CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2025
| Author | Rubio Krohne, Andres |
|---|---|
| Title | Reduction, causation and natural selection |
| Summary | It is common to claim that properties are causes. That is, that the properties of objects or events are relevant in causing effects. For example, the mass of a rock is relevant in its breaking a glass. In the thesis, I will consider two views about properties as causes. The first one, which I call “reductionism”, claims that, to count as a cause, a property must be either physical or reducible to the physical. Another view, which I call “causal functionalism”, claims that some properties are causes, without being physical or reducible to the physical. According to causal functionalism, these properties are defined by their causal role, and not their physical substratum. I consider problems for both views. I argue that reductionism is at risk of being overly unsystematic, that is, of regarding similar phenomena as different. Causal functionalism, on the other hand, is at risk of being overly systematic, that is, of regarding different phenomena as if they were the same. After describing these difficulties, I consider some ways in which they might be avoided. I argue that this can involve emphasising the role of natural selection. |
| Supervisor | Kronfeldner, Maria Elisabeth |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2025/rubio-krohne_andres.pdf |
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