THE CHINESE DISCOURSE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A GENEALOGY OF CHINESE POST-COLD WAR HEGEMONIC STATE PROJECT

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Submitted to

Central European University

Department of International Relations

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations (2 years)

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Vienna, Austria 2025

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Acknowledgement

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Michael Merlingen, whose guidance has been instrumental in shaping this thesis. His expertise not only introduced me to Gramscian analysis but also challenged me to engage with it more critically and rigorously. His intellectual generosity, insightful feedback, and thought-provoking discussions have profoundly influenced my academic development.

I am equally appreciative of the support from my professors, colleagues, friends, and family, whose patience and encouragement have sustained me throughout this journey. My thanks go to everyone who, in one way or another, contributed to the completion of this thesis.

Abstract

The apparent contradictions in the Chinese state's post-Cold War strategies towards the globalisation of the Liberal International Order (LIO), oscillating between state-centric security paranoia towards the West and liberalisation into the global economy, present a puzzle that existing literature fails to resolve. Dominant approaches either view the Chinese state's actions as coherent and unitary or as evidence of fragmented governance, overlooking the polyvalent nature of Chinese state formation. This thesis addresses the critical gap in understanding how the Chinese state reconciles these seemingly opposing strategies through the rationalisation of its relationship with the post-Cold War international order. The central research question is: How was the Chinese hegemonic state project of international order configured to align divergent governmental rationalities such as geopolitical security and liberalisation? Drawing on Bob Jessop's critical state theory, Laclau and Mouffe's concept of hegemonic articulation, and Foucault's studies of governmentality, this thesis conceptualises the hegemonic state project as a flexible policy paradigm that maintains a balance between disciplinary power and governmental management. It used thematic analysis of over 400 Chinese policy texts from the 1960s to the 1990s to trace the genealogy of China's hegemonic state project of international order. The analysis demonstrates how the international order functioned as an indeterminate nodal point to relocate Maoist articulations of the people's revolutionary passion and vitalism into the disciplinary rationality of geopolitics and governmental management of liberalisation. The findings suggest that the Chinese state's articulations of geopolitical antagonism toward the West are not a straightforward challenge to the LIO but a passive revolution that reconfigured Maoist hegemony in relation to the emerging post-Cold War LIO. This reinterpretation challenges the conventional integration-challenge dichotomy in understanding contender states and highlights the polyvalence of hegemonic state projects to align heterogeneous governmental rationalities.

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Introduction: The post-Cold War International Order and the Chinese State

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the post-Cold War "globalisation of the liberal [international] order" (LIO) started (Ikenberry 2018, 10). The collapse of the socialist bloc and the emergence of the United States (U.S.)' unipolarity led to an unprecedented expansion of liberal economic and political norms. At this pivotal moment, the President of the U.S. George H.W. Bush (1991) proclaimed the "New World Order" of "peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law" as the "universal aspiration of mankind". As Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge (2006) observed, the discourse of the world order replaced the Cold War discourse as new geopolitical imagery, promoting a world restructured by political and economic liberalism. Börzel and Zürn (2021) further described the early 1990s as a turning point for liberal internationalism towards the "post–Cold War international order of postnational liberalism" or neoliberalism, which was more intrusive towards illiberal states than its classical manifestation.

The Chinese state's responses to the globalisation of post-Cold War LIO were marked by contradictions. On one hand, it seemed to reject the emerging LIO by reinforcing its "security paranoia," perceiving Western influence as both an internal and external threat. (You 2016, 180). Unlike its Eastern European counterparts, the Chinese state forcibly suppressed the pro-democracy movement in 1989. After that, the state revived the Maoist-era campaign of "Anti-Peaceful Evolution (*fan heping yanbian* 反和平演变)", originally launched in the 1960s, and adapted it to the post-1989 context (Ong 2007). The resuscitated campaign framed the internal Tiananmen incident and the external collapse of socialist regimes as outcomes of the Western Peaceful Evolution strategy, i.e., the non-military subversion of socialist states through economic, political, and ideological infiltration (Garver 1993). Over the next three decades, warnings of Western strategies of non-military regime change have been a recurring theme in the discourses of successive Chinese leadership, from Jiang Zemin (1991), Hu Jintao (2012), to Xi Jinping (2024).

On the other hand, the Chinese state appeared to embrace the Liberal International Order by tempering its security paranoia and accelerating its integration into the global economy. As

Ezra Vogel (2011, 664) recounted in his authoritative biography of Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader launched a liberalisation campaign in 1992 as his "finale" against anti-West and anti-reform conservatives. This shift led the Chinese state to scale back the Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaign and officially endorse the establishment of the Socialist Market Economy (*shehui zhuyi shichang jingjhi* 社会主义市场经济) (Jiang 2006, 219). Scholars widely recognise 1992 as a watershed moment in Chinese politics; from this point onward, the Chinese state embraced global capitalism and reoriented its governmental rationality in alignment with (neo-)liberalism (Harvey 2007; Jeffreys 2009; Wang 2011; Chun 2013; Breslin 2016).

The duality of simultaneous rejection and embrace of the post-Cold War LIO puzzled scholars. For some, the Chinese state's enduring security paranoia suggests a fundamental challenge to the LIO (Weiss and Wallace 2021). For others, the Chinese state's internationalisation within the LIO precluded its capacities to challenge the status quo (Jones and Hameiri 2021). Still, others argue that China aligns with certain aspects of the LIO while diverging from others (Johnston 2019a; Benabdallah 2019). These divergent views highlight the contradictions inherent in China's strategies. The Chinese state is attempting to reconcile competing logics of governance – old and new, challenge and integration, security and liberalisation – while navigating the globalisation of the post-Cold War LIO.

Nonetheless, the challenge-integration framework for analysing the Chinese state's relationship with the post-Cold War LIO presents a profound puzzle: how the Chinese state simultaneously resists and adapts to the LIO without descending into disorder. When operating within divergent rationalities, where different institutions foster incoherent interests and competing groups adopt incompatible identities, how does the state maintain relative coherence? In other words, how is the Chinese state able to maintain internal power blocs while forging new elite alliances around emerging and competing rationalities within the context of the post-Cold War LIO? To solve this puzzle, it is essential to understand how the Chinese state itself rationalises its relationship with the international order. This requires an investigation into how various rationalities are interwoven around the issue of international order.

The Chinese state's discourse on international order emerged precisely at the end of the Cold War (Zhang 2008; Xiao 2009). For the first time, Chinese Premier Li Peng (1989) advocated in the governmental annual report for the establishment of a "new international political order". Similarly, General Secretary Jiang Zemin (1992) in the report of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party called for "a peaceful, stable, just and reasonable new international order". Indeed, as demonstrated in Figure 1[1], references to "international order" in Chinese publications have surged since the early 1990s.



Figure 1: References to "international order" in Chinese publications

Therefore, *this thesis seeks to explore how the discourse of international order reconciled the Chinese state's seemingly contradictory rationalities in transition to post-Cold War LIO*. On one hand, it examines how the discourse maintained the continuity of anti-Western-liberal security paranoia, as seen in the Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaigns in the post-Cold War era.

[1] The graph was generated by the *China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database* of academic journals, books, dissertations, newspapers, yearbooks, etc. https://www.cnki.net/index/

On the other hand, amidst this enduring state-centric security paranoia, it investigates how the discourse rationalised the apparent discontinuity in the Chinese state, i.e., its further liberalisation and integration into the global economy after 1992.

This thesis addresses these questions in three chapters. *Chapter 1* critically examines existing literature on China's relationship with the international order, identifying limitations in its formalised understanding of the Chinese state. I argue that the extant analyses tend to reduce the Chinese state into a unitary actor, fragmented apparatuses or epiphenomenon of deeper social forces. Building on this critique, I adopt Bob Jessop's strategic-relational approach, which views the state not as a fixed entity but as a dynamic condensation of social relations. This framework enables the thesis to conceptualise the Chinese state's engagement with the post-Cold War LIO as a hegemonic state project – a structured yet flexible formation that integrates divergent social forces, identities, and interests into a relatively coherent whole.

To further operationalise this complex concept, *Chapter 1* introduces a heuristic model of a hegemonic state project, drawing on Laclau and Mouffe's theory of hegemonic discourse and Foucauldian analytics of governmentality. Laclauian discourse analysis explains how a hegemonic discourse is constructed through three distinct but complementary articulatory mechanisms. Building on these mechanisms, I apply Foucault's triangle of state power – comprising sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management – to interpret the dynamics of hegemonic state projects. The model posits that the state's sovereignty, as the nodal point in Laclauian discourse, is inherently empty of meaning. Nevertheless, this empty sovereignty serves to link competing rationalities of discipline and governmental management. While the state's disciplinary rationality follows the articulatory logic of equivalence – seeking to homogenise the social space through constructing antagonisms and the coercive enforcement of normative standards – governmental management operates through the logic of difference. This logic aims to complicate the social space by self-limiting the state's intervention, thereby enabling the autonomy of various social forces. As a result, the hegemonic state project functions as a flexible "policy paradigm" that strikes a balance between the state's disciplinary power and governmental management (Jessop 1990, 207, 209; 2015, 72)..

Using this framework, Chapter 2 examines how the misperceived continuity of anti-Western security paranoia was constructed in the post-1989 Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaign. Challenging the view that this campaign was merely a conservative reaction to the emerging post-Cold War LIO, I compare its differing functions within two historical contexts: the Maoist hegemonic state project of world revolution in the 1960s and the post-Cold War project of international order. I argue that Maoist hegemony was anchored in the nodal point of world revolution, which linked the discipline of anti-imperialist war with the governmental management of people's revolutionary vitality. While the post-Cold War hegemony of international order retained the Maoist element of anti-Western rhetoric, the post-1989 Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaign transformed the Maoist people-centric and bottom-up approach to discipline into a state-centric discipline of geopolitics – emphasising national security control, foreign intelligence infiltration, and ideological surveillance. Moreover, the emerging disciplinary geopolitics rejected Maoist governmental management of people's revolutionary vitality – where the state self-limited its power to encourage mass spontaneity and bottom-up rebellion – and instead aligned with the governmental management of liberalisation, in which the state self-limited itself to foster economic prosperity and international exchange. By comparing the disciplinary anti-imperialist war and disciplinary geopolitics, as well as the governmental management of revolutionary vitality and liberalisation, Chapter 2 demonstrates how the post-Cold War hegemonic state project successfully readapted elements of Maoist hegemonic state project to the post-Cold War LIO. This produced a new policy paradigm that balanced the competing rationalities of geopolitics and liberalisation.

