Die Neue Freie Presse*, January 6, 1870.

³³⁴ Gunther Rothenberg, "The Army of Francis Joseph," (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1976), 85-86.

³³⁵ Rothenberg, "Army," 85-87.

³³⁶ Koetschet, *Pasha*, 30-32.

³³⁷ "Von der koratische Militaer Grenze," *Die Neue Freie Presse*, May 24, 1870.

and Interior Ministry failed to address refugee issues during the period, according to surviving reports. However, one event along the Croatian Military Border would garner attention across Austria-Hungary the following year.

On October 7, 1871, the sleepy Croatian Military Border town of Rakovica awoke to a revolution. The so-called Rakovica Revolt (*Rakovica buna*) saw Eugen Kvaternik, Croatian Party of Rights cofounder, and his two close confidants, Ante Rakijaš, a disgraced Habsburg military officer, and Vjekoslav Bach, an “orthodox Croat” and right-wing *Hrvatska* newspaper editor, lead an anti-Habsburg revolution with their approximately four hundred *ustaše* troops from the Croatian Military Border regiments.³³⁸ As early as 1859, Kvaternik believed that Croatia should become an independent constitutional monarchy, incorporating Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and parts of Serbia into its lands.³³⁹ Furthermore, he reasoned that any bid for Croatian national separatism needed to begin with the *Grenzzer*s, a self-sufficient army dissatisfied with the dissolution of the Croatian Military Border.³⁴⁰ Kvaternik hoped that *Grenzzer*’s displeasure would lead them to abandon Habsburg rule altogether.³⁴¹ During the Revolt, Rakijaš boasted that not only the *Grenzzer*s had joined the cause, but also irregular Ottoman Christian troops, numbering 70,000 stationed across Northern Bosnia, awaited the Croatian revolutionaries’ command (an explicit lie to intimidate Habsburg officials).³⁴²

In his memoir, recounting the revolt years later, Mollinary stated that “the regiment’s officers had not noticed any of these [revolutionary] preparations.”³⁴³ Regardless, Kvaternik’s gambit failed, and within two days, as *Grenzzer* battalions mobilized in response, *ustaše* numbers dwindled to a few dozen.³⁴⁴ Kvaternik ordered a retreat to the Bosnian border, where the remaining

³³⁸ The word *ustaša*, along with its plural form, *ustaše*, derives itself from the infinitive Croatian verb *ustati*, to rise or wake up. Historically, it described the Croatian fascist movement under the leadership of Ante Pavelić, but it earlier described revolutionaries who participated in the Rakovica Revolt.

³³⁹ Eugen Kvaternik, *La Croatie et la Confédération italienne*, (Paris: Imprimerie de J. Claye, 1859), 56

³⁴⁰ Ferdo Šišić, *Kvaternik (Rakovica buna)*. Zagreb: 1926, 22.

³⁴¹ Kvaternik, *Croatie*, 55-56.

³⁴² “Der Oguliner Aufstand,” *Die Oesterreichisch-ungarisch Wehr Zeitung*, October 25, 1871.

³⁴³ Anton Mollinary, *Sechshundvierzig Jahre im österreichisch-ungarischen Heere*, 1833-1879, volume 2, (Zurich: Orell Fussli Verlag, 1905), 233-236.

³⁴⁴ Šišić, *Kvaternik*, 23-25.

revolutionaries, like the Hungarians two decades prior, vainly sought Ottoman amnesty.³⁴⁵ However, *Grenzers* intercepted the *ustaše* near the Bosnian border, summarily killing Kvaternik, Rakijaš, and Bach. Mollinary fondly described the conduct of loyal *Grenzers*, writing, “It was a final fine demonstration of loyalty and discipline, an outstanding performance of the old machine before it was forever retired.”³⁴⁶ The Rakovica Revolt provided Andrassy with the necessary leverage for quickening the Croatian Military Border’s dissolution, claiming that it signified insurrectionist Pan-Slavist agitation throughout Austria-Hungary.³⁴⁷ While Andrassy’s fearmongering overstated the popularity and effectiveness of South Slav nationalism, Kvaternik provided only a single, domestic example.

