CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2012
| Author | Madunic, Domagoj |
|---|---|
| Title | Defensiones Dalmatiae: Governance and Logistics of the Venetian Defensive System in Dalmatia During the War Of Crete (1645 - 1669) |
| Summary | This PhD dissertation deals with the Venetian defensive system in the Adriatic theater of operations; its structure, organization (the navy and the army), governance and administration, and logistical problems involved with keeping it operational. In temporal terms this study is limited only to the period of the the longest war the Republic of Venice ever fought with the Ottoman Empire, the war known as the War of Crete (1645-1669). Although the War of Crete was just the first in the series of three subsequent wars fought in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries between these two states, in many respects, it represented a turning point. On one hand, in spite of resounding victories in the Dardanelles (1654-1657), and tenacious defense of Candia, the Republic failed to achieve its objectives in these zones, and the war did end with Ottoman victory and conquest of the island of Crete. On the other hand, in the Adriatic theater of operations, fortunes were reversed. In Dalmatia, Venice won its most celebrated land victories of this war, crowned its success by taking two sandjak beys as prisoners, and for the first time after a series of defeats during previous wars (1537-1539 and 1570-1573), the Republic could claim local victory in this region, and expand its territory. Although Venetian territorial gains in this war were insignificant when compared to those of the following two wars - when all the land between the Adriatic Sea and the Dinaric mountains was re-conquered - nevertheless, for the first time, the Ottomans were stopped and even pushed back on the eastern Adriatic shore. To a lay eye, such final result of this war, the Venetian loss of the Island of Crete and limited territorial gains in Dalmatia, may seem as a very unlikely outcome. Although the Ottoman Empire had by the 17th century affirmed its position as a first class naval power in the Mediterranean, its main strength still rested on land. The series of unbroken victories against Christian powers in the course of the last two centuries preceding this war was more than impressive, giving its land forces a frightening reputation. On the other hand, even if by the mid-17th century the golden age of Venetian maritime power was long gone, the Republic was still a respectable naval power with a long tradition and experience in naval warfare. If 3/451 anywhere, it was on the sea that the Republic's best chance for challenging the Ottoman Empire was to be found. Achieving victory at sea and thus securing its possessions in the Levant seemed a more likely scenario than the denial of victory to Ottomans in Dalmatia, where the Empire could deploy its massive land forces. However, the course of events proved to be just the reverse. Through research of the Venetian military commitment in the Adriatic theater of operations during the War of Crete, this study aims to provide solid basis for the understanding of such and unlikely outcome of this war. The main theme of this study is best defined as the research of successes and failures of early-modern state administration in an "imperial republic" (supposedly in a condition of decline), in the liminal situation of war waged against a "real" empire (also supposedly in a condition of decline). The thesis is divided into three parts, each dealing with one particular context. The first chapter the "Military-Political Context," provides a sketch of the historical background, giving an overview of war events in the Dalmatian theater of operations during the War of Crete. The second chapter: "Military-Administrative Context" deals with a range of topics; in the first place with the structure and organization of the Venetian armed forces in Dalmatia, the structure of the military command, civil organs of control, and provides a general overview of the Venetian military commitment in Dalmatia. Additionally, this chapter also covers the problematic question of the integration of the Morlacchi in the Venetian defensive system in Dalmatia, and strives to provide the evaluation of the Morlacchi contribution to the overall Venetian war effort in this battlefield. The common theme that is interwoven into each of these inquires is that of military administration. Finally, the last chapter the "Logistical Context" tackles the problem of the supply of the Venetian forces in this battlefield, aiming to grasp the scale of the challenge the Republic of Venice faced in maintaining its war effort in Dalmatia, for more than two decades. |
| Supervisor | Kontler, Laszlo |
| Department | History PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2012/hphmad02.pdf |
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