Chapter 3 examines how the new rationality of liberalisation was internally connected with anti-Western security paranoia in the post-1992 liberalisation campaign. Contrary to existing interpretations, I argue that the liberalisation campaign after 1992 was not a counterreaction to the conservative Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaign. Instead, both campaigns shared an identical hegemonic structure, as analysed in Chapter 2. I demonstrate that the post-1992 liberalisation campaign was also shaped by the hegemonic project of international order, maintaining a balance between the discipline of geopolitics and the governmental management of liberalisation. While the governmental management of liberalisation reinterpreted the

Maoist notion of people's vitality as market spontaneity and political-cultural plurality, the disciplinary logic of geopolitics reframed Maoist anti-imperialist antagonism into a fragmented, chronic, and localised form of warfare. In other words, the Chinese state's embrace of global markets and international society was intrinsically linked to its securitisation of the post-Cold War international order.

Chapters 2 and 3 reveal that the post-1989 Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaign and the post-1992 liberalisation campaign were not contradictory strategies in the Chinese state's response to the emerging post-Cold War LIO. Instead, both were structured by a hegemonic state project of international order, which integrated the complementary disciplinary rationalities of geopolitics and the governmental management of liberalisation. This hegemonic state project emerged at the end of the Cold War as a passive revolution of Maoist hegemony, readapting its elements to align with the post-Cold War LIO.

These findings challenge the conventional challenge-integration paradigm used to analyse contender states' engagement with the LIO. It is misguided to interpret a contender state's strategy as the outcome of rational cost-benefit calculations, internal bureaucratic competition, or the imperatives of a dominant power bloc. Instead, the Chinese state's discourse on the LIO should be understood as a condensed hegemonic project—one that aligns competing social forces and operates within a broader historical process where political rationalities are continuously readapted, mutated, and displaced. This perspective helps explain why the Chinese state has been able to maintain the relative cohesion of its elite blocs and state institutions despite tensions between competing rationalities: between the legacy of Maoist hegemony and the emerging post-Cold War LIO, and between illiberal, anti-Western security paranoia and the push for liberalisation into the global market and international society.

Chapter 1: The Discourse of International Order as a Hegemonic State Project

Drawing on Bob Jessop's (1990; 2007; 2015) strategic-relational approach, this chapter critiques the formalist view of the state in debates on China's integration into and challenge to the international order. It argues that focusing on the state as a sovereign actor and apparatuses overlooks its "societalisation," or what Jessop (1990, 6) terms "the state project." Formal analyses of state overstate contradictions between different strategies. This study examines the discourse of international order as a Chinese hegemonic state project formed in the early 1990s, uniting contradictory governmental rationalities. The chapter first reviews three complementary literatures, including realist-liberalist debates, constructivist interventions, and critiques from governance studies and political economy, before introducing the framework of the hegemonic state project to analyse China's discourse on international order.

1.1. Literature review

Discussions on China's relationship with the international order often centre on the debate between John Mearsheimer (2006) and John Ikenberry (2008), representing offensive realism and liberal internationalism, respectively. While they reach opposing conclusions—China as a military challenger or as integrated into the Western-led order—both treat the Chinese state as a black-boxed actor whose actions are dictated by systemic imperatives. Despite the simplicity of their frameworks, these arguments fall short: there is no necessary alignment between China's foreign policies and the structural form of the state or international system. In debates over China's status as a "status quo" or "revisionist" power (see H. Feng 2009) and its "assertive turn" (see Johnston 2013), scholars struggle to provide clarity, as contradictory evidence renders definitive conclusions elusive.

To address this contradiction, some scholars argue that the relationship between the Chinese state and the international system is not mechanically determined but is instead mediated by ideational factors such as perceptions, identities, and norms. The Chinese state is influenced not only by structural pressures but also by fluctuating leadership perception of the international system (Deng 2022, 13). Alastair Johnston's (2008, 27) constructivist thesis

suggests that China's integration is a process of socialisation within international institutions. However, the alignment of Chinese norms with international practices is uneven, with greater conformity in some institutions than in others (Johnston 2019b).

In contrast, others argue that China's "insular, nationalist, and propagandistic" identities, as well as its "Westphalian" norms, are incompatible with the liberal international order (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018, 861; Weiss and Wallace 2021, 636). Some even suggest that China could counter-socialise the regional order into a "Sino-centric" one through non-coercive means like diplomacy and investments in transnational technocracy (Carlson 2011, 96; Callahan 2016, 231; Benabdallah 2019; 2020). Yang (2017) sharply critiques the socialisation thesis as "anachronistic," arguing it overstates the integrative effects of international institutions by oversimplifying the internal dynamics of the Chinese state. This critique extends to the norm-changer thesis, which similarly fails to account for the complexities of state power formation, assuming that the Chinese state operates with a coherent, self-coordinating identity and set of norms.

Scholars influenced by governance studies challenge the integrationist-contender paradigm by highlighting the incoherence within the Chinese state apparatus. Building on the insight that the making of Chinese foreign policies was experiencing "pluralisation" and "decentralisation" and becoming a "bureaucratic, sectorial, and regional competition" (Lu 1997, 2; Lampton 2001, 4), recent scholars argue that no coherent Chinese foreign policy exists, whether integrationist or contender, due to the decentralisation of foreign policy-making. The input of foreign policy is now shaped by local academic and bureaucratic actors (Jones and Zeng 2019), and the coherence of Chinese foreign investment is undermined by the diversity of institutions involved (Jones and Zou 2017). Most notably, state intervention has shifted from command-and-control to regulatory management, driven by the economic crises facing the country (Jones and Hameiri 2016; Ye 2020).

While the governance literature highlights the inconsistency of state apparatuses, it treats divergent institutions as self-contained rather than relationally framed. The underlying assumption is that "autocratic" coercive apparatuses follow statist logics of security and

geostrategy, while emerging "post-Westphalian" forces adhere to non-statist, sectorial, and commercial logics (Ye 2020, 48; Jones and Hameiri 2021, 12). However, this creates a new problem: how do various institutions struggle for power without "a collapse into barbarism" (Jessop 1990, 245)? Clearly, the Chinese state is not engaged in a "war of manoeuvre," defined by open and violent civil conflict (Jessop 2015, 54). Instead, social groups continue to align their interests with the leadership's "political slogans" or "nationalist rhetoric," including the reformist discourses of international order (Zeng 2020, 2; Ye 2020, 8). In other words, these groups compete in a "war of position," relying on socially accepted rationales (Gramsci 1971, 229). The key question is: what rationalities interpellate conflicting identities and interests into this dynamic political field?

Also challenging the assumption of the state as an autonomous agent, scholars of international political economy reduce the Chinese state to the instruments and functions of the dominant power bloc and the reproduction of capital. On the one hand, works drawing on neo-Gramscian analysis interpret China's relationship with liberal international order in terms of the transnational network between Chinese corporate elites and the European-American capitalist class (see Naná de Graaff and van Apeldoorn 2017; Naná de Graaff 2020; Chen 2021; 2022). On the other, some rooted in the literature on varieties of capitalism take the institutional path-dependencies of Sino-capitalism as the defining forces that influence China's relationship with international institutions and norms (see Nana de Graaff, ten Brink, and Parmar 2020; Weinhardt and ten Brink 2020; McNally 2020). These perspectives emphasise the hybridity between China and the liberal international order, highlighting the overlap and divergence between the Chinese ruling bloc and the liberal heartland. Compared to governance studies, these arguments underscore the structural influence of class and capital. However, critics argue that class- and capital-based transnational historical materialism overlooks the formation of class agency in fragmented societies like China (Silva 2010; Montalbano 2022). In other words, they neglect how class and capital power shape Chinese foreign policies within the fractured state highlighted by governance literature.

When the existing literature on China's relationship with the international order is read eclectically, the insights do not contradict but rather complement each other by illuminating

different aspects of Chinese state formation. The following propositions can be drawn: 1) For realism and liberalism, the problem of international order is central to Chinese state actions. 2) For constructivism, this issue is articulated through the programmatic ideas of the Chinese state and system. 3) For governance studies and political economy, the Chinese state is overdetermined by the co-presence of the ruling bloc, capital imperatives, and the interests and identities of divergent social groups and institutions. To connect these propositions, the question becomes how to understand Chinese state power as the result of the emerging alignment of various social forces through the discursive articulation of China's relationship with the international order. As the next section demonstrates, the strategic concept of the state project effectively integrates the different moments of Chinese state formation discussed in the existing literature.

1.1. Polycontexual and polymorphic state projects

Jessop's strategic-relational approach to the state draws eclectically from thinkers such as Nicos Poulantzas, Antonio Gramsci, and Michel Foucault. The key principle he inherits from Poulantzas is that the "state is a social relation," a "material condensation of a relation of forces between classes" (Jessop 1985, 336–37). In this view, the state is not an autonomous agent or a unified apparatus, but a product of "social bases" (Jessop 1990, 207, 346; 2015, 72). The works in governance studies and political economy on Chinese foreign policy illustrate this by showing the diversity of forces involved. However, analysis must move beyond these forces to study the process of their condensation. A gap exists between the activities of economic institutions, corporate elites, state managers, and intellectuals, and the overarching state power. Here, Gramsci's concept of "hegemonic visions" is crucial (Jessop 1990, 208–14; 2015, 86–88). To avoid reductionism, it is necessary to examine "the more general political and ideological relations" that align divergent interests into a unified national-popular programme (Jessop 1985, 344; 2007, 121). The condensation of an "unstable equilibrium" between social forces in hegemonic formation is both the source and purpose of state power (Jessop 2015, 72–73, 86–88).