Vasa Pelagić (1833—99), an Orthodox Archimandrite and head of the Orthodox seminary in Banja Luka, until his expulsion in 1869, spent much of his adult life either exiled, imprisoned, or otherwise maligned due to his political convictions.³⁴⁸ Harsh Habsburg responses to his prolonged presence in Austria-Hungary as a “political refugee (*politische Flüchtlinge*)” exemplify, similar to Luka Vukalovic, how Habsburg refugee policies proved wholly unwelcoming for those deemed dangerous political deviants. Pelagić’s unique interpretations of Marxism led to a distinct form of Serbian socialism, which maintained close ties to the Bulgarian and Romanian socialist movements. While he opposed Russian imperialism, Pelagić also espoused Pan-Slavist tendencies.³⁴⁹ In a letter from then-Habsburg Consul in Belgrade, Benjámín von Kállay (1839—1903), to Andrassy, Kállay expressed his concerns regarding Pelagić’s presence in Habsburg Neusatz/Novi Sad; Pelagić requested permission from Kállay to travel to Prague.³⁵⁰ The idea of a known Pan-Slavist with “communist tendencies” in the perceived center for Pan-Slavism in

³⁴⁵ Šišić, *Kvaternik*, 25-27.

³⁴⁶ Mollinary, *Heere*, 233-234.

³⁴⁷ Rothenberg, “Dissolution,” 77.

³⁴⁸ Blagovest Njagulov, “Early Socialism in the Balkans: Ideas and Practices in Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria,” in *Entangled Histories of the Balkans Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, eds. Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 227-228.

³⁴⁹ Njagulov, “Socialism,” 228.

³⁵⁰ Benjámín Kállay to Gyula Andrassy, August 24, 1872, Archimandrit Pelagic, bosnischer Flüchtling, 1872, MdÄ IB box 32-699, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

Austria-Hungary worried these two Hungarian aristocrats. However, according to the law, they could not outright deny Pelagić amnesty as a “persecuted” Ottoman refugee.³⁵¹

The primary controversy surrounding Pelagić after he left Bosnia centered on a political pamphlet he published in Belgrade in 1871, in which he openly endorsed Bosnian and Herzegovinian Christian rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.³⁵² For his crimes, the Ottoman government in Bosnia sought his extradition, but the Habsburg consul in Sarajevo, Teodorović, denied Ottoman requests, citing that “in all countries, it is not possible to extradite political refugees.”³⁵³ Despite these attempts, Habsburg officials displayed an increasing weariness toward Pelagić and scheduled his deportation. Pelagić travelled to Montenegro from Slavonia, continuing his long exile.³⁵⁴ South Slavic political agitation in Austria-Hungary demonstrates how the 1867 Compromise sewed discontent toward regions neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina. The following year, 1873, another refugee crisis would test Austro-Hungarian convictions, and the foreign policies established surrounding Ottoman South Slavic refugees that remained unyielding and broadly unchanged for decades.

The 1873 Bosnian Plenipotentiary Committee to Vienna

As the South Slavic regions of Austria-Hungary voiced discontent, some more violently and unsuccessfully than others, unrest again arose in Northern Bosnia. After the removal of Osman Pasha, incrementally, the incidents of Muslim abuses of power over Christians allegedly rose. Bosnian Christians, without much other recourse, increasingly turned to Habsburg officials, either in Habsburg consulates in Bosnia and Herzegovina or on the Croatian Military Border. The Banja Luka district, in Northern Bosnia, experienced the most pronounced discord between Christians and Muslims. As a result, between 1870 and 1872, a Plenipotentiary Committee of

³⁵¹ Kállay to Andrassy, August 24, 1872.

³⁵² Lebereth to Toth, November 16, 1872, Archimandrit Pelagic, bosnischer Flüchtling, 1872, MdÄ IB box 32-699, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁵³ Telegram to Emanuel von Ludolf, December 22, 1872, Archimandrit Pelagic, bosnischer Flüchtling, 1872, MdÄ IB box 32-699, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁵⁴ “Agram, 14 Januar,” *Die Neue Freie Presse*, January 15, 1873.

twenty-four Orthodox merchants from Bebir/Gradiška across the Sava River from Alt/Stara Gradiška complained of abuses and sent ten petitions to the district governor in Banja Luka, requesting relief.³⁵⁵ When the petitions failed, the “Plenipotentiary Committee of the Refugee Christians from Gradiška in Bosnia” fled across the border.

