CEU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2022
| Author | Dumanli, Merve |
|---|---|
| Title | Testing Selectorate Theory in a Hybrid Regime Context: Does the Change to Presidential System Provide Greater Incentives for Public Good Provision? |
| Summary | Untangling the redistributive effects of formal political institutions in the context of hybrid regimes remains a subject that requires further investigation. It is why this study addresses the question whether the change to the presidential system provides greater incentives for public good provision compared to the parliamentary system in the context of a backsliding hybrid regime. Through testing selectorate theory in the case of Turkey, this study delves into the changes in the winning coalition structure and public-private good provision entailing the shift to the presidential system. Selectorate theory suggests that presidential systems compared to parliamentary ones have larger winning coalitions, therefore, are performing better in terms of public good provision. However, in the case of Turkey, the results of the analysis demonstrate that the shift to the presidential system downgraded the size of the winning coalition and decreased the amount of public goods provided, while private goods increased at a significant rate. These changes can be explained by the context in which the change to the presidential system has taken place. Democratic backsliding phenomena observed in the country during recent years established the ground for the change to the presidential system which was seen as a guarantee for absolute control over the state institutions. Consolidating the control over the judiciary, decreasing the power of the parliament through overutilization of ordinary and emergency decrees, and intensifying the constitutional powers of the president without effective checks and balances provide proof for arguing the presidential system has provided the ground for further authoritarianism and backsliding rather than increasing the size of the winning coalition and public good provision. |
| Supervisor | Schneider, Carsten Q. |
| Department | Political Science MA |
| Full text | https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2022/dumanli_merve.pdf |
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