To explain the condensation of political and ideological relations, Jessop introduces the concept of state projects. Rejecting reductionism that links state power solely to social forces or

structural necessities, Jessop (1990, 260–68; 2007, 36–37) builds on Poulantzas's idea that the state is a strategic field where political strategies—state projects—are developed through the interaction of social forces or alliances. These divergent projects compete for the "substantive operational unity" of the state, which both define the boundaries between the state and its environment (such as the international order) and shapes the political rationalities and techniques of the state apparatus (Jessop 1990, 260; 2015, 84). For this reason, Jessop (1990, 348–49; 2007, 140; 2010, 63; 2015, 9–10, 85) emphasizes the importance of the "state idea," "the idea of state," "statecraft," and "governmental rationalities" in the process of state formation, drawing on state semantics and Foucauldian power analysis of governmentality. In this context, the Chinese geostrategic, identity, and normative discourses of China's relationship with the international order, as explored by realist, liberalist, and constructivist scholars, are not merely illusory; rather, they are essential practices in the condensation of Chinese state power.

Although both focus on state ideas, the methodological implications of traditional theories of international relations and the strategic-relational approach differ significantly. Drawing on Foucauldian discourse and power analysis, Jessop (2015, 43–45) emphasises the "polycontextual" and "polymorphous" nature of state projects. It is important to remember that social bases are the source of state power, a point confirmed by governance studies and political economy. Since the state is fraught with contradictions and power struggles, state projects, as political strategies, are "non-subjective," emerging only "*ex post through collisions among mutually contradictory micro-policies and political projects formulated in different parts of the state system*" (Jessop 2007, 128, emphasis added). This leads to two key methodological implications.

Firstly, the constructivist approach to state ideas is inadequate, as it assumes these ideas are centralized within a coherent identity and normative discourse of state agents and leadership. In contrast, we must adopt an "ascending analysis" (Foucault 1980, 99; Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010, 14; Walters 2012, 15), which explores governmental rationalities in dispersed contexts, such as rank-and-file bureaucracy, expert reports, and the daily routines of

technocrats, where various forms of government expertise are circulated (see Merlingen 2006; 2011).

Secondly, state projects are always "polyvalent, polymorphous crystallisations of one or another dominant principle of societal organisation" (Jessop 2015, 44). Due to competing rationalities from multiple social forces, as confirmed by governance studies and political economy, the state project "can never be self-contained." It relies on and incorporates divergent forces within and beyond the state to achieve comprehensive governance (Jessop 2015, 90). Consequently, governmental rationalities "overlay and interfere" with a "broader field of discursivity" shared with various forces (Merlingen 2012, 191). These are the state's "capabilities," as it can align broad social forces by leveraging the polyvalence of discourses, but also its "liabilities," as the state project can never achieve permanent equilibrium and is subject to continuous challenges (Jessop 2007, 6).

1.2. Identifying hegemonic state projects

If the hegemonic state project is polycontextual and polyvalent, the challenge lies in identifying it. Jessop offers little methodological guidance on how to operationalise the concept, and scarcely applies it to states' foreign and security policies. This thesis proposes a heuristic model of the hegemonic state project through a combined reading of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's (2001) semiotic reinterpretation of Gramscian hegemony and Foucault's (2003; 2007; 2008) studies on the government rationalities.

Building on Jonathan Joseph (2014; 2017), I argue for the usefulness of addressing polymorphous governmentalities through the lens of hegemony, which highlights structural dominance through the strategic selection of rationalities. However, Joseph does not conceptualise the relationship between hegemonic mechanisms and governmentalities. Laclau and Mouffe's concept of hegemonic discourse, drawing heavily on Derridean and Lacanian semiotics and Foucauldian analysis of discursive formation, offers a poststructuralist semiotic framework for hegemony, allowing for an organic interpretation of late Foucault's power analysis.

To briefly summarise Laclau and Mouffe's *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, they explain Gramscian hegemony through three interconnected semiotic mechanisms: nodal points, the logic of difference, and the logic of equivalence. They define hegemonic discursive formation as a "structured totality" consisting of a chain of differential positions, formed through the articulation of nodal points, i.e., "privileged discursive points" that partially fix the meaning of the chain of differential positions (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 105, 113). This understanding of hegemony involves three semiotic mechanisms.

Firstly, hegemonic formation relies on the articulation of the *nodal points* (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 96). Nodal points as the master signifiers are meaningless in themselves; their meanings are only partially stabilised through the chain of differential positions anchored on them (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 26). In other words, a nodal point is an empty signifier that "means very little, or more precisely, one that has very little precise and concrete content" (Kølvraa 2017, 103).

The logic of difference extends the meaning of nodal points in a differential chain of signifiers. According to the basic assumption of Saussurean semiotics, the meanings of signifiers depend on their differentiation from other signifiers (Kølvraa 2017, 101). The logic of difference expands the complexity of the political space by incorporating different interests and identities as legitimate moments in the hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 130). Nonetheless, the logic of difference cannot be extended infinitely without limits because the hegemony by definition is constructed as a structured, i.e., finished, totality.

The logic of equivalence, on the contrary, limits the meaning of the discursive totality through antagonism. If the hegemony is a finished totality, differential positions in the political space are equivalent due to their commonality as parts of the totality. In other words, they are equivalent in the sense that they "can be cut out as totality with regard to something beyond them" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 143). This mechanism to cut out the limit between inside and outside is what Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 125) called "antagonism". For example, the meaning "the people" is maintained in its antagonism with the enemy, i.e., the "'Other' that prevents me [the people] from totally being myself" (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 125). Therefore, in contrast

to the logic of difference, the logic of equivalence is a "logic of the simplification of political space" as the antagonism between the inside and outside (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 130).

Therefore, hegemonic formation is the effect of the interactions between the two logics. The logic of difference and equivalence do not negate each other but interpenetrate at the "crossing points" of master signifiers, allowing the balance between simplicity and complexity in a hegemonic formation (Torfing 1999, 125). In other words, the hegemony is maintained through a "tenuous compromise" between the two logics (Kølvraa 2017, 102). As Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 142) emphasise, "hegemonic formation cannot be referred to the specific logic of a single social force" because "every form of power is constructed in a pragmatic way…through the opposed logics of equivalence and difference".

Laclau and Mouffe's semiotics of hegemony provide a valuable configuration principle of the hegemonic state power. Through the three articulatory mechanisms examined before, we may figure out the relationship between Foucault's (2007, 107) enigmatic "triangle" of "sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management".

Articulatory mechanisms	**Triangle of state power**
Nodal point: empty signifier that partially fixes the political space	*Sovereignty*: the spectacular legal and juridical imperative
Logic of equivalence: the simplification of the political space in antagonism	*Discipline*: the enforcement of norms upon defective and harmful elements
Logic of difference: the complexification of the political space in the recognition of differential positions	*Governmental management*: the self-limitation of the state to foster the positive circulation of elements

Figure 2: The articulatory mechanisms of the hegemonic state project

Firstly, the sovereign power of the state articulates the nodal point. Just like the nodal point as the privileged empty signifiers, sovereignty as the juridical-discursive mechanisms, like the law and the will of the King, are spectacular but too vague and arbitrary to govern effectively

(Foucault 1978, 82–91). Although it is inefficient to operationalise a hegemony, sovereignty as the articulation of the nodal point nonetheless "capitalises a territory" thereby opening the possibility to operationalise a political space through discipline and governmental management (Foucault 2007, 20).

Secondly, the disciplinary power of the state is the articulation of the logic of equivalence. Discipline imposes the normative standard upon differential positions, a process Foucault called "normation", forcing different positions to become equivalent parts of a homogenous totality (2007, 57). Statist rationalities, like "state racism" or "*Raison D'état*", and coercive technologies, like "military-diplomatic apparatuses" and the "police", are examples of the effectuation of the logic of equivalence (Foucault 2003, 57; 2007, 365; 2008, 5–9). In this sense, the disciplinary as the articulation of the logic of difference simplifies the political space.

Thirdly, governmental management is the articulation of the logic of difference. Governmental management takes the object of government as a quasi-natural reality, i.e., "milieu", composed of "circulations" between different elements whose pluralised identities and interests are recognised by the state (2007, 18, 20, 62). To recognise the differential system as a legitimate object of government, such as society, economy and population, the state is required to impose "self-limination" (Foucault 2008, 20). As a result, the governmental management maintains the complexity of the political space.

Therefore, a hegemonic state project is the effect of the sovereign power articulating the nodal point around which the discipline and the governmental management crisscross with each other. The hegemonic state project simultaneously mobilises disciplinary power to contract the fragmented positions into an equivalent totality anchored on the nodal point; meanwhile, it also mobilises governmental management as the self-limitation of the state to expand the complexity of differential positions in the structured totality.

In the next two empirical chapters, I will analyse the textual data according to the criss-crossing relationship between the governmental rationalities of discipline and governmental management. The data selection will not include the articulation of the leadership because the research aims at an ascending analysis of state projects. Instead, the textual data is collected

from the publications affiliated with or directed by official state institutions, like think tanks of the state system and party system, and semi-official research institutions, like public universities. In total, I collected 146 articles related to "Anti-Peaceful Evolution" published from 1960 to 1968[2]; 114 articles and 17 pamphlets/textbooks published for the Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaign from 1989 to 1992[3]; 135 articles with "international order" as the keywords from 1992 to 1994[4].

Using thematic analysis as the data analysis method and the software of NVivo as assistance, I code the texts according to the discursive mechanisms of nodal points, the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. Textual articulations related to the antagonism between inside and outside and the simplification of the political space, i.e., the negation of outsiders and the homogenisation of the insiders, will be coded and thematised as disciplinary rationality. Differently, textual articulations related to the recognition of identities, interests and demands as legitimate different positions will be coded and thematised as the rationality of governmental management.

[2] While 126 articles from 1960 to 1967 were collected from *CNKI database*, 20 articles from 1966 to 1968 were collected from *The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database* (edited by Song 2002). The texts of this period are collected from different databases because the Chinese political communication system was completely transformed by the Cultural Revolution in 1966 (see Volland 2021). The articles related to the Anti-peaceful evolution campaign after 1966 abruptly disappeared from the *CNKI database* which only collected publications of registered institutions. State-affiliated Journals, such as *International Studies*, *Shijie Zhishi*, *Xijubao*, *Film Art*, *Literary Review* and *Acta Psychologica Sinica*, were paralysed by the mass organisations that emerged from the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Therefore, texts after 1966 were selected from the *The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database* which collected publications of mass ogranisations.

[3] 114 journal articles were collected from *CNKI database* published from 1989 to 1992. 17 pamphlets and textbooks were published for the APE campaign in the same period.