The merchants’ petitions show the ineffectiveness of Bosnian reforms in the years immediately after Osman Pasha’s reign. Not unlike the 1858 Bosnian Deputation, the merchants utilized Austria-Hungary’s position as a signatory to the 1856 Treaty of Paris to illicit Habsburg aid.³⁵⁶ One of the first Bosnian Christian merchants to arrive in the Croatian Military Border, Petar Miljković, with his wife and two children, during an interrogation, attributed his reasons for fleeing to “the religious persecution of Christians” which worsened in recent years preventing North Bosnian Christians from participating politically or even selling goods in public markets.³⁵⁷ When the other merchants, fearing arrest and torture, crossed into the Croatian Military Border, their wives and children stayed behind. They traveled to Sarajevo to beseech General Governor Ibrahim Dervish Pasha (1817—96) not to confiscate their homes and property, despite their husbands’ “crimes,” to no avail.³⁵⁸ One Serbian merchant recounted to Habsburg consular officials how one of the merchant’s wives, Jovanka Ljubović, with her three young children, tried to convince Dervish Pasha to appeal his decision; her actions so offended the Governor General he physically threw her five-year-old child out palace doors as police removed Ljubović.³⁵⁹

The British consul in Banja Luka, William Richard Holmes (1822—1882), reported a contrasting account to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Istanbul, Count Emmanuel von Ludolf (1823—1898). Holmes corroborated some of the Bosnian merchants’ claims, agreeing that they maintained some “cause for complaint,” but Holmes identified many as undoubtedly exaggerated,

³⁵⁵ Jared Manasek, “The High Stakes of Small Numbers: Flight, Diplomacy, and Refugee Return on the Habsburg-Ottoman Border 1873–74,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 51 (2020): 64–65.

³⁵⁶ Manasek, “Refugee,” 60.

³⁵⁷ Carl Geisinger to Gyula Andrassy, June 21, 1873, *Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiska 1. Teil*, 1873, MdA IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁵⁸ Anton von Mollinary to Gyula Andrassy, July 22, 1873, *Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiska 1. Teil*, 1873, MdA IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁵⁹ Mollinary to Andrassy, July 22, 1873.

used to elicit Habsburg sympathy.³⁶⁰ Holmes reveals explicit biases: as a British agent, he aimed to preserve Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina and suppress ethnic or confessional strife. At the same time, he openly acknowledged Austria-Hungary's efforts to assert diplomatic control over Bosnia and Herzegovina, even encouraging limited Austro-Hungarian diplomatic intervention. Ludolf and other Habsburg officials defined the merchants broadly as deserving of political asylum, even if they found aspects of the merchants' complaints against Ottoman officials dubious. Unlike previous Bosnian Christian delegations, diplomatic concerns over the merchants soon spread.

A coalition of unnamed merchants from the Habsburg port of Trieste wrote a petition to Andrassy on behalf of the Bosnian merchants, citing the "rift between the Turkish and Christian populations of Bosnia" as not just morally deplorable but bad for business.³⁶¹ Trieste's merchants maintained close commercial ties with the refugee merchants, but more importantly, the Bosnian merchants owed money to the merchants of Trieste.³⁶² They urged that Andrassy make an "immediate intervention" on the matter.³⁶³ Andrassy refused to heed the Trieste merchants' request. In a letter to Mollinary, Andrassy asserted that Austria-Hungary should refrain from "getting involved in the complaints of Turkish subjects with local officials, to make clear to the *Porte* [our] terms for all the refugees' return," suggesting a Habsburg stance far removed from the Trieste merchants' demands.³⁶⁴

After the Bosnian merchants safely arrived at Alt/Stara Gradiška they sent their petition to Emperor Franz Joseph I. The petition broadly sought Habsburg mediation in alleviating "Turkish oppression," further arguing that the merchants remained "ever-loyal subjects and

³⁶⁰ William Holmes to Emmanuel von Ludolf, July 3, 1873, Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiska 1. Teil, 1873, MdÄ IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁶¹ Petition from the Merchants of Trieste to Andrassy, July 12, 1873, Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiska 1. Teil, 1873, MdÄ IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁶² Petition from the Merchants of Trieste to Andrassy, July 12, 1873.

