CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2025
| Author | Ryan, Liam Dominic McCabe |
|---|---|
| Title | Mind & Numen |
| Summary | The purpose of this dissertation is to come to a better understanding of the nature of philosophical problems, what it means to solve a philosophical problem, and how we ought to approach seemingly unsolvable philosophical problems, especially if we seek to make philosophical progress. It is shown that some philosophical problems can be solved if they are reduced to formal problems with formal solutions. However, some philosophical problems are intractable and elude a formal so- lution, perhaps even in principle as is the case with paradoxes. It is proposed that it is the unsolvable nature of such problems that makes them truly philosophical. It is also proposed that philosophical progress is made by engaging with philosophical problems in a philosophically satisfying manner: doing one’s due diligence by not abandoning seemingly in- tractable problems nor biting the bullet too readily on solutions that do not engage with the notions that motivated the problem in the first instance. One such approach is to grapple with the pre-formalised notions that give rise to a problem in the first place. By engaging with the dynamic interplay between the pre-formalised notions and their formal representations that inform the relevant problem, and by considering as many of the pre- formalised intentions of the premises as one can, the scope of initial pre-formal notions about the problem under consideration can be expanded. One way to account for many of the pre-formalised notions that give rise to a given philosophi- cal problem is by being receptive to the truth of these pre-formalised notions. Hence, informed by an analysis of philosophical problems and progress, this dissertation proposes an approach to philo- sophical problems called receptivism. Receptivism stands in opposition to methodologies that reject pre-formalised notions out-of-hand, because to deny the relevant pre-formalised notions is to avoid philosophically engaging with the given problem. Instead, the receptivist approach suggests striving to account for the relevant pre-formalised notions that inform a given problem, even if this means entertaining philosophical positions that one might normally overlook or reject, perhaps because they appear to fail to fit with some wider philosophical programme. The efficacy of this method will be demonstrated by applying it to current philosophical problems in the study of the human mind and the divine mind: mind and numen. The thesis engages with three specific philosophical problems: the problem of consciousness for physicalism, the problem of re- ligious beliefs, and the problem of evil. Part I shows that the philosophical view known as physicalism faces serious challenges, and ought to be reconsidered; specifically, physical inscrutabilism, the genus of physicalism which posits inscrutable properties. Inscrutable properties are properties that are the grounds of mentality but which are not revealed through physical enquiry yet that allegedly do not violate physicalism. The analysis reveals that inscrutables fail to help the physicalist account for men- tality. Part II considers what it means to believe something. It is argued that religious beliefs are not only archetypal cases of belief that provide insight into the nature and meaning of belief, but that they are rational kinds of beliefs. Lastly, one of philosophy’s most famous paradoxes, the problem of evil, is addressed. The argument is made that because the created world exists and God cannot be arbitrary, that therefore, nothing will be precluded from existence by God due to the presence of a kind and level of property that already exists in creation, in this case, evil. By this process, the receptivist approach is tested on problems in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and religion, and in turn, genuine progress is made in these debates. |
| Supervisor | Howard Robinson |
| Department | Philosophy PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2025/ryan_liam.pdf |
Visit the CEU Library.
© 2007-2025, Central European University