[4] 135 articles were all collected the CNKI database.

Chapter 2: The Relocation of the Anti-Peaceful Evolution Campaign After 1989 in the Hegemonic State Project of International Order

This chapter deconstructs the assumed continuity of the Anti-Peaceful Evolution (APE) campaign from the 1960s to the 1990s. I refute the understanding of the APE campaign as the monotonous articulation of the Chinese state's anti-liberal security paranoia. On the contrary, *the campaign implicated at least four different governmental rationalities*. Only one of them was the articulation of state-centric security paranoia. Moreover, the security paranoia was not anti-liberal but complementary to the liberalisation of reform and opening up.

In the 1960s, the APE campaign was structured by the Maoist hegemony state project of world revolution. The Maoist project was articulated 1) in the disciplinarisation of people's revolutionary passion and 2) in the governmental management of people's revolutionary vitalism. In the early 1990s, the APE campaign was structured by an emerging hegemonic project of international order. The new project relocated elements of Maoist hegemony. It relocated Maoist antagonism between imperialism and the people into 1) the state-centric discipline based on geopolitical antagonism. Moreover, the new project aligned the APE campaign with 2) the governmental management of economic prosperity and opening-up which was inconceivable for the Maoist hegemony.

2.1. The APE campaign in the 1960s

Through the analysis of 146 texts from 1960 to 1968, I argue that the APE campaign during the Maoist era articulated two crisscrossing governmental rationalities. The former rationality was articulated with the logic of equivalence as the discipline of anti-imperialist war, i.e., the politicisation of the people against peaceful evolution. The latter rationality was articulated with the logic of difference as governmental management of the people's revolutionary vitalism, i.e., the quasi-natural reality of people's authenticity, creativity and self-organisations against peaceful evolution.



Figure 3: The thematic map of the APE campaign in the 1960s

2.1.1. The people-centric discipline of anti-imperialist war

It is correct to argue that the APE campaign implicated geopolitical rhetoric. Elaborated in the texts published by journals affiliated with the diplomatic system, like *International Studies* and *Shijie Zhishi* (World Affairs), the code of "enemy's deployment of force" articulated the peaceful evolution as the American geo-strategy of non-military subversion of the socialist regime (Xia 1963, 37; Huang 1964, 58; Wu 1964, 3; Chen 1964, 18; Xu 1965, 4; Sang and Wu 1965, 32). The American government was articulated as the geopolitical entity that conceptualised and implemented the strategy (Mei 1960, 5; Xia 1963, 38; Zhang 1963, 12; Zhao 1964, 11; Yi 1964, 19); American politicians were identified as the direct strategists who supported the policies (Mei 1960, 5; Yang 1963, 1; Zhang 1963, 12; Shi 1963, 6; Li 1964, 9; Zhang 1964, 4). For example, as the political caricature of peaceful evolution presented by *Shijie Zhishi* (1963, 2) symbolised, the American President John F. Kennedy camouflaged as a "peace dove" singing "peaceful coexistence" while standing on cannons aimed at socialist states.



Figure 4: "American Dove(singing): Goo, Goo, My Peaceful Coexistence"

However, it is incorrect to assume that the APE campaign in the 1960s was a monologic manifestation of an anti-liberal *Raison D'état* occupied with regime stability as international security and geopolitics as external security. As shown in Figure 3, the code of "deployment of force" was only a subordinate element in the overall rationality of the anti-imperialist war; the body part of the rationality focused on the politicisation of the people which was articulated in the antagonism between "imperialist peaceful coexistence" and "armed struggle of the people" (Cai et al. 1960, 28; Shi 1960, 5).

First of all, the rationality of anti-imperialist war constructed the antagonism between the imperialist peaceful coexistence and people's armed struggle. The liberal peace maintained by "tolerance", "negotiation" and "compromise" were articulated as strategies of peaceful evolution (Xing 1963, 12; Li 1964, 12; Ye and Ren 1964, 45–46; Yi 1964, 19; Liu 1965, 46). Meanwhile, the coexistence maintained by the balance of military power was also articulated as a form of peaceful evolution (Gu 1963, 6; Shi 1963, 6; Li 1964, 9; Meng 1965, 2). On the contrary, the rationality of the anti-imperialist war articulated "the people" as the opposite of

imperialism (Cai et al. 1960, 18; Shi 1960, 5; Shi 1963, 7; Li 1964, 12). Antagonistic to the peaceful coexistence maintained through either liberal peace or balance of power, it called for the "victory of people's war", "no fear of war" and "all people as soldiers" (Lu 1960).

To curb the imperialist peaceful coexistence and foster people's armed struggle, the rationality of anti-imperialist war focused on the disciplinarisation of people's revolutionary passion. To evoke the political passion of the individual, the disciplinary rationality localised the total antagonism between imperialist peaceful coexistence and people's armed struggle in the daily life of the people. The abstract antagonism was translated into the concrete confrontation between the peaceful evolution as "nice and cosy (*shushufufu* 舒舒服服)" life and the "stormy (*dafengdalang* 大风大浪)" life of class struggle (Chen 1964, 18; Zhang 1964, 6; Jiang 1965, 26; Wu, Chen, and Xue 1966, 28; Qiao 1966, 15). As the authors explained, the antagonism was in "everyday life (*richang shenghuo* 日常生活)", such as the process of production, family relations and styles of education (Zhou 1964; Xu 1965; Jing 1965).

As a result, the APE campaign was preoccupied with people's mundane life. One of the genres invited by the campaign in the early 1960s was literary and art criticism (Lu 1964; Ke 1964; Wang 1964; Wei 1965; Wu and Cai 1965; Sha 1965; Sang and Wu 1965). For example, the official journal of dramas *Xiju Bao* provided a quotidian critique of urban life. The analyst lamented that the character was "peacefully evolved" by the nice and cosy life:

> "[The character] was intoxicated in his unhealthy romance, the comfort of the moment, and personal little business…[he preferred the life of] working during the day, listening to music, reading a novel and poetry and watching movies at night; going to the park and chatting with friends on Sunday…[he] forget politics and loathed passionate struggles in the real world" (Yang 1963, 1–2).

Another genre of the APE campaign was the confessions of the masses and cadres. Collecting the individual self-criticism, these texts were the first-person reports and the in-person investigation of how the person's revolutionary passion was weakened by the temptations from their daily life, such as the unhealthy desire for unnecessary consumption, the running away

from manual labour, and the bureaucratic attitude towards the working class and peasants (Yang 1965; Wu 1965; Yang 1965; Liu 1966; Qiao 1966; Yan 1966).

Thus, epistemologically, disciplinary rationality flattened the totalising, positivist and state-centric geopolitical horizon. For example, the psychology journal *Acta Psychologica Sinica* published articles to scorn that "science for science's sake is a lie", which rejected the method of "treating people as animals" and "the abstraction and biologicalisation of people" (Sima 1965; Xiting Huang, Wang, and Zhu 1966, 135). The methods that the APE campaign practised were "social investigations (*shehui diaocha* 社会调查)" based on in-person participation in mass campaigns which "do not evaluate the person as if [he/she] was *dead*" but probe "[his/her] *live* thoughts" through "three together (eat, live and labour together, *santong* 三同)", "heart-to-heart talk (*tanxin* 谈心)" with the person, and the "trust in the person (*xiangxin benren* 相信本人)" (Jiang et al. 1965, 33; Wei 1965, 49; Xiang 1965, 13).

2.1.2. The governmental management of revolutionary vitalism

The APE campaign did not just articulate disciplinary rationality but also rationalised the limitation and criticism of the state based on the articulation of people's revolutionary vitalism. This rationality of governmental management articulated the revolutionary vitalism as the masses' authenticity, creativity and self-organisation.

The APE campaign not only disciplined the daily life of the people but also criticised the party-state, such as the degenerated "leadership", "the party-government apparatuses" and "bureaucratism" (Wu 1964, 4; Wu and Cai 1965, 13; Jiang 1965, 22; Xu 1965, 4; Chen 1966, 30). Since late 1965, the leaders "in power taking the capitalist road" had been articulated as a form of peaceful evolution (Qi 1966; Lin 1966; Zhou 1967; Guan 1967; Xiao 1967; Wang 1967).

On the contrary, the APE campaign recognised people's revolutionary vitalism. The people were assumed to be more authentic than the party-state due to their inherent revolutionary passion. It required the "state regime" to "be close to", "trust in" and "rely on" the people (Xu 1963, 4; Ji 1965, 15; Wang 1965, 27; Liu 1966, 9). For example, "the excellency of the workers and peasants", "the superiority of the poor and middle peasants" and "the enthusiasm of the

masses for socialist revolution" were regarded as the standard with which the party-state must adhere (Xu 1963, 4; Ji 1965, 18; Sang and Wu 1965, 32).

Moreover, the governmental management of people's revolutionary vitalism asked for the recognition of people's creativity. The APE campaign asked the people to exercise the "spirit of creativity" through the methods of "Four Big Democracy (speak out freely, air views fully, big debates, big-character posters, *sida* 四大)" to "educate themselves about what is right and what is wrong" (Tan 1966; Lin 1966; Zhou 1966; Guan 1966; Xiao 1967; Li 1967). The people were assumed to have superior revolutionary creativity than "the person in power", and could "criticise and supervise party and government leaders at all levels" (Dongfanghong Commune 1966; Tan 1966; Qi 1966). Four Big Democracy rationalised the masses's spontaneous interpretations of the paramount leader's directive beyond the established authority; as one of the leaders of the Central Cultural Revolution Group Kang Sheng (1966) encouraged mass organisations:

> *"*No matter what authority they are, no matter if they are old revolutionaries, no matter what qualifications they have, as long as they deviate from Chairman Mao's thought and Marxism-Leninism, they can be criticised and bombarded! *"*.