³⁶³ Petition from the Merchants of Trieste to Andrassy, July 12, 1873.

³⁶⁴ Gyula Andrassy to Anton von Mollinary, July 29, 1873, Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiska 1. Teil, 1873, MdÄ IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

taxpayers” to Sultan Abdulaziz I (1830—76) and to the Banja Luka district, “where [the merchants] forebears lived and died” under Ottoman rule.³⁶⁵ As evidenced above, the petition’s rhetoric resembled that of the 1858 Bosnian Deputation. The merchants’ aims cursorily resembled those of the 1858 Bosnian Deputation as well; their circumstances, though, differed considerably. When the Bosnian merchants arrived, Austria-Hungary no longer sought universal adherence to the 1856 Treaty of Paris, adopting a more forceful diplomatic stance.

The shift in Habsburg policies toward Bosnia perhaps originated from the consistent calls from Habsburg military leaders to occupy those Ottoman provinces. Many European powers seemed unwilling to consider the so-called “Bosnian Question.” Whereas, Austria-Hungary’s proximity and decades-long policies surrounding Ottoman South Slavic Christian refugees (and the associated financial drain) more acutely affected Habsburg decision-making, even concerning the supposedly trivial Bosnian merchants.³⁶⁶ Andr  ssy seemed determined to neither extradite the merchants to Bosnia nor fulfill their demands, thereby risking open conflict with the Ottoman Empire over what to him appeared a trifling matter of local Bosnian politics.³⁶⁷

The Ottomans accused Austria-Hungary of utilizing the merchants as a diversion for Habsburg-backed Christian revolutionaries in Bosnia, stoking long-held fears among Bosnian Muslim elites of an unprovoked Habsburg invasion.³⁶⁸ The Habsburg vice consul in Banja Luka, Captain Stanislaus Dragan    von Drachenfels, hardly helped alleviate such accusations, as he contributed to “nationalist agitation” in the region by distributing pamphlets that advocated an Austro-Hungarian occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁶⁹ Habsburg Foreign Ministry officials promised Dragan   ’s dismissal if Ottoman officials recalled the offending Banja Luka officials cited in the Bosnian merchants’ petition; however, even Dragan   ’s removal failed

³⁶⁵ Bosnian Merchants’ Petition to Emperor Franz Joseph I, July 7, 1873, *Bosnische Fl  chtlinge (Kaufleute) aus t  rkisch Gradiska 1. Teil*, 1873, Md   IB box 37-362,   sterreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁶⁶ Manasek, “Refugee,” 61.

³⁶⁷ “Christenverfolgung in Bosnien,” *Die Neue Zeit*, September 23, 1873.

³⁶⁸ Manasek, “Refugee,” 67.

³⁶⁹ Manasek, “Refugee,” 68.

to convince Ottoman officials that he acted alone.³⁷⁰ The dismissal of offending officials and the lifting of criminal charges against the merchants show at least the partial fulfillment of their demands. As winter set in, Mollinary reported to Andrassy that the merchants, languishing on the Croatian Military Border near starving, “now express their full willingness to return immediately to their homeland with passes of safe conduct.”³⁷¹ After eight months abroad, the Bosnian merchants returned to their homes in Bebir/Gradiška in February 1874.³⁷²

The Prague German-language press *Die Politik* identified the Bosnian merchants as the most “burning political issue” for Austria-Hungary and the “Bosnian Question” more broadly at that time.³⁷³ The article half-mockingly identified Andrassy’s curt transformation from a famous “friend to the Turks” to a “Christian-lover” throughout the Bosnian merchants’ stay in Austria-Hungary appeared hypocritical yet fortuitous since any plans for a Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would require Andrassy’s hearty approval.³⁷⁴ While Habsburg authorities continued to negotiate amicably with Ottoman officials to resolve the diplomatic crisis that originated with the Bosnian merchants, as conditions for Bosnian and Herzegovinian Christians worsened, Habsburg officials shifted toward more colonial approaches.

