CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2025
| Author | Yang, Yiming |
|---|---|
| Title | Why There is No Cognitive Phenomenology |
| Summary | Some philosophers believe that our thinking, understanding, and such cognitive states influence our experience and the phenomenology of the experience. They argue that in addition to our sensory perception, our cognitive acts have a distinctive proprietary cognitive phenomenology. However, some other philosophers hold a position against the cognitive phenomenology theory. They believe all the phenomenology of thinking or understanding can be reduced to sensory phenomenology. All the so-called "cognitive phenomenology" is sensory. In Siewert's terminology, we choose between "variation" and “reducibility." If we support variation idea, we support the cognitive phenomenology; if we support reducibility idea, we deny the cognitive phenomenology. However, I believe that actually we can neither support the variation idea nor the reducibility idea. To deny the reducibility does not indicate the success of variation, and vice versa. I want to argue that both reducibility and variation idea are not successful. |
| Supervisor | Crane, Tim |
| Department | Philosophy MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2025/yang_yiming.pdf |
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