At last, the governmental management of people's revolutionary vitalism asked for people's self-organisation outside the party state. The APE campaign was rationalised to let people have the right to self-organise without the political mediation of state apparatuses[5]. This radical expression came from the free-flow interpretation of the top directive published in *People's Daily* (1966) by the mass organisations which called for "to be like the Paris Commune, to have a full electoral system". Peaceful evolution was, borrowed from Leon Trotsky's terminology, the "[bureaucratic] substitutionalism"; for this reason, the mass organisation must "disintegrate from the authority" and become independent (Dongfanghong Commune 1966). The APE was to oppose the re-centralisation of power, to eliminate the "bureaucratic

[5] For the comprehensive studies of mass organisations during the Cultural Revolution, see Yin 2009 and Wu 2014.

bourgeoisie", to "smash the old state apparatus", and to establish a "new society without bureaucrats" (Wang 1967; Shengwulian 1968a; 1968c; 1968b).

Therefore, the APE campaign in the 1960s was not the monotonous articulation of *Raison D'état* of regime security and social stability. The campaign was structured in a state project consisting of disciplinary rationality of anti-imperialist war and the governmental management of revolutionary vitalism.

2.2. The APE campaign after 1989

The result (Figure 5) of the analysis of the new APE campaign in the early 1990s indicates that the structuration of the new campaign was different from the old one. "International configuration/order (*guoji geju/zhixu* 国际格局/秩序)" emerged as the new master signifier. The new state project was composed of two rationalities, including "the relative peace based on the balance of power" and "peaceful competition of comprehensive national power". The former disciplinary rationality was articulated with the logic of equivalence centred on geopolitical antagonism. In contrast, the latter rationality of governmental management was articulated with the logic of difference.

Name	References
Correct Mao's Leftist error	63
International configuration and order	39
Peaceful competition of comprehensive national power	31
Economy prosperity through Reform&opening-up	65
Regulation of positive and negative elements	37
Relative peace based on balance of force	26
Enemy's deployment of force	109
Party-state building	59
Struggle between social systems	53
Deployment of ideology	34
State-society systemic enginnering	17

Figure 5: The table of codes by references of the APE campaign in the 1990s

2.2.1. The renunciation of Maoist hegemony in the new hegemony of international order

To begin with, the APE campaign in the early 1990s did not repeat the Maoist state project but renounced it. Although a large number of texts were dedicated to "inheriting" Mao's APE campaign (Deng 1990; Liu 1991; Yu 1991; Guo 1992; Luo 1992; Yu 1992), the code of "correct Mao's leftist error" called for a "correct" reception of Mao's APE campaign. They separated Mao into a rational strategist and an irrational old man "in his late years" who made "fatal errors" and "serious mistakes" (Wu 1991, 36; Zhou 1991, 51; Zhang and Yang 1992, 11; Song 1992, 7; Ma 1992, 15). In other words, the functions of the APE campaign in the 1960s were renounced.

The most illustrative example of the renunciation of the Maoist state project was the authoritative article written by Pang Xianzhi in 1990. As the former secretary and official biographer of Mao, Pang was one of the officially anointed supervisors of Mao's personal archive. He used his monopolised legitimacy to interpret Mao's political legacy, explaining that Mao in his late years over-extended the revolution and wrongly mobilised masses to attack the party-state (Pang 1990, 5–19). Following Pang's renunciation of the Maoist project, some authors even went as far as to imply that Mao in his late years "actually [counterproductively] helped [enemies' strategy of] peaceful evolution" due to the "chaos" caused by "Big Democracy" and "bottom-up rebel" (Wu 1991, 36; Luo 1992, 22; Wang 1992, 25; Zhong 1992, 26).

Renouncing the Maoist state project of world revolution, the "international configuration (*geju* 格局)" or "order (*zhixu* 秩序)" became the nodal point. The new APE campaign in the early 1990s articulated that world of "war and revolution" had ended because the "international situation" and "configuration" was changing from "tensions to conciliation", from "confrontation to dialogue" (Ling 1989; Wang 1989, 18; Song 1990, 9; Xiong 1990, 18; Zhang 1991, 38; Zhang 1991, 37; Liu 1992, 68). A "new international order" based on "peaceful coexistence" was emerging from an "old international order" of U.S. hegemony (Wang 1990, 16; Jilin and Henan Provincial Committee 1990, 224; Li 1990, 26; Guo 1991, 20; Wu and Xiao 1991, 23; Shen 1992, 29; Guo 1992, 20).

Most importantly, the new APE campaign articulated two equivocal rationalities around the nodal point of international configuration/order. On the one hand, the new international order had not fully developed yet, which must be maintained by force. For this reason, the international sphere was still imbued with "challenges", "struggles", "dangers" and "conflicts" (Ling 1989, 2; Yu 1989, 33; Zhang 1989, 8; Xu 1989, 3). On the other hand, the change towards a new order had been an objective and unavoidable reality. Most countries in the world had taken "peace and development" as their priority; "globalisation" has made countries "mutually dependent"; economic integration" had pushed countries to "exchange" and "cooperate" (Wang and Hu 1989, 3; Li 1990, 25; Cong 1991, 20; Guo 1992, 20; Central Party School 1992, 60). Based on the two equivocal imageries, the APE campaign articulated two parallel rationalities, i.e., "relative peace" and "peaceful competition".

2.2.2. The state-centric discipline of geopolitics

Different from the disciplinary rationality of the anti-imperialist war in the 1960s, the new disciplinary rationality of geopolitics replaced the antagonism in the 1960s between imperialism and people's armed struggle with the antagonism between "politically, militarily, economically, culturally, psychologically" calculable geopolitical entities (He and Jian 1991a, 16; 1991b, 47). As shown below (Figure 6), the minor geopolitical code of "enemy's deployment of force" in the 1960s (Figure 5) was raised to a dominant position in the new rationality. Geopolitical terminologies, such as the "force (*liliang* 力量)", "[military, economic, technological] power (*shili* 实力)" and the "balance (*duibi* 对比, *junshi* 均势)" between states, became the dominant inscriptive devices to conceptualise the antagonism (Ling 1989, 2; Xi 1990, 2; Hou and Cai 1990, 9; Wang 1990, 6; Song 1990, 9; Wu 1990, 44; Dong 1992, 13; Guo 1992, 17).

The rearticulated antagonism of geopolitics fractured the total antagonism between the people and imperialism into the antagonisms between states with different social systems. On the one hand, the Maoist articulation of the unitary people was replaced by a complex chain of signifiers, such as "socialist system", "Chinese nation", "national sovereignty", "national dignity", "the survival of state and nation" and "patriotism" (Xiong 1990, 19; Hu and Liu 1990, 35; Jilin and Henan Provincial Committee 1990, 225; Chen 1991, 21; Liang, Zhou, and Wei

1991, 9; Li 1992, 15; Yu 1992, 33; Chen 1991, 15; Dong, Hu, and Bai 1991, 236). On the other hand, the pluralised states were foregrounded as the protagonists of antagonism. The new campaign denied the previous preoccupation with people's political passion for "class struggle" and "exporting revolution [to the world]" (Xu 1989, 3; Li and Dong 1991, 29; Jiang 1991, 72; Wu 1991, 36; Liu 1991, 242). In contrast, the new campaign regarded the antagonism as "objective" and "non-subjective" confrontations between "states with different social systems" (Wang 1989, 19; Su 1990, 10; Huang and Liu 1990, 29; Pang 1990, 3).

Therefore, the new geopolitical antagonism changed the bottom-up and individualised perspective of the old APE campaign into a state-centric perspective. It regarded Anti-Peaceful Evolution as a process of "system engineering" through the "deployment of ideology" and "party-state building". Instead of the individual political passion, the discipline of geopolitics focused on the corporealised and objectified state apparatuses. Anti-peaceful evolution became a "difficult and complex system engineering" which relied on scientific "deployments, plans and procedures" and "multi-pronged comprehensive governance" (Li and Dong 1991, 30; Zhang 1991, 34; Cui 1992, 69; Xiang 1992, 17; Liu 1992, 43; Liu 1992, 7; Chen 1991, 74). Instead of the old genres of confessions, autobiographies or in-person investigations, the textbook on the APE campaign for university students published in 1991 described the APE as a "systemic knowledge" which studies the "objective law" of "philosophy, economy, scientific socialism, strategy, psychology, ideological and political work, enemy situation, social-school-family education" (Li 1991, 3).

In this new state-centric perspective, the new APE campaign discarded the politicisation of the people in daily life and refocused on the stability of the ideology and the party-state. Ideology and the party-state were reified as corporeal systems that could be scientifically managed, with the new objective of "stability" (Lu 1990, 65; Feng 1990, 7; He and Jian 1991b, 52; Liang, Zhou, and Wei 1991, 12). Firstly, ideology construction was articulated as "social science" which should be redeemed from the unscientific Maoist mass campaigns, i.e., "leftist errors" caused "endless disasters" (He and Jian 1991a, 2). Ideology had its own "regularity" that must be objectively studied and harnessed (Cong 1991, 22–23). The individualised perspective should be replaced by "(inter-)nationalised" management in "governmental systems", "national

defence systems" and "intelligence systems" (He and Jian 1991a, 18; 1991b, 50; Zhang 1989, 145; *Jiangsurenmin chubanshe* 1992, 50; Liang et al. 1992, 50; Li and Wu 1992, 204–15). Secondly, the state apparatuses once obscured in the old APE campaign were explicitly conjured up. Stability was said to be maintained through "strengthening the state machine", "relying on the state apparatuses", and "upgrading the system and technology equipment of the army, armed police, public security police" (Zhang 1989, 11; Wu and Xiao 1991, 21; Li 1991, 305; Liu 1991, 90; Xu and Jin 1992, 203; Li and Ding 1992, 141; Central Party School 1992, 260).

2.2.3. The governmental management of peaceful competition

The rupture of the new APE campaign from the past was also shown in its re-alignment to the governmental management of peaceful competition. Firstly, in the new international order of peace and development, peaceful evolution became a quasi-natural reality, i.e., the non-military and peaceful competition between states. The peaceful evolution was characterised as an objective reality of "one earth, two systems and peaceful competitions" (Cheng and Yu 1990, 48; Li and Dong 1991, 30; Chen 1991; Deng 1991, 41; Liu 1991, 5). In other words, the governmental management further diluted the friend-enemy antagonism of geopolitics by aligning it with the rationality of peaceful "competition (*jingzheng* 竞争, *jingsai* 竞赛)", i.e., a non-antagonistic relation of difference (Zhao 1989, 7; Xi 1990, 1–2; He and Jian 1991b, 48; Liang et al. 1992). The crucial signifier that sutured up geopolitics and peaceful competition was the terminology "comprehensive national power (*zonghe guoli* 综合国力)" in which the meaning of power was extended from states' coercive capacities to that of "economy, science and technology" (Wu 1990, 47; Cheng and Yu 1990, 48; He and Jian 1991b, 48; Deng 1991, 41). Therefore, under this rationality of governmental management, peaceful evolution became a quasi-natural reality, i.e., the competition of economy and science between different social systems on a common earth.