The 1875 Herzegovina Uprising and the Question of Scale

In the Spring of 1875, Austro-Hungarian military leaders lobbied for and organized an imperial tour for Emperor Franz Joseph I across Dalmatia as the pretext for an invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁷⁵ *Die Neue Freie Presse* reported a “joyful” atmosphere at the Emperor’s arrival

³⁷⁰ Cited in Manasek, “Refugee,” 68.

³⁷¹ Anton von Mollinary to Gyula Andrassy, November 23, 1873, Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiška 2. Teil, 1873, MdA IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁷² Manasek, “Refugee,” 62.

³⁷³ “Die bosnische Frage,” *Die Politik*, August 17, 1873, in Bosnische Flüchtlinge (Kaufleute) aus türkisch Gradiška 2. Teil, 1873, MdA IB box 37-362, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

³⁷⁴ Balta, “Boundaries,” 140.

³⁷⁵ *Die Politik*, August 17, 1873.

³⁷⁵ Raymond Detrez, “Reluctance and Determination: The Prelude to Austro-Hungarian Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878,” in *Wechsel Wirkungen: Austria-Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Western Balkans, 1878-1918*, eds. Clemens Ruthner et al, (New York: Peter Lang, 2015), 7.

in every port city along the Dalmatian coast with parades, Habsburg flags, and “triumphal arches” erected in the streets.³⁷⁶ During military inspections of the fortress at Metković along the mountainous Dalmatian-Herzegovinian border, *Die Presse* reported that lining the streets, Christian peasants and Franciscan friars from nearby Herzegovina “cheered His Majesty,” displaying the close kinship between the provinces.³⁷⁷ During the Emperor’s final destination in Cattaro/Kotor, Bosnia’s Governor General, Ibrahim Dervish Pasha, met with him, though the contents of their conversation remain unknown; the meeting likely went poorly.³⁷⁸ In the following days, during a speech in the borderland north of Cattaro/Kotor (not far from where the Krivošije Uprising occurred), Emperor Franz Joseph I instructed the troops stationed there that an Austro-Hungarian invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina neared.³⁷⁹ News of the Emperor’s speech and military preparations penetrated Herzegovina, brewing bitter dissent among Christians.

In 1874, in the Nevesinje region of Southern Herzegovina, near Cattaro/Kotor, blight annihilated the wheat crop, and the Christian peasant populace, threatened by violent measures by the region’s two Muslim and one Christian tax collectors, fled into the nearby mountains and began preparing for an armed resistance.³⁸⁰ The 1875 Herzegovina Uprising, a predominantly agrarian affair, initially bore a striking resemblance to every other armed revolt in the preceding twenty years across Bosnia and Herzegovina. The British consul Holmes thought the Uprising hardly surprising since tax collectors overtaxed and widely abused the Christian peasants in that region.³⁸¹ While taxation formed a primary reason for unrest, another incident contributed to the Uprising’s spread. After one of the first skirmishes, Bosnian Muslim troops murdered a Franciscan friar, a friar who previously attended one of Emperor Franz Joseph I’s speeches in Dalmatia.³⁸² The friar’s

³⁷⁶ “Die Kaiserreise Telegramme des Correspondenz Bureau,” *Die Neue Freie Presse*, April 10, 1875.

³⁷⁷ “Die Kaiserreise, Metkovic,” *Die Presse*, April 27, 1875.

³⁷⁸ *Die Neue Freie Presse* April 10, 1875.

³⁷⁹ Detrez, “Reluctance,” 6-7.

³⁸⁰ Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 132.

³⁸¹ Miloš Ković, “The Beginning of the 1875 Serbian Uprising in Herzegovina: The British Perspective,” *Balkanica* 41 (2010): 58.

³⁸² Detrez, “Reluctance,” 6.

brutal death outraged local Catholics who broadly supported Austria-Hungary as a loyal protector and thereafter rebelled openly.

