CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2019
| Author | Anwar, Haider Waseem |
|---|---|
| Title | Securitized Migration: Investigating the Puzzle of Deterring Migration Through Development Aid |
| Summary | Why do prominent donor countries opt for a policy to deter migration through development-aid, in defiance of inefficient results (increases, instead of decreasing migrations in long-run) of such a policy of aid on ‘low to middle income’ countries? The paper proposes that it is the level of securitized migration such ineffective policy towards the use of development-aid. The hypothesis explains that the high level of securitized migration leads to a policy of deterring migration and a drastic increase in dissemination of development-aid; whereas, a low level of securitized migration does not lead to a policy to deter migration and depicts a consistent pattern in dissemination of development-aid. This paper therefore, sheds light on the development-aid puzzle and elaborates on aid to sectors that deter migration. Furthermore, it illustrates why the ‘Paris school of thought’ is most suitable, compared to alternative security theories to define ‘mechanisms for determining level of securitized migration’. The paper uses these mechanisms to analyze the case study of Germany to show; that Germany had a history (narrative premise) of de-securitized migration, it observed a low level of securitized migration during the 2000’s and a high-level of securitized migration by the 2015 EU migration crisis – with a gradual shift occurring around pre and post 2013. The research uses a macro (overall ODA) and micro (ODA by sectors related to deterrence) level-analysis to support the hypothesis and bridge the empirical gap in literature. In conclusion, the research depicts a significant correlation between level of securitized migration and development-aid. |
| Supervisor | Li, Andrew Xiang |
| Department | International Relations MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2019/anwar_haider.pdf |
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