As a result, the governmental management of peaceful competition articulated economic prosperity as an integral part of Chinese national comprehensive power to counter Western peaceful evolution. The resort to economic prosperity as the power to counter Western peaceful evolution was a form of economic determinism. Economic determinism regarded the non-

military struggle between the Chinese state and the Western strategy of peaceful evolution as a competition between different levels of "productive force" (Zhang 1989, 10; Li 1990, 20; Wu 1990, 59; Li 1990, 26; Mao and Fang 1991, 16). In other words, if the Chinese state could foster a prosperous economy, it would enjoy better comprehensive national power to counter Western economic, political and ideological infiltrations.

To foster economic prosperity, the new APE campaign reached two absurd conclusions. The first is that the Chinese state must continue to reform according to the law of economic development in order to prevent Western peaceful evolution. As economic prosperity was the material precondition to fight Western peaceful evolution, the state must follow the economic "objective law" for which the state must scientifically study and understand; thereby, the governmental interventions must follow "the regularities" of economic development; the governmental institutions must be further reformed to "suppress irrational impulses" and "take actions according to economic regularities" (Lei 1990, 8; Chen 1991, 24; Li 1991, 291).

Contrary to the hostility towards daily life consumption in the 1960s, economic reform as a strategy of Anti-Peaceful Evolution was rationalised based on the people's material demands. The old socialist system was vulnerable in front of the Western non-military infiltration because it neglected "people's increasing material and cultural needs"; for instance, the socialist states collapsed in 1989 lost the support from their people because they failed to redress "the chronic and worsening of economic hardship" (Wu 1990, 59; Cheng and Yu 1990, 49; Shen 1992, 28; Li 1991, 228; Zhong 1992, 65; *Jiangsurenmin chubanshe* 1992, 102; Liang et al. 1992, 3). Therefore, the Maoist articulation of the revolutionary passion of the people was reconfigured as the people's demands for material welfare.

Secondly, an even more absurd conclusion, the new APE campaign advocated for opening up to the outside world in order to prevent Western peaceful evolution. It rationalised that the Chinese state would be more vulnerable vis-à-vis Western non-military subversions if it decided to isolate itself from the outside world. China could "become more backward" in its self-imposed isolation; the Chinese state must open to the world to foster economic prosperity and scientific development otherwise "the more [we] counter peaceful evolution, the poorer

[we will be]" (Li 1991, 293; Liu 1991, 223; Shen 1992, 208). Therefore, the new APE campaign regarded "learning and introducing western advanced scientific culture and management knowledge", "economic, technological and cultural exchanges", "winning more friends [around the world]", "expanding foreign exchanges and cooperation" and "breaking the closed state of isolation" as legitimate methods of Anti-Peaceful Evolution (Zhang 1989, 11; Su 1990, 11; Cheng and Yu 1990, 47; Zhang 1991, 38; Liu 1991, 223).

To balance the risk of peaceful evolution and the imperative of reform and opening up, the new APE campaign introduced the governmental management of security as the nexus between stability and openness. Security, instead of the absolute antagonism between friends and enemies, became a technical issue of government management. As the issue of peaceful evolution and opening up needed to be addressed simultaneously, the APE campaign articulated a stability-openness nexus. "Both…and (*jiyao youyao* 既要又要)" became a typical idiom (Yu 1989, 35; Zhang 1989, 10–11; Su 1990, 11; Wang 1990, 83; Gao 1991, 37; Wu 1991, 2). On the one side, opening to the outside was normal for the "self-development" of the socialist system; on the other side, beyond a certain range of normal openness, excessive connections with the outside world would produce "disordering elements" (Yu 1989, 35; Zhang 1991, 292; Hou and Cai 1990, 9; You 1992, 13; Dong, Hu, and Bai 1991, 271).

This stability-openness nexus was articulated as a "dialectical unity", as a natural phenomenon with its "ebb and flow"; policymakers must have "accurate and appropriate evaluation" to "neither ignore nor exaggerate" the positive and negative elements (Liu 1990, 10; Cheng and Yu 1990, 48; Jiang 1991, 72; Li 1991, 338; Liang 1992, 3). Therefore, to avoid "Mao's leftist error" in the 1960s of simplifying all openness to the world as abnormal, the objective of the governmental management in the new APE campaign was to keep the openness within the range of "normal phenomenon"(Wang 1990, 13; Su 1990, 11; Pang 1990, 4; Zhu 1991, 12; Liu 1991, 3).

To conclude, through the comparison between the old APE campaign in the 1960s and 1990s, I argue that the continuity of anti-liberal security paranoia was misplaced. The new campaign readapted Maoist rationality of anti-imperialist war, especially Maoist hostility towards

Western non-military strategies of regime subversion. However, the perceived continuity was misplaced because the APE campaign in the 1990s was structured by a new hegemonic state project of international order. The new project not only colonised the Maoist antagonism between the people and imperialism with a state-centric antagonism of geopolitics but also realigned the antagonism with a new rationality of the governmental management of economic prosperity and opening up.

Chapter 3: The Post-1992 Liberalisation Campaign in the Hegemonic State Project of International Order

The last chapter argues that the accepted continuity of the Anti-Peaceful Evolution campaigns from the 1960s to the early 1990s as the state-centric security paranoia is a myth. The hegemonic state project of the international order that emerged after the late 1980s has changed the political function of the APE campaign from the bottom-up agitation and management of people's revolutionary vitalism to the top-down maintenance of societal stability and management of economic prosperity. This chapter further investigated the hegemonic effect of the state project of international order in the post-1992 liberalisation campaign of marketisation and opening up.

The chapter first challenges the understanding of the liberalisation campaign as the withdrawal of state-centric security paranoia by showing the quantitative intertextuality between the concepts of "market/reform & opening up" and "war/local war" in journal articles on international order. Further, it illustrates how the international order as the nodal point was articulated as an empty signifier that can suture the governmental management of liberalisation and the disciplinary rationality of geopolitics. The former rationality relocated the Maoist articulation of people's revolutionary vitalism into the diversity of the global market and political-cultural pluralism of international society. Simultaneously, the discourse of international order rearticulated Maoist total antagonism between the people and imperialism into the dispersed and chronic antagonisms between and intra-states.

3.1. The intertextuality between the concepts of "market" and "war" in the discourse of international order

It was an unreputable fact that the APE campaign after 1989 was replaced by the liberalisation campaign after 1992. As historians convincingly argue, the Chinese leadership stopped the criticism of liberalisation as the Western peaceful evolution and shifted to a new agenda of establishing the Socialist Market Economy in 1992 (Meisner 1996; Fewsmith 2008; Garver 2015; Dikötter 2022). The leadership had overcome the trauma of the Tiananmen incident, the

fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union to campaign for another round of opening-up and market reform.

However, this unreputable fact could be misleadingly interpreted as de-securitisation (Vuori 2019), a temporary withdrawal of security rationality, when we neglect other simultaneous developments happening in the Chinese state. While the APE campaign was watered down to make room for liberalisation after 1992, the Chinese coercive state apparatuses experienced unprecedented augmentation. Internal security became the new top benchmark to evaluate officials, and bureaucrats from the police and legal system started to dominate local governments after 1991 (Wang and Minzner 2015). Meanwhile, radical reforms in external security were on their way. As analysts of Chinese military strategies indicate, the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991 led by the U.S. generated unexpected effects on the Chinese military reforms (J. You 2004; D. Cheng 2011; Fravel 2018). The Chinese leadership was shocked by the American high-tech operations in Iraq thereby hastily declaring its new strategy of "Local War under the Condition of High Technology" in 1993 (Jiang Zemin 2006a, 285). Following this development, Chinese leadership further declared the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese Characteristics" (Jiang Zemin 2006b, 576–99). In other words, at least since 1992, the leadership has decided to pursue a more modernised and lethal war juggernaut.

These changes in the Chinese state should be examined together instead of independent processes that happened separately as economic or security issues in the extant literature. As this thesis argues, they are parts of the hegemonic state project, adjusting the boundaries between the Chinese state and the newly recognised reality of international order after 1989. This was directly reflected in the discourse of international order among bureaucrats and intellectuals. In the 135 (semi-)official journal articles took "international order" as the keyword published from 1992 to 1994, the concepts of "market (*shichang* 市场)" and related "opening-up (*kaifang* 开放)" overlapped with the concepts of "war (*zhanzheng* 战争)" and related "local war (*jubu zhanzheng* 局部战争)".



Figure 6: The intertextuality between the signifiers of “market” and “war”

There were 55 articles elaborated on both the issues of market economy/opening-up and warfare, accounting for 40 per cent of the texts. The texts that elaborated on either one of the issues accounted for another 45 per cent, which left only 5 per cent of the articles mentioned neither issue. In other words, *95 per cent of the articles on international order were related to either or both issues of market economy and war as conflicts*. This quantitative intertextuality between “market” and “war” in international order discourse suggested a basic fact that the liberalisation campaign after 1992 was closely related to the rationality of geopolitical security but not a simple discontinuity from the latter. Nonetheless, the problem is how. How was the international order discourse articulated to suture contradictory governmental rationalities of liberalisation and geopolitical security?

3.2. International order in transition as the empty signifier suturing different rationalities

After the 135 articles are coded according to the two logics of hegemonic formation, the result indicates two parallel articulatory logics. On the one side, the differential logic increased the complexity of the political space, i.e., the pluralisation of the interests and subject positions in

the international order. The logic was shown in the code of "new order (*xinzhixu* 新秩序)" (60 references), articulating the diversity of the global market and political-cultural pluralism of international society. As its company, the code of "peaceful coexistence" (84 references) articulated the governmentality of liberalisation.