The Herzegovina Uprising gained momentum amidst decades of Habsburg coalescing efforts to portray Bosnia and Herzegovina as an “Oriental” religious protectorate, or even a potential colonial project. The sheer scale of refugees triggered by the Uprising further amplified these narratives. By August, the revolt spread northward into Bosnia.³⁸³ The reasons for the revolt’s spread into Bosnia remain unclear, although many at the time blamed foreign orchestration by Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, and even the Russian Empire.³⁸⁴ In Austria-Hungary, many blamed Serbia for the revolt’s spread, and indeed, Serbian aid committees and insurgent volunteers certainly contributed to the Uprising’s spread outside of Herzegovina.³⁸⁵ British consular agents in Bosnia suspected Austria-Hungary’s illicit involvement in the Uprising once it spread, since Catholic rebels in the north allegedly hoisted Habsburg Double Eagle (*Doppeladler*) flags.³⁸⁶

Dalmatian newspapers complained about the amassing numbers of Herzegovinian refugees on the Dalmatian border, but for border officials, the insurgents among the refugees proved a more pressing issue.³⁸⁷ According to preexisting protocols, border officials confiscated the insurgents’ weapons but returned them upon the rebels’ voluntary repatriation to Herzegovina, inadvertently further fanning the revolt.³⁸⁸ Along the Croatian Military Border, military leaders only partially mobilized *Grenzer* troops to meet the crisis of arriving refugees and insurgents since the Croatian Military Border no longer maintained the soldiers or funds to sustain a full mobilization.³⁸⁹ On August 22, 40 Bosnian Muslim mounted cavalry crossed the Habsburg border near Dubica, pursuing fleeing Christian insurgents, and a mere three *Grenzers* repelled them with threats alone, unlike decades earlier, when *Grenzer* detachments would repel similar incursions with

³⁸³ Ković, “British,” 68.

³⁸⁴ Ković, “British,” 68.

³⁸⁵ Ković, “British,” 67-68.

³⁸⁶ Ković, “British,” 59.

³⁸⁷ “Die bosnische Flüchtlinge in Dalmatien,” *Das Vaterland*, August 4, 1875.

³⁸⁸ *Das Vaterland*, August 4, 1875.

³⁸⁹ “Der Aufstand in der Herzegovina,” *Die Neue Freie Presse*, August 24, 1875.

overwhelming violence.³⁹⁰ Bosnian Muslim intrusions occupied the few *Grenzvers* stationed on the border not refugees. At the same time, over 3,000 refugees crowded near the fortress at Alt/Stara Gradiška, and more arrived daily.³⁹¹ By the end of the year, refugee numbers soared to over 50,000 in Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, and by 1878, over 250,000.³⁹²

The 1875 Herzegovina Uprising inadvertently sparked the “Eastern Crisis,” during which the Great Powers oversaw the relinquishment of Ottoman control over many of its European territories amid widespread unrest from Ottoman Christian populations, not only in Herzegovina but across Ottoman Europe. Over three years, Austria-Hungary would spend nearly ten million florins on refugee aid.³⁹³ The Croatian Military Border’s commander, Mollinary, viewed the cost of aid as an unfortunate but necessary expense. The Habsburg Finance Ministry disagreed, as by the end of 1875, without any change in refugee policy, the government spent 475,000 florins on 53,474 refugees.³⁹⁴ Mollinary possessed a rather indicative perspective on poverty, distinguishing between “deserving” and “undeserving” poor, aligning with the previously established Habsburg Christian moral obligations.³⁹⁵ In defense of the costs, he referenced “norms of care,” which undoubtedly referred to the Rescript of 1854.³⁹⁶

The problems surrounding the scale of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian refugee crises from 1875 onward certainly factored into Habsburg administrators’ decisions, as provincial governments in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia incessantly complained about the untenable rise in food prices.³⁹⁷ As refugee crises worsened, other nations, including Great Britain and the Kingdom of Prussia, intervened, raising broader diplomatic concerns. When the Principality of Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire in June 1876, Austria-Hungary’s refugee policies forced

³⁹⁰ “Der Aufstand in der Herzegovina,” *Die Neue Freie Presse*, August 25, 1875.

³⁹¹ *Die Neue Freie Presse*, August 25, 1875.

³⁹² Manasek, “Repatriation,” 301.

³⁹³ Mollinary, *Heere*, 232-239, Cited in Manasek, Repatriation, 309.

³⁹⁴ Manasek, *Empire*, 21-22 and Manasek “Repatriation,” 309-310.

³⁹⁵ Manasek, *Empire*, 85-86.

³⁹⁶ Manasek, *Empire*, 85-86.

