CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2016
| Author | Somodi, Gergo |
|---|---|
| Title | A perlocutionary account of metaphor |
| Summary | Much has been said about metaphors in philosophy of language, but few such thought provoking and controversial papers had been written on how they “work their wonders” than Donald Davidson’s What Metaphors Mean (1978). In the last four decades many linguist, philosopher and cognitive scientist, working on an account of how we communicate by means of metaphors, started with pointing out what Davidson got wrong or right. His view that metaphor carries no special meaning or content different form the literal meaning of the expressions it is comprised of, that it is simply a tool to draw our attention to similarities, served as the starting point for many to articulate their own theory (cf. Bergmann, 1982; Rorty and Hesse, 1987; Moran, 1989; Hills, 1997; Stern, 2000; Camp, 2003; Guttenplan, 2005; Reimer and Camp, 2006; Camp, 2008; Stern, 2008; Reimer, 2008; Lepore and Stone, 2010). is thesis is no different. I think what Davidson essentially got right is emphasizing the causal effects of metaphors, i.e., that metaphors nudge us into noting similarities, to take on a new perspective on the mentioned things. He also thought—to anticipate, this will be where I disagree—that this is the ulterior aim of metaphor and the metaphorical speaker. Consequently, according to Davidson, there is no special meaning the speaker aims to convey, given that this effect can be achieved by the literal meaning of the uttered sentence, or its comprehension thereof. is is not to deny that the metaphor has a point iv or that it inspires a lot of thoughts. In his Communication and Convention, Davidson (1984, 273) links what he calls ulterior purposes of utterances to John L. Austin’s notion of perlocution (Austin, 1962); acts people perform by uttering sentences. Such an act for instance is, making the audience to undertake certain actions by asking them to do so, or to surprise them by what one is saying. Given this much, Davidson (1978) can be described as developing a perlocutionary theory of metaphor (cf. Lepore and Stone, 2010). My aim is to show that a perlocutionary theory does not have to follow Davidson’s arguments and conclusions, just roughly outlined above. After a careful examiniation of the notion of metaphorical meaning, the perspectival effect of metaphors, and the notion of perlocution and perlocutionary effects, I will argue, first, that metaphors’s effect of making us see something in a new light is indeed a perlocutionary effect. I call this the Perlocution Claim. Second, I will also point out that achieving perlocutionary effects are not necessarily the ulterior purposes of the speakers. In most cases, they are just one among the many intended effects a speaker can have in uttering something. Consequently, Davidson’s claims about the casual effects of metaphors will not support his conclusion that there is no metaphorical meaning beyond the perspectival effect of metaphors, in as much as there are examples where eliciting the metaphorical effect is not the final aim of the speaker. Examples are not hard to find, and they support the existence of metaphorical meaning contrary to Davidson. Nevertheless, recent theories of metaphorical meaning do not fit well with the Perlocution Claim. Partly, because they reject the claim as belonging to Davidsonian non-cognitivsm (cf. Stern, 2000), a label introduced to designate theories denying the existence of metaphorical meaning. Additionally, because they also consider perlocutionary effects to be final, non-linguistic, aims of utterances. e proposed theory of metaphor endorsing the Perlocution Claim relies on the v distinction between different possible realizations of perlocutionary effects. It incorporates a non-cognitivist theory for some examples of metaphors while at the same time, using the same theoretical framework, it provides an account of how metaphorical utterances have a special meaning on certain occasions. As a theory of metaphorical meaning, it is close to that developed by Elisabeth Camp (2003; 2008; 2014) on which if there is a metaphorical meaning, it is an inexplicit meaning which the hearer has to recover by way of cultivating the perspective offered in the metaphor. |
| Supervisor | Farkas, Katalin |
| Department | Philosophy PhD |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2016/somodi_gergo.pdf |
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