On the other hand, the state project of international order was also articulated through the logic of equivalence, simplifying the political space of international order. The equivalential logic articulated the code "old order (*jiuzhixu* 旧秩序)" (68 references) as the antagonism against outsiders of the new order. The antagonism rationalised the code "contradiction and conflict" (78 references), articulating the governmentality of geopolitical security. *Most importantly, the logic of difference and equivalence are condensed on the nodal point, the empty signifier, coded as the "transition of international order"* (87 references).

Figure 7: The thematic map of the discourse of international order

The nodal point "transition of international order" was an empty signifier that had no decided meaning. Instead of the source of determined meaning, the empty signifier of international order opened the possibility of connecting contradictory rationalities. The state project was centred on an undecided problematic without articulating any positive content of the international order. No authors pretended to know the nature of international order but began the discursive articulation with "the problem (*wenti* 问题)" of international order. Instead of closing the problem by providing a definitive answer, these authors listed all the possible ways

to address the problem suggested by different actors; the problem concerned not just Chinese leadership but "the world" and "international society" in general, and the U.S., Japan and Western European countries in particular (Li 1992, 27; Shen 1992, 63; Yu and Cao 1993, 37; Qiu 1993, 40; Cai 1994, 14; Sa 1994, 5). In other words, the openness to different possibilities was the only accepted characteristic of the international order.

The undecidedness of the international order was contextualised by the radical transition or change (*bianhua* 变化) that happened in the world. To legitimise the problem of an undecided order, articles repeated that "the old [international] order…has ended while the new order has not yet taken shape" (Wang 1992, 1; Yan 1992, 19; He 1992, 1; Lin 1992, 18; Chi 1994, 51; Li 1994, 8). This undecidable status between the old and new international order has already been observed in the analysis of the APE campaign after 1989 in *Chapter 2*. The reason that the new order did not fully develop was that the old order was disrupted abruptly in "the most profound and dramatic historical change after World War II" (Zhang 1992, 44). The disruptive events, such as the Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the 1989 Tiananmen incident, were so "hard to believe" that no actors were ready to deal with the problem of how to establish the new international order.

This undecidedness caused by radical transition was further articulated in an ambiguous temporal category, i.e., "the interim period (*guodu shiqi* 过渡时期)" which indicated the unpredictability of the international order. As the articles constantly emphasised, the world was situating "in between (*jiaoti* 交替)" the new and old international order (Wang 1992, 1; *Dangxiao Keyan Xinxi* 1992, 1; Yan 1992, 19; He 1992, 1; Lei 1993, 52; Guo 1994, 5). The in-betweenness designated at least two temporalities, including the progressive development into the new order and the recurrent persistence of the old order. The temporal direction was not predetermined since the international situation was "extremely complex and illusive" (Lin 1992, 18; Li 1994, 39), "constantly changing, difficult to predict" and "unexpected things" would happen at any time (*Dangxiao keyanxinxi* 1992, 1). While the progression towards the new order was noticeable, "some mechanisms formed in the old order will continue to play a stabilising and regulating role in different areas and to different degrees"(Hong and Wu 1994, 87). The new and old elements and their effects "coexist", "intermingle" and were

"interchangeable" (Guo 1992, 1; Wang 1992, 25; Sa 1994). As a result, the international situation was "turbulent" and unpredictable (Qian 1992, 2; Wang 1992, 18; Hong and Wu 1994, 25).

3.3. The emerging new order: the world market, international society, and peaceful coexistence

Within the undecided temporality of international order, the progressive tendency towards new order was articulated in the differential logic of the economic and political liberalisation. The code of "new order" indicated the increasing complexity of the political space, i.e., the international order; the code of "peaceful coexistence" correspondingly stipulated the liberalisation of the Chinese state vis-à-vis the new international order. However, the rationality of liberalisation was not simply a discontinuity from the Maoist state project of world revolution; it is more accurate to argue that the state project of international order relocated elements of Maoist hegemony. This is because the new order was conditioned on the rearticulation of the Maoist concept of "the people" as revolutionary vitalism (see Chapter 2). The new hegemonic state project of international order rearticulated the revolutionary vitalism into the economic interconnectedness of the world market and the political-cultural diversity of the international society.

First of all, the new order was articulated as emerging from the demands of the people all over the world. The discourse traced the origin of the international new order in the post-colonial nations. The transformation towards new order was "an unstoppable historical trend" because it was supported by the genuine demands of "people all over the world"(Liu 1992, 27; Wang 1992, 108; Wu 1994, 23; Yi 1994, 5; Wang 1994, 2; Gao 1994, 3). The subordinate people, i.e., "the third world (*disan shijie* 第三世界)", asked for a new order of economic equality and political democracy (Chen 1992, 18; Hu 1992, 30; Yang and Lei 1992, 26; Leng 1992, 62; Li 1992, 9). Such demand was not a new agenda after the end of the Cold War but a persistent contrivance of the post-colonial people. This is why, although most articles regarded the year 1988 as the official starting point of Chinese leadership's strategy of establishing international new order (Shen 1992, 63; Liang 1992, 49; Yang 1992, 30; Zhao 1993, 104; Liu 1993, 314; Xiao 1994, 17; Wang 1994, 6), it nevertheless traced its origin in the "Declaration for the

Establishment of a New International Economic Order" supported by non-alignment movement and adopted in the United Nations in 1974 (Chen 1992, 15; Lang 1992, 21; Li 1992, 16; Gao 1994, 8). Through the connection with the historical post-colonial movement, the discourse of international order inherited the Maoist concept of the people.

However, the discourse of international order replaced the revolutionary vitalism of the people with the interconnectedness of the world market. Different from the revolutionary authenticity and creativity of the people articulated in the 1960s, the discourse of international order naturalised the economic spontaneity of the people as the dynamics of the "world market (shijie shichang 世界市场)"(Yan 1992, 21; Leng 1992, 24; Lang 1992, 15; Jin 1992, 46; Liu 1994, 4; Wang 1994a, 14; 1994b, 1). People all over the world asked for economic equality between developed and developing countries because all nations were connected by and benefitted from the market exchanges. As one author explained plainly, "After a long history of development, different nations have evolved from self-sufficient individuals to an interconnected, mutually reinforcing *unified market*" (Wang 1992, 6).

Most interestingly, in the unstoppable transition towards a unified world market, it was not the anti-imperialist revolution but the revolution of technology played the key role (He 1992, 5; Wei 1992, 22; Yang and Lei 1992, 25; Zhu 1992, 55; Wang 1994b, 3; Huang 1994, 41). Revolution, as the master signifier of the Maoist state project, acquired a completely new meaning in the new discourse:

> "With the rise of the new scientific and technological revolution and the tremendous progress of social productivity, the international division of labour, international trade and international investment in the contemporary world has been developing at an unprecedented speed and scale" (Lang 1992, 15).

As these articles indicated, this revolution of technology and productive force had fundamentally stroke and destabilised "the previous international system and contributed to the collapse of the bipolar order" (W. Zhu 1992, 55; Wu 1994, 23). Therefore, although the people still occupied a crucial position in the discourse of international order, revolutionary vitalism was naturalised in the dynamics of the world market and the revolution of material forces.

Moreover, the self-organisation of the people was replaced by the political-cultural pluralism of international society. Different from the Maoist mobilisation of the people to criticise the bureaucratic system, the discourse of international order articulated the people as different actors who pursued diversified interests and ideas. The key concept became "pluralisation (*duoyanghua* 多样化)"(Wang 1992, 6; Wang 1992, 28; Li 1992b, 45; Yang 1992, 33; Qiu 1993, 6; Chi 1994a, 30; Huang 1994, 41). All people in different "regions", "geographical locations" and "levels of development", with non-identical "ideologies", "values" and "cultures" should be recognised (Wang 1992, 6). For this reason, the discourse of international order translated the political-cultural demands of the people into a new reality of pluralised "international society (*guoji shehui* 国际社会)" composed of nation-states(Lang 1992, 20; Liu 1992, 27; Shen 1992, 24; Yang 1992, 33; Liu 1993, 15; Zhou and Qiu 1993, 72; Qiu 1993, 6; Zhao 1993, 107). As one author explained succinctly,

> "More than 160 countries in the world exist on the same earth. Although these countries are different in size, strength, advanced and backward, they are all members of the international society, occupy a certain space, reproduce from generation to generation, and become an integral part of mankind" (Wang 1992, 7).

Accordingly, to cope with the connectedness of the world market and plurality of international society, the role of the states was rationalised to follow "the principle of peaceful coexistence (*heping gongchu yuanze* 和平共处原则)"(Yan 1992, 21; Zhang 1992, 45; He 1992, 2; Fan 1992, 23; Qiu 1993, 41; Huang 1994, 43; Zheng 1994, 36). The interventions of the states in international affairs, in this principle, should be limited, without imposing any unilateral agenda on the world market and international society. Instead, the legitimate intervention should be "cooperation (*hezuo* 合作)" and "negotiation (*xieshang* 协商)"(Wang 1992, 28; Li 1992b, 41; Zhou and Qiu 1993, 73; Zhao 1993, 107; Ma 1994, 9; Zheng 1994, 36). As it explained,

> "The new international order will be conducive to better cooperation among states in the world and better play to their respective advantages and strengths so as to promote comprehensive and balanced development in the world. Only with effective

cooperation among all kinds of states in the world can there be hope and guarantee for the prosperity and progress of the world" (Wang 1992, 28).

For the Chinese state, the principle asked for further liberalisation, to "strengthen economic cooperation and exchanges with the rest of the world, continue reform and opening up, and quickly promote our economic development…do not make too many enemies, seek common ground while reserving differences, make friends extensively" (Hu 1992, 5). However, it would be completely wrong to take the discourse of international order as the monological rationality of liberalisation while neglecting the other face of the discourse – the logic of equivalence and antagonism.

3.4. The persisting old order: power politics, local war and contradiction/conflict

As the rationality of liberalisation readapted the Maoist rationality of people's revolutionary vitalism, the hegemonic state project of international order also relocated Maoist rationality of anti-imperialist war into geopolitics. When the vitality of the people was naturalised into the dynamic of the world market and the pluralism of international society, the revolutionary war of the people against imperialism was also rearticulated as state-centric power politics and localised warfare. In other words, *the rationality of geopolitics, instead of the counter-rationality of liberalisation, was also the result of the transformation from the Maoist state project of world revolution to the state project of international order*.