³⁹⁷ Manasek, *Empire*, 83-87.

refugees to stay on Habsburg territory much longer than expected which strengthened Habsburg claims to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Habsburg public, predominantly in Vienna, lent aid to refugees, though only enough to moderately supplement governmental programs.³⁹⁸ Despite public charity, Habsburg presses predominantly remained neutral regarding Habsburg intentions toward Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁹⁹ Following Serbian military defeats and the Russian Empire's entry into the war in 1877, for Andrassy, neutrality no longer remained an option. After the outbreak of the Herzegovina Uprising, Andrassy attempted to preserve the long-held *status quo* between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, holding firm against the advice of Habsburg military leaders to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1878, Andrassy's opinion changed, impacted by Ottoman administrators' failures to implement reforms to quell the numerous Christian revolts across Ottoman lands and effectively repatriate refugees.⁴⁰⁰

On May 2, 1878, Andrassy sent an ultimatum to Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842— 1918), stating that either the Ottomans government in Bosnia and Herzegovina oversee the immediate and permanent repatriation of the 250,000 South Slavic Christian, or Austria-Hungary would initiate an immediate military occupation of those provinces.⁴⁰¹ Around the same time, *Die Neue Freie Presse* reported on the Austro-Hungarian army's preparation for the "occupation corps numbering over 60,000 men, fully mobilized."⁴⁰² The article acted as a means to prepare the Habsburg public for the colonial project, but any occupation required recognition and consent from the other Great Powers.

The 1878 Berlin Congress sought to resolve the "Bosnian Question" by formally ceding nominal control of the provinces to Austria-Hungary, among other colonial concerns, "resolved" among the nations of Europe. Immediately after the Congress, Habsburg officials in the Foreign

³⁹⁸ Manasek, *Empire*, 4.

³⁹⁹ Manasek, *Empire*, 4.

⁴⁰⁰ Manasek, "Repatriation," 311-313.

⁴⁰¹ Manasek, *Empire*, 254-255.

⁴⁰² "Zur Okkupation von Bosnien und der Herzegovina," *Die Pester Lloyd*, July 20, 1878.

Ministry drafted protocols for the repatriation of the hundreds of thousands of refugees still sheltered in Austria-Hungary. The “Memoir on Measures for the Repatriation of Refugees,” taken in isolation, exhibits one of the primary reasons for the occupation. When examined closely within the context of over two decades of revolving refugee crises from Ottoman South Slavic lands, the so-called “Memoir” encapsulates Habsburg rhetoric and policies toward a colonial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The “Memoir,” likely produced either during or immediately after the Berlin Congress, advocated, “using refugees as a political tool to undermine the existing conditions.”⁴⁰³ Habsburg officials affirmed their intention to use refugees as “political tools” to justify the occupation long before the “Memoir” introduced the idea. The “Memoir,” however, omits the religious rhetoric that defined earlier Habsburg responses to South Slavic Christian refugee crises. One possible reason for this shift: Habsburg administrators and local officials on the Croatian Military Border experienced exhaustion from accommodating hundreds of thousands of refugees over more than three years, resulting in a lack of empathy toward fellow Christians. Within the “Memoir’s” pages, Bosnia and Herzegovina emerges as an object of expansionist designs for Austria-Hungary.

Despite plans for a seamless military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a “peaceful” repatriation of refugees, Habsburg authorities, like many European colonial ventures, encountered unexpected resistance that only reinforced Habsburg colonialism's unique form. The development of colonial rhetoric toward Bosnia and Herzegovina extensively drew from the unraveling South Slavic refugee crisis bearing upon political fissures in Austria-Hungary. The failures of Habsburg refugee policies in the months and years after the 1875 Herzegovina Uprising reflected not a localized event but a longer trajectory of maligned refugee policies shattered by the ignition of violent Habsburg colonialism.

⁴⁰³ “Memoir über Maßnahmen zur Rückführung von Flüchtlingen,” Bosnische und Montenegrinische Flüchtlinge, 1863-1868, MdA IB annex 33, Österreichisches Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienna, Austria.