First of all, the code of the old order rearticulated the Maoist concept of imperialism into power politics between states. As the Maoist concept of the people was naturalised into market dynamics and pluralised international society, the enemy of the people, i.e., imperialism, was naturalised into geopolitics. While "imperialism" was still regarded as one of the lingering effects of the old order (Qian 1992, 3; Li 1992b, 43; Wang 1992, 108; Li 1993, 39), it stripped off the previous connection with capitalist relations of production and lifestyle as illustrated in *Chapter 2*. Imperialism was rearticulated as the epiphenomenon of the more fundamental reality of international relations, i.e., "power politics (*qiangquan zhengzhi* 强权政治)" (Wang 1992, 2; Hu 1992, 3; Fan 1992, 23; Hu 1992, 29; Yang and Lei 1992, 24; Leng 1992, 60; Li 1992b, 42).

As a result, instead of the antagonism between the revolutionary people and the imperialism, the old international order was articulated as the antagonisms between states equipped with different levels of power, i.e., "an order in which a few big and powerful states exploited and bullied weaker states for their own interests" (Wang 1992, 24). The Maoist world revolution between the people and imperialism was substituted by a new historical imaginary; as one author explained, "As far as the international political and economic order is concerned, the world history so far has basically been the history of a few great powers struggling for hegemony" (Lang 1992, 20).

The persisting old order, therefore, was articulated as the geopolitical hegemony. If the old order in the Cold War was a bipolar hegemony of "the Yalta system (*yaerta tizhi* 雅尔塔体制)" controlled by two superpowers (Yan 1992, 19; Yang and Lei 1992, 23; Liang 1992, 45; Wen 1994, 10), the persistence of the old order after the Cold War would be the unipolar hegemony controlled by the U.S.. The U.S.' victory in the Gulf War in 1991 and the American President's slogan to construct a "New World Order" was regarded by many authors as the continuation of the American unipolar hegemony (Hu 1992, 8; Chen 1992, 4; Xu 1992, 3; Guo 1992, 1; Hu 1992, 30; Yang and Lei 1992, 24; Liu 1994, 2). In other words, statist geopolitics instead of (counter-)revolution became the logic of antagonism.

Secondly, the code of the old order rearticulated the anti-imperialist war as local wars. In other words, the total antagonism was fragmented into limited antagonisms. The attempt to fragment the Maoist total antagonism was conspicuous in one of the criticisms of Maoist military strategy:

> "One-sided emphasis on the danger of total war and excessive demands for preparation for [early, big, nuclear] war was inevitably related to the Party and Mao Zedong's dogmatic understanding of the war and revolution" (Liu 1993, 308).

War was not the inevitable total antagonism between the people and imperialism. Instead, war or conflicts was the result of "power's growth, decline, division and combination" and "the constant change of the boundaries between friends and enemy" (Wang 1992, 2). What replaced the antagonism between clearly defined friends and enemies was the incompatibilities of

interests between states. As the author contended, "all conflicts between the East and West, the North and South, the West and South are conflicts between states"(Wang 1992, 5).

For this reason, the war was localised between states or intra-states. If total war was no longer conceivable, the discourse of international order did not "deny the existence of local war and regional conflicts"(Sui Yu 1994, 29). The local wars, exemplified by the Gulf War, were caused by diversified reasons, inter alia, "disputes over territory and borders", "ethnic conflicts", "religious conflicts", "regional power politics" and "struggles for resources"(Wang 1992, 5; Li 1992, 41; Qiu 1993, 5). The previous total war was superseded by a different imagery of war. War became spatially limited but dispersed, as one author depicted,

> "A dangerous zone is formed from the Balkans to the Caucasus Mountains and to Central Asia…They are intertwined with historical grievances and territorial disputes; they are also mixed with factors such as political struggles, religious disputes, and economic interests; the involvement of external forces makes the problem more complicated"(Yang 1992, 28).

Temporally, war was short but chronic; as another author explained, "local instabilities and even armed conflicts have increased; according to statistics, in the 1970s and 1980s, there were 30 local armed conflicts in each decade, an average of three a year; in the first two years of the 1980s, there were 12, an average of six times a year" (Guo 1992, 3).

Therefore, with the relocation of the total antagonism of anti-imperialist war to dispersed and chronic antagonisms of power politics and local war, the emerging new order was not incompatible with the persisting old order; the rationality of liberalisation, in this sense, was not incompatible with the rationality of geopolitics. On the contrary, the progressive development of the new order relied on the maintenance of antagonism. As the authors indicated,

> "The world is bound to go through a period of turbulence and instability because the birth of a new order is by no means a natural development. It depends on the changes in the world political and economic structure and depends on the certain struggles between states" (Wang 1992, 28).

When the dispersed and chronic power politics still hinder the full development of the new order, the establishment of a new international order "will be a long process of struggle"(F. He 1992, 2); accordingly, the Chinese state should "adopt a more flexible, active and realistic attitude to participate in the struggle for leadership in building a new international order" (Jixue Zhang 1992, 45).

To confront the potential antagonisms in the transition to the new order, the Chinese state must first adapt its military capacities to the new requirements of dispersed and chronic antagonisms. After the Gulf War, some authors contemplated, the "arms race may get new impetus and transform into new forms", i.e., "high-tech modern weapon system" (Wang 1992, 28; Lu 1993, 25). As one author discussed the adjustment of the military posture of the Chinese state in the post-Cold War era,

> "The main threat to security is no longer a worldwide nuclear war, but various types of local wars. Although [nuclear] deterrence strategy is still the basis of national military strategy, "rapid response" strategy is rapidly becoming the focus and has a significant impact on all aspects of military strategy. While the nuclear and conventional armaments have been greatly reduced, the development of high-tech armaments should receive greater attention, and the investment in high-tech war will be significantly increased" (Guo 1992, 6).

In other words, the emerging new order had transformed the nature of antagonism, and accordingly, the military strategy to cope with the persisting old order should also be changed. More specifically, the Chinese state must equip itself with adequate capacities to cope with the potential conflicts with the American regional hegemony and the possible local conflicts, like the possible local war in the Taiwan Strait (Wu 1992, 7).

Moreover, not just military strategy regarding external security, the security strategy in general must be adjusted according to the needs of the transition from the old to the new order. The APE campaign as the alertness towards Western non-military subversions examined in *Chapter 2* was regarded as an indispensable strategy in the period of order transition. While the total war was excluded as a legitimate imagery, the dispersed and chronic antagonisms may expand

beyond the military sector into economic, political and cultural sectors, i.e., antagonisms between "comprehensive national power" (Liu 1992, 87; Wen 1993, 13; Zhou and Qiu 1993, 74; Gao and Liu 1994, 38). Thus, the Chinese state must have a "sense of crisis and sense of urgency" of the potential antagonisms of power politics in all aspects of power (Liu 1992, 87). The most prominent one would be the "Anti-Peaceful Evolution", the struggle with the Western ideological, cultural and political influence in China (Wang 1992, 5; Hu 1992, 5; Ding 1992, 2; Wang 1992, 108; Gao and Liu 1994, 37; Li 1994, 39).

To conclude, the liberalisation campaign as the establishment of a market economy and integration into the world market and international society was not the withdrawal of state-centric security paranoia. When the governmental management of liberalisation relocated Maoist articulation of people's revolutionary vitalism, the Maoist total antagonism was relocated as dispersed and chronic antagonisms. More but not less securitised, the international order in transition was articulated as filled with the threats of geopolitics and local wars.

Conclusion

Through the genealogy of the Chinese state project in *Chapter 2 and 3*, we may conclude that the post-1989 APE campaign and post-1992 liberalisation campaign were integral to the emerging Chinese hegemonic state project of international order. The APE campaign was not solely a monolithic expression of state-centric security paranoia; rather, it was aligned with the governmental management of economic prosperity and opening-up policies. Similarly, the subsequent liberalisation campaign was not merely an articulation of integration into the global market and international society but was connected to the securitisation of the international order, perceived as fraught with risks of geopolitical struggles and local conflicts. Both campaigns shared a common thread: the marginalisation and relocation of Maoist articulations of revolutionary passion and vitality. Thus, these campaigns represented continuous strategies to hegemonise the state project of international order.



Figure 8: The genealogy of Chinese hegemonic state project

The genealogy elucidates the seemingly contradictory strategies of the Chinese state within the post-Cold War LIO, highlighting the polyvalence of its hegemonic state project. Contrary to

existing literature that seeks to identify a coherent and unitary strategy of the Chinese state toward the international order, this thesis underscores the hegemonic effect of the discourse surrounding the international order. The Chinese state should not be understood as a homogenous entity but as a product of the hegemonic formation of heterogeneous social forces. The concept of international order, as a nodal point, functions as an empty signifier with no fixed meaning. It has been articulated as the unresolved problem of the transition from the old to the new order. This indeterminacy allowed the international order to bridge two seemingly contradictory governmental rationalities: the discipline of geopolitics and the management of liberalisation. Rather than conflicting, these rationalities complemented each other, serving the identical political purpose of repositioning Maoist elements within a new hegemony. In this sense, these rationalities collectively constituted a "policy paradigm" that transformed the Maoist state project of world revolution

The genealogy of China's hegemonic state project in shaping international order has significant implications for its relationship with the post-Cold War liberal international order. Conflicts between contender states and the so-called liberal heartland should not be seen as direct challenges to the LIO by a pre-existing, unitary actor, apparatus, or power bloc. Rather, a contender state's securitisation of international order is only one element of a broader hegemonic state project, which is multifaceted and brings together different rationalities. Antagonistic rhetoric in this context is part of a hegemonic discourse that consolidates competing forces, interests, and identities.

In China's case, its antagonism towards the U.S.-led post-Cold War LIO was not simply a rejection. First, its disciplinary geopolitics, shaped by a logic of equivalence, was closely linked to the logic of difference, as seen in China's liberalisation towards the global market and international society. Second, this sense of security paranoia was less an anti-liberal strategy than a depoliticisation of Maoist total antagonism against global capitalism. In this sense, it acted as a passive revolution, tempering the more radical Maoist opposition to global capitalism. As a result, the discourse of international order was able to incorporate security apparatuses, marketised institutions, traditional party-state elites, and internationalised business actors into

a relatively coherent national project, within which they could negotiate, compete, cooperate and struggle under a shared framework of consensus.

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