Afterword: Pretensions into Practice

In the 1853 War Ministry “Operational Draft” for the hypothetical Habsburg invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, strategists estimated that while the provinces’ terrain proved challenging, the Habsburg army would only need to deploy 56,000 soldiers.⁴⁰⁴ Judging by the “Operational Draft’s” calculations, the estimate appeared generous, since those in the War Ministry expected little resistance from Ottoman forces and the provinces’ Christian populations.⁴⁰⁵ In actuality, the 1878 occupation took months to enact and forced Habsburg military leaders to deploy nearly 200,000 soldiers against 79,000 local insurgents (Ottoman Christians among them) and 13,800 Ottoman soldiers.⁴⁰⁶ The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina cost Austria-Hungary much more in lives and treasure than refugee aid in the over thirty years preceding the occupation. The recurring South Slavic Christian refugee crises that troubled Habsburg administrators and their Orientalist views of refugees from Ottoman lands, examined here, help explain the decades-long indecisions toward these Ottoman provinces.

The impact of Ottoman South Slavic Christian refugee movements on the Habsburg Monarchy from the 1848—49 Revolutions to the commencement of the “Eastern Crisis” in 1875 lies with the changes wrought on Habsburg institutional policies. To illuminate these phenomena, I questioned how these recurrent refugee movements changed Habsburg colonial rhetoric and expansionism toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further analysis of Habsburg colonialist and Orientalist discourses showed how Habsburg administrators initially used religious arguments which eventually collapsed under stress and reverted to an Orientalist colonial paradigm when referring to Bosnian and Herzegovinian Christian refugees. I utilized a broad array of sources from the Austrian State Archives, particularly the Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry, and War Archives,

⁴⁰⁴ “Operationsentwurf No. 6,” 1853.

⁴⁰⁵ “Operationsentwurf No. 6,” 1853.

⁴⁰⁶ Tado Oršolić, “Sudjelovanje dalmatinskih postrojbi u zaposjedanju Bosne i Hercegovine 1878 [The Participation of Dalmatian Croats in the 1878 Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina],” *Radovi Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru*, 42 (2000): 288-292.

and the Austrian National Library's digitized periodical collections examined in this thesis illustrate the ramifications of Habsburg policymaking toward South Slavic Christian refugees.

I argued that the Habsburg Monarchy perceived itself initially as a protector of Ottoman Christendom in its foreign policy and internal politics. Habsburg refugee policies toward Ottoman South Slavic refugees reflected deeply religious beliefs. Despite this "Christian moral duty" Habsburg refugee policies, marred by local practicalities such as food shortages and lack of resettlement locations, exacerbated poor living conditions for refugees. These governmental failures, coupled with a progressively worse refugee crises, radicalized Habsburg rhetoric on Bosnia and Herzegovina toward a strategic occupation using Orientalist justifications, so that Habsburg rule would replace "Oriental" Ottoman rule. This prospect was achieved with disastrous consequences in 1878. Despite practical geographic scope and source constraints, I acknowledge that this thesis could include more regional perspectives, not merely Habsburg. I leave that to research further, as my work demonstrates how seemingly marginal refugees impacted Habsburg policies toward Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Closely guarded Habsburg neutrality, with all its faults and contradictions, eventually relented into colonial expansionism, and Bosnia and Herzegovina formed Austria-Hungary's "first and only colony."⁴⁰⁷ Subsequent conflicts increased significantly due to the closeness of Habsburg bureaucrats and the colonized populace.⁴⁰⁸ While Habsburg parentalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina resembled that of European colonial administrations elsewhere, the proximity of Bosnia and Herzegovina to "core" Habsburg crownlands made the colony an anomaly. Habsburg Orientalist interpretations compounded the lingering Christian moral duty to save captive South Slav Christians from the degeneration of "Oriental stasis."⁴⁰⁹ The paradox of Habsburg colonialism

⁴⁰⁷ Robert J. Donia, "The Proximate Colony: Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian Rule," *Kakanien Revisited*, 9 (2007): 1.

⁴⁰⁸ Donia, "Colony," 1-2.

⁴⁰⁹ Diana Reynolds-Cordileone, "Displaying Bosnia: Imperialism, Orientalism, and Exhibitionary Cultures in Vienna and Beyond: 1878-1914," *Austrian History Yearbook* 46 (2015): 29.

lay with the moralization over refugee aid to fellow, though foreign, Christians before the occupation yet led to the Orientalist trivialization of those same Christians under Habsburg rule.

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